Remedies and Cooperation: What Have we Learned The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do no necessarily represent the views of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner. Russell Damtoft Office of International Affairs United States Federal Trade Commission Latin America and Caribbean Competition Forum Managua, Nicaragua
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Remedies and Cooperation: What Have we Learned – R. Damtoft USFTC – 2017 Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum
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Remedies and Cooperation: What Have we Learned
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do no necessarily represent the views of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner.
Russell Damtoft Office of International Affairs
United States Federal Trade Commission Latin America and Caribbean Competition Forum
Managua, Nicaragua
What’s New
• 2017: FTC retrospective study on the effectiveness of merger remedies. – What works, what doesn’t.
• 2017: FTC/DOJ revised guidelines on international enforcement and cooperation. – Added major section on cooperation.
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Remedies: Block, Permit, or Negotiate • Formally, U.S. agencies have two
choices following merger review: – Challenge it in court – Allow it to proceed
• Most merger problems are limited in scope – Remedies can fix the problem. – Remedies usually negotiated with
parties as an alternate to a challenge – Generally not imposed by the
agencies unilaterally 3
Types of Merger Remedies
• Structural remedies: – Maintain, restore, or increase the pre-merger
competitive situation – Rely primarily on market forces to maintain or
restore competition • Behavioral remedies:
– Prohibit or require conduct – Requires agency supervision
• Some orders use both 4
Structural Remedies: Divestitures
• Divestitures are the most common structural remedy – Create viable competitors – Buyers are able to enter business – Assets/businesses remain “in” the market, for
some meaningful time • Structural remedies can also include
removal of barriers to entry
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Principles of Merger Remedies
• Any remedy should . . . – Address the competitive threat that would be
created by the acquisition – Fit the facts of the case, the theory of harm, and
the characteristics of the relevant market – Be easy to administer and enforce
• A good remedy should be tested with suppliers, customers, competitors
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Historical Experience with Remedies
• Structural remedies work better – Create or strengthen a competitor to replace
that lost by the merger – Eliminate barriers to entry or expansion
• Behavioral remedies less desirable – Required conduct may not align with market
incentives – Ongoing monitoring required – But sometimes it’s the only option – Often used short-term to facilitate divestiture 7
1999 Merger Remedies Study • Examined divestitures from 1990-1994 • Led to changes in FTC merger practice
– Required buyer up front in more cases – Shorter divestiture period required – Increased use of monitors
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2017 Study • Examined 89 merger remedies
– Case study for 50 mergers – Questionnaires for 15 in cases where markets are
local – 24 involved pharmaceuticals – special expertise
• What we learned – 100% of remedies involving the sale of an ongoing
business succeeded – 70% of remedies involving sale of assets that are
less than an ongoing business succeeded – Success is defined as restoring or maintaining
competition in the affected market
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A Somewhat Intuitive Conclusion
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Which package of assets is more likely to work?
Study Shows that Details Matter
• Divestitures of something less than an ongoing business requires more scrutiny – Source of funding – Time for due diligence for buyer – Buyer access to key employees and facilities
• Back office functions – details matter – Integration of systems into buyer’s business
may be complicated – E.g., IT, human resources, finance, legal
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Applying Lessons Learned
• Assets to be divested depend on: – the theory of harm – what is necessary to ensure full and viable
relief • What is to be divested
– Complete divestiture of a stand-alone business entity preferred
– Partial divestiture of limited assets possible but more scrutiny required
• Key question: what would prevent harm from the merger?
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The On-Going Business Unit • Presents least risk • Ensures remedy will immediately eliminate
competitive problems • The business unit should include
– Manufacturing facilities – Access to key inputs – Research and development capabilities – Intellectual property, technology, know-how – Key personnel – Access to capital
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“Up Front” Buyers • Requires parties to find acceptable buyer for
divested assets before final order is made • More likely required when it’s less than an
ongoing business unit • Helps resolve concerns about:
– Whether divested assets were sufficient – Whether a good buyer will be found – Whether necessary third-party approvals will be
obtained – Risk that competition will be lost during the search
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Terms of Relief
• No minimum price – “Fire sale” prices are common – Incentive for firms to divest overlapping assets
before merger announced • Buyer must be acceptable to the agency
– Cannot be anticompetitive – Buyer must be capable of using assets
Remedies in Cross-Border Cases • Remedies are designed to protect domestic
commerce and consumers – Seek to avoid remedies that conflict with those of
foreign agencies – Remedies involving foreign assets or conduct sought
only to extent needed to protect competition in the US • Negotiated remedies may address concerns of
multiple jurisdictions • Sometimes a remedy in another jurisdiction will
solve the problem. 16
International Coordination
• The growth of cross-border commerce has led to a growth in cross-border mergers
• While mergers can affect many jurisdictions, competition problems are not always the same. – Market structure – Timing – Remedial powers
• Cooperation is no longer optional! 17
U.S. International Guidelines
• January 2017: US FTC and US DOJ issue updated guidelines for international enforcement and cooperation
• New Section on International Cooperation – Investigative tools – Confidentiality – Legal basis for cooperation – Information exchange and waivers – Remedies
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Cooperation and confidentiality • Effective cooperation involves exchanging
information on: – Markets affected – Theories of harm – Anticompetitive effects – Possible remedies – Timing
• Information exchanges are subject to: – National confidentiality legislation – Internal regulations and practices
• The challenge: cooperating while protecting confidentiality
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Protecting Confidences Matters • Confidential commercial information and
trade secrets • Effective cooperation often depends on
merging firms – Firms more likely to cooperate if they are
confident about confidential treatment – Maintaining a reputation for protecting
confidential information is critical to success
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Confidentiality and Waivers • Legal confidentiality protections usually belong to
the party supplying business information – The party supplying the information may waive that
protection • But confidentiality protections of the agency’s
own information usually belong to the agency – The agency may choose to share that information when
it is convinced that confidentiality will be maintained • In many cases, parties waive confidentiality to
facilitate cooperation • Especially useful for coordinating remedies
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Classification of Shareable Information 1. Publicly available information
– General knowledge about markets – Published information
2. Information normally kept confidential, but not protected by law (“Agency Confidential”)
– Can often be shared under assurances of confidentiality – E.g., timing, theories about markets and competitive effects
3. Information protected by law (“Party Confidential”) – Can only be shared if party waives protection – E.g., merger filings, third party data, proposed remedies
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1. Public Information
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Do you know if anyone has tried to enter this market?
Yes, Alpha Corporation built a new factory here last year.
Were they able to compete successfully?
Yes, I think so. I will send you a link to their annual report where they report it has done well.
2. Agency Confidential Information
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We think the market includes small cars but not minivans.
Why do you think that?
Sorry, but I can’t say without revealing protected data.
OK, I understand. Anyway, our market sources are telling us the same thing.