Remembering and Forgetting in Istanbul: Individual, Memory, and Belongingness

This article was downloaded by: [Marmara Universitesi]On: 19 December 2014, At: 05:38Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

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Book reviewsAli Murat Yel a , Cengiz Sürücü b , Mim KemalÖke c , Murat Cemrek d , Bedri Gencer e ,Yilmaz Bingöl b & Gökhan Bacik fa Fatih University , Istanbulb Indiana University , Bloomingtonc Bosphorus University , Istanbuld Bilkent University , Ankarae Istanbul Universityf Middle East Technical University , AnkaraPublished online: 18 Apr 2007.

To cite this article: Ali Murat Yel , Cengiz Sürücü , Mim Kemal Öke , MuratCemrek , Bedri Gencer , Yilmaz Bingöl & Gökhan Bacik (2000) Book reviews,Turkish Studies, 1:1, 206-220, DOI: 10.1080/14683840008721228

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Book Reviews

Turkey Unveiled: Ataturk and After by Nicole and Hugh Pope (London: John Murray,1997). Pp. xviii + 373. $27.99 (paper). ISBN 0-7195-5653-8.

In Turkey Unveiled: Ataturk and After journalists Nicole and Hugh Pope haveproduced, to paraphrase reviewer Peter Hopkirk, a source for anyone who wishes tounderstand the Turkish people and their modern history. The result of years spentliving and reporting on Turkey (Nicole for Le Monde and Hugh for the Independent,The Los Angeles Times, the BBC, and Reuters), the Popes' book, written for non-Turks, combines academic research (the authors draw on more than 100 sources) andjournalistic prose to produce a nostalgic effect; reading the book is like listening to anold grandparent share personal stories about life in the Republican era.

The title and subtitle of the book reveal a thinking parallel with headlinespublished some 65 years ago in the Istanbul daily Cumhuriyet: "Pecesini atan Tiirkiye"(Turkey Throws Away its Veil). The article states: "Ataturk is a half-idol; he is fatherof the Turks. For no other heads of state were carved so many of their own statueswhile they were alive. Neither Mussolini nor Hitler nor even Lenin's statues could becompared with his" {Cumhuriyet, August 5, 1935).

Indeed, the Popes have accurately tied Turkey's twentieth-century history to thefigure of Ataturk, whose name and likeness are still carried by street names,airports, and important buildings such as concert halls, conference centers, andtheaters. The title of the Cumhuriyet item, which covered a ceremony unveiling astatue of Ataturk in a small town in Anatolia, is symbolic since the unveiling of thestatue does unveil the history of Turkey, which could be written or read as thehistory of Ataturk. Some 60 years after his death, the father of the Turkish Republicstill looms large.

Although the Popes are foreigners (Nicole is Swiss, Hugh is British), the book issurprisingly "native," describing national issues such as the compulsory "donations"that parents registering their children in state schools must make. Because they bothspeak Turkish, the authors were able to interview almost all of the country's leadingpoliticians. However, this advantage turns out to be a limitation as the bookconcentrates on high politics. The book contains useful information on politicalparties, elections, governments, and military coups, but few personal opinions orinterpretations of ordinary citizens, apart from some female Islamists, Kurds, soldierswho fought in the southeastern Turkey, and taxi drivers. One sometimes feels that thebook relates bar-table talks with members of the elite.

Turkey Unveiled is divided into 18 chronological chapters. The introductorychapter describes the ancient history of the Turks, the second chapter discusses theOttoman empire, and the third addresses the Armenian massacre and Greek minorityproblem. Chapter four - entitled "Immortal Leader" - is entirely devoted to MustafaKemal Ataturk: his personality, marriage, and political qualities. The subsequentchapter takes up the era of ismet inonu, Turkey's second president, and the eventsfollowing the Second World War. The chapter analyses Inonii's (so-called) success inavoiding the war, and how the country entered an economic crisis afterwards.

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Subsequent chapters take readers through the Turkish Republic's history coveringimportant figures such as prime minister Adnan Menderes, who was executed inTurkey's 1960 military coup, and Turgut Ozal, whom the authors consider the secondmost influential political leader in Turkish history, after Ataturk. Issues discussedinclude the 1974 Cyprus war, the September 1980 military coup, and the Kurdishquestion. The authors also evaluate Turkey's foreign policy and relations with Greece,the European Union (EU), and the republics of the former Soviet Union.

Among the important issues raised in these chapters is the fragile state of Turkishdemocracy. The execution of Menderes, which the authors blame on elements within theprevailing bureaucracy, shows how little the support of the Turkish electorate means inTurkish politics. Another interesting conclusion is the authors' claim that Kurds whohave been forced to migrate to bigger cities have become more radical about maintainingtheir distinct identities. The Popes are also pessimistic about Turkey's integration into theEuropean Union, as indicated by the title they chose for the chapter on Turkish-EUrelations, "A Bridge Too Far." They write: "Even if Turkey might one day become aneconomic Cindrella and a dream partner for European businesses, the Europeanestablishment reacted as if one of the ugly sisters had asked the prince for a dance."

Although the authors are objective in their evaluation of Greece-Turkey hostilities,their impartiality regarding the 1980 military coup is dubious. They rely mainly on thememoirs of coup leader turned dictator General Kenan Evren, hardly a credible sourcefor a reasonable and acceptable analysis of a coup. Other parts of the book lack properhistorical and political analysis largely because many of the experiences the authorsrelate come directly from newspaper articles or "formal" state teachings that are underserious debate among Turkish intellectuals from both the right and the left.

Perhaps the greatest value of the book lies in its attempt to clarify misconceptionsabout Turkey and improve its image abroad. Yet, the picture on the cover portraysTurkey as an underdeveloped country. Another weak point of the book is its approachto Ottoman history. It is difficult to understand why the book would include severalchapters on the history of Turks from the time of their origin in Central Asia, given thatthe subtitle of the book is "Ataturk and After." The same criticism applies to chapterthree, which deals with the Armenian massacres that occurred between 1890 and 1908.The chapter is entitled "Turkey for Turks" yet most Turks strongly believe that theAtaturk era began with the proclamation of the Republic in 1923.

Turkey Unveiled is appropriate for a general audience that is interested in learningabout or visiting Turkey, and perhaps can be used as an introductory text in a universitycourse on Turkey. It is not, however, a scholarly book in the tradition of BernardLewis's The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Erik Ziircher's Turkey: A Modern History,and Feroz Ahmed's The Making of Modern Turkey, nor does it claim to be. The Popesdo not provide footnotes most of the time, even when quoting sources verbatim, andthey make more than one spelling mistake when using Turkish words and expressions,such as Maras, Hasan Saka, Fahri Koruriirk, and Zahid Kotku. In general, however, thebook is an accurate and up-to-date account of modern Turkey with valuable personalobservations and interviews with both politicians and intellectuals. It can serve toenlighten public opinion in a country that suffers from too much misinformation.

ALI MURAT YELFatih University, Istanbul

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Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and The Middle East, edited byC.L. Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Pp. 337. $55.00 (cloth);$19.50 (paper). ISBN 0231-1103042; 0231-1103050.

As Bilkent University professor Halil Inalcik reminds us in this volume, the conceptof legacy is a mediator between the present and the past. It is impossible to detachhistory from the present, but it is possible to do it justice by depicting a path-dependent, time-and-space sensitive picture of the past. Carl Brown's book, ImperialLegacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, presents acomprehensive, elaborate, and precise analysis of the Ottoman empire's legacy to itssuccessor states in the Middle East and the Balkans.

Brown's 17-chapter book is divided into six parts. In Part One, inalcik discussesthe negative impact of contemporary ideologies, mainly nationalism and Marxism, onthe Middle East and the Balkans, which the ethnocentric perspectives of manyhistorians often obscure. He shows how a number of major Ottoman arrangementsgreatly influenced post-Ottoman societies. Under the Ottomans, for example, thesmall-scale farming system in the Balkans and Anatolia was different from the large-scale holdings of the Middle East, accounting for differences in later agrarian reformsof successor states. He also describes how the empire served as an economic bridgebetween Europe and Asia, enabling the flow of goods and technologies between thetwo continents, a subject that is usually ignored by studies of the industrial revolution.

Norman Itzkowitz, Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, alsotakes up a methodological issue, evaluating the Ottoman influence on the nationalidentities of successor states. He argues that the multireligious, multiethnic, andmultilingual character of the Ottoman empire generated a hierarchy of identities,especially after nationalism appeared in Ottoman lands. Accordingly, from the time theOttomans appeared in the Balkans until nationalism began to grow, Ottoman rule -with its lighter taxes, religious freedoms, and property rights - was preferred toindigenous rule. Itzkowitz, however, mistakenly identifies the rise of anti-Ottomanismin the Balkans with the perpetual hostility between Christians and Muslims. Inconstructing their national identities, Balkan leaders glorified their national histories,necessarily negating the foreign Ottoman past - but the process had little to do withanimosity toward Islam. Even when Itzkowitz acknowledges that the roots of currentconflicts in the former Ottoman territories stem more from modern nationalism thanOttoman rule, his claim that "intergenerational transmission of attitudes" feedcontinued grievances greatly underestimates the way political leaders exploitnationalism to garner domestic support for their regimes.

In Part Two, Maria Todorova, Professor of History at the University of Florida,lays out the two main approaches to studying the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. Thefirst identifies the Ottoman period as an alien intrusion where Christians lived assegregated communities, impervious to Ottoman elements, and the second holds thatthe legacy is a synthesis of Turkish, Islamic, and Balkan traditions, rather than aforeign intrusion. Todorova favors a middle ground between the two approaches,arguing that the Ottoman influence is felt more in the Balkans' popular culture andsocioeconomic sphere, rather than the political sphere. She points to traces of theOttoman period such as the absence of a landed aristocracy, a weak bourgeoisie, astrong state tradition, and ethnic heterogeneity. But, she concludes, the strength of

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nationalist elements in the region precludes an impartial assessment of the Ottomanlegacy.

Three other chapters in this section address the Ottomans' political legacy in theBalkans and the Middle East and highlight the negative contribution of nationalism tothe regions' political histories. Dennison I. Rusinov, professor of history at theUniversity of Pittsburgh, shows how nationalism is responsible for the bloody ethnicconflicts of the former Yugoslavia. Similarly, Sienna College professor Karl K. Barbirfinds that Ottoman rule was portrayed as foreign oppression only after nationalismpenetrated Arab intellectual circles, especially as Arab nationalist leaders consolidatedtheir nation-states. Lastly, Andre Raymond, professor emeritus at the Universite deProvence, argues that in forming internal borders in the Middle East, the Ottomanswere sensitive to the balance of forces between local peoples, unlike their Europeansuccessors. Modern-day border disputes, accordingly, are the legacy of Europeancolonialism that established strict artificial boundaries in the region. Local autonomyand decentralization, states the author, were distinct features of Ottomanadministration that benefited local relations for centuries.

Part Three of the book is devoted to the Ottomans' powerful political legacy in thecontemporary Turkish Republic. Ergun Ozbudun, Professor of Turkish Politics atBilkent University, asserts that the Ottomans' most pronounced contribution is the ideaof a strong and centralized state that is largely impervious to societal forces, andpaternalistic and protective toward its citizens. According to Ozbudun, the Ottomanstate did not promote the formation of a merchant class, and effectively curtailed thepower of landowners through a land system that recognized the state as the ultimateowner of most of agricultural lands. A strong state meant a weak civil society and thus,no autonomous organizations mediated between the state and the people. Ozbudunpredicts that the rise of Islamism and economic liberalization may reverse thetraditional "strong state, weak society" configuration in the region.

The Arabs, unlike the Turks, have oscillated between building a strong state and apan-nationalist philosophy, pan-Arabism. Professor Carter V. Findley from Ohio StateUniversity shows that the proclivity of modern Middle Eastern states toward a largebureaucracy controlling economic and social life is a distinct legacy of the Ottomanempire. A weakness of his otherwise forceful argument is the causal link he makesbetween his dependent variable (the preference for a command economy in the MiddleEast) and the Ottoman heritage. He proposes that the Ottoman state used to intervenein the economy through a number of instruments, chiefly a wage system, priceregulations and provisionism. However, given our knowledge of the fairly limited roleof the Ottoman state in the economy, this unconventional argument remainsunderdeveloped in his chapter. He does not go into the details of the significance ofthese policies for the overall state-economy relations in the Ottoman empire. Heshould have given concrete evidence that the new ruling elite in the successor stateswere influenced by the Ottoman tradition in this particular field and not by the socialistor fascist experiments of this century.

Parts Four and Six of the book discuss the Ottoman contribution in the fields oflanguage, religion, and culture. William Ochsenwald, professor of history at VirginiaPolytechnic University, argues that change rather than continuity was the rule of thegame as the multireligious empire broke up into successor nation-states, significantlyaltering the relationship between religion and state. The legitimacy of Ottoman rule

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210 TURKISH STUDIES

had partly been based on its claim to represent Sunni Islam, and the institutionalizationof Islam as a state religion has survived in the modern Middle East, albeit with greatdifferences. The role of the Muslim ulema, for example, has been greatly reduced vis-a-vis the secular leadership. The rise of Islamism throughout the region represents therevival of the notion of the Muslim umma, however, there are few signs of a return toOttoman religious system.

The two other fields where the Ottomans left their imprints, namely economics andthe military, are discussed in Part Five. Charles Issawi, Professor of Near EasternStudies at Princeton, finds that the empire's subjects had gradually fallen behind theEuropeans in the social, economic, and cultural spheres. Consequently, formerOttoman states were cut off from European advancements in science, technology, andeconomics and were relegated to the periphery of the European economic system. Infact, the Ottoman empire never entered the phase of capitalist development, itsrelationship with the economy remained in the form of tax collection. Issawi correctlyemphasizes the underdevelopment of the Ottoman empire in these fields, however, hebarely goes into the impact of the the Ottoman land system and water-managementarrangements on the economic policies of the successor states, which would have beenmore relevant for a discussion of particular dynamics of development in westernEurope and lack of it in the Middle East.

In the military realm, Dankwart Rustow, Professor of Politics at the CityUniversity of New York, underlines the role of warfare in Ottoman political culture,claiming that the empire's policy amounted to "war on the frontiers, tolerance within."Military reforms of the late Ottoman period, notably adopting Western standards,alienated officers from the traditions they were expected to defend. Moreover, newtaxes were required to fund the training and conscription of soldiers, adding to theburdens of Ottoman subjects. Most of the leaders of the successor states came from theOttoman military tradition, especially in Turkey, and they perceived the military bothas an agent of modernization and also, as the main building block of their new regimes.

Evaluating the Ottoman legacy in the Middle East and the Balkans is difficult andthis book should be commended for broadening our understanding of survivingOttoman traditions and institutions in these regions. However, the book's organizationis a bit problematic, with too many chapters addressing vaguely demarcated issueareas, making some sections hard to follow. Nonetheless, the book largely deliverswhat it promises, not only presenting a detailed, fair, and balanced evaluation of the"surviving Ottoman empire" in successor states, but also raising new questions toprompt further research.

CENGIZ SURUCUIndiana University, Bloomington

Tiirkiye ve Radikal Demokrasi (Turkey and Radical Democracy) by E. Fuat Keyman.(Istanbul: Baglam, 1999). Pp. 211. TL 1,350,000 (paper). ISBN 9756-947-19-5.

Some observers claim that the turn of the millennium has ushered in a new politicalage that is turning Modernity on its head. As was the case in previous eras, when theScientific, Industrial, and Political Revolutions influenced the spirit of the times, weare now undergoing significant societal change. Although the depth and global

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dimensions of this change are open to academic discussion, political historians arefacing a paradigm shift. Globalization and the communications revolution, alongsideadvances in genetic engineering, are not only causing radical revisions of economicrelationships but also are creating a new set of parameters to examine our political lives.

Supranational entities on the one hand, and global tribalism on the other, are givingway to post-modern identities characterized by fundamentalist or violentmanifestations of cultural self-determination. Thus, our conventional understanding ofdemocracy is on the verge of redefining itself. This is the vital problem that ProfessorFuat Keyman attacks in his book, Tiirkiye ve Radikal Demokrasi (Turkey and RadicalDemocracy). Democracy, according to Keyman, must not be viewed with stagnanteyes. Post-modern democracy, Keyman argues, must tackle the question of"difference" along the lines of pluralism.

After critically examining the wealth of material on liberal democracy, Keymanfirst and foremost familiarizes readers with hitherto confusing, if not contradictory,concepts such as radical democracy, which he believes is the only to solve Turkey'spresent political impasse. Radical democracy, he emphasizes, would restructure liberalphilosophy to fit the requirements (or demands) of the post-modern political animal -that is, us.

Keyman devotes his first chapter to "Globalization and Radical Democracy," andfollows it up with "Post-modernism, Identity Policies, and Democracy," and "Theoriesof Radical Democracy." He then turns his spotlight on Turkey. He underlines thecountry's crisis by claiming that the relationships between parties and the state, andparties and citizens, cannot accommodate the dynamic nature (and demands) ofsocietal life. Stressing the crisis of representation in Turkish politics, he then turns towhat he calls the peripheral antagonism, including secular vs. Islamic, modern vs.fundamentalist, Republican vs. Democrat, Western vs. Oriental, global vs. local, Turkvs. Kurd, and so on.

His last chapter is a natural continuation of his previous arguments. In "Kemalism,Modernity, and Tradition," he tests whether the founding philosophy of the Republiccan reform itself along the lines of radical democracy. Kemalism was, indeed, asuccessful project of Turkish modernization. The Kemalist model led to economicindependence and absorbed various ethnic and religious identities for the sake ofTurkish secular nationalism. The uniqueness of the Kemalist model, Keyman argues,is based on a social engineering program that left the individual (or citizen) with moreresponsibilities towards the state than vice versa, a factor which distinguished it fromthe Western liberal experience. Eventually, this "primacy of the state," to Keyman'smind, led to a governing tradition which in theory reflects the Ottoman legacy. Thiscultural heritage, ironically, even influenced the Islamic parties (with special relevanceto now banned Islamist Refah Party) which saw its political role as transformingsociety according to an Islamist ideology.

Keyman elaborates on the basics of a new "societal contract" based on the twinpillars of multiculturalism and pluralist democracy. He believes that in order toachieve peace at home, Turkey should not stress tolerance and compromise but, rather,an agonistic relationship among the "differents." He warns us that differences shouldnot lead to societal privileges. Dialogue among the "differents" in the domain of civilsociety will lead to a more participatory democracy that would rescue the Turkishpolitical system.

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This book is an excellent read for those who are interested in the philosophical andinstitutional framework of Keyman's democratic vision. Turkey and RadicalDemocracy is an inspiring research project argued comprehensively by an authority inthe field. It builds on a sound scholarly background but is also well equipped andpractical enough to provide a recipe for current Turkish democracy.

MlM KEMAL OKEBosphorus University, Istanbul

Cumhuriyet Iradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi: Turkiye'de Demokratik AcihmArayislan (The Will of Republic: The Reasoning of Democracy: Search forDemocratic Repercussions in Turkey) by Ayse Kadioglu (Turkey: Metis Yayinlan,1999). Pp. 135. TL 1,500,000 (paper). ISBN 975-342-2407.

Globalization has focused attention on questions of citizenship and identity, andRepublican Turkey is a ripe model for examination. Among recent studies analyzingthe development of democracy in Turkey, Ay§e Kadioglu's Cumhuriyet IradesiDemokrasi Muhakemesi examines the issue from a novel point of view: individualism.On the one hand, Kadioglu explains, being a "good citizen" in Turkey requires asacrifice of individualism. But, on the other hand, she disagrees with those who claimthat "there is no individualism in Turkey," by defending the history and tradition ofindividualism in the country.

Kadioglu opens the discussion on liberalism in Turkey with the history of politicalthought on individualism. She believes that liberalism in its classical meaning was lostafter the First Young Turks Assembly in 1902. In the Republican period, an altruistic,ethical, and romantic type of liberalism has been adapted in the tradition of AhmetAgaoglu, a prominent Turkish liberal thinker. Modernization, and its nationalist,feminist, liberal, and Islamist streams of thought, should be evaluated with reference tothe Republican epistemology, which promotes a type of social engineering dictatedfrom above. This epistemology saw the Enlightenment not as a process, but as a projectthat would break old traditions and establish new ones. Such a development paved theway for the recent voicing of long-repressed ethnic or Islamic identities. Kadiogluconcludes that the formation of a democratic vision through either Kemalism, Islamism,or socialism, needs to emphasize the individual and the notion of reasoning.

Kadioglu criticizes the Republic's politics as elitist, viewing the citizen's mainduty as merely to follow orders. The Republican elite, she claims, prefers passivecitizens, who possess irade (will) rather than the ability of muhakeme (reasoning).Such a form of citizenship, however, is not a Republican creation, but rather aholdover from the Ottoman period. Further, she argues that the state's continuedemphasis on civic passivity explains why Turkey's political elite must constantlyovercome crises of legitimacy "since the legitimacy of the state has always shadowedthe legitimacy of the politics." However, Kadioglu misses a very important point: thepolitical elite is fond of the passive citizen precisely because he or she does notquestion the state's legitimacy.

In her first chapter, Kadioglu weighs in on the question of Turkish identity,questioning the "invention of tradition" that has accompanied the Republic's

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modernization. The images of modernization, she contends, have been more importantthan the process. She extends the issue into her second chapter when she discussesTurkish nationalism in the context of the French and German models and shows howTurkey adopted norms of western civilization and culture, producing an imitation aswell as a critical reading of the West through eastern eyes. Kadioglu, however, fails toconsider that establishing a nation-state upon the ashes of an empire would requireeliminating the old tradition and creating a new one.

Kadioglu takes up the issue of liberalism in the Turkish Republic in chapter four,explaining differences between Prince Sabahhattin, the founder of Turkish liberalthought, and Ahmet Agaoglu, who developed an altruistic version of liberalism. Shealso explains how liberalism is shadowed by the official ideology which favors the'follower' citizen.

The fifth and sixth chapters are devoted to the role of women. Chapter five focusesprimarily on how women have become agents of modernization through their attire.The importance of women's attire is not only a feature of political Islam, but could beobserved throughout the Turkish modernization process starting with the Tanzimat(Reformation) period in the Ottoman empire (1839-56). Despite the fact that womenstill occupy traditional roles in the family, the author concludes, they have becomemodernists in their clothing. In chapter six Kadioglu describes how women'sindividualism has been ignored by Kemalist, socialist, and Islamist ideologies. Shenotes that since Tanzimat the position of women has evolved from servitude tocitizenship. However, throughout this process, women have never been accepted assignificant citizens except in terms of their family responsibilities.

To Kadioglu's credit, this book lays to rest any doubts about the meaning of theRepublican epistemology - Kadioglu approaches it from different perspectives inconcise, well organized, clearly written, and even-handed chapters. However, becausethe book is composed of previously published articles, it can seem a bit disconnectedas a whole. Further, some of Kadioglu's claims are weak. For example, in discussingthe formulation of Republican epistemology, she misses the importance of the legacyof the Ottoman period. She is wrong to argue that there has been a rupture between theOttoman past and the Republican present. Indeed, there has been a continuoustransformation. Additionally, she argues that political Islam has been reproduced fromthe internal dynamics of Kemalism, which is a reductionist approach that fails toaddress the influence of other social dynamics on the politicalization of Islam. Overall,however, she has made a significant contribution to the study of liberalism which hasnot received enough attention in Republican history.

MURAT CEMREKBilkent University, AnkaraD

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The Egyptian Question (1831-1841): The Expansionist Policy of Mehmed AH Pasa inSyria and Asia Minor and the Reaction of the Sublime Porte by Muhammed H.Kutluoglu (Istanbul: Eren Press, 1998). Pp. 271. $40.00 (cloth). ISBN 975-7622-583.

Although the debate over Europe's nineteenth-century expansion into the Middle East,commonly called the Eastern Question, has not yet been settled, it is beyond doubt thatEgypt's secession from the Ottoman empire - the "Egyptian Question" - was amilestone. In his seminal work, International Politics and the Middle East, L. CarlBrown skillfully evaluates the significance of Egypt's rebellion, led by one-time loyalvassal turned Egyptian national hero Mehmed AH Pasa, in the development of theEastern Question.1

Rendering important services to the empire early in his career, such as suppressingthe Wahhabi rebellion in Nejd between 1812 and 1818 and the Greek revolt in theMorea in 1827, Pa?a later became a piercing thorn in the side of Ottoman authoritiesas he grew into a power-hungry warlord. Considered by Carl Brockelmann to be themost important man in the history of modern Islam, Pasa's recalcitrance againstOttoman suzerainty was perhaps the decisive factor that provoked European GreatPower intervention in Ottoman affairs and finally led to the Tanzimat reforms in 1839which were intended to strengthen and modernize the empire.2 The effects and causesof both Pasa's rebellion and the Tanzimat reforms mired the Ottoman empire inEurope's balance of power game, with fatal consequences.

In view of its importance, the Egyptian Question has not received as muchattention as it should have - until now. Muhammed Hanefi Kutluoglu's work,originally prepared for a doctoral thesis at Manchester University, is exhaustive andoriginal. Kutluoglu belongs to an ascendant and promising generation of youngTurkish scholars that includes S. Tufan Buzpinar, Gokhan Cetinsaya, Hasan Kayah,Zekeriya Kursun, and Azmi Ozcan, who have been expanding the historiography ofthe late Ottoman period by focusing on its fatal points, such as the one at hand.

Kutluoglu's book covers the decisive ten-year period preceding the Tanzimat.Hostilities first broke out between Pasa (who cast his eye on the eventual seizure ofSyria) and the "Sublime Porte" (the nickname of the Ottoman government during theTanzimat era) in 1831. Pa§a's invasion of Acre in November 1831 had far-reachingconsequences. It launched a successful invasion of the whole of Syria and even ofAnatolia. In little more than a year, Pasa was conceivably in a position to overthrowthe Ottoman dynasty as a whole. Although there was a temporary settlement in 1833,the struggle between Istanbul and Cairo continued until 1841.

Relying on wide-ranging archival material, Kutluoglu challenges many previousmisconceptions about Egypt's secession, set in motion by Pasa. As a matter of fact,according to Kutluoglu, Pasa hardly deserves his unofficial title as the forefather ofmodern Egypt. Pa§a took advantage of Egypt's de facto autonomy within the empireand the power vacuum resulting from Napoleon's retreat from the country in 1801 tolaunch his mutiny. For the Janissaries, the troops who were purported to be theregime's guardians, Pasa's moves amounted to yet another palace revolution, afamiliar feature of Ottoman history.

Seemingly, Egypt's split from the empire was a consequence of the strain betweenthe Ottoman center and periphery that resulted from the "enlightened despotism" ofSultan Mahmud II who aimed throughout his reign between 1808 and 1839 to

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centralize his authority and westernize his empire. It is hardly surprising, then, thatPasa accused the Sultan of turning away from Islam and imitating Christian Europe asa pretext for insurrection. In this regard, he was similar to the Janissaries.

As an Albanian, not an Arab, Pa§a's discourse did not have a political edge drivenby racial or nationalistic impulses. The available evidence suggests that his struggle isbest seen not a campaign for formal independence, but rather, as an attempt to leavehis descendants a secure legacy - a hereditary succession. As a matter of fact, his talkof independence in 1834 and 1838 was in part a pressure tactic against the Sultan andthe Europeans to secure his family legacy. In short, Pasa exemplified an Ottoman-typewarlordism as contrasted with L. Carl Brown's national liberation movements. Brownshows how Pasa, a successful warlord from Kavala, Albania, operating in the contextof the Eastern Question, could become the unplanned patron of Egyptian nationalism.

As Brown states, unlike national liberation movements, which tended to rely onoutside intervention, the Egyptian case developed through arrangements between old-style warlords and central authorities. For this reason, Kutluoglu approaches theEgyptian Question as an internal Ottoman problem rather than an international issue.The role of foreign powers, albeit critical, was peripheral in deciding the balancebetween Pasa and the Sultan. Also, the Ottoman authorities failed to formulate a pro-active, conscious policy to handle the crisis with favorable results. Crippled by the lackof such a policy, the Ottomans chose to handle the first crisis (1831-33) as an internalproblem and tried to negotiate a solution. Only after Egyptian forces, led by Pa§a's sonIbrahim, entered Anatolia in 1832 did the Sublime Porte look to the European powersfor military assistance (which it did not receive.)

During the second crisis (1839^41), on the other hand, the Egyptian problembecame internationalized. Throughout this phase, as Kutluoglu writes, it is possible totrace the intricacies of the game played by three European powers: Britain, France, andRussia. Britain was primarily interested in maintaining the status quo in the MiddleEast and viewed the Ottoman empire as an essential balancer between France andRussia. Russia also favored the Ottomans, while France supported Pasa. Over time,however, France fell in behind Britain in an effort to rid the Sublime Porte of Russianinfluence, and the three countries together restored Syria to the Ottomans.

Kutluoglu based his work on a variety of sources, both published and unpublished,some previously untapped, and treated his subject very thoroughly. But, one might findthe book a bit too narrative, focusing largely on the diplomatic process. In this respect,Kutluoglu could have highlighted the parallel modernization processes of Egypt byPa$a and the Ottoman empire by Mahmud II. Ironically, although Pa$a criticized theSultan for copying the Christian Europeans, it was he who initiated Egypt's overallmodernization with the goal of building a strong military to execute an imperial,expansionist policy. Obviously, it would hardly have been possible for Pa§a tomodernize Egypt had Mahmud II not previously laid the foundation for taking thecountry in such a direction. Additionally, the book focuses primarily on Anatolia andSyria, neglecting Pasa's expansion towards the Persian Gulf and the ArabianPeninsula. Nevertheless, Kutluoglu's work makes a remarkable contribution to thediplomatic history of the Ottoman empire in particular, and to the Eastern Question ingeneral, that can be built upon in future detailed studies.

BEDRI GENCERIstanbul University

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216 TURKISH STUDIES

NOTES

1. L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1984).2. Carl Brockelmann, History of Islamic Peoples (London: Routledge, 1980).

Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia by Gareth Winrow (London: The Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs, 1995). Pp. 53. $12.95 (paper). ISBN 0905031-997

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the five Central Asian republics - Uzbekistan,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan - have emerged from morethan a century of imperial Russian and Soviet domination. The emergence of thesenew nations has inevitably led to drastic changes in the foreign policies of regional aswell as global powers. One such power is Turkey, to which many of the newlyemerged Central Asian states are both linguistically and culturally linked.

Turkey sees itself as these states' mentor. Such a feeling, however, is only partiallyappreciated by the peoples of the Turkic republics, particularly the ruling elites. Whilethey welcome opportunities for increased Turkish aid and trade, they are veryprotective of their own sovereignty, even after almost a decade of independence. Theyseem to be reluctant to collaborate in building a Turkish sphere of prosperity or to bepart of a cultural, linguistic, and ethnic assemblage dominated by Turkey. They see thebilateral relationship rather as one of friendly business, in which Turkey's role is tooffer economic concessions and investments, which they in turn, are pleased to accept.

Gareth M. Winrow's work primarily examines the shortcomings and achievementsof Turkish policies and attitudes towards the four new Turkic-speaking Central Asianstates, and pays less attention to Persian-speaking Tajikistan. Winrow provides a shorthistorical background of the Turkish policy toward, and relationship with, CentralAsian Turkic peoples. He focuses, for the most part, on the period from the Gorbachevera until the present.

The author starts with a discussion of the somewhat confusing terminology for"Turkic" versus "Turkish" in the Turkish language. He argues "the distinction betweenthe terms 'Turkish' and 'Turkic' is not apparent in the Turkish language." It is true thatthe word Tiirk has been recently used in the place of both English words "Turkish" and"Turkic," and the word Tiirki is rarely used only by some academicians and journaliststo mean "Turkic." However, this is because of political considerations in Turkey, notbecause of the lack of distinction between the terms in the Turkish language.

Winrow highlights a shift in Turkish policy toward the region from historicallyirredentist approaches, advocated by the late Alparslan Tiirkes and his National ActionParty, and exacerbated by the early euphoria after the Soviet Union's demise, torelatively rational policies after the first Turkic Summit convened in Ankara inOctober 1992. The results of this summit, which was attended by the heads of state ofTurkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, weredisappointing for Turkish nationalists because of their inflated hopes for developingclose relations with these states. According to the author, Turkish officials alsooverestimated their capability to affect political, social, and economic developments inthe newly independent Turkic states.

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BOOK REVIEWS 217

Winrow often demonstrates the early euphoria and enthusiasm in Turkey byquoting from top governmental administrators in the early 1990s. At that time theTurkish prime minister, Siileyman Demirel, articulated phrases such as "a gigantic'Turkish' world stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China," andPresident Turgut Ozal announced that "the twenty first century would be the centuryof the Turks." Winrow warns the officials of the danger of making such statements,indicating that these speeches were seized upon by those critical of Turkey (such asBosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic) as supposed evidence of Ankara's pan-Turkicpolicy.

Turkish policymakers, however, would revise their high expectations soon afterthe first summit. Officials in Ankara, Winrow argues, realized that in spite of an initialgenuine eagerness to build tics with Turkey, Central Asian leaders were anxious not toprovoke Russia and were also interested in increasing contacts with states other thanTurkey that were prepared to offer them support. This realization brought about anoticeable shift in Turkish policy towards the region from one based on sentiment toone based more on self-interest. Since much less was expected of the next TurkicSummit, held in October 1994 in Istanbul, Turkey was perhaps satisfied with itsresults. After all, Turkey would seem to be eager to formalize and institutionalizerelations between the Turkic states.

Turkey's economic interests were not so different from its political and socialexpectations. Winrow explains how Turkey initially made unrealistic promises andproposals by offering up to $3 billion in support to the Turkic states. This sum wasobviously beyond its capacity, as it was both politically and economically impossiblefor Turkey per se to develop the market in the region. In a little while, these unrealisticpromises would likewise have to be revised into a more "hard-headed realism."Nevertheless, Turkey has continued to be reasonably generous in grantinghumanitarian assistance and distributing credits.

With regard to economic penetration, smaller Turkish companies were morewilling to take risks in what was still an insecure market. Winrow appropriately pointsout that Turkish entrepreneurs, compared to their Western counterparts, have someadvantages because they are familiar with regional culture. Further, the closeness ofthe Turkish language to those spoken in Central Asia enables them to adapt more tolocal conditions in the area.

Turkey's presence in the region is, of course, not only limited to businessinvestments. Turkey, mainly through its private sector, is also active in the areas ofreligion, education, media, and so on. Winrow in particular pays attention to theprivate schools operated by Fethullahgilar, followers of Fethullah Giilen, who leadsone of the Nurcu sects in Turkey. The author, however, misguidedly considers theseestablishments to be "religious schools." It may be one of their unarticulated goals toeducate true or Anatolian-style Muslim believers in these schools; however, they arenot religious schools. They follow the curriculum of secular and/or moderneducational systems and enjoy a great deal of success nationally and internationally incompetitions, such as the Intercollegiate Science Olympics. Further, the Turkishnewspaper Zaman is indeed affiliated with Fethullahgilar, but not with the outlawedWelfare Party, or today's Virtue Party, as Winrow claims.

The most striking part of the work is the seventh section, in which Winrowdiscusses the extent of competition and cooperation between regional powers in post-

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218 TURKISH STUDIES

Soviet Central Asia. The author argues that Iran, Russia, and perhaps in the longer termChina, are to some extent Turkey's economic and political rivals. Although relationsbetween Turkey and Russia have continued to improve in recent years, Winrowadvises officials in Ankara that "in order to avoid tension with Russia, [Turkey] shouldkeep its pan-Turkic supporters in check, and Turkish officials should not be seen to beopenly espousing goals such as the creation of a Turkic Union or Confederation."

Despite the fact that Turkish officials constantly deny that such a rivalry exists,Winrow insists that Iran and Turkey are ideological rivals in the sense that both areMuslim countries that offer alternative models of political, economic, and culturaldevelopment. These two countries, the author argues, have clashed in a great effort toestablish cultural preeminence in the region. However, the author also believes thateconomic cooperation between Turkey and Iran in Central Asia is possible.

Winrow considers China, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia to be Turkey's other potentialregional rivals. To the author, the latter two are not really major players in the region,but China may eventually be a strong rival, as it has greatly expanded its economicinterests in neighboring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Winrow also discusses variousdegrees of cooperation between Turkey and other regional powers. What is missing inthe book, however, is a regional map that might help readers to better comprehend thegeopolitics of the region, especially possible geographic impediments for regionalrivals and/or partners.

Living in Turkey, Winrow has observed political developments there very closely,and has provided us with firsthand information from Turkish academicians,journalists, businessmen, governmental officials, and policymakers via the mediaand/or direct interviews. Overall, Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia is a useful andreadable work that gives the reader an essentially balanced and accurate picture ofTurkish policies and attitudes towards the Central Asian Turkic Republics. This studymay be recommended to students, scholars, economists, politicians, and policymakersinterested in Eurasia. Since the publication of the book, however, much has changed.An updated second edition of this work would perhaps be appreciated in academia.The author might consider "From Romanticism to Realism" as the subtitle of apossible second edition of this book.

YILMAZ BlNGOLIndiana University, Bloomington

The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations: From World War I to 1998 byRobert Olson (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1998). Pp. xx + 105. $19.95(cloth). ISBN 1568590679.

The arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999 brought the Kurdishquestion back to the fore of Turkish political life after an incomprehensibleinternational adventure involving three continents and more than five countries. Theguerrilla fighter was sentenced to death by a Turkish court in June, a verdict that wasconfirmed by Turkey's Supreme Court on November 25, 1999, sparking Kurdishprotests in European capitals and eliciting stern warnings from the European Union(EU). What makes the Ocalan situation so complicated for Turkey is its falloutregarding the country's foreign relations, especially with the West.

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The Kurdish question has long been a restricting factor in Turkey's foreign policyparticularly regarding global crises with an ethnic character, such as those in Kosovoand Chechnya. Because of its own ethnic problem, Turkey refrains from interfering in,or even expressing its views about, similar situations in neighboring countries andbeyond. Unless considering the role the Kurdish issue plays in Ankara'sdecisionmaking, one cannot understand the reasons behind Prime Minister BiilentEcevit's visit to Russia in November 1999, where he signed an agreement that wouldserve as a common judicial base for the two countries against terrorism. Not only doboth Russia and Turkey fear terrorism, but each fears the other's intervention innuisance domestic ethnic problems.

Because in Turkey pro-state scholars dominate some important policy debates,such as that over the Kurds, it is almost always illuminating to read what westernauthors have to say on the subject. Robert Olson's book is an illustrative contributionto the field. Olson approaches the Kurdish question in a way that enables readers tounderstand its external implications. He also takes into account recent developmentsin Turkish politics that provide important clues as to why the issue has currentlyresurfaced — namely, the internal struggle of the past two years between the secularTurkish establishment and political Islamists. Olson describes in detail the differentapproaches taken by the (now banned) Islamist Welfare Party and the Turkish ArmedForces regarding the Kurdish question.

More important is Olson's theoretical explanation that locates the issue in thehistorical background of Turkish-Iranian relations. According to Olson's "omni-balancing model," developing countries "construct their alignments on theirperceptions of how to best protect themselves from threats they face, whether thesource is domestic or international." Yet, "where external threats are significant andinternal ones manageable, priority may tilt toward external ones."

A developing country may, however, sometimes externalize internal threats.Olson deftly demonstrates his theory using Turkey's relations with Iran as anexample. The Turkish army once declared that the state's number one enemy was notthe PKK but rather Islamist reactionism. Thus, Olson notes, "even if Iran hadnothing to meddle, interfere or encourage such groups in Turkey...any Kemalistgovernment in Turkey would accuse it of doing so in order to externalise its owninternal threats."

What is most interesting about Turkish-Iranian relations is the continuedcooperation on the Kurdish issue, despite the mutually negative perceptions they havedeveloped since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Olson does not see such cooperation asparadoxical. The new opportunity map that arose after the Cold War provided variousincentives for Turkey and Iran to act in concert regarding the Kurds, including "theirmutual interest in participating in the oil and gas resources and their distributivenetwork" and "their need to agree on their respective spheres of influence in northernIraq." In fact, neither of them, according to Olson, "allowed the Kurdish question inall of its manifestations to endanger their own interest."

Olson pays brief but satisfactory attention to the historical background of theKurdish question, drawing a parallel between the conditions of our time and that of the1920s. The similarities in the two eras point to recurring themes and problems that canbe traced from the 1920s up until today. "The circumstances as to why a Kurdish Statewas not created in the 1920s," he notes, "resemble the situation of the 1990s when,

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220 TURKISH STUDIES

again the geopolitical circumstances did not allow for the establishment of a Kurdishstate." Old questions still retain their currency.

Another recurring theme that Olson highlights is that the Kurdish question hasalways been connected to larger regional and global conflicts. Olson explains that inrecent years, the issue has been related to new structural relationships in the MiddleEast between Turkey and Iran and Turkey and Israel.

Olson's book presents a fresh, well-informed, and theoretically supported study. Italso, however, contains a number of obscure expressions and labels that should beexplained in the context in which they are used, such as calling the Turkish newspaperSabah "conservative." The concept of conservatism in Turkey needs to be clarifiedsince other conservative Islamic and government sponsored newspapers exist. Someof his conclusions should also be better explained, such as the one he draws regardingIsraeli investments in southern Anatolia. Without more information, the reader couldhardly understand the concrete determining relationship between Kurdish migrationand Israeli investment or why the author mentioned the two topics under the samerubric. Nevertheless, students of Middle Eastern studies will benefit from readingOlson's take on recent developments as it is quite unique.

GOKHAN BACIKMiddle East Technical University, Ankara

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