Repairing the Fire Damaged Notre Dame Bridge

8/18/2019 Repairing the Fire Damaged Notre Dame Bridge

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REPAIRING THE FIRE DAMAGED NOTRE DAME BRIDGE

Thomas A. French, P.E.†

† MSCE; Senior Structural Engineer; Hoyle, Tanner & Associates Inc.;

150 Dow Street, Manchester, NH 03101; [email protected] (603) 669-5555; Fax (603) 669-4168

KEYWORDSBridge Repairs, Fire Damage, Disaster Management, Bridge Retrofit, FireProtection, Material Testing

BACKGROUND

On April 12, 2003 at approximately 4:00 pm EST a fire ignited underneath animportant bridge in the City of Manchester, New Hampshire. In the year and a half

since the fire, the investigation into fire has determined the official cause as arson.Although the fire was intentionally set and caused major interruptions to traffic,telephone lines, and some city fire department communications there is no evidencethat this was an act of terrorism. Since the terrorist attacks on our country, greatemphasis has been placed on protecting our infrastructure. Although there areemergency plans in place and we take great precautions to prevent additional threats,disasters (natural and man-made) are still going to occur.

Fire investigators determined that unidentified juveniles set a fire among thebelongings of a homeless couple that called the Notre Dame Bridge home. The firewas started in a makeshift apartment constructed of wood pallets, plywood, carpeting,and mattresses. The unfortunate thing for bridge owner Manchester Department of

Fig 1. Fire Crews Fight the Utility Duct Fire

right ASCE 2 4 Structu

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Public Works, was that this “apartment” had been constructed against the westernmost concrete abutment and extended from the rip-rap lined ground slope up to theunderside of the bridge’s steel girder superstructure. Supported just inside the fasciagirder was a utility duct bank carrying telephone lines, cable television lines, and FireDepartment communication lines. This utility duct bank was constructed from twenty

fiber reinforced plastic (FRP) conduits.

Once ignited, the fire spread quickly through the shelter and did not take long toimpinge on the FRP conduits. Within minutes, the fire had created enough heat,smoke, and flame that the conduits themselves caught fire. These conduits had notbeen constructed of the self-extinguishing materials that are commonly used today.

THE NOTRE DAME BRIDGE

The Eastbound Notre Dame Bridge is one of two bridges that carry Bridge Street overNew Hampshire’s Central Turnpike, the Merrimack River, several parking lots, local

city streets and a railroad line. This bridge is an eleven-span, 470-meter (1544-foot)long bridge with a concrete deck supported on steel girders. The bridge carries twolanes of eastbound traffic and a single sidewalk along its southern side. The mainbridge spans are each approximately 47 meters (155 feet) long.

A consulting engineering firm designed the bridge in 1985 and construction wascompleted under the direction of the New Hampshire Department of Transportation(NHDOT) in 1988. Although the original design plans show provisions for the utilityduct bank, New England Telephone and Telegraph Company constructed it separatelythrough the provisions of a utility installation permit dated April 18, 1991.

Fig 2. A View of the 11-span Notre Dame Bridge.


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The bridge deck is a 200 mm (8”) thick Portland Cement Concrete (PCC) slab withepoxy coated AASHTO M31 (ASTM A615) GR 60 main reinforcing steel bars thatrun perpendicular to traffic. The deck is supported on five steel girders made ofAASHTO M222 (ASTM A588) GR 50 painted steel. The girders are all welded plategirders with 1524 mm (60-inch) deep, 14 mm (9/16-inch) thick web plates. The web

plates are stiffened by steel connection plates that are welded to both flanges as wellas along the entire height of the web. The connection plates have spaces raging from6 meters (20 feet) to 7 meters (23 feet). Near the girder bearing points additional webstiffening is provided by transverse stiffener plates also welded to the web andflanges with a 2-meter (6-foot) spacing.

The utility duct bank is located between girders four and five directly beneath theconcrete sidewalk. The ducts are supported at 2.3-meter (7’-6”) intervals by steelwide-flange beams welded to the girder webs with 200 mm (8”) high steel plates.

THE DISASTER

The fire started at approximately 4:00 pm EST and was immediately reported to theManchester City Fire Department by a passing motorist as a brush fire under theNotre Dame Bridge. When the first fire engine arrived approximately ten minuteslater, they quickly discovered that it was not a brush fire, but much more. The firehad started among the belongings of a homeless couple that resided under the bridge.Quickly the fire spread to the utility duct banks that carried telephone, cable TV andfire department communication lines along the bridge. Bt the time the FireDepartment was able to begin to fight the fire it had already burned the first two spansof the bridge. It moved quickly beyond the second pier out over the MerrimackRiver. The rapid river water kept the fire department from mounting a successfulattack from the western bank and the fire grew toward the third pier. By 4:30 the firebetween the western abutment and pier no. 2 had been extinguished, but the fire overthe river was out of reach and burned uncontrolled.

As soon as the Fire Department arrived on scene they mobilized State Police Officersto close the interstate and City Police Officers to close Bridge Street. During rushhour on a Friday afternoon, the Central turnpike was full and the fire snarled trafficfor hours. The NH State Police and the NHDOT closed the turnpike and set up aneight-km (five-mile) detour by 5:00 to reroute the nearly 12,000 vehicles per hour thatpass under the bridge.

The Fire Department set up crews on the eastern bank of the river and waited for thefire to progress along the bridge until they could reach it with their water streams. By5:00 the fire had reached the eastern side of the river and fire crews were able toextinguish it. In about an hour the fire had burned along nearly 180 meters (600 feet)of the bridge. Because the utility duct banks were located between the fourth andfifth girders, the fire was contained to that bay of the bridge.


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THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

At the moment the fire started, the president of the telephone company that nowowned the duct banks happened to be at City Hall. It did not take long for thepresident to start receiving notice of service interruptions of customers west of the

bridge. The telephone lines that had burned provided communication service to over10,000 customers. As soon as the fire started to consume the duct bank, all thosecustomers lostservice.

By 5:30 pm the Emergency Management Director had been contacted and he madethe decision to open the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). This decision wasmade, not only due to the damage to the bridge, but because of the loss ofcommunications west of the river. This loss of communications meant that all theaffected customers could not dial 911 in the event another emergency arose. By 6:00the EOC was fully staffed by the chief of police, chief of fire, the health and trafficdepartment directors, superintendent of schools, chairman of the Board of Mayor and

Aldermen, and the Mayor.

Each EOC staff member was briefed on the incident and they quickly made decisions.The telephone company president was brought into the meeting and offered to assistin any way they could. By early evening the telephone company had strategicallydistributed over 120 cell phones to emergency phone stations that were established onthe “west side”. Over 2,450 meters (8,000 feet) of replacement cable was orderedand delivered from Massachusetts and New York. The EOC remained operationalthroughout the night. It was decided that temporary telephone service must beestablished. By Saturday morning splice crews began to reestablish thecommunication link across the river. Telephone crews worked around the clockthrough the weekend and by Monday, over 2.5 km (1.5 miles) of temporary cable hadbeen installed and over 100,000 splices were made.

Shortly after the start of the fire, the Manchester Public Works Highway Departmentwas contacted and arrived at the bridge site. Because the fire was spreading quicklythe Director of Public Works immediately contacted the City’s Bridge Engineer,Hoyle, Tanner and Associates, Inc. (HTA), to bring plans to the bridge so that theFire Department could determine what utilities were in the burning duct banks. Theplans were delivered to the Fire Chief by 4:20 pm and he was able to determine that itwas safe for the firefighters to extinguish the fire with water.

Once the fire was brought under control and the fire debris was being cleaned up, theHighway Department set to work to decide if the bridge could be reopened to traffic.The HTA bridge engineers worked off Fire Department ladders and made a briefinspection of the fire damaged area. Since the fire was isolated to only the bay thatcontained the duct banks, the associated damage was limited to that area. The baythat was involved with the fire is located under the sidewalk and there was no damageto areas that are subjected to vehicular traffic. The brief structural inspection wascompleted and the damage was revealed to be limited to the concrete deck and the


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steel girders. The underside of the concrete deck had spalled and exposed some ofthe reinforcing steel. The paint system on the girders had completely failed and bothof the girders near the fire showed signs of warping. The steel warping was isolatedto the web plates and appeared to be present between the transverse stiffeners andconnection plates. After the brief inspection it was determined that the bridge could

be reopened, but traffic restrictions were instituted until a more detailed analysiscould be performed. By 8:00 pm, one traffic lane on the bridge was reopened andtraffic on the Central Turnpike was reestablished.

POST DISASTER EVALUATION

Over the weekend following the fire, HTA personnel arranged for the use of theNHDOT articulated bridge inspection bucket truck and staff. Personnel also studiedand reviewed bridge construction drawings to determine appropriate assessmenttechniques and to identify key areas susceptible to fire damage and diminished loadcarrying capacity.

Field Investigations

On Monday, April 15, representatives from HTA performed a close-up and detailedfield investigation of the fire damaged portions of the bridge.

During this investigation HTAperformed detailed inspections of theunderside of the concrete deck, thestructural steel, the utility supports andconduits, the paint system, the bridgeshoes, the expansion joints, and thebridge substructure near the fire area.The findings are presented in the FireAssessment section of this paper.

Based on our original investigation andpublished reports about fire damage toconcrete and steel, we determined thatit was necessary to perform destructivetesting of the affected structural steel

girders. Existing research on fire-damaged steel indicates that if structural steel doesnot exceed 650 °C (1200 °F), it is unlikely that any metallurgical changes will occur.By inspecting the telephone lines that were inside the FRP conduits we found that inmany places the copper had fused together. Published literature indicates that themelting temperature of copper is 1084 °C (1984 °F). Since the copper had melted inmany places we felt that it was likely that fire temperatures near the steel may haveexceeded the 650 °C (1200 °F) threshold. Therefore we felt that it was prudent toremove steel samples for a metallurgical assessment. A structural analysisdetermined that the removal of samples would not affect the load carrying capacity ofthe girders as long as they were taken from strategically located low stress and low

Fig 3. Utility Bay Damaged By Fire


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fatigue sites in the girder webs. Therefore,with the assistance of a metallurgist, HTAdeveloped a steel removal plan.

On Monday April 29, HTA hired a

subcontractor to perform the work ofremoving steel samples from the webs ofthe steel girders. During this removal,temperatures were closely monitored toensure that the steel samples neverexceeded 93 °C (200 °F). The sampleswere removed by using a plasma cutterfollowing a smooth steel template. Thesamples were 100 mm X 200 mm (4” by8”) ovals with 50 mm (2”) minimum radii.

After the samples were removed, cut surfaces were ground smooth by a handheldportable grinder.

Based on the assumption that the bridge would be reopened to traffic when themetallurgical assessment was complete and that it would be several months before thefinal repairs were completed, it was decided to place steel plates over the removalareas. This decision was made for three reasons; 1) If traffic was placed on the

girders, the plates will arrest any fatigue problems that might develop. 2) The publiccan see the holes since some of the samples were taken from an exterior girder.Although the holes do not reduce the capacity of the girders, as a matter of publicperception it was best to cover them. 3) The plates that were installed could beutilized as a final patch of the holes; however, they were installed in such a mannerthat they could be removed if necessary during final repairs with no detrimentaleffects to the bridge.

Fig 5. Steel Sample Removal Fig 6. Surface Preparation

Fig 4. Sample of Melted CopperTelephone Cable


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On Tuesday, April 30, the same subcontractor was hired to install the plates over theremoval areas. The plates were cut from steel having the same properties as the steeloriginally used to construct the girders. These oval plates measured 150 mm X 300mm (6” by 12”) and were welded in place with continuous 8 mm (5 / 16”) fillet weldsaround the entire circumference.

Fire Assessment

As mentioned in the previous section, an assessment was performed on the concretedeck, the structural steel, the paint system, utilities, deck joints, bridge shoes, and thesubstructure. This section provides a brief description of each, along withrecommended repairs where needed.

Concrete deck

The underside of the concrete deck

below the sidewalk was spalled. Theextent of spalling varied along thelength of the bridge from minor (10%– 15% of surface area spalled) tosevere (80% surface area spalled). Ingeneral, approximately 19 mm to 38mm (¾” to 1½”) of concrete hadspalled off the underside of theconcrete deck. There are somelocations (approximately 10 – 15locations) where spalled concrete hadexposed primary reinforcing steel inthe deck. The exposed reinforcingsteel was generally in good conditionand did not show any signs of damage.

The spalled and unspalled areas of concrete were sounded by hammer and determinedto be in good condition. It was determined that all spalled areas of concrete and areasof exposed reinforcing steel could be repaired as apposed to performing a completedeck replacement. The repair included saw cutting around the damaged areas,removing deteriorated concrete, sandblasting the underside of the deck (to removesoot and other thin areas of damaged concrete), placement of epoxy coating overexposed reinforcing steel, and patching the concrete with an anchored concrete mortarpatch material.

Based on our findings, we informed the owner that vibrations from vehicular trafficcould potentially cause any remaining loose concrete on the underside of the deck tofall from the bridge onto the turnpike. Although we sounded the deck with ahammer, we did so randomly. In light of this potential, we recommended that the

Fig 7. Spalled Concrete with ExposedReinforcing


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For comparison purposes, observations and measurements were made of girdersnumber 1 and 3. Neither of these girders showed any visible signs of fire damage.There were no observable or measurable distortions of girder number 1 and 3 webs orflanges.

As mentioned in the field investigation section, based on our research, experience,and prudent engineering judgment, we deemed it necessary to determine if the firehad caused any metallurgical changes in the structural steel. Based on our

observations of the fire extinguishingefforts, we felt that the fire might haveaffected the steel in two differentways. Portions of the steel wereheated and then cooled rapidly by thefire department water. Other areas ofthe steel were heated (possible evenhotter than the areas extinguished by

the fire department) and then cooledmore slowly. Both of these heataffects can cause changes in the steelmetallurgy. Due to concerns that thestrength and ductility of the steel mayhave been compromised we removedand tested several steel samples.

Since our visible observations showed the girder webs to have the only noticeable firedamage, steel samples were obtained from these areas for assessment. Samples wereremoved from areas deemed to have received the greatest heat as well as from areasdeemed to have received the quickest cooling. Samples were delivered to NHMaterials Testing Laboratory, Inc. for analysis. Laboratory findings are summarizedin Table 1.

During our inspection of the structural steel, we made assessments of verticalconnection plates, intermediate stiffeners, and the field bolted connections. We foundno evidence of distortion or damage to any of these components.

Steel diaphragms, which are made up of angles and channels run transverselybetween girders number 4 and 5. In addition, utility support beams, which consist ofsmall channels, also are located in the fire-damaged bay. No noticeable ormeasurable damage or distortion was observed or measured in the diaphragms orutility support beams.

Although it was our intent to find, measure, and document the greatest deformationsin the girders, it was possible that there were some areas that had deflections slightlygreater than allowable tolerances. In order to account for this, the constructioncontract for repairs included provisions to perform a full survey of the girders andheat straighten any areas that were found to be outside the allowable flatness

Fig 9. Fire Extinguishing Efforts


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tolerances. Also, during final repairs, the areas that samples were taken from had thetemporary plates removed. The holes then had a plate inserted into the web and a fullpenetration groove weld was used. During construction, the complete detailedinspection of the webs was performed and there were no areas found to be outside theallowable flatness tolerances. The heat-straightening portion of the construction

contract was subsequently removed.

Table 1 – Steel Sample Summary i

# Location ConditionsYieldMPa(ksi)

TensileMPa(ksi)

Elongationin 50 mm(2”) (%)

1 Girder #5, Span 425’-3” East of Pier 3

Fascia Girder – estimatedhottest point of the fire(steel turned bluish color)

360(52.2)

527(76.5)

33.7%

2 Girder #4, Span 4 8’-

10” East of Pier 3

Interior Girder –

estimated hottest point ofthe fire

383

(55.5)

521

(75.6) 35.2%

3 Girder #5, Span 326’-9” East of Pier 2

Fascia Girder – largestmeasured webdeflections, possiblyquenched by fire dept.

392(56.9)

569(82.5)

31.8%

4 Girder #4, Span 3,55’-6” East of Pier 2

Interior Girder – largestmeasured webdeflections, possiblyquenched by fire dept.(steel turned bluish color)

387(56.2)

563(81.7)

33.2%

5 Girder #5, Span 216’-9” East of Pier 1 Fascia Girder – verylikely quenched by firedept.

345(50.1)

496(72.0)

36.4%

Based on our visual observations and the metallurgical assessment, we determinedthatthe only effect the fire had on the structural steel was to cause deformations in theweb steel plates. As shown in Table 1, the steel that was sampled and tested still metthe requirements of AASHTO M222 (ASTM A588) for the structural steel used whenconstructing this bridge.

Paint System

The paint system in the area of the fire was severely damaged. Paint systems can failat temperatures much lower than was obtained during this fire. The paint on theaffected girders (Nos. 4 & 5) failed in two ways. On the sides towards the fire much

i The minimum tensile requirements for AASHTO M222 (ASTM A588) GR 50 Steel are:Yield = 345 MPa (50 ksi), Tensile = 485 MPa (70 ksi), Elongation in 50 mm (2”) = 21%


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Fig 10. Paint Rolls in Flanges

of the paint was consumed. This wasevident by the mottled markings thatwere left on the steel.On the sides away from the fire, thesteel reached temperatures that were

high enough to cause the paint todebond from the steel. This is evidentby the large rolls of paint thataccumulated along the top of thebottom flanges.

In various locations there is evidencethat the primer coats have failed aswell. Our recommendation to repairthe paint system was to clean the steelin accordance with SSPC-SP 10, Near-

White Blast Cleaning and then applyan approved paint system.

Utilities

Ducts for the utilities and the structuralsupport system for the utility ductswere damaged beyond repair by thefire. Damage consists of totaldestruction and disintegration of thetwenty (20) FRP ducts that housedutility cables as well as the steel andfiberglass support system (bolts,miscellaneous tubes, plates andwashers) that held the ducts in place.The ducts and the support system weretotally removed and replaced.

Deck Joints

Deck expansion joints are located in several places along this bridge. Only one ofthese locations, over pier 1, was subjected to the fire. The deck joints allowexpansion through the use a modular strip seal expansion joint. This type of joint iscomprised of steel and rubber elements. Although the rubber elements were locateddirectly above the fire area, there did not appear to be any permanent damage to thisbridge joint. The rubber in the joints still appear to be soft and pliable and shouldcontinue to work as they were designed to do. The deck joints did not require anyrepairs.

Fig 11. Destruction of Utility Conduits


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Bridge Shoes and Substructure

There was no damage to thesubstructure or any of the bridge shoesthat were near the fire. While the fire

was burning, some of the liquid plastic(from the utility ducts) dripped ontothe concrete piers and splashed ontosome of the bridge shoes. The bridgeshoes and concrete pier caps weresimply cleaned of the debris and nofurther repairs were required.

REPAIRS AND RETROFITTING

In the 18 months following the fire, the City undertook an aggressive design andconstruction schedule to return the bridge back to its pre-fire condition. The City’sbridge engineer, HTA, prepared all the necessary construction plans, specifications,and contracts in order to offer the repair contract to a competitive bid process. Theproject was advertised, bid on, and the construction contract was executed by October4, 2002.

Prior to the beginning of construction, the telephone company hired an independentcontractor to remove and dispose of all the remnants of the conduit and cables thathad once been within them.

The repair contract included the construction of a temporary containment structurethat surrounded the entire fire damaged area. This structure was used to keep thework area heated, contain the debris from concrete removal, and as a containment tokeep the painting from effecting the traveling public or the environment. Once thecontainment was erected, the design engineer and the contractor inspected the entireunderside of the concrete deck and mapped out all the areas for concrete removal.The concrete was removed, the deck was sand blasted, an epoxy coated welded wirefabric was anchored to the bottom of the deck, a corrosion inhibitor was applied, andthe concrete patching was completed using SIKA MonoTop 611.

All of the structural steel within the fire-damaged area was sand blasted to an SSPC-10, Near-White Blast Cleaning and a three-coat paint system was reapplied. Eventhough this bridge was only fourteen years old, test samples of the existing paintsystem showed levels of lead and other heavy metals that exceed EPA regulations,therefore a lead abatement program was developed and adhered to during therepainting process.

Fig 12. Typical Debris on Top of Pier


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In order to prevent such a disaster from reoccurring, the City required the phonecompany to install steel conduits between the abutment and the first pier. Theremainder of the conduit was replaced with Fiberglass Reinforced Epoxy conduit.This conduit is self-extinguishing and exceeds the fire resistance requirements of U.L.651 – Section 17. As an added precaution, the City had the contractor install chain

link fencing around the abutment so that access can be controlled through a lockedgate.

The construction project has been completed and the total cost was as follows:

• Engineering - $ 55,700

• Construction - $ 918,100

• Const. Admin - $ 40,000

• Utility Replacement - $1,250,000 est.Total Project Cost: $2,263,800

LESSONS LEARNED

After this disastrous fire the City realized just how vulnerable their infrastructuresystem was. Like many cities across the nation, the City of Manchester hasundergone a change in the way they look at their vulnerabilities. They haveundertaken an effort to better understand their safety shortcomings. To that end theyhave performed an assessment of their thirty-one bridges. This assessment focusedon areas such as the ones that existed on the Notre Dame Bridge that contributed tothe devastation that the arson fire had. Each bridge site was examined for undesirableaccessibility to critical areas, potential fire hazards such as deficient utility conduits,and other areas that could create a potential for damage by vandalism.

Now that the assessment is completed the City is performing repairs on many of theirdeficient bridges. On many bridges they are installing additional safety fencing andsecuring bridge abutments and piers with locked gates. The City Police force hasincreased their patrols of areas that are frequented by homeless people and arevigilant for the construction of make shift shelters. On the few major bridges thatcontinue to carry utility conduits similar to the ones that were once on the NotreDame Bridge, the City is installing steel blast plates and insulation to prevent flameand heat impingement from accessing the conduits.

CONCLUSIONS

Although the fire turned out to be a very costly lesson for the City of Manchester, theresults could have been much worse. It has been seen around the country, that majorhydrocarbon fires that occur under bridges have catastrophic results where entirestructures are lost and must be completely reconstructed. This fire, although muchsmaller in scale than a fuel truck fire, had initial indications that it might requiremajor reconstruction of the bridge. Although the fire burned hot enough to meltcopper and warp the steel web plates, the air currents caused by the fire itself and theheat radiating ability of the large web plates prevented the steel from undergoing any


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metallurgical changes. The temperature of the fire was great enough to increase porepressures in the concrete exceeding the concrete tensile strengths and spalling theconcrete along the lower mat of reinforcing. However, the fire did not affect thestrength of the remaining concrete and had no effect on the steel reinforcing.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Bridge owners should take a serious look at the vulnerabilities of their infrastructuresystem. Even if never faced with a potential terrorist threat, man-made disasters canstill occur. Their assessments should include an assessment of potential fire hazards,potential vandalism, utility hazards and any other thing that could cause majordamage to a vulnerable bridge.

REFERENCES

Abrams, Melvin S. (1977). “Performance of Concrete Structures Exposed to Fire”,

Portland Cement Association, Skokie, Illinois.

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, (2000).“Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges, Sixteenth Edition, 1996 as Amendedby the 2000 Interim Revisions”, Washington, DC.

American Institute of Steel Construction, (1989). “Manual of Steel Construction –Allowable Stress Design, Ninth Edition”, Chicago, Illinois.

American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association, (1999).“AREMA Manual for Railway Engineering – Section 8.6 Guidelines for EvaluatingFire Damaged Steel Railway Bridges”, Chicago, Illinois.

American Welding Society, (1996). “ANSI/AASHTO/AWS D1.5-96, 1996 BridgeWelding Code”, Miami, Florida.

Babrauskas, Dr. Vytenis. “Temperatures in Flames and Fires”, Fire Science andTechnology, Inc., http://www.doctorfire.com/flametmp.html (April 22, 2002).

Corus Publication. “The Reinstatement of Fire Damaged Steel and Iron FramedStructures”, http://www.corusconstruction.com/fire/fr014.htm (April 25, 2002).

Dexter, Robert J. and Le-Wu Lu, (2001) “The Effects of a Severe Fire on the SteelFrame of an Office Building”, Engineering Journal, Fourth Quarter, 2001.

Dill, Fritz H. “Structural Steel After Fire”, American Bridge Division, U.S. SteelCorp., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Franssen, Jean-Marc and Venkatesh Kodur, “Residual Load Bearing Capacity ofStructures Exposed to Fire”, Liege, Belgium


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French, Thomas A. (2002), “Final Fire Damage Assessment report of the NotreDame Bridge”, Hoyle, Tanner & Associates, Inc., Manchester, New Hampshire.

National Codes and Standards Council of the Concrete and Masonry Industry, (1994).

“Assessing the Condition and Repair Alternatives of Fire-Exposed Concrete andMasonry Members”, Skokie, Illinois.

New Hampshire Department of Transportation, (1999). “Bridge Design Manual”,Concord, New Hampshire

New Hampshire Department of Transportation, (1998). “Construction Manual”,Concord, New Hampshire.

Tide, R. H. R., (1998). “Integrity of Structural Steel After Exposure to Fire”,Engineering Journal, First Quarter, 1998.

Van Vlack, Lawrence H. (1989). “Elements of Material Science and Engineering –Sixth Edition”, Addison – Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, Massachusetts.

Repairing the Fire Damaged Notre Dame Bridge

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