REMARKS ABOUT ARMISTICE AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE WAR PERIOD OF 1409-1411 (

T O R U Ń S C I E N T I F I C S O C I E T YFACULTY OF HISTORY

ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNEDEVOTED TO THE HISTORY OF POMERANIA

AND BALTIC COUNTRIES

VOLUME LXXV – YEAR 2010BOOK 2

ON THE 600TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE OF GRUNWALD

TORUŃ 2012

C O N T E N T

A l v y d a s N i k ž e n t a i t i s , Ž i v i l ė M i k a i l i e n ė : Lithuanian Žalgiris, Polish Grunwald: two national toposes in the context of comparative analysis. S o b i e s ł a w S z y b k o w s k i : Witnesses of the privilege of Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen of 28 October 1409. From the research on pro-Teutonic orientation among Dobrzyń Land’s noblemen in the war period of 1409–1411. K r z y s z t o f K w i a t k o w s k i : Th e fi rst impressions in Prussia aft er the defeat of the Teutonic Order in the battle of Grunwald. A d a m S z w e d a : Remarks about the armistice and peace documents from the war period of 1409–1411. S ł a w o m i r J ó ź w i a k : Teutonic enemy prisoners in the battle of Koronowo. D a r i u s z K . C h o j e c k i : Two cities, two diff erent worlds. Social-spatial diversifi cation of infant mortality in Szczecin in the years 1876–1913 (part II). M i c h a ł P s z c z ó ł k o w s k i : From the history of the construction of Toruń’s university campus 1967–1973.

T O R U Ń S C I E N T I F I C S O C I E T YFACULTY OF HISTORY

ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNEDEVOTED TO THE HISTORY OF POMERANIA

AND BALTIC COUNTRIES

PUBLISHED SINCE 1908(TO 1955 AS ZAPISKI TOWARZYSTWA NAUKOWEGO W TORUNIU)

VOLUME LXXV – YEAR 2010BOOK 2

TORUŃ 2012

EDITORIAL COUNCIL OF THE JOURNAL ZAPISKI HISTORYCZNEHead of the Council: Mieczysław Wojciechowski

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CONTENTS

O n t h e 6 0 0 t h A n n i v e r s a r y o f t h e B a t t l e o f G r u n w a l dAlvydas Nikžentaitis, Živilė Mikailienė, Lithuanian Žalgiris, Polish Grunwald: two na-

tional toposes in the context of comparative analysis ................................................. 5Sobiesław Szybkowski, Witnesses of the privilege of Grand Master Ulrich von Jungin-

gen of 28 October 1409. From the research on pro-Teutonic orientation among Dobrzyń Land’s noblemen in the war period of 1409–1411 ..................................... 17

Krzysztof Kwiatkowski, Th e fi rst impressions in Prussia aft er the defeat of the Teutonic Order in the battle of Grunwald ................................................................................... 35

Adam Szweda, Remarks about the armistice and peace documents from the war pe-riod of 1409–1411 ........................................................................................................... 51

Sławomir Jóźwiak, Teutonic enemy prisoners in the battle of Koronowo ....................... 69

A r t i c l e s Dariusz K. Chojecki, Two cities, two diff erent worlds. Social-spatial diversifi cation of

infant mortality in Szczecin in the years 1876–1913 (part II) ................................... 83Michał Pszczółkowski, From the history of the construction of Toruń’s university cam-

pus 1967–1973 ................................................................................................................. 145

Z A P I S K I H I S T O R Y C Z N E — V O L U M E L X X V — 2 0 1 0BOOK 2

ALVYDAS NIKŻENTATIS (Vilnius), ŽIVILE MIKAILIENE (Vilnius)

LITHUANIAN ŽALGIRIS, POLISH GRUNWALD: TWO NATIONAL TOPOI

IN THE CONTEXT OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Key words: national myth; culture of memory, culture of remembering

Th ere have appeared many studies concerning the historical importance of Žalgiris/Grunwald. Th e issue, irrespective of debates about – for example – the site of the battle1, has received suffi cient attention in Polish, German and Lithuanian historiography.2 However, not much has been said in respect to the comparative analysis of the problems connected with memory of the event. So far there has been research into the memory of the battle in individual countries3, but the recep-tion of the event in Poland and Germany4 has not been given enough attention.

* Th e fi rst edition of the article was published in Polish in Zapiski Historyczne, 2010: 75, z. 2, p. 7–21.

1 S. Ekdahl, Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410. Quellenkritische Untersuchungen, Bd. 1: Einfüh-rung und Quellenlage, Berlin 1982, pp. 354–357.

2 In the bibliography about the battle of Grunwald Publisher in 1990 there were 1662 books and articles recorded, see: H. Baranowski, I. Czarciński, Bibliografi a bitwy pod Grunwaldem i jej tradycja, Toruń 1990.

3 Th ere are many publications concerning the subject. Th us we shall reduce their number to the most recent ones: F. B. Schenk, Tannenberg/Grunwald, [in:] Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, hrsg. v. E. Francois, H. Schulze, Munchen 2001, pp. 438–454; S. Ekdahl, Tannenberg – Grunwald – Žalgiris: eine mittelalterliche Schlacht im Spiegel deutscher, polnischer und litauischer Denkmaler, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft , Bd. 50: 2002, pp. 103–118; A. Nikžentaitis, Zur Bedeutung und Funkti-onsweise eines litauischen Nationalmythos, [in:] Mare Balticum. Begegnungen zu Heimat, Geschichte, Kultur an der Ostsee, hrsg. v. D. Albrecht, M. Th oemmes, Munchen 2005, pp. 98–109; R. Traba, Grun-wald. Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion eines nationalen Mythos, [in:] ibid., pp. 110–132; idem, Kon-struowanie pamięci. Analiza semantycznapolskich obchodów rocznic grunwaldzkich, [in:] idem, Histo-ria – przestrzeń dialogu, Warszawa 2006, pp. 206–227; R. Petrauskas, D. Staliūnas, Die drei Namen der Schlacht. Erinnerungsketten um Tannenberg/Grunwald/Žalgiris, [in:] Verfl ochtene Erinnerungen. Polen und seine Nachbarn im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, hrsg. v. M. Aust, K. Ruchniewicz, S. Troebst, Koln–Weimar–Wien 2009, pp. 119–136.

4 S. Ekdahl, Tannenberg/Grunwald – ein politisches Symbol in Deutschland und Polen, Journal of Baltic Studies, vol. 22: 1991, Nr. 4, pp. 271–324; F. B. Schenk, op.cit.

A l v y d a s N i k ż e n t a t i s , Ž i v i l e M i k a i l i e n e6

Z a p i s k i H i s t o r y c z n e — V o l u m e L X X V — 2 0 1 0B o o k 2

In the last few decades the importance of the battle of Grunwald has not been considered in the context of researching the memory. Th is article attempts to fi ll in this gap at least partly.

If we tried to answer the question concerning the signifi cance of the battle of Grunwald in the face of its 600th anniversary, we could ascertain the major role of this event, which can be proved not only by celebrations taking place in Poland and Lithuania5, the aim of which is to commemorate the event, but also by con-ferences organized in various countries. Th e name Žalgiris/Grunwald appears in other contexts, for example as the name of a street or a sport venue. Irrespective of the popularity of the name, the signifi cance of Žalgiris/Grunwald in the culture of memory of Lithuania and Poland has not been defi ned. Having taken into ac-count that the event has been present in the history of Lithuania and Poland for hundreds of years, it should be examined historically, with special emphasis given to the representations of the event in periods of nationalism.

1. IMAGES OF THE BATTLE OF GRUNWALD IN LITHUANIAN SOCIETY

Considering the role of the battle of Grunwald in social consciousness, fi ve periods may be distinguished:

1) the memory of the battle of Grunwald in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania started to develop soon aft er the battle; it took its fi nal forms in the mid-16th cen-tury;

2) the image of the battle of Grunwald changed in the second half of the 16th century, and survived until the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century;

3) in the 20th century the narration about Grunwald changed three times: in Lithuania Grunwald was perceived diff erently in the inter-war period, in the So-viet period and aft er 1990.

We refer to the memory of the battle of Grunwald in the pre-nationalist period only because it was then that all interpretations of the battle used in the period of nationalism were created. Th e Lithuanians came back to the subject of Grunwald wanting to emphasize their diff erence from Poles (in the 16th century and in the fi rst half of the 20th century), wanting to be closer to Poles (from the end of the 16th century to the beginning of the era of nationalism and aft er 1990), and only once – in the Soviet Lithuania – the subject of the battle was used as a weapon against Western imperialists. Th us in all cases the discourse was connected with the prob-lem of Lithuanian identity. In the fi rst half of the 16th century, while the Lithuanian nation was being politically created, in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania there was a tendency to underline the fact that Lithuanians were diff erent from Poles. It was then that the story about the brave duke Vytautas and his courageous Lithuanians who defeated the Teutonic Order was created. Th e image of the grand leader was

5 See the programme of both parties: http://grunwald600.pl/.

Lithuanian Žalgiris, Polish Grunwald: two national topoi... 7


juxtaposed with the fi gure of pious Wladislaw Jagiello and the indecisive Poles who watched Lithuanians defeating the enemy.6

In the 17th century, Lithuanians knew the account of Jan Długosz according to which the Lithuanians escaped from the site of the battle of Grunwald. Th e re-sponse to the allegations of the chronicler came very quickly: the Lithuanians had not escaped as their retreat was a tactical manoeuvre.7

At the beginning of the 20th century the story of Grunwald reappeared. Al-though, given the gradual formation of the interpretation concerning Grunwald, it is hard to speak about any continuation of the tradition from previous centu-ries, it can be stated that the arguments remained the same. Th e desire to separate from Poland on the one hand, and the joint military actions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland on the other hand infl uenced the fact that in the fi rst historical studies in Lithuania at the beginning of the 20th century there appeared very few records about the battle. Poland’s intentions concerning the future ensured that the subject was treated very cautiously. As could be seen at the ceremony of the anniversary of the battle of Grunwald in Cracow in 1910, the revival of the past attempted to create the future. At the beginning of the 20th century Poles wanted to restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Th e Polish plans ensured that the Lithuanian delegation did not appear in Cracow in 1910. Th e Lithuanians sent there only observers.8

In the 1920s and 1930 the attitude of Lithuanians towards the battle did not change: it was moderate. Th e argument about the tactical manoeuvre of Lithua-nians during the battle was underlined and presented as the major factor aff ecting the result of the battle. However, Grunwald did not achieve the status of an inde-pendent historical theme in the culture of memory of the Lithuanians. It was only talked about as a brave deed of the grand Lithuanian duke Vytautas.9 Th is circum-spection was also the result of the cautious policy towards Germany. It was only in 1935, when there took place a serious crisis between Lithuania and Germany due to the confl ict regarding the Klaipėda Region, that the president of Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas Michał Römer made a public speech in which he mentioned the second Lithuanian-Polish Grunwald against Germany.10

Th e offi cial attitude of Lithuania towards the battle is shown by an event which took place in Prague. Th e military attaché of Lithuania while presenting creden-tials gave the president of Czecho-Slovakia a copy of the picture “Th e Battle of Grunwald” by Jan Matejko, stressing that “the picture of the famous Czech painter

6 See Полное Собрание Русских Летописей, т. 32, Москва 1975, s. 151.7 See Albert Wiiuk Koialowicz, Historia Litvaniae, vol. 2, Antverpiae 1669, p. 86 n.8 R. Petrauskas, D. Staliūnas, op.cit., p. 123.9 Comp. K. Binkis, Kaip Vytautas Didysis sutriuškino kryžiuočių galybę [How Vytautas the Great

defeated the Teutonic Order], Kaunas 1930.10 Comp. Vairas, 1935, Nr. 4, p. 508



is given to commemorate the Lithuanian-Czech victory over the common ene-my11 [bold type – A.N., Ž.M.]”.

As has been mentioned above, the discourse about the battle of Grunwald was oft en used to bring Lithuanians and Poles closer together. Th e fi rst time when the event was mentioned in this context was in 1564 at the Seym in Warsaw and led to the fi rst public discussion about the battle. Th e Lithuanians mentioned the joint campaigns of Lithuania and Poland in the past, including also the battle of Grun-wald (“Mutual help took place sometimes, the evidence of which is the old Polish anthem about the Prussian defeat [this is how the battle was referred to at that time – A.N., Ž.M.], where our Ancestors went forward and shed their blood: go away Poland because Lithuania has no gain”); the Cracow bishop reacted to it by recall-ing the Lithuanian escape from the battlefi eld as described by Jan Długosz and his successors (“Lithuania had no gain because it had escaped”).12 Nonetheless, the controversies concerning the past did not prevent both countries from signing the Union of Lublin fi ve years later.

Th e situation from 1564 was repeated at the end of the 20th century. Despite the fact that the common memory of the battle of Grunwald was not given as much attention as in the 16th century, the meeting of the presidents of Poland and Lithuania took place at the Battlefi eld of Grunwald on 15 July 2000. In the context of the desire to integrate with the European Union and NATO it was underlined that the battle was a good example of “strengthening security, stabilization and welfare in Europe”.13

Th e problem of Grunwald was used on a large scale in Soviet ideology. Prior to the outbreak of WWII, Joseph Stalin referred to themes connected with the past, exploited heavily during the war. In 1939 there appeared the fi rst publication about Grunwald14 in the Soviet Union. However, the topic was exploited on a larger scale by activists from the Lithuanian SSR who remained in the Soviet Union. In the inter-war period Soviet partisan units in Lithuania were given the names of medi-eval heroes, including ones from Grunwald.15 It must be noted that very soon, the Lithuanians followed the example and named one of their units Grunwald.

Th e Soviet Union referred to the past in a short period of time – more or less from 1947 to 1948. Later until the end of the 1950s both in the USSR and the LSSR, unlike in Poland, medieval history was not used to justify the contemporary reality.

Later, the only time when the past was exploited was during the rule of Nikita Khrushchev. Th e reference to the past used to strengthen policy consisted in seek-

11 L. Švec, Československo a pobaltske staty v letech 1918–1939. Vyvoj politickych a hospodařskych vztahů Československa s Litvou, Latyšskem a Estonskem v mezivalečnem obdobi, Praha 2001, p. 300.

12 A. T. Działyński, Źródłopisma do Dziejów Unii Kor. Polskiej i W. X. Litewskiego, vol. 2, part 1,Poznań 1861, p. 299 nn.

13 See http://adamkus.president.lt/one.phtml?id=1428.14 See R. Petrauskas, D. Staliūnas, op.cit., p. 127.15 Lietuviška tarybinė enciklopedija [Th e Soviet Lithuanian Encyclopedia], Vilnius 1984, vol.

12,p. 467.



ing themes common for both the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact. Th e fi ght against West European imperialism was given much attention, the evi-dence of which were celebrations of the anniversary of the battle of Grunwald in Poland and the attention it received from the First Secretary of the Central Com-mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

On the borders of the USSR – in the Lithuanian SSSR – the anniversary of the battle of Grunwald was celebrated with the same anti-imperialist focus. It was best described in post-war Lithuania by one of the most outstanding historians of the Middle Ages: “Th e history of Grunwald teaches us that we should observe closely the military plans of western imperialists. American militarists feed the Bundeswehr and supply it with weapons, but the fascist animal will not manage to get out of its hole, because it will be immediately killed”.16 Putting aside the similar degree of loft iness appearing in Moscow, Warsaw and Vilnius, the celebrations of the 500th anniversary of the battle of Grunwald were much more modest in Lithuania than in other places. Apart from a few occasional speeches, one of them being given by a worker of the “Žalgiris”17 factory, the organizers limited them-selves to placing a commemorative stone on Gediminas Hill [Pilies Kalnas] with the inscription “the monument to commemorate the Battle of Grunwald shall be built here”. It must be noted that the motif of the celebrations matched the general context of the Lithuanian fi ght against the Teutonic Order. In the evening of 15 July, the opera of Vytautas Klova Pilienai was performed. It was a story which even in the inter-war period was a symbol of the fi ght of Lithuanian soldiers against the German knights.18 Th e modesty of the anniversary celebrations is understandable. In 1960 a fear of referring to national history was still signifi cant and was propa-gated by Moscow. Th e Lithuanian authorities understood very well how dangerous history could be, even if in the offi cial propaganda it was interpreted “from the correct point of view”.

Th e anniversary of 1960 was an impulse to revise the Soviet historiography, on the basis of which the new Soviet ideology was to be created. It is obvious that the creators of the new ideology did not care much about the battle of Grunwald itself. Th e most important thing was to explain the division of the world into two parts. Th e representatives of the whole Soviet bloc did not have to worry for historical reasons as the new ideologists predicted how the historical causes of the division of the world into two camps should be properly presented. According to the newly created historical conception, the states belonging to the Soviet camp should be shown as historical allies. In other words, the ideological model of the USSR in the centre of which there was the “brotherly Russian nation” was transferred to other

16 Comp. Sovetskaja Litva of 15 July 1960.17 Vienybė – tautų jėga. Vilniuje atidengtas paminklinis akmuo pergalės prie Žalgirio 550 – mečio

proga [Unity – the power of nations. In Vilnius the commemorative stone was revealed dedicated to the 550th anniversary of the victory in the battle of Grunwald]], Tiesa, Nr. 166 of 16 July 1960.

18 Comp. D. Baronas, Pilėnai ir Margiris: faktai ir fi kcijos [Pilėnai and Margiris: facts and fi ction], [in:] Istorijos šaltinių tyrimai [Research of historical sources], kn. 1, Vilnius 2008, p. 27–63.



countries of the socialist camp. Such a model could be carried quite eff ectively. In case of Lithuania, one of the basic aims of the new ideology was to conciliate Lithuania and Poland.

Th e theme of Grunwald was particularly useful in this context, for apart from the Lithuanians and Poles, three Smolensk regiments included in the army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania fought against the Teutonic Order. In this situation, Długosz’s tradition of the battle of Grunwald according to which the Smolensk regiments played a crucial role in the fi ghts suited Soviet ideologists. Ignoring the national identity of the Smolensk soldiers, ideologists called them Russians in the sense of a modern nation and showed their actions as brotherly help to Poles and Lithuanians.19 It is understandable that the element was heavily exploited for ideo-logical purposes.

It must be stressed that the story was used by the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev20, whose speech was a signal for the ideologists of Soviet Lithuania that the battle of Grunwald should be mentioned and that Lithuanian-Polish relations should be revised. To achieve this aim a short work titled Draugystės santykių raida tarp lietuvių ir lenkų tautų [Th e develop-ment of friendly relations between the Lithuanian and Polish nations] was written by Juozas Žiugžda. Th e title of the work and its author – the head of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences in the Lithuanian SSR, one of the most important ideologists of the Soviet historical policy in Lithuania – leave no doubt that the appearance of the publication was to mark the beginning of new proc-esses in Lithuanian historical science which was to entail the thorough analysis of Lithuanian-Polish relations. Nevertheless, the book by Juozas Žiugžda was pub-lished only in Polish and was never translated into Lithuanian.

It is not clear why the action was started and then interrupted. On the other hand, the reasons for the failure of the action are quite obvious. Ideologists at-tempted to combine two things which could not be combined: Lithuanians were to be befriended by both Russians and Poles at the same time. Th e history of the battle of Grunwald, if properly interpreted, could be used to justify such a combi-nation. However, the whole history of the 20th century, most of all the question of Vilnius, could become a serious obstacle in the creation of the image of the Poles as historical friends of the Lithuanians. Th e Poles could not be at the same time brothers of the Lithuanians and invaders of the Vilnius region. How should the So-viet campaigns of 1939 be explained? Th us, the question of Vilnius not only in the fi rst half of the 20th century, but also in the years of the Soviet rule did not facilitate the most important ideological aims.

Th e unsuccessful attempt to create an ideology based on the common past of the countries of the Warsaw Pact aff ected the history of the Lithuanian USSR.

19 See История Литовской ССР, T. 1, Vilnius 1953, p. 163 n.20 See J. Žiugžda, Rozwój stosunków przyjaźni między narodami litewskim i polskim, Vilnius 1962,

s. 17 n.



Aft er 1960 the name “Žalgiris” was legitimized in the new context of Soviet life. In 1962 this name was given to the Vilnius football team (before it bore the name “Dynamo” and “Spartak”). Using Žalgiris to name a sports team was the most im-portant factor to impart a strong emotional charge. In other words, sport had won in the face of history. In the period of sovietization it was sport that paradoxically helped to maintain and strengthen the national identity.21

It must be stressed that the name “Žalgiris” also appeared in literature. Th e list includes a poem by Liudas Gira Žalgirio Lietuva [Lithuania of Grunwald] published in Moscow, and a poem by Teofi lis Tilvytis Žalgirio broliai [Brothers of Grunwald] (1960).22 In 1965 as part of the celebration of the 555th anniversary of the battle of Grunwald, the opera by Vytautas Klova Žalgiris was staged at the Th eatre of Opera and Ballet ( within a repertoire under a more neutral title Du kalavijai [Two swords]. In 1981 a poem by Sigitas Geda Žalgiris (written from 1968 and corrected many times) was published. It must stressed that it was during the Soviet period that the theme of Grunwald was emphasized. Th e myth of Grun-wald23 was created at that time.

2. IMAGES OF THE BATTLE OF GRUNWALD IN POLISH SOCIETY

Th e tradition of Grunwald in Poland, like in Lithuania, is deeply rooted. Th e research shows that, unlike in Lithuania, the battle began to be exploited politi-cally and was integrated into the culture of memory of Poland at the end of the 18th century.24 It was aft er the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that Germany joined the list of Poland’s enemies. Besides, while planning the rebirth of the Polish state, one had to remember about its lost lands.

Th e theme of Grunwald became particularly popular in Polish society in the 19th century when it was refl ected in literature and art including the novels of Hen-ryk Sienkiewicz and Jan Matejko’s historical picture “Th e Battle of Grunwald”, which popularized the visual version of the event.25

Th e subject of Grunwald in Poland, like in Lithuania, underwent a few diff er-ent stages. Th e historical topos of Grunwald had never lost its importance to Polish society despite the fact that at times interest in the subject declined temporarily.

In the last century the battle of Grunwald was twice considered to be a particu-larly important event, which in both cases was connected with the need to create a

21 I. Butautas, Rasa Čepaitienė. „Mus vienija alus ir pergalės“? arba sportas ir lietuviškoji tapatybė [We share beer or sport? Or sport and the Lithuanian identity], Lietuvos istorijos studijos, vol. 17: 2006, p. 101.

22 Tiesa, Nr. 165 of 15 July1960.23 A similar situation took place in case of uprisings in the 19th century. Aft er the transforma-

tion in the Soviet period they became the Lithuanian heritage, see D. Staliūnas, Savas ar svetimas paveldas? 1863–1864 m. sukilimas kaip lietuvių atminties vieta, Vilnius 2008.

24 S. Ekdahl, Tannenberg/Grunwald – ein politisches Symbol, p. 276 nn.25 J. Zdrada, Krakow – Grunwald 1910, [in:] Grunwald, „Rota”, Nowowiejski, ed. J. Chłosta,

J. Jasiński, Z. Rondomański, Olsztyn 2010, pp. 12–18.



new national identity. In both cases the content concerning the battle of Grunwald was signifi cantly modifi ed.

At the beginning of the 20th century, before the rebirth of Poland, the main emphasis was devoted to the victory over the Reich rather than over the Teutonic Order. Th e unity of the Polish state understood as the Polish-Lithuanian Common-wealth was stressed. Th e bishop Władysław Bandurski devoted to this subject two out of fi ve elements of his sermon given at the main celebration of the anniversary of the battle of Grunwald in 1910.26 It must be underlined that the ideas included in the sermon were to be realized through the invitation of representatives of the nations constituting the former Commonwealth – Lithuanians and Ukrainians, who declined the invitation and refused to visit Cracow.

Aft er WWII Grunwald again achieved the status of national myth. Howev-er, this time it was used to legitimize the “regained territories”27 and became the cornerstone for the anti-imperialist ideology of the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, there were some similarities in the way the idea of Grunwald was com-memorated in Poland and Lithuania: the name of the battle was eff ectively popu-larized among Polish communists and anti-communists during the war and in the fi rst years aft er the war.28

Just like during the rebirth of Poland at the beginning of the 200th century, aft er WWII the major role in commemorating the Grunwald myth was played by the celebrations of the 550th anniversary of the battle of Grunwald. It must be noted that both in Lithuania and Poland they were placed in a wider context. In the Peo-ple’s Republic of Poland they were part of a well thought out plan: the programme devoted to the celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the Polish State. One of its main objectives was to “neutralize” the Church in Poland, which prepared for the commemoration of the Millenium of the Baptism of Poland.29 Th e preparations took a few years. Communist leaders in Poland wished to give the ceremonies a powerful impetus.30 On 17 July 1960 in the Battlefi eld of Grunwald there took place ceremonies attended by the fi rst secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers’ Party Władysław Gomułka, other leaders, representatives from abroad, offi cial delegations from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. During the ceremony a monument commemorating the battle of Grunwald was unveiled. Supposedly, the ceremony was attended by about 200,000 Poles.

26 Comp. R. Traba, Grunwald. Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion eines nationalen Mythos, [in:] Mare Balticum. Begegnungen zu Heimat, Geschichte, Kultur an der Ostsee, hrsg. v. D. Albrecht, M. Th oemmes,Munchen 2005, p. 114.

27 Comp. G. Strauchold, Myśl zachodnia i jej realizacja w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1945–1957, Toruń 2003.

28 Comp. R. Traba, Grunwald. Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion, p. 115.29 A. Streikus, Istorinės atminties sovietizavimo ypatybės Lietuvoje, [in:] http://www.bernardinai.

lt/straipsnis/2005-11-16-arunas-streikusistorines-atminties-sovietizavimo-ypatybes-lietuvoje/567830 A. Dudek, Grunwald During Th e Communist Era in Poland, [in:] http://grunwald600.pl/

en,d47,grunwald_during_the_communist_era_in_poland_antoni_dudek.html.



Nevertheless, unlike in Lithuania, where the commemoration of the anniver-sary of the battle of Grunwald was considered a sign of thaw, in Poland aft er 1960 the commemoration of the Grunwald anniversary were received with criticism.31 Looking at the year 1960 with some perspective it can be stated that Polish society was becoming ready to reconcile with Germany. Th e evidence for this was the famous reconciliatory address of Polish bishops to German bishops32 announced fi ve years later. However, the intentions included in the bishops’ letter were not fully realized until 1990 at the Battlefi eld of Grunwald, where the former opposi-tion could express their opinion about the national myth created by the commu-nist authorities of Poland.33

During two other historical epochs: the Second Polish Republic (1918–1939) and aft er 1989, the myth of Grunwald was replaced by other myths. In the inter-war period the centre stone was occupied by the myth of Józef Piłsudski. Nowa-days, since 2002, the Warsaw Uprising (1944) has constituted the major myth of Poland.

In literature touching upon the signifi cance of Grunwald in those important historical periods, the memory of the event is frequently understated – it is re-duced to the list of cases when the battle was mentioned publicly. Th us, one can agree with the opinion that the memory of Grunwald was suitable in the descrip-tion of the situation of the confl ict between Germans and Poles in the inter-war period.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to limit the memory of the event only to this. It seems that the success of the myth of Józef Piłsudski in Poland as a Polish national hero is connected with the incorporation of the memory of Grunwald into the content of this myth. Th is concerns not only Grunwald.

Aft er the rebirth of the Polish state, Poles were particularly susceptible to his-torical narrations concerning fi ghts for freedom, in the centre of which were: the Constitution of May 3, uprisings – particularly the Kościuszko Uprising, the vic-tory of Jan III Sobieski near Vienna and others. Th e success of the myth and cult of Józef Piłsudski in many cases depended on combining all stories into one person. Such tendencies were visible for example in the performance staged in 1933 on the day of Piłsudski’s birthday Żywe obrazy Polski od Bolesława Chrobrego do Piłsudskiego [Vivid pictures of Poland from Bolesław Chrobry to Piłsudski] or in the series of stamps devoted to national heroes, published in 1938.34 Th e literature

31 D. Stankus, Jaunųjų turistų paštas, Lietuvos fi latelijos apžvalga, 2009 Spalis, No. 2, pp. 13–27 (http://www.phila.lt/assets/Uploads/Bulletin/2009/Lithuanian-Philately-Review-2-2009-October.pdf).

32 Comp. Versohnung und Politik. Polnisch–deutsche Versohnungsinitiativen der 1960-er Jahre und die Entspannungspolitik, hrsg. v. F. Boll, W. Wysocki, K. Ziemer, unter Mitarbeit v. T. Roth, Bonn 2009.

33 R. Traba, Grunwald. Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion, p. 123.34 Comp. H. Hein, Der Pilsudski – Kult und seine Bedeutung fur polnischen Staat 1926–1939,

Marburg 2002, p. 288.



describing the memory of Grunwald frequently mentions the monument com-memorating the battle unveiled in New York in 1939. However, in this context it is forgotten to say that Marshall Piłsudski35 was immortalized in the monument as well. Th e tradition of Grunwald aft er 1910 was replaced by the “idea of the Jagiel-lonians” – a political doctrine of Józef Piłsudski36, which has remained valid ever since. It must be noted that such an attitude of the cult of Piłsudski to earlier na-tional myths does not mean that Poland was unique. It is a general rule of national myths, which are confi rmed by presenting, for example, Otto von Bismarck as a national hero with Martin Luther, or Adolf Hitler with Paul von Hindenburg.37 In view of the previously mentioned facts it is not justifi ed to say the Grunwald myth has lost its signifi cance.

In order to understand better the importance of the Grunwald myth in the his-tory of Poland even today we must refer to theoretical studies devoted to national myths and the culture of memory. Dieter Langewiesche in his research on national myths in Western Europe drew attention to Belgium, where identity diff erences between the Walloons and the Flemish are justifi ed by a myth in the centre of which are not only events from WWII, but also from the Middle Ages – referred to as the second national myth aff ecting the identity of both groups in Belgium.

Such a co-existence of two myths allowed the author to call the myth connect-ed with WWII a basic myth (Grundungsmythos), and the myth associated with the history of the Middle Ages – a confi rmation myth (Bestatigungsmythos).38 As Aleida Assmann points out there exists a direct relationship between a myth and memory, because the most important medium of collective or political memory is a myth. A myth allows memory to be shaped in a more oriented way. Th e task of a myth is to make a story or a picture more credible. Apart from the traditional Greek defi nition of a myth there are other defi nitions:a) myth as a falsifi cation of history which should be shown by a historian;b) myth may be interpreted as history perceived through the perspective of identity.

Th e aim of such a meaning of myth is to explain the contemporary reality through the past perspective and to show some directions for the future. History which is transformed into a myth is changed into social reality, which infl uences decisions made in a defi nite time and place.39

35 Ibid., p. 327.36 J. Serczyk, Die Wandlungen des Bildes vom Deutschen Orden als politischer, ideologischer und

gesellscha. licher Faktor im polnischen Identitatsbewustsein des 19. Und 20. Jahrhunderts, [in:] Vergan-genheit und Gegenwart der Ritterorden. Die Rezeption und die Wirklichkeit, hrsg. v. Z. H. Nowak,unter Mitarbeit v. R. Czaja, Toruń 2001, s. 55–64.

37 See A. Nikžentaitis, Tautiniai mitai Lietuvoje ir Vidurio Europoje [in:] idem, Vytauto ir Jogailos įvaizdis Lietuvos ir Lenkijos visuomenėse, Vilnius 2002, pp. 108–129.

38 Comp. D. Langewiesche, Unschuldige Mythen: Grundungsmythen und Nationsbildung in Eu-ropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, [in:] Kriegserfahrung und nationale Identitat in Europa nach 1945, hrsg. v. K. von Linden, Paderborn 2009, pp. 27–41.

39 A. Assmann, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit. Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik, Munchen 2006, pp. 40–41.



In the case of the culture of memory it seems that we encounter a similar situ-ation as described by D. Langewiesche. Here we must distinguish two types of culture of memory: the memory dominating at present in a given country is called the culture of memory, and the memory which earlier dominated and now is in the background – the culture of remembering, as takes place in the Anglo-Saxon world and in the German-speaking areas.40 Such a relationship between a myth and the culture of memory may explain the importance of Grunwald in Poland and the fact that aft er 1960 when it lost its political and ideological signifi cance, it is still regarded as one of the most important events in the history of Poland.41 It can be stated that aft er 1960 Grunwald was gradually changing from one of the basic ele-ments of the culture of memory into a component of the culture of remembering. Th e end of this process overlapped with the collapse of communism.

3. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ŽALGIRIS AND GRUNWALD

Bearing in mind the fact that the narrations of Žalgiris and Grunwald diff er in content, they can be compared as national myths of Poles and Lithuanians and as components of the culture of memory and the culture of remembering. In this sense Žalgiris and Grunwald are alike, because they can be called myths. Th e dif-ference is that in Poland Grunwald became a myth at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, while in Lithuania Žalgiris became more important in the Soviet period. It must be stressed that both Žalgiris and Grun-wald have a structure of a national topos. Žalgiris in Lithuania in the inter-war period did not have an independent role, but it constituted one of the elements of a myth; particularly aft er 1930 in the reborn Lithuanian Republic it was just an element of the national myth of Vytautas the Great, the aim of which was to under-line the military achievements of the leader. At the beginning of the 20th century, Grunwald had features of an independent myth manifested in the Jagiellonians, the symbol of whom was Władysław II Jagiełło. On the other hand, in Poland the symbol of the myth itself could be an element of the national myth. It can be noticed in the arrangement of the monument erected in Cracow in 1910. Th e monument devoted to Jagiełło (the construction of a monument commemorat-ing Grunwald could have been unwelcome for political reasons) was received as a monument commemorating the 15th century battle. It seems that this case created a precedence the evidence of which is the monument put up in New York in 1939 which commemorated the battle of Grunwald. Like in Cracow, the main element was the fi gure of Jagiełło.

In the inter-war period Grunwald shared the fate of Žalgiris – it became one of the elements of the myth of Józef Piłsudski. In the inter-war period Grunwald

40 M. Csaky, Die Mehrdeutigkeit von Gedachtnis und Erinnerung, [in:] http://www.vifaost.de/texte-materialien/digitale-reihen/handbuch/handb-mehrdeutigk/.

41 R. Traba, Grunwald. Konstruktion und Dekonstruktion.



was fi nally transformed into another idea of the Jagiellonians, which originally was a doctrine justifying the political actions of Marshall Piłsudski, and now it is still valid in Poland (with no direct associations with Piłsudski), the evidence of which are debates about the directions of foreign policy.

During WWII and aft er the war Žalgiris and Grunwald shared the same fate: the communists exploited it as a device to motivate society to fi ght against Nazi Germany, and next to justify the political system in Europe aft er the war. However, in using the myths of Žalgiris and Grunwald there gradually appeared diff erences in content. In Poland, Grunwald quickly lost its communist edge and it became one of the main elements of the myth of the regained lands.

In Lithuania in the Soviet period Žalgiris was an important component of the narration about Lithuanian-Polish brotherhood. It must be noted that the project named aft er Teofi lis Tilvitis: “Broliai lietuviai ir rusai, ir lenkai,– / Ginklas baisiau-sias pamišėlio rankoj. / Žalgirio broli, akių nesudėk,– / Dieną ir naktį už laisvę budėk!” [Brothers Lithuanians, Russians and Poles/ In the hand of a mad man there is a terrible weapon/ Brother from Grunwald don’t close your eyes/ Watch for freedom day and night] was never realized – in the Soviet period Poles and Lithuanians did not become brothers.

It must be emphasized that the subject of Žalgiris and Grunwald was also ex-ploited by the opposition, and in case of Lithuania by the semi-opposition, where the topoi were given a diff erent meaning. Here we can see clearly the infl uence of the culture of remembering or earlier traditions of Grunwald and Žalgiris on the societies of Poland and Lithuania. In this sense Žalgiris in Lithuania and Grunwald in Poland are judged diff erently. However, they remain elements of the culture of remembering of both societies.

Translated by: Agnieszka Chabros


SOBIESŁAW SZYBKOWSKI (Gdańsk)

WITNESSES OF THE PRIVILEGE OF GRAND MASTER ULRICH VON JUNGINGEN OF 28 OCTOBER 1409.

FROM THE RESEARCH ON PROTEUTONIC ORIENTATION AMONG DOBRZYŃ LAND’S NOBLEMEN

IN THE PERIOD OF THE WAR OF 14091411*

Key words: Polish-Teutonic War 1409–1411; Dobrzyń land, Kulm law; local noble elite; ge-nealogy; 15th century, district offi ces

Th e document of Ulrich von Jungingen prepared for the noblemen of Dobrzyń on 28 October 1409 in Bobrowniki has been widely discussed in literature on the topic. Th e document was fi rst analyzed in 19601 by Marian Biskup having dis-covered it. A decade later Karol Górski dealt with the source, and his analysis has been the most thorough study of the grand master’s privilege of 1409 conducted so far2. Janusz Bieniak3 included very important remarks concerning the reasons for the creation of the source in one of his works, while Beata Możejko discussed it in her monograph about the Dobrzyń line of the Świnka family4. However, it does not mean that the document should not undergo another broader analysis, taking into account literature concerning Polish-Teutonic relations and the history of Dobrzyń land at the end of the 14th and at the beginnin’g of the 15th centuries, which has developed in the last forty years since Karol Górski’s study was pub-lished. Here we wish to refer only to the problem concerning the identifi cation of


1 M. Biskup, Materiały do dziejów krzyżackiej okupacji w ziemi dobrzyńskiej na przełomie XIV i XV wieku, Zapiski Historyczne, vol. 25: 1960, z. 2, p. 73–74 (the review of the document), p. 79–81 (the edition of the source).

2 K. Górski, O przywileju krzyżackim dla rycerstwa dobrzyńskiego z 1409 r., [in:] Europa––Słowiańszczyzna–Polska. Studia ku uczczeniu profesora Kazimierza Tymienieckiego, Poznań 1970, p. 427–436; second edition with no changes in: idem, Studia z dziejów państwa krzyżackiego, Olsztyn 1986, p. 149–158; in this article we quote the latter edition.

3 J. Bieniak, Recepcja prawa chełmińskiego na Kujawach i ziemi dobrzyńskiej w średniowieczu, [in:] Studia Culmensia historico-iuridica czyli księga pamiątkowa 750-lecia prawa chełmińskiego, red. Z. Zdrojkowski, Toruń 1990, p. 222–223.

4 B. Możejko, Rod Świnków na pograniczu polsko-krzyżackim w średniowieczu, Gdańsk 1998, p. 123–126, 142–144.

S o b i e s ł a w S z y b k o w s k i18


the people who witnessed the privilege and reasons which led to the fact that in the fi rst stage of the confl ict of 1409–1411 they supported the Teutonic Knights oc-cupying Dobrzyń land. Th e problem of the witnesses’ identity has been addressed in Polish literature on the topic5; nevertheless, the studies were disperate and it is necessary to recapitulate the problem in one article.

Before we move on to the main point, let us introduce the source and the con-text of the creation of the privilege. Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen issued the privilege on 28 October 1409 in Bobrowniki – in Dobrzyń land – the headquarters of Teutonic voigts (bailiff s) in the years 1392–1405, which later became the head-quarters of the royal starosts6. Th e territory remained under the authority of the Teutonic Order from August 1409, when the Teutonic Knights invaded the area during the fi rst stage of the confl ict between the Monastic State and the Polish-Lithuanian Union of 1409–14117. Karol Górski was incorrect in suggesting that Ulrich issued the privilege during his war expedition as a result of which Dobrzyń land fell under Teutonic authority8. However, it is highly probable that while the grand master was staying in Bobrowniki at the end of October 1409, at least part of Dobrzyń’s noblemen paid homage to him. Th e creation of the document was prob-ably preceded by longer discussions among the highest Teutonic dignitaries. It is conceivable that Dobrzyń’s szlachta noblemen who had decided to remain under the authority of the Teutonic Order and to cooperate with it were also consulted, which is confi rmed by one sentence in the privilege saying that Dobrzyń’s szlachta came to the grand master and asked him to confer the Kulm privilege on their lands9. Th e privilege is considered to be one of the elements of Teutonic policy, the aim of which was to unite at least some part of Dobrzyń land in the interest of the Teutonic Order, which explains why the articles included in the privilege were ex-ceptionally liberal10. It means that the Teutonic Knights hoped to keep the territory despite the fact that they realized that they would have to return Dobrzyń land to Poland in exchange for Żmudź [Samogitia] which had been invaded by the Lithu-

5 Comp. the works mentioned in the two previous footnotes.6 J. Bieniak, Kształtowanie się terytorium ziemi dobrzyńskiej w średniowieczu, Zapiski Histo-

ryczne, vol. 51: 1986, z. 3, p. 24–25, 36–38; idem, Średniowiecze na ziemi dobrzyńskiej, cz. 2, [in:] Z dziejów ziemi dobrzyńskiej, vol. 2, red. Z. Goźdź, Dobrzyń nad Wisłą 1998, p. 23

7 S. M. Kuczyński, Wielka Wojna z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411, Warszawa 1987 (ed. 5), p. 133–134; M. Biskup, Wojny Polski z zakonem krzyżackim 1308–1521, Gdańsk 1993, p. 44; S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print).

8 K. Górski, op.cit., p. 149.9 M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 79.

10 K. Górski, op.cit., p. 154–155; M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 73–74. We are not going to discuss whether Grand Master was going to keep his promises resulting from the privilege of 28 October 1409 (which was the main concern of K. Górski (op.cit., s. 154), as he died in the battle of Grunwald. We focus on the fact that in the autumn of 1409 the grand master off ered Dobrzyń’s landowners favourable conditions concerning their lands within the Monastic State.

Witnesses of the privilege of Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen... 19


anians, as confi rmed by the document issued by Ulrich11. Th e armistice accepted by both parties of the confl ict at the beginning of October 1409 stipulated an ami-cable settlement of the Polish-Lithuanian-Teutonic dispute, which was to be an-nounced by the Czech king, also referred to as King of the Romans, Wenceslaus of Luxembourg. Th e grand master could not have known about the settlement at the end of October in the fi rst year of the war12. Th us, it was possible that the military confl ict could end with the mutual agreement on the grounds of status quo ante bellum. Ulrich wisely secured himself in case any circumstances should arise.

Th e document discussed here is not the original version, but – as established by both M. Biskup and K. Górski – it is a copy which was to be sent to one of the squires of Strzygi (domino de Stzrigen) in Dobrzyń land, who according to B. Możejko may be identifi ed with Adam Świnka of Strzygi and Zielona – one of the witnesses of the privilege13. It seems that the copy made on the basis of the original document of the grand master in his chancellery in Malbork never reached its destination and remained where it was created and thus became the only proof of the original privilege which did not survive.

According to the list of witnesses from the copy of the grand master’s privilege, the privilege was certifi ed by: Janusz and Jakub of Radziki, Adam Świnka of Strzygi, Jan (Świnka) of Chojnowo, Adam (Świnka) of Sarnowo, Piotr of Starorypin and Namięta of Łapinóż14. B. Biskup was the fi rst to identify the witnesses underlining the fact that that the Świnka family was heavily represented. Th ey possessed lands both in Dobrzyń land and in Zawkrze (Masovia), the latter being in the pledge from the Teutonic Order15. K. Górski provided more details and he identifi ed Janusz and Jakub of Radziki as representatives of the Dobrzyń branch of the Ogończyk (Ogon) family. He also recognized the witnesses from the Świnka family to whom he rightly included: Adam of Strzygi, Adam of Sarnowo and Jan of Chojnowo. Nevertheless, he was wrong to identify Piotr of Starorypin. He also noticed that all the above-

11 M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 80; J. Bieniak, Kształtowanie, p. 40; S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print).

12 S. M. Kuczyński, op.cit., p. 149–151; M. Biskup, Wojny, p. 46–47; S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print).

13 M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 74; K. Górski, op.cit., p. 149; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 125. Bieniak’s hy-pothesis seems to be less probable (Sadłowo i jego dziedzice w średniowieczu, [in:] Zamek w Sadłowie na ziemi dobrzyńskiej, red. L. Kajzer, Rypin 2004, p. 73); Bieniak assumes that the copy of the privi-lege was prepared for Adam’s younger brother: Jakub Świnka of Strzygi. Nevertheless, the Teutonic offi cials were more likely to show more consideration to Adam on account of his seniority and the fact that in 1409 he was holding more prominent positions than Jakub (in 1402 he was appointed castellan of Rypin – he lost the offi ce when Dobrzyń land was recovered by the Polish Crown). Th us, it seems more certain that Adam, not Jakub, was responsible for copying Ulrich’s document; the data concerning Adam’s and Jakub’s careers are provided below with the reference to the literature of the topic.

14 M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 80–81.15 Ibid., p. 74.



mentioned came from the county of Rypin and Zawkrze. What is more, he also underlined the fact that the group did not include “anyone from the Kościelecki family” considered by him to play a leading role in Dobrzyń land16.

Th e identifi cations made by the previously mentioned researchers, based on knowledge of the noble elites available at the time of their work, can be now complemented and corrected, taking into account the results of J. Bieniak and B. Możejko17. Taking into consideration the careers of the witnesses of the privilege before 1409 and their family relations, we may now establish the reasons for which they decided to adopt a friendly attitude towards the Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land when it was taken over by the Teutonic Knights in 1409, the clear sign of which was their presence in Ulrich’s privilege of 28 October 1409.

Th e fi rst two testators of the grand master’s privilege for Dobrzyń land, Janusz and Jakub of Radziki (Rypin county in Dobrzyń land) were brothers – sons of Mikołaj of Kutno (Gostynin land in the Duchy of Płock) and Skępe (Lipno county in Dobrzyń land)18 and grandsons of the castellan of Dobrzyń Andrzej of Wola and Radziki of the Ogon house. Originally Janusz of Radziki used the appella-tion stemming from the name of his possessions in Kutno (Masovia). Neverthe-less, he also used the appellation of Kościelec aft er he had married Dobrochna at the beginning of the 15th century, a daughter of the Brześć judge Mikołaj, who was the only heiress of the Kościelecki family’s lands in the Inowrocław part of Kuyavia. Except Jakub, Janusz’s other younger brothers were: Piotr ( later known as Piotr of Działyń, the progenitor of the Działyński family), Otto and Andrzej. Th eir sister was the wife of the judge of Chełmno Janusz of Legendorf (Mgowo). Castellan Andrzej’s grandsons at the beginning of the 15th century still remained in the collective family property, owning the lands from the fi efdom of Skępe and Działyń (Dobrzyń land), of Kuczbork (Zawkrze), of Kutno (Gostynin land in the Duchy of Płock) and other more dispersed villages. Janusz Mikołajewic of Skępe and Kościelec was a direct progenitor of the Kościelecki family – one of the most outstanding magnate families in Greater Poland19. Prior to the outbreak of the war

16 K. Górski, op.cit., p. 153–154.17 Individual works of the researchers listed here will be given below.18 J. Bieniak, Recepcja, p. 222–223.19 About family relations and estate owned by the descendants of the catellan of Dobrzyń An-

drzej comp.: Słownik historyczno-geografi czny województwa płockiego w średniowieczu, z. 2, opr. A. Borkiewicz-Celińska, Wrocław 1981, s. 156–157; T. Żychliński, Złota księga szlachty polskiej, vol. 10, Poznań 1888 (the document concerning the division of the land among the sons of Mikołaj of Kutno of 1413); J. Bieniak, Recepcja, p. 222–223; idem, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej w późnym średnio-wieczu i jej majątki, [in:] Włocławek i jego dzieje na tle przemian Kujaw i ziemi dobrzyńskiej, red. O. Krut-Horonziak, L. Kajzer, Włocławek 1995, p. 33–36; idem, Prawa patronackie szlachty kujaw-skiej w kościołach parafi alnych w świetle źródeł, [in:] Religijność na Kujawach i ziemi dobrzyńskiej w czasach staropolskich, red. A. Mietz, Włocławek 2003, p. 41–42; idem, Radziki (Radzikowo) i ich dziedzice w średniowieczu, [in:] Zamek w Radzikach Dużych na ziemi dobrzyńskiej, red. L. Kajzer, Rypin 2009, p. 23–26 (here also the identifi cation of Janusz and Jakub of Radziki, the witnesses of Ulrich’s privilege, with the grandsons of the castellan Andrzej) 27–29, 40; A. Supruniuk, Otoczenie



of 1409 he had already held some offi cial posts. From 1400 he held the title of castellan of Dobrzyń20. He was appointed castellan by Grand Master Konrad von Jungingen. However, King Władysław Jagiełło did not recognize the promotion of Janusz. Th e reason for this was that Poland refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Teutonic Order’s ownership of Dobrzyń land in the form of the pledge which was conferred on the Teutonic Knights in 1392 by the Duke of Opole Władysław – the liegeman of the Polish crown. Władysław Jagiełło, who considered himself the only disposer of district offi ces in Dobrzyń’s hierarchy, appointed people of his choice to hold offi cial positions in Dobrzyń land. His nominations were not rec-ognized by the real territorial ruler – the grand master – who nominated his own candidates, which resulted in the fact that many offi ces were held by two people in the years 1392–1405. Th e problem disappeared when Dobrzyń land was repur-chased by the Polish Crown, which took place in June 1405. Władysław Jagiełło dismissed most offi cials appointed by the grand master (including all high and middle ranking offi cials)21. It also aff ected Janusz, who was addressed as Dobrzyń’s castellan in 1407, but in fact Władysław Jagiełło dismissed him from offi ce before the summer of 1406, when the castellan of Dobrzyń became Piotr of Radomin and Włoszczowa nominated by the king22. Th e fact of depriving Janusz of his offi ce is confi rmed by the document issued by Władysław Jagiełło in 1410, in which he is referred to as “the former castellan of Dobrzyń land”23.

Jakub’s (Janusz’s brother) pre-war career was less spectacular, but also con-nected with the Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land. From 1398 he was a servant (diner) of the grand master: fi rst of Konrad, and aft er Konrad’s death – of Ulrich von

księcia mazowieckiego Siemowita IV (1374–1426). Studium o elicie politycznej Mazowsza na przełomie XIV i XV wieku, Warszawa 1998, p. 144–145, 211–212; B. Możejko, op.cit., s. 124–125; S. Szybkow-ski, Kujawska szlachta urzędnicza w późnym średniowieczu (1370–1501), Gdańsk 2006, p. 577–578 (however, here Janusz of Kościelec was wrongly identifi ed with a son of the castellan Andrzej); idem, O potomstwie kasztelana dobrzyńskiego Andrzeja z Woli i Radzików, [in:] Odkrywcy, princepsi, rozbój-nicy, red. B. Śliwiński (Studia z dziejów średniowiecza, nr 13), Malbork 2007, p. 283–292; K. Pacuski, Możnowładztwo i rycerstwo ziemi gostynińskiej w XIV i XV wieku. Studium z dziejów osadnictwa i elity władzy na Mazowszu średniowiecznym, Warszawa 2009, p. 161–163 (all the above mentioned works include older literature of the topic).

20 J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 34; idem, Radziki, p. 27, 40; S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 488.

21 J. Bieniak, Od wójtów Rypina do rodu szlacheckiego. Starorypińscy w XIV i XV wieku, [in:] Rypin. Szkice z dziejów miasta, red. M. Krajewski, Rypin 1994, p. 56; S. Szybkowski, Pięć dokumen-tów sądu ziemskiego dobrzyńskiego z XIV i XV w., [in:] Biskupi, lennicy, żeglarze, red. B. Śliwiński (Gdańskie studia z dziejów średniowiecza, nr 9), Gdańsk 2003, p. 399–402; idem, Kujawska szlachta, p. 113–114, 179–180, 193–194.

22 J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 34, 53; idem, Radziki, p. 40; S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 488–489.

23 J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 34, fn. 97; comp. also the annex to the source – here I would like to express my thanks to Dr. hab. Adam Szweda from the Institute of History and Ar-chival Science of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń for comparing my interpretation of the source published here against its original.



Jungingen24. He continued to serve the latter also in the autumn of 1409, aft er the confl ict with Poland-Lithuania broke out25.

Th e next witnesses of the document of 28 Oct 1409, Adam of Strzygi (Dobrzyń land, Rypin county) and Jan of Chojnowo (Zawkrze land) were the representatives of the Dobrzyń line of the Świnka family26. Adam of Strzygi, an heir of Zielona in Zawkrze land, was a cousin of the remaining two testators. His father, appointed pantler of Dobrzyń by the Teutonic Order, was Piotr Świnka (II), who died at the turn of 1401 and 1402. His other children were: Piotr (III), Jakub and daughters: Beata, Małgorzata and Dorota. It must be added that as a result of his marriage with Katarzyna, who according to J. Bieniak was a daughter of one of the heirs of Legendorf (Mgowo), he became the owner of the lands in Dobrzyń land: part of Legendorf (Mgowo) and the village of Wronie27 . Adam of Strzygi and Zielona, like Janusz of Skępe, started his career while Dobrzyń land was in the hands of the Teutonic Order by way of a pledge. Grand Master Konrad von Jungingen ap-pointed him castellan of Rypin in 1402. Like Janusz, he was deprived of his offi ce by Władysław Jagiełło aft er Dobrzyń land was repurchased by the Crown in 1405. His successor, appointed by Władysław Jagiełło, became Jan of Wielka Chełmica of the Jastrzębiec coat of arms28.

Adam of Strzygi’s cousins, Jan of Chojnowo and Adam of Sarnowo, were Jakub’s sons. Jakub did not hold any district positions. According to J. Bieniak, he mar-ried an unidentifi ed heiress of the estates in Stangenberg (now Stążki) in Teutonic Pomesania, as a result of which his sons became heirs of the land. Th e grandfather of both Adam and Jan was the castellan of Rypin Piotr (I) Świnka, who died in 1398, which means that he held his offi ce during the Teutonic pledge of Dobrzyń land29.

24 Das Marienburger Tresslerbuch der Jahre 1399–1409 (further cit. MTB), hrsg. v. E. Joachim, Königsberg 1896, s. 19, 87, 165, 179, 202, 248, 400–407, 502, 504, 502, 507, 514, 515, 530, 537, 540, 543,546, 555, 562, 567, 586, 587; J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 40.

25 MTB, p. 586.26 M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 74; K. Górski, op.cit., p. 153.27 J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 44–46; idem, Średniowieczne polskie rody rycerskie. Stan

badań, problemy sporne, możliwości i trudności badawcze, [in:] Genealogia. Stan i perspektywy badań nad społeczeństwem Polski średniowiecznej na tle porównawczym, red. J. Pakulski, J. Wroniszewski, Toruń 2003, p. 63–73; idem, Sadłowo, p. 36–50, 117–119, 122; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 119–126, 134 (the author believes that Adam was married twice: the fi rst time to a woman of an unknown name from the Legendorf family, the second time to Katarzyna – who appears in the sources as his widow; according to Możejko the latter might have been a daughter of Mikołaj of Grzebsko).

28 J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 45; idem, Sadłowo, s. 48–50; B. Możejko, op.cit., s. 120––121; S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 501.

29 J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 44–45; idem, Średniowieczne polskie rody rycerskie, p. 63–73; idem, Sadłowo, s. 27–57; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 140–142. We do not agree with Bieniak’s supposition (idem, Sadłowo, p. 51–57) that the castellan of Dobrzyń Piotr (I) Świnka died in 1397, and the castellan of Dobrzyń Piotr Świnka in 1398 was his son Piotr (II) who was promoted to the offi ce from the position of the pantler of Dobrzyń. Th e researcher is not able to provide any source in which with no doubt Piotr (II) would be referred to as the castellan of Dobrzyń. Moreover, his last appearance in December 1401 corresponds with the appearance of his successor to the offi ce of the pantler of Dobrzyń in January 1402 (S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 499).



Th e next witness of the privilege, Piotr of Starorypin, was identifi ed with the Świnka family30 by older literature on the topic. J. Bieniak and B. Możejko proved this to be unjustifi ed. According to them, the heirs of Starorypin was another noble family coming from the reeve of Rypin (Vogt) of the mid-14th century Eberhard31. Bieniak suggests that the brothers of Piotr were the parish priest of Rypin and canon of Płock Eberhard and probably Jan Rasz (in the German sources referred to as “Raschow”)32. However, Bieniak’s suggestion that their father was Andrzej Rasz must be refuted, as it is contradicted by the source from 1406 in which Andrzej and Jan were referred to as brothers33. Th us, the family relations between Piotr, Eberhard, Jan and Andrzej remain an open question. Th eir predecessors were undoubtedly the pantler of Dobrzyń Eberhard (Bieniak identifi es him with the above-mentioned reeve (Vogt) of Rypin) and the cup-bearer of Dobrzyń Mikołaj of Starorypin (known in 1385). Bieniak mentions also another member of Piotr’s father’s family – Mikołaj Dudek, known to the sources of 1413. Despite its burgher Prussian origin, in the last quarter of the 14th century the family held important offi ces. It belonged to the district elite also thanks to the family connections of the women of the family. Piotr of Starorypin’s aunt, Dorota, was the wife of the deputy cup-bearer of Dobrzyń (from 1378), and next she married the judge of Brześć Marcin of Tłuchowo and Baruchowo of the Cholewa house. His cousin (prob-ably a daughter of Mikołaj Dudek) married the deputy master of the pantry of Gniewkowo Mikołaj of Pacierzyn of the Ogon house, who was a son of the widow of the governor (voivode) of Brześć Krzesław of Kościół (Kościelna Wieś)34. Jan and Andrzej’s mother (who was probably also the mother of Piotr and Eberhard) also came from a signifi cant family. In the letter of 1405 from the grand master to King Władysław Jagiełło, the pantler of Dobrzyń Andrzej of Lubin of the Ogon35 house was referred to as Jan Rasz’s “brother”. However, the brotherhood must mean only that they were cousins. As in Jan’s generation there appeared the names of Andrzej and Piotr, it is more probable that the Rasz brothers’ mother was the pan-tler Andrzej’s aunt. If so, she should be recognized as a sister of the sword-bearer of Dobrzyń Piotr of Lubin and Umień (the father of the pantler Andrzej) and of the castellan of Dobrzyń Andrzej of Wola and Radziki (the grandfather of Janusz and

30 K. Górski, op.cit., p. 153 (here Piotr is presented as a representative of the Świnka fam-ily); M. Pelech, Die hochmeisterlichen Rate vom Jahre 1412. Ein Beitrag zur Personengeschichte des Deutschordenslandes Preusen, Altpreussische Geschlechterkunde, N. F., Jg. 13: 1982, p. 74 (here Piotr is identifi ed with the grandfather of Jan of Chojnowo, Adam of Sarnowo and Adam of Strzygi – the castellan of Dobrzyń Piotr (I) Świnka).

31 J. Bieniak, Od wojtów, p. 61–62; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 125.32 J. Bieniak, Od wojtów, p. 43–46, 55–59, 67; A. Radzimiński, Prałaci i kanonicy kapituły kate-

dralnej płockiej w XIV i I poł. XV w. Studium prozopografi czne, vol. 2, Toruń 1993, p. 51.33 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preusischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin–Dahlem, XX. Hauptabteilung, Or-

densfolianten (further cit. OF), nr 3, p. 263 (on the basis of microforms kept in the State Archive in Toruń).

34 J. Bieniak, Od wojtów, p. 43–62; S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 606, 641–642.35 OF, nr 3, p. 208; J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 47.



Jakub of Radziki, who were also witnesses of the privilege of 1409). It is logical that that the less important family took over the names of the more signifi cant family – the names of Andrzej and Piotr of Starorypin referred to the names used in the family of their mother. Let us add that the father of the castellan Andrzej and the sword-bearer Piotr was Piotr of Radziki – also the castellan of Dobrzyń)36.

Despite the fact that the Rasz family settled into the noble environment of Dobrzyń, they did not renounce their property in Prussia. Andrzej and Jan owned lands in Prussia in 1406 when they exchanged them with Grand Master Konrad von Jungingen, who informed Władysław Jagiełło about this fact. Unfortunately, the source fails to provide the location and names of the lands which were the subject of the transaction. It is possible that they were situated in the commandry of Dzierzgoń whose owners were reported to bear the name Rasz (“Raschow”). In 1399 the village of Smausgheyeyn (Smausien=Bündtken) was the property of Konrad Rasz. It must have been Konrad who sold the exchanged village to the sub-sequent two commanders of Dzierzgoń: Burchard von Wobeke (1404–410) and his successor Albrecht von Schwarzburg for 850 grzywnas. In 1398 a Rasz was the owner of part of the village of Linken (now Linki), which bordered on the estates of Sztembark situated in Pomesania. A Rasz appeared in the sources as a squire of Linken in 1418. According to Heide Wunder, it is possible that Rasz of Linki was the very same Konrad Rasz37.

Jan Rasz, probably a brother of Piotr of Starorypin, was connected with the Monastic Teutonic State not only as an owner of lands situated there. From 1399 he was a servant (diner) of fi rst Konrad, and later of Ulrich von Jungingen38. He started the service for the grand master at the same time as Jakub of Radziki. Th ey might have done it together, which should not be surprising as they were relat-ed on the distaff side (although they belonged to diff erent generations). Jan, like Jakub, served Ulrich also during the great war39. Piotr of Starorypin’s brother was one of Grand Master Konrad’s confi dants if he was appointed the pantler of the court. Th e grand master also appointed him standard-bearer of Dobrzyń aft er the death of Mikołaj of Trutowo (who last appeared in the sources in 1402). Owing to the young age of Jan Rasz, Konrad temporarily gave the offi ce to Andrzej of Lu-bin. Before Jan managed to take the position of the standard-bearer of Dobrzyń,

36 Family relations of the castellan of Dobrzyń Piotr of Radziki are presented by J. Bieniak, Radzi-ki, p. 23-37, 38-44. Th e conclusion concerning the family relation between Jan Rasz with the pantler Andrzej of Lubin is also given by J. Bieniak on the basis of the above-cited source (ibid., p. 47). However, Bieniak’s divagations are not complete owing to poor computer typesetting (the sentence remains unfi nished), which causes that we are not familiar with detailed conclusions concerning the issue. Th e preserved fragment seems to suggest that Bieniak changed his point of view concerning the family affi liations of Jan Rasz and now he considers the cup-bearer of Dobrzyń Mikołaj of Staro-rypin to be Jan Rasz’s father.

37 OF, nr 3, p. 263; H. Wunder, Siedlungs- und Bevölkerungsgeschichte der Komturei Christburg 13.–16. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden 1968, p. 138–139, 142, 144, 151; J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 58–59.

38 J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 56–58.39 Ibid., p. 58.



in June 1405, Dobrzyń land fell again under the authority of Władysław Jagiełło, who did not recognize most of Konrad’s nominations to district offi ces in Dobrzyń land. In 1394 Władysław Jagiełło appointed Jan of Orchowo ,who started to act as the standard-bearer of Dobrzyń aft er June 1405. Originally, the grand master did not give up and wrote letters to Jagiełło, Jagiełło’s brother Świdrygiełło [Švitrigaila] and to the king’s advisors to approve of the nomination of Jan Rasz. However, his eff orts were fruitless, and Starorypiński never became standard-bearer. However, it must be noted that in 1406 Konrad addressed Jan Rasz as standard-bearer of Dobrzyń in his letter to the king40. Th e problems with the offi ce of Piotr of Staro-rypin prove that the family fell victim to repression aft er Dobrzyń land had been repurchased from the Teutonic Order in 1405.

Th e least is known about the last witness of the privilege of Ulrich von Jungin-gen for Dobrzyń land – Namięta of Łapinóż (Dobrzyń land, county of Rypin). His ancestor might have been Piotr of Łapinóż, who appeared in the list of the witness-es of the document of Duke of Dobrzyń Władysław Garbaty of 1346. Namięta did not come from a family belonging to the elites of offi cials of Dobrzyń land. Never-theless, he belonged to one of the most signifi cant representatives of the knightly family of Zagroba in Dobrzyń land. He got involved in the activities connected with the mission of Benedict of Makra in Dobrzyń land. Moreover, in the docu-ment of the szlachta of Dobrzyń of 1434 concerning the succession to the throne aft er Władysław Jagiełło’s death he placed his seal as one of the two representatives of his clenodium41.

Having introduced the witnesses of the grand master’s privilege of 28 Octo-ber 1409 in terms of their family relations, material situation and contacts with the court of grand masters (holding the position of a diner of the grand master), we should consider the motives which led them to support the Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land and made them appear in Grand Master Ulrich’s document.

Janusz of Radziki, Skępe and Kościelec, his brother Jakub and Piotr of Staro-rypin were inclined to adopt a friendly attitude towards the Teutonic knights due to the close institutional connections of the representatives of their families with the grand master’s court: when the war of 1409–1411 broke out, Jakub of Radziki and Jan Rasz of Starorypin had been servants (diners) of the heads of the Teutonic Order for a decade. Th e Rasz family of Starorypin and the Świnka family were connected with Prussia also in the way of property. Th e former owned some lands in Prussia (perhaps in the commandry of Dzierzgoń), whereas the latter were the

40 OF, nr 3, p. 208, 263; Codex epistolaris Vitoldi Magni Ducis Lithuaniae 1376–1430 (further cit. CEV), collectus opera A. Prochaska, Cracoviae 1882, nr 322; J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 56; S. Szyb-kowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 484–485.

41 Codex diplomaticus Poloniae [...] (further cit. CDP), T. 2, pars 2, ed. L. Rzyszczewski, A Mucz-kowski, Varsaviae 1847, nr 578; Lites ac res gestae inter Polonos Ordinemque Cruciferorum, T. 2, ed. I. Zakrzewski, Poznań 1892, s. 261, 263; A. Biliński, Szlachta ziemi dobrzyńskiej za ostatnich Jagiel-lonów, Warszawa 1932, p. 103; J. Bieniak, Recepcja, p. 226–227 (source appendix 2); idem, Od wójtów, p. 60, 75, fn. 195.



owners of some property of Mgowo and Sztembark. In 1409 they were subjects of both the Polish king (owing to the property in Dobrzyń land) and the grand master (the lands in Prussia). Moreover, Raszów was originally situated in the Mo-nastic State of the Teutonic Order. It must be also added that when Dobrzyń land came under Teutonic rule in 1409 the Radzikowskis, the Świnkas and the Rasz family did not possess any inherited property in the territory under the direct authority of the Polish king (excluding the lands of Kościelec which constituted the property of the wife of Janusz of Radziki, but not his patrimony). From 1407 by way of a pledge, the Teutonic Order controlled Zawkrze in Masovia, where the Radzikowskis owned the fi efdom of Kuczbork (they also possessed the fi efdom of Kutno in Płock Masovia, ruled at that time by Siemovit IV) and the Świnkas – Zielona, Niechłonin, Chojnowo and Sarnowo. It is noteworthy that the Teutonic Order also owned Zawkrze by way of a pledge in the years 1384–139942. As has already been suggested by B. Możejko, Jan and Adam Świnka of Sarnowo and Choj-nowo must have aided the Teutonic knights if on 24 March 1409 they received 30 grzywnas from the Teutonic treasurer43.

Apart from institutional reasons (in the case of the Radzikowskis and the Rasz family), the above-mentioned families were inclined to cooperate with the Teu-tonic Order for fear of losing their land and property. Aft er Dobrzyń land was taken over by the Teutonic Order in 1409, landowners who were loyal to the Polish king had their property confi scated by the Order and they emigrated to the areas directly under the Polish king’s rule44. Th e Świnkas supported the Teutonic Order because they hoped to regain the fi efdom of Sadłowo with the castle erected by the castellan of Rypin Piotr (I) Świnka. Th e castle was inherited on the distaff ’s side by the Polish king’s supporter – the castellan of Słońsko Wojciech of Plecka Dąbrowa. It must be stressed that the Teutonic Order confi scated the fi efdom of Sadłowo

42 K. Neitmann, Die Pfandverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen, Zeitschrift für Ostfor-schung, Bd. 41: 1992, H. 1, p. 4–6 and no. 1a, 1b, 1c; M. Radoch, Długi zastawne Siemowita IV Ma-zowieckiego wobec zakonu krzyżackiego, [in:] Społeczeństwo i polityka do XVII wieku, red. J. Śliwiński, Olsztyn 1994, p. 53, 55, 57–57; idem, Z dziejów stosunków mazowiecko-krzyżackich na przełomie XIV i XV wieku, cz. III: Jeszcze w sprawie zastawów ziem zakonowi krzyżackiemu przez księcia płockiego Siemowita IV w latach 1382–1402, [in:] Mazowsze i jego sąsiedzi w XIV–XVI wieku, red. J. Śliwiński, Olsztyn 1997, p. 31, 40–47, 50; idem, Zarys działalności polityczno-dyplomatycznej książąt mazo-wieckich wobec państwa krzyżackiego w Prusach w latach 1385–1407, Olsztyn 1998, p. 34, 80, 97–98; A. Supruniuk, Zawkrze w polityce księcia mazowieckiego Siemowita IV, [in:] eadem, Szkice o rycer-stwie mazowieckim XIV/XV wieku, Toruń 2008, p. 101–103, 105–106, 108–109.

43 B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 142.44 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preusischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin–Dahlem, XX. Hauptabteilung, Or-

densbriefarchiv, nr 28083 (I would like to thank Prof. Dr. hab. Sławomir Józwiak from the Institute of History and Archival Science of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń for making the source available to me); M. Biskup, Materiały, p. 77–79 (nr 3) (the correct defi nition of the date of the source: J. Bieniak, Kształtowanie, p. 39, fn. 200; S. Joźwiak, Wywiad i kontrwywiad w państwie zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach. Studium nad sposobami pozyskiwania i wykorzystywaniem poufnych infor-macji w późnym średniowieczu, Malbork 2004, p. 97–98, fn. 190); J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 30; idem, Sadłowo, p. 73–75.



from Wojciech and passed it over to the hands of the Świnka family45. It is possible that other testators hoped to get wealthier thanks to the redistribution of the con-fi scated lands planned by the Teutonic Order.

Th e witnesses’ motives to support the Teutonic Order were also aff ected by the political past of Dobrzyń land. Th e territory ceased to be under the direct rule of the Polish king in 1370. Authority was executed by dukes who were vassals of the Crown: fi rst by Kazimierz Bogusławic in the years 1370–1377, then for a short time by his widow – Duchess Małgorzata Siemowitówna, and fi nally by Duke Władysław Opolczyk, who gave the land by way of a pledge to the Teutonic Order in 139246. During the rule of both Kazimerz Bogusławic and Władysław Opolczyk the grand-fathers of the Radzikowskis and the Świnkas held the two most important offi ces in the district: Andrzej was the castellan of Dobrzyń and Piotr (I) Świnka was the castellan of Rypin47. Th e position of the Rasz family was somewhat weaker as its representatives held lower offi ces: Eberhard was the pantler and Mikołaj was the cup-bearer48. Andrzej of Radziki and Piotr (I) Świnka kept their offi ces also during the Teutonic rule thanks to their friendly cooperation with the Order49. Th e Teu-tonic knights respected the outstanding position of the Radzikowskis and Świnkas in the Dobrzyń elite, and aft er the death of both castellans they appointed their grandsons Janusz of Radziki and Adam Świnka of Strzygi to the vacant positions. Th us, the young members of the Radzikowski, Świnka and Rasz families identifi ed the rulers of Dobrzyń land with dukes-vassals and the Teutonic knights. Moreover, the latter were perceived as “good rulers”, defi nitely better than Władysław Jagiełło, who had deprived Adam and Janusz of their district offi ces and did not recognize the grand master’s nomination for Jan Rasz50. Th us, the Radzikowski, the Świnka

45 J. Bieniak, Sadłowo, p. 57–75.46 M. Goyski, Sprawa zastawu ziemi dobrzyńskiej przez Władysława Opolczyka i pierwsze lata

sporu (1391–1399), Warszawa 1907, passim; Z. Guldon, J. Powierski, Podziały administracyjne Kujaw i ziemi dobrzyńskiej w XIII–XIV w., Warszawa–Poznań 1974, p. 217–225; J. Bieniak, Kształtowanie, p. 31–37; idem, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 48; K. Neitmann, Die Pfandverträge, s. 6–8 and nr 2a–o; J. Pakulski, Jeszcze o zastawie Złotorii i ziemi dobrzyńskiej krzyżakom przez Władysława Opolczyka w latach 1391–1392, Zapiski Kujawsko-Dobrzyńskie, vol. 9: 1995, p. 11–30; J. Karczewska, Kujawsko-dobrzyńskie władztwo Władysława Opolczyka, [in:] Władysław Opolczyk jakiego nie znamy. Próba oceny w sześćsetlecie śmierci, red. A. Pobóg-Lenartowicz, Opole 2001, p. 53–59; J. Sperka, Wojny Wła-dysława Jagiełły z księciem opolskim Władysławem (1391–1396), Cieszyn 2003, p. 17–23; idem, Oto-czenie Władysława Opolczyka w latach 1370–1401. Studium o elicie władzy w relacjach z monarchą, Katowice 2006, p. 37–39; J. Tęgowski, Władztwo księcia Władysława Opolczyka w ziemi dobrzyńskiej i na Kujawach. Zarys problematyki, [in:] Książę Władysław Opolczyk. Fundator klasztoru paulinów na Jasnej Górze w Częstochowie, red. M. Antoniewicz, J. Zbudniewek, Warszawa 2007, p. 291–308.

47 M. Szymecka, Otoczenie księcia słupsko-dobrzyńskiego Kaźka, [in:] Szlachta, starostowie, za-ciężni, red. B. Śliwiński (Gdańskie studia z dziejów średniowiecza, nr 5), Gdańsk–Koszalin 1998, p. 309; J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 34, 44; idem, Sadłowo, p. 44, 117; idem, Radziki, p. 39––40; A. Supruniuk, Otoczenie, p. 235; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 87–100.

48 J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 60–61; S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 487, 499.49 Comp. the literature with footnote 47.50 S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 484–485, 488–489, 501; other district offi cials deprived

of their offi ces included: the judge Trojan of Kikół and Ostrowite, as well as the subjudge Beszel of



and the Rasz families hoped that the stable Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land would allow them to regain their former position among the szlachta of Dobrzyń.

It must also be underlined that the Radzikowskis and the Świnkas were related to each other through the Legendorfs (the Mgowski family) from Chełmno land. What is more, the Radzikowskis were also related to the Rasz family, which we discussed above.

Th e conclusion drawn from what has been written so far in this article is that the families of the Radzikowskis, the Świnkas and the Rasz of Starorypin had much in common with the Teutonic Order in 1409, maybe even more than with the Crown, particularly if we take into account the military successes of the Teutonic Order in the fi rst stage of the war51. Undoubtedly, they were inclined to accept the Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land and to adopt the knight’s law of Chełmno, the lib-eral rules of which were familiar to them as their lands bordered on Chełmno land and they also had land in Prussia (Świnków, Raszów).

It is more diffi cult to defi ne the motives of Namięta of Łapinóż, who was the only witness of Ulrich’s privilege whose family did not hold any offi ces. Perhaps he decided to support the Teutonic rule due to some unidentifi ed family connections with the Radzikowskis, the Świnkas and the Rasz family. It is also possible that he wanted to win the new rulers’ friendship, which could help to increase Namięta’s status in Dobrzyń land.

Th ere is one more question – whether all the testators of the privilege of 28 Oc-tober 1409 remained the advocates of the Teutonic Order until the end of the war. It seems that the supporters of the Teutonic knights until the Peace of Toruń were Jakub of Radziki and Jan Świnka of Chojnowo. Th ey were forbidden by the king to return to their Dobrzyń and Masovian lands aft er the Peace of Toruń was con-cluded (1 Feb 1411), which was against one of the treaty’s articles. Th e new grand master of the Teutonic Order Heinrich von Plauen sent Teutonic envoys who were to intervene in the matter. Th e Teutonic envoys’ actions also concerned Jan Rasz of

Czarne. Th eir offi ces were taken over by the royal supporters returning to Dobrzyń land, which they had left in the years 1391-1392 when the area became occupied by the Teutonic Order (ibid., p. 495, 497). However, the marshal of Dobrzyń Iwan of Radomin received the most severe repressions. He was not only deprived of his offi ce, but he was also sentenced to pay 5000 fl orins to Władysław Jagiełło on charge of treason and contributing to Jagiełło’s losing Dobrzyń land. As a result, his es-tates were confi scated. Iwan left for Prussia with his sons Mikołaj and Henryk-Andrzej (CDP, T. 1, ed. L. Rzyszczewski, A. Muczkowski, Varsaviae 1847, nr 158; CEV, nr 368; K. Neitmann, Die Staats-verträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen 1230–1449, Wien 1986, p. 444; idem, Die Pfandverträge, nr 2p, p. 57–59; J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 52–53). It must be added that the repressions directed at Iwan and depriving the offi cials nominated by the Teutonic Order of their offi ces con-stituted a breach of the agreement of Raciążek of 1404, which was stressed by the Teutonic high-ranking dignitaries in their correspondence to the Polish monarch (Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen im 15. Jahrhundert, Bd. 1, hrsg. v. E. Weise, Marburg 1970, nr 23; K. Neitmann, Die Pfandverträge, nr 2p, p. 57–59).

51 S. M. Kuczyński, op.cit., p. 133–152; M. Biskup, Wojny, p. 44–45; S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print).



Starorypin, which means that the representative of this family also supported the Teutonic Order until the end of the war52. We still do not know about the attitude of his supposed brother, who was also a witness of Ulrich’s documents, for there is no preserved source information about his activity during the war aft er 28 Oct 1409. As for Jakub, Jan Świnka and Jan Rasz, J. Bieniak and B. Możejko seem to be right in saying that the former two probably participated in the summer campaign of 1410 on the Teutonic side. Th us, it is possible that they also took part in the battle of Grunwald53. Another piece of evidence that Jan Świnka of Chojnowo was a supporter of the Teutonic Order is the fact that he was staying in Malbork at the end of April where he witnessed the transumpts of documents concerning Polish-Lithuanian-Teutonic relations issued by the Pelplin and Oliwa abbots at Ulric von Jungingen’s request54.

On the other hand, it seems that the elder brother of Jakub of Radziki, the former castellan of Dobrzyń, Janusz of Skępe, Kutno and Kościelec ceased to sup-port the Teutonic Order. J. Bieniak in his two works recognized him as the king’s servant in the fi rst half of 1410. According to Bieniak, Janusz was to hand over the money lent to the monarch by the chamberlain-subcamerarius [podkomorzy] of Łęczyca Mikołaj Jastrzębiec55. He based his opinion on the document which we have published in the appendix to this article. Nevertheless, the content of the article allows an interpretation which diff ers from the one represented by Bie niak. Th e document concerns the endowment of 200 grzywnas of Prague groschens and 50 grzywnas of circulating coins paid in Dąbie in Łęczyca land by Władysław Jagiełło to the above-mentioned chamberlain-subcamerarius [podkomorzy], who gave the money to the former castellan of Dobrzyń, Janusz. Th e phrase “recepi-mus cum eff ectu” does not really mean that the king received the sum of money. Th e phrase suggests that Jastrzębiec gave Jakub of Radziki 250 grzywnas, which resulted in a debt56. Considering the political attitude of Janusz at the beginning of the war when he witnessed the grand master’s privilege for Dobrzyń land, it is highly probable that the king tried to win him over using a fi nancial argument. Th e political bribery was facilitated by a brother of one of the closest supporters of Władysława Jagiełło – the bishop Wojciech Jastrzębiec57, who put in a suffi cient amount of money (his brother-bishop might have contributed to it) for the brib-ery, which in this way did not constitute any burden for the royal budget. Instead,

52 M. Pelech, Der verlorene Ordensfoliant 5 (früher Hochmeister-Registrant II) des Hist. Staats-archiv Königsberg mit Regesten (nach Rudolf Philippi und Erich Joachim), [in:] Beiträge zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. 1, hrsg. v. U. Arnold, Marburg 1986, nr 12; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 145–146; J. Bieniak, Sadłowo, p. 76; idem, Radziki, p. 40–41.

53 B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 145; J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 41.54 B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 143–144.55 J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 34 and fn. 97; idem, Radziki, p. 40.56 Comp. source appendix.57 J. Sperka, Szafrańcowie herbu Stary Koń. Z dziejów kariery i awansu w późnośredniowiecznej

Polsce, Katowice 2001, p. 274–276.



he received some property in Crown land, which he had leased for some time in fact58. Th e middlemen in the transaction might have been close agnates of Janusz, the sons of the Dobrzyń sword-bearer Piotr and at the same time sons of Janusz’s grandfathers’ brother: the Dobrzyń pantler Andrzej of Lubin, and the deputy mas-ter of the pantry Dobiesław of Umień, who both leased the fi efdom of Umień in Łęczyca land. So, they were close neighbours of Mikołaj Jastrzębiec, who owned the fi efdom of Borysławice (with a castle)59.

Whether it was the fi nancial argument that convinced Janusz to support the Teutonic knights, it must be assumed that he changed sides soon aft er the end of October 1409. Soon aft er the end of the war Władysław Jagiełło appointed him voivode of Inowrocław in 1412, which entailed Janusz’s becoming a member of the Royal Council60. It must be stressed that Janusz was appointed voivode although he had not held any lower-ranking positions under Władysław Jagiełło before. Th us, the fact must be interpreted as the expression of the monarch’s reward for Janusz’s services for the king during the war.

Th e reasons which made Janusz of Radziki change his political orientation must have been complex. His fi nancial situation certainly aff ected his decision. When the war with the Teutonic Order broke out in 1409, all the sons of Mikołaj of Kutno, and the grandsons of the castellan of Dobrzyń Andrzej of Radziki still remained in the collective family property. Probably the youngest sons of Mikołaj – Andrzej and Otto– had become of age by that time, which means that they and their two older brother, Jakub and Piotr, might have demanded the division of the whole patrimony. Janusz wanted to keep most of the estate for himself, which meant that he had to pay off his younger brothers. Th e document of 1413 concern-ing the division of the patrimony confi rms that Janusz together with Jakub and Piotr were obliged to pay 700 grzywnas to Andrzej and Otto61. Th us, the money obtained from the king probably helped Janusz to meet his fi nancial liabilities.

Nevertheless, family connections might also have aff ected Janusz’s decision. Having married Dobrochna of Kościelec, he became related to the outstanding mag-nate family line of Leszczyce of Pakość and Łabiszyn, who were particularly power-ful in Kuyavia and north-east Greater Poland. His wife’s paternal uncle was Maciej of Łabiszyn, the voivode of Inowrocław, who during the great war was a member of the Royal Council62. Th e above-mentioned close agnates of Janusz of Radziki, the pantler Andrzej of Lubin, and the deputy master of the pantry Dobiesław of Umień, were also supporters of Władysław Jagiełło in the years 1409–1411. More-over, according to sources, Dobiesław of Umień served Władysław Jagiełło as early

58 T. Nowak, Własność ziemska w ziemi łęczyckiej w czasach Władysława Jagiełły, Łodź 2003, p. 26–27.

59 Ibid., p. 27–28, 30–31; J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 36; idem, Radziki, p. 32–33.60 S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 479, 577.61 T. Żychliński, Złota księga, vol. 10, p. 70–72; J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 24–25.62 S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 600–602 (here included older literature concerning Ma-

ciej).



as the beginning of the war63. Andrzej of Lubin also supported the Polish monarch in the years 1409–1411, despite the fact that he had been appointed pantler by Konrad von Jungingen. By way of reward, Władysław Jagiełło endowed him with part of Starorypin in 141164. As can be concluded from the above, political orienta-tions of his close relatives and agnates probably infl uenced Janusz’s decisions more than the sum of money off ered by the monarch. Moreover, Janusz feared losing the lands of Kościelec belonging to his wife, situated in the county of Inowrocław, which was under the authority of the Crown throughout the whole period of the war of 1409–141165.

Th e sources of 1410 and the beginning of 1411 do not say anything about the attitude towards the war represented by the next two testators of the grand master’s document of 1409 – Adam Świnka of Zielona and his brother Jakub Świnka of Strzygi. J. Bieniak concludes that both brothers must have participated in the elim-ination of the Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land aft er the battle of Grunwald in 1410, for the Teutonic knights invaded Strzygi aft er the Peace of Toruń was signed66. If he is right, it will mean that they changed their political orientation aft er the Polish party won the decisive battle67.

Nothing is known about the political orientation of the least signifi cant wit-ness of Ulrich’s privilege – Namieta of Łapinóż in the later period of the war of 1409–1411.

To sum up, it is worth answering the question how witnessing Ulrich von Jungingen’s privilege infl uenced the testators’ careers aft er the end of the war.

As previously mentioned, Janusz of Kościelec, Skępe and Radziki was ap-pointed voivode of Inowrocław in 1412 and held the offi ce until his death in 1426. Moreover, he held the position of Dobrzyń starost twice68. King Władysław Jagiełło entrusted him to represent the interests of the Kingdom in numerous diplomatic

63 S. Joźwiak, Wywiad, p. 187.64 CDP, T. 2, pars 1, ed. L. Rzyszczewski, A Muczkowski, Varsaviae 1848, nr 354; J. Bieniak, Od

wójtów, p. 39.65 J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 41, suggests that Janusz decided to support the Polish king due to the

fact that he resided in Kościelec; nevertheless, we do not know whether the castellan of Dobrzyń lived there with his wife permanently. His being witness of Ulrich’s document contradicts this assumption. Apparently, at the beginning of the war he was staying in Dobrzyń land, perhaps in Radziki, where there was a castle unlike in Kościelec.

66 J. Bieniak, Sadłowo, p. 77–78.67 Another reason for the weakening support for the Teutonic Order among the szlachta of

Dobrzyń before the summer campaign of 1410 could have been the political uncertainty of Dobrzyń land. On the strength of the sentence of Wenclaus IV of February 1410 Dobrzyń land was to be passed over to Wenclaus’ representative and taken over by Poland if the Teutonic rule was restored in Samogitia. Irrespective of the fact that Władysław Jagiełło did not approve of the Czech king’s settle-ment, in the fi rst few months of 1410 it remained unknown whether the Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land would be permanent; comp. S. M. Kuczyński, op.cit., p. 317–320; M. Biskup, Wojny, p. 48; J. Bie-niak, Kształtowanie, p. 40; S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print).

68 S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 577.



missions to Prussia and at meetings with the representatives of the Teutonic Order. As established by Adam Szweda, he took part in diplomatic missions and meet-ings of this type 14 times in the years 1414–147669. Th us, Janusz can be regarded as one of the three most important experts in Teutonic matters in the crown council in the second half of Jagiełło’s reign in Poland, the other two being the voivode of Poznań Sędziwój of Ostroróg and the voivode of Brześć Maciej of Łabiszyn. In his diplomatic activity the voivode of Inowrocław used his good knowledge of local relations and his family contacts (he was Janusz Legendorf ’s brother-in-law).

Th e former servant (diner) of the grand masters – Jakub of Radziki – had to wait a long time to be appointed to a district offi ce. He returned to Dobrzyń land before 1413 when the patrimony was divided between him and his brothers. Ap-parently, Władysław Jagiełło acceded to the requests of the Prussian envoys of 1411. However, the permission to return to his lands did not mean that the King had forgiven him his conduct during the war. It was not until the 1420s that the monarch appointed him to his fi rst quite low-ranking offi ce in the Dobrzyń hier-archy – lesser standard-bearer in 1425. Jakub was not promoted until the last year of Jagiełło’s life when the monarch appointed him greater standard-bearer aft er Aleksy of Płomiany was appointed the judge of Dobrzyń. In the sources he ap-peared as greater standard-bearer only once – on 25 Jan 1434, which was the last time he was mentioned as a living person. Probably, he died before 4 March 1436, because at that time the offi ce of greater standard-bearer was held by Jerzy (Jurga) of Lasotki70. Apparently, the service for the grand masters and his conduct during the war aff ected his promotion prospects negatively. He had to wait a long time for his fi rst district offi ce, which he received probably thanks to the intercession of his older brother. Th e next time he got promoted was short before his death. Władysław Jagiełło took a long time to forgive Jakub his disloyalty. Nevertheless, the king did not consider it a reason to banish Jakub. What is interesting, some scarce sources referring to the activity of Jakub of Radziki aft er 1413 do not con-fi rm that he maintained any contacts with Teutonic Prussia.

Another witness of the grand master’s privilege – Adam Świnka of Strzygi and Zielona – did not remain in disgrace with the king for a long time. Th e former castellan of Rypin (appointed to the offi ce by the Teutonic Order) became the cas-tellan of Dobrzyń as early as in 1416, and he held the offi ce until his death (he died before 1429)71. Like the voivode of Inowrocław Janusz, he took part in diplomatic missions in Prusssia and Polish-Teutonic meetings72. It must be added that at the end of Jagiełło’s rule, Adam’s younger brother Jakub Świnka of Strzygi started his career. In 1430 he was the greater standard-bearer of Dobrzyń only to become the

69 A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika dyplomacji polskiej w stosunkach z zakonem krzyżackim w Prusach w latach 1386–1454, Toruń 2009, p. 36 and according to the index.

70 S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 486; J. Bieniak, Radziki, p. 24–25, 44.71 B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 127–134; J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej, p. 45; idem, Sadłowo, p. 78;

S. Szybkowski, Kujawska szlachta, p. 489.72 A. Szweda, Organizacja, p. 338, 384, 388.



castellan of Rypin in the same year. In 1451 he still held the offi ce (aft er 1451 he died)73. Apparently, his pro-Teutonic attitude in 1409 did not blight the career op-portunities of other members of that family.

Nevertheless, the cousins of the heirs of Zielona and Strzygi – Jan Świnka of Chojnowo and Adam Świnka of Sarnowo – did not avoid repressions. Th ey were both forbidden to come back to their Masovian estates, which made them forge a close relationship with Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen. In 1412 they became members of the council set up by the grand master, where they represented the dis-trict of Człuchów. Th e grand master probably endowed them with some lands in the district of Człuchów (in Prussia they owned the lands of Sztembark in Pomesa-nia). Jan of Chojnowo regained his lands in Masovia aft er the war fi nished with the peace treaty signed near Lake Mełno in 1422. Adam returned to Masovia earlier. Th e Świnka family’s conduct during the war infl uenced their decision to continue to support the Teutonic Order even for over a decade (in case of Jan of Chojnowo). Th e latter maintained close contacts with Teutonic offi cials also in the later period, which was connected with the fact that he owned the lands of Sztembark until the beginning of the 1440s. Among the most outstanding witnesses of the document of 1409 (that is the Radzikowski and the Świnka families) Adam and Jan waited the longest time to be appointed to district offi ces. Th ey made a career only in Masovia and it did not take place until the 1430s: Adam became the head of sąd ziemski – judex terrestris in Zawkrze, while Jan was appointed judge in Zawkrze, and later castellan of Płock (probably in 1444; in 1445 he died)74.

Not much can be said about the infl uence of the conduct during the war on the careers of Piotr of Starorypin and Namięta of Łapinóż. Th e former was still alive in 1420. Nevertheless, the sources do not say that he fell victim to repression; nor that was he appointed to any district offi ce75. Representing the family of Zagroba in the document of the Dobrzyń szlachta concerning the succession to the Polish throne was the peak of his career76. Whether Piotr and Namięta maintained contacts with Prussia aft er 1411 remains unknown. Namięta represented the Polish party during the Dobrzyń stage of the mission of Benedict of Makra in 141377.

* * *

Six out of seven witnesses of Ulrich von Jungingen’s privilege for Dobrzyń land came from szlachta families whose members held district offi ces, with the Radzikowskis and the Świnkas belonging to the most signifi cant families (the posi-tion of the Starorypiński family was somewhat lower). Only Namięta of Łapinóż

73 B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 225–230.74 M. Pelech, Die hochmeisterlichen Räte, p. 74–77; B. Możejko, op.cit., p. 147–200; J. Bieniak,

Sadłowo, p. 76–77.75 J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 43–45.76 CDP, T. 2, pars 2, nr 578; J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 75 and fn. 195.77 Lites, T. 2, p. 261, 263; J. Bieniak, Od wójtów, p. 60.



came from the szlachta whose representatives did hold any offi ces. Th e Świnkas and the Radzikowskis held held the highest-ranking district offi ces in the Dobrzyń hierarchy both during the rule of the dukes-vassals of the Crown and the Teutonic pledge of the years 1392–1405. For this reasons when Dobrzyń land was taken over by Władysław Jagiełło they fell victims to repression – they were deprived of their offi ces to which they had been appointed by the grand masters. Th e same situa-tion took place in case of the Starorypiński family. Th e Radzikowskis, the Świnkas and the Śtarorypińscy were related to one another. Th ey also had family relations and property in the Monastic State. Th e representatives of the Radzikowskis and the Starorypińskis were also connected with grand masters owing to the fact that from the end of the 14th century they served as diners fi rst to Konrad, and later to his successor Ulrich von Jungingen. All the factors inclined them to support the Teutonic rule in Dobrzyń land in the autumn of 1409. Nevertheless, soon aft er-wards the most outstanding witness of the documents Janusz of Radziki, Skępe and Kościelec changed his political orientation and supported the king. He was probably infl uenced by his relatives who were against his cooperation with the Teutonic Order, the bribery and his hopes to make a career in the Polish Kingdom, which turned out to be vain aft er all. As for the remaining witnesses we know that Jakub of Radziki supported the Teutonic Order until the end of the war (which resulted in the delay in his career in the Polish Kingdom). Probably the same hap-pened with the Świnkas ( the sources confi rm it in case of Jan of Chojnowo). How-ever, their career aft er the war was diversifi ed: Adam Świnka of Strzygi and Zielona quickly won over Władysław Jagiełło who appointed him castellan of Dobrzyń (his brother Jakub also made a career), whereas Jan of Chojnowo and Adam of Sarno-wo fell victims to tough repression. Nothing is known about the conduct of Piotr of Starorypin and Namięta of Łapinóż in the last stage of the war. However, Piotr’s brother Jan Rasz fought on the Teutonic side until the end of the war of 1409–1411. No representative of neither the Starorypiński family nor heirs of Łapinóż were ap-pointed to any offi ces during the whole reign of Władysław Jagiełło.



KRZYSZTOF KWIATKOWSKI (Toruń)

THE FIRST IMPRESSIONS IN PRUSSIA AFTER THE DEFEAT OF THE GERMAN ORDER IN THE BATTLE OF GRUNWALD*

Keywords: the German Order; the perception of war events; the Polish-Teutonic war 1409––1411; the battle of Grunwald; late medieval Prussia; the psychological infl uence of events on people’s attitudes; the 15th century

For at least a few decades it has been obvious for the contemporary humanities that contrary to the 19th century’s misconceptions, the concept of war is not only “a simple continuation of politics by applying other means”1, but is multi-dimen-sional and multi-faceted and constitutes one form of interpersonal collective con-fl ict2. In this sense the war can be understood as one of the elements, factors and

* Th e fi rst edition of the article was published in Polish in Zapiski Historyczne, 2010: 75, z. 2, p. 47–66. In the text the following sigla were used: OBA = Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kul-turbesitz, Berlin (Dahlem), XX. Hauptabteilung (Historisches Staatsarchiv Königsberg), Ordensbrief-archiv; SRP = Scriptores rerum Prussicarum; MPH = Monumenta Poloniae Historica. Biblical quota-tions were provided according to the fi ft h edition of the Vulgate: Biblia Sacra iuxta Vulgatam versio-nem, instr. R. Weber, praep. R. Gryson, Stuttgart 2007.

1 C. von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, hrsg. v. M. von Clausewitz, Bd. I, Berlin 1832, Buch 1, Cap. 24, p. 26: „Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik unter Einbeziehung anderer Mittel” (comp. the Polish edition: C. von Clausewitz, O wojnie. Księgi I–VIII, transl. A. Cichowicz, L. W. Koc, F. Schoener, Lublin 1995, p. 23).

2 M. Mead, Alternativen zum Krieg, [in:] Der Krieg. Zur Anthropologie der Aggression und des bewaff neten Konfl ikts, hrsg. v. M. Fried, M. Harris, R. Murphy, Frankfurt a. Main 1971, pp. 235–252; comp. also H. von Stietencron, Töten und Krieg. Grundlagen und Entwicklungen, [in:] Töten und Krieg, hrsg. v. eiusdem, J. Rupke (Veröff entlichungen des Instituts für Historische Anthropologie, Bd. 6), Freiburg a. Breisgau–München 1995, pp. 22–23. It must be underlined here that Clausewitz’s im-age and projection of ‘war’ became relevant in totally new contexts – particularly in reference to eco-nomic competition and confl ict in contemporary market economy. Ideas of the Prussian offi cer are now frequently quoted, mainly in English literature of the subject matter and Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition; comp. H. Sherman, R. Schultz, Open Boundaries: Creating Business Innovation through Complexity, Santa Fe 1998; H. Mintzberg, J. Lampel, B. Ahlstrand, Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Th rough the Wilds of Strategic Management, New York 1998; T. v. Ghyczy, B. v. Oetinger, Ch. Bassford, Clausewitz on Strategy: Inspiration and Insight from a Master Strategist, s. l. 2001 (Polish translation: Clausewitz o strategii, transl. A. Ehrlich, Warszawa 2002). Th us, we can notice here a considerable semantic expansion of the term “war” and the cultural diff usion of the allegedly constant rules of the phenomenon, formulated immediately aft er the revolution. Naturally, it co-exists with the “stan-dard” theoretical-military refl ection using Clausewitz’s categories; comp. T. Will, Operative Führung.

K r z y s z t o f K w i a t k o w s k i36


determinants of culture3 – a general cultural phenomenon4. European Medieval Studies “discovered” and conceptualized this cultural aspect of “war” much earlier5 than researchers dealing with later periods, having obtained a variety of instru-ments of diff erent humanistic analytical categories which facilitate the perception of “war” and “confl ict” more in terms of Bloch’s “understanding” than “knowing”6. It must be considered a signifi cant acquisition in the fi rst decades aft er WWII, tak-ing into account the major psychological impact of the experience of war on the manner of understanding the discussed phenomena7.

Within the phenomena of “war” and “confl ict”8, the psychological issues con-nected with the perception and experience of war events, are interesting areas of research, even for a medievalist9. However, they are quite diffi cult to grasp, not

Versuch einer begriffl ichen Bestimmung im Rahmen von Clausewitz’ Th eorie „Vom Kriege”, Hamburg 1997; R. Beck, Clausewitz’ Kriegslehre in unserer Zeit, Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift , Bd. 146: 1980, pp. 272–276; R. Bruhl, Zur militärtheoretischen Leistung Carl von Clausewitz, Militär-gerichtes, Bd. 19: 1980, pp. 389–401; and in Poland the study of M.A. Faliński: Aktualność myśli Carla von Clausewitza, Warszawa 1991.

3 O. G. Oexle, Geschichte als historische Kulturwissenschaft , [in:] Kulturgeschichte heute, hrsg. v. W. Hardtwig, H.-U. Wehler (Geschichte und Gesellschaft , Sonderheft 16), Gottingen 1996, pp. 14–40.

4 It refers to the phenomenon contrary to the „Anglo-Saxon” one. It does not concern the transposition of military categories to other areas of human activity (i.e. economic ones), with the emphasis on non-military conditions of the phenomenon of “war”. It means treating “war” not as a collection of physical acts of violence committed with the use of weapon and conditioned by univer-sal rules understood as objective signs of success (= achieving the aim), but as a much more complex phenomenon – which was successfully suggested by the humanities of the German-speaking world; comp. e.g. T. V. Troth, Zur Soziologie der Gewalt, [in:] Soziologie der Gewalt (Kolner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft e, H. 37), Wiesbaden 1997, pp. 9–56.

5 Comp. H.-H. Kortum, Der Krieg im Mittelalter als Gegenstand der historischen Kulturwissen-schaft en. Versuch einer Annäherung, [in:] Krieg im Mittelalter, hrsg. v. H.-H. Kortum, Berlin 2001, pp. 13–43. Similarly, the Romance humanities, mainly French, proposed a new general cultural trend of presenting the phenomenon of “war” in the Middle Ages; comp. e.g. the collection of articles published in the post-conference volume La guerre, la violence et les gens au Moyen Age, sous la dir. P. Contamine, O. Guyotjeannin, vol. 1: Guerre et violence, Paris 1996; vol. 2: Guerre et gens, Paris 1996; the work of Philippe Contamine La guerre au Moyen Age (Nouvelle Clio n° 24), Paris 1980 (ed. 1) (Polish edition: Wojna w średniowieczu, transl. M. Czajka, Warszawa 1999 (ed. 1)) is regarded as pioneering in the presentation of “war” as an inherent cultural phenomenon, preceded by the dis-sertation: idem, Guerre, État et société á la fi n du Moyen Age. Études sur les armées de rois de France 1337–1494 (Civilisations et societes, vol. 24), Paris 1972.

6 Marc Bloch’s opinion that “in our mind the desire to understand is much stronger than the de-sire to know” is not uncontroversial (Pochwała historii czyli o zawodzie historyka, transl. W. Jedlicka, Warszawa 1962 (wyd. 2), p. 34), as while the human mind is undoubtedly capable of understanding, which is the fundament of its evolutionary development, at the same time it easily tends to generalize, categorize and simplify.

7 J. Nowosadko, Krieg, Gewalt und Ordnung. Die Einführung in die Militärgeschichte, Historische Einfuhrungen, Bd. 6: (Berlin) 2002, p. 11–17, 108–110, 131–138.

8 A. u. J. Assmann, Kultur und Konfl ikt. Aspekte einer Th eorie des unkommunikativen Handelns, [in:] Kultur und Konfl ikt, hrsg. v. J. Assmann, D. Harth, Frankfurt a. Main 1990, p. 11–48.

9 Comp. e.g. B. Ulrich, „Militärgeschichte von unten”. Anmerkungen zu ihren Ursprungen, Quellen und Perspektiven im 20. Jahrhundert, Geschichte und Gesellschaft , Bd. 22: 1996, H. 4 (Militärge-

Th e fi rst impressions in Prussia aft er the defeat of the German Order... 37


only as a result of the scarce and relatively homogenous source base, but mainly from the mental and cultural distance between contemporary man (of the indus-trial and post-industrial/information technology epochs) and medieval man (of the epoch of traditional, mainly rural, societies and oral communication)10. Th is gap does not mean, however, that no attempts should be made to examine such problems. On the contrary, the results of the last two or three decades of research have verifi ed all the potential and real doubts11.

Th e multi-faceted analysis of the confl ict of the Polish King Władysław Jagiełło and the Grand Duke of Lithuania Alexander Vytautas against Grand Master Ul-rich von Jungingen (as well as the Teutonic Order and everybody recognizing its territorial authority in Prussia) also had a classical political-military nuance12. It is worth considering the confl ict also in the previously mentioned historical-cultural perspective13.

Th e perspective includes, for example, the question of the psychological im-pact of military campaigns on man, both in an individual and collective sense. Th e issue concerns both participants of war and its observers, and it refers to both the pre and post war period. Th e magnitude of this impact varies according to the dif-ferent stages of participation and/or the learning process.

Th e term “impression” used in the general sense of the word refers to a psycho-logical condition caused by external and /or internal stimuli, so therefore means an inner feeling14. It must be noted that etymology explicitly shows the limited original semantic scope of the word, which originally meant a psychological eff ect through the infl uence of an individual by means of exclusively external stimuli15.

schichte heute, hrsg. v. D. Langewiesche), p. 474–504. Issues connected with the problem of war experiences, emotions and impressions have been researched by the team led by Anton Schindling at Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen within Sonderforschungsbereich 437 („Kriegserfahrungen. Krieg und Gesellscha. in der Neuzeit”).

10 J. Le Goff , Wprowadzenie, [in:] idem, Długie średniowiecze, transl. M. Żurowska, Warszawa 2007, p. 5–16; idem, Człowiek średniowiecza, [in:] Człowiek średniowiecza, transl. M. Radożycka-Palo-etti, Warszawa–Gdańsk 1996, p. 11–50; and the recent work of Robert Fossier: Ludzie średniowiecza, transl. A. Czupa, Krakow 2009.

11 Comp. i.e. A. Crépin, Les depouilles des tues sur le champ de bataille dans l’histoire, les arts et la pensée du haut Moyen Age, [in:] La guerre, la violence et les gens au Moyen Age, vol. 1, p. 15–24.

12 Th e new monograph of the war of 1409–1411 prepared by four medievalists from Toruń and Gdańsk is part of a classical traditional trend, comp. S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szyb-kowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print), here: „Wstęp”, p. 11–12.

13 Some questions were touched upon in the above-mentioned monograph. Nevertheless, they still need a more thorough analytical examination. On the other hand, they also should be presented systematically and should not limited by the chronologically limited narration; comp. K. Kwiatkows-ki, „Wyprawa letnia 1410 roku”, [in:] S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, op.cit., p. 238–563.

14 Inny słownik języka polskiego, ed. M. Bańko, vol. 2: (P–Ż), Warszawa 2000, p. 1048: „Nasze wrażenie z czegoś to nasze myśli o tym i uczucia, jakich doświadczamy w zetknięciu się z tym [...]”.

15 Th e verbs „wrażać”, „wrazić” in Old Polish meant the activity of inserting, jamming; thus, it connoted the “otherness”, the “ outerness”, which may disturb the integrity of a human being, and it



Cognitive psychology understands “impression” as one of the learning processes of man which, being the most primitive and natural, constitutes a sensual kind of “perception”16. Th e aim of this article is not to show the structure of the epistemo-logical phenomenon of acquiring information about the defeat of the Teutonic Order in the battle near Stębark (Tannenberg) and Grunwald (Grünfelde) – its perception17, but to attempt to analyze the reactions of individuals or groups (of inhabitants of the Prussian state) to the defeat, and more precisely – to various an-nouncements concerning it. Th us, the subject matter of the article will be human reactions resulting from not only the sensual perception of stimuli, but also from other cognitive mechanisms of man – for instance: attention, memory and think-ing18. As such reactions occurred every time in a given community, we shall deal with collective social reactions, in other words psychosocial phenomena19.

Th e article has been limited to the analysis of the reactions of Prussian state inhabitants only. However, there were many other groups of people who had per-ceptions of the eff ects of the battle of 15 July such as: 2) members of the royal army who were not inhabitants of Prussia; 3) mercenaries taking part in the battle on both sides, mostly living outside Prussia; 4) members of the German Order from other branches of the corporation (of Livonia and West-European and South-Eu-ropean bailiwicks); 5) subjects of the Polish king who did not take part in the summer expedition20; 6) the widely understood “public opinion” regarding Prus-sia, Th e Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in neighbouring countries21).

may aff ect it; comp. Słownik staropolski, ed. S. Urbańczyk, vol. X: (W–Wżgim), z. 4(64): (Wjechać–Wronię), Kraków 1991, p. 317; see also S. B. Linde, Słownik języka polskiego, vol. VI: (U–Z), Warszawa 1814, p. 305. Th e same situation takes place in the German language (Eindruck) and the English lan-guage (impression), which took the term over from Latin (impressio) through French (impression)

16 E. Nęcka, J. Orzechowski, B. Szymura, Psychologia poznawcza, Warszawa 2006 (wyd. 1), s. 278–279; T. Maruszewski, Psychologia poznania, Gdańsk 2002 (ed. 2), p. 33.

17 Th is problem creates research possibilities and has already been discussed in the historiog-raphy of Grunwald in the context of the question when and to what extent King Władysław II be-came aware of the magnitude of his victory; comp. i.e. S. M. Kuczyński, Wielka wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411, Warszawa 1987 (wyd. 5), p. 413, 430–431; though it must be noted that he was not consistent in his analyses expressing sometimes contradictory opinions; comp. ibid., p. 434.

18 Comp. e.g. T. Maruszewski, op.cit., p. 32, 76–77, 117–120, 332–335; E. Nęcka, J. Orzechowski, B. Szymura, op.cit., p. 278–279, 320–326, 421–423; J. Kozielecki, Myślenie i rozwiązywanie proble-mów, [in:] Psychologia ogólna, ed. T. Tomaszewski, vol. 1, Warszawa 1992, p. 91–92.

19 A. S. Reber, E. S. Reber, Słownik psychologii, collectiva translation, ed. I. Kurcz, K. Skarżyńska, Warszawa 2005, p. 728.

20 Some elements of the result of the perception of the battle of Grunwald among inhabitants of the Polish Kingdom in the 15th century was analyzed by Czesława Ochałówna: Bitwa grunwaldzka w poezji polsko-łacińskiej XV wieku, Małopolskie Studia Historyczne (further cit. MSH), R. 3: 1960, z. 1/2, p. 81–106.

21 About this problem comp. the works of Andrzej F. Grabski: Echa bitwy grunwaldzkiej w histo-riografi zachodnioeuropejskiej, Zapiski Historyczne, vol. 32: 1967, z. 1, p. 7–48; idem, Pogrunwaldz-kie polemiki, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne, Seria I,



Considering the issue of perception concerning the outcome of the battle of Grunwald and behavioural reactions to it, we should assume three chronological divisions – 1) the day of 15 July, which means the hours between the end of the military activity in the main area of fi ghting (in various spacial areas22) and the time when most of the victorious army retired for the night; 2) the day aft er the battle, 16 July and the beginning of the following day – the time when the victori-ous royal army and at least some prisoners of war (inhabitants of Prussia) were staying near the site of the battle (on the symbolical “battlefi eld”23); 3) the days following 17 July. Understandably, the time boundaries of the phenomenon are quite blurred, which is typical of humanistic research. What is more, the fact that many of the Teutonic army surrendered en masse should be mentioned here. Th is surrender resulted from a series of stimuli and messages relaying the impossibility of continuing and winning the battle (in both an individual and collective sense). All these events should be treated as inherent elements of the battle.

It must be stressed that the preserved source records contain only indirect in-formation about the fi rst reactions on the day of the battle, which, obviously, had to be limited to Prussian veterans from the grand master’s army and not the nu-merous inhabitants of the Prussian state who had not taken part in the battle.

Jan Długosz’s narration presenting the events soon aft er the Teutonic camp was conquered included some premises which suggest the variety of reactions from rural inhabitants of the area near the battlefi eld, who had observed the bat-

z. 45, Łodź 1966, p. 45–66; K. Pieradzka, Bitwa grunwaldzka w obcych relacjach kronikarskich (prus-kich, śląskich i zachodnioeuropejskich), MSH, R. 3: 1960, z. 1/2, p. 51–65; J. Radziszewska, Echa bitwy grunwaldzkiej w ruskich latopisach, MSH, R. 3: 1960, z. 1/2, p. 67–80.

22 K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 384–432.23 Such a symbolic projection of the battlefi eld is confi rmed by a copy of the royal diploma of 17

July for Iwan Suszik of Romanów issued “w wojsku, na poboju, na polu w pruskiej ziemi u wsi Th anen-briku i Grymwaldu”; comp. Zbiór dokumentów małopolskich, part VI: Dokumenty króla Władysława Jagiełły z lat 1386–1417, wyd. I. Sułkowska-Kuraś, S. Kuraś, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków– Gdańsk 1974, nr 1743; however, according to the reliable source Kronika konfl iktu and Roczniki the king moved the camp by ¼ mile (about 1940–2100 m) in the direction of Malbork on 15 July in the eve-ning; so, he could have left the battlefi eld (prelii locum) of Stębark and Grunwald, which was obvious due to hygienic and sanitary reasons and the necessity to fi nd potable water; comp. Cronica confl ictus Wladislai regis Poloniae cum cruciferis. Anno Christi 1410. Z rękopisu Biblioteki Kornickiej (further cit. CC), wyd. Z. Celichowski, Poznań 1911, p. 29; Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, ed.S. Gawęda et alii, lib. X–XI (1406–1413) (further cit. Długosz X/XI), ed. K. Baczkowski et alii, Varsoviae 1997, p. 117; also SRP, Bd. III, Leipzig 1866, p. 426 (= MPH, vol. II, p. 868); SRP, Bd. III, p. 427 (= MPH, vol. II, p. 867; Kodeks dyplomatyczny Wielkopolski (further cit. KDW), wyd. I. Zakrzewski, F. Piekosiński, A. Gąsiorowski, vol. V (1400–1444), Poznań 1908, nr 163, p. 171). Th e analysis of the phenomenon of the battlefi eld as an isolated area has been recently carried out by Bernd Huppauf: Das Schlachtfeld als Raum im Kopf, [in:] Schlachtfelder. Codierung von Gewalt im medialen Wandel, hrsg. v. S. Martus, M. Münkler, W. Rocke, Berlin 2003, p. 207–234; comp. remarks of Ulrich Brockling: Schlachtfeldforschung. Die Soziologie im Krieg, [in:] Schlachtfelder, p. 189–206.



tle24. Th e chronicler tells the story25 about the king’s order to destroy all barrels with wine and gives the evidence of witnesses who confi rmed that great amounts of wine mixed with blood were to fl ow down to the meadows of Stębark, creating a gushing stream26. Next, Długosz narrates that the lower social classes created stories in which the battle was so magnifi cent that the blood of the slain fl owed like streams27. Th e fragment provides the socially conditioned stereotypical idea that any information which includes elements of the bizarre, particularly if re-counted by people from the lower social strata, is to be considered fi ctitious (fi ctio) and fabulous (fi bula) by people of noble background. Nevertheless, such a stere-otypical form of perception and stereotypical descriptive systems would prove that such “folk” stories did work in the mid-15th century. Naturally, it is hard to say whether they were created only in the area of the Polish Kingdom28, or if they also included information from the local people of the region of Ostróda [Osterode] in Hockerland29, which aft er 1454 in the context of another war might have reached Poles and the Polish chronicler in a more or less direct manner30. Th e existence of a story about a miraculous pond31 situated next to the chapter erected aft er 1411 and reconstructed aft er 1414 seems very probable. Th is phenomenon of simple

24 Długosz mentions six oaks growing on the site of the fi rst battle, from which members of one army were to observe the fi ght; comp. Długosz X/XI, p. 105; they might also have been local people.

25 Comp. my recent remarks: K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 428, fn. 930 p. 428–429.26 Długosz X/XI, p. 114: „Veritus autem Wladislaus Polonie rex, ne exercitus suus a vino inebria-

tus redderetur inutilis, facile, si quis congredi auderet, eciam ab ignavo hoste vincendus, ne quoque ex nimia potacione in morbos et languores solveretur, vasa vini discindi frangique iubet. Quibus ad imperium regis celerrime confractis defl uebat vinum occisorum cadavera, quorum erant in loco stativorum hostilium haut parve congeries, et mixtum cum hominum equorumque interfectorum sanguine rubeum torrentem confi ciens usque ad prata ville Tamberk visum est defl uxisse et aluendo alveum ripasque ad modum torrentis sua impetuositate eff ecisse”.

27 Długosz X/XI, p. 114: „Inde vulgari fi ccioni et fabule occasionem prestitam ferunt, qua vulga-tum erat tantum eo prelio sanguinis fusum esse, ut cruor torrentis in modum defl ueret”.

28 It is refl ected in preserved lyric works; comp. Cz. Ochałowna, op.cit., nr I, w. 40, p. 104; nr II, w. 10, 20, p. 105; saying there were many thousands (e.g. 40 000) of victims, or even reporting that all members of the grand master’s army were killed.

29 Accounts of folk beliefs concerning miraculous healings were given by the Pomesanian dig-nitary a few years aft er the battle; comp. Johann’s von Posilge, offi cialis von Pomesanien, Chronik des Landes Preussen, hrsg. v. E. Strehlke, [in:] SRP, Bd. III, p. 333.

30 Comp. M. Biskup, Działalność dyplomatyczna Jana Długosza w sprawach pruskich w latach 1454–1466, [in:] Dlugossiana. Prace historyczne w pięćsetlecie śmierci Jana Długosza, ed. S. Gawęda, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, nr 561, Prace Historyczne, z. 65, Warszawa 1980, p. 146–149, 150–156, 158–164.

31 R. Odoj, Kaplica na Polach Grunwaldu, Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie, 1962, nr 4 (78), p. 745; the beliefs may have been associated with the pond or with the picture of Saint Virgin Mary installed in a chapter consecrated on 12 March 1413; comp. Das Ausgabebuch des Marienburger Hauskomtur für die Jahre 1410–1420, hrsg. v. W. Ziesemer, Königsberg 1911, p. 114 (17–18); S. Kujot, Pobożne fundacye i pamiątki bitwy, Roczniki Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu, vol. 17: 1910, p. 359; R. Odoj, op.cit., p. 745; S. Ekdahl, Pobojowisko grunwaldzkie i okolica w XV i XVI stuleciu, [in:] Studia Grunwaldzkie, vol. III, ed. M. Biskup (Rozprawy i Materiały Ośrodka Badań Naukowych im. Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego w Olsztynie, nr 136), Olsztyn 1994, p. 63.



oral narrations which overemphasized the great amount of blood in the Teutonic camp shows that there existed very strong sensual stimuli causing a psychological reaction of hyperbolic perception of the reality. Th e strong sensual stimuli were caused by the magnitude of the event – a signifi cant number of bleeding and in-jured bodies32. It may be assumed that the very fi rst impression of the inhabitants of Prussia in the evening of 15 July was a very intense emotion triggered by the number of killed people and the concentration of fi ghts in that place, which led to the feeling of astonishment and disbelief. Th is feeling of the bizarre created the ambience for hyperbolic interpretations33. If we take into account the fact that the Teutonic camp was the only signifi cant34 place in the battlefi eld where the fi ghts were so concentrated and had a quite static nature, the reaction becomes fully understandable. Th e homiletic text preserved in the 15th century copy prepared on the basis of the so-called original Chronicle of confl ict35 shows clearly that in the Teutonic camp there were killed more people than in the whole “open” battlefi eld36; the author stressed that all the defenders of the camp had been killed, which was obviously an exaggeration to intensify the impressions of the reader37.

32 Th e evidence are human remains excavated near the chapter, some of which bore the signs of many injuries; comp. B. Łuczak, Ludzkie szczątki kostne z Pól Grunwaldu, [in:] Studia Grunwaldzkie, vol. I, ed. M. Biskup (Rozprawy i Materiały Ośrodka Badań Naukowych im. Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego w Olsztynie, nr 124), Olsztyn 1991, p. 106–142. Th e memory about the bloody fi ght in the camp, ex-tended with time to the whole battle of 15 July, was also vivid in the 16th century, the evidence of which is the seal used by in 1518 by the priest of the Grunwald chapter Jakob Rauther showing two battleaxes directed against each other; comp. S. Ekdahl, op.cit., p. 65 and pict. 1 p. 66.

33 A similar psychological phenomenon was presented in the narrative about an open battle be-tween two mounted armies in the valley. Its dynamic character, considerable magnitude and the use of a cavalry charge contributed to the creation of oral traditions about “the bridge made of human arms” (“quasi unus pons manu factus”); comp. CC, p. 26.

34 Using the adjective I leave aside local fi ghts for battle standards, only one example of which is given by Długosz – the description of the combat for the Great Banner of Cracow (1); comp. Długosz X/XI, p. 109. Being familiar with the structure of medieval cavalry battle (comp. e.g. A. Ayton, Arms, armour and horses, [in:] Medieval Warfare. A History, ed. M. Keen, Oxford 1999, s. 187–193; S. Ekdahl, Die „Banderia Prutenorum” des Jan Długosz – eine Quelle zur Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410 (Abhan-dlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaft en in Gottingen, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Bd. 3, Nr. 104), Gottingen 1976, p. 9–23), it is hard to believe that among several dozen of battle standards, only the Great Banner of Cracow gave rise to local fi ghts. Th e Polish chronicler described only this episode, because he had concrete information about it; moreover, he did it also for stylistic reasons – to build tension and to make the narration more dramatic. I shall address this complex problem of Długosz’s narration about the battle of 15 July and the whole expedition of Władysław II in a separate study (Dlaczego i w jakim celu Jan Długosz opisał bitwę grunwaldzką tak, jak ją opisał?).

35 Z. Celichowski, Wstęp, [in:] CC, p. 12.36 CC, p. 28: „In illo autem loco plus, quam in toto con. ictu, cadavera mortuorum apparu-

erunt”.37 Ibid., p. 28: „[...] sed statim devicti omnes in ore gladii perierunt”. Th e poetica expresion in ore

gladii – in the clutches of the sword taken from the Vulgate (Luc. 21, 24): „[...] et cadent in ore gladii et captivi ducentur in omnes gentes et Hierusalem calcabitur a gentibus donec impleantur tempora nationum [...]”, the prophetic and eschatological biblical context of this extract from the Gospel of St. Luke presented as the words of Christ makes us perceive the fragment of Kronika konfl iktu (or



Th e next day aft er the battle, on 16 July, apart from the sight of dead bodies and horses, local people were exposed to a series of symbolic actions undertaken by King Władysław II. Th ese ritual actions included the previously mentioned osten-tatious march of the king and horses through the battlefi eld and next to it, which caused extending the “battlefi eld” to the area of the enemy, inside Prussia, which took place in the evening of 15 July38.

Th e fi rst action had a purely sacral nature – a liturgy which was described both in Chronicle of confl ict and in Długosz’s annals as incredibly elaborate. Both records contain information saying that three solemn masses were conducted that morning39. Th e text of Chronicle of Confl ict says that they were votive masses: about the Holy Spirit (de Sancto Spiritu), to the Holy Trinity (de Sancta Trinitate) and about the Division of the Apostles (de Divisione Apostolorum)40, whereas ac-cording to Długosz the votive masses are called: about Saint Mary (de Benedicta Domina Nostra Maria), about the Holy Spirit and the Trinity41. It is understand-able that the votive mass in honor of the Holy Trinity was preceded by the liturgy to the Holy Spirit – the originator of God’s involvement in human life42. Neverthe-less, the remaining two liturgies raise doubts. It must be noted, though, that the letter of Władysław II to the bishop of Pomesania Johann II Rymann written on 16 Sept 1410 included thanksgiving references both for the intercession of Saint Mary and the Twelve Apostles. Th e king introduced to the Prussian bishop his intention to found a monastery on the battlefi eld43. Th e prisoners of war must have

maybe also the original Kronika konfl iktu?) diff erently. In such a case the quantifi er omnes does not constitute a biblical amplifi cation.

38 I look closer at this act in the monograph of war of 1409–1411, comp. K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 450–451. About ritual acts constituting an essential element of the monarch’s rule and its manifes-tation comp. in Polish historiography the recent studies of Zbigniew Dalewski: Władza, przestrzeń, ceremoniał. Miejsce i uroczystość inauguracji władzy w Polsce średniowiecznej do końca XIV wieku, Warszawa 1996; idem, Rytuał i polityka. Opowieść Galla Anonima o konfl ikcie Bolesława Krzywo-ustego ze Zbigniewem, Warszawa 2005 (both works include foreign (mostly English and German) literature of issues connected with understanding and executing the monarch’s power in the Early, High and Late Middle Ages).

39 Długosz X/XI, p. 118. A solemn mass was an elaborate sung service; more about this issue comp. e.g. J. Braun, Liturgisches Handlexikon, Regensburg 1924, p. 220, 223, 225; J. A. Jungmann, Missarum Sollemnia. Eine genetische Erklärung der römischen Messe, Bd. I: Messe im Wandel der Jahr-hunderte, Messe und kirchliche Gemeinschaft , Vormesse, Wien–Freiburg–Basel 1962 (wyd. 5), p. 267.

40 CC, p. 29.41 Długosz X/XI, p. 121.42 Th e king’s letters to his spouse – Queen Anne, the archbishop Mikołaj II Kurowski and the

Bishop Wojciech Jastrzębiec of 16 July express the concept of God’s help given to the king while he was choosing the site of the battle; comp. SRP, Bd. III, p. 426 (= MPH, vol. II, p. 867); Universitätsbiblio-thek Eichstätt, Ms. 698, s. 379, 379 (edition: E. Schnippel, Vom Streitplatz zum Tannenberge, Prussia, Bd. 31: 1935, s. 66); SRP, Bd. III, p. 427 (= MPH, vol. II, p. 866 = KDW, vol. V, nr 163, p. 170).

43 E. Strehlke, Ein Kloster auf dem Tannenberger Schlachtfelde, Altpreussische Monatsschrift , Bd. 7: 1870, p. 46 (= S. Kujot, op.cit., Dok. nr 1, p. 375–376); comp. S. Kwiatkowski, O zapomnianym programie ideowym kaplicy grunwaldzkiej w latach 1410–1414, [in:] Studia Grunwaldzkie, vol. I, p. 59.



witnessed all those liturgical rituals, the aim of which was the manifestation of the belief that the Polish monarch had been supported by some supernatural powers during the battle of Grunwald. It is impossible to defi ne to what extent those ritu-als were staged with the intention of emphasizing the victory, and to what degree they refl ected the actual convictions of the king and people surrounding him both emotionally and mentally. Both these factors could be relevant. While the latter cannot be the subject of historical analysis, the sources remaining show clearly that several dozen hours aft er the battle there were some providential interpretations of the event which had a strong moral persuasive infl uence.

Liturgies are closely connected with the ritual of laying battle standards in front of the king. Th ey could have been acquired during the battle or found later near the battlefi eld44. Th e text of Chronicle of Confl ict interprets the events symbolically. It relates the fact that the king stayed on the battlefi eld “for three consecutive days”45, and like Długosz’s annals, it describes the ritual character of the monarch’s actions – emphasizing the victory by the physical presence of the winner on the battlfi eld46. Th is demonstration of victory consisted in the public ritual of laying at the feet of the king the standards of the defeated enemy47 – the signs of God’s protection over the leader and the army understood as a physical and real medium between super-

44 Th e Polish chronicler tells the story about seven standards from the army of the grand master abandoned by escaping Teutonic knights and found by Polish knights in a birch grove on the day of the battle; comp. Długosz X/XI, p. 114: „Reperta deinde sunt in silva parva arboribus, quas multi-coraces vocamus, obsita et haut procul a stacione hostili distante, septem hostium banderia a fugie-ntibus derelicta et terre tantummodo infi xa et mandata, que ad regem continuo delata sunt”.

45 CC, p. 29: „Tribus autem diebus continuis in loco con. ictus rex moram traxit, in quibus regi banaria portabantur hostium, ita quod ab omnibus poterant intueri”; moreover ibid., p. 30. It must be noted here that the verb ”intuo, -ere” does not mean just ”watching”, but “scrutinizing”, “admir-ing”, so it implies ostentation; comp. Słownik łacińsko-polski, red. M. Plezia, vol. III: (I–O), Warszawa 1969, p. 245.

46 K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 459–460.47 Kronika konfl iktu informs that prisoners of war and battle standards were brought to the king

simultaneously; comp. CC, p. 29. Th e information about how prisoners of war were treated was also included in the king’s letter to Archbishop Mikołaj II Kurowski, written on 16 July, in which the king wrote about bringing prisoners of war to royal tents; comp. Universitätsbibliothek Eichstätt, Ms. 698, p. 378 (= E. Schnippel, op.cit., p. 66); also the letter to Poznań’s bishop Wojciech Jastrzębiec; comp. (SRP, Bd. III, p. 427 = MPH, vol. II, p. 866; KDW, vol. V, nr 163, p. 171). Undoubtedly, the creator of the so-called original Kronika konfl iktu took information from those sources. Also Jan Długosz (Długosz X/Xi, p.115) writes clearly that prisoners of war were introduced to the Polish monarch the next day aft er the battle. It can be concluded from the didactic narrative about capturing Marquard von Salzbach, about which the king was informed by Great Duke Alexander Vytautas when the fi ghts were about to fi nish. However, the prisoner (together with another two Teutonic knights) was not introduced to the king at that time; comp. Długosz X/Xi, p. 116. Other fragments of Długosz’s de-scription prove that such acts took place the day before. Nevertheless, the chronicler underlines that the king left battle standards and prisoners of war in the hands of those who had captured them, with the intention of repeating the whole ritual of laying battle standards, which had a symbolic meaning; comp. Długosz X/XI, p. 117–118: “Tota insuper nocte insequente gentes regie a persecucione hos-tium cum captivis et spoliis unnumeris redibant captivosque et signa hostium regi illa nocte excubias in observacionibus agenti dedebant, quos et que ille iubet in crastinum reservari”.



natural and earthly powers48. Th e act of laying the battle standards in front of the victor had a double message; on the one hand, it showed the defeated party having been abandoned by the supernatural powers; on the other hand, it manifested the providential support of the victor. Symbolically, it constituted an announcement of God’s decree, as did every battle at that time49.

Among the Teutonic prisoners of war, the act must have aroused apprehension. Assuming that Długosz’s story about the meeting of Marquard von Salzbach with Alexander Vytautas is not a rhetorical construct, the feeling of dejection should be added to the list of emotions experienced by Teutonic prisoners of war, at least in some individual cases50. Supposedly, feelings ran very strong, and they became even stronger every time the standards were laid at the Polish monarch. Th e Polish chronicler stresses the glorifi cation of the Polish victory calling it a “triumph” (tri-umphus) and writing about the “glory” (Gloria), which the event brought to the Polish king and his army51. It must have been a refl ection of the fact how the mon-arch and the whole army were perceived, which is confi rmed by the king’s letter sent the next day aft er the battle to the bishop Wojciech Jastrzębiec52. Th e tendency of the king to maintain “glory” is visible, for he was careful not to commit anything that could undermine it.

Apart from the act of laying standards and presenting prisoners of war another decree of the king must be mentioned – the decree to fi nd the dead body of the commander of the defeated army, as well as the personal participation of the king in looking for dead bodies of Teutonic knights53 and sending them back to the Teu-

48 O. Ławrynowicz, Treści ideowe broni rycerskiej w Polsce wieków średnich (Acta Archaeologica Lodziensia, nr 51), Łodź 2005, p. 35 (this outstanding work also includes broader literature of the subject matter).

49 Acten der Ständetage Preussens unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens (further cit. ASP), hrsg. v. M. Toeppen, Bd. I, Leipzig 1878, nr 98; Długosz X/XI, p. 123–124 (the narrative about the conduct of Duke of Warsaw and Czersk Janusz I; comp W. Schild, Schlacht als Rechtsentscheid, [in:] Schlachtfelder, p. 147–168; K. DeVries, God and Defeat in Medieval Warfare: Some Preliminary Th oughts, [in:] Th e Circle of War in the Middle Ages. Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History, ed. D. J. Kagay, L. J. A. Villalon (Warfare in History, vol. 6), Woodbridge 1999, p. 87–97. Irrespective of the above-mentioned prophetic interpretation of the events, which was the result of thinking pro-cesses, it may be stated that this formula of understanding the battle is confi rmed at the earliest stage by the liturgy, particularly by the votive masses.

50 Die „Banderia Prutenorum” des Jan Długosz – eine Quelle zur Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410 (further cit. Banderia (E)), hrsg. v. S. Ekdahl (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaft en in Gottingen, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Bd. 3, Nr. 104), Gottingen 1976, p. 248; and a similar, but not identical description in Roczniki; comp. Długosz X/XI, p. 116–117.

51 Długosz X/XI, p. 117, 118 (with the connotation of the Old Testament, comp. Ps. 88, 11), 120, 121, 126; comp. Also Banderia (E), p. 250.

52 SRP, Bd. III, p. 427 (= MPH, vol. II, p. 867; KDW, vol. V, nr 163, p. 171).53 Długosz X/XI, p. 146; it can be inferred from the source that such a treatment of the defeated

enemy corresponded with the norms of that period. About this phenomenon comp. some remarks of Valentin Grobner, Menschenfett und falsche Zeichen. Identifi kation und Schrecken auf den Schlachtfel-dern des spaten Mittelalters und der Renaissance, [in:] Schlachtfelder, p. 21–32.



tonic party having demonstrated proper respect54. It must have included the act of laying the dead body of the Teutonic commander in front of the Polish monarch, which must have been in the presence of observers. Moreover, Długosz confi rms the use of the dead bodies of the defeated knights and expresses the opinion that the monarch would have achieved a better result had he buried the Teutonic of-fi cials in cathedrals, monasteries and chapters of the Polish kingdom so that the tombs would have recalled the Polish triumph55. It must be emphasized that the dead bodies of the defeated offi cials56, including the grand master, were laid in front of the king in the presence of the royal procession, which constituted a real manifestation of the king’s victory over the master of the land. On the way to the convent in Ostróda, where the bodies were probably transported57, the procession on 17 July demonstrated clearly the result of the battle of Grunwald. Th e mani-festation took place outside the battlefi eld, whereas the monarch himself demon-strated ostentatiously his victory on the battlefi eld by participating in the search for dead bodies.

Th ere was another act aimed at manifesting the Polish monarch’s victory. It was a ceremonial feast for which the king invited not only dukes and signifi cant members of his army, but also some prisoners of war such as the duke of Szczecin Casimir V and the duke of Oleśnica Konrad VII the White58, both of whom were members of the Teutonic army. Th ere exist no sources which confi rm or deny the participation of prisoners of war who were inhabitants of Prussia, such as burghers of big Prussian cities. Th e only prisoners of war among people invited to the feast who were named were the servant (diner) of the grand master Stanisław (Staszek) of Bolumin59 (he took part in the search for corpses of the Teutonic knights, so his

54 CC, p. 30; Długosz X/XI, p. 121.55 Długosz X/XI, p. 121: „Prestabilius autem et gloriossius iudicio meo Wladislaus Polonie rex

egisset, si corpora magistri, marsalci et comendatorum Prussie, non remittendo in Mariemburk, in aliqua cathedralium aut conventualium seu collegiatarum ecclesiarum sui regni humari ordinasset, triumphum suum magnifi cum radio visionis assidue renovatura”.

56 Th e body of Ulrich von Jungingen was sent together with the bodies of Grand Marshal Fried-rich von Wallenrode, the commander of Człuchów Arnold von Baden and the commander of Toruń Johann Graf von Sayn; comp. Banderia (E), p. 172, 228, 268.

57 More about the issue comp. K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 455–456.58 Długosz X/XI, p. 122.59 In 1410 Stanisław of Bolumin was a servant (diner) of the grand master; according to Długosz,

he was one of the closest servants (familiarior) of the head of the Teutonic Order amongst all the pris-oners of war; comp. Długosz X/XI, p. 120. Th is is confi rmed by the sources from between 1403 and 1413; comp. Das Marienburger Tresslerbuch der Jahre 1399–1409 (further cit. MTB), hrsg. v. E. Joa-chim, Königsberg 1896, p. 218 (5–7) (the sale of three horses worth 26, 24 and 10 grzywnas to the treasurer of the Order in Bierzgłow); 553 (35–36); 560 (30–31) (the envoy of the grand master to Poland in July 1409); OBA, nr 1974 ( remaining outside the Prussian state together with Bertold, next to Alexander Vytautas for fear of the hostile reaction of the Teutonic knights to his behavior in the summer of 1410); Acta capitulorum nec non iudiciorum ecclesiasticorum selecta, vol. III, pars 2: Acta iudiciorum ecclesiasticorum dioecesum Plociensis, Wladislaviensis et Gnesnensis (1422–1533), ed. B. Ulanowski (Monumenta Medii Aevi Historica, vol. XVIII, Wydawnictwa Komisyi History-cznej Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie, Nr 63), Kraków 1908, nr 529 (the record confi rms that



participation in the feast is highly probable60), and the mayor of the Old Town of Toruń Johann von der Mersche61.

All the actions discussed above were to communicate the king’s total glorious victory over the Teutonic army in all respects. Th e message was directed to both the royal army and to the prisoners of war. Th us, the psychological impact of the victory on the participants and observers of the battle must be analyzed taking into account not only the sensual stimuli from the battlefi eld, but also all the rituals of the victorious monarch which took place between the evening of 15 July and the noon of 17 July.

Th e ritual acts were to manifest and emphasize the impressions of the vic-tory and “glory” of the triumphant monarch and the commander of the victorious army62. An important question arises here – how the message and its perception aff ected the emotions and reactions of the inhabitants of the Prussian state during the fi rst days aft er the battle.

Th e analysis of the remaining source material shows that the psychological impact of the events witnessed by the prisoners of wars on the battlefi eld on 15–17 July should not be overestimated. Th e subsequent events confi rm that the impres-sions caused by the rituals of the victorious king entailed relatively few concrete behavioural reactions which could be understood as acts of support for the Polish king. Th e sources report only one action directed against the Teutonic knights directly aft er the battle – in the convent of Ostróda63, while other similar attacks on fi ve convents in Chełmno Land (Starogród, Papowo, Bierzgłowow, Kowalewo, Pokrzywno) and the castles in Lipienek and Rogóźno were not initiated until the fi rst half of August64. It turns out that the impressions form the battlefi eld did not

Stanisław of Bolumin owned the village of Płowce in Kuyavia in 1413, grantem to him by the Polish king); comp. also Lites ac res gestae inter Polonos ordinemque Cruciferorum, vol. III, ed. J. Karwasińska, Warszawa 1935 (wyd. 2), p. 45, 47. His two relatives, Bertold von Bolmen (of Bolumin) and Poleske von Bolmen (of Bolumin) were servants (diners) of Ulrich von Jungingen in 1409; comp. MTB 545 (28–30), 551 (27–29), 553 (26–28), 560 (24–27), 572 (2–4); comp. remarks of Antoni Czacharowski (Opozycja rycerstwa ziemi chełmińskiej w dobie Grunwaldu, [in:] W kręgu stanowych i kulturalnych przeobrażeń Europy Północnej w XIV–XVIII w., ed. Z. H. Nowak, Toruń 1988, p. 83–84), who fol-lowing the suggestions of Stefan M. Kuczyński pointed out that Stanisław and Bertold provided information to the Polish king in 1409. Th e estates in Bolumin (Gros Bolmen) covering 40 lans were the property of private owners in 1423/1424, but the proprietors’ identity is unknown; comp. OBA, nr 3625, p. 8 (edition: S. Ekdahl, Das Dienstbuch des Kulmerlandes (1423/24), Jahrbuch der Albertus-Universität zu Königsberg/Pr., Bd. 16: 1966, p. 97). About Stanisław, his relatives and off -spring comp. the recent comprehensive study of S. Szybkowski, Rodzina Bolumińskich na Kujawach i w Wielkopolsce w XV wieku, [in:] Heraldyka i okolice, ed. A. Rachuba, S. Gorzyński, H. Manikowska, Warszawa 2002, p. 419–443.

60 Długosz X/XI, p. 125.61 ASP, Bd. I, nr 98.62 J.-C. Schmitt, Gest w średniowiecznej Europie, transl. H. Zaremska, Warszawa 2006, p. 11–29;

also Z. Dalewski, Rytuał i polityka, p. 10–11.63 E. Schnippel, Der Verrat von Osterode (1410), Oberländische Geschichtsblätter, H. 5: 1903,

p. 94–97.64 K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 511.



make the inhabitants of the Prussian state sympathize with the Polish king. It can be concluded that irrespective of the psychological perception of the battle and its aft ermath, most inhabitants of Prussia did not regard the events discussed above as motives which could convince them to act against their territorial ruler even in the face of the physical elimination of people exercising power in Prussia – the Teutonic dignitaries and the grand master himself.

What aff ected the attitude of the inhabitants of the Prussian state was the ac-tual, not symbolic, presence of the king’s army in the closest geographical vicinity. It can be seen in the behaviour of major Prussian towns such as the Main City of Gdańsk, the Old Town of Toruń, the Old Town of Elbląg and the Old Town of Königsberg65, as well as in the reaction of two (out of four) Prussian bishops – Heinrich IV Heilsberg von Vogelsang and Johann II Rymann. In all cases the action undertaken by the heads of the cities and territories were determined by information about the proximity of the Polish army66. Th e Prussian towns adopted a wait-and-see attitude in fi rst two weeks aft er 15 July. Th us, the opinion found in the literature of the subject that the act of releasing the prisoners of war was to change the attitude of the Prussian population towards the monarch67 should be verifi ed as the infl uence of the propaganda action was not at all so eff ective.

It seems that the aft ermath of the battle of Grunwald and the rituals conducted on the battlefi eld on 15–17 July were not the only factors determining the fact that the Polish monarch achieved territorial rule over most of the Prussian state rela-tively quickly. Th ere existed two more conditions which facilitated his accession to power: fi rstly, the real and physical presence of the royal army in various regions of the Prussian state, the size of which was gradually growing; secondly, actions undertaken by the authorities of local communities, the latter being a question for separate research analysis.

Nevertheless, the reactions of members of the Prussian branch of the Teu-tonic Order (both the participants of the battle and its observers) were diversi-fi ed68. Th e sources remaining suggest that feelings of terror and panic were domi-nant among those who had managed to escape from the battlefi eld. According to Długosz, Grand Hospitaller Werner von Tettingen was the fi rst to escape from the battlefi eld, and then from the Teutonic camp near Stębark in the direction of his own convent of Elbląg, from where he ran away to Malbork. He was to run away

65 Th e Old Town of Braniewo, which was at that time the fi ft h biggest town in Prussia, was ruled by the bishop of Warmia [Ermland] Heinrich IV Heilsberg von Vogelsang, who did not take part in the battle and whose territorial rule was not interrupted.

66 I present a more extensive analysis of the phenomenon in the monograph of the war of 1409––1411; comp. K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 473–526.

67 S. M. Kuczyński, op.cit., p. 417, 430; it must be underlined that the researcher’s opinion was infl uenced by his specifi c Sienkiewicz-esque image of the Teutonic knights as the “hated foreign parasitic ruling class maintaining power only thanks to oppression” – the image which had little in common with the reality of the beginning of the 15th century.

68 Th ere are no sources commenting on the behaviour of the Teutonic prisoners of war.



with other fugitives69. Although the narration was included in Roczniki [Annals] to contrast cowardly Werner von Tettingen with the brave commander of Gniew killed during the battle, it was based on real information transmitted orally. Th e presence of the grand hospitaller in the convent of Malbork during the summer siege of the castle by the Polish army is confi rmed indirectly by other sources70. It must be noted, however, that he did not stay in the nearest convent of Ostróda where he could have undertaken defence preparations and prevented the enemy from marching into the centre of the country. Th e analysis of the events shows that other dignitaries such as the commander of Balga Johann von Schönfeld failed to organize any kind of defence, and they directly made for their convents71. Such circumstances illustrate the feelings of panic and confusion.

Other events also confi rm this kind of reaction. Th e commander of Świecie Heinrich von Plauen, who did not take part in the battle, within 72 hours aft er the battle undertook preparations for the defence of the headquarters of the Teu-tonic Order. Interestingly, such preparations were not initiated by other dignitaries – participants of the battle – such as Werner von Tettingen, Johann von Schönfeld, Friedrich Graf von Zollern, Sigismund von Ramungen). Moreover, Heinrich von Plauen so far had not displayed any particular leadership or organizational skills72. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that aft er the battle of Grunwald the corpora-tion bonds of the Teutonic Order were undermined. In such circumstances the organization of action was based to a large extent on family connections, which is confi rmed by the case of the elder brother of the commander of Świecie Heinrich (the Elder) von Plauen, who in the summer of 1410 held the offi ce of the procu-rator of Barciany [Barten] belonging to the convent of Brandenburg73and whose participation in the battle of Grunwald was highly probably in the context of his stay in the castle of Malbork in the third decade of July. His behavior immediately aft er 15 July was similar to the cases presented above – he escaped north. First, he probably ran away to his convent in Brandenburg (Pokarmin). Th ere he could have witnessed the capture of his superior Marquard von Salzbach and the defeat of the army of the grand master, which might have led him to the decision to escape directly to Malbork. In the last half of July he appears in the convent of Malbork as the close associate of his younger brother, who was appointed grand master on 19 July. In the castle there were also other relatives of his such as Heinrich VIII (younger/older) von Plauen from Świecie74. It leads to the conclusion that the

69 Długosz X/XI, p. 121.70 K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., pp. 438, 489, 579.71 Ibid., p. 438, 508.72 Comp. my remarks about the characteristic mythicization of Heinrich (the Younger) von

Plauen, K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 486, fn. 1269. It should be stressed here that the commander’s impetuousness was not regarded as a military virtue, which is expressed in the 15th century military treaties.

73 Ibid., p. 489, fn. 1291.74 Ibid., p. 468, fn. 1163.



defence of the headquarters between 19 and 22 July was organized mainly on the basis of structures beyond the Teutonic corporation. It demonstrates the unprec-edented situation of the Teutonic Order in the second half of July 1410, and refl ects the psychological condition of some of its members.

Th e impressions aft er the lost battle and in the face of so many victims on the Teutonic side must have been overwhelming75. Even though aft er 15 July the con-vents were still supervised as the majority of commanders did not take part in the battle, the loss of so many Teutonic knights (203 or 211 brothers did not return from the battle)76 contributed greatly to the feeling of dejection. Although it did not provoke the total panic described by Długosz in his exaggerated narrative77, in the next few days aft er 15 and 17 July the pessimistic ambience was strengthened by the new information about the royal army reaching the centre of the Prussian state. Some individual cases prove the gloomy atmosphere in the Teutonic Or-der78.

Th e analysis conducted here shows that the Prussian branch of the Teutonic Order felt the specifi c situation in Prussia in the second half of July very intensely. Th e phenomenon may be illustrated by the opinion expressed by the bishop of Poznań Wojciech Jastrzębiec two weeks aft er the battle of Grunwald on 29 July. Th e bishop associated the events of the days aft er the battle with the dissolution of the Order of Knights Templar a century before79.


75 Ibid., p. 440.76 Deutschordenszentralarchiv Wien, Hs. 427c, f. 27r. About the number comp. my dissertations:

K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 437.77 Długosz X/XI, p. 122–123.78 OBA, nr 28290, k. 1r.79 SRP, Bd. III, p.. 429; I discussed it more thoroughly in the collective monograph of the war of

1409–1411; comp. K.. Kwiatkowski, op.cit., p. 497.


ADAM SZWEDA (Toruń)

REMARKS ABOUT ARMISTICE AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE WAR PERIOD OF 14091411*

Key words: peace; armistice; document; seal; notarial instruments; Poland; Teutonic Order; Polish-Teutonic war 1409–1411; 15th century

Documents of treaties concluded between Poland and the Teutonic Order in the 14th and 15th centuries have enjoyed popularity among both Polish and German historians such as Erich Weise1, Maksymilian Grzegorz2, Antoni Gąsiorowski3, Klaus Neitmann4, Stanisław Szczur5, Przemysław Nowak6, and the author of this article.7 However, this does not mean that the subject matter has been exhaust-ed. In this article I wish to discuss documents draft ed during the war of 1409––1411, which means not only the Treaty of Toruń, but also acts connected with armistices concluded during the confl ict.8 I shall devote more attention to Polish


1 E. Weise, Zur Diplomatik der Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens seit 1400, Altpreussische Forschungen, Jg. 12: 1935, p. 218–231; Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen im 15. Jahrhundert, hrsg. v. E. Weise, Bd. I, Marburg 1970 (ed. 2); Bd. II, Marburg 1955 – it not only provides information about valuable sources, but also includes numerous remarks of the author.

2 M. Grzegorz, Analiza dyplomatyczno-sfragistyczna dokumentów traktatu toruńskiego 1466 r., Toruń 1970.

3 A. Gąsiorowski, Polscy gwaranci traktatów z Krzyżakami XIV–XV w., Komunikaty Mazursko- -Warmińskie, 1971, nr 2–3, p. 245–265; idem, Formularz dokumentów traktatów polsko-krzyżackich z XIV–XV wieku, Archeion, vol. 66: 1978, p. 171–184.

4 K. Neitmann, Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen 1230–1449. Studien zur Diplomatie eines spatmittelalterlichen deutschen Territorialstaates, Koln–Wien 1986.

5 S. Szczur, Traktaty międzypaństwowe Polski piastowskiej, Kraków 1990; idem, Traktat pokojowy Kazimierza Wielkiego z Zakonem Krzyżackim z 1343 r., Zapiski Historyczne (further cit. ZH), vol. 56: 1991, z. 4, p. 7–43.

6 P. Nowak, Dokumenty pokoju w Raciążku z 1404 roku, Studia Źródłoznawcze, vol. 40: 2002, p. 57–77; idem, Niemieckojęzyczne dokumenty Władysława Jagiełły, ibid., vol. 42: 2004, p. 97–114; idem, Dokumenty II pokoju toruńskiego z 1466 roku, ibid., vol. 43: 2005, p. 85–110; Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej pokoju mełneńskiego z 1422 roku, ed. P. Nowak, P. Pokora, Poznań 2004.

7 A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika dyplomacji polskiej w stosunkach z zakonem krzyżackim w Prusach w latach 1386–1454, Toruń 2009, p. 293–310.

8 Th e following monograph is devoted to the confl ict in: S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda,

A d a m S z w e d a52


(Polish-Lithuanian) documents. As the title of the article implies, it is not a mono-graph of the problem.

On 8 October 1409 documents confi rming the armistice concluded until 24 June 1410 between King Władysław Jagiełło and Grand Master Ulrich von Jung-ingen9 were draft ed. Both acts were written in German, which was a customary offi ce practice of the Teutonic Order, but this observation applies mainly to inter-nal relations of the Prussian state and relations with selected foreign partners.10 Latin remained the language used in Teutonic armistice and peace treaties con-cluded with Poland throughout the whole 15th century. It was only in the Treaty of Raciążek in 1404 that Grand Master Conrad von Jungingen made one document for King Władysław Jagiełło in German, which was a response to a letter written also in German in which the king confi rmed the conditions of the peace between the Teutonic Order and Prince Vytautas the Great concluded in 1398 in Ostrów Saliński.11 In Polish diplomacy, the act discussed above constitutes one of the few examples when the German language was used. Th ere are only seven known docu-ments in the strict sense of the word and one letter written in German dating back to the whole period of Władysław Jagiełło’s reign.12 Th e fact that documents were normally made in Latin led researchers to attempt to answer the question why it was drawn up in German, and not in Latin. Zenon H. Nowak supposed that “the copy of the treaty might have had a counterpart in Latin, which did not survive”.13 Przemysław Nowak rightly pointed out that such a suggestion “is devoid of positive premises”.14 He maintained that the fact of the armistice document being made in German by both parties was determined by “the fact that [...] the letter in which the Teutonic Order declared war was in German”.15 Nevertheless, this premise does

S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print) (further cit. Wojna 1409–1411).

9 Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, Nr. 74 (the royal document); Lites ac res gestae inter Polonos Ordinemque Cruciferorum, vol. II, ed. I. Zakrzewski, Poznań 1892 (ed. 2), supplemet no 51, p. 440–442 (Grand Master’s document).

10 K. Forstreuter, Latein und Deutsch im Deutschen Orden. Zur Frage einer Amtssprache, [in:] Studien zur Geschichte des Preussenlandes. Festschri. fur Erich Keyser zu seinem 70. Geburtstag, hrsg. v. E. Bahr, Marburg 1963, p. 384–385; M. Armgart, Die Handfesten des preusischen Oberlandes bis 1410 und ihre Aussteller. Diplomatische und prosopographische Untersuchungen zur Kanzleigeschichte des Deutschen Ordens in Preussen, Koln–Weimar–Wien 1995, p. 70–71; comp. T. Jurek, Język średnio-wiecznych dokumentów śląskich, Kwartalnik Historyczny, vol. 111: 2004, nr 4, p. 36–39; A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, p. 139–140.

11 P. Nowak, Dokumenty pokoju w Raciążku, p. 59–60 and reg. no 4A, 6A, p. 72–74; idem, Nie-mieckojęzyczne dokumenty, p. 107–112, no 4.

12 P. Nowak, Niemieckojęzyczne dokumenty, p. 97–114 (6 cases) and complemented by A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, p. 143.

13 Z. H. Nowak, Akt rozpoczynający „Wielką Wojnę”. List wypowiedni wielkiego mistrza Ulryka von Jungingen z 6 sierpnia 1409 roku, Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie (further cit. KMW), 1976, nr 1, p. 81.

14 P. Nowak, Niemieckojęzyczne dokumenty, p. 103, fn. 47.15 Ibid., p. 102–103.

Remarks about armistice and peace negotiations from the war period of 1409–1411 53


not seem convincing, either. Forms of letters declaring war belonged to correspon-dence, although they looked like documents.16 Th is rule is confi rmed in case of the act declaring war on Władysław Jagiełło by Grand Master Ulrich von Jungin-gen in August 1409.17 Starting from the spring of 1407 with very few exceptions all correspondence sent from the Teutonic offi ce to the Polish king was written in German.18 Th us, it is not surprising that the same rule applied to the letter declar-ing war sent in 1409. It is hard to assume that the language in which the act was written entailed any repercussions. Th e key to explain why the 1409 armistice acts of both parties were written in German is the context in which they were created. Th e armistice was concluded with the intermediary of the Czech and Roman king Wenceslaus IV, whose envoys were dukes of Oleśnica Conrad III the Old and his son Conrad IV the Elder, brothers Vaclav and Beneš von Dohna connected with the Prague court, the starost of Wrocław and Świdnica Jan from Chotěmice, a knight Johann von Schweyne and Wrocław’s councilors. Th e initiative of Luxembourg was connected with the situation in the Reich, where the position of Wenceslaus IV had just become stronger as against the anti-king Ruprecht Wittelsbach elected in 1400. Mediation in a serious international confl ict underlined Wenceslaus IV’s exe-cution of the prerogative of the Roman king.19 Additionally, the document defi ned the procedure of amicable proceedings in front of the Czech and Roman king; thus, it had to be comprehensible for Czech diplomats and diplomats of the royal offi ce. As far as Wenceslaus IV’s documents are concerned there were no strict rules con-cerning the language – documents were written in Latin, German and – to a lesser extent – in Czech. Nevertheless, in the “proper” Reich (excluding the Czech lands and Moravia) the German language tended to dominate.20 Th e hint that makes us suppose that the author of the document was a person from the German-speaking world is the date to which the decision of the mediation allermanne Fastnacht to denote the fi rst Sunday of Lent (Invocavit) should be added. Th is is a typically “folk” term, used both in the south and north of Germany.21

16 W. Rosener, Fehdebrief und Fehdewesen. Formen der Kommunikation beim Adel im spateren Mittelalter, [in:] Kommunikationspraxis und Korrespondenzwesen im Mittelalter und in der Renais-sance, hrsg. v. H.-D. Heimann in Verbindung mit I. Hlavaček, Paderborn 1998, p. 96; A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, p. 290.

17 Z. H. Nowak, op.cit., p. 84 (edition of the source); K. Kwiatkowski, Okoliczności wypowiedze-nia wojny królowi polskiemu Władysławowi II przez wielkiego mistrza zakonu niemieckiego Ulricha von Jungingen w sierpniu 1409 roku, ZH, vol. 74: 2009, z. 3, p. 32–33 (edition of the notary instrument with a description of the letter declaring war).

18 About the circumstances of shirting from Latin to German see A. Szweda, Organizacja i tech-nika, p. 139–143.

19 See J. Goll, Čechy a Prusy ve středověku, Praha 1897, p. 112, 114; K. Durschner, Der wacklige Th ron. Politische Opposition im Reich von 1378 bis 1438, Frankfurt am Main 2003, p. 210–211.

20 I. Hlavaček, Das Urkunden- und Kanzleiwesen des bohmischen und romischen Konigs Wenzel (IV.) 1376–1419. Ein Beitrag zur spatmittelalterlichen Diplomatik, Stuttgart 1970, p. 87–93.

21 H. Grotefend, Zeitrechnung des deutschen Mittelalters und der Neuzeit, Bd. I, Hannover 1891, p. 55, 57–58.



Th e original copies of documents from both parties have survived. Th e Polish act bears the medium-sized seal of Władysław II Jagiełło as the draft er of the docu-ment22 and seven (originally nine) sigils of the guarantors: the archbishop Mikołaj Kurowski (impressed on red wax, like the king’s seal), the castellan of Wojnowice Mikołaj Białucha of Michałowo, the chamberlain of Cracow Piotr Szafraniec, Do-brogost Świdwa of Szamotuły, Voivode of Kalisz Maciej of Wąsosz, the Castellan of Nakło Wincenty of Granowo and Mikołaj of Oporowo. Of two parchment stripes with seals there are left only cuts in the parchment; according to the list of the guarantors there were included in the document the seals of the castellan of Ka-lisz Janusz of Tuliszkowo and the Marshall of the Polish Kingdom Zbigniew of Brzezie.23

Th e Teutonic document also bears ten seals, the fi rst one being (according to the corroborating text) unsers ordens groste ingesegel, which was the image seal of the grand master which bore the character of the offi cial sigillum in accordance with the Teutonic statutes. It depicted the Madonna enthroned with the child and was impressed on black wax.24 On its reverse there was a contrasigillum impressed on red wax – it was a smaller heraldic seal of the grand master.25 Th e remaining nine seals were placed by the guarantors from the Teutonic side: Grand Com-mander Kuno von Lichtenstein, Grand Marshal Frederick von Wallenrode, Grand Hospitaller and Commander of Elbing [Elbląg] Werner von Tettingen, Grand Cloak-Bearer and Commander of Dzierzgoń Burkhart von Wobeke, Commander of Th orn [Toruń] Albrecht von Schwarzburg, Commander of Danzig [Gdansk] Jo-hann von Schönfeld, Commander of Grudziądz [Graudenz] Wilhelm von Helfen-stein, Commander of Świecie [Schwetz] Heinrich von Plauen, and Commander of Mewe [Gniew] Siegmund von Ramungen. Th e seals were impressed on green and brown wax.26

22 About the mark see Z. Piech, Monety, pieczęcie i herby w systemie symboli władzy Jagiellonów, Warszawa 2003, p. 49–50.

23 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin–Dahlem (further cit. GStAPK), XX. Hauptabteilung (further cit. XX. HA), Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 63, Nr. 3; P. Nowak, Niemieckojęzyczne dokumenty, reg. no 5, p. 112–113.

24 About the chief stamps of grand masters see zob. J. Trupinda, Ikonografi a pieczęci wielkich mistrzów, [in:] Kancelaria wielkich mistrzów w Malborku. Katalog wystawy, ed. J. Trupinda, Malbork 2001, p. 22–26; por. R. Kahsnitz, Siegel als Zeugnisse der Frommigkeitsgeschichte, [in:] 800 Jahre Deut-scher Orden. Ausstellung der Germanischen Nationalmuseums Nurnberg in Zusammenarbeit mit der Internationalen Kommission zur Erforschung des Deutschen Ordens, hrsg. v. von U. Arnold, Gutersloh – Munchen 1990, p. 370–374.

25 About the seal see J. Trupinda, Ikonografi a pieczęci, p. 26–27.26 Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Warszawa (further cit. AGAD), Zbiór dokumentów per-

gaminowych (dalej cyt. ZDP), nr 48 – I would like to thank Dr Janusz Grabowski from AGAD for the possibility to examine the Teutonic originals; J. Grabowski, Źródła do dziejów stosunków Polski z zakonem krzyżackim w Prusach w zbiorach Archiwum Głównego Akt Dawnych w Warszawie, [in:] Kancelarie krzyżackie Stan badań i perspektywy badawcze, ed. J. Trupinda, Malbork 2002, p. 111 and fn. 27.



What is curious is a certain disproportion in the seals used by the rulers (the main seal of the grand master, and the mere medium-sized seal of the king) and the choice of the guarantors (the most important offi cials on the Teutonic side, but on the Polish side there were two knights who did not hold any position). It seems that it may be explained by the urgency of the situation and fi eld conditions: the king did not have the majestic seal with him, and the guarantors were chosen from the people who happened to be within reach – interestingly, there were few high offi cials within the chosen group.

Both acts are identical – the diff erences concern only the draft ers, guarantors and the way of addressing Wenceslaus IV, who for the grand master was the “most kind master”, whereas for the king he was a “beloved brother”.27 Th ey were simpli-fi ed forms (i.e. there is no arenga), and the content of the treaty was organized into articles.28 Both documents (the Polish one and the Teutonic one) were engrossed by two diff erent people29, which seems to have been a rule in case of treaties like this one.

Th e armistice concluded in October 1409 was to last until 24 June 1410, and during that period the Polish-Teutonic confl ict was to be judged by Wenceslaus IV. However, the failure of mediation proceedings led to the renewal of military actions, preceded by the prolongation of the period of armistice for another 10 days. It took place in the morning of 24 June 1410 at the initiative of the envoys of the Hungarian king and the vicar-general of the Reich Siegmund of Luxembourg: Mikołaj Gary and Ścibor of Ścibórz30, who must have been given special powers by Władysław Jagiełło as it is not known whether they were accompanied by an envoy of the Polish king. Hungarian diplomats wanted to win some more time for further mediation. According to Jan Długosz, Grand Master Ulrich von Jungin-gen prolonged the armistice fi rmavit litteris.31 With this document, which did not survive in any form, the Hungarian envoys must have gone to King Władysław Jagiełło, whom they met in Wolbórz on 26 June while he was consulting his advi-sors. Th e king approved of the agreement and drew up a document on his part. Władysław Jagiełło promised to maintain the armistice until 4 July 1410 in his name , in the name of Duke Alexander Vytautas the Great and all his subjects. On the other hand, it also embraced the grand master and his subjects from Prussia and the New March [Neumark]. Th e Polish king made a reservation that the treaty could not be breached even if some of his subjects who did not know about the ar-mistice agreement attacked the Teutonic Order. Th e document has a simple form;

27 It was pointed out by E. Weise, Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, Nr. 74, p. 74.28 Such a form is used starting from the Treaties of Raciążek – A. Gąsiorowski, Formularz doku-

mentów, p. 176.29 P. Nowak, Niemieckojęzyczne dokumenty, p. 102.30 See K. Kwiatkowski, „Wyprawa letnia 1410 roku”, [in:] Wojna 1409–1411 (in print), where the

critical analysis of sources and literature is to be found.31 J. Długosz, Annales seu cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, lib. X/XI, ed. M. Plezia et al., Warszawa

1997, p. 62.



it does not list the guarantors for observing its conditions; nor does it include a list of witnesses. Th e formula near the date bears the name of Mikołaj Kurowski, the Archbishop of Gniezno. Th e act was authenticated by a smaller heraldic seal of the Polish ruler (with a quadrated image of the Eagle and the Pahonia).32 Th e eco-nomical form of the king’s document shows that the lost document of the grand master looked identical. In a sense the form of the document was connected with the fact that it was a short-term armistice, and nothing in the document suggests that it was to be used as a kind of a trial period before coming to a permanent agreement. According to the Polish chronicler, Władysław Jagiełło was satisfi ed with a prolonged armistice, for it allowed him to concentrate the army and march towards the border with Prussia. In the same vein, for the head of the Teutonic Order the armistice also had a purely military signifi cance.33

Aft er the summer and autumn campaign of 1410 the fi rst negotiations between the parties of the confl ict took place at the end of November.34 Th e talks begun at that time led to the conclusion of the armistice agreement of 7 December 1410 by advisors of both rulers; the agreement was to be binding from 14 December 1410 to 11 January 1411. Th e fact of establishing the armistice and its conditions were confi rmed in the documents of King Władysław Jagiełło and Grand Master Hein-rich von Plauen made on 9 December in Nieszawa [Nessau] and (the New City of) Toruń.35 In both acts there appear guarantors. Th e Polish document lists the follow-ing guarantors: Bishop of Płock Jakub of Kurdwanów, Voivode of Poznań Sędziwój of Ostroróg, Voivode of Sieradz Jakub of Koniecpol, Voivode of Inowrocław Ma-ciej of Łabiszyn, Subchamberlain of Cracow Piotr Szafraniec, the judge of Poznań Mikołaj of Czarnków, the castellan of Santok Mikołaj of Błociszewo, the castel-lan of Łęczyca Jan Rola of Łąkoszyn, the castellan of Międzyrzecz Janusz Furman of Zaniemyśl, the castellan of Nakło Maciej Kot of Dębno, next two dots appear on the parchment (..) followed by the word pincerna (cup-bearer), then the list continues to give the following names: Master of the Hunt of Łęczyca Mikołaj of Oporowo, the starost of Sieradz Bartosz, the castellan of Biecz Domarat of Koby-lany and the court marshal Piotr of Niedźwiedź.36 Th e list raises doubts in two cases: the anonymous cup-bearer and the starost of Sieradz Bartosz. At that time the position of the starost of Sieradz was held by Mikołaj Białucha of Michałowo (1406–1418)37, which is very well documented in the sources. Th e original of the

32 GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 63, Nr. 7; see also Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, p. 83. Th e seal described by Zenon Piech, op.cit., p. 50.

33 J. Długosz, Annales, lib. X/XI, p. 61, 62; K. Kwiatkowski, „Wyprawa letnia” (in print).34 A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, p. 375 (here sources and literature are to be found).35 Edition: Lites ac res gestae, vol. II, suplement no 63, p. 453–455 (the Polish document), supple-

ment no 64, p. 455–457 (the Teutonic document).36 Ibid., suplement no 63, p. 453–455. Th e edition omits Mikołaj of Błociszewo and dots before

the word pincerna. Original – GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 63, Nr. 5.37 Urzędnicy łęczyccy, sieradzcy i wieluńscy XIII–XV wieku. Spisy, opr. J. Bieniak, A. Szymcza-

kowa, Wrocław 1985, p. 137, nr 357.



Polish armistice document 38 allows us to solve the riddle. It bears 14 seals, and on one parchment stripe there are only remains of the wax protective cup. Th e smaller heraldic seal of the king was placed fi rst; next to it there is the heraldic seal of the bishop of Płock impressed on red wax, then the document bears sigils with the coats of arms of lay offi cials: Nałęcz of Sedziwój of Ostroróg, Pobóg of Jakub of Ko-niecpol, Leszczyc of Maciej of Łabiszyn, Starykoń of Piotr Szafraniec and Nałęcz of Mikołaj of Czarnków. Th e common feature of all the images is the fact that the coats of arms are shown with jewels. Th e next sigils were placed irrespective of the order in which their owners appeared in the text of the document and the images of the coats of arms are devoid of jewels. Th ese seals include the coats of arms of: Rola of Jan Rola of Łąkoszyn, the remains of the wax cup on the parchment stripe, Grzymała of Domarat of Kobylany, Pobóg of an anonymous owner, Starykoń of Piot r of Niedźwiedź, Sulima of Mikołaj of Oporowo, a seal with a blurred image and rim inscription, Sulima of an unidentifi ed owner (blurred rim inscription). Th e seal mark, on which there is only part of the protective cup left , and the stamp with a completely blurred image might have borne the coats of arms of Doliwa (Janusz Furman and Maciej Kot), or Ostoja of Mikołaj of Błociszewo. At least one of those three men did not place his seal on the document. Th e two remaining si-gils should be associated with the mysterious cup-bearer and the alleged starost of Sieradz Bartosz. It seems that the latter could be associated with the seal of Sulima, for at that time a Bartosz bearing this coat of arms was a servant of Władysław Jagiełło. His name was Bartosz of Charbinowice and Ogrodzie niec, who from September 1411 was a subchamberlain of Sandomierz39, connected with the royal court as the housemaster [Hormeister] of Queen Anna’s court from 1414.40 It is still unknown what position was held by him in December 1410. It is possible that Bartosz was at that time the starost of Sandomierz as it is not known who held the position at that time. In December 1408 the position was held by Krystyn of Ostrów, and from 25 February 1411 Jan of Sprowa is documented as the starost of Sieradz.41 It is possible that someone made a mistake and wrote “Syradiensis” instead of “Sandomieriensis”. However, there are no premises which could allow us to identify the “cup-bearer” (pincerna) with any offi cial bearing the coat of arms of Pobóg. Cup-bearers of the time bore other coats of arms, but it must be noted that in some cases the manning of the offi ce of the cup-bearer for some lands has not been identifi ed.

Apart from the problems with identifi cation referring to particular people, it must be stated that the Polish armistice document was prepared hastily and ad hoc. Its draft failed to include the list of guarantors, and probably recorded inaccu-

38 GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 63, Nr. 5.39 Urzędnicy małopolscy XII–XV wieku. Spisy, opr. J. Kurtyka, T. Nowakowski, F. Sikora, A. So-

chacka, P. K. Wojciechowski, B. Wyrozumska, Wrocław 1990, nr 841.40 K. Piotrowicz, Charbinowski Bartosz, [in:] Polski słownik biografi czny, vol. III, Kraków 1938,

p. 263.41 Urzędnicy małopolscy XII–XV wieku, nr 1381, 1382.



rately the offi ce held by one of them. Moreover, not all the guarantors placed their sigils on the document, which is another argument that the document had been prepared in a hurry.

Th e guarantors of the document of the grand master were: Archbishop of Riga Johann von Wallenrode, Bishop of Würzburg Johann von Egloff stein, German Land Master and the bishop’s brother Konrad von Egloff stein, former Land Com-mander of the Teutonic Order in the Czech lands and Moravia Albrecht von der Duba (Duben), Great Commander Hermann Gans, Commander of Toruń Eber-hard von Wallenfels and many “guests” and mercenaries: Heinrich VIII von Plauen, Beneš von Dohna, Peter von Schellendorf, Franczke von Warnsdorff , Czenke von Borsnitz, Nicolaus von Loga, Johann Rabe and Martin von Busewoy (Budziwojo-wic).42 Th e original of the act has also survived.43 It is symptomatic that only 12 out of the 15 guarantors placed their seals there. One seal has disappeared and another three have been damaged. Both acts were drawn up in a simple form and began directly with the intitulation.

Th e subsequent armistice documents were draft ed by both parties during talks which started on 21 January 1411. Th ey were sealed by representatives of Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen and King Władysław Jagiełło. Th ey were amended with additional “points, articles and decisions”. Th e sources have not survived, but we know about their existence from the records in the document of the next armi-stice.44 Th e break in military actions was to last until midnight of Friday 23 Janu-ary. Th e following day it was prolonged until the morning of 26 January. Th is time the royal document survived. Its co-draft ers and guarantors were: Grand Duke of Lithuania Alexander Vytautas, Voivode of Poznań Sędziwój of Ostroróg, Voivode of Sandomierz Mikołaj of Michałowo, Castellan of Kalisz Janusz of Tuliszkowo and Castellan of Sącz Krystyn of Koziegłowy.45 Władysław Jagiełło placed his smaller heraldic seal on the document, and Vytautas – a smaller horse seal (with Th e Pa-honia on the right)46; only the parchment stripe remains of the sigil of Sedziwój of Ostroróg. Next there are heraldic seals of the remaining guarantors impressed onto green wax: Poraj of Mikołaj of Michałowo, Doliwa of Janusz of Tuiszkowo and Lis of Krystyn of Koziegłowy.47 Th e Teutonic armistice act of 1411 did not survive.

Aft er the period of armistice had terminated, there took place military cam-paigns, but the negotiations of 30 January led to the conclusion of a permanent

42 Lites ac res gestae, vol. II, suplement no 64, p. 455–457.43 AGAD, ZDP, nr 50.44 Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy, ed. E. Raczyński, Wrocław 1845, p. 125–127. About the talks see

A. Szweda, K. Kwiatkowski, „Rokowania przed zawarciem pokoju i sytuacja militarna na przełomie stycznia i lutego 1411 roku”, [in:] Wojna 1409–1411 (in print).

45 Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy, p. 125–127.46 See W. Semkowicz, Sfragistyka Witołda, Wiadomości Numizmatyczno-Archeologiczne, R. 13:

1930, p. 73; Z. Piech, op.cit., p. 93.47 GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 64, Nr. 12.



peace treaty on 1 February 1411 in Toruń.48 Prior to signing the peace treaty Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen pledged to pay 600,000 grosches as ransom for Teu-tonic prisoners of war. Th e act is not well preserved.49 On 1 February the condi-tions were recorded in the preliminary peace documents. Th e First Peace of Toruń represented, according to the terminology introduced by Klaus Neitmann, a “so-phisticated” manner of concluding treaties – fi rst the document was drawn up by plenipotentiaries, and then it was ratifi ed by rulers in the form of a separate act bearing the names of all guarantors.50 Th e act of the Polish-Lithuanian party was drawn up under the name of King Władysław Jagiełło and Grand Duke of Lithu-ania Vytautas. Th e preliminary documents bear the seals of the king and the grand duke, as well as the Masovian dukes (Siemovit IV of Płock and Janusz of Czersk), seven Polish negotiators (Voivode of Sandomierz Mikołaj of Michałowo, Voivode of Poznań Sędziwój of Ostroróg, Castellan of Kalisz Janusz of Tuliszkowo, Mar-shal of the Kingdom Zbigniew of Brzezie, Subchamberlain of Cracow Piotr Szafra-niec, Castellan of Santok Mikołaj of Błociszewo, and the judge of Poznań Mikołaj of Czarnków).51 Only the sigil of the grand duke, placed as the second, survived. Th is is the previously mentioned smaller seal with the image of the Pahonia (an armored knight holding a silver sword in his right hand). We can suppose that King Władysław Jagiełło analogically used his smaller heraldic seal to stamp the preliminary peace document.

Th e draft er of the Teutonic Order’s document was Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen. Th e act was also authenticated by Teutonic negotiators (Archbishop of Riga Johann von Wallenrode, Bishop of Würzburg Johann von Egloff stein, Bishop of Chełmno Arnold Stapel, Bishop of Pomesania Johann Rymann, German Land Master Konrad von Egloff stein, Livonian Land Master Konrad von Vietinghoff and commanders of the mercenaries: Johann Romlian von Kobern, Werner Nothast and Konrad Truchses).52 Th e head of the Teutonic Order used his smaller seal im-pressed on black wax, a small piece of which has survived. Th e bishops impressed their seals on red wax, and the rest on green and brown wax. One seal has not sur-vived at all – there is only a parchment stripe left . Th e preliminary documents were prepared in a simple form, and their rulings were expressed in points.53

48 About the details of the last stage of the negotiations see A. Szweda, K. Kwiatkowski, „Ro-kowania przed zawarciem pokoju” (in print).

49 M. Pelech, Der Verpfl ichtungsbrief des Hochmeisters Heinrichs von Plauen bezuglich der Bezah-lung von 100000 Schock bohmischen Groschen an den Konig von Polen vom 31. Januar 1411, Preussen-land, Jg. 17: 1979, p. 59–62, Anhang Nr. 1.

50 K. Neitmann, Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, p. 148–149, 162–165; see also A. Gąsiorowski, Formularz dokumentów, p. 173.

51 AGAD, ZDP, nr 4487; edition: Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, ed. A. Lewicki, vol. II, Kraków 1891, nr 35. Podobizna: J. Grabowski, Z dziejów stosunków Polski z Zakonem krzyżackim w Prusach, Warszawa 2006, p. 24, nr 6.

52 AGAD, ZDP, nr 49; editio: Lites ac res gestae, vol. II, suplement no 61, p. 461–464.53 Comp. A. Gąsiorowski, Formularz dokumentów, p. 175.



Th e preliminary documents drawn up in Toruń on 1 February 1411 defi ned the manner of ratifying the conditions of the peace treaty as well as the people and towns whose seals should be included in the main documents. According to the established procedure the stamping and the exchange of the documents took place at the assembly of the plenipotentiaries of both parties at Drwęca near Złotoria on 10 May 1411.54 Th e Polish party received the Teutonic act with 41 seals. Accord-ing to the corroborating text, the Grand Master placed his sigillum maiusm – the previously mentioned seal with the image of the Madonna, but only parchment stripes have survived in the document. Apart from Heinrich von Plauen, the fol-lowing bishops stamped their seals: Bishop of Chelmno Arnold Stapel, Bishop of Pomesania Johann Rymann, Bishop of Sambia Heinrich von Seefeld; the land mas-ters: German Land Master Konrad von Egloff stein, Livonian Land Master Konrad von Vietinghoff , Grand Commander Hermann Gans, Chief Marshal Küch meister, Grand Hospitaller and Commander of Elbląg [Elbing] Werner von Tettingen, Grand Cloak-Bearer and Commander of Dzierzgoń Albrecht von Tonn, the trea-surer Boemund Brendel; the commanders: Commander of Toruń Eberhard von Wallenfels, Commander of Balga Frederick von Zollern, Commander of Branden-burg Ulrich Zenger, Commander of Neman [Ragnit] Helferich von Drahe, Com-mander of Ostróda [Osterode] Konrad Sefeler, Commander of Gdańsk [Danzig] Heinrich (the Elder) von Plauen, Commander of Gniew Peter von Lorich, Com-mander of Świecie [Schwetz] Johann von Konstat, Commander of Grudziądz [Graudenz] Johann von Bichau, Commander of Radzyń [Rehden] Georg von Wirs-berg, Commander of Człuchów [Schlochau] Jost von Hohenkirchen, Commander of Tuchola [Tuchel] Simon Langschenkel, Commander of Brodnica [Strasburg an der Drewenz] Wilhelm von Eppingen, Commander of Kowalewo [Grünhagen] and Golub [Gollub] Karl von Waltershausen, Commander of Nieszawa [Nessau] Konrad von Buchsecke, Commander of Starogród [Althausen] Frederick Schott; the reeves [vogts] : of Tczew [Dirschau] Heinrich von Querfurt, of Grabino [Gre-bin] Johann von Techwitz, of Rogozina Hartmann Lebe; the knights: Augustin von Ziegenberg (of Cymbark, Cegenberg), Heinrich of Bąków [Bankau], Kaspar of Bażyny (von Baysen, Th omas of Taszewo (von Teschow) and Nikolaus Weytkop; the towns: Chełmno [Kulm], Toruń [Th orn], Gdańsk [Danzig], Elbląg [Elbing], Królewiec [Königsberg] and Brodnica [Strasburg an der Drewenz]. Th e bishops impressed their sigils on red wax, the offi cials and knights on brown wax and the towns on green or brown wax.55

Th e Teutonic party received the Polish-Lithuanian act. Its original did not sur-vive, and its contents are known from transumpts and copies made out aft er 1411.56

54 A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, p. 378.55 AGAD, ZDP, nr 1062; rdition: Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, Nr. 83b (paralel

edition of the Teutonic document and the Polish-Lithuanian act). Th e image: ‘Grunwald. 600 lat chwały. Katalog wystawy”, compiled by J. Grabowski (in print).

56 Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, nr 83b.



According to the text of the corroboration of the document it was impressed with the majestic seals of King Władysław Jagiełło and Grand Duke of Lithuania Alex-ander Vytautas, the sigils of Masovian dukes Janusz I and Siemovit IV, Lithuanian dukes Semen Lingwen Olgierdowicz, Sigismund Kęstutaitis and Semen Jamunto-wicz; Archbishop of Gniezno Mikołaj Kurowski; the bishops: Bishop of Cracow Piotr Wysza, Bishop of Poznań Wojciech Jastrzębica, Castellan of Cracow Krystyn of Ostrów; the voivodes: Voivode of Poznań Sędziwój of Ostroróg, Voivode of Ka-lisz Maciej of Wąsosze, Voivode of Cracow Jan of Tarnów, Voivode of Sandomierz Mikołaj of Michałowo, Voivode of Sieradz Jakub of Koniecpol, Voivode of Brest Krzesław of Kościelna Wieś, Voivode of Inowrocław Maciej of Łabiszyn; the castel-lans: Castellan of Sandomierz Michał of Bogumiłowice, Castellan of Kalisz Janusz of Tuliszkowo, Marshal of the Kingdom Zbigniew of Brzezie, Subchamberlain of Cracow Piotr Szafraniec, Castellan of Santok Mikołaj of Błociszewo, the judge of Poznań Mikołaj of Czarnków; Lithuanian magnates: Voivode of Vilnius Wojciech Moniwid, Land Marshal Stanisław Czupurny, Voivode of Kiev Jerzy Giedygołda, Voivode of Uszpole Krystyn Ościk, Radziwiłł57, Rumbold Wolimuntowicz, Jan Sugajła and Jan Niemira; and the towns: Cracow, Sandomierz, Cracow, Poznań, Kalisz, Brześć Kujawski and Inowrocław.

Th e Polish-Lithuanian document of the Peace Treaty of Toruń received a few transumpts made on the request of the grand master when it was necessary to show it as proof during international confl icts involving the Teutonic Order. Transport-ing the original far away was too risky.58 Th e fi rst transumpt edited in the form of a notarial instrument by the Bishop of Pomesania Johann Rymann on 8 October

57 He is commonly identifi ed with the son of Krystyn Oscika whose name is given next, comp. recently: R. Petrauskas, Lietuvos diduomenė XIV a. pabaigoje – XV a. Sudėtis – struktūra – valdžia, Vilnius2003,p. 215. Taking into account that Radziwill Oscikowicz died in 1477 or 1478, and he ap-pears in the sources from 1420 (the source printed out by Rimvydas Petrauskas: GStAPK, XX. HA, Ordensbriefarchiv, nr 29038 – dated from 1412, por. ibid., p. 81, fn. 71, was created most probably in 1411 and might be connected with the establishment of the fi nal list of the guarantors of the peace treaty); the supposition of Mirosława Malczewska (Latyfundium Radziwillów w XV do połowy XVI wieku, Warszawa–Poznań 1985, p. 30), that it may be another person is worth considering. It was also considered by Władysław Semkowicz (O litewskich rodach bojarskich zbratanych ze szlachtą polską w Horodle roku 1413 (printed in the years 1913–1930 in Miesięcznik Heraldyczny and Rocznik Polskiego Towarzystwa Heraldycznego), reprint: Lithuano-Slavica Posnaniensia. Studia Historica, vol. 3: 1989, p. 61; here also (fn. 376) a list of various members of the Radziwill family including those who rarely appeared in sources). Th e statement of Tadeusz Wasilewski (Pochodzenie rodu Radziwillow-Oscików, Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica, vol. 7: 1997, p. 12) that the person mentioned in the text is Krystyn Oscik Radziwillowicz is wrong as Oscik was a son of Syrpuc, comp. R. Petrauskas, op.cit., p. 80–81 and fn. 71, p. 214–215; moreover, in this case there would have been 35 guarantors, but the document bore 38 seals (see below), which means 2 seals of the drawers and 36 ones of the guarantors.

58 Such a role of transumpts of important documents drawn up by high church offi cials or church chapters is widely confi rmed in the medieval reality – M. Koczerska, Opisy pieczęci Jagiełły i Jadwigi w widymacie Zbigniewa Oleśnickiego z 1427 roku, [in:] Heraldyka i okolice, ed. A. Rachuba, S. Go-rzyński, H. Manikowska, Warszawa 2002, p. 231–234; see also S. Szczur, Traktaty międzypaństwowe, p. 123–124.



1412 includes a description of thirty-eight seals fi xed to the document.59 Th e in-strument was drawn up and described by a public notary Andrzej, son of Magnus from Nowe Miasto.

Th e presentation of the seal starts with the majestic sigillum of King Władysław Jagiełło, impressed on wax of natural color, fi xed on brown and green silk ropes. Aft er presenting the ruler on the throne under a canopy, the notary described the coats of arms placed next to the throne. Th ey show correct images, except the fi ft h escutcheon which was to exhibit three lilies (tria lilia). It refers to the coat of arms of Dobrzyń Land, the emblem of which was the crowned head with horns. Interest-ingly, in subsequent descriptions this element of the majesty of King Władysław Jagiełło did not raise any doubts – caput pilosum et barbatum cum cornibus [...] et inter cornua quedam crux.60 Th e cross mentioned here is in fact one of the fl eurons of the crown. Th e second was the majestic seal of Grand Duke of Lithuania Alex-ander Vytautas, fi xed on silk red and green ropes.61 Th e seal was also impressed on wax of natural color. Th e Teutonic notary noticed that the ruler on the throne holds a escutcheon of the Pahonia in his left hand. Th us, he started describing the coats of arms from the left heraldic hand-side to the right. In the second escutcheon he recognized a standing knight (the coat of arms of the Duchy of Troki [Trakai]), and in the fourth one – the cross (of Volyn). According to the notary, between them there was fi gura cuiusdam animalis nondum noti- the unknown animal is a march-ing bear (the coat of arms of Smolensk land, or Kiev land). In further instruments it was identifi ed as: animal ad modum ursi, faciem vertentis ad imaginem principis.62 Th e majesty of the grand duke bore a contrasigillum impressed on red wax with the previously mentioned smaller horse seal of the duke, and the rider in the Pahonia was identifi ed by the notary as St. Martin. Th e remaining seals in the main docu-ment of the Polish-Lithuanian party were fi xed to parchment stripes.63 Th e third seal belonged to Archbishop Mikołaj Kurowski: a round seal impressed on red wax, representing a seated bishop (in the souce: imago sancti Nicolai – probably because of the name of the owner, but the transumpt of 1414 fails to include this identifi ca-tion: imago episcope infulati) under a canopy, with his right hand raised to bless and his left hand holding a pontifi cal cross (vexillum crucis, the record of 1414 informs about a crosier et crux loco curvature). In the bottom part there is a es-cutcheon with quoddam signum ignotum. However, in later documents the sign is

59 GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 64, Nr. 7. Later notarizations of the Polish main document include descriptions of some of the seals and fail to include the description of the set of propter multitudinem (GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 64, Nr. 15 of 16 June 1414), or propter varia signa incognoscibilia et multiplices caracteres paganicas (GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 64, Nr. 8 of 10 May 1421 , like: ibid., Nr. 5 of 5 Nov 1421).

60 Ibid., Schiebl. 64, nr 15.61 See about the mark. Z. Piech, op.cit., p. 94–98 (here you will fi nd earlier literature).62 GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 64, Nr. 14; comp. also ibid., Nr. 8, 5.63 Interestingly, the notary instrument of 1412 described here does not mention this fact, but it is

mentioned in later notarizations (GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 64, Nr. 15, 8, 5).



not described, but the notary included its image: it is a coat of arms of Szreniawa in its older form with an emblem in the form of a sphere (curvature) of a crosier on the left , with the cross from the forehead.64 It is the well known smaller seal of the Arch-bishop of Gniezno.65 Th e fourth seal presented by the notary was a small, round seal on green wax, and its image included scutum, cruce superposita et in circumferen-cia scuti quatuor magna puncta, in quorum medio parva stella videbatur. Littere vero circumferenciales tales legebantur: S. Alberti, cetere vero littere obscure erant et leginon poterant. Th anks to this in-depth description the sign can be unambigu-ously identifi ed as the seal of Voivode of Vilnius Wojcich Moniwid, who used it in 1410. It showed an escutcheon crowned with a cross, with four squares in its fi eld and a fi ve-pointed star in the middle; the inscription on the rim being: “† s. alberti: capit: de: vilna”.66 Th e seal was properly identifi ed, but describing it as the fourth one must have been a mistake most probably caused by rearranging the parchment stripes. Th e fi ft h seal described by the notary was the seal of the Bishop of Cracow Piotr Wysza – round, medium-sized and impressed on red wax. Th e notary identi-fi ed two angels in the fi eld of the coat of arms – one at the top, and the other at the bottom. He could not make out the elements between the angels. Th e description of 1414 was better: the escutcheon was identifi ed and the crowns in it were recog-nized.67 On these grounds it can be concluded that in 1411 the medium-sized seal of the bishop of Cracow was used: in the quadrifoil there was a escutcheon divided by a cross bearing alternately arranged heraldic coats of arms of Wysza – Leszczyc and three crowns – the emblem of Cracow’s chapter; above the escutcheon there was a bust of the bishop (in the transumpt taken for an angel), underneath the head of an angel with wings.68 Next was a small, round seal on red wax belonging to Bishop of Poznań Wojciech Jastrzębiec. In its fi eld there were two “apostle-like” fi gures (in 1414 rightly recognized as attributes of St. Peter and St. Paul), and in the middle – the bishop with a crosier. It is probably a sigillum identical to the smaller seal of the bishop, but this one was a little oval in shape.69 Th e seventh (perhaps again as

64 Ibid., Schiebl. 64, Nr. 15 – in the source there is no cross, but there is a knob, which probably results from the bad condition of this part of the seal.

65 Its imperfectly copied image was published by Marian Gumowski, Handbuch der polnisch-en Siegelkunde, Graz 1966, Nr. 344; comp. also P. Mrozowski, Imago potestatis – na pieczęci Jana Gruszczyńskiego, [in:] Heraldyka i okolice, p. 270–271. About the Coat of Arms of Szreniawa and its kinds see J. Szymański, Herbarz średniowiecznego rycerstwa polskiego, Warszawa 1993, p. 270–272.

66 GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 63, Nr. 4 (edition: Codex epistolaris Vitoldi, magni ducis Lithuaniae, wyd. A. Prochaska, Kraków 1882, nr 441 – without the description of the seal concerned); W. Semkowicz, O litewskich rodach, p. 14–15; in Horodło Wojciech Moniwid was granted the Coat of Arms of Leliwa.

67 GStAPK, XX. HA, Pergament-Urkunden, Schiebl. 64, Nr. 15.68 Th e seal is to be found e.g. in the document of 1397 – Kodeks dyplomatyczny miasta Krakówa,

parts II–IV, ed. F. Piekosiński, Kraków 1882, nr 399; the image – S. von Karwowski, Geschichte des Hauses Leszczyc von Radolin Radoliński, Posen 1908, Tafel 2 (between pages 8 and 9).

69 See G. Lichończak-Nurek, Wojciech herbu Jastrzębiec. Arcybiskup i mąż stanu (ok. 1362–1436), Kraków 1996, p. 230–231.



a result of rearranging the stripes) seal described by the notary was a small, round seal impressed on green wax, with an indecipherable inscription on the rim. In its fi eld there was an escutcheon with a sign copied by the notary: a half annulet with the base directed to the bottom and with a cross in the middle. It might have been a sigillum of any of the remaining Lithuanian boyars.

Next came a very well described medium-sized heraldic seal of Masovian Duke (of Czersk) Janusz I, which in a quadripartite escutcheon depicted a winged dragon and an eagle without a crown – the notary referred to the beast as a grif-fi n. Th e same seal of Janusz I was placed on the document of the Peace Treaty of Melno of 1411.70 Next came the description of the major heraldic seal – referred to as majestic – which belonged to Duke Siemovit IV of Masovia (of Płock) with an image of an earl.71 Th e tenth (undoubtedly the order was mistaken again) was a small round seal impressed on green wax, with an indecipherable rim inscription, and a quadripartite circle in the escutcheon empty in the middle. Th is mark should be associated with one of the marks given in the sigils formula of the Lithuanians.

Next came also a small sigillum impressed on green wax with an image of the Pahonia, the rim inscription being written in the Cyrillic script (karacteres). It be-longed to either Duke Simon Lingwen or to Zygmunt Korybutowicz. Th e twelft h seal looked similar, and in its fi eld there was fi gura non signifi cativa with a small cross above. It must have belonged to a Lithuanian dignitary, or perhaps to Knyaz Semen Jamuntowicz. Th e thirteenth seal with the Pahonia belonged to either Duke Simon Lingwen or to Zygmunt Korybutowicz. It must be stressed that it was small and impressed on green wax. Next the seals of knights and boyars were described. Th e notary was unable to identify many images in the seals; nor could he make out most of the rim inscriptions. Sometimes he was completely helpless, as in case of seal 22: sigillum rotundum erat de cera viridi communi impressa, in cuius medio scutum propter obscuritatem fi gurarum describi nec littere circumferenciales po-terant legi.

Fortunately, the seals of towns received a much better treatment. Th e 25th seal was sigillum rotundum competenter magnum impressed on red wax; it was a smaller seal of Cracow with a meticulously presented seal image: St. Wenceslaus girded with a sword, holding a fl ag in his right hand and a shield with a cross in his left hand. On his right there was an eagle, on his left a crown, and in the fi eld of the seal there was an inscription “S. Wence-slaus”.72 In twenty-seventh place,

70 S. K. Kuczyński, Pieczęcie książąt mazowieckich, Wrocław 1978, p. 331–332; Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej, p. 23, seal 3.

71 S. K. Kuczyński, Pieczęcie książąt, p. 338–339 – it survived only in one copy where its rim is slightly damaged. Th e document gives its full form:” † S. Semoviti dei gra(cia) ducis Mazovie et do-mini Plocensis ac Visnensis”. It was probably placed on the Peace Act of Melno, but it is not preserved – Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej, p. 23, seal 4.

72 M. Gumowski, Najstarsze pieczęcie miast polskich, Toruń 1960, p. 122, nr 213, 214 (two very similar seal pistons used at the same time); M. Friedberg, Herb miasta Krakówa, Kraków 1937, p. 13, nr 4, 5; H. Seroka, Herby miast małopolskich do końca XVIII wieku, Warszawa 2002, p. 139. Th e



impressed on red wax there was a seal of Sandomierz with a characteristic emblem of the Kingdom over the city gate.73 In twenty-ninth place there was described a secret seal from Poznań impressed on green wax; in its fi eld there are two crossed keys, and above them an escutcheon with an eagle without a crown.74 Notary An-drzej from Nowe Miasto described a seal from Kalisz as the thirty-fi rst; it was impressed on green wax, with an image of the merloned wall with a gate and two towers on either side, and a trumpeter on the left with a fi ve-pointed star above him.75 Th e thirty-third seal was a seal of Brest showing a wall with three merloned towers, and two holy patrons between them: St. Stanislav with a crosier and St. Peter (in the transumpt: fi gura episcopi i principalis imago unius sancti).76 Th e thirty-sixth seal (from Inowrocław) was described as follows: impressed on green wax presenting a fi eld with an eagle between two merloned towers.77

Th e form of the main documents was somewhat more elaborate. Th ey started directly with an intitulation, but they included an arenga and were organized into articles. In the Order’s act aft er the corroboration there comes information about the date: datum et actum in Th orun, sub anno Domini (1411), die dominica prima mensis Februarii, and the general testimony refers to the persons listed above as the guarantors. Th e document of the Polish-Lithuanian party includes the dating which takes into account only actum: Actum in Th orun, die dominico in vigilia Purifi cacionis sancte Marie Virginis. Next comes the testimony listing the negotia-tors of the treaty. Th e document fi nishes with the solemn formula datum per ma-nus, which mentions Sub-Chancellor of the Kingdom and Archbishop of Halych Mikołaj Trąba. A. Gąsiorowski rightly pointed out that the use of the tem actum by the Polish party was connected with the fact that in the dating formula of the main document there was given the date of concluding the peace agreement, and not the day of the actual draft ing of the document.78 Th e formula datum per ma-nus is characteristic of practically all Polish documents of that period which had a solemn or eternal character.79

document of the Peace Treaty of Melno bears the great seal of Cracow – Dokumenty strony polsko--litewskiej, p. 91, seal 109.

73 See M. Rokosz, Sigillum regis.... et civitatis. About the great seal of Sandomierz see in: Heral-dyka i okolice, p. 311–321; comp. M. Gumowski, Najstarsze pieczęcie, p. 192–193, nr 382; H. Seroka, Herby miast, p. 32, 103–104. Th e same seal was used in the Melno document, but there it was im-pressed on green wax – Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej, p. 96, seal 115.

74 M. Gumowski, Najstarsze pieczęcie, p. 178, nr 349; M. Adamczewski, Heraldyka miast wielko-polskich do końca XVIII wieku, Warszawa 2000, p. 403.

75 M. Gumowski, Najstarsze pieczęcie, p. 101–102, nr 167; M. Adamczewski, op.cit., p. 345.76 M. Gumowski, Najstarsze pieczęcie, p. 43, nr 28; M. Adamczewski, op.cit., p. 316–317. Th e

Melno act bears a damaged copy of the mark – Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej, p. 93, seal 111 (there is a mistake in the reconstruction of the inscription).

77 M. Adamczewski, op.cit., p. 340. Th e same impress is to be found on the act of the Peace Treaty of Melno – Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej, p. 97, seal 117.

78 A. Gąsiorowski, Formularz dokumentów, p. 178–179; comp. A. Szweda, Organizacja i technika, p. 294–295.

79 A. Gąsiorowski, Formularz dokumentów, p. 180–181.



Th e question arises in what circumstances the original of the document of the Polish-Lithuanian party had disappeared. It was passed to the representatives of Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen on 10 May 1411. As is confi rmed in the sources mentioned above, until 1421 it was transumpted on the request of the Teu-tonic Order’s authorities. One of the articles of the document of the Peace Treaty of Melno of 1422 obliged the Teutonic knights to reveal to Poland any documents and privileges connected with Nieszawa, other estates in Kuyavia belonging to the Order and Toruń’s river crossing which the Teutonic Order were losing in favour of the Kingdom. It concerned mainly the acts of the Treaty of Toruń and two am-icable settlements of Siegmund of Luxembourg (of 1412 and 1420).80 Th e main document of the Order confi rms the fact of passing certain documents to the con-tracting party.81 As is confi rmed by the preserved register of documents passed over to Poland during the ratifi cation convention in Veliuona in May 1423 the list of documents included: Die berichtunge von Th orun des datis was purifi cacionis.82 However, decisions of the Peace Treaty of Brest of 1435 literally repeats the article of the Treaty of Melno concerning the fact of passing over the documents to the Polish party, including in the list also the Peace Treaty of Toruń.83 In the oldest preserved inventory of the Teutonic Order’s archive from about 1436 there was re-corded Litera concordie facte in Th orun anno domini millesimo quadragentesimo undecimo, and in another place the fact of keeping the transumpt of the document was mentioned.84 Th e act of the Second Peace of Toruń of 1466 does not add any-thing new in this respect as it only mentions the annulment of all and any docu-ments belonging to the Teutonic Order which could stand in contradiction of the conditions of the Treaty of 1466.85

Th ree registers of the Teutonic Order’s documents prepared in connection with diplomatic actions come from the beginning of the 16th century. In 1508 among documents prepared for the amicable convention in Wrocław (which eventually

80 Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej, p. 7; Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, Nr. 152 (the preliminary document), Nr. 154 (the main document).

81 Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, Nr. 154.82 GStAPK, XX. HA, Ordensbriefarchiv, Nr. 4118, s. 6; about the source see E. Weise, Zur Diplo-

matik, p. 226–227.83 Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. I, Nr. 181, art. 18.84 Th e Diocese Archive in Płock, sygn. A 187, k. 131, 135; S. Gougenheim, Das Cartular von

Płock: einige Bemerkungen zur Schri. lichkeit, Archivierung und Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens in der Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts, [in:] Die Rolle der Schri. lichkeit in den geistlichen Ritterorden des Mittelalters: innere Organisation, Sozialstruktur, Politik, hrsg. v. R. Czaja, J. Sarnowsky, Toruń 2009, p. 105, here also (p. 99–119) you will fi nd a detailed description of the content of the inventory. About the source see also K. Neitmann, Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, p. 101–103 and fn. 93; S. Joźwiak, J. Trupinda, Organizacja życia na zamku krzyżackim w Malborku w czasach wiel-kich mistrzów (1309–1457), Malbork 2007, p. 280. According to Sylvain Gougenheim (op.cit., p. 102) registers and copies of the emperor’s documents and papal acts were included in the volume from the 13th century until 1481.

85 Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. II, nr 403, par. 2.



did not take place) there was transsumptum pacis perpetuae in Th orn factae.86 Two years later the envoys of the Teutonic Order submitted Litere pacis perpetue Torunie a Vladislao rege Polonie et Alexandro alias Vitolth magno duce Lithvanie cum ordine facte de datis MCCCCXI.87 And in 1522 Grand Master Albrecht von Hohenzollern took with him to the Reich e.g. der ewige friede beschrieben und sonst ander handlung, so vorm hern hobmeister zu Th orun gescheen ist.88

It must be underlined that in Poznań in 1510 Poles objected to presenting the transumpts by the Teutonic party. Th e envoys of the grand master replied that they would show the originals if a separate date for this was established.89

Eventually, the Treaty of Cracow of 1525 stipulated that Duke Albrecht von Hohenzollernshould hand in to King Sigismund I of Poland all privileges and docu-ments received by the Teutonic Order from emperors, popes, dukes of kings of Poland.90 In Gdańsk in 1526 the King received a box with many documents, for instance the Golden Bull of Rimini.91 Probably, the copy of the Polish main docu-ment of the First Peace of Toruń was placed next to it. Th us, the question is what document the Polish party received in Veliuona in 1423? Undoubtedly, they must have been the Polish preliminary documents, kept now in the Main Archive of Old Files, but recorded in the inventories of the crown archive from the mid-16th century.92 Th e main document must have disappeared soon aft er it had been given to the Polish party in 1526.

Armistice documents and treaties still constitute a relevant research area. Docu-ments of this type should be published as they are known exclusively from their archival originals. As it turns out, transumpts are equally valuable, for information included there enriches our knowledge about the manner of sealing the Polish--Lithuanian main document of the First Peace of Toruń.


86 I. Janosz-Biskupowa, Zestawienia dokumentów z archiwum Zakonu Krzyżackiego z początków XVI wieku. Przyczynek do roli dokumentów w walce dyplomatycznej Zakonu z Polską, Acta Universi-tatis Nicolai Copernici. Historia XIX, Toruń 1984, p. 58.

87 X. Liske, Zjazd w Poznaniu w roku 1510, Rozprawy i sprawozdania z posiedzeń Wydziału historyczno-fi lozofi cznego Akademii Umiejętności, vol. 3, Kraków 1875, p. 306.

88 I. Janosz-Biskupowa, op.cit., p. 62. More details about the circumstances of preparing the above-mentioned lists, see P. Nowak, Dokumenty pokoju, p. 64.

89 X. Liske, op.cit., p. 317, 323; A. Wojtkowski, W sprawie wydania Polsce dokumentów krzyżackich, KMW, 1959, nr 4, p. 457–458.

90 Corpus iuris Polonici, ed. O. Balzer, t. IV/1, Kraków 1910, nr 46, par. 29.91 P. Nowak, Dokumenty pokoju, p. 65 and fn. 63; idem, Dokumenty II pokoju toruńskiego,

p. 92–93.92 Wrocław, Biblioteka Ossolińskich, rkps 134/II, k. 120v (1551 r. – next to the preliminary and

main documents of the grand master); AGAD, the so-called Metryka Litewska, dz. VIII, nr 14, s. 80 (1582 r. – again the preliminary Polish document and both Teutonic documents).


SŁAWOMIR JÓZWIAK (Toruń)

TEUTONIC PRISONERS OF WAR AFTER THE BATTLE OF KORONOWO*

Key words: Polish-Teutonic war of 1409–1411; the battle of Koronowo; prisoners of war; mercenaries; ransom; the 15th century

During the war between Poland–Lithuania and the Teutonic State in Prussia in the years 1409–1411 there took place two especially important battles which in-fl uenced the course of the war: the battle of Grunwald (15 July 1410) and the battle of Koronowo (10 October 1410). While various aspects of the former have been widely analyzed over the last hundred years, the presence of the latter in literature on the topic is limited.1 Th e fundamental diffi culty in researching the course of both battles consists in the fact that there have survived relatively few sources con-cerning the events. Among those surviving prevails the chronicle of Jan Długosz2, written a few dozen years aft er the events, overwhelming in its scope and evoca-tive style. For this reason it is necessary to reconstruct the course of both battles in an incontrovertible and reliable manner. It is particularly important in case of the battle of Koronowo, the course of which is only known from the narration of the Polish chronicler. However, thanks to other preserved sources, particularly from the intensive research of the chancellery of grand masters in Malbork, it is pos-sible to learn about some less important, but also interesting aspects of the battle. One of them is the question of how the prisoners of war of the defeated party were treated, to which this article is devoted.


1 Among the studies concerning the battle of Koronowo comp. S. Kujot, Wojna, Roczniki To-warzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu, R. 17: 1910, p. 265–267; E. Kutowski, Zur Geschichte der Soldner in den Heeren des Deutschordensstaates in Preussen bis zum ersten Th orner Frieden, Oberlandische Geschichtsblatter, H. 14: 1912, p. 486–489; Z. Spieralski, Bitwa pod Koronowem 10 X 1410, [in:] Bitwa pod Koronowem 10 X 1410, ed. A. Tomczak, Warszawa 1961, p. 47–67; K. Kwiatkowski, „Kontrak-cja militarna Zakonu. Napływ kontyngentów pomocniczych i zaciężnych z obszarów Rzeszy”, [in:] S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print). Th e study by Piotr Derdej – idem, Koronowo, Warszawa 2004 – is a step back in the research concerning the battle of Koronowo owing to the author’s scarce knowledge of sources.

2 Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, ed. M. Plezia, lib. 10–11, Varsaviae 1997 (further cit. Długosz), p. 99–115, 152–156.

S ł a w o m i r J ó z w i a k70


Th e battle of Koronowo took place in an unidentifi ed place near the town of Koronowo3 on 10 October 1410. Th e Teutonic army, commanded by Michael Küchmeister the bailiff of the New March, consisted mostly of mercenaries from the Reich, Silesia and the Czech lands. Some of them were sent by the ally of the Teutonic Order – the King of Hungary Sigismund of Luxembourg. Th e Polish army consisted of royal court units, the Pospolite Ruszenie (the “Noble Host”) from the borderland and other groups. Th e size of the armies is in fact unknown despite various digressions on this subject, which are devoid of any reliable evidence of source.4 Nevertheless, it has been hitherto assumed that the Teutonic army was more numerous.5 According to Długosz, victory in the battle which lasted until evening fell to the Poles. Th e chronicler stressed twice that although the battle was smaller than the battle of Grunwald, it might be considered superior owing to its ferocity and signifi cance.6 It seems that this statement of Długosz is not an exaggeration. Earlier sources also prove the signifi cance of the battle of Koronowo. Particularly interesting information is included in an extensive letter written on 11 October 1410 by the temporary deputy of the grand marshal, the commander of Balga Friedrich von Zollern to the temporary deputy of the grand master, the commander of Świecie [Schwetz] Heinrich von Plauen. Th e Teutonic offi cial had just received news from his confi dant (from Toruń?), who told him that the previ-ous day (10 October) some representatives of the town (councillors?) talked with the king in Inowrocław, asking him for military help (it was the time when the local authorities of Toruń were wondering which side of the confl ict they should support). Th e monarch probably told them that they should be brave and tena-cious. He said that if God permitted him to win the confl ict, he would release them from the authority of the Teutonic Order. However, if he were to lose, the Toru-nians would do what they could and what they might consider right for them.7 Władysław Jagiełło was to express this opinion on 10 October, when he did not yet know about the victory of his army in the battle of Koronowo. From what he said

3 Comp. the most recent remarks of Krzysztof Kwiatkowski about the place and time of the battle – idem, op.cit.

4 According to Zdzisław Spieralski, the Teutonic army commanded by Michael Küchmeister included 3500 people – Z. Spieralski, op. cit., p. 61. On the other hand, Stefan M. Kuczyński estima-ted the number at fewer than 4000 people – S. M. Kuczyński, Wielka Wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411, Warszawa 1980 (ed. 4), p. 502–503.

5 Długosz mentioned a few times the military preponderance of the Teutonic army. In another place the chronicler exaggerated saying that 8000 people were killed in the battle on the Teutonic side.

6 Długosz, p. 155–156.7 „[...] Und die von € orun synt also gestern von Leslaw von im [krola – S. J.] gescheyden, do

się bie im gewest synd bittende umb rettunge; das her czu in gesprachen hat, das sie sich sulden enthalden als bederwe luthe; hil. im got, das her den streyt gewynnet, her welde sie wol von uns macht entseczen, worlust her aber den streyt, so sullen sie thun, wie sie mogen” – Geheimes Staatsar-chiv Preusischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin–Dahlem, XX. Hauptabteilung, Ordensbriefarchiv (further cit. OBA), nr 1355.

Teutonic prisoners of war aft er the battle of Koronowo 71


we may suppose that he seriously considered the possibility of Poland’s defeat in the war. In the context of this information it is hard to doubt that this Polish mili-tary triumph aff ected considerably the future course of the confl ict.

Describing the course of the battle of Koronowo, Cracow’s canon Jan Długosz mentioned prisoners of war and wrote about them more extensively in the sum-mary of the aft ermath of the battle. Th e chronicler mentioned twice Konrad von Nimptsch [Nympcz], a knight in the court of Sigismund of Luxembourg, who came from Silesia and fought on the Teutonic side. Prior to the battle, he was to break out of the compact formation and call for a volunteer from the opposite side to fi ght with him. Th e volunteer was Jan Szczycki under the Coat of Arms of Doliwa, who defeated the Silesian knight by pushing him off his horse. Długosz did not explain whether the defeated knight had survived or not, but he included Nimptsch in the list of prisoners of war in his resumé of the battle of Koronowo.8 Th e Cracow chronicler comments on a temporary armistice established between the second and third decisive clash. Both parties were to swap prisoners of war and return opponents’ horses captured during the fi ght (this question will be discussed more extensively in the subsequent part of this article).9 According to the chroni-cler, during the last stage of the battle which brought victory to the Poles, nobody would have managed to avoid being captured but for the darkness of the night.10 Another interesting fact concerning the issue under discussion here was included in Długosz’s extensive fi nal commentary referring to the battle of Koronowo. Th e Polish army captured many Franconians, Silesians, Bavarians, Turingians, Czechs, inhabitants of the Rhineland and Meissen, Saxons and Swabians. Th e chronicler gave the names of the commander-in-chief of the Teutonic army Michael Küch-meister – the bailiff of the New March, Konrad von Nimptsch [Nympcz] and other courtiers of Hungarian King Sigismund of Luxembourg: Konrad Elkinger, Konrad Truklszesz, Baltasar of Głowno (or Sluwno)11 and Hannus Lebel.12

How many Teutonic prisoners of war were eventually captured aft er the battle by the Polish army? In Rocznik Świętokrzyski there appeared a record that among all the prisoners of war there were 300 of notable background.13 Ernst Kutowski assumed that the number of captured noblemen was at least 120.14 On the other hand, Zdzisław Spieralski referring to the information included in the Polish annal,

8 Długosz, p. 153, 156. Th e fact of Konrad Nimptsch being taken prisoner of war was also recorded in a few sources of the Teutonic origin – about this comp. in the subsequent part of the article

9 Długosz, p. 154.10 Ibid., p. 155.11 Th e spelling of the name varies in each copy of the chronicler’s work.12 Długosz, p. 156.13 „Anno eodem breui interuallo, iterum Poloni cum Cruciferis circa claustrum Corunow bel-

lum fecerunt et Cruciferos vicerunt et 300 notabiles captiuos ad regem in Wladislauiam addux-erunt” – Rocznik świętokrzyski do r. 1490, ed. A. Bielowski, [in:] Monumenta Poloniae Historica, ed. A. Małecki, W. Kętrzyński, K. Liske, vol. 3, Lwów 1878, p. 84.

14 E. Kutowski, op.cit., p. 487.



was quite inconclusive.15 A thorough analysis of all the preserved sources listing Teutonic prisoners of war captured aft er the battle of Koronowo allows us to state that there were at least 200 of them, 67 names of whom are identifi ed (excluding Michael Küchmeister).16 Taking into consideration the fact that the register of the sums of money spent by the grand master on fi nancial support for the prisoners of war, which exists in two manuscripts slightly diff ering from each other and written between July 1411 and August 141217, is the largest register of this kind but still does not include all the prisoners of war (even the mercenaries and knights from the close circle of Sigismund of Luxembourg)18, we may suppose that there might have been over 300 prisoners of war captured aft er the battle.

Długosz described precisely what happened to the prisoners of war between 10 and 16 October 1410. So, on 12 October the Poles were to escort them to Bydgoszcz, and on 15 October to Inowrocław, where the king was residing at the time. Some of them (maybe the injured ones19) were transported on 60 carts provided by the mon-arch, while others walked or rode on horseback. According to Długosz, Władysław Jagiełło treated the prisoners of war with great courtesy: they were given dinner, their wounds were cured, and they were housed in comfortable quarters, where the king himself visited them. Aft er dinner, the monarch was to talk with prisoners of war for a long time explaining to them why the Polish-Lithuanian party had waged the war. As the chronicler wrote, the listeners became convinced that they had been fi ghting for the wrong cause and had supported the wrong side in the confl ict. Th e

15 Th e author misinterpreted the information included in the source. On the one hand, he main-tained that there could not have been “300 notable knights” among the prisoners of war, as the total number of knights included in Küchmeister’s army was slightly over 300. On the other hand, he con-cealed the fact that the given total number of prisoners of war would refl ect the reality if the number comprised knights, squires, servants, etc. – comp. Z. Spieralski, op.cit., p. 66–67.

16 OBA, nr 1375; Das Soldbuch des Deutschen Ordens 1410/1411. Die Abrechnungen fur die Soldtruppen, bearb. und ediert v. S. Ekdahl, Teil I, Koln–Wien 1988 (further cit. Soldbuch), p. 97––98, 102 and Anhang, nr 23, p. 177; nr 24, p. 184–187, 196–199; Kodeks dyplomatyczny Wielkopol-ski, ed. A. Gąsiorowski, R. Walczak, vol. VII, Warszawa–Poznań 1985 (further cit. KDW), nr 670; M. Biskup, Z badań nad „Wielką Wojną” z zakonem krzyżackim, Kwartalnik Historyczny, R. 66: 1959, nr 3, Dodatek nr 7, p. 702–705, 709; Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preusischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin–Dahlem, XX. Hauptabteilung, Ordensfolianten (further cit. OF), nr 13, p. 553–554; Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 192, fn. 16.

17 Th e editor of the sources, Sven Ekdahl, established that they were written aft er 15 July 1411 and before 24 Aug 1412 – Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 178, 189 – the publisher’s commentary.

18 For example, Długosz wrote that Baltasar of Głowno (Sluwno) was one of the members of the Hungarian king’s court who was taken prisoner – Długosz, p. 156. Such a name does not appear in any of the sources registering the names of prisoners of war from the battle of Koronowo. According to E. Kutowski, the wrong spelling used by Długosz was to blame for it – E. Kutowski, op.cit., p. 486. However, it is hard to agree with the suggestion of the researcher, for in all preserved sources with the names of prisoners of war from the battle of Koronowo, there is nobody bearing the name of Baltasar.

19 Badly injured prisoners from the battle of Koronowo (who survived) are mentioned in the above-mentioned registers prepared between July 1411 and August 1412: „Item Lobens czwene gesell-en worden gefangen und swerlich gewunth, 8 frankisch kroner” – Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 185.



following day (16 October) the names of the prisoners of war were taken down and the king obliged them to turn up at the determined place and time for the ransom. Later, they were released. Only the commander-in-chief of the Teutonic army was not released. Fettered, he was sent to the castle of Chęciny.20 Długosz’s account con-cerning Władysław Jagiełło’s treatment of the prisoners of war aft er the battle of Koronowo is confi rmed in the Teutonic record. In a letter written on 20 October 1410 in Tuchola [Tuchel] the temporal deputy of the commander of Tuchola Si-mon Langschenkel informed the commander of Świecie [Schwetz] Heinrich von Plauen (who replaced the grand master at that time) that the Teutonic prisoners of war were gradually arriving in Tuchola. He wrote about the arrival of Mr Nymsche (Długosz’s Konrad Nympcz, also referred to in Teutonic sources as Nymnicz or Nympcz) with other knights and servants (“knechte”), who had arrived earlier than Mr Erkynger (undoubtedly it refers to Długosz’s Konrad Elkinger, a participant in the battle who came from the Franconian family of Erkinger von Seinsheim).21 Th e latter was also making for Tuchola, but eventually he stayed a mile away from the town. Th ey were all released by the king except the Teutonic bailiff of the New March. Some of the returning knights brought also Polish prisoners of war whom they had captured before they were captured themselves.22 Th e deputy of the com-

20 Długosz, p. 157. Th e Teutonic chronicler wrote that Michael Küchmeister was treated severely by the Poles, because he was a brave man, he had caused much damage to the Polish Kingdom and had captured the knight Jarosław [of Iwno – S. J.] – comp. Johann’s von Posilge, offi cialis von Pome-sanien, Chronik des Landes Preussen, hrsg. v. E. Strehlke, [in:] Scriptores rerum Prussicarum, hrsg. v. T. Hirsch, M. Toppen, E. Strehlke, Bd. III, Leipzig 1866 (further cit. Posilge), p. 323. However, there exist sources saying that the Teutonic bailiff of the New March was not the only prisoner of war not released on parole by the monarch immediately aft er the battle of Koronowo. Another was Heinrich Harfust, who in Koronowo fought as a servant– “diener”– of the commander of Toruń and was captured in unknown circumstances, but was to be ransomed relatively quickly. Next, he became a member of Küchmeister’s army, and again, like the bailiff of the New March, he was taken prisoner of war in Koronowo. A record included in the letter of Grand Master Paul von Rusdorf to the arch-bishop of Cologne of 20 Feb 1438 („und darnach in der Nuwenmarke mit her Michel Kochmeister, unserm vorfar, der u} die czeit voith in der Nuwenmarke was, wart her [Henryk – S. J.] aber gefangen und wart ouch mit em los [...]” – OF, nr 13, p. 553–554) allows us to think that the knight Heinrich, like Michael Küchmeister, was in Chęciny and they were both released at the same time. Th e whole story is known from the fact that he, and aft er his death his wife, claimed damages from the Teutonic Order. Th e Teutonic Order rejected their claims saying that all the liabilities resulting from Heinrich’s having been taken prisoners had already been covered. More details concerning the issue were given by S. Ekdahl – comp. Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 192, fn. 16 (the publisher’s commentary).

21Among the killed participants of the battle Długosz distinguished a young man, Ulrich Er-kingar, probably a relative of Konrad’s , who was to come from such a rich house that if he had been alive, the ransom for his freedom would have been estimated at 60,000 fl orins (about 30,000 grzy wnas). He was buried in a separate tomb in Koronowo’s monastery – Długosz, p. 156. In the light of the sums of money demanded for discharging a prisoner of war at that time the information provided by Długosz seems to have been greatly exaggerated.

22 „[...] und sy habin etlich gevangen van den Polan mit in gebracht, dysygevangen, e das sy gevangen wurden [...]” – OBA, nr 1375. Długosz does not mention such great courtesy. He only informed about the exchange of prisoners of war during the second established interval in the battle – Długosz, p. 154.



mander asked the knights about how they had been treated aft er the battle. Th ey were to reply that they had promised (probably to the Polish party) not to say any-thing about it. Nevertheless, the Teutonic offi cial managed to get some information out of them. Th ey stated that they had never heard of a monarch who would be more right to fi ght for justice than the Polish king; the king asked the prisoners of war whether there existed any monarch who would agree to this (in the text it is understated – probably it refers to injustice); so he would like to do as a righteous monarch should. Th at is why – as the Teutonic offi cial stressed – many knights and servants admitted that the Polish king was right.23 Undoubtedly, the fragment of the letter refers to the monarch’s argumentation about the rightness of his case, which, according to the deputy of the commander, was to convince many mercenaries to support the Polish king.

As recorded in Długosz’s chronicle and in other sources of Teutonic origin, the prisoners of war were released on parole by Władysław Jagiełło, but fi rst they had to swear to present themselves at a determined place and time for the purposes of ransom.24 Some mercenaries serving the Teutonic Order had contracts with their principals which included release from captivity, remaining in pay while in captiv-ity and the payment of damages for losses and travel expenses to the place where the ransom was to be handed over.25 Th at is why their names appeared in subse-quent sources of Teutonic origin. However, the date of the records cannot be iden-tifi ed precisely. What is more, the information included therein can not be easily interpreted in any conclusive way. It refers, for example, to Erkinger von Seinsheim. Th e list of Polish prisoners of war captured in Prussia, which was written in the period between the battle of Koronowo and the Peace Treaty of Toruń26 and kept in the former chancellery of grand masters, announces that many Teutonic prisoners of war were to be exchanged for Polish prisoners27, and Erkinger von Seinsheim

23 „[...] sunder also vil sagen sy wol, das sy ny keynen herren sich groslicher habin gehort irbyten tzu gerechtykeit, wen den konyng, wen her spricht, wer irneyn herre, der sichs annemen welde; her welde tun, als das her von rechte tun sulde. Hir ummb so gebin im vele rittere und knechte gerecht, als ich von in gehort habe” – OBA, nr 1375.

24 How this mechanism worked is known for example from the history of one of the most impor-tant commanders of Teutonic mercenaries, who was taken prisoner during the battle of Grunwald, Nicolas von Kottewitz (in June 1410 he brought to Prussia horse lances and many crossbowers). He was released on parole by the king having fi rst promised to arrive with ransom in Cracow on 29 Sep-tember. Th ere his freedom was estimated to be worth 12000 Czech grosches (about 250 grzywnas), two armours, and four crossbows, which is known from his letter to Heinrich von Plauen written in Cracow in October 1410. – comp. S. Ekdahl, Kilka uwag o księdze żołdu Zakonu Krzyżackiego z okre-su „Wielkiej Wojny” (1410–1411), ZapiskiHistoryczne (further cit. ZH), vol. 33: 1968, z. 3, p. 126–127, 129 (with the publication of the source). If Kottewitz informed about it the deputy of the grand mas-ter, he must have hoped the Teutonic Order to pay ransom for him.

25 About the subject matter comp. S. Ekdahl, op.cit., p. 111–130. 26 According to Marian Biskup the source was written before the period of 20 Oct 1410–2 Feb

1411 – comp. M. Biskup, op.cit., Dodatek nr 7, p. 701.27 E. Kutowski summarized the preserved copy of the letter, dated 24 May 1412, which was

written by Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen to Duke Przemek Opawski. Th e head of the Teutonic



was to be exchanged for the cup-bearer of Dobrzyń Jan Kretkowski28, captured in Bratian. However, in the subsequent part of the extensive source there appears information that Erkinger and his servants were given a dozen Polish prisoners of war along with their commander Jarand29, captured in Miłomłyn [Liebemühl].30 Th is was probably in order to arrange an exchange of prisoners of war, which is now impossible to reconstruct. Th e manner and time of either the fi rst or the sec-ond exchange does not appear in the sources. Two lists revealing the fi nances that the Teutonic Order allocated in support of its prisoners of war, written between July 1411 and August 141231, diff er slightly. Nevertheless, it turns out that Erkinger (recorded among the captured “vor der Kronaw”) was to receive from the Teutonic Order 200 nobles, 50 Prussian grzywnas, 100 “schilde” (écu d’or) and 30 fl orins (in total 340 grzywnas).32 Additionally, 50 fl orins (25 grzywnas) were paid to his 5 unidentifi ed servants, and 75 nobles, 16 grzywnas and 110 fl orins (in total over 150 grzywnas) were received by his 5 comrades whose names were registered.33 In light of the possibility of exchanging Teutonic prisoners of war for Polish ones, we do not know what the money paid out to Erkinger was intended for. It cannot have been a form of payment as the Teutonic Order did not consider Erkinger and his people as mercenaries. It is possible that the money was at least partly to cover

Order informed that the dissatisfaction of the mercenaries with the remuneration for their service forced him to increase their pay and to guarantee that in case of their being captured he would ex-change them for Polish prisoners of war.– E. Kutowski, op.cit., p. 488, fn. 1. Unfortunately, the copy used by the German researcher disappeared during WWII. Only short summaries of registers, let-ters and documents have survived. On their basis we can only correct the wrong date of preparing the letter of the grand master provided by E. Kutowski, the correct date being 27 Sept 1412 – comp. M. Pelech, Der verlorene Ordensfoliant 5 (früher Hochmeister-Registrant II) des Hist. Staatsarchivs Königsberg, mit Regesta (nach Rudolf Philippi und Erich Joachim), [in:] Beitragezur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, hrsg. v. U. Arnold, Bd. I, Marburg 1986, nr 102, p. 167. From other sources it is known that aft er the battle of Koronowo the Teutonic authorities increased the pay of the mercenar-ies from 11 to 12 grzywnas for lances fourniers per month – comp. S. Ekdahl, op.cit. p. 119; Soldbuch, p. 25, 98 (the publisher’s commentary).

28 About Jan Kretkowski see J. Bieniak, Elita ziemi dobrzyńskiej w późnym średniowieczu i jej majątki, [in:] Stolica i region. Włocławek i jego dzieje na tle przemian Kujaw i ziemi dobrzyńskiej, ed. O. Krut-Horonziak, L. Kajzer, Włocławek 1995, p. 38; T. Sławiński, Kretkowscy i ich dzieje od połowy XIV wieku, Włocławek–Warszawa 2007, p. 40–42.

29 Th e most recent research shows that it may have referred to two people: either to Jarand of Grabie (Brudzewo), the standard-bearer of Inowrocław, or the pantler of Brest Jarand of Mała Kłobia, who at the beginning of 1411 received a nomination to be castellan of Kowal – comp. S. Szybkowski, „Postawy polskich i litewskich elit społecznych wobec konfl iktu w trakcie wyprawy letniej i kampanii jesienno-zimowej”, [in:] S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print). Th us, if it concerned the latter, he would have had to be released at the beginning of 1411.

30 M. Biskup, op.cit., Dodatek nr 7, p. 703–704.31 About the date of the source comp. fn. 17.32 According to the conversion rate suggested by S. Ekdahl, one Hungarian fl orin was equal to

half a grzywna (12 skojecs); the French gold ecu corresponded to 14 skojecs, while the English noble was equal to 26 skojecs and 4 pfennigs – comp. S. Ekdahl, Einführung, [in:] Soldbuch, p. 18.

33 Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 186, 197–198.



the cost of the ransom. However, it is not certain and cannot be proved. What is certain is that shortly aft er the end of the war and having been released from cap-tivity34 Erkinger and his people were to demand the Teutonic Order to pay them wages and to cover any expenses connected with the losses suff ered during the service to the Teutonic Order during the previous confl ict.35

It is worth looking at other more important prisoners of war from the battle of Koronowo. According to the previously mentioned register written between October 1410 and February 1411, the knight from Silesia mentioned by Długosz – Konrad Nympcz, a courtier of Sigismund of Luxembourg, was to be exchanged together with his two comrades for Piotr Wągiel along with his company36 cap-tured in Tczew. According to the registers recording the sums of money allocated by the Teutonic Order to support the prisoners of war draft ed between July 1411 and August 1412 Konrad von Nimptsch [Nympcz] received 50 Prussian grzywnas, while his comrades-in-arms ( probably 2437) were to be given 50 grzywnas and 100 fl orins – 4.5 grzywnas for each of them).38 Here again the intended allocation of the money is not clear, for Konrad von Nimptsch [Nympcz] was not a mercenary in the pay of the Teutonic Order, but a member of the court of Sigismund of Lux-embourg. Konrad Truklszesz, as noted by Długosz, must have been the Konrad Truchtsesse (Troksos) registered in the list of payments made to support the pris-oners of war. He received 30 fl orins (15 grzywnas). From the second version of the list it turns out that the sum of money was paid to him to cover his travel expenses to Cracow, where he had to appear on a certain day.39 His seven comrades and two servants were given in total 90 fl orins (10 fl orins each).40 Th e last prisoner of war whose name was mentioned by Długosz was Hannus Lebel (in Teutonic sources knowsn as Hannus von Lobel), also a member of the court of Sigismund of Luxem-bourg. He was probably taken prisoner of war together with his relative Nicolaus and Nymand. Next to his name there was recorded 35 grzywnas and 155 fl orins (which is 112.5 grzywnas) – 135 fl orins he was to receive for some unidentifi ed damage (probably to weapons and horses).41

34 More about it see later in the text.35 OBA, nr 1593, 1628. In the letter of 8 May 1419, the master of the German branch of the

Teutonic Order asked Grand Master Michael Küchmeister to satisfy fi nancial claims of Erkinger (from the war of 1410–1411), as his friendly attitude towards the Teutonic Order would be benefi cial – comp. OBA, nr 2959; E. Kutowski, op.cit., p. 506, fn. 5.

36 M. Biskup, op.cit., Dodatek nr 7, p. 702. Not much is known about Piotr Wągiel. It might have been him who was mentioned among the knights of the court of Sigismund of Luxembourg in 1397 – comp. P. Engel, Magyar Orszag vilagi archontologiaja 1301–1457, vol. 1, Budapest 1996, p. 421; Długosz, p. 271 (the publisher’s commentary).

37 Th is may be concluded from version B of the source.38 Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 184–185, 196.39 „Iten 30 goldin her Conrado Troksos czerunge sich czu gestellin”.40 Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 198.41 Ibid., Anhang, nr 24, p. 185, 196.



Among the remaining prisoners of war captured aft er the battle of Koronowo Heincze von Proff en (Profi n), the commander of the larger troop of mercenaries, is well documented in the sources. From the Teutonic “Payment Book”, written soon aft er 10 October 1410, we learn that not all members of his cavalry unit – Rota – were taken prisoners during the battle of Koronowo.42 From the previously men-tioned records of the sums of money given by the Teutonic Order to support the prisoners of war (from July 1411–August 1412) it can be concluded that he re-ceived 30 fl orins (15 grzywnas) as the fi rst payment. Next, for the period of captiv-ity he was given 262 grzywnas. Th e Order might have paid the money to cover the damages for the losses during the battle or to ransom him and his people.43 It could not have been his outstanding pay, as according to Proff en’s letter of obligation, written probably at the beginning of 1411 (aft er 10 January?)44, he and his people (“mit meynen gesellen also adirrn rittern und knechten”) agreed to have their pay deducted for a quarter for twenty lances, the 60 cavalrymen who were taken pris-oners with Proff en before the battle of Koronowo.45 Th e editor of the source, Sven Ekhdal, pointed out that the commander of the mercenaries mentioned his debt resulting from the above (“schulde”). Th e editor concluded that the commander must have taken the money by 10 October 1410, which he later had to give back when he became a prisoner of war. It is possible, however, that this was the case since no exact sum was given. Another question is whether Proff en with his people were released on parole aft er the battle having fi rst promised to appear for ransom. Th e source does not provide a defi nite answer.

Th e preserved records suggest that several days aft er the battle of Koronowo negotiations were held at the highest level (originated by the temporary deputy of grand master Heinrich von Plauen) concerning the exchange of the prisoners of war, particularly Michael Küchmeister, the bailiff of the New March. It is known from the letter the monarch ordered to write on 25 October as a reply to requests made by the commander of Świecie [Schwetz]. Władysław Jagiełło suggested that the Teutonic prisoners of the battle of Koronowo taken on 10 October should be released on parole having promised to appear for ransom. Heinrich von Plauen suggested similar actions towards Polish prisoners of war captured by the Teutonic army. Th e monarch answered that irrespective of the requests made by the deputy of the grand master, he was nevertheless guided by commendable Christian values

42 „Item her Heyncze Osustulit 315 m. off 21 spyse von her Heyncze Profi ns gesellen, dy nicht gefangen worden vor der Kronaw” – Soldbuch, p. 102.

43 „Her Heincze von Profi n 262 m., dy im unser homeister gab von Nickel Pyskerdorf, in czu manen, als her Hincze gefangen wart, und Niclos Pyskerdorf darvonquam und henusreyth” – Sold-buch, Anhang, nr 24, p. 186–187, 199.

44 S. Ekdahl dated the source at the end of 1410 – the beginning of 1411 – Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 23, p. 177 (the publisher’s commentary). Th e scientist, however, did not discuss the information (included in the source) that Proff en agreed to have part of his pay deducted for a quarter as he with his people had been captured. It would allow us to assume that three months passed from 10 October.

45 OBA, nr 1625; Soldbuch, Anhang, nr 23, p. 177.



and he discharged on parole all prisoners of war – both from the battle of Korono-wo and those who had been captured earlier, having obliged them to appear for ransom at a specifi ed time. Next, the king leveled a number of charges against the Teutonic Order saying that the knights did not respect military customs concern-ing the release of prisoners on parole having obliged them to promise to appear for ransom. On the contrary, prisoners of war were very oft en killed, tortured and maltreated. Th us, the king insisted that such practices be abandoned. In the end, the monarch replied to the detailed suggestion made by Heinrich von Plauen. Th e Teutonic offi cial suggested exchanging the standard-bearer of Poznań Jarosław of Iwno, captured during the battle near Człuchów [Schlochau] (“circa Slochow”)46 for Michael Küchmeister – the bailiff of the New March, captured aft er the battle of Koronowo. Władysław Jagiełło stated that it was not possible as Jarosław had al-ready been released (the name of the person who took him prisoner is unknown). Th us, not being bound by any promise, he was free from all obligations resulting from being a prisoner of war.47

Let us discuss the last issue touched upon in the letter. Th e standard-bearer of Poznań and the starost of Wschowa Jarosław of Iwno was at that time a very im-portant person. From 1406 he worked in the royal diplomacy. Before 1409 he trav-elled throughout Western Europe, probably taking part in fi ghts against the Moors in Spain. Aft er 9 September 1409, Władysław Jagiełło sent him on a diplomatic mission during which he reached England having visited Mecklenburg, West-phalia, Kleve, Gelderland, Holland, the Duchy of Brabant, Palatinate, Burgundy and France. Visiting the courts of German dukes, the German King Rupert Wit-telsbach (Heidelberg) along with the kings of France and England presented the arguments of Poland during the confl ict with the Teutonic Order.48 He returned to Poland in the spring of 1410. Długosz wrote that Jarosław was incorporated into the army commanded by the voivode of Kalisz and starost of Nakło Maciej of Wąsosz, which invaded Teutonic Pomerania on 13 July 1410. Th e army was defeated in an unidentifi ed place by the army of Michael Küchmeister – the bailiff of the New March. Jarosław was taken prisoner of war aft er the battle. Długosz underlined that the fact that the capture of Jarosław being the cause of the defeat of the Polish army could not be concealed in the camp of the Polish-Lithuanian soldiers who were besieging Malbork.49 As the previously mentioned letter of 25

46 Th e publisher of the source, Edward Raczyński, suggested the spelling „Slothow” – Kodeks dyplomatyczny Litwy, Publisher E. Raczyński, Wrocław 1845 (further cit. KDL), nr 6, p. 118. Never-theles, in the original the name is spelt „Slochow” – OBA, nr 1383.

47 OBA, nr 1383; KDL, p. 117–118.48 About Jarosław of Iwno and his diplomatic activity comp. A. Szweda, Na polsko-krzyżackim

pograniczu. Działalność starosty nakielskiego Jarosława z Iwna (1413–1423), Roczniki Historycz-ne, R. 69: 2003, p. 105–126; idem, S. Szybkowski, „Aktywność dyplomatyczna stron konfl iktu na dworach europejskich”, [in:] S Józwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print).

49 Długosz, p. 85.



October says, the battle took place somewhere near Człuchów [Schlochau].50 Th e Teutonic chronicler, the canonical judge for Pomesania, Johann von Redden also made a reference to the event. Describing the defeat of the Teutonic Order in the battle of Koronowo, he mentioned that the bailiff of the New March was a brave man as earlier (“vor”) he had caused much damage to the Kingdom of Poland and had captured a signifi cant knight – Jarosław, “who used to accuse the Teutonic Order in the German courts”.51 Undoubtedly, he referred to the diplomatic mission of the standard-bearer of Poznań in the years 1409–1410. It is not known in what circumstances the knight Jarosław was released. According to the king’s letter of 25 October, it took place shortly before 25 October and the monarch seemed to have intervened in the case. Th e importance of Jarosław is proved by the fact that the Teutonic knights wanted to exchange him for the Teutonic commander in the battle of Koronowo – the bailiff of the New March (later the grand master) Michael Küchmeister. Nevertheless, it was impossible due to the reasons mentioned previ-ously. Th e Teutonic offi cial was set free soon aft er the conclusion of the Peace of Toruń (aft er 1 February 1411).52

As can be seen in the example of Jarosław of Iwno, some prisoners of war could be exchanged in a less offi cial way, but for sure never for free. Interesting information is included in a letter written on 21 Dec 1410 in Nakło, in which the starost of Kalisz Maciej of Wąsosz presented to Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen the conditions under which he would agree to release a Teutonic subject captured aft er the battle of Koronowo, a certain Kaspar of Nieżychowice [Schönfeld ]53, for whose freedom the Polish offi cial demanded 40 grzywnas. Th e captured prisoner was to pay 30 grzywnas for a letter (of debt?) of a Bogumiłek (probably a house-hold member of Maciej of Wąsosz) to a burgher of Debrzno [Preußisch Friedland] – a Paszek – a landowner of Brzeźno.54 He was to bring the remaining 10 grzywnas to the starost. Maciej of Wąsosz stressed that his off er of exchange had a time limit, and added that he had agreed to it only at the request of the grand master.55 Th e

50 OBA, nr 1383.51 Posilge, p. 32352 Th e exact circumstances and time of his release are not known. Th e researchers agree that it

must have taken place between February and March 1411 – comp. W. Nöbel, Michael Kuchmeister. Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens 1414–1422 (Quellen und Studienzur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, Bd. 5), Marburg 1969, p. 33, 43; K. Kwiatkowski, op.cit.

53 In the source he appears as “Caspar dictus Szenefelt”, which may suggest that he lived in Schonfeld (Nieżychowice, 3 km southwest of Chojnice). Nevertheless, it is not sure as the record called “Szenefelt” might have suggested a nickname of his. On the other hand, the appearance of Paszek “de Brzesna” (Brzeźno Człuchowskie West of Nieżychowice) would justify the correct inter-pretation of the origin of Kaspar.

54 Not known from other sources.55 „Scirevelitis, quia Casparem dictum Szenefeltincaptivavimus dum con. Ictumante Corunow

habuimus in invicem, quem eciam taxavimus super quadraginta marcas tali condicione, quod literam a Pascone herede de Brzezna concive in Fredelant in triginta marcis exbrigare deberet Bogumilconis et decem marcas secum aportare, ut eum a captivitate dimittemus. Hec facere habet inprotracte, hanc enim taxacionem sic parvam fecimus causa vestri” – OBA, nr 1424; KDW, vol. VII, nr 670.



source suggests that the Polish offi cial used the fact of having a prisoner of war to pay off the debts of one of the members of his household. One piece of information included in the letter analyzed here is somewhat surprising. In the introduction Maciej mentioned that Kaspar was taken prisoner during the battle of Koronowo. However, other sources do not confi rm the fact of his participation in the battle. Jan Długosz gave the names of 40 Polish knights taking part in the battle, but his list did not include Maciej of Wąsosz.56 It is quite improbable that the starost of Nakło received the prisoner as a present from somebody. Incidentally, it must be noted that the letter does not say that Maciej released his prisoner on parole imme-diately aft er the battle having obliged him to promise to appear for ransom. It con-trasts with the conduct of the king, who, as the sources say, acted thus on a large scale. It might have concerned only the mercenaries or the visitors of the Teutonic Order who remained under the authority of the monarch, unlike born and bred knights (terrigena) who had much freedom in treating prisoners.

Apart from the records presented above, which are the only preserved sources, there are no other sources which could help to describe the Poles’ process of re-leasing Teutonic prisoners of war from the battle of Koronowo. Interestingly, the issue was not regulated in the Treaty of the Peace of Toruń. In the so-called letter of obligation of 31 January 1411 Grand Master Heinrich von Plauen in the name of the Teutonic Order obliged himself to pay the Polish king 100,000 three score Prague groschens (in four equal installments: 8 March, 24 April, 11 November, and 2 February 1412) as a collective ransom to release all prisoners.57 Nevertheless, the treaty contained only imprecise terms. It did not include any dates for releasing prisoners of war; nor did it provide any guarantee for the Teutonic Order should Władysław Jagiełło not release them. Th e Poles did not prepare any document concerning this matter.58 Later sources inform us that prior to handing in the let-ter of obligation the grand master expressed his anxiety that the king should not keep his promise to release prisoners of war. Th at is why the marshal Zbigniew of Brzezie and ten Polish magnates had to make an oral vow to fulfi ll the declara-tion regarding the prisoners kept nearby within eight days of the payment of the fi rst installment (to 16 March), and within 14 days regarding the prisoners kept

56 Długosz, p. 157–158.57 M. Pelech, Der Verpfl ichtungsbrief des Hochmeisters Heinrich von Plauen bezuglich der Bezah-

lung von 100 000 Schokbohmischer Groschenan den Konig von Polenvom 31. Januar 1411, Preusen-land, Jg. 17: 1979, Nr. 4, s. 55–58 and Anhang, nr 1–3, p. 59–63.

58 Th e document of the peace treaty did not specify the terms and conditions of releasing prison-ers of war. It only included a reservation that all hitherto unsettled fi nancial liabilities concerning the ransom for individual prisoners of war should be annulled – more about it in: M. Pelech, W sprawie okupu za jeńców krzyżackich z wielkiej wojny (1409–1411) (part I), ZH, vol. 52: 1987, z. 1, p. 134; A. Szweda, „Traktat pokojowy”, [in:] S. Joźwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, „Wojna Polski i Litwy z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411” (in print).



in more distant places (to 22 March).59 Th e guarantors60 of the Teutonic letter of obligation were, for example, prisoners from Koronowo Erkinger von Seinsheim and Konrad Truchtsesse.61 It is not known, however, whether they were already free at that time, or they were to be released aft er at least the fi rst installment of the ransom had been paid.62 Th ere are no sources providing information about the manner and date regarding the release of other prisoners of war from the battle of Koronowo. It did not have to follow the conditions of the agreements negotiated at the end of January 1411. On other hand, in the following months aft er the Peace Treaty of Torun was concluded there appeared no records saying that no Teutonic knights, known mercenaries or visitors remained in Polish or Lithuanian captivity. Nevertheless, other sources say that at the end of 1411 there were to remain in total at least between 600 and 900 prisoners of war in Polish and Lithuanian captivity.63 Th ey must have been prisoners still kept in Poland and Lithuania, but they came from lower social strata and it took a long time before they were released. Another reason might have been delays in the payment of installments of fi nancial liabili-ties on the part of the Teutonic Order. Apparently, the total amount of ransom sug-gested by the grand master in the letter of obligation of 31 January 1411 (100,000 three score Prague groschens – about 142,000 Prussian grzywnas) was lower than the sums of money the Poles could have got if prisoners of war had been ransomed individually64, which was probably one of the reasons for the confl icts.65

To recap the above dissertation, it must be stated that while it is quite hard to reconstruct the battle of Koronowo of 10 October 1410 due to the scarcity of sources, some secondary aspects of the battle are better documented, one of them being the issue of Teutonic prisoners of war. Th e Teutonic army consisted most-ly of mercenaries (from Germany and Silesia), knights, courtiers and household

59 M. Pelech, Der Verpfl iichtungsbrief, p. 57 oraz Anhang, nr 1, p. 59–62; idem, W sprawie, p. 135.

60 Each guarantor from the group of “dukes, earls and noblemen” was obliged to send to Cracow two counselors (each with four horses), while those from the group of “knights, squires and bur-ghers” were to appear in person, each with four horses. Th e departure to Cracow was to take place not later than within 9 weeks aft er being informed about the Teutonic Order’s refusal to pay ransom. Th ey were to stay in Cracow until the Teutonic Order had covered all the liabilities – M. Pelech, Die Verpfl ichtungsbrief, Anhang, nr 1, p. 59–62; idem, W sprawie, p. 133.

61 M. Pelech, DieVerpfl ichtungsbrief, Anhang, nr 1–3, p. 59–63.62 Markian Pelech still treated them as prisoners of war – comp. M. Pelech, W sprawie, p. 136.

However, it is not so obvious.63 Th e information is included in the letter of 30 Jan 1412 written by Sigismund of Luxembourg

and the letter of 18 Feb 1412 written by the Teutonic procurator in the Holy See in Rome Peter of Orneta comp. Die Berichte der Generalprokuratoren des Deutschen Ordens an der Kurie, bearb. v. H. Koeppen, Bd. II, Gottingen 1960, nr 68, p. 138; M. Pelech, W sprawie, p. 137.

64 M. Pelech, W sprawie, p. 137.65 About Polish-Teutonic controversies (also concerning the question of releasing prisoners

of war) in 1411 comp. A. Szweda, Po Wielkiej Wojnie. Zjazdy polsko-krzyżackie w 1411 roku, [in:] Kancelaria wielkich mistrzów i polska kancelaria królewska w XV wieku, ed. J. Trupinda, Malbork 2006, p. 267 n.



members from the court of Sigismund of Luxembourg. At least 300 participants of the battle were taken prisoner of war by the Polish side, 68 of whom are known by name. According to all the sources, the king was to treat them with courtesy. Th e king tried to win them over, and aft er a few days their names were taken down and they were released on parole under the condition that they came back with ransom at a specifi ed place and time. However, such treatment was probably received only by foreign mercenaries and knights-courtiers of Sigismund of Luxembourg. Teu-tonic knights and Teutonic subjects taking part in the battle were not discharged (the latter being the authority of the Polish knights, who had captured them).

Th e question of the manner and conditions for releasing the prisoners from the battle of Koronowo is not very clearly presented in the sources. Apart from de-manding ransom, in some cases there were attempts to exchange them for Polish knights captured by the Teutonic army (mostly in September 1410). Th e status of some prisoners caused problems to the Teutonic authorities. Th e Teutonic Order had to pay damages, cover travel expenses to the site where ransoms were to be handed over, and perhaps pay for the ransom of the mercenaries (they stopped receiving pay while they were prisoners). At the same time, the knight-courtiers of Sigismund of Luxembourg were treated diff erently (as visitor-volunteers) and the Teutonic Order refused to pay for their ransom. It led to long-lasting confl icts and continuous claims from the mercenaries which the Teutonic authorities regarded as unjustifi ed. It seems that the majority of Teutonic prisoners of war of the battle of Koronowo were released within a few months aft er the Peace Treaty of Torun was signed (aft er 1 February 1411).



DARIUSZ K. CHOJECKI

ONE CITY, TWO DIFFERENT WORLDS. THE SOCIAL AND SPATIAL DIVERSITY OF INFANT MORTALITY

IN SZCZECIN, 18761913*

PART TWO

Key words: West Pomerania; historical demography; mortality; social history; history of the 19th and 20th century; Szczecin

IN DETAIL

Breastfeeding – the basic demandsIn German the word “infant” has a totally diff erent origin than in Polish. A child

who is under one is called Säugling. Th e semantics of the word clearly shows that it refers to a human being who is not yet capable of speaking and is still breastfed – lite rally like a small mammal. Th e remark allows us to understand better the de-mand of the City Committee for Health which clearly stated that every small baby has the right to be breastfed75. Th e desideratum which already had a history76, was presented to the public in the fi rst report of the committee which outlined its ac-tion plan in the fi eld of health care. On the one hand, it demonstrates how much importance was given to natural feeding in the struggle against the high mortality of infants; on the other hand, it shows a “move away from nature” determined by changes in civilization, which physicians considered to be social pathology. Never-theless, it was commonly known that the phenomenon was not as widespread as for example in Paris. In Szczecin, women did not give their newborn babies to wet nurses in the countryside, which did not mean that they did not use their services at all77, which will be discussed further on in this article.

* From the editor: the fi rst part of the article was published in z. 1 of Zapiski Historyczne (vol. 75: 2010, pp. 65–96); page, chart and cartogram numbers are continued from the fi rst part.

75 Bericht über Verwaltung der Gemeinde-Angelegenheiten der Stadt Stettin 1902/1903 (further cit. BVGASS), p. 22.

76 See. Das öff entliche Gesundheitswesen des Regierungsbezirks Stettin in den Jahren 1883, 1884 und 1885, fünft er Verwaltungsbericht erstattet v. Ludwig Dieterich, Stettin 1887, pp. 146–147; Das öff entliche Gesundheitswesen im Regierungsbezirke Stettin wahrend der Jahre 1886, 1887, 1888, sech-ster Verwaltungsbericht erstattet v. Dr. Katerbau, Stettin 1890, pp. 116–118.

77 H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen über die Kindersterblichkeit in Stettin vom Standpunkte der

D a r i u s z K . C h o j e c k i84


Apparently, medical doctors did not reprimand the future and present moth-ers in order to lock them up at home to appease the conservative78. Let us have a closer look at the results of the research. At fi rst, let us turn to the pioneering data about the deaths of infants in Szczecin in the period from 15 June to 15 September 1902 collected on the request of the Committee for Health and prepared by Dr. G. Freund Jr (chart 14)79. Th e data shows that within 5 months of the summer and autumn, 981 children under one died in the capital of West Pomerania. Among them only 93 (9.5%) were breastfed by their mothers. In the latter group only 20 (21.5%) died of enteritis, gastritis, diarrhea and other similar illnesses, while among all dead infants the number of deaths of such illnesses amounted to 505 (51.5%)80; its relative share was twice larger than among children who were breast-

öff entliche Medizin, Stettin 1867, pp. 43–44. More: E. Badinter, Historia miłości macierzyńskiej, transl. K. Choiński, Warszawa 1998, pp. 145–147, 161–165.

78 One of the reasons why the propaganda of natural feeding had many advocates was that it did not require much fi nancial resources unlike the measures eliminating the causes of the high mortal-ity rate. Comp. B. Witzler, Grosstadt und Hygiene. Kommunale Gesundheitspolitik in der Epoche der Urbanisierung, Stuttgart 1995, pp. 192–193.

79 BVGASS 1902/1903, p. 23; 1904/1905, p. 227.80 Th e rainy summer aff ected the low value of the number. See W. Gehrke, Die Sterblichkeit der

Kinder im ersten Jahr in Stettin 1905 und 1906, Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift , 1907, No. 15, p. 598.

zgony niemowląt niekarmionych mlekiem

matki49,4%

zgony niemowląt karmionych mlekiem matki i zwierzęcym

1,7%

zgony niemowląt z powodu zaburzeń w

funkcjonowaniu układu trawiennego

51,5%

zgony niemowląt z wykluczeniem zgonów z powodu zaburzeń w funkcjonowaniu układu

trawiennego48,5%

zgony niemowląt karmionych wyłącznie

mlekiem matki0,3%

Chart 14. Infant deaths due to disorders in their digestive system in Szczecin in the period from 15 June to 15 September 1902 according to the type of nutrition

Source: the author’s compilation on the basis of the source from footnote 79.

infant deaths caused by disorders in their digestive

system 51.5%

infant deaths caused by reasons other than disorders in the digestive

system 48.5%

deaths of infants who were

not breastfed 49.4%

deaths of infants who were both

breastfed and fed on animal’s milk

1.7%

deaths of infants fed on mother’s milk

0.3%

One city, two (diff erent) worlds... 85


fed. Th e diff erence becomes even more visible if we take into account the fact that in the previously mentioned group of 20 deaths, 17 infants were fed on cow’s milk, substitutes and the so-called fl our soup. So, among the 505 children who died of some malfunction of the digestive system, only 3 had been fed exclusively on their mothers’ milk. Although the data does not describe precisely the magnitude of the phenomenon as there is not enough information about the number of breastfeed-ing women, it clearly shows that natural nutrition infl uenced the number of deaths among the youngest children. Moreover, it turns out that breastfeeding was not as common as it was described in the diaries of Szczecin’s midwives from the years 1907–1911, in the light of which as much as 80% of women breastfed their new-born babies for some time81. Th e phenomenon was presented to look even better in Szczecin at the turn of the 1880s and 1890s (83.4–84.5%)82.

Th e analysis of Erich Peiper, who was critical of reports given by midwives83, is much less optimistic. Th anks to the assistance of doctors from West Pomerania, he obtained information about the length of breastfeeding collected when babies were fi rst time vaccinated (the summer of 1909). Although E. Peiper’s report lacks data concerning Szczecin84, the loss was compensated by the fact that the statis-tics of breastfeeding were prepared – among others – for Szczecin’s rural district (Randow)85, which included, among others, industrial working-class places con-stituting the integral municipal complex of Szczecin86. In the years 1901–1905 this administrative unit reported the highest number of infant deaths in West Pomera-nia. It was there that merely 55.3% of vaccinated children who were on average 10 months-old were breastfed for some time. Th e number would have been even smaller had the analysis included younger children who had died before the fi rst vaccination87. In the group of naturally fed children, breastfeeding lasted most of-ten from one to three months (41.6%)88. According to a district doctor who prob-ably was not familiar with the results of E. Peiper’s research, the decision to give

81 Archiwum Państwowe in Szczecin (further cit. AP Szczecin), Rejencja Szczecińska Wydział Prezydialny (further cit. RSWP), sygn. 8037, k. 145 (royal district doctor – kg. Kreisarzt (further cit. KLO) of the city of Szczecin (west region) to the authorities of RS, Szczecin, 25 Oct 1912).

82 Das öff entliche Gesundheitswesen im Regierungsbezirke Stettin wahrend der Jahre 1889, 1890, 1891, siebenter Verwaltungsbericht erstattet von Dr. Katerbau, Stettin 1893, p. 98.

83 E. Peiper, mitarb. R. Pauli, Die Säuglingssterblichkeit in Pommern, ihre Ursachen und Bekamp-fung, Klinisches Jahrbuch, Jg. 23: 1910, p. 260, 278–279.

84 In 1906 during the fi rst vaccinations Szczecin’s doctor were to collect the statistical mate-rial which informed about the kind and length of nutrition. Th e results of the research were to be published in a special report, unknown to me and not mentioned by other sources. Comp. BVGASS 1906/1907, p. 212.

85 Th e number of vaccinated children was 650.86 See the general remarks: E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój Szczecina w latach 1871–1918,

[in:] Dzieje Szczecina 1806–1945, vol. 3, ed. G. Labuda, Szczecin 1994, pp. 281–282.87 E. Peiper, mitarb. R. Pauli, Die Säuglingssterblichkeit, p. 261.88 Ibid., p. 263 (tab. XLVII).



up breastfeeding was not so much women’s choice, but it was made mainly due to their biological incapacity resulting from malnutrition89.

Why are midwives’ records not reliable? District and commune doctors them-selves were critical about them, pointing out that midwives did not attach much signifi cance to maintaining the registration90 as they were not paid for it. In con-trast to nurses responsible for infant care91, they were interested in their own fi -nancial ends92 off ering poorer women bad quality baby food93. To put it bluntly, for purely economic reasons some midwives were not interested in lowering the infant

89 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 135 (KLO wiejskiego powiatu Szczecin do władz RS, Szcze-cin, 31 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 22v (KLO wiejskiego powiatu Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 24 IX 1908 r.).

90 Ibid., sygn. 8038, k. 23 (KLO wiejskiego powiatu Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 24 IX 1908 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 77v, 78 (magistrat miasta Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 13 XI 1908 r.).

91 Ibid., sygn. 8038, k. 39v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 15 IX 1908 r.).

92 Ibid., sygn. 8037, k. 91v (naczelny prezydent prowincji Pomorze do władz RS, Szczecin, 17 V 1912 r.). In a circular letter referring to the treatise of Erich Peiper it was underlined that midwives be provided steady income (Bezierkshebammen) to make them independent of their patients, which would allow them to enforce the guidelines of the government’s policy aiming at the reduction of infant mortality.

93 Ibid., sygn. 8038, k. 78 (magistrat miasta Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 13 XI 1908 r.).

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

karmione piersią karmione piersią i butelką karmione butelką

liczb

a w

ypis

anyc

h ni

emow

ląt

0,0

5,0

10,0

15,0

20,0

25,0

30,0

35,0

40,0

odse

tek

zmarły

ch n

iem

owlą

t

liczba wypisanych niemowlątodsetek zmarłych niemowląt

Chart 15. Th e number of dead infants in 100 children discharged from the Municipal Care for Infants in Szczecin in 1907 – the division according to the type of nutrition

Th e source: the author’s compilation on the basis of the source from footnote 99.

breastfed fed on mother’s milk and animal’s milk fed on animal’s milk

the number of discharged infants the percentage of dead infants

the

num

ber o

f dis

char

ged

infa

nts

the

perc

enta

ge o

f dea

d in

fant

s



mortality rate and promoting the idea of breastfeeding94. Nevertheless, the nega-tive image of Hebammen had disappeared before the First World War95.

Undoubtedly, nurses paid from the municipal budget did their job well96. Ac-cording to suggestions from the central authorities97, Szczecin’s Health Offi ce or-dered them to promote breastfeeding, eradicate “bad habits” and notify of condi-tions unfavourable for infants98. Nurses prepared, among others, statistical reports, one of which is particularly interesting – it refers to 1907 and shows the mortality of infants according to the type of feeding in a community of 1530 children (chart 15)99. Th e chart demonstrates that in the group of infants discharged from the municipal care for infants who were breastfed “merely” 14.2% died, whereas in the group of babies fed on both mother’s and animal’s milk – 15%. Among the Flaschenkinder – babies fed only on animal’s milk and surrogates, the mortality rate was 34.5% – so it was by 113.3% higher than the mortality rate of babies who were fed exclusively on their mother’s milk. Th e results cannot constitute the basis for the generalization of the results although they refer to about 15–17% of children who were under one100 as they concern infants whose parents had untaxed income – lower than 900 marks a year. Nevertheless, they show the diff erences in the group of poorer people. It can be stated that among the less wealthy the number of deaths of infants was not homogenous and depended largely on the type of feeding.

Th e establishment of the municipal bureau of statistics in 1910 gave rise to the compilation of the complete (including all dead infants) statistics of causes of deaths categorized according to the method and type of feeding. Th e statistics were created in cooperation with Registry Offi ces and must have followed Berlin’s patterns101. Th e capital of Germany had been collecting information about infant mortality and their nutrition since the end of the 19th century. Szczecin’s results were published once in 1911, which was an exceptional year as it was characterized

94 Ibid., sygn. 8037, k. 42v (pruskie ministerstwo ds. wyznania, nauczania i medycyny do preze-sów rejencji i prezydenta policji w Berlinie, Berlin, 16 VI 1908 r.).

95 Ibid., sygn. 8037, k. 191 (magistrat miasta Szczecin, deputacja ds. zdrowotności do władz RS, Szczecin, 14 III 1913 r.).

96 BVGASS 1904/1905, p. 231 and included there Beilage: W. Gehrke, Bericht über die Sauglings-fursorge des Jahres 1905, Stettin 1906, p. 3.

97 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 45 (pruskie ministerstwo ds. wyznania, nauczania i medy-cyny do prezesów rejencji i prezydenta policji w Berlinie, Berlin, 16 VI 1908 r.); sygn. 8037, k. 99v (pruskie ministerstwo spraw wewnętrznych do prezesów rejencji i prezydenta policji w Berlinie, Ber-lin, 31 VIII 1912 r.).

98 Ibid., sygn. 8038, k. 76v, 77 (magistrat miasta Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 13 XI 1908 r.).99 BVGASS 1907/1908, p. 226.

100 BVGASS 1908/1909, p. 257 (data from 1908).101 See for example: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin, Jg. 33: 1916, pp. 1038–1040.



by a very hot summer102. In August, when the mortality rate in Szczecin103 reached its peak of 81.25%, there was not even one cloudy day, and 18 days were very hot (during the whole summer there were as many as 47 hot days); the precipitation amounted to 23 mm and the air humidity only 60% while the average temperature (20.1 °C) was 2.6 °C higher than normal104. In a nutshell, it was hell for infants, particularly the ones who were not breastfed and whose immune systems were weaker and more susceptible to bacteria from animal’s milk which used to go off in hot temperatures. Th us, it is not surprising that on those hot days the infant mortality rate grew due to disorders in the digestive system. Metaphorically, it can be said that the curve demonstrating the deaths took the shape of a tall Gothic ca-thedral which hid inside the youngest human beings, which can be easily observed in Szcze cin and Grabowo105 on the basis of the combined statistics concerning seasons and causes of deaths (chart 16).

Let us now return to the starting point – the research made in 1902 as commis-sioned by the Committee for Health. Th e research, as mentioned already, proved indirectly that in the group of breastfed infants the risk of death caused by enteritis or diarrhea was much lower than in the group of infants fed in any other manner. Bearing this in mind, it will be easier to analyze the data of 1911 referring to the 1306 deaths (charts 17). Th e statistics – like the ones above – seem incomplete as they would be much more valuable if they included information about the method and type of feeding of the living infants as well as their number. Nevertheless, the results concerning the hot year 1911 show that only 12.5% dead infants were fed exclusively on their mother’s milk and that among the youngest children the highest mortality rate was recorded among babies fed exclusively on animal’s milk (56.4%). In the latter group as much as 52.0% died of gastritis, enteritis and di-arrhea, while in the group of breastfed babies the percentage amounted to 21.5%106 – the same107 as in the fi ve months of 1902. Th e high value of the Pearson’s correla-

102 More about the relationship between infant mortality and the climate on the example of Western Pomerania: E. Peiper, mitarb. R. Pauli, Die Säuglingssterblichkeit, pp. 235–252. See also the discussion of weather conditions for 1907 and 1908 (AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8038, k. 38; KLO rejonu zachodniego powiatu miejskiego Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 15 IX 1908 r.).

103 Verwaltungsbericht der Stadt Stettin 1911 (further cit. VBSS), p. 66.104 Statistischer Jahresbericht der Stadt Stettin (further cit. SJBSS), Jg. 2: 1911, p. 1.105 Author’s calculations on the basis of Veröff entlichungen des Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamts [for

the year 1888:] No. 10, 15, 19, 23, 27, 31, 35, 41, 45, 48; 13, No. 1, 6, [1889:] 10, 15, 19, 23, 28, 32, 37, 41, 45,49; 14, No. 2, 5, [1890:] 9, 13, 18, 22, 27, 31, 36, 40, 44, 49; 15, No. 1, 5, [1891:] 9, 14, 18, 22, 27, 31,36, 40, 44, 48; 16, No. 1, 5, [1892:] 10, 14, 19, 23, 27, 31, 36, 40, 44, 49; 17, No. 1, 5, [1893:] 10, 14, 18,23, 27, 31, 36, 40, 44, 49; 18, No. 1, 6, [1894:] 10, 13, 18, 23, 27, 31, 36, 40, 45, 49; 19, No. 2, 6, [1895:] 10, 14, 19, 23, 27, 32, 37, 41, 45, 49; 20, No. 2, 6. Information gaps in the sources – no infor-mation for three months of 1896 – they make it impossible to take into consideration the seasonality of the years 1896–1899. In 1888 Grabowo had over 15,000 inhabitants, thanks to which, according to the requirements of the Emperor’s Offi ce for Health, information about the natural migration and causes of deaths could be published in a bulletin.

106 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 2: 1911, s. 18.107 Despite the same numerical values those numbers are incomparable as the data were col-

lected in diff erent times and diff erent weather conditions.



0,0

50,0

100,0

150,0

200,0

250,0

300,0

350,0

400,0

450,0

500,0

sty lut mar kwi maj cze lip sie wrz paź lis gru

GrabowoSzczecin

Chart 16. Th e incidence of seasonally-related infant deaths caused by disorders in the di-gestive system in Grabowo and Szczecin in the years 1888–1895 (the average = 100.0)


nieznany4,1%

bez odżywienia5,0%

mleko zwierzęce i surogaty

4%

wyłącznie surogaty3,8%

wyłącznie mleko matki12,5%

mleko matki i zwierzęce

14%

wyłącznie mleko zwierzęce

56,4%

mleko matki, zwierzęce i surogaty

1%

mleko matki i surogaty

0%

Chart 17. Infant deaths in Szczecin in 1911 categorized according to the manner and type of feeding


Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec

Unknown 4.1% Exclusively mother’s milk

12.5%

Mother’s and animal’s milk

14%

Mother’s milk, animal’s milk and surrogates

1%

Mother’s milk and surrogates

0%

Exclusively animal’s milk

56.4%

Animal’s milk and surrogates

4%

Exclusively surrogates 3.8%

Without nutrition 5.0%



tion coeffi cient calculated on the basis of the statistics X2 proves that the method and type of nutrition were associated with the causes of the deaths. For Szczecin’s data of 1911 the statistics amounted to 0.688 (p<0.001) at a 0–1 scale. Th e result may be interpreted in the following way: the more natural the baby’s food was, the less frequently babies died of digestive disorders and the more oft en deaths were caused by hereditary defects and other illnesses (chart 18).

If infant mortality diff ered according to the social-professional position of the parents, as is shown in the data from the years 1902–1913, it can be assumed that causes of deaths in the already mentioned dichotomic division should also be con-ditioned by the social-professional position of the parents. Th e data compiled for the fi ve months of summer and autumn of 1902108 allow us to assume that this was certainly the case. (chart 19)109. Let facts speak for themselves: in three groups of dead infants whose parents came from higher social and professional classes (of-fi cials and military men, craft smen running their own businesses, merchants – in-cluding craft smen who had their own shops), the percentage of deaths of enteritis, gastritis and diarrhea fl uctuated from 36–37%.

Th e situation looked diff erent in the remaining groups of dead infants whose parents held the lowest positions in the social-professional ladder (qualifi ed, un-qualifi ed and day labourers). 52–56% of children died due to disorders in the di-gestive system before they had turned one. Th e highest percentage of deaths for the above reason was reported in families of craft smen who ran their own business (61%), which must have referred to journeymen and apprentices. As can be seen, the diversifi cation of the analyzed phenomenon was conditioned by the social-professional position of the parents, but its magnitude should not be overestimat-ed. Th e reason was the weather. Th e cool summer of 1902 positively aff ected the infant mortality rate, weakening the structural contrasts.

Th e diff erences described above should be refl ected in the geographic space of the city (cartogram 2). Unfortunately, the information was collected only for three districts of the Registry Offi ces in the city of Szczecin110. What is more, the information was characterized by a small degree of social-professional homoge-neity, which cannot be said in case of municipal statistical districts. Th e lowest diversifi cation degree belonged to district II of the Registry Offi ce, which included working class boroughs of Szczecin – Grabowo and Drzetowo inhabited to a large extent by shipyard workers. Th ose areas of Szczecin were marked by the highest infant mortality. In 1902 there were 33.8 deaths in 100 live births among children who were under one. Th us, it is not surprising that district II of the Registry Of-fi ce was marked by the highest percentage of infants who died due to disorders

108 BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 3), p. 243.109 Data about the social-professional position of parents was given for 756 infants. In the group

of those children the percentage of deaths caused by disorders in the digestive system was the same as in the group of all infants included in the research (981 children) and amounted to 51.5%, which allows us to draw more daring conclusions.

110 BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 3), p. 242, 252.



0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

wyłącznie mlekomatki

mleko matki izwierzęce lub

surogaty

mleko zwierzęce lubsurogaty

bez odżywiania nieznany

niezdolność do życianieżyt żołądka lub jelit, biegunkaatrofiaskurczeinne choroby

Chart 18. Infant deaths in Szczecin in 1911 categorized according to the type and manner of nutrition and causes of deaths


Chart 19. the percentage of deaths of infants caused by disorders in the digestive system as opposed to the total number of infant deaths in Szczecin in the period from 15 June to 15 Nov 1902 according to the social-professional position of parents


0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

ogółem

robotnicy dniówkowi

niewykwalifikowanirobotnicy

wykwalifikowani robotnicy

niesamodzielnirzemieślnicy

samodzielni rzemieślnicy

urzędnicy i wojskowi

kupcy i rzemieślnicyprowadzący własny sklep

nieżyt jelit lub żołądka, biegunka inne choroby

merchants and craftsmen running their own shops

offi cials and military men

independent craftsmen

craftsmen

qualifi ed blue-collar workers

unqualifi ed blue-collar workers

day labourers

total

inability to liveenteritisatrophycontractionsother illnesses

enteritis and gastritis other illnesses

Unknown Exclusively mother’s milk

Mother’s milk and animal’s milk or surrogates

Animal’s milk or surrogates

Without nutrition



in the digestive system (55%), while the percentages of such deaths in Registry Offi ce III (47%) and Registry Offi ce II (50%) characterized by a lower mortality rate were respectively 26.1% and 27.3%. Th e diff erences could be determined by the professional activity of women. According to a district doctor of the Szczecin- Zachód region (exclusive residential districts) breastfeeding was quite common111. Th e mortality rate of the youngest children was the lowest in the whole city. Why? One of the reasons is that women from such districts did not work according to the bourgeois mentality112, since their husbands were expected to maintain the fam-ily. If they worked, they did so in their homes, which facilitated breastfeeding and determined a lower mortality rate113.

111 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 145v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.).

112 R. Sieder, Sozialgeschichte der Familie, Frankfurt am Main 1987, p. 187–189.113 Maria Nietyksza mentions the infl uence of professional work of women on the mortality rate

in the context of denominational groups (Ludność Warszawy na przełomie XIX i XX wieku, Warszawa 1971, pp. 114–115).

−

−

Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Grabowo Grabowo Grabowo Grabowo Grabowo Grabowo Grabowo Grabowo Grabowo

1

3

GrabowoGrabowo

DrzetowoDrzetowo

Umieralność niem. (%) 26,1 (1) 27,3 (1) 33,8 (1)

Zgony niemowląt w 1902 r. (%) 55

UT zgony Inne zgony

Zgony niemowląt w 5. m. 1902 r. (%) 100 50 10

UT zgony Inne zgony

Cartogram 2. Th e percentage of infant deaths caused by disorders in the digestive system within the total number of deaths and infant mortality in Szczecin’s districts of registry Offi ces in 1902

Note: DS deaths – deaths caused by disorders of the digestive system.Source: the author’s compilation on the basis of the source from footnote 110.

Infant deaths in 5 months of 1902 (%)

DS deathsother deaths

Infant mortality in 1902 (%)

Infant mortality (%)

DS deathsother deaths



Why among babies of the poorer social strata was the percentage of deaths caused by enteritis, gastritis or diarrhea higher than among infants of more affl u-ent parents? Th e sanitary-hygienic conditions, women’s professional activity and bad habits could not have been the only reason. Th e quality of animal’s milk was questionable. As early as in the 1860s Hermann Wasserfuhr spoke very critically of it saying that Szczecin’s milk was oft en of poor quality as milking cows took place in bad conditions; milking girls had dirty hands and their hair and dandruff were oft en found in milk in which one could also detect urine and stable dust. Th e situation was made even worse as fresh milk was mixed with bad milk or diluted with water. Paradoxically, diluting milk with water could have saved many babies’ lives as it lowered the energy value of the milk. Many parents were not conscious of the fact that too much fat and nutritive substances could be harmful for a baby’s development, for a calf grew much more rapidly than a human infant114. Poorer parents tended to buy cheaper milk for themselves and their children115, which was normally not the case for the well-off 116.

Th e police issued an order which entered into force on 1 July 1903117 the aim of which was to prevent the pernicious practice of diluting milk. As can be supposed, the stimulus for the order were the results of the research of 1902. It turned out that half of dead infants had been fed on Szczecin’s milk, while the sale of imported milk was seven times higher than the sale of Szczecin’s milk118. In the face of those facts, the city authorities attempted to lower the infant mortality rate in the fi rst year of life by giving out good milk to the poor. Th e milk came from Szczecin’s dairy (Eckerberger Molkerei)119 as babies fed on that milk reported a relatively low mortality rate caused by disorders in the digestive system (54.2%). Babies fed on milk from milkmen from outside Szczecin died much more frequently due to digestive problems (69.2%)120. Such were the results of the research of 1902. What knowledge is provided by the research conducted in the third quarter of 1903 af-ter the order entered into force? It turned out that the infant mortality rate121 in the group of babies fed on the milk from Eckerberger Molkerei amounted to 15% (114:759), and in the group of babies in general – 14% (953:6827). A pessimist could complain having seen the diff erence in the relative numbers. However, an optimist would comment on the whole situation in the following way: nutrition with good-quality milk brought positive results because the mortality of children

114 See G. Temme, Die sozialen Ursachen Sauglingssterblichkeit, Berlin–Schoneberg 1908, p. 38––39; M. Konarzewski, Na początku był głód, Warszawa 2005, p. 100–101.

115 H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen, pp. 84–86.116 BVGASS 1904/1905, Beilage: W. Gehrke, Bericht, p. 12.117 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 146 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni)

do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.).118 BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 3), p. 253.119 Ibid. (Anlage 4), p. 254.120 Ibid. (Anlage 3), p. 248.121 Th e mortality rate here represents the relation of the number of infant deaths to the number

of living children in a given moment.



of poor parents (usually high) did not diverge signifi cantly from the mortality rate of all children including infants fed exclusively on their mother’s milk!122 Th e re-sults of the research, despite not being as positive as in Berlin, did not discourage the city authorities from the idea of developing “the milk campaign”. From De-cember 1904 they started to give out milk to the poor. In October 1905 the system was modifi ed and poorer families were subsidized (families with an income of less than 900 marks a year and not more than 100 marks for one child)123. Th e system was preferential to mothers who breastfed their babies as they were subsidized for one litre of milk whereas mothers who fed their babies on animal’s milk received a subsidy for ½ litre of milk. Th e system was to reduce the mortality rate of babies of poorer parents by providing good milk whose the quality was checked by the Health Offi ce124. Th ere was even a plan to introduce milk ready to drink (trinkfer-tige Portionen), but it was given up for fear that it should discourage women from breastfeeding125. Subsidies were given until the outbreak of the First World War.

Emphasizing the need to breastfeed among poorer women – strongly promot-ed from the beginning of the 20th century, taking place while a baby was being registered in a registry offi ce126 and constituting one of the activities undertaken by the Patriotic Association of Women127 and the Municipal Care for Infants – could suggest that natural feeding was a norm among women who came from more af-fl uent families, as they did not need to work and and wean their newborn babies to maintain the family, unlike working-class women inhabiting areas near Szcze-cin128. To enable the latter group of women to breastfeed their babies during work, factories were to be equipped with special rooms for breastfeeding129; neverthe-

122 BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 4), pp. 255–256.123 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8038, k. 43v–44v (KLO wiejskiego powiatu Szczecin do władz RS,

Szczecin, 1 X 1908 r.) In his demands he raised the problem of the tax threshold allowing the use of the help provided by the Municipal Care for Infants – strictly speaking the right to get the subsidies for milk. According to him, the threshold was too low, as a result of which too few children were given help. He put forward a demand to establish the tax threshold at the level of 1,500 marks, which was never realized.

124 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 190–190v (magistrat miasta Szczecin, deputacja ds. zdrowia do władz RS, Szczecin 14 III 1913 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 149–149v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin(rejon wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 29 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 39 (KLO powiatu miejskiegoSzczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 15 IX 1908 r.) and BVGASS 1904/1905, Beilage:W. Gehrke, Bericht, s. 2; BVGASS 1905/1906, pp. 220–221.

125 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8038, k. 79v (magistrat miasta Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 13 XI 1908 r.).

126 BVGASS 1904/1905, p. 24.127 Agnieszka Chlebowska writes more about the activity of the association (W walce o poprawę

warunków życia. Opieka nad dzieckiem jako obszar działalności organizacji kobiecych w Pru-sach naprzełomie XIX i XX wieku na przykładzie Szczecina, [in:] Choroba i śmierć w perspektywie społecznejw XIII–XX wieku, ed. D. Chojecki, E. Włodarczyk, Warszawa 2010).

128 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 135 (KLO wiejskiego powiatu Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 31 X 1912 r.).

129 Ibid., sygn. 8038, k. 23v (KLO wiejskiego powiatu Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 24 IX 1908 r.).



less, it was never put into action. To give a more complete picture let us add that insured married women had the right to a short six-week paid maternity leave (Wochengeld)130.

It is curious that the sources omit the question of the social circumstances surrounding breastfeeding and they concentrate on poorer women. Was it a con-spiracy of silence? For example, Prof. Erich Peiper who had access to the best sta-tistical material did not say anything about the infl uence of the social-professional position on the frequency of breastfeeding. Other doctors failed to speak too. Only one doctor, Hermann Wasserfuhren, in the mid-1860s collected information about the natural feeding of 327 newborn babies (chart 20) during his home visits. It turned out that aft er labour women whose husbands were well-off (with an an-nual income over 1000 thalers) had most diffi culty in breastfeeding. In this group, ¾ of women were unable to breastfeed their babies themselves. Among them only one mother fed her baby on animal’s milk; the remaining 29 women enjoyed the help of wet nurses. In the group with the 32 wives of middle and lower-ranking offi cials whose income did not exceed 1000 thalers only ¼ of women could not breastfeed themselves and 5 of them had their babies fed by wet nurses while the

130 Comp. [dr] Behr-Pinnow, Geburtenrückgang und Bekämpfung der Säuglingssterblichkeit, Berlin 1913, p. 50.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

wieśniaczki (przyległe miejscowości do Szczecina)

niezamężne

żony robotników

żony czeladników

żony właścicieli małego przedsiębiorstwa

żony urzędników niższego i średniego stopnia

żony zamożnych

mogły same karmićnie mogły karmić

Chart 20. Th e capability to breastfeed newborn babies in Szczecin in the mid-1860s ac-cording to the social-professional position of mothers


Wives of the rich

Wives of lower and middle – ranking offi cials

Wives of owners of small enterprisescould breastfeed

Wives of journeymencould not breastfeed

Wives of workers

Unmarried women

Women-peasants (areas adjacent to Szczecin)



remaining three fed their children artifi cially. Th e wives of the owners of small enterprises and journeymen hardly ever had problems with breastfeeding, while 100% of working-class women at the bottom of the social ladder could breastfeed their babies. Th e situation looked equally good in the case of rural women living in areas adjacent to Szczecin: out of 98 women only 5 did not breastfeed their babies. What their nutrition looked like later is unknown. What is known, however, is that Dr. H. Wasserfuhr tried to explain the abnormal incapacity to breastfeed among the wealthiest patients with the condition of their health, saying that the produc-tion of milk disappeared spontaneously or the amount of milk was insuffi cient. Additionally, some women suff ered from a mammary gland infl ammation. What were the reasons for such a situation? Reportedly, more affl uent women inherited their health from their parents who led an unhealthy life in cities, were not active physically and got married too early. One of the listed reasons should be under-lined – hypersensitivity (Blut- und Nervenleben) as it can prove a non-biological dimension to the phenomenon. Reading the study of Dr. H. Wasserfuhr, the reader can get the impression that this fragment loses its reliability, for the doctor did his best to defend his rich patients using biological explanations131 while failing to mention their desire to maintain a fi rm bust132 or to get rid of the so-called “long leash” to be able to lead an active social life. It was not until the political ambience changed aft er WWI when the ideals of the bourgeois world collapsed that district doctors started to report that giving up natural nutrition was characteristic of the highest social classes and was being transmitted to lower classes. Th e “bad” exam-ple was to come from the city133.

Non-marital children – the high-risk groupDoctors paid special attention to unmarried women because the infant mor-

tality rate in the group was a few dozen percent higher than the mortality rate of infants of married women (chart 21).

It was obvious that the situation was changing for the better in this fi eld134. At the beginning of the 20th century the infant mortality rate tended to go down both in the group of marital and non-marital babies135, but in the latter group the tendency was more rapid and more systematic, which must be underlined particu-larly in the context of the growing number of non-marital births136. In the analyzed

131 H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen, pp. 43–44.132 Comp. G. Temme, Die sozialen Ursachen, p. 64.133 D. Szudra, Ludność pruskiej prowincji Pomorze. Przemiany w ruchu naturalnym i migracyjnym

w latach 1914–1939, Szczecin 2005, p. 202.134 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 145v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni)

do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8037, k. 151–151v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 29 X 1912 r.).

135 SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, p. 17.136 In 1901 in Szczecin there were 11.5 non-marital births in 100 live births, and in 1913 – 15.0.

See: Statistische Vierteljahresberichte der Stadt Stettin (further cit. SVBSS), Jg. 5: 1915, Nr. 1, (D. An-hang: 1. Die auserehelich Geborenen in Stettin und ihre Mütter), p. 36.



period the relative diff erence between both rates reached its peak in 1902 amount-ing to 96.4%, while it reached its minimal values in 1911 when it was reduced to 19.8%137. It remains unknown how the numbers were refl ected in the geographical space of the city. Although some data regarding the deaths of non-marital infants in selected parts of Szczecin in the fi ve months of the summer and autumn of 1902 was published, it does not have any particular value as it shows only the percentage share in the total number of dead infants (cartogram 3)138.

It may prove that most non-marital children were born in the Old Town and in the area of Szubieniczne Łąki (Galgenwiesen) situated now in Gen. Henryka Dąbrowskiego Street and in Górny Wik. Th e level of infant mortality was deter-mined largely by the deaths of non-marital babies whose percentage amounted to 25 and 31% respectively. Th e phenomenon should not surprise us if we consider it in the context of the remarks made by Edward Włodarczyk. In the fi rst case the high value of the analyzed percentage resulted from a growing proletariazation of the Old Town at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and the worsening of its infrastructure. In the second case it refl ected social and residential relations in Fort

137 Th e author’s own calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, p. 17.138 BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 3), p. 245.

10,0

15,0

20,0

25,0

30,0

35,0

40,0

45,0

50,0

55,0

1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913

pozamałżeńskie

ogółem

małżeńskie

Chart 21. Infant mortality in Szczecin in the years 1901–1913 – according to the legitimacy of dead children (%)


non-marital

total

marital



Prusy – an area of extreme poverty. Some streets of Dolne Drzetowo139 were also considered slums. Th eir polar opposites were municipal areas such as the work-ing-class Grabowo and Dolny Wik (13%) and the intelligentsia-bourgeois West-ened, Turzyn and north-west part of the city centre (Śródmieście) in the source referred to as part of the New City140 (15%). Th e data concerning the latter group should not be surprising. However, the results for Grabowo and Dolny Wik are astonishing taking into account the fact that these areas were inhabited by workers employed in the shipping and engineering industries. It is possible that this fact played a role in shaping the level of non-marital births if women rarely worked in heavy industry – they worked mainly in the garment and tobacco industries and

139 E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, pp. 324, 328.140 In the offi cial nomenclature the name Neustadt (New Town) referred to the part of the city

adjacent to the south-west of the Old Town (the areas near today’s Dworcowa Street, Trzeciego Maja Street and part of Narutowicza Street). However, in doctors’ reports to the magistrate the district is called ehemalige Neustadt (the former New Town), and the “proper” New Town are considered areas situated in the axis of Wojska Polskiego Street in the part probably marked by Bolesława Krzywo-ustego Street and Plac Sprzymierzonych (see BVGASS 1907/1908, p. 225).

Cżęść Śródmieścia Cżęść Śródmieścia Cżęść Śródmieścia Cżęść Śródmieścia Cżęść Śródmieścia Cżęść Śródmieścia Cżęść Śródmieścia Cżęść Śródmieścia Cżęść Śródmieścia - okolice ul. Piotra Ściegiennego, - okolice ul. Piotra Ściegiennego, - okolice ul. Piotra Ściegiennego, - okolice ul. Piotra Ściegiennego, - okolice ul. Piotra Ściegiennego, - okolice ul. Piotra Ściegiennego, - okolice ul. Piotra Ściegiennego, - okolice ul. Piotra Ściegiennego, - okolice ul. Piotra Ściegiennego, Władysława Łokietka i al. Piastów Władysława Łokietka i al. Piastów Władysława Łokietka i al. Piastów Władysława Łokietka i al. Piastów Władysława Łokietka i al. Piastów Władysława Łokietka i al. Piastów Władysława Łokietka i al. Piastów Władysława Łokietka i al. Piastów Władysława Łokietka i al. Piastów

Szubieniczne Łąki (Galgenwiese), Górny Wik Szubieniczne Łąki (Galgenwiese), Górny Wik Szubieniczne Łąki (Galgenwiese), Górny Wik Szubieniczne Łąki (Galgenwiese), Górny Wik Szubieniczne Łąki (Galgenwiese), Górny Wik Szubieniczne Łąki (Galgenwiese), Górny Wik Szubieniczne Łąki (Galgenwiese), Górny Wik Szubieniczne Łąki (Galgenwiese), Górny Wik Szubieniczne Łąki (Galgenwiese), Górny Wik

Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo Drzetowo

Turzyn, Westend, część Śródmieścia Turzyn, Westend, część Śródmieścia Turzyn, Westend, część Śródmieścia Turzyn, Westend, część Śródmieścia Turzyn, Westend, część Śródmieścia Turzyn, Westend, część Śródmieścia Turzyn, Westend, część Śródmieścia Turzyn, Westend, część Śródmieścia Turzyn, Westend, część Śródmieścia

Stare Miasto Stare Miasto Stare Miasto Stare Miasto Stare Miasto Stare Miasto Stare Miasto Stare Miasto Stare Miasto

Tuż Przed Bramą Królewską Tuż Przed Bramą Królewską Tuż Przed Bramą Królewską Tuż Przed Bramą Królewską Tuż Przed Bramą Królewską Tuż Przed Bramą Królewską Tuż Przed Bramą Królewską Tuż Przed Bramą Królewską Tuż Przed Bramą Królewską i Portową, część Śródmieścia i Portową, część Śródmieścia i Portową, część Śródmieścia i Portową, część Śródmieścia i Portową, część Śródmieścia i Portową, część Śródmieścia i Portową, część Śródmieścia i Portową, część Śródmieścia i Portową, część Śródmieścia

Grünhof (Dolne Niebuszewo) Grünhof (Dolne Niebuszewo) Grünhof (Dolne Niebuszewo) Grünhof (Dolne Niebuszewo) Grünhof (Dolne Niebuszewo) Grünhof (Dolne Niebuszewo) Grünhof (Dolne Niebuszewo) Grünhof (Dolne Niebuszewo) Grünhof (Dolne Niebuszewo)

Łasztownia Łasztownia Łasztownia Łasztownia Łasztownia Łasztownia Łasztownia Łasztownia Łasztownia Grabowo, Dolny Wik Grabowo, Dolny Wik Grabowo, Dolny Wik Grabowo, Dolny Wik Grabowo, Dolny Wik Grabowo, Dolny Wik Grabowo, Dolny Wik Grabowo, Dolny Wik Grabowo, Dolny Wik

Cartogram 3. Th e percentage of deaths of non-marital children within the total number of infant deaths in Szczecin in the period from 15 June to 15 Nov 1902 according to the city’s districts (%)

Note: grouping by the method of equal intervals; lack of strict borders between regions; the borders of statistical data come from 1911.Source: the author’s compilation on the basis of the source from footonote 138.

25 do 31 (2) 18 do 25 (5) 13 do 18 (2)



as servants. It must be reminded that in the light of the data from the years 1911––1913, Grabowo was characterized by a relatively low infant mortality rate, which was unusual among Szczecin’s working-class districts situated in the outskirts of the city (see notes in the part “General considerations”). Th is phenomenon may be explained by the relatively low level of non-marital births.

Th e diff erence between the number of deaths of marital and non-marital chil-dren was determined socially considering the fact that single mothers came usu-ally from lower social strata, which is proved by the data from the years 1902–1913 (chart 22)141. Presenting the data, we can use the logarithmic scale considering the exceptionally high value of the rate of non-marital births in the group of women employed as servants (96.4%!). Th eir children prevailed in the group of non-mari-tal births not only relatively, but also absolutely (3435 occurrences), which leads us to conclude that the general level of infant mortality among non-marital children was shaped mainly by deaths of babies whose mothers were employed as serv-ants142. Th e deaths of babies whose mothers were hired workers of various kinds, had managerial positions or worked as freelancers also aff ected the magnitude of the analyzed phenomenon (the exception to the rule is only ostensible considering the fact that this group of unmarried mothers included also poor needlewomen and tailors), as well as those employed as unqualifi ed and qualifi ed labour in craft and industry.

Th e statistics of 1914 make it possible to analyze the internal professional struc-ture of women who had a non-marital child143. According to the statistics, in the group of the above-mentioned mothers (899 mothers) prevailed the Dienstmäd-chen – servants (33.8 %); next came tailors, needlewomen and women who did the ironing (13.6%); the last group constituted women who had no job (10.2%). For the sake of contrast, in bigger professional groups the least represented were women employed in the civil service and the private sector (not häusliche Dienst) and those with liberal professions (0.7%). Th e source lists a pianist, three artists, a minder of the sick and a deaconess – an Evangelical nurse.

Why did servants prevail in the group of unmarried women? Michael Mit-terauer answers this question in an interesting way saying that in big cities women employed as servants were usually immigrants living far from the religious and social infl uence of their families. Th ey left their family homes to acquire new ex-periences and get to know a new world. Employers were more willing to hire girls from outside the city as it allowed them to infl uence and control the servants144,

141 Th e author’s own calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, pp. 12–13.142 About the situation of house servants in Szczecin: E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, pp.

471–472.143 SVBSS, Jg. 5: 1915, Nr. 1, p. 35. Db; 15,5; 665144 M. Mitterauer, Ledige Mütter. Zur Geschichte unehelicher Geburten in Europa, München 1983,

p. 102. See also general remarks about house servants: A. Fauve-Chamoux, Służba domowa w Europie od XVI wieku: dzieje i źródła zjawiska, [in:] Rodzina i gospodarstwo domowe na ziemiach polskich w XV–XX wieku. Struktury demografi czne, społeczne i gospodarcze, ed. C. Kuklo, Warszawa 2008, pp.



which was even easier as the girls were usually very young. Th e data of the Munici-pal Care for Infants gathered in 1912 show how much unmarried mother diff ered from married ones in this respect. According to the data, 4/5 of women had a non-marital child when they were under 25, while only ¼ of married women bore a child while under 25. Th e average age of mothers in the fi rst group was 22.1 and in the other 29.9145. Obviously, the numbers do not refl ect precisely the diff erences because of a diff erent frequency of subsequent births in both groups of mothers. To compare the age we should take into account only the fi rst births, but there is no information about them in the source.

Complete data concerning non-marital births in 1914 allow us to suppose that among unmarried mothers prevailed those who were 19, 20, 21 and 22 when their baby was born. Th eir age during labour was most oft en around 21.1. Th e majority of unmarried mothers were single – only 1.9% were widows (1.3%) or divorced (0.6%)146.

324–326; R. Poniat, Kontrola służby domowej na ziemiach polskich w świetle aktów prawnych w końcu XVIII i XIX wieku, [in:] ibid., pp. 353–362 (in reference to Polish lands under Prussian rule).

145 Th e author’s own calculations on the basis of VBSS 1912, p. 90.146 Th e author’s own calculations on the basis of SVBSS, Jg. 5: 1915, Nr. 1, pp. 35–36.

Db;

15,

5; 6

65

Ba;

10,

7; 8

85

Bd;

8,3

; 1 1

95

Ab;

7,5

; 5

Cc;

7,2

; 279

Ac;

5,9

; 13

Bc;

5,1

; 971

F1; 4

,3; 1

8

Aa;

3,7

; 11

Ea;

2,5

; 42

Cb;

2,5

; 54

Ca;

1,8

; 72

Cd;

1,8

; 151

Bb;

1,1

; 20

Ec;

0,8

; 8

Eb;

0,5

; 13

Da;

96,

4; 3

435

Ad;

20,

4; 5

7

0,0

20,0

40,0

60,0

80,0

100,0

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

ranga

urod

zeni

a po

zam

ałżeńs

kie

(%)


Chart 22. Th e absolute and relative level of non-marital births in Szczecin in the years 1902–1913 (data collected) presented according to the social-professional position of mothers

A – agriculture B – craft and industry C – trade and transport

Aa, Ba, Ca – independent manageressesAb, Bb, Cb – intellectual workersAc, Bc, Cc – qualifi ed workersAd, Bd, Cd – unqualifi ed workersDa – house and personal servantsDb – hired workers of various kinds

Ea– liberal professions Eb– regular offi ce workersEc– caretakers, porters, messengers, staff of public utility places, etc.F1 – rentiers, old-age pensioners, Altsitzers

rank

Non

-mar

ital b

irths

(%)



All this allows us to think that ledige Mütter had neither any fi nancial nor social position147.

Th e situation of unmarried mothers was diffi cult for one more reason. Th e group included a considerable percentage of mothers from outside Szczecin (chart 23). While in the years 1910–1913 the percentage of the latter in the group of married mothers amounted to only 2.4%, in the group of unmarried women the level reached 10.3% and was still growing (from 8.3% in 1910 to 12.8% in 1913)148. It must be stressed that in terms of absolute magnitude, births given by unmarried mothers from outside Szczecin did not diverge signifi cantly from births given by married women from outside Szczecin despite the diff erences in their number. Al-though the data of the Municipal Care for Infants concerning the year 1912 shows that women born outside Szczecin were more heavily represented in the group of

147 In the light of the data of the Municipal Care for Infants from 1912 in the group of unmarried mothers using obligatorily the assistance of the institution, 42.8% worked as servants, 20.9% worked as factory workers, 19.7% were employed in non-industrial plants, 5.3% worked as merchants’s as-sistants (Angestellte in Geschäft en), and 10.4% had no profession at all. See: VBSS 1912, p. 89.

148 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 1: 1910, p. 5; Jg. 2: 1911, p. 12; Jg. 3: 1912, p. 17; Jg.4: 1913, p. 11.

pozamałżeńskie - żywe; 10,3; 334

małżeńskie - martwe; 9,7; 55

pozamałżeńskie - martwe; 8,4; 11

małżeńskie - żywe; 2,4; 445

0,0

2,0

4,0

6,0

8,0

10,0

12,0

14,0

0 1 2 3 4 5

ranga

Udz

iał u

rodz

eń z

mat

ek p

ozam

iejs

cow

ych

(%)

Chart 23. Th e percentage of births given by mothers from outside Szczecin in the total number of births in Szczecin in the years 1910–1913 (collected data) grouped according to the legimization and the still/live births factor at the moment of birth


The

perc

enta

ge o

f birt

hs g

iven

by

mot

hers

from

out

side

Szc

zeci

n

Non-marital – alive; 10.3; 334

Marital – dead; 9.7; 55

Non-marital – dead; 8.4; 11

Marital – alive; 2.4; 445

rank



married mothers (74.6%) than in the group of unmarried ones (65.0%), it turns out that the latter group included women who stayed in Szczecin for some time. As much as ½ of unmarried mothers lived in Szczecin not longer than a year – the number for married women in this case is 1/7

149.Th e main reason for the “labour tourism”– in the period when most children

were born in the privacy of home150 – was the desire and need to give birth to a child far from the unfriendly rural or provincial surroundings, which normally did not accept children born out of wedlock and put the tarnish of blame and disgrace on unmarried mothers. Th e big city of Szczecin gave unmarried pregnant women more anonymity and allowed them to give birth to their children in good conditions in special institutions. Some women probably returned to their local environment aft er labour. However, most of them remained in Szczecin to look for a job there. As they were not supported by their families, the ones who had to pay the highest price were their children.

Every politically involved scientist or journalist joined the heated debate about the causes of the extraordinary infant mortality. One of the most interesting de-scriptions of the phenomenon was written by one of Szczecin’s doctors – Dr. Her-mann Wasserfur – in the mid-1860s. Reading the work, one could get the impres-sion that one of the main reasons for the deaths of non-marital infants were the de-liberate actions of some mothers whose aim was to kill their illegitimate off spring. Th e motive of such initiatives was the fear of disgrace and impossibility to carry out life plans hindered by a child out-of-wedlock. It must be stressed here that for most women employed as house servants having an illegitimate child meant losing their job and modest accommodation151.

According to H. Wasserfuhr, some non-marital children were born in secret secluded places; mothers did not provide them with warmth, appropriate clothes, care or access to fresh air in order to provoke their death and make people believe that their deaths were natural. He observed that illegitimate children were dropped on the pavement and fractured their head, while others were strangled in latrines, under the bed or squeezed under their mother’s body. It sometimes happened that newborn babies died of hyperthermia or heavy loss of blood as they had not had their umbilical cords tied on time. Th ese actions were premeditated and constituted criminal off ences. Dr. Wasserfuhr concludes that children were deliberately led to their death by being drowned, strangled, beaten up or buried152. Half a century later, an expert in this problem – Dr. Behr-Pinnow – urged the authorities to provide in-nocent illegitimate newborn babies with the protection of probation offi cers153, for

149 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of VBSS 1912, p. 89.150 For example, in Szczecin in the years 1910–1913 only 8.1% of children were born in social

care institutions. Th eir mothers were predominantly from outside Szczecin. See: Preusische Statistik (further cit. PS) 229, 1910, p. 222; 233, 1911, p. 222; 238, 1912, p. 222; 245, 1913, p. 222.

151 E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, p. 471.152 H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen, p. 36.153 It was introduced in Szczecin on 1 Jan 1910.



they “had to bear the consequences of their parents’ mistake”, which was not justi-fi ed ethically and was against Christian values. In one word, it was barbarity154. Th e stigma of guilt was reinforced in social law: unmarried mothers were discriminated against by the social insurance system as they did not have the right to a six-week paid maternity leave (Wochengeld)155. Th e situation did not change until the times of the Weimar Republic. Nevertheless, the mental attitude towards non-marital children did not change, at least in the Wets-Pomeranian province156.

Th e pessimistic picture of the mortality of non-marital infants should be re-fl ected in numbers. To verify the assumptions made by Dr. H. Wasserfuhr we can use the data published for Szczecin from 1886 about the causes of deaths presented according to their sex and age with special emphasis being given to homicides, ac-cidents or other forms of sudden death (gewaltsame Einwirkungen) in the group of children who died before they had turned one. Th e number should demon-strate the criminal action of some mothers towards their children, which could be euphemistically referred to as postnatal birth control. It turns out that the facts looked diff erent. In individual fi ve-year periods (1886–1890–1906–1910) and the last three-year period (1911–1913) the total number of deaths for the above-men-tioned reasons fl uctuated between 4 and 16. In the structure of causes of infants’ deaths they did not play a major role, as their share fl uctuated between 0.6% and 2.2%, and it did not experience and upward trend157. More detailed data from the years 1910–1913 which take into account the legitimization of infants confi rm that the phenomenon described by Dr. H. Wasserfuhr was marginal before the First World War even if we look only at his Dunkelziff er. Offi cially, during those four years in Szczecin two infants were killed – one marital and one non-marital. In the group of the youngest children from marital relationships, six died through acci-dent or another sudden cause, whereas among non-marital newborn babies only one died due to one of these two reasons158.

Th e above data should not conceal the fact that non-marital infants ran more risk of losing their lives for various reasons than marital newborn babies (chart 24). In the group of the latter “fortunate enough to be born to married parents” the number of deaths was higher only in the case of illnesses of the respiratory system and the nervous system, excluding convulsions and contractions (Krämpfe)159.

154 [Dr] Behr-Pinnow, Geburtenrückgang, p. 45.155 Ibid., p. 50.156 See:. D. Szudra, Ludność, p. 200.157 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of BVGASS 1886/1887, pp. 52–53; 1887/1888, pp. 38–

–39; 1888/1889, pp. 34–35; 1889/1890, pp. 36–37; 1908/1909, pp. 224–228; PS 118, 1890, pp. 54–55; 124, 1891, pp. 54–55; 132, 1892, pp. 54–55; 135, 1893, pp. 54–55; 139, 1894, pp. 54–55; 145, 1895, pp. 52–53; 152, 1896, pp. 52–53; 157, 1897, pp. 52–53; 162, 1898, pp. 52–53; 166, 1899, pp. 52–53; 171, 1900, pp. 50–51; 179, 1901, pp. 50–51; 184, 1902, pp. 50–51; 189, 1903, pp. 50–51; 195, 1904, pp. 50–51; 199, 1905, pp. 54–55; 208, 1906, pp. 54–55; 214, 1907, pp. 56–57; VBSS 1909, pp. 12–13; SJBSS, Jg. 1: 1910, pp. 6–7; Jg. 2: 1911, pp. 14–15; Jg. 3: 1912, pp. 20–21; Jg. 4: 1913, pp. 14–15.

158 SJBSS, Jg. 1: 1910, pp. 6–7; Jg. 2: 1911, pp. 14–15; Jg. 3: 1912, pp. 20–21; Jg. 4: 1913, pp. 14–15.159 Th e source as above.



Th at inequality in the face of illness and death infl uenced the mental and phys-ical health of mothers was refl ected in the vitality of infants, whose condition was portrayed in the data from the Municipal Care for Infants of 1910–1912. It turns out from the data that among children admitted into care there were relatively more “healthy and strong” babies in the group of marital infants (the diff erence about 6.4–10.5%). Th e situation was reverse among the youngest infants who were described as “healthy, but weak”, for in this case there were relatively more non-marital infants (the diff erence of 6.5–7.7%)160. Th e contrast between both groups of infants would have been even more visible had the research of the Municipal Care for Infants encompassed most newborn marital babies as was the case in relation to newborn non-marital babies. Considering the structure of the causes of deaths in the categorization according to the legimization of infants, we can also perceive the above-mentioned inequality. Th e diff erence is particularly visible in the case of deaths due to “genetic incapacity to live, including body defects”. In Szczecin in the years 1910–1913 the causes was more frequent in the group of non-marital infants (24.6%) than in the group of marital babies (21.7%); the number of deaths due for this reason was bigger by 49% among non-marital infants in comparison with marital ones (see chart 24)161.

160 VBSS 1910, p. 62; 1912, p. 89.161 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 1: 1910, pp. 6–7; Jg. 2: 1911, pp. 14–15;

Jg. 3: 1912, pp. 20–21; Jg. 4: 1913, pp. 14–15.

0,0

10,0

20,0

30,0

40,0

50,0

60,0

70,0

80,0

90,0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

ranga (pozamałżeńskie) i numer przyczyny

umie

raln

ość

niem

owlą

t (‰

)

pozamałżeńskiemałżeńskie

1. Choroby układu trawiennego2. Wrodzona niezdolność do życia w tym wady budowy3. Skurcze4. Choroby zakaźne5. Atrofia dziecięca6. Choroby organów oddechowych7. Inne zidentyfikowane przyczyny śmierci8. Choroby zewnętrzne skóry9. Choroby serca i układu krwionośnego10. Choroby układu nerwowego (bez skurczy)11. Niepodane lub niedokładnie zidentyfikowane

Chart 24. Infant mortality in Szczecin in the years 1910–1913 (collected data) according to the causes of death and the legitimization of children


1. Disorders of the digestive system2. Genetic incapacity to live (including body defects)3. Contractions4. Infectious diseases5. Spinal muscular atrophy in children6. Illnesses of the respiratory system7. Other identifi ed causes of death8. Illnesses of the skin9. Illnesses of the heart and the circulatory system10. Illnesses of the nervous system (without contractions)11. Unidentifi ed or not clearly specifi ed

non-marital marital

range (non-marital) and the number of a cause

Infa

nt m

orta

lity

(‰)



Unmarried mothers were compelled to start working immediately aft er giving birth which, according to doctors, adversely aff ected the frequency and length of breastfeeding162. Some of them, in an attempt to earn money, were employed as wet nurses in wealthy families; thus, they fed rich women’s babies with their milk, but their own off spring with animal’s milk or surrogates163. Was this practice in decline in Szczecin? It is hard to answer the question on the basis of remaining sources. However, prior to WWI the institution of wet nurses did not disappear since it was mentioned in the context of controlling them via a centralized agency164. Some negative opinions of doctors about feeding non-marital babies can be verifi ed on the basis of the statistics of 1911165, which take into account the legitimization of dead infants (chart 25). In the light of this data, the share of babies not fed on their mother’s milk at all (fed on animal’s milk or surrogates) in the group of marital infants was about 63.1% whereas in the group of non-marital ones – 71%. Th e

162 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 134 (KLO powiatu wiejskiego Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 31 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 38 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 15 IX 1908 r.).

163 H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen, p. 45.164 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 147 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni)

do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8037, k. 150 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 29 X 1912 r.).

165 SJBSS, Jg. 2: 1911, p. 18.

1

10

100

1000

małżeńskie pozamałżeńskie

wyłącznie mleko matki

mleko matki i zwierzęce lub surogaty

mleko zwierzęce lub surogaty

bez odżywiania

Chart 25. Deaths of infants in Szczecin in 1911 categorized according to the legitimization and the kind of feeding


exclusively mother’s milk

mother’s milk and animal’s milk, or surrogates

animal’s milk or surrogates

without nutrition

marital non-marital



diff erence between both values – as can be seen – was not so huge, as doctors suggested. Th e phenomenon looked diff erent in the light of data gathered in 1912 from the Municipal Care for Infants when as much as 35.1% of unmarried moth-ers fed their babies with animal’s milk while in the group of married mothers the number was 18.4%166. It must be born in mind that the municipal care looked aft er infants whose mothers came from the poorer social strata.

According to the district doctor of the district of Szczecin during hot summer days non-marital babies particularly ran the risk of death due to disorders of the digestive system as they were breastfed less frequently167. If this is the case, this cause should stand out much more visibly in the structure of deaths of non-marital infants than marital ones. Although it seems logical, empirically it is denied – to my surprise and probably to the surprise of initiators of the research who tended not to mention the “awkward” problem so as not to weaken the strength of the propaganda for natural feeding. Th e results of the research of 1902 and 1911 show that in the fi rst and in the second group of dead infants the percentage of deaths caused by enteritis, gastritis or diarrhea was almost the same (sic!) or did not dif-fer signifi cantly, which of course cannot be said about the frequency of deaths. In fi ve cool and rainy summer-autumn months of 1902 in the group of non-marital infants the percentage was 51.8%, and in the group of marital babies – 51.4%168. In the year 1911, characterized by a very hot summer, the level of the percentage of causes of deaths of infants was respectively: 44.8% and 41.6%169. Taking into consideration the condition of the medical diagnostics at that time, we can say that the share in both groups was in fact much higher. Many children who died because of disorders of the digestive system, were “hidden” in two categories of death causes – contractions (symptom!) and atrophy. Hence, it turns out that in the years 1910–1913 in Szczecin the percentage for marital babies was somewhat higher (58.3%) than for non-marital ones (56.4%)170. Can this fact be interpreted as a sign of the fact unmarried mothers did not diff er from married ones in the frequency of breastfeeding?

As can be seen, the legitimization of infants did not aff ect the structure of death causes examined in the dichotomous division. Th e data of 1902 demonstrates that its diversifi cation according to the social-professional position of parents, which allows us to put forward a hypothesis the share of infant deaths caused by enteritis, gastritis or diarrhea was correlated with housing conditions and the number of children in the family, which, in turn, depended on the social-professional posi-tion of parents. A remark made by a district doctor supervising the western region

166 VBSS 1912, p. 89.167 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 134–135 (KLO powiatu wiejskiego Szczecin do władz RS,

Szczecin, 31 X 1912 r.).168 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 3), p. 244.169 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 2: 1911, p. 18.170 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 1: 1910, pp. 6–7; Jg. 2: 1911, pp. 14–15;

Jg. 3: 1912, pp. 20–21; Jg. 4: 1913, pp. 14–15.



seems quite signifi cant – he stated that the mortality of Ziehkinder (allegedly most exposed to losing their lives, also referred to Haltekinder – non-marital and parent-less children looked aft er by strangers) was lower than the mortality of babies in large families171. Th e Municipal Care for Infants more willingly admitted children who were born fi rst, assuming that it would be hard to convince mothers who had already had a few babies to adopt new rules, for such mothers had ingrained hab-its in infant care which were unlikely to change172. Is there any evidence for this? Only the fact that in 1911, which had a very hot summer, the frequency of deaths in the group of marital babies grew while in the group of non-marital ones it fell. A similar situation, if not so spectacular, took place in 1913. Doctors commented the phenomenon as a success of the Municipal Care for Infants173 which, since 1910, had as a matter of obligation embraced all non-marital children174.

It is worth adding that another institution – the House of Infant and Mother (Säuglings- und Mutterheim), established in April 1907, contributed to the process of lowering the mortality among non-marital children175. Th e institution promot-ed natural feeding, a visible example of which was the practice of having newborn babies whose mothers were incapable of feeding breastfed by other fresh mothers. Most women admitted to the institution were servants, workers and shop assist-ants. Many of them came from outside Szczecin (72.8% in the group of the 1436 women registered in the period 1907/1908–1917/1918176. Th ere was also the House of Henrietta (Henriettehaus) which was set up by the Foundation of Magdalene. It helped “endangered and fallen” girls off ering them spiritual and material sup-port as well as decent conditions of living before and aft er labour. Its fundamental statute aim was, apart from the protection of newborn babies, to show women roads to a better world. Th e institution admitted girls with behavioural problems177 who were from outside Szczecin, and who – according to the data of April 1913 – constituted half of the residents of the institution178. Th e Provincial School of

171 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8038, k. 39 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 15 IX 1908 r.).

172 BVGASS 1908/1909, p. 254.173 VBSS 1911, p. 65; 1913, p. 92; AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 147v (KLO powiatu miej-

skiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8037, k. 151–151v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 29 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8037, k. 190v (magistrat Szczecina, deputacja ds. zdrowia do władz RS, Szczecin, 14 III 1913 r.).

174 VBSS 1910, pp. 60–61.175 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 146v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni)

do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8037, k. 148v–149 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 29 X 1912 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 40–40v (KLO powiatu miej-skiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 15 IX 1908 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 78 (magistrat Szczecina do władz RS, Szczecin, 13 XI 1908 r.).

176 Das Stettiner Säugling- und Mutterheim. Denkschri. aus Anlass der Betriebseröff nung des neuen Heims an der Turnerstr. 44, Stettin 1920, pp. 5, 9.

177 Th e care was extender upon girls over the obligatory school age.178 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8200, k. 8 (inserted Dreisigster Jahresbericht des Magdalenenstift s

Asyl für gefährdete und gefallene Mädchen und seiner Zweiganstalten, des Henriettehauses und des Kinderheims in Stettin vom 1. April 1913 bis dahin 1914, Stettin 1914, p. 4).



Midwives (Provinzial-Hebammen-Institut) provided basic medical care during childbirth to mostly unmarried mothers from outside Szczecin, many of whom later went to the House of Infant and Mother179. Th ey arrived in Szczecin to give birth to their children far from the unfriendly rural or provincial environment. It is impossible to discuss all the forms of assistance given to the poorest mothers180.

Living and sanitary conditions – the most important factorsDeaths of illegitimate infants were a topic of interest for journalists and sci-

entists due to their high frequency. Undoubtedly, it was a serious social problem. However, considering the problem globally, high mortality of non-marital children did not aff ected the general level of infant mortality, particularly in the western more affl uent part of Szczecin181. Th e frequency of deaths of marital infants was only slightly lower than the frequency of deaths of non-marital babies. To be able to defi ne the magnitude of the analyzed demographic phenomenon more precisely let us look at the data from 1902 and 1911182, which means from the years in which in Szczecin there took place the biggest and the smallest divergence in the level of mortality of marital and non-marital infants. It is obvious that there would noth-ing to talk about in a situation where the frequency of deaths had been the same or similar in both groups of infants under one year old. What would have happened if the level of mortality of non-marital infants had gone down to the level recorded by marital infants, and the remaining elements – the absolute number of living marital and non-marital births and the absolute and relative numbers of deaths of marital infants – had remained unchanged? It would have turned out that the absolute number of all dead infants would have been reduced by 9.8% in 1902 and 2.8% in 1911. Th e hypothetical numbers show the pursuit of the ideal and the exist-ing possibilities making us lower the elevated rate of the mortality of non-marital infants in the total mortality rate of children under one. Szczecin’s district doctor showed what the authorities should concentrate on insisting that the discussion about the mortality and care of infants not focus solely on feeding and climate, but

179 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8202, k. 3–3v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do królewskiego prezydium policji w Szczecinie, Szczecin, 11 XII 1912 r.). Pregnant women from the House of Infant and Mother were exposed to some inconvenience connected with a lack of a delivery room in the institution. Sometimes they gave birth on the way to the Regional School of Midwives, in the street or in a carriage. Th at is why the demand to build a delivery room appeared. In the years 1909–1911 the institution admitted on average 134–135 women and 113–114 children a year.

180 See: Wohltätigkeit und Wohlfahrtspfl ege in der Stadt Stettin. Ein Wegweiser, hrsg. v. der Ar-mendirektion, Stettin 1910, pp. 17–21, 36; M. Stelmach, Tätigkeit der Stift ungen und Wohlfahrts-pfl egeanstalten für Kinder in Stettin im 19. Jahrhundert, [in:] Kindheit und Jugend in der Neuzeit 1500–1900. Interdisziplinäre Annäherungen an die Instanzen sozialer und mentaler Prägung in der Agrargesellschaft und während der Industrialisierung, hrsg. v. W. Bucholz, Stuttgart 2000, pp. 211–222;A. Chlebowska, „W walce”, passim.

181 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 145v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.).

182 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 2: 1911, pp. 12, 17.



also refer to social issues, in particular in the context of housing conditions, which in Szczecin, in its eastern part, did not look very optimistic183.

Housing conditions in Szczecin and adjacent areas have already been ana-lyzed184. Th at is why I feel dismissed from the obligation of providing their detailed description. In the city space they can be synthetically depicted in two ways: by the number of rooms in one apartment, or, which seems to be more exact, by the aver-age number of persons inhabiting one room – the residential density of the popu-lation. Such a description of housing “conditions” is highly objective and unbiased. Th e size of the living space, treated as an intervening variable, normally refl ects the wealth of the residents and defi nes their prestige. It can be assumed that the level of welfare determines the mortality rate (expected negative correlation), for it infl uences sanitary-living conditions, the quality and variety of food, availability of medical and educational services including adequate infant care, etc.

Let us start with introducing a few facts which diff erentiate the city space con-sidering the housing factor185 and the infant mortality rate186; next let us refer to the synthetic measure of the mutual dependence of the two variables as expressed by the value of the Pearson’s correlation coeffi cient. Its use is justifi ed in the nor-mal layout of twelve observations187 of the average number of rooms (independent variable) and the average frequency of infant deaths (dependent variable), which is refl ected in the results of the Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.05). In Szczecin, according to the working-class district of Niebuszewo and Dolne Drzetowo (1.97), while the highest number of rooms – in rich Westend, Pogodno and part of the City Cen-tre near the former Fort Wilhelma (3.20). Th e value of the analyzed average was even higher in the case of separately examined, not densely populated exclusive residential districts – Nowy Westend and Pogodno (4.47), for which no separate information about the natural migration of people was given (cartogram 4). At the same time in the above-mentioned statistical districts the average frequency of infant deaths from the years 1911–1913 was inversely proportional to the size of fl ats expressed by the average number of rooms assuming 29.98% and 13.05% as extreme values (compare cartogram 1 and 4). Th is polarity is not surprising. What is astonishing is the unexpected power of the correlation between both variables.

183 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8038, k. 45 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.).

184 See: E. Włodarczyk, Zur Wohnungsfrage der Stettiner Arbeiterklasse vor dem ersten Weltkrieg,[in:] Materialien des IX. Kulturtheoretischen Kolloquiums „Kulturgeschichtliche Probleme proletarischer Lebensweise” am 26. und 27. November 1980 an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (Mitteilungen aus der Kulturwissenscha. lichen Forschung, Nr. 9), Berlin 1981, pp. 77–89; idem, Wielkomiejski rozwój, pp. 455–465; B. Kozińska, Rozwój przestrzenny Szczecina od początku XIX wie-ku do II wojny światowej, Szczecin 2002, pp. 222–228.

185 SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, p. 27. In the calculations of the weighted mean the last option of the vari-able – “8 and more” was treated as 9.

186 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 2: 1911, s. 6; Jg. 3: 1912, s. 11; Jg. 4: 1913, p. 5.

187 Th e number of the city’s statistical districts.



For twelve municipal districts its negative values amounted to as much as 0.808 (p < 0.001) in the 0–[1] scale, which can only confi rm the fact that in Szczecin infant mortality was determined by housing conditions and, most importantly, by the wealth of parents or single mothers.

Th e conclusion might be a target of criticism. A sceptic might undermine it by arguing that the average number of rooms per fl at is an appropriate measure of the family’s wealth, because it does not show the population density of a fl at, which plays a signifi cant role in spreading diseases. For example, a bedsit may or may not be inhabited by only one person if it is relatively big. A multi-room fl at may be inhabited by a large and/or extended family and a number of lodgers, which lowers the standard of living. Let us assume that I agree with the arguments of the sceptic. Although I suppose that bigger fl ats were seldom inhabited by large fami-lies due to high maintenance costs. Now, the correlation between both variables is clear and of course positive – it amounts 0.746 (p < 0.0025), which allows me to state that the increase in the number of people living in one fl at aff ected the infant mortality rate188 (cartogram 5). But this time the determination was smaller. Why?

188 Th e author’s calculations of the value of the correlation coeffi cient.

Cartogram 4. Th e number of rooms (on average) per fl at in Szczecin in 1913 in the division into municipal statistical districts

Note: grouping by the method of standard deviation.Source: the author’s compilation on the basis of sources from footnote 185.

1. Stare Miasto 2. Nowe Miasto, Fort Prusy, Górny Wik 3. Pomorzany miejskie 4. Turzyn 5. Przed Bramą Portową 6. Westend, Fort Wilhelma, Pogodno 7. Bolinko (Dolne Niebuszewo), Dolny Wik,

Przed Bramą Królewską 8. Grabowo 9. Górne Drzetowo

10. Dolne Drzetowo, (Górne) Niebuszewo 11. Niemierzyn 12. Prawobrzeże

N

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

89

10

11

12

2 ,73 do 3 ,2 (2)2 ,36 do 2 ,73 (4)2 do 2 ,36 (5)1 ,97 do 1 ,97 (1)



To answer this question let us have a look at the extreme values of the population density of fl ats.

Th e lowest level was reported in Westend and part of the City Centre (Śródmieście) near former Fort Wilhelma, where there was on average 1.22 per-sons living in one room. Th is fact is undisputable. What is astonishing is the fact that the average number was the highest in Nowe Miasto, Fort Prusy and Górny Wik (2.06), where the infant mortality rate was moderate. Naturally the exception proves the rules, but in this case we must be careful considering the fact that those areas were inhabited by a military population living in barracks, which must have been included in the total estimation of the population number189. Th is, in turn, means that the average calculated by me does not refl ect appropriately the hous-ing conditions. Th e picture of the depicted phenomenon is also to some extent distorted by empty fl ats190. Nevertheless, the problem may be ignored as in 1913 the number of empty fl ats went down considerably in all the statistical districts,

189 SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, p. 4.190 See: E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, p. 463.

Cartogram 5. Th e number of person (on average) inhabiting one room in Szczecin in 1913 in the division into municipal statistical districts

Note: grouping by the method of standard deviation.Source: the author’s compilation on the basis of sources from footnote 185, 188.




N

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

89

10

11

12

2 ,06 do 2 ,06 (1) 2 ,01 do 2 ,06 (1) 1 ,73 do 2 ,01 (5) 1 ,44 do 1 ,73 (3) 1 ,22 do 1 ,44 (1) 1 ,22 do 1 ,22 (1)



fl uctuating from 0.3% in Przed Bramą Królewska to 2.2% in Prawobrzeże, where the majority of people lived in Łasztownia and Kępa Parnicka191.

Housing conditions seen in the context of the average size of fl ats and their population density were inferior in northern and southern suburbs of the city, which were typically working-class and belonged to the eastern medical district. In the case of districts situated between them, dividing them by a sort of wedge, in the western region under the supervision of a district doctor the situation looked much better, which did not mean that housing conditions there were not criti-cized, in particular in reference to the densely populated City Centre (near Fort Wilhelma, the area Przed Bramą Portową, Turzyn). It can be said that they were the most important192 as social issues did not play such an essential role as in the case of the outskirts of the city and the Old Town which was undergoing a process of rapid proletarization at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Rental barracks (Mietskaserne) used by 90% of the city’s population193, were profi t-oriented and did not provide its residents appropriate health conditions. Even representative streets in Szczecin used to have and still have tall annexes to old apartment houses. Such a layout meant that a yard oft en had the shape of a well in which the air hardly circulated and the sunshine did not reach very oft en194. Limited access to the sunshine and fresh air aff ected the health of infants. Par-ents usually put newborn babies in the worst rooms – dark, stuff y, with windows overlooking the yard – leaving the best rooms for representative purposes. Dr H. Wasserfuhr observed this with terror as such a conduct took place even in better-off families residing in “healthy” Górne and Nowe Miasto. Poorer residents could not aff ord to have shutters fi tted in their windows which might reduce the amount of heat getting into their rooms. Not only did “uncurtained” windows facilitate the permeation of heat inside the fl at, the thin walls of the tenement houses also made it easier195. How the heat aff ected infant mortality in a big cramped city – so diff er-ent from the spacious countryside196 – has already been discussed. Th is pessimistic view of the picture-postcard part of Szczecin was complemented with the over-population of some fl ats. It was mainly caused by the desire to earn money rather than by a large number of children197. Some rooms were rented to the so-called Schlafl eute, Schlafgänger – people who came there to sleep during the night. A dis-trict doctor of the western region suggested that Schlafgängerwesen was charac-

191 SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, p. 27.192 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 145v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni)

do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.).193 See: E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, p. 455.194 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 145v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni)

do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.).195 H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen, pp. 39, 41.196 Comp. [dr] Behr-Pinnow, Geburtenrückgang, pp. 73–74.197 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 146 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni)

do władz RS, Szczecin, 25 X 1912 r.).



teristic not only of working-class districts198, but also those parts of the city which were inhabited by the lower middle class (petite bourgeoisie).

Housing in Szczecin may be associated with the image of a four-storey tene-ment house from La diable á Paris of 1845199, which demonstrated the social diver-sity depending which fl oor was inhabited by a given family – the higher the fl oor inhabited, the poorer its residents were (naturally, excluding the basement). One could expect that among the residents of the upper storeys the mortality should be higher than among the residents of the lower storeys. Let us verify this supposi-tion which Dr. Behr-Pinow took for granted200 in reference to the city of Szczecin. It is noteworthy that the city centre was characterized by densely-packed four-sto-rey buildings and there were at least one thousand residents living in the area of one hectare201. Undoubtedly, the city’s authorities must have been interested in the problem if they ordered the collection of data about it. Th e data, however, refer to the number of deaths in total, and do not show infant deaths. Nevertheless, it can be used in the preliminary analysis of the phenomenon which can be treated as an invitation to discussion, bearing in mind that prior to WWI from 1/3 to ½ of the to-tal number of deaths in a given year concerned infants. Th eir deaths depended on the season (the highest number during the summer heat), which in turn aff ected the level of the total number of deaths in quarters of a year. I use quarters as units of time as the numbers concerning deaths of inhabitants of Szczecin were grouped in quarters and the information about the storey inhabited was added. What are the results of the analysis of the data202 for 1880, 1881, 1882, 1886, 1890 and 1895 (chart 26)? Firstly, in the third quarter (July-September) the percentage of deaths achieved the highest level in each storey, which had not been expected. Secondly, the percentage of deaths in the third quarter did not show the tendency to grow according to the storey; we can observe complete chaos in the data, which again had not been expected.

Naturally, I realize that in order to explain the issue one needs to know the frequency of deaths divided according to the storey inhabited. Unfortunately, the lack of such data makes it impossible to draw far-reaching conclusions. On the ba-sis of the data acquired, I can only make two contradictory suppositions: either the seasonality (including infants) was not determined socially (which seems highly unlikely), or Szczecin’s tenement houses were not socially diversifi ed internally, as

198 See: E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, p. 461.199 See: L. Benevolo, Miasto w dziejach Europy, przeł. H. Cieśla, Warszawa 1995, s. 187.200 [Dr] Behr-Pinnow, Geburtenruckgang, s. 64: „[...] Das gleiche bewirkt das Zusammenwoh-

nen in großen Gemeinwesen, mehr noch aber in den Mietskasernen, in denen die Sterblichkeit des Säuglings jedenfalls wahrend der Hitzperiode mit der Höhe des Stockwerks zunimmt. Die enge, mit Koch- und Waschdämpfen durchzogene Wohnung mit Sommertemperaturen von 45 Grad und dar-über bewirkt bethlehemitische Kindermorde, und zwar in einzelnen bekannten Großstadthäusern so vollständig, das man sie mit Recht »Säuglingssterbehauser« genannt hat”.

201 E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, pp. 291, 455.202 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of BVGASS 1880/1881, s. 91; 1881/1882, s. 91; 1882/1883,

p. 77; 1886/1887, p. 57; 1890/1891, p. 44; 1895/1896, p. 94.



had been assumed originally, but externally, which meant that in the city space the borders of the social division were marked by the buildings themselves – some of them were inhabited by poorer residents, others by more affl uent ones. Using ad-dress books (Adressbuch) in future research should help to explain this ‘worrying’ phenomenon.

Th e development of infrastructure took place more rapidly in the city centre and exclusive residential districts, while in the working-class part of the town the process of modernization was quite slow despite the fact that it was in working-class areas that public utility plants were situated (gasworks, power stations, pump stations, etc)203.

Th e situation in the case of the water supply system was better. Before the out-break of WWI 89% of fl ats had access to running water, but central heating was still a luxury, particularly in the outskirts of the city. For example, in Pomorzany, Dolne Drzetowo, Górne Drzetowo and Niebuszewo only 4 fl ats had such facilities. More households were equipped with gas, but there still existed disproportions in its distributions with the suburbs being disadvantaged in this respect204. Th e modernization of the city was visible particularly in the development of the sewage

203 More: E. Włodarczyk, E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, pp. 300–305.204 Morej: ibid., p. 458–460.

Chart 26. Th e percentage of deaths in the third quarter in the total number of deaths in a given year in Szczecin in the years 1880, 1881, 1882, 1886, 1890, 1895 according to the storey inhabited.


0,0

5,0

10,0

15,0

20,0

25,0

30,0

35,0

40,0

1880 1881 1882 1886 1890 1895

suterena parter I piętro II piętro III piętro IV piętro

basementground fl oorfi rst fl oorsecond fl oorthird fl oorfourth fl oor



system which, together with the water supply system, played a major role in the process of improving health conditions and lowering infant mortality205. Szczecin’s sewage system was very old; the waste went directly into the Oder. Moreover, the sewage system did not reach as many recipients as in other big cities situated in the eastern part of the Prussian state206.

According to Edward Włodarczyk, in Szczecin “the poor technical standard of the fl ats did not aff ect sanitary conditions”207. Let us examine this by starting with the toilets (Abort) as did the city’s Committee for Health. In the summer of 1904 the committee made a survey which encompassed 304 fl ats of dockers spread all over the city208. Th e results of the survey were not optimistic – they were far from an ideal standard of hygiene and any moral code which may require toilets to be a private space and this aff ected their cleanness, which was of great importance to epidemiology209. In 1/3 of fl ats inhabited by dockers, 16 people used one com-mon toilet seat installed outside the apartments. In 61% of cases one toilet was used by 4 or more fl ats, and in 4.3% – 10 or more apartments. Most oft en one toilet was used by the residents of four fl ats (26.3%), then two fl ats (22.7%) and fi ve (14.5%). Not many toilets were equipped with toilet cisterns. If they were, the owners of tenement houses had them blocked and allowed their use only in special circumstances to reduce the costs of maintenance. Th e worst conditions were in Łasztownia in Energetyków street (Grosse Lastadie) and in Zachariasgang (not exis ting anymore), in the Old Town in Rybaków street (Fischerstr.) and Junker-straße, as well as in Niebuszewo in Wincentego Kadłubka stret (Zabelsdorferstr.). Th e fl ats of well-paid and qualifi ed workers had better access to toilets210.

Another sign of the sanitary modernization of the private space was the grow-ing number of bathrooms, which at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries were a more and more common element of a burghers’ fl at; they were a sign of comfort, provided intimacy and created an opportunity to take care of personal hygiene more oft en (cartogram 6). Th e presence of bathrooms in the residential space in-directly refl ected the fi nancial status of the fl at’s owners. It also proves the exist-ence of a trend to protect health, for washing (also infants) became one of the forms of fi ghting bacteria211. In the research of interrelationship the percentage of bathrooms in fl ats in a given statistical district was an independent variable

205 See for example: Das öff entliche Gesundheitswesen im Regierungsbezirke Stettin während der Jahre 1892, 1893, 1894, achter Verwaltungsbericht erstattet v. Dr. Katterbau, Stettin 1896, pp. 114––133.

206 E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, pp. 302, 304.207 Ibid., p 459.208 BVGASS 1904/1905, p. 233.209 More: G. Vigarello, Historia zdrowia i choroby. Od średniowiecza do współczesności, transl.

M. Szymańska, Warszawa 1997, pp. 237–244.210 BVGASS 1904/1905, p. 233.211 More: G. Vigarello, Czystość i brud. Higiena ciała od średniowiecza do XX wieku, transl.

B. Szwarcman-Czarnota, Warszawa 1998, pp. 212–229.



(data of 1909)212. Th e negative linear correlation of Pearson was as much as 0.833 (p < 0.001), indicating a clear relationship between sanitary conditions213 and the frequency of deaths among infants. However, it must be remembered that the sani-tary modernization of the private space was closely connected with the level of education and wealth of the owners of a given fl at.

Before the water supply reached most of Szczecin’s fl ats, water was taken from almost one thousand wells located in the city214. Th e Committee for Health was to decide whether it was safe to drink. Th e Committee for Health commissioned a series of analyses the aim of which was to check the quality of water (once even in connection with the mortality of infants). Th e results were presented for fi ve summer-autumn months of 1902215. Th e data referred to 981 dead infants in whose group there were 178 infants who had been given water from the well. In the latter

212 Qouted Edward Włodarczyk (E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, p. 459).213 Th e majority of fl ats with a bathroom must have been connected to the water supply system

and the sewer system; moreover, such fl ats certainly included a toilet. Th e author’s calculations of the correlation coeffi cient.

214 BVGASS 1904/1905, p. 237.215 Ibid. (Anlage 3), pp. 251–252.

Cartogram 6. Th e percentage of fl ats with a bathroom in the total number of fl ats in Szcze-cin in 1909 divided according to municipal statistical districts




10. Dolne Drzetowo, (Górne) Niebuszewo 11. Niemierzyn 12. Prawobrzeże 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

89

10

11

12 N

22 ,5 do 34 ,4 (3)11 ,2 do 22 ,5 (1)

0 ,6 do 11 ,2 (8)



group there were 129 deaths caused by disorders in the digestive system, which constituted 72.5% of the causes of deaths, while the norm leveled off at 51.5%. Th e highest number of children who were given water from wells came from Drzetowo and Grabowo (as many as 134). At fi rst glance, such a high percentage of deaths caused by enteritis, gastritis or diarrhea, observed in children given water from a well, may clearly show the cause-and-eff ect relationship between the two phenom-ena. Nevertheless, its signifi cance should be by played down – according to the suggestion made by Dr. Freund – as the phenomenon was also caused by other bad conditions. For example, in Łasztownia, where there were virtually no wells, and in Drzetowo in Kołobrzeska Street (Metzstr.) equipped with a sewage system and running water, the frequency of infant mortality was also high. Th e same situation took place in Grabowo, where the percentage of deaths caused by disorders in the digestive system was low and similar to the one of infants given water from the water supply (44.3%) and from wells (49%), which cannot be said about Drzetowo where the above-mentioned percentage was respectively 60.5% and 80%. Looking at the above data, it must be remembered that we should not draw any conclusions on the basis of the numbers owing to their randomness.

Th e physical features of the water delivered by the water supply also consti-tuted a setback to the process of reducing infant mortality. Water was taken from the Oder and cleaned in sand fi lters which were not technologically advanced216. In summer the temperature of water was 20°C (aft er some time 17–18 °C). Such a temperature caused the proliferation of bacteria. Moreover, tepid water could not be used to cool milk prepared for infants217, particularly in poorer families where a fridge was still an unattainable luxury. Th e installation of the pump station get-ting water from the ground located in Niemierzyn (Wasserwerk Nemitz)218 was expected to improve the conditions described above. It was not until 1912 that the water supply system reached the areas beyond the city, which Edward Włodarczyk considered to be only symbolic219. However, the improvement of the sanitary con-ditions in the suburbs realized through the development of the water supply and sewage systems did not have to determine lowering the infant mortality rate, for before the suburbs were incorporated into the city, Szczecin was characterized by a high frequency of deaths among the youngest children220. To “complicate” the issue even more, let us add that on the basis of the material gathered in 1902 and com-piled by Dr. Freund, no clear relationship between the density of the population of fl ats and the number of infant deaths due to disorders in the digestive system was observed221. Moreover, only half of children who died of diarrhea, enteritis or

216 E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, p. 301.217 Unpasteurized milk reached the customer aft er 12–18 hours from milking, or even aft er 20

hours, which increased the risk of the development of bacteria.218 BVGASS 1904/1905, Beilage: W. Gehrke, Bericht, p. 12.219 E. Włodarczyk, Wielkomiejski rozwój, p. 303.220 BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 5), p. 270.221 Ibid. (Anlage 3), p. 246.



gastritis lived in fl ats whose the standard did not allow parents to keep milk in ap-propriate conditions222.

Where shall we look for the key causes of the high infant mortality rate in Szczecin? It seems that in places where it is the most diffi cult to defi ne the causes using clear criteria and numbers – that is in the “bad habits” of parents223. For a dis-trict doctor of the eastern area including the suburbs of the city it was an obvious reason. He explained that the extremely high infant mortality in his district was caused primarily by the indolence, passivity and indiff erence of parents (he talked exclusively about mothers) as well as by their ignorance in the fi eld of childcare, not to mention the squalor and fi lth which he observed in tenement houses in-habited by the lower social strata. Subsequently, he mentioned bad housing condi-tions224. All the factors naturally depended on the fi nancial situation of the parents and their low level of education. Th ere was one more very important factor not mentioned by the district doctor – less assistance given by the family in infant care. Th e last factor resulted from the fact that people relying on the assistance of the Municipal Care for Infants and inhabiting southern (Pomorzany, Górny Wik and Szubieniczne Łąki) and northern (Grabowo and Górne Drzetowo) suburbs were mostly immigrants. It is proved by the relationship between the number of parents born outside Szczecin to the number of parents born in Szczecin. For the districts listed above it amounted to 5.8 and 4.9 while its value for the whole city was 3.0 (data from 1907)225.

Dr. H. Wasserfuhr made a list of parental bad habits defi ning their frequency according to the pattern: the poor – oft en, the middle-class – sometimes, and the rich – very rarely. Th e list includes the dark, stuff y or over-warm room mentioned previously; next a lack of appropriate care and regular walks; using unstable cra-dles instead of a stable bed; wearing too warm clothes, swaddling clothes; putting a cradle with a baby too close to a hot stove in winter and leaving it at night in a cool room; adequate care of the child only in the presence of a midwife, etc.226 Breaking the basic rules of hygiene was noticeable – for example – in the case of teats. According to the reports made by nurses from the Municipal Care for Infants their condition was tragic: not only were they fi lthy and smelly, but they also had holes made by their parents to “speed up” the process of drinking milk, the result of which were frequent stranglings227. Nevertheless, the relationship between in-fant mortality and using bottles with teats (Rohrsaugfl asche) was not confi rmed. Th e use of teats was to result from the high occurrence of diarrhea among the

222 Ibid. (Anlage 3), p. 252.223 BVGASS 1902/1903, p. 23. Th e Committee for Health underlined the role of external condi-

tions and negative habits of parents in the process of the formation of the high mortality rate.224 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8037, k. 148 (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon wschodni)

do władz RS, Szczecin, 29 X 1912 r.).225 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of BVGASS 1907/1908, p. 225.226 H. Wasserfuhr, Untersuchungen, p. 41–42.227 VBSS 1911, p. 66; 1912, p. 91.



youngest children, which could not be verifi ed by district doctors due to a lack of appropriate statistical analyses228.

Th e quality of infant care improved considerably from the beginning of the 20th century thanks to the activity of various institutions. It was not accepted willingly by the lowest social strata as it was perceived as an interference in private aff airs229. Yet, it seems that the role of this external factor should give priority to the internal one, which, to my way of thinking and according to other researchers230 was the slump in the number of births taking place simultaneously with the decline in the infant mortality rate from the beginning of the 20th century (chart 27)231.

In Szczecin the number of births went down by 41.9% between 1900 and 1912 despite the incorporation of working-class class areas inhabited by large families.

228 AP Szczecin, RSWP, sygn. 8038, k. 137, 220–220v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon wschodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 1 X 1910 i 8 I 1913 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 213 (KLO powiatu wiejskie-go Szczecin do władz RS, Szczecin, 3 I 1913 r.); sygn. 8038, k. 222–222v (KLO powiatu miejskiego Szczecin (rejon zachodni) do władz RS, Szczecin, 10 I 1913 r.).

229 See ibid., sygn. 8559, k. 105v (królewski prezydent policji do władz RS, Szczecin, 19 IV 1905 r.); BVGASS 1904/1905, Beilage: W. Gehrke, Bericht, p. 3; VBSS 1910, p. 61.

230 BVGASS 1904/1905 (Anlage 5), p. 270.231 PS 118, 1890, p. 54; 124, 1891, p. 54; 145, 1895, p. 52; 152, 1896, p. 52; 171, 1900, p. 50; 179,

1901, p. 50; 199, 1905, p. 54; 208, 1906, p. 54; SJBSS, Jg. 3: 1912, p. 6, 11 (Th e author’s calculations con-cerning fertility). Preussens Städte. Denkschri. zum 100 jährigen Jubiläum der Städteordnung vom 19. November 1808, hrsg. v. H. Silbergleit, Berlin 1908, s. 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 97; SJBSS, Jg. 4: 1913, s. 5.

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1876 1881 1886 1891 1896 1901 1906 1911

rodn

ość

(‰)

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

płod

ność

(‰)

rodność - liczba urodzeń żywych na 1000 mieszkańców

płodność - liczba urodzeń żywych na 1000 kobiet w wieku 15-49 lat

Chart 27. Average fertility and number of births in Szczecin in the years 1876–1913


Ferti

lity

(‰)

Number of births (‰)Fertility (‰)

Num

ber o

f birt

hs (‰

)



If in 1910, the birth of the fi rst baby constituted 23.5% in the total number of births, then in 1912 it was only 28.1%. On the basis of the analysis of the absolute num-bers one can suppose that in Szczecin the slump in the number of births resulted from a change in the attitude towards procreation among the lowest social strata (unqualifi ed workers, servants). Th ey were inspired by educated burghers, who at the end of the 19th century started to give birth to fewer children232. Mentioning this demographic phenomenon in the context of its infl uence on infant mortality, I realize that I start a “chicken or egg” style discussion. In such a situation I can only suppose (on the basis of intriguing facts from the years of the First World War233) that parents (mothers) were capable of providing their children with better care and were more open to innovations, for they gave birth to fewer children.

232 SVBSS, Jg. 3: 1913 (C. Anhang: „Die Geburtenhäufi gkeit in Stettin”), pp. 42–48. See also: K. Erler, Vier Jahre Krieg in ihren Wirkungen auf die Bevölkerungsbewegung Stettins, Stettin 1918, p. 7.

233 See: D. Szudra, Ludność, p. 79.

Cartogram 7. Th e number of births (on average) in 1000 inhabitants in Szczecin in the years 1911–1913 presented in the division into the city’s statistical districts





N

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

89

10

11

12

28 ,9 do 33 ,1 (2) 24 do 28 ,9 (5) 19 do 24 (3) 17 ,6 do 19 (2)



Th e phenomenon resulted from the process of social modernization which also included demographic transformation – that is the transfer from extravagant reproduction into economical reproduction, discarding the simple explanation of infant deaths expressed in the saying: “God gave and God took”234. Bearing that in mind, it can expected that in the divided city space we could observe a cause-and-eff ect relationship between the number of births (independent variable) and the frequency of infant deaths (dependent variable)235. Th e supposition is confi rmed in the clear linear correlation of Pearson, the value of which was 0.679 (p < 0.002). Th e number is not as high as in the case of the average number of rooms in one fl at correlated with infant mortality, but we must remember that the eff ective repro-ductiveness is not a precise gauge of the phenomenon, for it depends on the struc-ture of the population according to age, marital status and sex236 (cartogram 7). Unfortunately, due to the lack of data it is impossible to standardize the birth rate. Nevertheless, it will be true to say that higher reproductiveness was usually237 ac-companied by a higher infant mortality rate. In the same way, the frequency of births was determined by the social-professional position of the parents, which, in turn, was connected with the level of their education and wealth. Th us, we again return to the starting point.

CONCLUSION

Rapid industrialization and urbanization of Szczecin in the second half of the 19th century led not only to the economic development of the city, but also to lower health standards for the city’s inhabitants, particularly at the end of the 19th cen-tury. As a result of the high infant mortality rate the average life expectancy was one of the lowest in comparison with other major Prussian cities – it was about 30 years (mortality tables from the years 1890/1891). Th e highest number of infant deaths took place here much later than in other German cities and it overlapped with the period of the highest growth in migration. Th us, supposedly, the elevated migration to Szczecin aff ected considerably the level of the phenomenon under analysis. Th e attempts of the city’s authorities and public institutions were an im-portant factor in the reduction of infant mortality at the beginning of the 20th cen-tury. Nevertheless, it was not fully successful if in Szczecin infant mortality still belonged to one of the highest among German cities.

234 Comp. J.-L. Flandrin, Historia rodziny, transl. A. Kuryś, Warszawa 1998, p. 216.235 Th e author’s calculations on the basis of SJBSS, Jg. 2: 1911, p. 6; Jg. 3: 1912, p. 11; Jg. 4: 1913,

p. 5.236 Th e surprisingly low birth rate in the joint area of Nowe Miasto, Fort Prusy and Górny Wik

can be associated with military units staying there. In the case of the Old Town the situation might be explained with a probable demographic ageing of the district.

237 Th e relationship is not so obvious on a global scale. For example, the cities of the Ruhr area were characterized by a relatively high birth rate and a low infant mortality rate. Szczecin’s Commit-tee for Health emphasized this fact. See: BVGASS 1902/1903, p. 23.



Positive changes in infant mortality observed at the beginning of the 20th cen-tury resulted from a decreasing importance of external factors. Yet, the process did not eliminate social-spatial diff erences existing in the context of the phenomenon under analysis. It can even be said that by the outbreak of WWI the diff erences had become even more transparent. Th eir hierarchical structure did not undergo any bigger changes, except one: the leader of positive changes was the new mid-dle-class. Th e short series of data let us draw far-reaching conclusions about spa-tial changes. Nevertheless, the data of 1911–1913 shows signifi cant diff erences in the geographical layout of the phenomenon, which depends on the segregation of social-professional groups in the city’s space and is determined by an economic factor. In consequence, the city’s districts characterized by the highest frequency of infant mortality were located next to or overlapped with the areas of concen-trated industry, where badly-paid workers lived. Th e secondary character of the geographical space in relation to the social space could be also observed in the case of deaths of infants caused by disorders in the digestive system. Th e frequency of such deaths was correlated with the position of parents in the social-professional hierarchy.

Among external factors determining high infant mortality the most signifi cant was the insuffi cient breastfeeding of newborn babies; this resulted in their high-er mortality caused by disorders in the digestive system. According to Szczecin’s medical doctors this dangerous “move away from nature” was practiced mainly in working-class families where women had to work to maintain the family. It seems that the phenomenon was much more common, which is indirectly confi rmed by a lack of bigger diff erences in the percentage share of deaths due to enteritis, gastritis and diarrhea in the group of marital and non-marital infants. Promoting breastfeeding became the fundamental objective of the Municipal Care for Infants and other organizations and institutions. Such a treatment of the problem, the least costly fi nancially, resembled treating the symptoms of an illness rather than its causes.

Th ere were eff ective attempts to prevent the mortality of non-marital infants whose high number was determined by the diffi cult material situation of single mothers who came usually from outside Szczecin and were mostly employed as servants or casual workers. Th e analysis of the causes of deaths does not indicate that non-marital infants were likely to lose their lives mostly due to crimes com-mitted by their mothers (it cannot be excluded, though). Nevertheless, it shows that non-marital children had a weaker physical constitution and their infant mortality rate was higher irrespective of the causes of death. It is impossible to describe the mortality of non-marital infants in the divided city space due to a lack of sources. In the global dimension its level aff ected the general infant mortality only slightly, particularly from 1910, when non-marital children in Szczecin were given special protection.



In the divided city space the frequency of infant deaths was heavily correlated with the average number of rooms in one fl at, which meant that the phenomenon under analysis was closely connected with the material status of parents. Doctors also stressed the role of housing conditions criticizing the negative infl uence of rental barracks (Mietskaserne). Nevertheless, the analysis of the structure of deaths according to the storey inhabited before death did not indicate any correlation. Th is might mean that the lines of the social division, seen in the context of mortal-ity, did not run in the narrow perpendicular direction, but in the wide horizontal direction of the residential space. Th e standard of fl ats did not diff er in various dis-tricts. However, it must be stressed here that the bad condition of fl ats not always entailed deaths of infants due to disorders in the digestive system (50% of cases), which, in turn, makes us emphasize the role of less statistically tangible factors diff erentiating the phenomenon under analysis such as the bad habits of parents, which was closely connected with their level of education and wealth (fi lth, indo-lence, ignorance, insuffi cient care, etc.). Th e decline in the number of births from the beginning of the 20th century was supposedly a phenomenon which facilitated better childcare in families; it constituted a signifi cant element of positive changes in infant mortality.

Th e description and analysis of infant mortality, presented here mostly in the social context, does not address all the problems; the author intended to invite readers to further discussion, the axis of which might be the hypotheses drawn here. Th e issues need to be discussed more thoroughly in the context of the per-ception of causes and eff ects, which in this article very oft en change places. It can be achieved through the exploratory compilation of information included in the fi les in the registry offi ce and address books. Th e task is beyond the capabilities of one researcher considering the size of the city of Szczecin. Th e need arises to create a research team. Time will show whether such a team will be established.



MICHAŁ PSZCZÓŁKOWSKI (Toruń)

FROM THE HISTORY OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF TORUŃ’S UNIVERSITY CAMPUS 1967–1973*

Key words: campus; Nicolaus Copernicus University (NCU); architecture; Toruń, 20th cen-tury

As early as in the fi rst months aft er the end of WWII, the reconstruction and development of the infrastructure of higher education began. Both in western countries and in eastern bloc countries there was a dominant viewpoint that the high level of the society’s education would facilitate reconstruction aft er the war and would infl uence the future of the world1. Th e demands of modern science and teaching in the post-war period could be met only in new buildings. As the spe-cialization of various disciplines of science was expanding, the spatial requirements of universities were growing – the area of many of them exceeded the surface oc-cupied by central cities2, which was the case particularly in small cities where large universities were located (Würzburg, Karlsruhe). It led to the fact that universities oft en renounced a central location and chose a more attractive option initiated before the war: the construction of university buildings in the suburbs or even out of town, which gave the opportunity for further spatial development. Such a location allowed all the functions of a university to combine – academic-scientifi c, residential, cultural and recreational – and provided a unique opportunity for ar-chitectural expression during the realization of the construction design.

Th e popularity of university campuses aft er WW II grew all over the world. In Great Britain the idea was adopted in the early 1960s, in conjunction with the creation of the so-called new universities (Bradford, Sussex, York, East Anglia, Es-sex, Warwick, Lancaster, Bath, Loughborough). Also at the same time the concept


1 Comp. i.a.: Manifest Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego, Dziennik Ustaw, 1944, nr 1, poz. 1: “one of the most urgent tasks of the Polish Committee of National Liberation PKWN will be to restore education [...], and the Polish intelligentsia, particularly people of science and art shall be protected” – transl. AC).

2 According to evaluations carried out by the Germans, the area of a university educating 10,000 students should be 150 hectares; P. Conradi, H. Linde, Probleme bei der Planung von Hochschulen, Bauen + Wohnen, Jg. 14: 1964, Nr. 8, p. 295.

M i c h a ł P s z c z ó ł k o w s k i126


of a campus became very common in Scandinavian countries (Roskilde, Oslo, Lyngby, Likoping), the Federal Republic of Germany (Bochum, Konstanz, Ulm, Regensburg), France (Orlean, Dijon, Bordeaux). Very oft en partial solutions were introduced, which meant that campuses were limited to academic-scientifi c and administrative buildings (Odense, Besançon, Delft ) or only to residential-social investments in the form of “student districts”, which very oft en met the needs of several colleges (Stuttgart, Trondheim, Louvain, Stockholm, Cracow). Th ere were also some joint initiatives undertaken by academic and industrial centres. Many campuses were erected in the United States – the country with the longest campus tradition, and in the countries of the developing world (Havana, Mexico, Bogota, Brasilia, Caracas, Akra, Ibadan, Lusaka). Th ey were prestigious investments with ambitious architecture, constituting monuments of national culture as evidence of the intellectual freedom of these young states following the collapse of the colonial system. Socialist countries were also attracted by the concept of campuses3. Th e nature of the campus suited the ideology as it was associated with the “communi-zation” of students, which facilitated control over the young and educated environ-ment which was potentially dangerous.

Th e idea of the campus had numerous advantages such as the ideological fac-tors (Humboldt’s unity of teaching and research, the epitomy of the idea of univer-sitas as an indivisible institution located in one place), prospects for unlimited spa-tial development, the distance from the hustle and bustle of the city centre, contact with nature, and fi nally the lower costs of maintenance (in comparison with the central city zone). Th e centralisation of all the functions facilitated administrative work and favoured the interdisciplinary character of the scientifi c-academic sys-tem, relieved the city centre, and contributed to the development of contacts and bonds among members of the academic community4.

Th e NCU campus in Toruń was the fi rst complete realization of the concept of an academic campus in Poland.

Toruń’s university (Toruń’s Wszechnica) was established soon aft er the end of the military activity: on 24 August 1945 the Cabinet of Poland decided to set up Nicolaus Copernicus University5. Before the war, when there were attempts to es-tablish a university in Toruń, the idea was to erect a compact complex of new build-ings. It was obvious that buildings situated in the city centre could not be extended,

3 Comp. W. Queck, Einige Probleme des Hochschulbaus in der Sowjetunion, Deutsche Architek-tur, Jg. 20: 1971, Nr. 4, p. 245.

4 S. Vassal, Les nouveaux ensembles universitaires françaises, Annales de Géographie, An. 78: 1969, no. 2, p. 136; S. Wehle-Strzelecka, Kształtowanie struktury przestrzennej wyższej uczelni w powiązaniu z miejskim organizmem, Życie Szkoły Wyższej, R. 25: 1977, nr 4, p. 44; H. Aminde, Hochschulen als Gegenstand der Stadt- und Regionalplanung, [in:] Hochschulplanung. Beiträge zur Struktur- und Bauplanung, Bd. 4, hrsg. v. H. Linde, Düsseldorf 1969, p. 71; A. Znojkiewicz, Loka-lizacja wyższej uczelni, Architektura, R. 25: 1971, nr 6, p. 195; idem, Problemy lokalizacji wyższej uczelni, Studia + Projekty, R. 1: 1977, nr 1, p. 54.

5 Dekret z dnia 24 sierpnia 1945 r. o utworzeniu Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Dziennik Ustaw, 1945, nr 34, poz. 208

From the history of the construction of Toruń’s University Campus 1967–1973 127


so they were only capable of meeting the needs of the academic community on a temporary basis. Th e diffi cult post-war reality did not prevent any attempts to construct the whole complex in one place like in American campuses. Th e local authorities also appreciated the advantages of such a solution in terms of urban planning. In 1945 the university was given the building in Sienkiewicza street (the former college)6, and one year later it was decided to build an impressive “academic city” – university campus. Th e intention was to erect a complex of academic and residential buildings on the area of 15 hectares within 5 years7. It seems that the design was associated with the fantastic vision of a university complex published at that time in Głos Demokratyczny8. Th e university situated in Bielany was to consist of monumentally huge university buildings, enormous faculties, residential-social buildings for students and employees, airports, a zoo-botanical garden, a hospital and a leisure centre. Th e image created by the journalists must have resulted from their knowledge of foreign designs, for it included all the fundamental features of the American campus: the location in the outskirts of the city, the complete func-tional programme, the greenery and leisure areas. Moreover, the author underlined the problems resulting from the central location of old buildings taken over by the university, particularly their lack of functionality. It is the fi rst opinion concerning the location of modern colleges in Poland. At that time it was not very realistic that the budget of the country would cover the investment. Nevertheless, there was a plan that the resources might come from the donations of the Polish diaspora Polonia9. Unfortunately, Poles living in America failed to support the design, and even the modifi ed investment plan from the years 1947–1948 limited to only a few buildings10 was not completed. Th e design of the erection of a housing estate for professors in the so-called Stare Bielany was not completed either11.

Nevertheless, the idea of the construction of the “university campus” was brought up more and more frequently as a result of the growing demand for space and buildings. Th e question of the creation of the university zone was discussed by local authorities in 195112, but the fi nal years of Bolesław Bierut’s government did not favour such a big investment. Aft er October 1956 the next attempt was made to construct the campus. Th e prospects seemed promising: the idea of the university campus was included in the fi rst post-war general land development plan of the city of 1957. Th e complex, consisting of faculties, the NCU Rector’s building and student dormitories was to be situated by the Vistula river, very close to the Old

6 State Archive in Toruń (further cit. APT), Akta Miejskiej Rady Narodowej i Zarządu Miejskiego w Toruniu (further cit. AMRNiZM), sygn. 56, k. 12 (1945).

7 Ibid., sygn. 57, k. 13–17 (1946).8 St. Mat., Wizja miasta uniwersyteckiego, Głos Demokratyczny, R. 1: 1946, nr 6, p. 7.9 J. Bełkot, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu w latach 1945–85, Toruń 1986, p. 52.

10 Por. ibid., p. 52–53.11 Comp. APT, Akta budowlane miasta Torunia, sygn. G-846, k. 175, 185 (1948).12 Archive of Nicolaus Copernicus University (further cit. AUMK), Akta Rektoratu, sygn. R-124,

k. 7–8 (1951).



Town. Th e Old Town’s panorama was to be extended by low buildings in the fore-ground contrasted with low-density housing dispersed in the greenery with the architectural dominance of a huge entertainment-theatrical building13. Despite the fact that the design was approved by the Regional National Council in Bydgoszcz, it was never carried out due to the controversial location – it was believed that the college should be isolated from the city’s hustle and bustle.

Th e new location – Bielany – was soon chosen. It was situated in the north-western outskirts of Toruń. It was an area not too distant from the city centre and other university buildings. Moreover, Bielany had been associated with the future location of the university since the 1940s. Th e concept of the construction of the university campus in Bielany came up again at the end of the 1950s when talks with the local authorities recommenced. Although no agreement was reached14, in 1960 “Miastoprojekt Poznań” was commissioned to prepare the preliminary layout of the extension of NCU’s space. Th e suggested location on Bielańska street was not approved by the Senate of the university15, whose members were afraid that the university would be too isolated from the city16. Instead, a suggestion was put for-ward to incorporate new buildings in the area from the building in Grudziądzka street down to Chopina street, where the library was located17.

Th e model of the campus must have been very attractive for the city architect Cezary Mathes, who led to the establishment of the Committee of Experts con-sisting of: Ryszard Karłowicz and Leonard Tomaszewski from the Polytechnic of Warsaw, Bohdan Ledworowski from the Institute of Urban Economy, Krzysztof Miller – the head of the Regional Urban Planning Bureau and Janusz Wilski – the chief architect of the Bydgoszcz voivodeship18. Th e members of the committee supported the design of the university campus’s location in Bielany at the meeting on 27 Jan 1962. A few days later (2 February) the local authorities and the univer-sity’s authorities commissioned Ryszard Karłowicz and Eugeniusz Kosiacki from the Department of Architecture of Warsaw College of Technology to prepare an expert opinion19.

13 R. Sudziński, Przekształcenia strukturalne miasta Torunia w latach 1920–1975, Toruń 1993, p. 133.

14 Toruń’s authorities off ered plots in Grudziądzka street, but the representatives of NCU insisted on the area near the district of student dormitories – between Kraszewskiego street, Słowackiego street and Czerwona Droga street (E. Górna, „Obiekty dydaktyczno-naukowe i socjalne UMK w latach 1945–1994”, Toruń 1995 (master’s thesis, NCU), p. 53).

15 Resolution of 22 Jan 1962 (M. Zielińska, „Inwestycje Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika 1945––1977”, Toruń 1977 (master’s thesis, NCU), p. 32).

16 S. Staniszewski, Wspomnienia dyrektora administracyjnego, [in:] Uniwersytet Mikołaja Koper-nika. Wspomnienia pracowników, red. A. Tomczak, Toruń 1995, p. 299–300; M. Kaczmarek, Geneza powstania miasteczka uniwersyteckiego na Bielanach, [in:] ibid., p. 165.

17 Comp. Na miarę potrzeb i możliwości, Nowości, R. 2: 1968, nr 67, p. 1.18 R. Karłowicz, Koncepcja urbanistyczna, [in:] Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika. Projekt i realiza-

cja, red. B. Popławski, Warszawa 1974, p. 12.19 J. Bełkot, op.cit., p. 57.



Th e expert opinion prepared within two months defi nitely rejected the concept of extending the buildings already owned by the university (the idea was support-ed by Toruń’s professors) for a number of reasons: the dispersion of the university’s buildings, their poor technical condition, limited extension possibilities, a lack of functionality since they had been constructed for a diff erent purpose, high costs of maintenance20. Th e experts advocated the concept of the “students’ town”, which was connected with economic advantages (better organization of work, techni-cal support and transport during the investment process; maintenance profi ts – smaller personnel, a common energy base) and non-economic profi ts (combining learning, living and leisure space; the eff ective organization of students’ social and political life; easier contacts with the teaching staff )21. Four options were present-ed: Bielany, the city centre (near Wały Sikorskiego and Al. 500-lecia), Jakubskie Przedmieście (near Szosa Lubicka ) and Podgórz (a left -bank district of Toruń). Having conducted the comparative analyses in functional-spatial, technical, eco-nomic and sociological terms it was decided that Bielany was the best option22.

Th e Bureau of Construction Designs for the Chemical Industry “Prochem” [Biuro Projektów Budownictwa Przemysłu Chemicznego “Prochem”] (G. Kozik, S. Tomkiewicz) was also asked to put forward their own suggestions for the loca-tion23. Th ey off ered three suggestions for the extension (May 1963): 1) the area of Grudziądzka street and Nowickiego street (now Szosa Chełmińska), 2) the area of Kraszewskiego street and Bema street, and 3) the area of Bielańska street and Okrężna street. Eventually, the experts from “Prochem” also declared that the Bie-lany option was the optimal solution, and presented their concept for land devel-opment. Th e proposal included the complete functional programme of the univer-sity consisting of academic-scientifi c and residential-social spaces separated from each other. Despite being quite schematic and immature, the concept suited the western idea of the campus.

Th e choice of Bielany resulted from the fact that the district had numerous advantages. Apart from being very close to the city centre and other university buildings it also:– occupied a large area (about 50 hectares) off ering huge opportunities for ex-

tension owing to its outskirts location;– was situated close to the water intake, sewage system, water and gas supply

systems;– was surrounded by forest, which provided very healthy living conditions;– provided a very good transport connection with the city centre;

20 R. Karłowicz, op.cit., p. 12.21 Comp. AUMK, Akta Zarządu Inwestycji Szkół Wyższych (further cit. AZISW), sygn. ZI 16/53,

p. 170 (1962 r.).22 R. Karłowicz, op.cit., p. 15–16.23 AUMK, Akta Działu Technicznego (further cit. ADT), Analiza wariantów lokalizacji Wydz.

Mat.-Fiz.-Chem. z uwzględnieniem dalszej rozbudowy Uniwersytetu im. Mikołaja Kopernika w Toru-niu, sygn. DT 10/413 (1963 r.).



– was located close to the planned artery connecting Toruń and Bydgoszcz – the possibility to extend the university’s infl uence to Bydgoszcz, which did not have its own university24.Another argument was that there was a plan to build a housing estate in Bie-

lany, which was to strengthen bonds between the university and the town25.Nevertheless, the offi cial decision of the university depended on the opinion of

the university’s senate. Unfortunately, the professors still rejected the idea as they were afraid of the pernicious infl uence of the industrial plants such as Polchem and Merinotex, and of the diffi culties resulting from the extension of the airport26. Advocates for the university campus being erected in Bielany, headed by the ad-ministrative director Stanisław Staniszewski and his deputy Marian Kaczmarek, took measures to persuade the university’s senate to approve of the location in Bie-lany. Fortunately, they managed to transfer their enthusiasm over to a large circle of professors, including the university’s president Antoni Swinarski27. Th e study Prospects of the Development and Extension of NCU for the period 1964–1980 written by M. Kaczmarek also played an important role. It was the fi rst study of this type in Poland, based on the ministerial data concerning the planned number of students and the demand for the university’s graduates (June 1963)28. Th e study argued that the number of students would grow from 4,000 in 1963 to almost 12,000 in 1980. According to Kaczmarek, the university would demand three times more space for its academic activity, and twice as many places in student dormi-tories. Owing to the poor technical condition of the university buildings and their dispersion, the only solution was to build a new complex of buildings. Prof. Ernest Pischinger provided the most compelling argument: the central authorities were willing to fi nance the construction of the university campus regarding it as a pres-tigious investment connected with the 500th anniversary of Nicolaus Copernicus’ birthday29. All the factors convinced the university’s senate to overrule the decision of 22 January and to approve of the new location in Bielańska street30.

As the investment was planned to be completed very soon (1973), the decision was not to invite tenders but to employ three selected teams which were asked to present their design concepts. Apart from the team from the Faculty of Architec-ture of Warsaw Polytechnic (WA PW), the design concepts were to be put forward by two more teams – one from Toruń and the other from Bydgoszcz. Nevertheless,

24 R. Karłowicz, op.cit., p. 16, 26.25 Comp. Osiedle Fałata godną oprawą dla miasteczka uniwersyteckiego, Nowości, R. 4: 1970,

nr 152, p. 1.26 I got the information from Prof. Ryszard Kozłowski.27 S. Staniszewski, op.cit., p. 300.28 Comp. M. Kaczmarek, op.cit., p. 165.29 In March 1962 Prof. Ernest Pischinger talked with the head of the Department of Investment

of the Ministry of Higher Education Zygmunt Dżuganowski, who declared to support the idea of the extension of NCU in connection with the ceremonies of the anniversary of Nicolaus Copernicus’ birthday. (E. Górna, op.cit., p. 56).

30 Ibid., p. 57.



the shortage of time (only 5 months) made the fi nal two teams resign. Eventually, on 1 August 1964 only the Warsaw design by Ryszard Karłowicz, Witold Benedek and Marek Różański was presented31. Prior to presenting the design, the dean of the Faculty of Architecture (WA PW) Piotr Biegański undertook to prepare all the urban planning and architectural documentation. On the advice of the university’s president A. Świnarski32, Ryszard Karłowicz was appointed chief designer as he was familiar with the issue of NCU’s extension.

In 1964, aft er the proposal of the design was approved by NCU, the team of designers adopted an organizational form: the Laboratory of Urban Planning and Architecture S-77 was created in the Department of the Bases for the Construc-tion of Cities in the Institute of Architecture of Warsaw Polytechnic. In the begin-ning the Laboratory included Ryszard Karłowicz – chief designer of the Toruń campus, and the main designers of individual buildings – Marek Różański (the NCU Rector’s building [rektorat] and the university’s main lecture theatre [aula], Witold Benedek (the library), Józef Łucki (the Institute of Chemistry, from June 1969 Andrzej Jaworski), Bogdan Popławski (the Faculty of Biology and Earth Sci-ences (BiNoZ)), Wincenty Szober (student dormitories, hotels for assistant lectur-ers, the canteen), Zenon Buczkowski (the medical centre), as well as some auxil-iary designers of architecture and urban planning33. Later, more workers joined the laboratory. Cooperation began with other laboratories within the polytechnic: Laboratory S-99 dealing with construction (Jerzy Teliga), S-125 dealing with in-stallations (Józef Kozierski), S-43 dealing with the fi nancing and organization of the construction (Tadeusz Pałaszewski). Toruń’s branch of the Laboratory of Plas-tic Arts was made responsible for the preparation of the interior design34.

During the period of 1 April – 31 July 1964 the Department of the Bases for the Construction of Cities in the Institute of Architecture of Warsaw Polytechnic prepared the General planning of the future extension of Toruń’s university35. In May 1965 three options for the spatial layout of the university were presented36.

Th e fi rst option was based on the concept of a homogeneously shaped complex with clear functional divisions. Buildings with scientifi c-academic purposes and

31 R. Karłowicz, op.cit., p. 18.32 Koncepcja budowy miasteczka uniwersyteckiego w Toruniu, red. B. Popławski, Toruń 1965, p. 2.33 R. Karłowicz, W. Szober, Organizacja prac projektowych i naukowo-badawczych, [in:] Uniwer-

sytet Mikołaja Kopernika. Projekt i realizacja, p. 111.34 Budowa miasteczka uniwersyteckiego w Toruniu, red. B. Popławski, Toruń 1970, p. 2.35 M. Rożański, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Architektura, R. 25: 1971, nr 8,

p. 201.36 Resolution of the Council of Ministers no 224 of 29 July 1964 about economic progress in

nationalized economy and the Directive of the Head of the Committee for Planning at the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Construction and the Industry of Building Materials of 30 July 1965 about designing investments. Resolution of the Council of Ministers no 224 of 29 July 1964 about economic progress in nationalized economy and the Directive of the Head of the Committee for Planning at the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Construction and the Industry of Building Materials of 30 July 1965 about designing investments.



residential-social buildings were grouped along axes running at right angles. Along the north-east line they planned to erect the buildings of Chemistry, Biology and Earth Sciences, Physics and Mathematics, Astronomy, Law, Economic, Humani-ties and Fine Arts; along the east-west axis student dormitories, assistant lecturers’ hotels and public utility buildings such as student clubs, a gym, a health centre with a semi-sanatorium were to be erected. Both axes constituting the functional core of the design were connected with the buildings of the library, the NCU Rector’s build-ing and the university’s main lecture theatre [aula] – the centre of the university in the scientifi c, administrative and cultural sense. In the north-east part, among the greenery, there was to be a site for the recreational zone – a stadium, a football pitch and a swimming pool. In the second option student dormitories were moved west-wards giving space to some faculties. Th e central complex was placed in the east. In the third option the complex of student dormitories was moved northwards, which created space for the Faculty of Biology and Earth Scien ces.

What all the three options had in common was the principle of separating lanes for pedestrians from streets used by cars. Th e main car parks and bus stops were planned to surround the whole complex; however, it would still be possible to enter the complex in a vehicle in case of an emergency. Th e second and third options were inferior to the fi rst one in terms of functionality, as their role was to emphasize the positive aspects of the fi rst option and to stress that the fi rst option was the right choice 37. Changes introduced in the second and third options led to collisions among the buildings and generated additional costs connected with laying power lines and cutting down more trees. Th e main positive aspect of the fi rst concept was the division of functions into two groups – axes, which were at the same time connected with the central complex, which was to provide optimal functionality and cost-eff ectiveness.

In the years 1964–1967 the concept underwent a few stages determined by the rules and regulations concerning the preparation of the investment. In 1964 a draft concept was developed, and in the years 1965–1966 the so-called fi nal urban-plan-ning design of the development of the university was prepared and was approved in 1967. Moreover, it was necessary to draw preliminary designs and technical working designs for each building. It was assumed that all the required documen-tation would have been prepared by 1968.

Corrections introduced in the years 1964–1967 consisted in improving the de-sign in terms of its functionality, cost-eff ectiveness and esthetics38. A major change occurred in 1965 and it consisted in the centralization of the general spatial con-cept through the introduction of a clear lane perpendicular to the academic-sci-entifi c axes. It modifi ed the original concept in which residential-social buildings were to constitute an accidental combination of freely arranged buildings. Th e

37 R. Karłowicz, op.cit., p. 19.38 Comp. i.a. Budowa miasteczka, passim; Koncepcja budowy, passim; Projekt Uniwersytetu

Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, red. B. Popławski, Warszawa–Toruń 1967, passim.



medical centre with its semi-sanatorium was moved into the green spaces, which improved its functionality (healthy environment). In 1967, the homogenous stu-dent dormitory buildings were replaced by two types of buildings – low-rise and high-rise. Th is solution, based on the patterns used in the construction of housing estate areas, allowed a greater diversifi cation in the residential area. Th e modifi ca-tions in the central part and in the academic-scientifi c zone were directed mainly to enhance the functionality of individual buildings, particularly the faculties, the NCU Rector’s building and the main lecture theatre [aula].

Owing to the magnitude of the investment, the erection of the campus was divided into three stages: 1967–1970, 1971–1975 and 1976–1980. Nevertheless, it did not refl ect reality since the fi nal year was in fact 1973. Th e division of the process into three fi ve-year periods was determined by the budgeting policy of the country. Th e works were organized in such a way so as to create the whole complex from a functional point of view – so that the university had all the elements neces-sary to function properly such as the general university buildings (the NCU Rec-tor’s building, the library), scientifi c-academic (the Complex of the Departments of Chemistry, the Faculty of Biology and Earth Sciences) and the residential-social buildings (student dormitories, assistant lecturers’ hotels, the canteen, gyms, the medical centre). Th e dividing line marked by the year 1970 had only fi nancial and formal signifi cance. It was also possible to divide the construction of individual buildings into stages, which was actually applied in case of the buildings of the Faculty of Biology and the Faculty of Chemistry. It was assumed that by 1970 they would have completed the fi rst stage of the construction process without the scien-tifi c-research base. Th e land development plan of 1967 provided for the following deadlines for individual stages of the construction process – 1973, 1980 and aft er 198039. Th us, despite the formal arrangements, the period 1967–1973 should be treated as the fi rst stage of the construction process.

Th e socialist red tape meant that prior to receiving approval, the design of the extension of NCU had to be scrutinized by a number of committees. On 10 May 1965 it was approved by the main architect of the voivodeship40. On 22 June 1965 in Warsaw the fi rst option was chosen as the architectural solution for the con-struction of the campus at the meeting of the representatives of the Department of Investment in the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MOiSzW) and the Department of Construction, Urban Planning and Architecture in the Voivodeship’s National Council in Bydgoszcz41. On 9 October the design was ap-proved by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MOiSzW). On 12 October the university senate approved the General Principles of the Investment and Development of Nicolaus Copernicus University in the years 1966–1980 and

39 Projekt Uniwersytetu, p. 9.40 AUMK, AZISW, Generalne założenia inwestycji rozwoju Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika

w Toruniu w latach 1966–1980, sygn. ZI 16/53, p. 195 (1965).41 R. Karłowicz, op.cit., p. 19.



it sent the document to the Ministry for further approval. Th e Board for Invest-ments of Higher Education (ZISW) was established in Toruń, which was respon-sible for preparing all the stages of the documentation such as technical-economic principles, preliminary designs and working designs, providing furniture and equipment. Prof. Witold Łukaszewicz, the university’s president from 1965, ap-pointed the so-called senior-constructors – experts responsible for the preparation of technical-economic principles for individual buildings. Th e senior constructor of the whole construction project was the university’s ex-president A. Swinarski, while the senior constructors of individual buildings were: Prof. Ernest Pischinger (the Chemistry Departmental Complex, from 1967 Henryk Koneczny), Prof. Józef Mikulski (the Faculty of Biology and Natural Sciences), Maria Puciatowa (librar-ian) the university’s president W. Łukaszewicz (residential buildings), Dr. Jadwiga Sylwestrowicz (the medical centre), Zdzisław Marzec (the canteen), and the direc-tor S. Staniszewski (the NCU Rector’s building and the university’s main lecture theatre [aula])42. Th e general principles for the investment and development of NCU were approved on 29 September 1966. On 28 February 1967 the project was approved by the Committee for the Evaluation of Investment Projects of the Min-istry of Education and the Committee for Urban Planning and Architecture in the Bydgoszcz voivodeship and the city of Toruń43.

Th is complicated chain of procedures resulted from the fact that the role of “in-vestor” in the socialist system was reduced to organizing design works and their re-alization, whereas decisions concerning the launch of the investment, its scope and fi nancial resources allocated to it were the responsibility of the central government. Aft er a long time, the decision was fi nally made on 23 March 1967 by the Council of Ministers in resolution no 57/67, on the strength of which the construction of the university campus was combined with the celebration of the 500th anniversary of Nicolaus Copernicus’ birthday. Moreover, the fi rst stage of the university’s exten-sion was approved and 215 million zlotys was allocated for this aim44.

Undoubtedly, the approval of Toruń’s investment issued by the central authori-ties must have been connected with the program for the celebration of Nicolaus Copernicus’ anniversary. It is highly probable that the campus would not have been erected had it not been for this prestigious anniversary. Nevertheless, the personal involvement of the university authorities played a major role as well, for in the socialist system obtaining resources for investments of such magnitude also required many unoffi cial manoevres. Moreover, although the local authori-ties of Toruń accepted the extension of the university, Bydgoszcz – the capital of

42 R. Karłowicz, W. Szober, op.cit., p. 113.43 R. Karłowicz, op.cit., p. 30.44 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 23 March 1967 (M. Pszczółkowski, Przegląd

piśmiennictwa do dziejów budowy campusu UMK, Rocznik Toruński, R. 32: 2005, p. 239; M. Kacz-marek, op.cit., p. 166). On the strength of the next resolution of the Council of Ministers no 132 of 2 July 1971 the second stage of the construction of the Institute of Chemistry and the technological hall were approved (J. Bełkot, op.cit., p. 59).



the voivodeship where major decisions were made – had its own academic ambi-tions and the construction of the campus was not at all in its interest45. Publica-tions made by the university’s employees reveal that the person who contributed enormously fi rst to the construction of the campus46 and then to its completion47 was the university’s president Witold Łukaszewicz. Th e rector maintained relations with the Polish United Workers’ Party, ministries and other central institutions (he was an MP during the years 1969–1975). He eff ectively used his contacts to pro-mote the idea of the campus as a permanent monument of the great astronomer. M. Kaczmarek, a former employee of the ministry, also used his contacts in unof-fi cial discussions48. Th anks to the real involvement and personal qualities of these people49, the design of the campus in Toruń was approved and completed.

Th e investment process started with the settlement of the property status of the area where the campus was to be built. In 1967 most of 82 hectares of the plot belonged to the city; some part was the property of the army. What is more, 3.75 hectares were occupied by allotments, and the rest belonged to the Railway Station Toruń Zachodni and the line leading up to “Merinotex” factory. Th e areas now occupied by the buildings of the Faculties of Chemistry and Economics used to belong to private owners (3.75 hectares). Th e city’s property was taken over on the strength of a notarial deed; the railway line was relocated, the railway station and the army’s equipment dismantled, and the rest of the land purchased from private owners. Th e procedures for dispossessing the private owners were most time-con-suming as they were connected with altering land registry entries and providing fl ats for the owners of the purchased areas50.

Th e construction of the campus in Bielany offi cially started on 9 May 1967. Th e cornerstone was laid in the south-west angle of the students’ dormitory no 7, the erection of which in fact had already begun on 18 April. Th e ceremony was attended by workers and students of NCU, the university’s senate, the representa-tives of the authorities of the voivodeship and the authorities of Toruń, and also guests from Italian universities connected with Nicolaus Copernicus such as An-gelo Baserga from Ferrara and Giuseppe Mannino from Bologna.

Th e construction works lasted over 5 years. Th e cost of the investment exceed-ed 540 million zlotys51, with 400 million zlotys coming from the resources pro-vided by the Council of Ministers. Th e remaining 140 million zlotys were obtained thanks to various agreements, i.e. some buildings of the Institute of Chemistry

45 S. Staniszewski, op.cit., p. 299.46 M. Kaczmarek, op.cit., p. 166; S. Kalembka, Witold Łukaszewicz (1911–1975), [in:] Toruńscy

twórcy nauki i kultury 1945–1985, red. M. Biskup, A. Giziński, Warszawa 1989, p. 204.47 J. Bełkot, op.cit., p. 61.48 M. Kaczmarek, op.cit., p. 166; S. Staniszewski, op.cit., p. 300.49 Comp. S. Szarewicz, H. Jakobczak, To już 35 lat, Głos Uczelni, R. 30: 1980, nr 3–4, p. 45.50 M. Kaczmarek, op.cit., p. 167.51 AUMK, Akta Wydziału Mat.-Fiz.-Chem. (further cit. AWMFCh), Plan rozwoju Uniwersytetu

Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu w latach 1976–1985, sygn. WM 54/5, p. 2 (1975).



and the technological hall were built with the money from the Ministry of Chemi-cal Industry in return for research works carried out on behalf of the ministry. Some resources were also obtained from the plant “Elana” and the Social Fund for the Reconstruction of the Capital City. Several dozen teams belonging to nine construction companies participated in the works, including independent teams of experts. Th e total capacity of the buildings was over 288,000 cubic metres, and the usable fl oor area amounted to 66,800 square metres. On 2 October 1973 the campus was opened by the representatives of the Polish United Workers’ Party and the Government of the People’s Republic of Poland52.

Th e building schedule was based on the so-called Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT). Th is method of planning, only applied previously in Poland in theory53, had been developed in the USA in 1957 for the needs of cos-mic projects. In time, PERT was used for civil purposes, i.e. in the realization of huge construction investments. Th e idea of PERT was based on the analysis of the so-called critical track of a given venture, in other words the sequence of activi-ties related to each other. Th is meant “counting backwards” all the stages of the planned investment to ensure that all the stages of the process be completed at the right time.

Th e network of connections was developed in the form of a linear sched-ule divided into three groups of basic tasks. Th e division resulted from the fact that there were two main executors: Bydgoskie Przedsiębiorstwo Budownictwa Przemysłowego (BPBP) and Toruńskie Przedsiębiorstwo Budownictwa Ogólnego (TPBO). Th e former was responsible for the construction of the academic build-ings (the executor BPBP, and the latter – the social and residential buildings as well as the NCU Rector’s building and the main lecture theatre [aula] (the executor TPBO). Th e third group was responsible for the laying of pipes, sewers and power lines (the executor BPBP). Owing to technological and organizational connections the fi rst two groups were harmonized with the third one in the graphic layout of the network. Next, the objectives for the completion of the investment were planned. In this way, a transparent schedule was created which was to coordinate and dictate the construction works54.

Such a precise schedule should have prevented problems typical of the socialist construction industry, the most frequent of which were delays. In the People’s Re-public of Poland the completion of an investment was very oft en prolonged, some-times reaching incredible magnitudes (i.e. the construction of the Forum Hotel in Cracow lasted 17 years). Sometimes investments were never completed, an exam-ple of which are the so-called Szkeletors (Skeletors) in Cracow or Bielsko-Biała.

52 M. Kaczmarek, op.cit., p. 167.53 Por. T. Pałaszewski, Ekonomiczne problemy realizacji zespołu obiektów wyższych uczelni, [in:]

Materiały z seminarium na temat budownictwa szkół wyższych (27–28 I 1966), red. B. Popławski, Warszawa 1966, p. 53.

54 T. Pałaszewski, Organizacja inwestycji wieloletnich na przykładzie budowy Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Przegląd Budowlany, R. 45: 1973, nr 11, p. 459.



Th e problems arose from the malfunction of the centrally planned economy: deci-sions made by the central authorities oft en came from unoffi cial arrangements and had little to do with real possibilities. Additional factors such as infl ation, person-nel changes, time wasting and wastage of material in construction sites, changing priorities, etc. also generated extra costs.

In the case of NCU keeping the deadlines was of the utmost importance. Th e Toruń campus was perceived as being the greatest government investment con-nected with the Copernicus anniversary. It was a prestigious investment of an in-ternational dimension. Th us, the works were expected to be completed on time.

On the basis of the comparative analysis of the schedule and the actual process of construction works we can notice that despite the fact that the works started early (a month aft er the investment was included in the programme of the celebra-tion of the Copernicus anniversary) and originally they were completed earlier than planned55, several delays occurred. Th e fi rst building – the complex of student dormitories no 7 and 8 – was to be completed by 15 August and 15 September re-spectively, as had been decreed in June56. In fact, they were completed respectively at the beginning of October57 and in November 196858, but not yet equipped with central heating59. Further delays were even more worrying. Th e construction of the student dormitory no 9, the completion of which was planned in October 196860 was prolonged by a year. Th e construction began on 14 May 1968 (despite the fact that the preliminary design had been approved on 28 July 1967), and was complet-ed at the beginning of December 1969, with the water and central heating system being installed only on the fi rst fi ve fl oors61. Th e construction of the canteen and the gym began on 10 November 1968, which meant almost a one-year delay. In mid-1969 the press wrote optimistically that “TPBO will complete the construc-tion of the canteen ahead of schedule – in a year”62; almost two years later , in April 1971, the canteen was yet to be completed63. In fact, all the works fi nished on 31 December 1971. Th e construction of the NCU Rector’s building, the main lecture theatre [aula], the library and the medical centre was to be launched in 1968; in November 1968 the press wrote about the plans to start the construction of the library and the NCU Rector’s building on time64. Nevertheless, the works started in March (the NCU Rector’s building and the library) and in September 1969 (the medical centre and the main lecture theatre –aula). In April 1971 it was reported

55 In 1967 the investment plan in terms of expenditure was completed in 150% , and in terms of construction works in 115% (Aby zdążyć na czas, Nowości, R. 2: 1968, nr 48, p. 1).

56 Wyścig z czasem na Bielanach, ibid., nr 146, p. 2.57 D. Ciesielska, Dzień powszedni w „leśniczówce” na Bielanach, ibid., nr 238, p. 3.58 Drugi dom studencki w „leśniczowce” na Bielanach, ibid., nr 268, p. 1.59 D. Ciesielska, op.cit., p. 3.60 Wyścig z czasem, p. 2.61 Przeprowadzka na Bielany, ibid., R. 3: 1969, nr 284, s. 3.62 Rosną mury reprezentacyjnych budynków UMK, ibid., nr 193, p. 2.63 W kwietniu – stołówka, ibid., R. 5: 1971, nr 85, p. 1.64 Drugi dom studencki w „leśniczówce” na Bielanach, p. 1.



that the NCU Rector’s building was to be completed at the turn of the third and fourth quarter of 197165, while three months later the press wrote about the fourth quarter66. In fact, the works fi nished on 31 December 1971. Th e completion of the medical centre, planned in July 1971, was postponed to the beginning of 197267, but in fact it took place on 30 March 1972. Th e construction of the main lecture theater [aula] was considerably prolonged. Th e works started in the autumn of 1969, but the steel skeleton was installed in July 197168. In September the construc-tion of the aula was promised to be completed by 30 November, and the library by the end of October69, but both buildings were fi nished on 31 December 1972. Th e construction of the second hotel for assistant lecturers began in April 1969, of the building of the Institute of Chemistry in May 1969, and of the building of the Faculty and Natural Sciences in September 1969 – which means earlier than it was planned. However, it did not prevent a few months’ delay: in March 1972 it was reported that the buildings of the Institute of Chemistry and the Faculty of Biology and Natural Sciences were to be completed respectively on 31 July and 30 October70, but in fact the completion took place on 31 December 1972 and 30 September 1973.

Th e zenith of delays occurred in the middle of the construction process. In 1969 only 4.2% of the planned cubic capacity was completed, and in 1970 – only 2.6%71. In 1971 the situation improved, but by June still less than 40 % of the sched-uled works had been completed72. Th e delay was not a secret. Th e problem was touched upon in the press73. W. Łukaszewicz in his inauguration speech in 1968 admonished the designers and the construction companied for “the signifi cant dif-fi culties which disrupted the correlation between what was planned in the docu-mentation and what was actually completed”74. According to the president of the university the construction companies were to blame75. Th e central authorities were also concerned with the delay; the construction site was visited by the sec-retary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (KC PZPR) Józef Tejchma (10 June 1970)76 and the minister of Science and Higher Education

65 W kwietniu – stołówka, p. 2.66 W tym roku oddanie do użytku gmachu rektoratu, ibid., R. 5: 1971, nr 171, p. 1.67 Ibid.68 Trwa montaż wielkiej auli uniwersyteckiej na Bielanach, ibid., nr 186, p. 1.69 Pomyślnie przebiega budowa miasteczka bielańskiego, ibid., R. 6: 1972, nr 222, p. 1.70 Budowniczowie osiedla akademickiego zwiększyli tempo prac, ibid., nr 58, p. 1.71 W. Bartkowiak, A. Chojnacki, H. Jaskólski, R. Malejka, Rozbudowa Uniwersytetu Mikołaja

Kopernika w Toruniu w latach 1967–1973, Przegląd Budowlany, R. 45: 1973, nr 11, p. 468.72 W tym roku oddanie do użytku gmachu rektoratu, Nowości, R. 5: 1971, nr 171, p. 1.73 Comp.i.e. W przededniu nowego roku akademickiego, ibid., R. 4: 1970, nr 224, p. 1–2.74 Gaudeamus w toruńskiej uczelni, ibid., R. 2: 1968, nr 239, s. 1; por. H. Galus, Hołd – uczonemu,

szansa – miastu, ibid., nr 259, p. 3.75 5 tysięcy studentów na UMK, ibid., R. 5: 1971, nr 227, p. 1.76 Józef Tejchma w województwie bydgoskim, ibid., R. 4: 1970, nr 135, p. 1.



Henryk Jabłoński (9 July 1970)77. In March 1971 the Council for the Construction of the Academic Estate was established, the role of which was to monitor the cor-rect completion of the investment78. In June a meeting took place during which it was concluded that more teams of workers should be involved in the completion of the project79. In November 1971 the chief engineer of BPBP received an order from the Polish United Workers’ Party to fi nish the construction of the Rector’s building by the end of the year under threat of losing his job80. All these measures turned out to be eff ective: 300,000 zlotys’ worth of construction works were made every day81. Th anks to this, 47.6% of the whole plan was completed82.

Th ere were many causes of the delays. First, the investment had begun with-out complete preparation. Due to prolonged procedures the works were commis-sioned later than planned (i.e. the commission to prepare the design of the library – 21 July 196683), which resulted in the fact that the documentation of individual buildings was not ready on time: preliminary designs, planned to be completed during the years 1966–1967 were in fact carried out in the period of July 1967 – January 1969, which caused alterations to the schedule. Th e whole construc-tion site was not ready on time. In 1970 the question of dismantling the railway siding still remained unsettled84. Longer intervals in construction works occurred from to time: on 29 May 1969 the head of ZISW wrote to BPBP requesting him to intervene in connection with the break in the construction works of one month and a half (student dormitory no 9)85. Th is is what R. Karłowicz wrote about the construction process of the aula in November 1971: “Th ere was no work on the construction site for three summer months. Th e debates about the manner of re-moving underground water lasted one year and a half […] despite the fact that de-cisions concerning this matter were made in July 1970, no work was done through-out all of 1971”86. Th e team of designers was also to blame, for they did not visit Toruń frequently enough to supervise the construction process, which led to de-lays87. Nevertheless, the most important reason for the delays were decisions made

77 Minister Henryk Jabłoński wśród studentów odbywających praktyki robotnicze, ibid., nr 159, p. 1.78 W kwietniu – stołówka, p. 2.79 W tym roku, p. 1.80 AUMK, AZISW, Korespondencja w sprawie realizacji Osiedla Akademickiego na obchody ko-

pernikańskie 1971–1973, Notatka z narady KW PZPR w dn. 19 XI 1971, sygn. ZI 16/79, p. 1 (1971).81 Budowniczowie osiedla, p. 1.82 W. Bartkowiak, A. Chojnacki, H. Jaskólski, R. Malejka, op.cit., p. 468.83 AUMK, AZISW, Projekt koncepcyjny architektury budynku biblioteki głównej Uniwersytetu

Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu (wersja A), sygn. ZI 1/4, p. 3 (1967).84 Osiedle Fałata, p. 1.85 AUMK, AZISW, Plany i sprawozdania z realizacji budowy osiedla „Bielany”, pismo z dnia 29 V

1969 r., sygn. ZI 16/80 (1969).86 Ibid., Korespondencja w sprawie realizacji Osiedla Akademickiego na obchody kopernikańskie

1971–1973, pismo z dnia 23 XI 1971 r., sygn. ZI 16/79 (1971).87 Ibid., Plany i sprawozdania z realizacji budowy osiedla „Bielany”, pismo z dnia 26 XI 1971 r.,

sygn. ZI 16/80 (1971).



at the central level. In 1969 Th e Party-Government Committee verifi ed the project, reducing the investment plan by almost 5 million zlotys; in 1970 no construction works were undertaken as the ministry had failed to include the task of building the two faculties in the plan for 197088. What is mote TPBP became involved in the construction of a plant in the complex of “Elana” (July- August 1970), which meant that now there were not enough workers to continue the investment in Bie-lany. Th e phenomena resulted from the specifi city of the political system of that time, a feature of which was to make decisions to begin investments without hav-ing fi rst checked the capacity of construction companies. Th e press informed that other investments carried out by TPBO at that time were also delayed. Th e delay in the construction of the City Hospital resulted in the loss of 2.6 million zlotys, whereas the delays connected with the erection of the Chemical Technical College entailed the loss of about 4 million zlotys89. Moreover, the main executors were not specialized in building campuses – BPBP dealt mainly with the construction of industrial plants while TPBO “had even less experience and capacity”90.

Delays resulted from the insuffi cient production potential of the construction companies. When the deadline was close, the pace of work increased, which af-fected the quality. As R. Karłowicz wrote in his letter to ZISW: “the executor makes the user and the designer accept any outcome of work, be it good or bad”91. In the socialist system the common belief was that the newly-built “must” contain some faults92. In Bielany it concerned mainly residential buildings (students dormitories, hotels for assistant lecturers, the canteen93.

Another important reason for the delays were diffi culties in getting building materials. Th e delay in 1968 was caused by the lack of appropriate cables94. While building the canteen there were not enough ventilators95, and there was a shortage of cement96 and aluminium97. To save money, more costly elements of equipment

88 Ibid., Informacja dotycząca rozbudowy Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu za rok 1970, sygn. ZI 16/80, p. 2 (1971).

89 Trzeba nadrobić ubiegłoroczne opóźnienia, Nowości, R. 5: 1971, nr 6, p. 3.90 R. Karłowicz, Organizacja inwestycji, [in:] Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika. Projekt i realiza-

cja, p. 122.91 AUMK, AZISW, Korespondencja w sprawie realizacji Osiedla Akademickiego na obchody

kopernikańskie 1971–1973, pismo doc. Karłowicza z dnia 12 I 1973 r., sygn. ZI 16/79 (1973 r.).92 Comp. i.e. D. Ciesielska, op.cit., p. 3: „przez zacinające się (bo nowe!) drzwi wchodzimy do

pokoju” (“we enter the room through the door which is jammed (just because it is new!)”.93 Comp. the remarks in: W. Łukaszewicz, Srebrny jubileusz Almae Matris Copernicanae (1945–

–1970), Rocznik Toruński, R. 7: 1972, p. 17; W przededniu nowego roku akademickiego, Nowości, R. 4: 1970, nr 224, p. 2.

94 Aby zdążyć, p. 2.95 AUMK, AZISW, Plany i sprawozdania z realizacji budowy osiedla „Bielany”, Informacja

dotycząca rozbudowy Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu za rok 1970, sygn. ZI 16/80 (1971 r.), p. 2.

96 Na Bielanach w budowie stołówka i nowy dom studencki, Nowości, R. 2: 1968, nr 129, p. 1.97 W tym roku, p. 1.



were rejected98, which, as Karłowicz put it, resulted from pathological adminis-trative structures of socialist Poland: “struggling with organization diffi culties, pathetic scenes at meetings of the Committee for the Evaluation of Investment Projects (KOPI) and during talks with the investor and executors, who approved unfi nished buildings and the most irrational cost-cutting measures just to satisfy their desire to get a bonus. One could write an epic about exaggerated expenses on easy and quick investments, unrealistic deadlines and incredible eff orts of teams of designers to ensure the appropriate construction process”99. Th e incidences of building material theft from the construction site was an additional negative factor causing delays and aff ecting the quality of the work100.

To recapitulate, the divergences between the schedule and the factual com-pletion of the campus resulted from one major factor – the administrative and economic pathology of socialist Poland. Allegations that could be directed at the team of designers (delays in the preparation of the investment documentation) or the executors (low quality) were consequences of the political system. It was the specifi city of the political system that caused the ineff ectiveness of the construc-tion plan despite the application of the PERT method.

Th e question arises: whether the decision to use the western method of plan-ning, suitable for the western reality101, was at all appropriate. Th e answer should be affi rmative as the network of connections allowed the creation of a certain frame of reference which made it possible to judge the situation and reactions in case of problems. It is true that the reactions were typically socialist: they consisted in involving students in the construction of the campus. Students were employed to do simple tasks such as digging the ground or cleaning. Th e Action “Kopernik” belonged to the most famous ventures of this type. Th anks to the cooperation of OHP (Volunteer Labour Troops) and Związek Młodzieży Wiejskiej (the Associa-tion of the Rural Youth) students from Poland and abroad (in total about 1,000 people) took part in the construction works in Bielany102. As a result, the construc-tion process proceeded. Within the period of fi ve years thirteen buildings were

98 Comp. i.a. AUMK, AZISW, Korespondencja w sprawie realizacji Osiedla Akademickiego na obchody kopernikańskie 1971–1973, pisma doc. Karłowicza z dnia 23 XI 1971 i 11 IX 1972 r., sygn. ZI 16/79 (1971, 1972 r.).

99 R. Karłowicz, Projekt, który dał satysfakcję, Architektura, R. 27: 1973, nr 7, p. 269.100 Comp. i.a. AUMK, AZISW, Korespondencja w sprawie realizacji Osiedla Akademickiego na

obchody kopernikańskie 1971–1973, telegram dyrektora BPIP „Binstal” z dnia 10 VIII 1976 r., sygn. ZI 16/79 (1976 r.): “in building B [the Complex of the Departments of Chemistry –M. P.] much labo-ratory equipment was missing (it was stolen) [...] we won’t even be able to purchase elements of the stolen laboratory furniture as many essential accessories are also missing”.

101 It turned out that it was impossible to do construction works according to the schedule as the cycles of the construction process established by the PERT system were much shorter than the cycles set by the legal norms (T. Pałaszewski, Organizacja inwestycji, p. 463).

102 Akcja „Kopernik”, Nowości, R. 3: 1969, nr 150, p. 1; Studenci pracują na Bielanach, ibid., nr 165, s. 2; W czynie Kopernikowi, ibid., nr 180, p. 2; Kryptonim Kopernik, ibid., nr 191, s. 3; Bielany dziełem studenckich rąk, ibid., nr 263, p. 1.



completed; the whole legal documentation was ready, the two-stage investment documentation was compiled, installation works were completed, full equipment and all the furniture was provided. Moreover, installations were laid underground; the network of streets, squares and pavements was completed, the area of 45 hec-tares was provided with appropriate lighting and greenery spaces – all this accord-ing to the design plan and schedule.

Th e completion of the campus dramatically changed the image of the univer-sity. “Th anks to it, the university became a more stable institution. Before, it was just an improvised arrangement which could be terminated at any time”103. Un-doubtedly, the whole venture would not have taken place had it not been for the Copernicus anniversary. Although “it would be a mistake to think that the 500th anniversary of Nicolaus Copernicus’ birthday was the only reason for the comple-tion of the university under his name”104, this argument, always given somehow casually105, turned out to be decisive.. Aft er the anniversary celebrations fi nished, the investment works were gradually reduced.

According to the schedule approved in the 1960s which corresponded the so-called ‘fi ve-year plans” (pięciolatki), the work within the fi rst stage of the construc-tion process were completed in 1975 although the resources had diminished and the pace of work had fallen off . Th anks to the resources reserved for the period 1971–1975 the second stage of the building of the Institute of Chemistry with the technological hall and two student dormitories were completed. Th e second stage of the construction of the building of the Faculty of Biology and Natural Sciences was moved to the period 1976–1980 (originally planned to be completed in the period 1973–1975). Although such delays were partly justifi ed by the creation of a new faculty – Satellite Geophysics106 – it was already known that the extension of NCU had lost its prestigious character for the central authorities. At the same time, the investment needs of other universities increased, the number of which was growing due to the social pressure of having more colleges107.

Despite the unfavourable predictions for the future, the completion of other faculties and residential buildings was planned for the next two “fi ve-year-peri-ods” of (1976–1980 and 1981–1985)108. Th e biggest investments were divided into so-called tasks, which was to ensure the distribution of costs for a longer period

103 J. Serczyk, Minęło życie, Toruń 1999, s. 87.104 R. Karłowicz, Architektura szkół wyższych, Człowiek i Nauka, R. 5: 1975, p. 277.105 Por. idem, Koncepcja, p. 16.106 AUMK, AWMFCh, Plan rozwoju Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu w latach

1976–1985, sygn. WM 54/5, p. 13, 21 (1974); por. ibid., Projekt potrzeb inwestycyjnych Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu w latach 1974–1975 oraz 1976–1980, sygn. WM 54/3, passim.

107 More about it in i.a. R. Bohr, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w latach 1966–1980, [in:] Uni-wersytet Mikołaja Kopernika 1966–1980, vol. 1, red. J. Bełkot, Toruń 1992, p. 33; M. Rożański, Uni-wersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu. II etap rozbudowy uniwersytetu, Studia + Projekty, R. 2: 1978, p. 95–105.

108 AUMK, AWMFCh, Plan rozwoju Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu w latach 1976–1985, sygn. WM 54/5, s. 7; comp. M. Pszczółkowski, op.cit., p. 243.



of time and guarantee the continuation of the investment when the budget for the next “fi ve-year-period” was being prepared. In 1976 the project of the second stage was modifi ed, which resulted from the correction of the general layout of the city and moving an A road northwards, which gave the university an addi-tional 30 hectares and created new prospects for development109. Unfortunately, out of seventeen buildings included in the plan, only one was completed – a club. M. Kaczmarek turned out to be a false prophet saying in 1972: “it would be illogi-cal to stop at this point, but there are many “friendly” people saying: ‘wait until the anniversary ceremonies fi nish...’ Aft er all, all the installation has already been laid, so now the only thing to do is to erect buildings”110. At the end of 1978 the Board for Investments of Higher Education (ZISW) in Toruń was dissolved.

Th e campus of NCU is one the best examples showing how architects in the People’s Republic of Poland did their best to maintain the quality and ensure func-tionality and esthetics despite the technical and economic conditions of the time. Th e spatial solution of the fi rst stage of the construction process was an original concept ensuring optimal functionality and based on characteristic design trends in Western Europe in the fi rst two decades aft er WWII. Each stage of the proc-ess fi nished with the completion of one complex of buildings which constituted a uniform whole. It was important to complete general university buildings, some academic buildings and social complexes in the fi rst stage of the process as it was rightly expected that the resources for the investment would diminish when the ceremonies of the Copernicus anniversary fi nished. Th anks to it, the fi rst univer-sity campus – a uniform complex in a new area comprising all the functions of the institution – was created in Poland.


109 M. Różański, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu. II etap, p. 95.110 M. Machnicki, Bielany, Zwierciadło, R. 16: 1972, nr 27, p. 4–5.


LIST OF AUTHORS OF BOOK 2

Dariusz K. Chojecki, PhD, Institute of History and International Relations, Szczecin Uni-versity, [email protected]

Sławomir Jóźwiak, dr hab., prof. UMK, Instytut Historii i Archiwistyki Uniwersytetu Mi-kołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, [email protected]

Krzysztof Kwiatkowski, dr, Instytut Historii i Archiwistyki Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Koper-nika w Toruniu, [email protected]

Živilė Mikailienė, mgr, doktorantka, Lietuvos istorijos institutas Vilnius (Litwa), ztamkutony [email protected]

Alvydas Nikžentaitis, prof. dr, Lietuvos istorijos institutas Vilnius (Litwa), [email protected]

Michał Pszczółkowski, dr, Muzeum Okręgowe im. Leona Wyczółkowskiego w Bydgoszczy, [email protected]

Adam Szweda, dr hab., Instytut Historii i Archiwistyki Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, [email protected]

Sobiesław Szybkowski, dr hab., Wydział Historyczny Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, [email protected]

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