Remedial Law

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Faculty of Civil LawDigest Pool 2010

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES et al.v.DIGNO ALBAO JR.et al.

520 SCRA 539 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

When theres nothing remained to be resolved by the Regional Trial Court, it is a patent error for the appellate

court to order the remand of the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), through its co-petitioner JanetteLagarejos (Lagajeros) granted a loan to Digno Albao et al.The loan was secured by a mortgage over atitled property with improvements. Respondents Albao et al. failed to pay their obligations as they felldue. When petitioner DBPs demands remained unheeded, it foreclosed the mortgaged property. Albaoet al. then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) petition for injunction with prayer for preliminaryinjunction or temporary restraining order (TRO) against DBP et al.and the Ex Officio Sheriff to enjointhem from selling Albao et al.s property during the public auction. The RTC issued the TRO prayed forby them.

DBP et al.moved for a reconsideration of the RTCs order invoking Section 2 of PresidentialDecree No. 385, which provides that no restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall beissued by the court against any government financial institution in any action taken by such institution incompliance with the mandatory foreclosure

Accordingly, the RTC, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction, dismissed the main petition forInjunction and directed herein DBP and Lagajeros to proceed with the public auction. RespondentsAlbao et al.moved for a reconsideration of the RTCs order, while, in a separate move, they filed theirNotice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). The RTC denied the Albao et al.s motion forreconsideration. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for

pre-trial and trial on the merits in the Injunction case filed by respondents

HELD:

It bears emphasis that the complaint filed by Albao et al.from which the present petition arosewas one for injunction as a main action, as opposed to injunction as a provisional remedy. Since the actsought to be prevented the sale at public auction of the property subject of the mortgage had occurred,nothing remained to be resolved by the RTC. It was thus a patent error for the appellate court to orderthe remand of the case for further proceedings. Section 5 of Rule 39, which provides that where theexecuted judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may,on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrantunder the circumstances, is self-explanatory. If the executed judgment is reversed on appeal, "the trial

court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice maywarrant under the circumstances."

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.ANDRES L. AFRICA, et al.531 SCRA 533 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

The grant of leave to file amended pleadings is a matter peculiarly within the sound discretion of the court.


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The Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a complaint for therecovery of shares of stock that were allegedly registered under the names of AndresAfrica, et al. All the respondents answered the Complaint, except for Andres Africa, Racquel S.Dinglasan, Evelyn A. Romero, and Rosario Songco. Unfortunately, Africa and Songco died. TheRepublic filed an amended complaint to implead the heirs of Africa and Songco, and to properlysummon Racquel S. Dinglasan and Evelyn A. Romero. By Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the

Republics Motion for failure to properly set it for hearing. Another Motion for Leave to File AmendedComplaint was filed. The same however was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in assuming that the case at bar falls under Section 3 ofRule 10 of the Rules of Court (amendments by leave of court)

HELD:

Under Section 2 of Rule 10, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any timebefore a responsive pleading is served, and thereafter, only upon leave of court. It is true that when theRepublic filed its Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint most of the private respondents hadalready filed their respective answers. This does not bar the Republic from amending its originalComplaint once, however, as a matter of right, against Andres L. Africa, Racquel S. Dinglasan, Evelyn A.Romero, and Rosario Songco, the non-answering private respondents.

As the proposed amendments pertain only to the non-answering private respondents, they maystill be made as a matter of right. Being a matter of right, its exercise does not depend upon thediscretion or liberality of the Sandiganbayan. In fine, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretionwhen it denied the Republics Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LARRY LAURO DOMINGO

584 SCRA 669 (2009), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside lightly, least of all by a mere affidavit executed after

the lapse of considerable time.

Appellant Larry Domingo (Domingo) was charged with Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and two(2) counts of Estafa before Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. Domingo, denied all theaccusations against him and claimed that he was a driver hired by the real recruiter, Gimeno, whom hemet inside the Victory Liner Bus bound for Manila in September, 2000 Domingo likewise presented aswitnesses private complainants Enrico Espiritu and Roberto Castillo who corroborated his claim that itwas Gimeno who actually recruited them, and that the filing of the complaint against appellant was adesperate attempt on their part to get even because Gimeno could not be located. Prosecution witness

Simeon Cabigao (Cabigao) testified that he was among those who were recruited by Domingo, but helater on recanted his testimony. By Joint Decision, the trial court found Domingo guilty beyondreasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment(Large Scale) and of 2 counts ofEstafa.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Domingo maintained that the trial court erred for failing togive weight to Cabigaos retraction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on allaccounts. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:


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Whether or not the retraction of Cabigao should be given weight

HELD:

That one of the original complaining witnesses, Cabigao, later recanted, viaan affidavit and his

testimony in open court, does not necessarily cancel an earlier declaration. Like any other testimony, thesame is subject to the test of credibility and should be received with caution. For a testimony solemnlygiven in court should not be set aside lightly, least of all by a mere affidavit executed after the lapse ofconsiderable time. In the case at bar, the Affidavit of Recantation was executed three years after thecomplaint was filed. It is thus not unreasonable to consider his retraction an afterthought to deny itsprobative value.

At all events, and even with Cabigaos recantation, the Supreme Court finds that the prosecutionevidence consisting of the testimonies of the four other complainants, whose credibility has not beenimpaired, has not been overcome.

ALEGAR CORPORATION v. EMILIO ALVAREZ527 SCRA 289 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

If the defendant participated in the proceedings of the case, the purpose of summons, which is to give notice to thedefendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against him, was sufficiently met.

By virtue of a Deed of Assignment, the Legarda family assigned its rights and interests over aparcel of land in favor of Alegar Corporation. The Legarda family verbally leased the property on amonthly basis to Catalina Bartolome. After Catalinas death, her children Amado, Isabelita, Pacita,Ramon, and Benjamin continued to occupy the property.

Because of non-payment of rentals, Alegar Corporation, by counsel, sent a letter addressed tothe Heirs of Catalina Bartolome demanding them to vacate the premises and pay their arrearageswithin 15 days from receipt of the letter. Its demands having remained unheeded, Alegar filed before theMetropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Heirs ofCatalina Bartolome et al. Spouses Amado and Jane Doe, Bartolome, Spouses John Doeand IsabelitaAnquilo, Spouses JohanneDoe andPacita Landayan, Spouses Benjamin and Joan DoeBartolome-Alvarez, Ramon Alvarez, and those persons claiming rights under them. Subsequently, thesummons were received by one Gilberto Acosta.

Emilio Alvarez, son of the late Bartolome Alvarez questioned the service of only one set ofsummons, despite the number of defendants. Consequently, he claims that the MeTC did not acquire

jurisdiction over his person. MeTC held that the filing of an Answer constitutes voluntary appearanceand submission to its jurisdiction. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTCsdecision. On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) viaPetition for Review, the complaint was dismissedbecause the summons was merely left behind to a certain Gilbert Acosta, whose relation to the case isunknown. Hence, this petition for review before the Court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Emilio Alvarez

HELD:


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The complaint names the defendants as follows: Heirs of Catalina Bartolome,Spouses Amado and Jane Doe, Bartolome, Spouses John Doe andIsabelita Anquilo, SpousesJohanneDoe andPacita Landayan, Spouses Benjamin and Joan Doe Bartolome-Alvarez, Ramon Alvarez, and thosepersons claiming rights under them.

Admittedly, the therein named, now deceased, defendant Benjamin Alvarez is the father ofEmilio. Ergo, Emilio, who is apparently residing in the questioned premises, is one who claims rights

under him as in fact he proffers so.

Emilio questioned the service of summons on one Guilberto Acosta who, by his claim, was notauthorized to receive summons on behalf of the defendants. Assuming that Guilberto Acosta was not soauthorized to receive summons on behalf of the defendants, the summons, together with a copy of thecomplaint, must have reached Emilio; otherwise, he could not have filed an Answer to theComplaint. Emilio in fact participated in all the proceedings of the case. Thus, the purpose of summons,which is to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against him,was sufficiently met.

That the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Emilio does not, however, extend to theother defendant Ramon Alvarez on whose behalf Acosta allegedly received the summons with copy ofthe complaint.

Based on the Return of Service of Summons submitted by the Process Server, it appears thatindeed, only one set of summons and complaint was served that which was received by Acosta. Therest of the therein named defendants-children of Catalina having died or are living elsewhere, it wouldappear that only the therein named defendant, Ramon Alvarez, together with those deriving rights underhim, was served with summons thru Acosta. There is, however, no showing that substituted service ofsummons on Ramon Alvarez, under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

ALEGRIA P. BELTRAN v.JUDGE OSCAR E. DINOPOL, Executive Judge, Regional Trial

Court, Branch 24, Koronadal City, South Cotabato502 SCRA 446 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)A judge who allows the direct filing of an information without preliminary investigation is guilty of Gross

Ignorance of the Law.Criminal complaints for Falsification of Public Documents and Attempted Murder were filed by

the local police before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) South Cotabato against Manuel Beltran. JudgeOscar E. Dinopol thereafter issued two (2) similarly worded Orders finding probable cause to hale theaccused into court and consequently ordered the issuance of warrants for his arrest. Subsequently,however, upon motion of the accused, Judge Laureano T. Alzate of RTC Koronadal City, quashed thecriminal complaints on the ground of, inter alia, absence of preliminary investigation. Thereafter, AlegriaP. Beltran, wife of the accused, filed a Letter Complaint charging Judge Dinopol with Gross Ignoranceof the Law and Abuse of Authority.

Judge Dinopol argues that such procedural lapse was due to the serious medical conditions ofhis two successive prosecutors which rendered them unable to constantly attend hearings. He likewisesubmits that given the length of time that there was no prosecutor in the RTC of Koronadal City, he andJudge Alzate, of another branch of the court, agreed, to accept cases directly filed by the police oncondition that after the arrest of the accused but before arraignment, the cases would be remanded tothe Prosecutors Office for further preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:


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Whether or not Judge Dinopol is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law in forgoingwith the procedural requirement of Preliminary Investigation

HELD:

Preliminary investigation of criminal cases is intended to protect the accused from theinconvenience, expense, and burden of defending himself in a formal trial until the reasonableprobability of his guilt has first been ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competentofficer. It also protects the State from having to conduct useless and expensive trials.

If, as Judge Dinopol tries to justify his questioned act, the city prosecutor had been sickly, hecould have endorsed the criminal complaint to the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Koronadal City. Thealleged instruction of the MTCC judge not to accept cases for preliminary investigation did not justifyJudge Donopols violation of the Rules. Neither did the alleged failure of the designated Acting CityProsecutor to attend to all criminal cases in the city. Under those circumstances, Judge Dinopol was notwithout any remedy.

Parenthetically, why would, by Judge Dinopols own claim, allow the filing in the RTC ofcriminal cases which have not been subjected to preliminary investigations and, after issuing the warrantsof arrest, remand [the cases] to the Prosecutors Office for further preliminary investigation? A caseof putting the cart before the horse!

PANFILO A. ABAIGAR v.JESUS A. ABAIGAR506 SCRA 318 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

Certification by principal party, not counsel, is required in a Certification against Non-Forum Shopping.On challenge are the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 30,

2004 and February 4, 2005 dismissing herein Panfilo Abaigars Petition for Review on the ground that the

Certification against Forum Shopping has been signed merely by his counsel.

Panfilo moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts dismissal of his petition, explainingthat he had left for the United States before the filing of the petition, which fact should be deemedreasonable causefor failure to personally sign the certification; and that he has a good and meritoriouscase and substantial justice could be better served if his petition is reinstated. The CA denied the Motionfor reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not the circumstances surrounding the case requires a relaxation of the rule that a

Certification against Non-Forum Shopping be signed by the principal party himself

HELD:A certification by counsel and not by the principal party himself is no certification at all. It is adefective certification which is tantamount to non-compliance with the requirement prescribed by theRules of Court and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. This is because it is thepetitioner and not the counsel who is in the best position to know whether he actually filed or caused thefiling of the petition. The appellate court, strictly speaking, was, therefore, correct when it dismissed thepetition in this case. There have been instances, however, that the Rule on the matter has been relaxedsuch as when the interest of substantial justice overrides the procedural lapse.


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Panfilo, in this case, did not specify the prevailing circumstances nor advancethat he has or why he has a meritorious case to merit setting aside of technicalities.

LUDWIG H. ADAZA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al.464 SCRA 460 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J. )

Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over falsification cases committed not in relation to officeDepartment of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) of 1stDistrict of Zamboanga del Norte

awarded to Parents and Teachers Association (PTA)of Manawan National High School (MNHS) acontract for the construction of a school building at an agreed consideration of P111,319.50. Upon thecompletion of the project, PTA failed to receive the last installment payment amounting to P20,847.17.

PTA president Felix Mejorda (Mejorda) was informed by Hazel Pearanda, DPWH Cashier, thatthe check for P20,847.17 had been released to Ludwig H. Adaza (Adaza).

Subsequently, Mejorda found out that acknowledging receipt of the check bears his name andsignature which was not his. He likewise noticed that Adazas signature was affixed on the voucher.During that time, Adaza was municipal mayor of Jose Dalman. Upon examination of DBP Check issuedto payee, Mejorada noticed that there were two signatures at the dorsal portion of it, his forged signatureand another which he found to be that of Aristela Adaza (Aristela), wife of Adaza.

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations against Adaza. The Sadiganbayan foundAdaza guilty of the offense charged. It thereafter issued a Bench Warrant of Arrest. Hence, the filing ofthis petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the falsification case against Adaza whichwas not in relation to his position as municipal mayor

HELD:

In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged falsification was committed by theaccused, if at all, as a consequence of, and while they were discharging, official functions. Theinformation does not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of officialduties and the commission of the offense. . . .

Clearly therefore, as the alleged falsification was not an offense committed in relation to theoffice of the accused, it did not come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It follows that all itsacts in the instant case are null and void ab initio.

BANCO DE ORO UNIVERSAL BANK v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.468 SCRA 166(2005), THIRD DIVISION, (Carpio Morales,J.)

The counterclaim must be existing at the time of the filing of the answer, though not at the commencement ofaction.


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Having failed to comply with the Credit Line Agreement (CLA) obligation, Bancode Oro Universal Bank filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC) anapplication for an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties against Gabriel and Ma.Geraldine Locsin. Subsequently, the Locsins filed a complaint against BDO, the RTC Clerk of Court andEx-Oficio Sheriff of Quezon City, and Sheriff VI Marino V. Cahero, for Specific Performance, Tort andDamages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a Writ of

Preliminary Injunction. The RTC denied the issuance of a TRO.

A Supplemental Complaint was filed by the Locsins. They repleaded in toto the allegations intheir Complaint and additionally alleged that BDO proceeded with the public auction of the propertiescovered by the mortgage in the CLA contrary to law. BDO admitted that the public auction took placebut it denied that it was contrary to law.

More than eight months after the Locsins filed their Supplemental Complaint, BDO filed acomplaint against them before the Mandaluyong RTC for Collection of Sum of Money. To such, theLocsins filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it should have been raised as compulsorycounterclaim in their complaint and by failing to raise it as such, it is now barred by the rules. TheRTC denied the same.

The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the MandaluyongRTC finding that BDOs complaint was a compulsory counterclaim which should have been raised in itsAnswer to the Locsins complaint, and having failed to do so, it is now barred.

ISSUE:

Whether or not BDOs complaint is barred for failure to raise it as a compulsory counterclaim inits Answer to the Locsins complaint

HELD:

The Court held that until after the Locsins allegedly refused and failed to settle the allegeddeficiency amount of their outstanding obligation, despite BDOs letter of demand sent to the Locsins,BDOs cause of action had not arisen. BDO could not, therefore, have set its claim assumingarguendo that it is a compulsory counterclaim.

The counterclaim must be existing at the time of the filing of the answer, though not at thecommencement of action-a premature counterclaim cannot be set in the answer. The party who fails tointerpose a counterclaim although arising out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction oroccurrence of the plaintiffs suit but which did not exist or mature at the time said party files his answeris not thereby barred from interposing such claim in a future litigation.

The setting up of such after-acquired counterclaim, is merely permissive, not compulsory. Atall events, even if the claim of BDO is a compulsory counterclaim which should have been set up in itsAnswer to the Locsins Supplemental Complaint, technicality should give wayto justice and equity toenable BDO to pursue its after-acquired claim against the Locsins.

LDP MARKETING, INC., et al. v. ERLINDA DYOLDE MONTER483 SCRA 137 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)


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The requirements in regard to the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping may be tempered byspecial circumstance or compelling reasons.

A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by Erlinda Dyolde Monter against LDP Marketing,Inc. (LDP) and LDP's Vice-President-co-petitioner Ma. Lourdes Dela Pea. The Labor Arbiter and theNLRC ruled in favor of Monter. LDP filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorariwherein

the Verification/Certification of non-forum shopping was accomplished by Dela Pea.

The Court of Appeals, citing Digital Microwave Corp. v. CA, dismissed LDP's petition for "failingto attach to the petition a copy of the company board resolution authorizing said Ma. Lourdes Dela Peato sign the said Verification/Certification of non-forum shopping for and in behalf of LDP."

LDP filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached a Secretary's Certificate quotinga Resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of LDP during a special meeting giving authority toDela Pea to represent the corporation in this case. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Petition for Certiorari should be granted despite the belated filing of amandatory written authorization to sign the verification/certification against forum shopping

HELD:

In the more recent case of Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals cited by LDP, the thereinpetitioner Shipside Incorporated filed a Petition for Certiorariand Prohibition with the Court of Appealswhich, however, dismissed it, citing absence of proof that the one who signed the Verification andCertification of non-forum shopping, its Manager Lorenzo Balbin, Jr., was authorized to institute thepetition for and in behalf of the petitioner. Shipside Incorporated filed a Motion for Reconsideration towhich it attached a certificate issued by its board secretary stating that ten days before the filing of the

petition, its board of directors authorized Balbin to file it. The Court of Appeals just the same denied theMotion for Reconsideration.

The Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading isformal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading,non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification issimply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and notthe product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.

The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submissionthereof after the filing of the petition. In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court hasallowed the belated filing of the certification.

In the case at bar, the merits of LDP's case should be considered special circumstances orcompelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forumshopping.

ROLANDO DE TUMOL v.JULIANA DE TUMOL ESGUERRA, et al.463 SCRA 542 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)


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Dionisio De Tumol (De Tumol) was a beneficiary of farm holding located inNueva Ecija, which was issued by Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hesubsequently died leaving as heirs his wife Monica Sta. Ana de Tumol (Monica) and his four childrennamely respondents Juliana de Tumol Esguerra, Francisca Alejandro and petitioner Rolando de Tumol.

Upon the request of De Tumol for the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), it

noted that De Tumols co-heirs executed a document waiving their rights and interests over thefarmholding. Thereafter, DAR issued a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) Beneficiarycertificate to De Tumol.

However, Monica, represented by Juliana De Tumol Esguerra et al., filed a petition before theDepartment of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). De Tumol Esguerra et al.allege that DeTumol worked with deceit to transfer in his name the ownership of the landholding prejudicing his co-heirs.

Esguerra et al. subsequently filed a petition against the De Tumol before the DARAB allegingthat being a compulsory heir and considering that their mother is too old to bring an action, in theabsence or due to incapacity of the surviving spouse, priority shall be terminated among the heirsaccording to age.

De Tumol presented contends that the dispute was already settled, Esguerra et alhad been givenher share, which she, however sold to Magsakay. The Provincial Adjudicator ruled in favor of Esguerra etal., noting that the dispute was not yet settled and therefore Dionisio De Tumols farmholding should betransferred and registered collectively in the names of the heirs. The Provincial adjudicator, thru theMunicipal Agrarian Reform Office, generated an Emancipation Patent in the names of all the heirs ofthe deceased. De Tumol appealed to DARAB. However, DARAB affirmed with the decision ofProvincial Adjudicator.

On appeal before Court of Appeals (CA), De Tumol asserts that DARAB gravely erred in

cancelling the emancipation patents and allocating the subject property in favor of Esguerra et al. Hefurther alleges that the action to cancel has already prescribed after the lapse of 3 years from 1985. TheCA however dismissed the petition based on technical grounds. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action to cancel has already prescribed after the lapse of 3 years

HELD:

Answering the issue in the affirmative, De Tumol argued before the CA that, inter alia,the order

for the cancellation of his emancipation patents has no legal basis, the action to cancel the same havingprescribed after the lapse of three (3) years from 1985, following agrarian laws.

Without resolving the petition on the merits, the CA, by Resolution of December 22, 2000,dismissed it on technical grounds, it noting a discrepancy between the registry receipts evidencing proofof mailing of copies of the petition upon Esguerra et al. and the illegibility of the challenged DARABDecision dated June 11, 1998 and Resolution dated May 24, 2000 as well as the other papers thereto


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attached, in breach of Sec. 6(c), Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure whichrequires the petition for review to be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original ora certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together withcertified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supportingpapers. x x x

Following Article 1141 of the Civil Code which provides:

ARTICLE 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.

This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership andother real rights by prescription. Real actions over immovable property, like Esguerra et al.s petition toenforce her claim as successor to her fathers farmholding, prescribe after 30 years.

Since Esguerra et als cause of action accrued from her fathers death in 1979, she had until 2009to institute her claim as rightful successor to his fathers farmholding.

In 1988, however, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) which provides suppletoryapplication of the provisions of the CODE OF AGRARIAN REFORM consistent with it was passed.The relevant provision of said Code which is not inconsistent reads:

Since Esguerra et als petition before the DARAB Regional Office was filed on December 29,1992,it is covered by the above-quoted CODE OF AGRARIAN REFORM provision on prescription.The 3-year prescriptive period should thus be reckoned, not from De Tumols and Esguerra et alsfathers death in 1979, but from the time CARL took effect which was on June 15, 1988. Hence, Esguerraet al. had until June 15, 1991 to file her case.

ALLGEMEINE-BAU-CHEMIE PHILS., INC., v. METROPOLITANBANK & TRUST CO., et al.

482 SCRA 247 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

Jurisdiction is determined from the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

Allgemein filed before Muntinlupa Regional Trial Court a motion for intervention, with prayerfor the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale, delivery of title, and damages and for theissuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondentMetropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) to consolidate its title and take possession of its properties.The RTC, however, denied the same.

Hence, Allgemein filed a separate petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and awrit of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied Allgemeins prayer for the


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issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for failure to establish a clear and unmistakableright to the subject properties.ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court committed grave error in denying Allgemeins prayer for awrit of preliminary injunctionHELD:

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and hence, the jurisdiction of acourt, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Allgemeins only prayerin CA-G.R. No. 71217 is "for the preservation of the status quo, that is, Allgemein, having in possessionover the subject properties for several years, shall retain such possession until the controversy before thesaid trial court has been finally resolved and Metrobank be prevented from taking over such possession."

Clearly, what Allgemein filed with the appellate court was an original action for preliminaryinjunction which is a provisional and extra-ordinary remedy calculated to preserve or maintain the statusquoof things and is availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can beheard.

An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, however.Under B.P. 129, the appellate court has original jurisdiction only over actions for annulment ofjudgments of the RTCs and has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not they are in aid of itsappellate jurisdiction.

Thus, for want of jurisdiction, the petition before the appellate court should have been dismissedoutright.

ELPIDIO BONDAD JR., Y BURAC v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES574 SCRA 497 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act provides that failure of the apprehending or buy-bust team to conductinventory of the seized articles warrant the acquittal of the accused.

Elpidio Bondad, Jr. was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina City, for violation of

Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive DangerousDrugs Act of 2002. During the trial, the prosecution witnesses averred that Bondad was arrestedpursuant to a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted where he was allegedly found to have been inpossession likewise of two other sachets of white crystalline substance, later on found to be theprohibited drug, shabu.

The prosecution witnesses admitted and confirmed that there was no physical inventory taken ofthe seized drugs, neither were there photographs taken thereof, immediately after its seizure andconfiscation, contrary to the mandate of Section 21(1), R.A. 9165.

Bondad denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted and claimed that he was really arrestedwhile he was playing billiards. he further contested that, assuming a buy-bust operation had really been

conducted, still the evidence presented by the prosecution could not really be admissible in evidence, asits integrity has clearly become highly questionable in the light of the unjustified failure of theprosecution witnesses, while acting as apprehending officers, to comply with the mandate of Section21(1) of R.A. 9165.

The RTC found Bondad guilty of the offense charge. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirnedthe lower Courts decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:


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Whether or not the object evidence are admissible against Bondad despite non-compliance with Section 21 (1) of R.A. 9165

HELD

In the present case, by the claim of one of the prosecution witnesses, he immediately marked theseized items which were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. By his admission, however, he didnot conduct an inventory of the items seized. Worse, no photograph of the items was taken. There was thusfailure to faithfully follow the requirements of the law.

Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, Bondad in the present case questioned early on, during the crossexamination of one of the prosecution witnesses, the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with theinventory and photographing requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 ,despite their awareness of suchrequirements.

In fine, as the failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the identityof the items seized, which is the corpus delictiof each of the crimes charged against Bondad, his acquittal is in

order.

VICTORIA J. ILANO v. HON. DOLORES L. ESPAOL, et al.478 SCRA 365 (2005) (Carpio Morales,J.)

Where the allegations of a complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions, its dismissal is not properfor the defendant may ask for more particulars.

Amelia Alonzo is a trusted employee of Victoria Ilano. During those times that Ilano is in theUnied States for medical check-up, Alonzo was entrusted with Ilanos Metrobank Check Book whichcontains both signed and unsigned blank checks.

A Complaint for Revocation/Cancellation of Promissory Notes and Bills of Exchange (Checks) withDamages and Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against Alonzo et al. before theRegional Trial Court of Cavite. Ilano contends that Alonzo, by means of deceit and abuse of confidencesucceeded in procuring Promissory Notes and signed blank checks. Alonzo likewise succeeded ininducing Ilano to sign antedated Promissory Notes. The RTC rendered a decision dismissing thecomplaint for lack of cause of action and failure to allege the ultimate facts of the case. On appeal, theCourt of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court erred in dismissing the complaint

HELD:

While some of the allegations may lack particulars, and are in the form of conclusions of law, theelements of a cause of action are present. For even if some are not stated with particularity, Ilano alleged1) her legal right not to be bound by the instruments which were bereft of consideration and to whichher consent was vitiated; 2) the correlative obligation on the part of the defendants-respondents torespect said right; and 3) the act of the defendants-respondents in procuring her signature on the


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instruments through "deceit," "abuse of confidence" "machination," "fraud,""falsification," "forgery," "defraudation," and "bad faith," and "with malice, malevolenceand selfish intent."

With respect to the checks subject of the complaint, it is gathered that, except for Check No.0084078, they were drawn all against Ilano's Metrobank Account No. 00703-955536-7 shows that it was

dishonored due to "Account Closed." When Ilano then filed her complaint, all the checks subject hereofwhich were drawn against the same closed account were already rendered valueless or non-negotiable,hence, Ilano had, with respect to them, no cause of action.

With respect to above-said Check No. 0084078, however, which was drawn against anotheraccount of Ilano, albeit the date of issue bears only the year 1999, its validity and negotiable character atthe time the complaint was filed was not affected.

It is, however, with respect to the questioned promissory notes that the present petition assumesmerit. For, Ilano's allegations in the complaint relative thereto, even if lacking particularity, does not aspriorly stated call for the dismissal of the complaint.

HUN HYUNG PARK v.EUNG WON CHOI526 SCRA 103 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

If the evidence presented is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, it does not followthat the same is insufficient to prove his civil liability.

Eung Won Choi (Choi) was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise knownas the Bouncing Checks Law, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati for issuing a postdatedcheck in the amount of P1,875,000. The same was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficientfunds. Choi filed a demurer to evidence after the prosecution rested its case. The Makati MetropolitanTrial Court granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case.

Hun Hyung Park (Park) appealed the civil aspect

of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect. RTC heldthat while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove respondents criminal liability, it did notaltogether extinguish his civil liability. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside itsdecision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings, so that the defendantmay adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case.ISSUES:

Whether or not the remand of the case to the MeTC is properHELD:

When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted forjudgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the

right to present evidence. At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civilaspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved.

In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adducecountervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the twoaspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence insuch aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect andat the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not


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insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence islikewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.

On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonabledoubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence.For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The

only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect iswhen there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.

In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any findingthat the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTCorder of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand. Indicatively, Choi stands by hisdefense that he merely borrowed P1,500,000 with the remainder representing the interest, and that healready made a partial payment of P1,590,000. Park counters, however, that the payments made by Choipertained to other transactions. Given these conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the casewould afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve thesame.

AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., et al. v. POWER MERGE CORPORATION476 SCRA 62 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

Cause of action may be determined on the four corners of the complaint and the annexes attached to it may beconsidered parts thereof.

Amos P. Francia, Jr. and his sister Cecilia Zamora placed, on the suggestion of the bankmanager, an investment at Westmont Investment Corporation (WINCORP). Every time his investmentmatures, Francia would instruct a roll over and he would be issued a receipt reflecting the amount of hisplacement, the net interest rate, and the duration of the placement. Soon, Francia and Cecilia attemptedto withdraw their investments but they failed for the reason that WINCORP and Westmont Bank were

facing financial difficulties.

Despite several attempts to forge an out-of-court settlement between Francia and Cecilia andWINCORP and PMC, the same failed. Francia sent PMC a demand letter to pay within fifteen days thetotal amount of the maturity values of his placement. Receiving no response from PMC, Francia andCecilia filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damagesagainst WINCORP and PMC. WINCORP and PMC filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that theallegations in the complaint and its annexes failed to state a cause of action. The trial court ruled in favorof Francia and Cecilia. PMC thereafter assailed the trial court's orders before the Court of Appeals viapetition for certiorariand prohibition under Rule 65. The CA reversed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint alleges a cause of action against PMC

HELD:

A cause of action has three elements, to wit: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlativeobligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.In the determination of whether these elements are present, inquiry is generally confined to the four


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corners of the complaint and no other, but the annexes attached to the complaint may beconsidered, they being parts thereof.

A perusal of the complaint, together with its annexes, shows that each of the ConfirmationAdvice issued by PMC to Francia and Cecilia provides that "WINCORP has acted in the client's behalfand/or for the client's benefit, risk and account without recourse or liability, real or contingent, to

WINCORP in respect to the loan granted to the Borrower," the "borrower" being PMC. EachConfirmation Advice thus shows that the creditor-debtor relationship is between Francia and Cecilia andPMC, WINCORP having merely acted as PMC's agent.

In another vein, by filing a Motion to Dismiss, PMC hypothetically admitted the truth of thematerial allegations of the complaint.

In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations ofthe plaintiff's complaint. This hypothetical admission extends to relevant and material facts pleaded in,and the inferences fairly deducible from, the complaint. Hence, to determine whether the sufficiency ofthe facts alleged in the complaint constitutes a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truthof the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer? PMC cannotthus disclaim privity of contract with petitioners for whom WINCORP was merely acting as agent.

FIRST WOMENS CREDIT CORPORATION and SHIG KATAYAMA

v.HON. ROMMEL O. BAYBAY, et al.513 SCRA 637 (2007), SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio Morales,J.)

The trial judge need not state with specificity or make a lengthy exposition of the factual and legal foundationrelied upon by him to arrive at his decision. It suffices that upon his own personal evaluation of the evidence and the lawinvolved in the case, he is convinced that there is no probable cause to indict the accused.

First Womens Credit Corp. (First Women), represented by stockholder and director ShigKatayama (Katayama), filed criminal charges against Ramon P. Jacinto (Jacinto), Jaime C. Colayco(Colayco), Antonio P. Tayao (Tayao) and Glicerio Perez (Perez) for falsification of private document andgrave coercion.

The criminal charges did not pursue when Jacinto, et al., filed a Motion to WithdrawInformations and to Dismiss the Cases. The same was granted by Acting Presiding Judge RommelBaybay of MeTC of Makati.

Kayatama filed a Motion for Reconsideration and was denied by the trial court. Kayatamaquestioned the decision of the RTC contending that the decision was not in accordance with law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court failed to comply with its mandate to make an independentassessment and evaluation before granting the motion of the accused

HELD:

Petition DENIED.


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Kayatamas assertion that the trial court failed to comply with its mandate to makean independent assessment and evaluation of the evidence before granting the motiondoes not persuade.

The court said that the trial judge need not state with specificity or make a lengthy exposition ofthe factual and legal foundation relied upon by him to arrive at his decision. It suffices that upon his own

personal evaluation of the evidence and the law involved in the case, he is convinced that there is noprobable cause to indict the accused.

JUANITO AGULAN JR.v. TERESITA S. ESTEBAN445 SCRA (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

The Clerk of Court, as the person directly responsible for all Court collections, is duty bound to have custody ofofficial receipts or at least must have direct access to the place where the same are kept.

Petitioner Juanito Agulan Jr, filed a complaint of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty againstrespondent Teresita Esteban in her capacity as Clerk of Court II of the 2ndMunicipal Circuit Trial Courtof Nueva Ecija. Esteban allegedly issued an invalid release order copy pursuant to a cash bond allegedlyposted by a ceratin Jesus Agulan.

Executive Judge Johnson L. Ballutay of the Cabantuan City Regional Trial Court recommendedthat Esteban be suspended from service for 3 months without pay. However, the Office of CourtAdministration (OCA) modified the penalty to a fine of P 1,000.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Esteban is guilty of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty

HELD:A clerk of court who is directly responsible for all court collections, should have custody of

official receipts or at least have direct access to the place where they are kept. In Estebans case, sheadmittedly received the cash bond on a Sunday, August 8, 1999, but that as the key to the office was inthe custody of the court aide, she issued the receipt only the following day, August 9, 1999, a Monday.

Why Esteban, a clerk of court, did not herself have a key to the court office or exert effort tocontact the court aide who, like her, was residing in General Natividad, speaks of her irresponsibility ornegligence.

It bears emphasis that the issuance of official receipt for any collections made by anygovernment office, whether fiduciary or accruing to the government, is required to insure that funds areproperly accounted for, not to mention that it is necessity in order to avoid the risk of losing ormisappropriating them.

That no prejudice was caused to the government or any party due to Estebans delay in issuingthe receipt does not exempt her from administrative liability. The Court does not countenance anyconduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which violatesthe norm of public accountability and diminishes or even just tends to diminish the faith of thepeople in the judiciary.


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EDWIN SALUSIANO MATUTINA v.PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK483 SCRA 184 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

A writ of preliminary injunction must be issued only upon showing that the petitioner has a right which may beviolated.

Edna Linda Matutina-Cortes (Edna) obtained from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) a loanin the amount of One Million (P1,000,000) Pesos. To secure payment, she mortgaged her parcel of landcovered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 28714. Edna defaulted in the payment of herobligation, prompting the PNB to subject mortgaged property to public auction through an extra-judicialforeclosure.

Three days before the scheduled public auction sale, Ednas brother, herein petitioner EdwinSalusiano Matutina (Edwin), filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage with prayer for the issuance oftemporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. Edwin alleged in his complaint that themortgaged property was owned by his now deceased father but that Edna, to his and their other siblingsexclusion, had it titled in her name.

The trial court grant said petition and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued.

Finding that the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial courtsimply adopted the general allegations of the Edwin in his Complaint even if the same were notsupported by proof. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial courts decision and deniedthe issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA gravely abuse its discretion in nullifying RTCs order and the issuance of

Writ of Preliminary Injunction

HELD:

A perusal of the records of the case at bar shows, however, that the trial court, in arriving at itsbelie[f] that there is need to at least temporarily restrain the defendants . . . , just parroted petitionersallegations in his STATEMENT OF FACTS in the complaint and in his Affidavit in support of hisprayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The minutes of a purported session held onDecember 19 (sic) 2003 do not show that testimonial or documentary evidence was presented duringthe session-alleged summary hearing on December 18, 2003, the spaces below the therein entriesTestimonial Evidence and Documentary Evidence being blank.

While Edwin attached to his complaint a photocopy of the cancelled TCT No. 24274 in Ednasname from which TCT No. 28714 covering the mortgaged lot was (together with TCT No. 28713covering another lot originally forming part of the property covered by TCT No. 24274) derived,nothing in TCT No. 24274 indicates that Edna acquired it from her and petitioners father, EduardoMatutina.

And while Edwin attached too to his complaint a photocopy of a SPECIAL POWER OFATTORNEY (SPA) purportedly executed by Edna authorizing him and three others [t]o come to anagreement as and thereafter to sign for [her] in [her] name to divide the said lot as mentioned in TCT


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No. 24274, not only is this SPA a mere photocopy. It is undated, unnotarized. Worse,the phrase to divide the said lot as mentioned in TCT No. 24274 means just that. Intohow many portions the said lot was going to be divided or why the said lot was being divided or towhom the divided portions of the said lot were going to be allotted, it cannot be gatheredtherefrom. It is thus non sequitur to imply that petitioner and the three others mentioned in that SPAwere, together with Edna, co-owners of the property covered by TCT No. 24274.

Oddly enough, Edwin does not challenge Ednas ownership of the above-said other lot coveredby TCT No. 28713 into which TCT No. 24274 was divided, which lot was, by his own information,conveyed to one Editha M. Ramil.

There being then no showing or indication that Edwin had a right to the mortgaged propertywhich may be violated by its sale at public auction, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the trialcourt committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the prayer for and issuing the writ of preliminaryinjunction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EVELYN PATAYEK y CALAG, et al.399 SCRA 490 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

Absent any proof of intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against theaccused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty stands.

Evelyn Patayek (Patayek) and Arlene Goya (Goya) were charged with the crime of violation ofSection IV, Article II of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 for selling and delivering approximatelythree (3) kilos of suspected marijuana dried leaves with flowering tops wrapped with newspaper pagesand light brown masking tape placed in a black travelling bag with yellow strap, a prohibited drug, wellknowing that the sale and delivery of such drug is prohibited without authority of law to do so.

Based on the testimonies of SPO1 Modesto Carrera (Carrera) who was designated as the poseur-

buyer during an entrapment operation, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found both of the accused guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale and delivery of three (3) kilos of marijuana ascharged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of SPO1 ModestoCarrera

HELD:

Two basic elements for the charge of sale of prohibited drugs to prosper are: (a) the identity of

the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold andpayment therefor. The prosecution has proven the elements of the crime charged. The object of the salewas found by the PNP chemist positive for marijuana. The buy-bust money was recovered from themafter the transaction. All the elements of the crime were in fact established through Carreras testimony.

Patayek and Goya assail the credibility of Carreras testimony as not straightforward, claimingthat he even appeared reluctant to testify in court and had, along with other NARCOM operatives, thepropensity to fabricate cases. While the trial court observed that Carrera has time and again givenhimself away as clumsy in testifying, it nevertheless held that such detracts nothing from the core ofthe testimony he has given in the case at bench which exonerably points to the guilt of the accused.


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Patayek and Goyas defense that they were merely framed-up does not thuspersuade. It bears emphasis that frame-up as a defense has been invariably viewed withdisfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common standard defense ploy in most prosecutions forviolations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. That is why clear and convincing evidence is required to provethe defense which, in their case, they failed to discharge.

Absent any proof of intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious

crime against Patayek and Goya, the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty,as well as the doctrine that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to greatrespect, must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellants that they had beenframed-up.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REY SUNGA, et al.399 SCRA 480 (2003), EN BANC(Carpio Morales,J.)

The testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accusedcannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed orparticipated in the commission of the crime.

Upon the discovery of the mutilated body of a high-school girl at a coffee plantation, anInformation was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Rape with Homicide against severalsuspects including Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, andLocil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice.

Rey Sunga et al. filed with the RTC a petition for bail underscoring the weakness of theprosecutions evidence, there being no direct evidence against them. In the same proceeding, a motionwas granted to discharge Locil to become a state witness while deferring the resolution of the bailpetition.

Through the testimony of Locil, the RTC reached to a decision convicting Sunga and Lansang as

principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of death, andPascua as principal in the crime of Rape.

ISSUE:

Whether the guilt of Sunga et al.has been proven beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

HELD:

The testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to orimplicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moralcertainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must

be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and strongcircumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest.

As an exception to the general rule on the requirement of corroboration of the testimony of anaccomplice or co-conspirator-turned state witness, her testimony may, even if uncorroborated, besufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and ina straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not have been the result ofdeliberate afterthought.


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The Court is not in fact prepared to accord Locil credibly as a witness. Who cantrust one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a boarding housealbeit she has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to evade being tracedby her mother and aunt?

Evidence to be believed should not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness butshould also be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can

approve as probable under the circumstances.The observations pertaining to both the weak, incomprehensible voice with which Locil gave her

testimony, the improbability with which she was precisely made by appellants to be a witness to theircrime, and the failure of her description of Pascuas eyes to match the latters actual physical featurecannot but engender serious doubts as to the reliability of her testimony against all appellants. TheCourt thus finds her uncorroborated account to have failed the jurisprudentially established touchstonefor its credibility and sufficiency, that of straightforwardness and deliberateness, as evidence to warrantappellants conviction.

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR.v. LEONILAPORTUGAL-BELTRAN

467 SCRA 184 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta andshe gave birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-petitioner. Meanwhile, Lazo gave birth to respondentLeonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal.

Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver of Rights overthe estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed, Portugals siblings waivedtheir rights, interests, and participation over a parcel of land in his favor.

Lazo died. Portugal also died intestate. Having such situation, Portugal-Beltran executed anAffidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person adjudicating to herself the parcelof land. The Registry of Deeds then issued the title in her name.

Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City a complaintagainst Portugal-Beltran for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication alleging that she is not relatedwhatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the parcel of land. But such wasdismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action on the ground that Puerta and Portugal Jr.s status amdright as putative heirs had not been established before a probate court, and lack of jurisdiction over thecase.

Puerta and Portugal Jr. thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTCs

dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to determine theirstatus as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of Portugal-Beltrans Affidavit ofAdjudication and of the title issued in her name

HELD:


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The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties areputative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the specialproceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstancesof the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raisedand settled in said special proceedings.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate ofPortugal is the parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a specialproceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of Puerta andPortugal Jr. as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses ofan administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case-subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court whichassumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to stillsubject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of Puerta and Portugal Jr.sstatus as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by Puerta and Portugal Jr., the trial court shouldproceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereonupon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.COURT OF APPEALS, et al.458 SCRA 200 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

A special proceedings is a remedy which seeks to estalish a status, a right or a particular fact.

Apolinaria Malinao filed a petition before the Ormoc Regional Trial Court for the Declaration ofPresumptive Death of her Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc which was granted by Order of

September 29, 1999.The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal.The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal as the present case is a special proceeding whichrequires that a record of appeal be filed and served pursuant to Section 2 (a) Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure. The Republic filed a Petition for Certioraribefore the Court of Appeals as its Motion forReconsideration before the trial court was denied. The Republic contends that the declaration ofpresumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature ofa special proceeding

HELD:

As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a civil action is one by which a partysues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong" whilea special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as a remedy by which a party seeks toestablish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320,March 2, 1999).


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Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instantpetition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petitionmerely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse ClementeJomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of awrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against anyperson.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denyingOSG's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice ofAppeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special proceeding, OSGshould have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules ofCourt .

ROGER MANZANOv. LUZ DESPABILADERAS447 SCRA 123 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

At any time after issues have been joined, a party may serve upon any other party a written request for theadmission by the latter of the genuineness of relevant documents.

Petitioner Roger Manzano (Manzano) filed an action for the enforcement of money debt withdamages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga against Respondent Luz Despabiladeras(Despabiladeras) who received construction materials from the former on credit. During pre-trial, theparties agreed that Manzano shall submit an offer to stipulate showing an itemized list of materialsdelivered to Despabiladeras together with the cost claimed by Manzano within 15 days. Despabiladerasshall state her objections if any or comment therein within the same period of time.

Instead of submitting the same, Manzano filed a Request for Admission asking Despabiladerasto admit the materials particularly described therein, that the value of the goods delivered amount to

P314,610.50 and that only P130,000.00 has been paid. But Despabiladeras gave no response to the saidrequest.

The RTC ruled against Despabiladeras while The Court of Appeals held in her favor settingaside the implied admission which served as the basis of the RTCs decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the unanswered request for admission has any legal consequences

HELD:

Rule 26 of the Rules of Court provides that at any time after issues have been joined, a party mayserve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness ofrelevant documents described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material andrelevant matters of fact set forth in the request.

The above-quoted sections should not be disregarded as in fact the trial court did not, when itordered Despabiladeras to file comment thereon, just because the parties mutually agreed that Manzano


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submit an offer to stipulate. For as stated earlier, the request for admission is a remedyafforded any party after the issues have been joined.

Despabiladeras having failed to discharge what is incumbent upon her under Rule 26, that is todeny under oath the facts bearing on the main issue contained in the Request for Admission she wasdeemed to have admitted that she received the construction materials, the cost of which was indicated in

the request and was indebted to the petitioner in the amount stated therein.

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA) v. HONORABLEFELICIANO V.BUENAVENTURA et al.


It is the NLRC, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction to enjoin the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Because of serious institutional problems brought about by failure to pay maturing bills,National Electrification Administration (NEA) extended loans to Nueva Ecija III Electric Cooperative,Inc. (NEECO III). Consequently, the latter mortgaged its entire electric system or entire property toNEA. When NEECO III failed to pay its amortizations, NEA took over the properties and assets of thedissolved NEECO III.

Meanwhile, former employees of NEECO III subsequently filed complaints against NEECO IIIfor illegal dismissal, reinstatement, non-payment of salaries/backwages, 13thmonth pay, differentials, andbonuses. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the dismissed employees and ordered NEECO III toimmediately reinstate them with full payment of backwages and other damages. They subsequently filedbefore the NLRC anEx ParteMotion for Alias Writ of Execution to collect the amount representing theaward. NEECO III failed to comply with the order. The Regional Trial Court thereafter issued an orderfor the Sheriff to auction movable or immovable properties of NEECO until the award is satisfied.

NEA assailed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City the Alias Writ of

Execution. RTC denied the Motion on the ground that the trial court is powerless to restrain the LaborArbiter whose decision became final and executory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction to enjoin NLRC and its labor arbiters from enforcingjudgment or order regarding actions involving labor disputes

HELD:

The petition must be dismissed outright on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It is the NLRC,

not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over NEA's move for the quashal of the Alias Partial Writ ofExecution. Ostensibly the complaint before the trial court was for the recovery of possession andinjunction, but in essence it was an action challenging the legality or propriety of the levy vis--visthe aliaswrit of execution, including the acts performed by the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sheriffimplementing the writ. The complaint was in effect a motion to quash the writ of execution of a decisionrendered on a case properly within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

In case of failure to collect the said amount in cash, you are hereby directed to cause the fullsatisfaction of the same from the movable or immovable properties of NEECO III is not exempt from


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execution in accordance with the provision[s] of the Labor Code of the Philippines andthe New Rules of Court.

Precedents abound confirming the rule that said courts have no jurisdiction to act on labor casesor various incidents arising therefrom, including the execution of decisions, awards, or orders. Jurisdictionto try and adjudicate such cases pertains exclusively to the proper labor official concerned under theDepartment of Labor and Employment.

Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate cases regarding labor disputes pertains exclusively to the properlabor official concerned under the Department of Labor and Employment. To hold otherwise is tosanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. NEA's argumentthat the NLRC acquired no jurisdiction over it does not persuade.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.ROBERTO T. GARCIA529 SCRA 519 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

When a person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, a private parsonmay, without warrant, arrest a person.

Roberto T. Garcia and Melissa B. Cruz were caught in a buy-bust operation of possessingdangerous drug specifically Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). They were subsequently chargedbefore the Regional Trial Court for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The RTCrendered judgment finding Garcia and Cruz guilty of the offense charged.

On appeal, Garcia faulted the trial court in not finding that he was illegally arrested. He insistedthat none of the circumstances justifying a warrantless arrest under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the RevisedRules on Criminal Procedure was present. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was illegally arrested because a warrant of arrest was not presentedby the law enforcers

HELD:

Here, the Supreme Court said that the accused was wrong in saying that a warrant of arrestshould have been presented before the law enforcers arrested him.

The Court said Garcia was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of selling a sachet containingsubstances which turned out to be positive for shabu to poseur-buyer PO2 Barrameda. And as soon as

he was arrested, he was frisked by the arresting officers in the course of which a sachet also containingsubstances which too turned out to be positive for shabu was found in his pocket.

Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a peaceofficer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person tobe arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Havingcommitted the crime of selling shabu in the presence of the buy-bust operation team, and having beenfound to be in possession of another sachet of shabu immediately thereafter, Garcias arrest withoutwarrant is, unquestionably, justified.


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For a successful prosecution of a charge for illegal sale of a prohibited drug, thefollowing elements must concur: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, andthe consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material isproof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the objectevidence. Such requirements are present in this case.

MA. ELLAINE D. PANAGA v.COURT OF APPEALS503 SCRA 676 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

Ma. Ellaine D. Panaga filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Toyota Cubao, Inc. and itsemployees. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment against Toyota.

Panaga thereafter filed a Petition for Certioraribefore the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissedPanagas petition on the ground that it was found to be fatally flawed for it failed to contain an Affidavitof Proof of Service required by Section 13 of Rule 13 and for appending only the decisions of the LaborArbiter and the NLRC.

Panagas counsel filed a Motionfor Reconsideration of the appellate courts resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition

HELD:

While the initial determination of what pleadings or relevant or pertinent documents should beattached to the petition lies on petitioner, the final determination thereof lies on the appellate court.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the petition shall be accompanied by a

certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadingsand documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping asprovided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

In the present case, the labor arbiter summarized in its decision the material allegations in therespective pleadings of the parties. The NLRC decision, on the other hand, fully quoted the report andrecommendation on Panagas appeal whichsummarized Toyota Cubao, Inc. et al.s memorandum ofappeal. Given these, and taking into consideration the contents of the two documents appended toPanagas petition for certiorari filed before it, the appellate court could determine whether the petitionmake out aprima faciecase.

PASCUAL and SANTOS, INC.v. THE MEMBERS OF THE TRAMO WAKAS

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.442 SCRA 438 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

A petition for review may be dismissed if it does not comply with the requirements provided for in the Rules ofCourt.

The Director of the Land Managment Bureau (LMB) granted the petition of respondent, TheMembers of the Tramo Wakas Neighborhood Association, Inc. (TRAMO WAKAS) which prayed forthe grant of ownership over 3 parcels of land situated in Paranaque City. The same property is being


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claimed by petitioner Pascual and Santos Inc. (PSI). PSI appealed the said decision tohigher adjudicatory bodies but was denied and dismissed for lack of merit.

The Court of Appeals (CA) likewise dismissed the petition on the ground of Infirm Verificationand Certification of Non-forum Shopping for the same does not show proof that the persons whosigned therein were duly authorized by the corporation. The Court further ruled that the petition has not

been filed on time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the persons who executed the verification and certification of non-forumshopping attached to PSIs petition were authorized to do so

HELD:

Section 6 (d) of Rule 43 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court mandates that apetition for review shall contain a sworn certification against forum shopping in which the Pascual andSantos Inc. shall attest that he has not commenced any other action involving the same issues in thisCourt, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there issuch other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learnthat a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before this Court, the Court of Appeals,or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform theaforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five days therefrom.

For failure to comply with this mandate, Section 7 of Rule 43 provides that the failure of thepetitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket andother lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and thedocuments which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

The Court has ruled that the subsequent submission of proof of authority to act on behalf of apetitioner corporation justifies the relaxation of the Rules for the purpose of allowing its petition to begiven due course.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shoppingis mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat theobjective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum shopping.

FEDERICO A. POBLETE, et al. v.HONORABLE JUSTICESEDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, et al.

426 SCRA (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales,J.)

The test on whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a compliant or information iswhether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after theamendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information.

The officers of Samahan ng Lahing Mandaragat ng Pulborista, Inc. (Samahan) filed acomplaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner municipal officials of Kawit, CaviteFederico A. Poblete,et al. The complaint alleges that the officials caused the registration of foreshoreland in Barangay Binakayan, Kawit in the name of the Municipality of Kawit and subsequently sold thesame to FJI Property Developers, Inc., notwithstanding that under Commonwealth Act No. 141,


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specifically, Title III, Chapter [8], Section 59 in relation to Section 61, the land isinalienable and cannot be disposed by any mode or transfer, except by lease.

The complaint further avers that the sale of the land caused undue prejudice and injury to poorpeople, especially the indigent families who claimed it as communal fishing grounds since timeimmemorial, and gave private parties unwarranted benefits, the contract or transaction being manifestly

and grossly disadvantageous to the government and the public.

In an Ex-parte Motion to Admit Amended Information to which the accused filed theirComment, the Ombudsman Prosecutor sought to amend the information by inserting the number of thelot under controversy and the amount representing the price paid by FJI Property Developers Inc. for it.Also, the Ombudsman recommending further amendments to the information, the prosecution filed aMotion to Admit Amended Information (second Amended Information). For lack of merit, theSandiganbayan, denied the Motion to Quash the first amended information and by a subsequentResolution, it granted the Motion to Admit the second amended Information. Hence, the presentpetition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the secondamended Information

HELD:

As laid down by the Court, an amendment is only in form when it merely adds specifications toeliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely stateswith additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which,therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.

The mere re-arrangement of the words and phrases in the second Amended Information whichare also alleged in the first Amended Information does not change the basic theory of the prosecution,thus creating no material change or modification in the defenses of the accused.

Clearly, the allegations of Poblete, et al.are factual and evidentiary in nature which may best beconsidered as matters of defense to be ventilated in a full-blown trial. Lack of probable cause during thepreliminary investigation is not one of the grounds for a motion to quash. A motion to quash should bebased on a defect in the information, which is evident on its face. The guilt or innocence of the accused,and their degree of participation, which should be appreciated, are properly the subject of trial on themerits rather than on a motion to quash.

Poblete, et al.having failed to substantiate the grounds they invoked in their Motion to Quash

the first Amended Information, and it having been established that the amendments introduced in thesecond Amended Information are mere matters of form, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuseof discretion in issuing its Resolutions of October 10, 2001 and November 8, 2001.

SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC., v. BRIGHT FUTURETECHNOLOGIES, INC.



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A private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government agencycharged with the enforcement of special penal law may appear, participate and file pleadings in the searchwarrant proceedings.

Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. (SCEI) filed a complaint against Bright Future TechnologiesInc. for copyright and trademark infringement before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The RTC

issued search warrants following which a raid was conducted on the premises of Bright FutureTechnologies, Inc. (BFTI).

BFTI filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and/or to Exclude or Suppress Evidence and ReturnSeized Articles. BFTI contends that SCEI had no personality to represent the People of the Philippinesand to file the opposition to the motion because SCEI's agents were mere witnesses of the applicant forthe issuance of the search warrants. However, the said motion was denied.

The RTC held that it would treat SCEI's counsel as an officer of the Court and that the two-witness rule was violated hence, it granted BFTI's Motion for Reconsideration. Subsequently, and returnthe items that were seized, subject to the filing of a bond.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SCEI has the right to participate in search warrant proceedings

HELD:

In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isipa private individual or a private corporation complaining to theNBI or to a government agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD,may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the

validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the properties seized inanticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI orsuch government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrantissued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such motion toquash.

When SCEI then opposed BFTI's Urgent Motion to Quash and/or to Suppress or ExcludeEvidence and Return Seized A