Mediterranean Report #8 July 2015 Turkey after last general elections Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the country Edited By Francesca AZZARÀ MA in International Relations and Vice-CEO of Mediterranean Affairs (LUISS Guido Carli, University of Rome)
The domestic and external politics of Turkey have been hit by a tornado of changes consequently to some recent events coming from both inside and outside the country, that is the Turkish general elections and the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group.
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Mediterranean Report #8
July 2015
Turkey after last general elections Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the country
The domestic and external politics of Turkey have been hit by a tornado of changes
consequently to some recent events coming from both inside and outside the country,
that is the Turkish general elections and the nuclear agreement between Iran and the
P5+1 group.
The elections, perceived as a motion of no confidence against Erdoğan, have forced
the country to revise its policy towards the Kurds, to revive the peace process and, as
a result, modified its stance towards the war in Syria and its neighborhood as a whole.
These issues added to the foregoing rivalries between the political factions inside
Turkey, making it difficult for it to come out with a coalition Government to avoid
plunging into a straightforward situation of instability.
The recent agreement
between the P5and1 marked the
official return of the Iranian
power to – at least – the regional
stage, thus forcing Turkey to
resettle its ambiguous policy
towards a historically
competitive neighbor.
Thus, this report will try to
unveil some particular aspects of
the above-mentioned issues.
First, an interview to Daniele Santoro will explain the effects of the “Kurdish victory”
at the last general elections on the AKP’s attitude towards the Kurds, the war in Syria
and, more in general, to Iran. This first part of the report is extremely important as it
demonstrates how internal and external issues as well as human rights protection,
domestic politics and external affairs are deeply connected and determine the future of
the country as a whole and in relation to its neighborhood.
Then, a piece from Stephanie Plante will try to uncover an aspect of the last general
elections most of people failed to notice, that is the relationship between Turkey and
its “expats”. In fact, despite Turkey has been lately depicted as an immigration country
because of the refugees flow from the Syrian border, it is and always be an emigration
one. Hence, the way Turkey deals with the so-called “Turkish Diaspora” is a yardstick
of the former’s democratic maturity.
Source: Wikipedia
July 2015
4 Turkey after last general elections. Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the Country
Together, these two contributions will try to provide a specific while encompassing
picture of the changes occurring inside out Turkey especially since ever the benchmark
of the recent elections.The domestic and external politics of Turkey have been hit by a
tornado of changes consequently to some recent events coming from both inside and
outside the country, that is the Turkish general elections and the nuclear agreement
between Iran and the P5+1 group.
Francesca Azzarà
Vice-CEO of Mediterranean Affairs
July 2015
5 Interview with Daniele Santoro
Interview with Daniele Santoro
By Francesca Azzarà
Can you tell us what do you think about “relative” victory of the HDP at the last general elections concerning its internal politics, which is to the peace process and to the guarantee of more rights to the Kurds? Do you think that the AKP will find an agreement with the HDP through Öcalan or, otherwise, will go to snap elections?
The 13% of shares obtained by the HDP at the last general elections marks an extraordinary result, which undoubtedly is likely to influence the “peace process” with the Kurds. In fact, we can probably explain Erdoğan’s decision to suspend the peace process in April as a way to stem the HDP’s possibility to overcome the fatidic 10% threshold and to respond to the anti-AKP electoral campaign conducted by Demirtaş. Since 5th April, the Ministry of Justice has not been replying to the demands of the Imrali Committee to visit the PKK leader Öcalan. Thus, one can claim that the HDP’s success has somehow complicated the solution process for two reasons.
First, because Demirtaş did not accept the idea of exchanging presidentialism for more autonomy to the Kurds, as negotiated by Erdoğan and Öcalan.
Second, The HDP’s access to the Parliament established, on the Kurdish side, a relationship between the civilians and the military similar to the one
before the reforms introduced by Erdoğan. In this respect, it will be interesting to see how much Öcalan and the other leaders of the PKK will influence Demirtaş’ moves. After the elections, the Union of the Kurd Communities released a public statement in which it resized the HDP’s role in the elections and owed this success to Öcalan and to his democratic project.
A few weeks ago Murat Karayılan, the PKK’s military leader, publicly criticized Demirtaş’ excessive antagonism towards the AKP and called on to change this attitude. In this context, what is sure is that the AKP lost 2 million votes to the HDP. It remains to assess the impact on the peace process of Erdoğan’s strategy to re-conquer the lost votes. A positive sign comes from the meeting of last 4th July between the Turkey’s President and the HDP Deputy Celal Doğan and the project of going back to elections on November with a 5-7% to reduce the occurrence of a “convenience vote” of the Kurds in favor to the HDP.
This possible rapprochement to the Kurds inside Turkey does not clash with the antagonism demonstrated towards the Kurds in Syria? I mean, there have been speculations about a possible military action in Syria lately aimed
July 2015
6 Turkey after last general elections. Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the Country
at impede the creation of a Kurdish state cross the Syrian border.
The relations with the Kurds deeply influence that with the PKK and the solution process and vice versa. Turkey sees the PyD as an extension of the PKK. For this reason, Erdoğan reads each success of the Syrian Kurds as a reinforcement of the PKK. For instance, the establishment of the Rojava cantons in 2014, the alliance between the U.S. and the PKK/PyD established in occasion of the ISIS’ siege of Kobani and the curd militias’ recent siege of Tel Abyad made it possible for the PKK to control more or less directly a significant portion of the Syrian territory and to become the more significant American ally there. This powerful position enabled the PKK to be advantaged in the negotiations with Turkey to lay down the arms. Thus, in this moment, Ankara cannot accept the creation of a kind of Kurdish entity in the north of Syria. As told playfully in the last few days, that would imply the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PKK that, instead, Erdoğan scheduled to dismantle in a few years because of the negotiations with Öcalan. Bearing in mind that Syria is now a confederation of terrorist organizations, it is comprehensible that Turkey is interested in establishing a lasting relationship with the Syrian Kurds. Similarly, to what the Turkish Government did with the Kurds in Iraq, Rojava is likely to become a Turkish satellite. A move like this, anyway, cannot be made without an agreement with the PKK on the arms deposition.
Furthermore, Turkey has got valid geopolitical reasons to oppose the creation of a Kurdish entity able to control the almost totality of the border with Syria, which would happen if the PyD will manage to extend its control over the area stretching from the canton of Kobani to Afrin. In such a scenario, Ankara should negotiate with the PKK the transferal of weapons to the Syrian rebels and possible military operations in Syria in accordance to the agreement between Erdoğan and the Saudi king Salman of the last 2nd March. Some factors seem to point out that Turkey is trying to develop a strategy aimed not to compromise the long-term advantages deriving from the cooperation with Syrian Kurds and, at the same time, coping with the immediate threats deriving from their territorial expansion. Considering that Turkey seems lacking of the necessary strength, especially in terms of aerial power, to create autonomously a “buffer zone” in the northern part of Syria, the war announcement probably is a bluff aimed at threatening the Syrian Kurds, on the one hand, and at reinforcing the Ankara’s negotiating position in the talks ongoing with Washington. According to the Turkish media, the Government would have
Source: Corriere della Sera
July 2015
7 Interview with Daniele Santoro
sent the HDP three requests: first, the return of Arabs and Turkmens to Tel Abyad; then, the removal of the Kurdish flag from the city and absence of any hierarchy in the local Government. Turkey sees this as a test to evaluate the seriousness of the Syrian Kurds and the feasibility any eventual form of future cooperation.
How can you explain the matching between the possible agreement with the Kurds and the ambiguous attitude towards the ISIS, as evidently in Kobani? Many claim that it is also due to the Erdoğan’s unveiled support to the latter that the AKP lost part of its Kurdish electorate.
Underestimating the importance that the fight for Kobani would have had on the public opinion, Erdoğan has undoubtedly committed a huge tactical mistake. The problem is that, as confirmed by a discussed title of Sabah, a journal of property of Erdoğan’s son in law, the Turkish President and the AKP consider the Islamic State a less dangerous actor than the Syrian Kurds. For one single reason. The Caliph is a temporary actor; the Syrian Kurds are there to stay.
Erdoğan tried to manipulate the Islamic State to accomplish mainly three objectives. First, weakening the Syrian Government and the Shiite Government of Baghdad. Second, preventing the expansion of the Syrian Kurds. The result was not exactly positive. According to the Turkish media, in May Assad and the Islamic State would have achieved an agreement for a joint offensive against the rebel positions supported by Ankara in Aleppo. The status of American infantry provided to the Kurdish soldiers generated a mechanism implying that all the territories in the north of Syria risk to go under Kurdish control. What is more, the presence of the Islamic State in Iraq, allowed Iran to reinforce the Shiite militias. In the last few months, Erdoğan has very often displayed his intention to correct his strategy. In the event that Turkey starts to play a key role in the anti-Islamic state coalition, a problem may rise: who is going to control the territories subtracted to the Caliph in the north of Syria? According to Ankara, it would be a mistake to allow the Kurdish or the Assad’s regime to take over those territories.
Still concerning the war in Syria, do not you think that it will change Turkey’s “precious loneliness” within the neighborhood? What about Israel for example? Which are the future perspectives concerning the relationship with Iran, especially after the conclusion of the agreement on the nuclear?
Source: personal author archive
July 2015
8 Turkey after last general elections. Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the Country
The factor, which Turkey used to break its regional isolation, was the threat of a possible American-Iranian nuclear agreement, which eventually occurred. That helped Turkey restore its relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Turkish Saudi and Israeli synergies in Syria are a consequence of this approach. A for Israel, the perspectives of cooperation with Turkey in the Syrian scenario were discussed on June 22nd in Rome by Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Dore Gold, General Director of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the previous months, several managers from both sides, such as the Turkish Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Bülent Arınç and the former General Director of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alon Liel, tried to draft the content of a possible normalization of relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv. It is meaningful, in this respect, the fact that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice did not ever approve the request of the tribunal in charge of the Mavi
Marmara dispute to prosecute those involved.
Furthermore, the economic and commercial relations with Israeli are going very well. In any case, it is out of question that Ankara could join a straightforward anti Iranian alliance. The same goes for the relations with Saudi Arabia and with the so-called Sunni front with Riyadh and Islamabad. Differently from Saudi Arabia and Israel, in fact, Turkey does not consider the return of Iran in the economic, financial and energetic circuits and its legitimization in the Middle East as an existential threat. Although Turkey considers Teheran its main competitor in the region, it does not want to come at odds with it and tries instead to reduce the former’s hegemony in the Siraq. Furthermore, Turkey does not want to lose the enormous economic, commercial, energetic, infrastructural pros deriving from the abolishment of sanctions and from a further deepening of the relations with Iran.
July 2015
9 Turkish diaspora and out of country voting
Turkish diaspora and out of country voting
By Stéphanie Plante
In the end, Turkey’s first foray into OCV proved underwhelming. On August 4, 2014, Deputy
Prime Minister Emrullah Isle announced that worldwide, only 232,000 overseas voters cast a ballot,
giving the OCV electorate a turnout rate of 8.5%. So while Turks abroad were galvanized by the
election, their participation levels did not match expectations.
The contribution hereby presented was initially aimed at reporting on the results of
Turkish general elections and the perspectives ahead. Nonetheless, the issue of
Turkey’s domestic and international politics has evidently caught the interest of many
contributors and followers of Mediterranean Affairs. Thus, we decided to create
something quite similar to a mini-dossier. We did not use an academic approach.
Instead, we preferred to adopt a more flexible and variegated approach to attract the
attention of those who are interested in improving his knowledge of Turkish affairs.
Following to the last elections, the Kurdish issue has gained unprecedented
centrality and the ISIS has approached Erdoğan’s border. Thus, in this context it is very
important to understand properly Turkey’s domestic politics and forecast the future of
the relations between the AKP and the HDP1. The Turkish diaspora adds to and is
closely linked to the Kurdish issue.
Apparently, Turkey’s
international affairs are much
differentiated, and at first may
appear ambiguous. Actually, the
AKP’s external affairs are based
on realpolitik and aimed at
establishing long-term relations2.
In this contribution, we
provided two significant
examples of Turkey’s foreign
affairs, concerning the
relationships with Israel and Iran.
1 1 Which it is definitely a "Kurdish party" but that represents a part of the Kurds which is a world very fragmented and hard to understand in their own internal dynamics. For an overview of the complex are the relations between the various Kurdish political factions, see M. Ciola, Why arming Peshmerga Is not so useful, and maybe it will be dangerous, Mediterranean Affairs, October 17, 2014, Cfr. http://www.mediterraneanaffairs.com/en/events/why-arming-peshmerga-is-not-so-useful-and-maybe-it-will-be-dangerous.html. 2 Although, as always in politics, the attempt to build up alliances may increase instability. An example of this kind of attitude is the Syrian case.
14 Turkey after last general elections. Domestic and external factors influencing the future of the Country
As for the latter, the conclusion of the well-known nuclear agreement resulted in
new opportunities and challenges for Turkey. According to the latest declarations, the
AKP is willing to invest in Iran and is committed to proposing itself again as an
energetic hub for Iranian strategic primary resources. In fact, that which would benefit
from further stability on the Turkish territory than on other Middle Eastern neighbors.
The renovated economic relations with Teheran will benefit Turkey’s economic
growth, which is one of the pillars of
the AKP’s program. On the other
side of the coin, there is another
factor influencing Erdoğan’s moves
towards Iran that is Neo-
Ottomanism. The abolition of
sanctions on Iran have paved the
way for its rise as regional power,
which Turkey aspires to be too. In
the past, the Ankara-Teheran axis
revealed fundamental for regional
stability and prosperity – especially on Ahmadinejad’s first mandate as President. Now
things have changed. First, because Neo-Ottomanism implies the strengthening of
relations with Sunni states. Consequently, in the Middle East Erdoğan prefers dealing
with Sunni Presidents than with laic ones like.At the same time, he prefers the latter
than the Shiites like Rouhani because of the contradiction that such a thing would
generate both in domestic and external politics.
A similar framework can be applied concerning the relationship with Israel. While
on the one side Erdoğan has been often condemning Israel’s crimes against humanity,
on the other he welcomes a partnership with the country at stake to stem the
affirmation of the Iranian and Shiite power in the region. The diplomatic relations
between Ankara and Tel Aviv have been recently challenged by the discovery of gas
fields off the costs of Cyprus. The problem is that Ankara claims the sovereignty on
the country and on the gas field that Tel Aviv wants to protect by means of, for
instance, the renovation of bilateral military agreements with Greece.
In conclusion, it is clear that Turkey, despite being one of the most stable countries
in the region, is very complex to study in terms of domestic and external politics. This
mini dossier is not aimed at clarifying all these issues, but just a little specific area of a
sea that we wish the reader to explore further.
Marcello Ciola
Vice CEO of Mediterranean Affairs
Source: Payvand
July 2015
15 Authors
Authors
Daniele Santoro, Master’s degree in International Relations at LUISS Guido Carli. He lives in Istanbul and collaborates with “Limes – Rivista Italiana di geopolitica”.
Stephanie Plante, MA at the University of Windsor and ProDoc in Public Administration at the University of Lausanne. She is research assistant at “FN Digital Democracy” and has been involved in elections in various capacities since 2005