Religious actors as epistemic communities in conflict transformation: the cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland

Religious actors as epistemic communities inconflict transformation: the cases of SouthAfrica and Northern IrelandNUKHET AHU SANDAL*

Abstract. With the increasing influence of theocrats and other religious actors onpolicymakers and masses, recognising the agency of the clergy is crucial. This article uses the‘epistemic communities’ framework to place the religious ‘agents’ in contemporary politicsand it shows how hermeneutics can be treated as a form of ‘episteme’. Until recently, thisframework has been used to explain how scientific communities affect policymaking. Usingthe cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland, this article claims that religious actors,especially with their shared set of normative and principled beliefs as well as shared normsof validity, also meet the requirements of the epistemic community category. Theemployment of this established IR framework in theorising religious politics has thepotential to shed light not only on peacebuilding and mediation, but also violent movementsand terrorist organisations that use religion as justification.

Nukhet Ahu Sandal is a Visiting Fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies,Brown University where she teaches Religion and Global Politics. She is the author ofarticles on public theologies of governance; religion and International Relations theory; andcrisis decision-making. Nukhet can be contacted at: {[email protected]}.

The role of religion and religious actors in conflict transformation, as an area ofacademic investigation, is relatively new to the study of Comparative Politics andInternational Relations (IR). It may be argued that faith-related issues have alwaysbeen under the lens of political theorists but even a cursory glance at the prominentIR journals shows that this has not been the case, at least not until recently.1 Given

* I am grateful to Emanuel Adler, Laurie Brand, Mai’a Davis-Cross, Jonathan Fox, ThomasGoodnight, Jeffrey Haynes, Patrick James, Michael Kennedy, Neophytos Loizides, Daniel Philpottand the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the earlier versions of this article.

1 David Carment and Patrick James, ‘The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict: New Perspectiveson Theory and Policy’, Global Society, 11:2 (1997), pp. 205–32; Daniel Philpott ‘The Religious Rootsof Modern International Relations’, World Politics, 52 (2000), pp. 206–45; Scott Thomas, ‘TakingReligious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transfor-mation of International Society’, Millennium, 29:3 (2000), pp. 815–84; Daniel Philpott, Revolutionsin Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 2001); Brian Walker, ‘Religion and politics: The Case of Northern Ireland’, Peace and ConflictStudies, 14:2 (2007), pp. 74–92; Eva Bellin, ‘Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religionand World Politics’, World Politics, 60:2 (2008), pp. 315–47; Nukhet Sandal and Patrick James,‘Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding’, forthcoming inEuropean Journal of International Relations.

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the absence of religion and clergy – broadly defined to include all faith leaders –in the mainstream IR and Political Theory of the Cold War years, it remains achallenge to find the appropriate tools and frameworks that would accommodatethese phenomena in the 21st century. The religious dimension of the conflictsettings like Israel/Palestine, Rwanda, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and India/Pakistanrequires policymakers and academics to devise ways that can identify the channelsthe clerics can play a constructive role.

This article is an attempt to meet such a challenge, and adapt one of theinfluential frameworks of agency to the study of religious actors in dividedsocieties. Due to space restrictions, the article focuses on one religious tradition –Christianity – but this is not to say that the leaders of other religions are outsideof the theoretical scope. The proposed framework of religious actors has a widerapplicability to the other faith traditions than the ones which have been developed.For example, Jelen introduced a useful framework of clergy in a democraticpolitical culture by using the cases of Roman Catholicism, mainline Protestantismand evangelical Protestantism in American politics.2 His investigation and results,however, were not generalisable to divided societies or other traditions which donot have the same institutional structures as Christianity. Fawcett took anadditional step by investigating the Presbyterian Church of Ireland and the DutchReformed Church in South Africa.3 She concluded that the churches try to adaptto the existing political discourses in order not to be isolated. The EpistemicCommunities framework proposed in this article has a wider extension than thesetheories of Christian institutions and clergy. I argue that the religious epistemiccommunities, who can be members of any religion, show a high level of agency,influencing the politics of the divided societies, rather than being just ‘adaptors’ tochange as Fawcett proposed. The framework itself is not specific to certainchurches or societies; it is generalisable yet it is parsimonious. Undoubtedly, themechanisms elaborated in this article may not exactly fit to the traditions andinstitutional structures of all religions, but they constitute a useful blueprint for theexplanation of the role of religious actors in a wider array of conflict settings.

By using the cases of the churches’ role in the dismantlement of Apartheid inSouth Africa and the facilitating role of the faith leaders in the peace process thatculminated in the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, I argue that therole of religious actors in today’s political scene and conflict settings qualifies themas an ‘epistemic community’, primarily due to their high level of expertise, statusin the society and shared norms of validity. The Epistemic Communities approachhas mostly been used to explain the influence of scientists on the decision-makersin the Cold War era but it constitutes a useful framework to investigate theinfluence of the religious actors in conflict transformation. The two cases areselected because they are sufficiently similar in that they both came to a state ofrelative stability, became models in conflict-transformation in the internationalarena and the religious actors played a significant role in both cases, influencing thepolitical decision-making leading to the conflict transformation. At the same time,they are sufficiently different in terms of their characteristics; the case of Apartheid

2 Ted Jelen, The Political World of the Clergy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993).3 Liz Fawcett, Religion, Ethnicity and Social Change (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).

930 Nukhet Ahu Sandal

in South Africa is characterised as a racial conflict and the situation in NorthernIreland as an ethnic or class conflict.4 In the South Africa case, we see the debateswithin the Protestant Churches and in the Northern Ireland case the CatholicChurch is added to the equation. The two cases have already been subject toin-depth comparative investigations. In his comparison of the Calvinist theology inNorthern Ireland and South Africa, Bruce argued that outside pressures and threatperceptions of the settlers led to the continuation and at times, amplification of adistinctive body of imagery for both the settler community and the nativepopulation.5 In a similar vein, Akenson drew attention to the common behaviourpatterns of what he called ‘covenantal cultures’ (people who see themselves aschosen in divine terms) of the Afrikaners and the Ulster-Scots along with theIsraelis.6

Brewer states that in both South Africa and Northern Ireland cases, meaningof belonging to a group (including religious affiliation) was understood ‘mostly interms of its political and constitutional stance rather than its theology’ although healso concedes that there are many – especially in Northern Ireland – for whomthere is still theological meaning in the conflict.7 Even the view that religion playedthe role of being a political and constitutional boundary marker implies that it wasone of the key dimensions in the conflict. This does not mean that religious leaders‘solved’ these conflicts or their involvement is the only explanation for conflicttransformation. However, the roles these actors played in the process warrants anacknowledgement by the help of a systematical framework. The investigation of therole of religious actors in these two contexts has the potential to shed light on theconflict situations which have not come to a state of stability yet but containenough space for faith leaders to play a role in the transformation of the violentsettings.

Given that the status of religion has already been proposed as a model for thestate’s relation to science in the past and science has been defined as ‘anothersystem of beliefs to which [we] are committed’,8 taking the reverse step of adaptingmodels of scientific agency to religious actors does not go against the philosophicalunderpinnings of Epistemic Communities approach. Especially given that a numberof empirical studies have been published regarding the role of religion in conflict

4 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (Oxford: WileyBlackwell, 1995), pp. 354–55; David J. Smith and Gerald Chambers, Inequality in Northern Ireland(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). The nature of the conflict in Northern Ireland is admittedlyless clear-cut than in the South African case. For an in-depth treatment of the issue, see PamelaClayton, ‘Religion, Ethnicity and Colonialism as Explanations of the Conflict in Northern Ireland’,in David Miller (ed.), Rethinking Northern Ireland (London: Longman, 1998), pp. 40–54; ColinCoulter, Contemporary Northern Irish Society: An Introduction (London: Pluto Press, 1999). For theargument that the nature of the conflict was religious, see John Hickey, Religion and the NorthernIreland Question (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1984).

5 Steve Bruce, Conservative Protestant Politics (NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 49–54.6 Donald H. Akenson, God’s Peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel and Ulster (Ithaca,

NY: Cornell University Press, 1992).7 John D. Brewer, ‘Peacemaking among Protestants and Catholics’, in Mary Ann Cejka and Thomas

Bamat (eds), Artisans of Peace: Grassroots Peacemaking among Christian Communities (Maryknoll,NY: Orbis Books, 2003), pp. 48–9.

8 Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1946); MichaelPolanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy (London: Routledge & K. Paul,1958), p. 171.

Religious actors as epistemic communities 931

transformation and the activities of the faith leaders,9 the scholars of InternationalRelations and Political Science must start considering theoretical frameworks thatcan accommodate the relevant data. This consideration will also be a step towardsdeveloping transnational theories of order and change, extending beyond theconventional theories of war and peace.10

Epistemic communities as a framework

Episteme stands for ‘knowledge’ or ‘science’ in Greek. It is more theoreticalknowledge in the form of agreed rules, standards and procedures rather thanpractical knowledge. The latter is conveyed by the word techne.11 In the philosophyliterature, any coherent body of special knowledge may qualify as episteme andthat body does not need to be in the realm of science proper as we understand ittoday. Hermeneutics, ‘designated as a body of knowledge that deals with under-standing what is said in a text’12 constitutes such a branch of special knowledgeand possesses significant epistemic functions by itself. In addition, the importanceaccorded to a specific area at a specific time period defines the classification ofknowledge as a relevant episteme and its permeation to practice. Adler notes thatdepending on the historical context, ‘theories and policy proposals that previouslydid not make much sense to politicians may suddenly acquire a political meaning,thus becoming viable’.13 It would not be an exaggeration to propose that, with theincreasing role of religion in the political realm and the questioning of thesecularisation-modernisation arguments, faith-related issues have become muchmore relevant to contemporary policymakers and the theological knowledge hascome to be valued much more than it was in the beginning of the 20th century.

In the field of IR, an epistemic community is defined as ‘a network ofprofessionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain andan authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain orissue-area’.14 Although Haas states that ‘epistemic communities need not be made

9 Marc Gopin, Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East (New York:Oxford University Press, 2002); Douglas Johnston and Brian Cox, ‘Faith-Based Diplomacy andPreventive Engagement’, in Douglas Johnston (ed.), Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik(NY: Oxford University Press, 2003); David Tombs and Joseph Liechty (eds), Explorations inReconciliation: New Directions in Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); Douglas Johnston, ‘TheChurches and Apartheid in South Africa’, in Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (eds),Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); DavidHerbert, Religion and Civil Society: Rethinking Public Religion in the Contemporary World(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); David Little, Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in ConflictResolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

10 Ronen Palan, ‘Transnational Theories of Order and Change: Heterodoxy in International Relationscholarship’, Review of International Studies, 33 (2007), pp. 47–69.

11 Julia Annas, ‘Moral Knowledge as Practical Knowledge’, in Evan Selinger and Robert Crease (eds),The Philosophy of Expertise (NY: Columbia University Press, 2006).

12 Frederick A. Olafson, ‘Hermeneutics: “Analytical” and “Dialectical”’, History and Theory, 25:4(1986), pp. 28–42, 28.

13 Emanuel Adler, ‘The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and theInternational Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control’, International Organization, 46:1(1992), pp. 101–45.

14 Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’,International Organization, 46:1 (1992), pp. 1–35.


up of natural scientists: they can consist of social scientists of individuals from anydiscipline or profession who have a sufficiently strong claim to a body ofknowledge that is valued by society’,15 the scholarly investigations that employed‘epistemic communities’ framework mostly focused on the influence of the scientificelites on political decision-making. Examples include Mediterranean pollutioncontrol,16 protection of stratospheric ozone,17 nuclear arms control,18 climatechange19 and AIDS control regimes.20 The only exception is the relatively recenttreatment of diplomatic corps as epistemic communities by Davis-Cross.21

According to Haas, professionals should share a minimum of four conditionsto qualify as epistemic communities: A set of normative and principled beliefs,causal beliefs, norms of validity (that is, internally defined criteria for validatingknowledge) and a common policy enterprise in the form of common practicesassociated with a set of problems to which the professional competence is directed.Haas acknowledges that the framework, in general, resembles Fleck’s ‘thought-collective’ – a sociological group with a common style of thinking.22 Religiousactors, albeit different in a number of ways from scientific communities, share thesepreconditions. In terms of their normative and causal beliefs, not to mention theirnorms of validity, there is a remarkable level of agreement; this is perhaps notsurprising, given that they all make reference to the same texts and usually by usingwidely accepted methods of interpretation. Respect for life, equality, a belief in atranscendent being and the need for a just economic system sensitive to theenvironment are among many values that most – if not all – religious actorsmaintain as part of their ‘beliefs’ which they advocate actively on national andtransnational levels. Religious leaders often take part in ‘building the normativedimension of a global polity’, focusing on ‘small, experimental approaches’ tosocial and economic issues.23

One might argue that religious knowledge cannot be treated like scientificknowledge, which has been at the centre of the Epistemic Communities approachso far. As Scott Thomas notes in his discussion of the religious groups andepistemic communities, religious knowledge falls under the Weberian ethics-oriented ‘value rationality’ whereas procedural knowledge (such as scientificknowledge) is within the boundaries of goal-oriented ‘formal rationality’.24 As

15 Ibid., p. 16.16 Peter M. Haas, ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control’,

International Organization, 43:3 (1989), pp. 377–403.17 Peter M. Haas, ‘Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Strato-

spheric Ozone’, International Organization, 46:1 (1992), pp. 187–224.18 Adler, The Emergence of Cooperation.19 Clair Gough and Simon Shackley, ‘The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: The Epistemic

Communities and NGOs’, International Affairs, 77:2 (2002), pp. 329–46.20 Jeremy Youde, ‘The Development of a Counter-Epistemic Community: AIDS, South Africa, and

International Regimes’, International Relations, 19:4 (2005), pp. 421–39.21 Mai’a Davis-Cross, The European Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International Cooperation from

Westphalia to Maastricht (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).22 Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1979).23 James Brassett and Richard Higgott, ‘Building the Normative Dimensions of a Global Polity’,

Review of International Studies, 29 (2003), pp. 29–55.24 Scott Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations

(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 108–12; Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1978), pp. 25–6.


Thomas argues, the debate regarding the knowledge types and their acceptabilityin the international arena still continues. From a thick constructivist perspective,what counts as ‘episteme’ at a specific time would be defined by consensus and theextent to which a body of knowledge would be regarded as authoritative. In thatframework, what religious leaders preach and the communities forming aroundthese teachings constitute ‘islands of epistemic communities’, because the audienceof these teachings take this type of knowledge seriously, and regulate their publicand private lives accordingly. For a significant number of people, religiousknowledge has more relevance than scientific knowledge – actually, religiousknowledge, at times, has the power to define the borders of science as we have seenwith the debates surrounding stem cell research.

In a Foucaultian sense, religion has as much epistemic value as – if not morethan – science proper. From that perspective, this article claims that the‘Postmodern’ episode would constitute a fourth episteme, after the three epistemesdefined in ‘Order of Things’: The ‘Renaissance’, the ‘Classical’ and the ‘Modern’.25

Foucault’s epistemes can be defined as the set of time periods that are marked byspecific discourses and worldviews. Unlike Kuhnian paradigms, these epistemes donot follow a linear progression but they may have similarities and differences. The‘Renaissance’ was marked by the interpretation of ‘signs’ and the discovery ofresemblances; that particular episteme had a very thin line between the science aswe understand it today and divination. The ‘Classical’ episteme focused onidentity, difference and measurement; there was an increased value on theman-made taxonomies and analyses with the advancement in technology. In the‘Modern’ age, there was an implicit rejection of nature and divine as ‘the cause’.Nothing but ‘Man’ is responsible for knowledge. The ‘Modern’ episteme, in termsof its premises and its confidence in scientific theories and application, coincideswith the strongly secular and materialist political views of the twentieth century. AsFoucault notes in various instances, the questions and discourses in each epistememight resemble or borrow from another episteme but they still maintain an internalcoherence. With the end of the Cold War and the decline in the states’ capacitiesto respond to emergencies, structural violence or the need of allegiance, there hasbeen a decrease in the unquestioned belief in science and secular forms ofgovernance. This shift led to the recognition of the actors, who could actually comeup with ‘answers’ to the needs of the people. The post-modern episteme, therefore,will be the one that acknowledges the scientific advances but focuses on the humanspirituality and how man can relate himself to the outside world without beingalienated. The expert communities of that particular ‘episteme’, therefore, wouldhave to include the faith leaders.

If we go back to the Weberian conception of knowledge, one can even arguethat the interpretation of texts and the debates around these interpretationsconstitute a form of knowledge that is closer to ‘formal rationality’, which can beexpressed in ‘numerical and calculable terms’.26 Obviously, textual interpretation,no matter how rigorously it is conducted, is far from such numerical preciseness.

25 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: The Archaeology of Human Sciences (London: TavistockPublications Ltd., 1970).

26 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 85.


However, the fact that there are scholarly debates going on regarding theinterpretation of the sacred texts renders the ‘absoluteness’ of religious precepts(which is a defining component of ‘value rationality’) open to question.

The key dimension that makes the stance of the religious actors different fromthe beliefs and values of a layperson is the employment of exegesis andhermeneutics, which are acquired during an intensive technical education based oncommon principles and precedents, at least within the framework of a specificreligious tradition. Exegesis is the critical interpretation of an authoritative text likeHoly Scriptures; hermeneutics refers to the science of formulating guidelines, lawsand methods for interpreting a text’s meaning.27 This training on exegesis and onthe science of hermeneutics is what makes a faith leader credible when it comes tovarious issues of life. While it is true that one might find ‘conflicting’ textualevidence and advocate different positions, in many cases it has been possible tohave a technical discussion of the context and the message of a sacred text. Theexistence of conferences, conventions and peer-reviewed journals in the field oftheology consolidates the argument that there is a structured expert communitythat furthers criticisable and refutable knowledge in text analysis, interpretationand application, which brings us closer to the realm of ‘formal rationality’ in termsof methods and applications.28 It is true that different religions and evendenominations have different curricula when it comes to educating their religiousleaders, but this only proves that there are multiple epistemic communities in anissue area, and not one.

Furthermore, what the epistemic communities are seeking and ‘marketing’ isnot expected to be the ‘truth’, but systematised new perspectives which have thecapacity to influence the politics of the time. The theories put forward by theepistemic communities need not be falsifiable; what matters is the formation of newnorms and understandings which were informed by domestically developedtheoretical expectations that were created by the experts of a specific field.Epistemic communities need to convince key players that the adoption of theproposed framework or ideas would be in the players’ best interests. In the end,the key is not ‘inventing new concepts but raising them to new heights of publicawareness’.29

Faith leaders as an epistemic community

In August 2000, more than 1000 representatives of transnational and indigenousreligious traditions gathered at the UN for a Millennium Summit of WorldReligious and Spiritual Leaders, thereby acknowledging the influential role of faithleaders in world politics. What is surprising is not the size or the significance of the

27 Stanley E. Porter and Kent D. Clarke, ‘What is Exegesis? An Analysis of Various Definitions’, inStanley E. Porter (ed.), Handbook to Exegesis of the New Testament (Boston, MA: Brill Publishers,1997).

28 Examples include: The Journal of Theological Studies (Oxford Journals), Journal of the Academy ofReligion, Scottish Journal of Theology (Cambridge University Press), Doctrine and Life (DominicanPublications), First Things, Theology Today (Princeton Theological Seminary), Journal of BiblicalStudies.

29 Adler, The Emergence of Cooperation, p. 124.


gathering but the length of time it has taken to officially recognise their direct (andindirect) influence on politics.

One’s religious perspective determines his/her view of the others30 and religionis a powerful tool for legitimacy, providing a cultural framework that cannot beeasily counter-balanced by a reference to any other element of identity.31 However,citizens generally defer to the authority of experts both in circumstances involvingtechnical dimensions and in ‘all sorts of common decisions’.32 Thus, religiousactors become ‘heralds’, ‘advocates’, ‘observers’, ‘educators’ and ‘institutionbuilders’ in the political scene in addition to being citizens, public leaders andactivists.33 In short, faith leaders, for the most part, have ‘a well-established andpervasive influence in the community, a reputation as a force for change based ona respected set of values, unique leverage for reconciling conflicting parties,including an ability to rehumanize relationships and the capability to mobilizecommunity, national and international support for peace process’.34 Their pro-fessional training, prestige and reputation for expertise – a common trait ofepistemic community members in general – in an area such as religion, that is sohighly valued by society and consequently by elite decision-makers provide faithleaders with access to the political system and legitimise or authorise thepoliticians’ activities.

Beyond the elite level, the religious congregations also have been shown to bea hub for the formation of political views which cannot be simplified as theaggregation of the members of the group.35 In terms of conflict transformation,Lederach states that such mid-level and grassroots groupings and consequently theleadership, which can be provided by the clerics, are much more effective thanelite-level transformation attempts.36 This grassroots leadership distinguishes thefaith leaders from traditional scientific epistemic communities, who do not usuallyhave direct access to the public. The capability and in a way, obligation of the faithleaders to translate complicated textual interpretations to the everyday languageand daily practice adds to the effectiveness of their message when it comes to thehigher echelons in policymaking. The message and expectations that are locallycreated are conveyed to policymakers in the form of public announcements orindividual meetings. The members of the political elite follow the strategies

30 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (NY: Basic Books, 1973); Rodney Stark and WilliamBainbridge, ‘Of Churches, Sects, and Cults: Preliminary Concepts for a Theory of ReligiousMovements’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 18 (1979), pp. 117–33.

31 Clifford Geertz, ‘Centers, Kings and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power’, in JosephBen-David and Terry N. Clark (eds), Culture and Its Creators (Chicago: Chicago University Press,1977), p. 267; Nikos Kokoslakis, ‘Legitimation, Power and Religion in Modern Society’, SociologicalAnalysis, 46:4 (1985), pp. 367–76, 371.

32 Douglas N. Walton, Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority (University Park:Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 24.

33 David Little and Scott Appleby, ‘A Moment of Opportunity?’, in Harold Coward and Gordon S.Smith (eds), Religion and Peacebuilding (NY: SUNY Press, 2004); Timothy A. Byrnes CatholicBishops in American Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Allen D. Hertzke,Representing God in Washington: The Role of Religious Lobbies in the American Polity (Knoxville,TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1988).

34 Johnston and Cox, Faith-based Diplomacy, p. 14.35 Christopher P. Gilbert, The Impact of Churches on Political Behavior: An Empirical Study (Westport,

CT: Greenwood Press, 1993); Ted Jelen, ‘Political Christianity: A Contextual Analysis’, AmericanJournal of Political Science, 36 (1992), pp. 692–714.

36 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1997), p. 50.


recommended by local experts (in our case, faith leaders) when it best suits theirpolitical prospects, promoting the ‘knowledge’ at their disposal to other actors ininternational settings.

Religious leaders, like other epistemic communities, have their shared norma-tive and principled beliefs. Among these beliefs are a conviction of the equality anddignity of all human beings; upholding the sacredness of the individual person andhis/her conscience; defending the value of the human community; arguing themight is not right, and that human power is neither self-sufficient nor absolute;espousing compassion, unselfishness; arguing that the force of inner truthfulnessand the spirit are more powerful than hate, enmity and self interest and standingwith the poor and the oppressed against the rich and the oppressors.37 Thestrongest disagreements among the religious leaders do not stem from the rejectionof any of these principles, but from certain ‘exceptions’ such as the admissibilityof harming another in self-defence, which could (or not) be allowed under certaincircumstances.

Although many religions share a number of core principles, their specific ritualsor practices might drastically differ. By itself, this is not an obstacle to theachievement of common ends. These traditions, embodied as groups or states, mayform purposive associations, defined as relationships among those who cooperatefor the purpose of securing certain shared beliefs, values and interests, who adaptcertain practices as a means to that end, and who regard such practices as worthyof respect only to the extent that they are useful instruments of the commonpurpose.38 An observant Protestant, for example, might have more in commonwith an observant Catholic, than a Protestant who does not live up to the tenetsof his/her religion.39

The claim of this article is that the process by which faith communities,including the religious leaders and the theologians, influence political decision-making in divided societies can be investigated by employing these traditionalepistemic communities variables. The cases of Northern Ireland and South Africaexplored in this article show that epistemic communities of religion made an impacton conflict transformation and policy change by forming a network that changedexclusive public theologies to inclusive ones that would assist a major politicaltransformation. For the purposes of this article, public theology can be defined asthe reflection and implications of a religion in the activities that take place in thecommon space, including political and social life.40 It is not necessarily what isliterally stated in the relevant scriptures; it includes human interpretation of whatis relevant and to what extent particular religious premises can be experienced inthe public arena.

37 Kyoto Conference Proceedings (1973).38 Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1984).39 Although this phenomenon is not investigated in this article, it is plausible to state that there are

‘religious communities’ which define their identities primarily against ‘non-believers’ as opposed tobelievers in other traditions. This kind of ‘othering’ might make cross-traditional understandingeasier, but has also the potential to cause conflicts between the Westphalian state and the religioussegments of societies.

40 See Nukhet A. Sandal, ‘Clash of Public Theologies? Rethinking the Concept of Religion in Politics’,forthcoming in Alternatives.


The article argues that the transition from exclusive to inclusive publictheologies in both cases was made possible by the religious epistemic communities,and this transition significantly contributed to the atmosphere that led to stabilisingpolitical arrangements, the abolition of Apartheid and the signing of the GoodFriday Agreement respectively. Epistemic Communities are ‘a vehicle for thedevelopment of insightful theoretical premises about the creation of collectiveinterpretation and choice’ and is ‘methodologically pluralistic’.41 Given thecharacter and the formation process of public theologies as well as the voluntarynature of the religious affiliations and practice, faith-related debates and processescall for such a vehicle.

Towards a theology of racial equality: the case of South Africa

Apartheid, literally meaning ‘separateness’ in the Afrikaans language, refers to thephilosophy and the legal structure of racial segregation enforced mainly between1948 and 1990 in South Africa. During the first years of Apartheid, a number ofexplicitly racist laws were enacted to ensure white dominance over the blackpopulation. The Population Registration Act of 1950 classified individuals into‘white’, ‘colored’ or ‘African’; the Group Areas Act of 1950, recommended by aDutch Reformed missionary conference, created separate areas for different racialgroups.42 The intermarriage of Europeans and Non-Europeans was prohibited bya separate act in 1949.

The segregationist policies were, if not directly caused by, inspired andconsolidated by the policies of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), which was thecountry’s established church and had a prior record of vigorously pursuingsegregationist policies. In 1857, for example, it was a synod of DRC that hadintroduced separate services along racial lines and this policy had been representedas ‘the will of God’ by using various textual references from the Bible pointing tothe differences among people.43 In 1942, the Federal Mission Council was formedby a number of DRC members to implement policies of segregation in publicareas.44 Almost all these racist policies were legitimated by references to the sacredtexts and stories, thereby making their ‘marketing’ to the public much easier thansecular ideologies. The tower of Babel story (Genesis 11:1–9) became a ‘cardinaltenet of Apartheid theology’45 – it was normal for people to be treated differentlybecause they were different and the difference in treatment was the divine will.Apartheid quickly became the prevalent mode of life in South Africa, unquestionedby the majority of domestic institutions.

The type of theology created by the mainstream religious actors helped shapingthe public attitude of the Afrikaners. Given that 90 per cent of the Afrikaan

41 Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas, ‘Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order and the Creationof a Reflective Research Program’, International Organization, 46:1 (1992), pp. 367–90, 368.

42 John W. de Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans,1979), p. 32.

43 Willie Esterhuyse, Apartheid Must Die (Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers, 1981), pp. 34–5.44 Colleen Ryan, Beyers Naude: Pilgrimage of Faith (Claremont, S. Africa: David Philip Publishers,

1990), p. 34.45 See Johnston, The Churches and Apartheid.


speakers had a church affiliation and 70 per cent were affiliated to DRC in the1980s,46 the population and the politicians were, at the very least, encouraged bythe theological justification to perpetuate this institutional cycle of overt racism.

In response to the racist policies of the South African government, ‘blacktheology’, as an alternative public theology to the dominant segregationist one, andrepresented mainly by figures like Bishop Manas Buthelezi, Desmond Tutu, AlanBoesak, Barney Pityana and Zephania Kameeta, gained ground among theoppressed people of South Africa, by reframing Apartheid and redefining theinterests of the people of South Africa. Black theology is a version of liberationtheology47 with references to Brazilian educator and author, Paulo Freire. Itemphasises the need for inclusion of the poor and the marginalised to the societyas well as the centrality of justice in the Gospel. Unlike DRC and AfrikanerNationalism, black theology did not attach itself to any brand of nationalism. Itdefended self-awareness and equality, making it a form of inclusive public theologyand easier for the international actors to support it.48 The Dutch ReformedMission Church under Allan Boesak, who, with the support of Afrikaner religiousleaders like Beyers Naude, challenged the common wisdom of the time by referringto the same sources as their opponents, but from a radically different, inclusiveangle which was more acceptable to the world community of experts – religiousleaders and theologians in our case – in that specific area. In 1963, the Afrikanercleric Beyers Naude who did not agree with the exclusive local theology of DRC,founded the Christian Institute of Southern Africa, an ecumenical organisationworking for interracial dialogue.49

The creation of such inclusive and exclusive theologies in the public realm is animportant facet of ‘the ambivalence of the sacred’.50 Epistemic communities ofreligious actors do not always produce and spread inclusive and peacefulinterpretations. However, unlike inclusive public theologies, which receive consider-able support from the fellow members of the expert communities from outside,exclusive/violent public theologies that focus on narrower segments of laity receivelimited official support from the international community of faith leaders, so theyhave a weaker epistemic validity. Therefore, whereas there are a number ofexclusive/violent and local public theologies some of which have worldwide impact,they tend to remain relatively isolated. More inclusive public theologies might nothave the same immediate popularity in local settings due to the absence of aprimordial ‘other’ category but they enjoy a gradually built support mechanismthat facilitates the transmission of their message to political leaders and thesubsequent operationalisation of that message.

46 Gerhardus C. Oosthuizen, ‘Christianity’s Impact on Race Relations in South Africa’, in MartinProzesky (ed.), Christianity Amidst Apartheid (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).

47 Phillip Berryman, Liberation Theology (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1987); GustavoGutierrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation (NY: Orbis Books, 1988).

48 Allan Boesak, The Politics of Hope or The Politics of Delusion, The Ashley Kriel Memorial Lecture,30 July 2008; J. Deotis Roberts, Liberation and Reconciliation: A Black Theology (Westminster: JohnKnox, 2005).

49 Despite the employment of theology and religious credentials in the process, the counter-Apartheidepistemic community in South Africa cannot be equated with the profession of priesthood. Thereligious epistemic communities in general may include academics, religion based NGOs and eveneducated members of congregations who participate actively in the creation of public theologies.

50 Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation (New York:Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).


Although the DRC policies and its theology contributed significantly to theracist structure of Apartheid, it is crucial to recognise the oppositional religiousvoices and the early roots of an inclusive public theology from the very beginning.In theoretical terms, the approach to Apartheid and the treatment of differentraces, therefore, can be seen as the ‘units of variation’ in the epistemic communitiesjargon and one can distinguish an ongoing theological debate, even during theApartheid period. In 1949, for example, Rosettenville ecumenical conference, theEnglish-speaking member churches opposed Apartheid on a declaratory level. In1960, the World Council of Churches (WCC), which is the broadest umbrellaorganisation for the ecumenical movement, sponsored the first conference thatprotested Apartheid. The members came up with 17 resolutions emphasising thebiblical passages on equality and human rights, thus challenging the truth claimsof the churches promoting separation. Not surprisingly, DRC, in an attempt toseparate itself from this inclusive line of interpretation, withdrew its membershipfrom WCC.

Eight years later, the South African Council of Churches (SACC), the nationalecumenical coordinator of the inter-church communication, issued the ‘Message tothe People of South Africa’, signed by 600 ministers and 27 churches. Thisstatement was regarded as the strongest religious denunciation of Apartheid thathad ever been issued.51 In the same year, at its Fourth Assembly, WCC initiatedthe Program to Combat Racism (PCR), which translated the condemnations intopractical action. Under the PCR initiative, WCC started a special grant pro-gramme to combat racism, from which racially oppressed groups and organisationsrepresenting these groups were going to be funded. The fund was supplied not onlyby voluntary contributions from churches but also from local ecumenical andsupport groups all over the world.

The most serious epistemic challenge to the political system and the dominanttheology supporting Apartheid came in the early 1980s. The World Alliance ofReformed Churches (WARC), which has a membership of 214 churches repre-senting 75 million Christians, made the following statement, again backed bynumerous scriptural references: ‘Apartheid is a sin, and [. . .] the moral andtheological justification of it is a travesty of the Gospel and, in its persistentdisobedience to the Word of God, a theological heresy’.52 Framing Apartheid asa ‘sin’ and ‘theological heresy’ challenged the mainstream South African churcheseither to take a stronger stand and come up with a counter-framing or to stepdown and accept this alternative formulation. The same year, the Dutch ReformedMission Church, which had a membership of black and white South Africans andwas a parallel church to DRC, came up with the Belhar Confession, in which itjoined WARC, declaring Apartheid a ‘heresy’. This chain of framing showed thatthe international membership structure of the Reformed Churches affected thelocal politics and public theologies, which, in turn, helped transform the attitudetowards racist ideologies. As we can witness in this case, international epistemiccommunities of religion has the capacity to influence the local ones by coming up

51 South African Democracy Education Trust, The Road to Democracy in South Africa: 1960–1970(2004), p. 679.

52 Statement quoted in John de Gruchy and Charles Villa-Vicencio (eds), Apartheid is a Heresy (CapeTown: David Philip, 1983).


with alternative interpretations of the very same religious sources. However, it isusually the latter which can challenge and change the local political practices.

In 1985, South African President P. W. Botha declared a state of emergency,which would be a justification for detention without trial and other extrememeasures during a time of growing dissent. The tensions under these extraordinarycircumstances gave way to an important document of protest, Kairos, drafted by153 black South African church leaders and theologians. The Kairos document,with its ambitious claim that the state theology and the church theology were incollusion and therefore people should actively resist, became the cornerstone of theensuing civil disobedience doctrine. Embodying this strategy, Desmond Tutu wasnamed Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town and he kept championing themovement as the leader of SACC. SACC made it possible for the individualchurches in South Africa to come against the established segregationist policiesunder a united front, without drawing attention to individual parishioners whowere not ready to come under close scrutiny.

Tutu’s active diplomacy raised the issue to a higher level of awareness, drawingother theologians’ and politicians’ attention to the domestic disturbances in SouthAfrica. The World Council of Churches issued the Harare Declaration inDecember 1985. The declaration went beyond a simple condemnation by invitingall members to put immediate sanctions against South Africa. The protests werenot confined to the religious sphere; even the US President, Ronald Reagan, underthe pressure of changing norms of the international system, signed an orderimposing financial sanctions against South Africa.53 Obviously not all politicalprotests and condemnations can be tied to the Harare Declaration. However, it isreasonable to state that the declaration along with the theological epistemicconsensus on an international level, made it difficult for the political leaders tojustify silence.

DRC, after coming under the pressure of the other religious actors as well aspolitical ones, joined the religious epistemic community condemning racialsegregation and changed its ‘public theology’ from exclusive to inclusive. ‘Churchand Society’, the document issued by DRC in 1986, acknowledged that despite thegood intentions of the Church, supporting Apartheid was a ‘mistake’:54

The Dutch Reformed Church is convinced that the application of Apartheid as a politicaland social system by which human dignity is adversely affected, and whereby one particulargroup is detrimentally suppressed by another, cannot be accepted on Christian-ethicalgrounds because it contravenes the very essence of neighbourly love and righteousness andinevitably the human dignity of all involved.

As a result of the international political and religious pressure and the U-turn inthe public theology of DRC, the domestic political outlook started to change. Thegeneral public became more attentive to the voices of moderation which won atheological debate. Political change followed the change in public theology. InSeptember 1989, Frederik Willem de Klerk, the leader of the National Party whosemotto was ‘Fairness, Firmness, Peace’ came to power. As soon as he came to

53 Audie Klotz, ‘Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and US Sanctions AgainstSouth Africa’, International Organization, 49:3 (1995), pp. 451–78.

54 Quoted in Johann Kinghorn, ‘On the theology of Church and Society in the DRC’, Journal ofTheology for Southern Africa, 70 (1990), pp. 21–36, 22.


power, de Klerk ordered the release of prominent political prisoners, includingNelson Mandela, lifted the state of emergency that was declared in 1985 andrepealed all Apartheid laws.

The relevance of and the frequent references to the South African experience inother divided societies55 show how the attitudes and the institutions partly shapedby peaceful public theologies can enter other conflict settings like Northern Ireland.The South Africa example, in the context of Northern Ireland, suggests that‘oppositional groups might obtain more from peace processes than their govern-mental antagonists had anticipated’.56 In fact, the African National Congressplayed an advisory role in the Irish peace process and at one point, PresidentNelson Mandela chaired discussions in South Africa between Republican andLoyalist leaders of Northern Ireland.57 Furthermore, a year before the signing ofthe Good Friday Agreement, thousands of Presbyterian pastors, along withprominent South African faith leaders, gathered in Belfast, to make a publicrecommitment to peacemaking between Protestants and Catholics – many of theseleaders were actively involved in reconciliation projects in one way or the other.58

Although the extent of the influence of such connections on the Good FridayAgreement is debatable, the South African experience diffused to the NorthernIrish religio-political scene by virtue of these public initiatives and communications.

The South African experience also shows how individual faith leaders, byattending international meetings, connecting the transnational to the local andvoicing their concerns can start the process of theological innovation. This casealso demonstrates that there are indeed shared norms of validity which force thereligious leaders representing exclusive public theologies to either come up with anequally valid political argumentation or to adopt the theology which meets theinterpretative criteria.

It is not surprising that the local churches (in this case, the Dutch ReformedChurch), usually the loci of the dominant public theology, are not always theinstigators of change and innovation. When investigating the mechanisms ofinfluence of the epistemic communities of faith, it is therefore important torecognise that although given legitimacy by their institutional position, religiousleaders, especially during the incipient stages, can behave independently of theinstitutional centre and even challenge the existing policies of the institution. Thosereligious leaders can use alternative institutional bases, such as SACC and theChristian Institute of Southern Africa, which provide them with a safe platform tofurther theological discussions on sensitive issues. However, unless the religiousinstitution at the core, like DRC in the South African case, recognises thelegitimacy of this challenge and changes its public theology, a non-violent politicaltransition from ‘divided’ to ‘united’ is very unlikely, if not altogether impossible.

55 Rachel Monaghan, ‘Community Based Justice in Northern Ireland and South Africa’, InternationalCommunity Justice Review, 18:1 (2008), pp. 83–105; Mark Amstutz, The Healing of Nations: ThePromise and Limits of Political Forgiveness (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); ScottAppleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred.

56 Richard English, Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland (London: Macmillan, 2006),pp. 410–11.

57 See Tom Hayden, ‘Northern Ireland, South Africa in Secret Peace Talks’, The Nation (28 September2007).

58 Timothy Morgan and Mary Cagney, ‘Northern Ireland: For God or Ulster?’, Christianity Today (5October 1997).


Theologies of interdenominational reconciliation: the case of Northern Ireland

In Northern Ireland, two of the major traditions of Christianity view themselves as‘opposing religions’ rather than variations of a single tradition.59 The Protestant-Catholic dichotomy has been accepted as the equivalent of an ethnic divide.60 Thedivision goes back to the early 17th century Ulster plantations, during whichProtestant colonists from Scotland and England were given ownership of Ulsterand control over the local Gaelic and Catholic population. The Protestantpopulation has traditionally wanted to keep the union with Britain whereas theGaelic population has striven for autonomy. This dichotomy became especiallyproblematic and securitised starting in the late 1960s, with high levels of violencecontinuing until the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

The Troubles Period, as it is called by some circles, began with the civil rightsmarches of the Catholics, which were countered by the heavy-handed tactics of themainly Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary. The Irish Republican Army (IRA),which had the stated aim of defending the Catholic minority, became active againafter a period of internal division of opinion in regards to the effectiveness ofviolence.61 As a result of the inner conflicts over the tactics to be pursued, the moremilitant ‘Provisional’ IRA (PIRA) later broke away from the ‘Official’ IRA. Likethe Official IRA, PIRA supported civil rights, the defence of the Catholiccommunity and the unification of Ireland. Its distinguishing feature was that itsmembers were prepared to go for unification in defiance of Britain and would useforce to achieve their goals.62 As a response to the rising violence, loyalistparamilitaries also organised their own structures under the umbrellas of the UlsterVolunteer Force and the Ulster Defence Association.

Beyond representing the markers of ethnic identity, the churches were notactive participants in the conflict, unlike in the South African case. In 1970, leadersof the four main Churches in Northern Ireland (Presbyterian, Methodist, Churchof Ireland, and Roman Catholic) came up with a joint statement stating thatreligion was not a cause or component of the conflict,63 rather than taking a strongstand against or in favour of a deeper interaction with the ‘other’ community. Apossible reason for this detachment was hesitation over becoming involved inpolitical conflict, not to mention the responsibility such an involvement wouldplace on the churches.

The majority of the clergy and the local churches were initially unwilling toengage in interdenominational and ecumenical activities. The pastors, due toreasons of credibility and reputation and in the absence of active institutionalsupport from the higher authorities, did not want to lose their parishioners in areligiously competitive environment.64 In other words, the religious leaders were

59 Máiréad N. Craith, Culture and Identity Politics in Northern Ireland (NY: Palgrave, 2003), p. 120.60 See John D. Brewer, ‘Sectarianism and Racism, and Their Parallels and Differences’, Ethnic and

Racial Studies, 15:3 (1992), pp. 352–64.61 J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA (Edison, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), p. 340.62 English, Irish Freedom, pp. 368–82.63 Oliver Rafferty, Catholicism in Ulster 1603–1983: An Interpretative History (London: Hurst

Publications, 1994), p. 270.64 Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, The Churching of America, 1776–1990: Winners and Losers in our

Religious Economy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992); Rachel McCleary andRobert Barro, ‘Religion and Economy’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20:2 (2006), pp. 49–72;


initially hesitant to come up with an inclusive public theology that couldpotentially compromise the coherence of their respective traditions. Segregatededucation and the encouragement of endogamy further enabled the absence ofcontact between the members of the two Christian traditions.65 However, activeparties to the conflict attacked this neutral stand, claiming that the religious leadersmust play a part in realising the political ambitions of ‘their people’. Consequently,the churches became an unwilling party in the conflict, even before they themselvesrecognised it.

The active involvement of Rev. Ian Paisley, the leader of the Free PresbyterianChurch, in politics by establishing the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in 1971,complicated the picture by blurring the line between religion and politics evenfurther. Paisley set up his own media outlet, the Protestant Telegraph, whichbecame known for its strong anti-Catholic stance. He also published a number ofbooks and pamphlets on religion and politics to further his exclusive theology,denouncing the Catholic Church and the Pope. He managed to blend the ‘vertical’and ‘agentic’ theologies of evangelical Protestantism66 with the broader questionsof the conflict in Northern Ireland. By virtue of its reference to and interpretationof the Scripture, Paisley can be seen as leading a counter-epistemic community,which favoured an exclusive portrayal of the Protestant identity. Similar to theSouth Africa case, there was not only one theology or one religious epistemiccommunity around the conflict in Northern Ireland. The systematic production ofknowledge in terms of interpretation of the sacred texts is not confined to themembers favouring an inclusive theology. However, although by virtue of hisinterpretation and his direct political outlet he influenced the Northern Irishpolitics to a significant extent, the recognition and the mechanisms of thisknowledge production is not as clear as the faith leaders of the four main churches.The fact that Paisley had his own political party, and his limited influence on thedecisions of other politicians, raised doubts about his groups’ qualification as anepistemic community. Regardless, the Free Presbyterians constituted an importantchallenge for the pro-reconciliation epistemic community of faith leaders inNorthern Ireland.

With the mainstream churches struggling to remain aloof, DUP carrying theProtestant fundamentalist banner and the remaining political parties’ rejection ofthe possible religious causes of the conflict, the contribution of the religion to apositive conflict transformation was made almost impossible, at least for a longwhile. Finally, in 1976, with the increasing levels of deadly violence, ‘Violence inIreland’, a report of self-criticism of the churches for their implicit role in theincreasing bitterness, was published by the Irish Council of Churches and theRoman Catholic Church Joint Group on Social Questions. The signs of aninclusive theology in Northern Ireland came as a response not only to increasinglevels of violence but also to Paisley’s exclusive theology. As indicated in Brewer’stypology of grassroots peacemaking, ecumenical activity – including church-to-church, clergy-to-clergy groups, ecumenical organisations, public events and jointdeclarations of belief and commitment – is regarded as an important dimension of

Laurence Iannaccone, ‘Voodoo Economics? Reviewing the Rational Choice Approach to Religion’,Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 34:1 (1995), pp. 76–89.

65 John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).66 Jelen, The Political World of the Clergy.


the cross-community peacemaking. Brewer counts churches and religious groups asactors also in mediation, cross-community activities, self-identified peace initiatives,anti-sectarianism and in initiatives dealing with the problems of post-violence.67

The range of activities religious leaders took part in was much wider than theSouth African case, where debates mostly took place on an official level and withsignificant international ramifications.

The churches remained cautious in terms of lending full support to the religiousleaders who took part in ambitious initiatives, such as direct interaction with the‘other’. The inclusive public theology was therefore more driven by the like-mindedfaith leaders than the institutions. However, the conflict period witnessed anintrospection in all mainstream Churches as part of an epistemic transformation.For example, the Protestant churches felt a need to revise their long held doctrinesafter the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council (1962) under Pope John XXIIIaffirmed that an individual can be saved regardless of his or her religious status.Given that ‘theological Protestantism and anti-Catholicism can lay claim to alonger unbroken historical pedigree in Ulster than any other still-existent ideologi-cal rival’,68 it was especially challenging for the Protestant faith leaders to eradicatehostilities without compromising their own religious identity. Nevertheless, theChurch of Ireland (1986) under General Synod encouraged increased communityand personal relationships between members of all Christian traditions. In a similarvein, the 1987 Methodist Conference officially concluded with invitations to jointprayers and study, and unity in Christ.

The boldest attempt at doctrinal revision came from the Presbyterian Churchin the 1988 General Assembly. The Assembly challenged the WestminsterConfession of Faith (1646) which regarded the Pope as ‘the Antichrist, the man ofSin and the son of damnation’. Delegates decided that this interpretation was notmanifestly evident in the Scripture. John Dunlop, a former Moderator of the IrishPresbyterian Church, in a later speech, recognised the importance of the SecondVatican Council on later ecumenical relations (1993):

Since God cannot be privatised to only one of our two communities, or to the EuropeanCommunity of which our two countries are members, the challenge is to listen and speakacross the frontiers and not to become the private chaplains of only one community. Thishas become easier since the end of Vatican II when the people in the churches arefrequently now in frank discussion with one another.

The theological discussions stated above, which were held on a highly technicallevel, satisfied an important prerequisite of transition to a peaceful and inclusivetheology, in a way similar to the Kairos document and the subsequent revision ofthe Apartheid doctrine by DRC in the South Africa case. The changes and thedeclarations made continued to be debated, but even the mere existence of thesedebates proved that the denominational lines did not definitively create exclusiveidentities. The changing nature of the institutional interpretations of the ‘other’constitutes further evidence to the epistemologically evolving character of thereligious communities.

67 John D. Brewer, C. Wright Mills and the Ending of Violence (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 75.68 Duncan Morrow, ‘Suffering for righteousness sake? Fundamentalist Protestantism and Ulster

Politics’, in Peter Shirlow and Mark McGovern (eds), Who are “the people”?: Unionism,Protestantism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland (London: Pluto Press), pp. 55–71, 55.


Despite the relatively late acknowledgement of the Churches’ roles andresponsibilities in the conflict, individual efforts, which later led the Churches toreconsider their position, had started as early as 1974. For example, the famousFeakle Talks, held between Protestant church representatives and IRA, helped tobring about an IRA ceasefire. These early efforts continued later. In 1987, Fr. AlexReid and Fr. Gerry Reynolds facilitated a truce between the Irish NationalLiberation Army and the Irish People’s Liberation Organization. Rev. Roy Magee,a prominent Presbyterian minister, was influential in the process of the CombinedLoyalist Military Command ceasefire, and later in the unilateral ceasefire by mainloyalist paramilitary organisations in 1994. These individual efforts and manysimilar others by religious leaders, embodied a change – even if symbolically – ofa non-inclusive public theology.

It was another Presbyterian Minister, Ray Davey, who founded CorrymeelaCentre for Reconciliation in 1965, which provided the safe space for theProtestants and the Catholics to engage in dialogue and focused on the Christ’sforgiveness of his enemies as a model.69 As soon as it was established, Corrymeelabecame a platform for producing and spreading peaceful and inclusive publictheology backed by textual evidence from the Scripture.70 Similar reconciliationgroups, like Cornerstone Community in West Belfast, Christian Renewal Centerand the Columba House, were established to transform the attitudes andperceptions of the people. Very much like Beyers Naude’s anti-apartheid ChristianInstitute of Southern Africa, these centres provided the inclusive discourse withinstitutional bases and facilitated the epistemic discussions of scripture among themembers of pro-peace religious community.

In terms of mediation and provision of safe space, the individual contributionsmade by clergy to the conflict transformation set examples that are to be followedby the faith leaders in other religious conflicts.71 The churches, despite remainingsilent in the beginning of the conflict and sticking to non-inclusivist – if notcompletely exclusivist – pastoral duties, played a key role in mediation by focusingon the inclusion of all parties to a final agreement. As Power argues, from 1980sonwards, the churches shifted from what was mostly a theological discussion toaddressing ‘the issues of identity and communal relations from a Christianperspective’.72 For example, The Fitzroy-Clonard Fellowship (between the FitzroyPresbyterian Church and Clonard Catholic Monastery), which started as aninter-church Bible study group in 1981, did not shy away from encouraging themembers to recognise the ‘other’ as a fellow Christian, to visit him in his hospitalbed and to participate in the ‘other’’s weddings and funerals.73 The CatholicChurch provided a safe space for the dialogue between Sinn Féin and SocialDemocratic Labour Party, both having nationalist constituencies, in the earlystages of the peace process.74

69 Alf McCreary, In War and Peace: The Story of Corrymeela (Belfast: The Brehan Press Ltd., 2007).70 David Stevens, The Place Called Reconciliation: Texts to Explore (Belfast: The Corrymeela Press,

2008).71 Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred.72 Maria Power, From Ecumenism to Community Relations: Inter-Church Relationships in Northern

Ireland 1980–2005 (Portland, OR: Irish Academic Press, 2007), pp. 198–9.73 Ronald A. Wells, Friendship Towards Peace: The Journey of Ken Newell and Gerry Reynolds (Dublin:

The Columba Press, 2005).74 Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (London: Allan Lane, 2002).


It was primarily the individual faith leaders who constituted the pro-interdenominational reconciliation epistemic community. The Feakle talks men-tioned above, for example, proved that the Protestant clergy were respected andtrusted enough that the Irish Republican leadership were willing to meet withthem. The statements by the clerics in favour of inclusion of all parties to apolitical arrangement, the renunciation of violence and ambitious Catholic-Protestant encounters (with both paramilitaries and politicians) facilitated by theclergy on both sides gradually changed the political atmosphere to which theextreme factions that had been rejecting the legitimacy of the other would sittogether and have a joint voice on the future of Northern Ireland. Although Powerargues that ‘a new form of interaction between the churches in local areas beganto occur because of political events rather than in spite of them’, she also maintainsthat ecumenical relations that were conducted among individual religious leaderscontributed to the change, and the change was caused by the growing realisationof ‘biblical imperative for Christian reconciliation’.75 In other words, the Churcheswaited for the positive changes in the political climate to take a public stance, butan epistemic community of religious leaders, who put forward the biblicalimperative for reconciliation and worked in spite of the lack of institutionalsupport, contributed to the change in political discourse and the introduction ofceasefires and political initiatives.

Similar to the South African case, the religious figures in Northern Ireland whocontributed to the creation of this inclusivist theology and political perspective,knew each other well; they met regularly, made public appearances and shared theexpectations that set them apart from those experts who defended the perpetuationof the exclusivist public theologies. As mentioned above, individually and to alesser extent, institutionally, they formed an epistemic community which producednew interpretations and knowledge structures in their field. These new interpreta-tions contributed to changing political perspectives. Although one can see theinfluence of an international community of religious leaders (such as WCC) in theSouth Africa case, the ambitious theological steps and initiatives were taken bylocal faith leaders in Northern Ireland, which partly translated to the institutionaladaptations later.

Ian Paisley and other senior figures of DUP had an official meeting with seniorCatholic clergy at Stormont in 2006, led by Archbishop Sean Brady. Thisencounter would have been unimaginable only a decade before.76 An even moredramatic change came with the subsequent transformation of DUP policies. DUPstarted sharing power with Sinn Féin starting in May 2007. Ganiel states that thepublic discourses of the traditional evangelical activists, including DUP members,shifted towards ‘moral’ issues in recent years, such as homosexuality and abortion,when these activists – once supporting exclusive theologies – noticed that theCalvinist ideology of church and state was not applicable to the context ofNorthern Ireland.77 The mainstream Churches and the initiatives of the individualfaith leaders played a significant role in conveying this message both implicitly and

75 Power, From Ecumenism, pp. 101, 200.76 McCreary, In War and Peace, p. 241.77 Gladys Ganiel, ‘Ulster Says Maybe: The Restructuring of Evangelical Politics in Northern Ireland’,

Irish Political Studies, 21:2 (2006), pp. 137–55.


explicitly to the creators of exclusive public theologies, creating a ‘competition’ byproviding and embodying an alternative, inclusive and peaceful public theology.

The change in the official theologies of the mainstream churches, the rise of analternative Christian civil society that supports ecumenical relations and theindividual attempts of the religious leaders to bring together the parties that werenot accessible before, rendered the political atmosphere more conducive to astabilising political arrangement. The signing of the Good Friday Agreement in1998, with its clauses regarding the release of the political prisoners, theestablishment of a power-sharing executive and the process of decommissioning,marked the beginning of a new period in Northern Ireland that continued with thepower-sharing of DUP and Sinn Féin, two parties that had been at the oppositeextremes of the political scale. The agreement was welcomed by the majority of theNorthern Ireland electorate. With the end of the decade’s long conflict, NorthernIreland established itself as an exemplary case for other divided societies. Forexample, in 2007, the Sunni and Shi’a leaders of Iraq started a potential peaceprocess drawing on the experience of political and religious leaders from NorthernIreland and South Africa.78

Conclusion

How faith leaders can affect policies and what kind of roles they play in conflictresolution are and will remain important questions in the years to come. Given thecentrality of religion in individuals’ lives, the direct involvement of the clergy inpolitics and the legitimacy religious actors bestow upon the political leaders, it iscrucial for scholars to devise frameworks that can account for the mechanismsbehind the political cycles in conflict transformation and also the reasons fordifferences among various traditions, denominations and even individuals.

There are several advantages of the Epistemic Communities approach to thestudy of religious actors. It increases the sensitivity to local and cultural factors aswell as identity construction and perpetuation, leading to a greater understandingof the evolution of a new international political order. In addition, it draws criticalattention to the impact of sacred texts, practices and interpretation on national andinternational practices, most notably to the effect of theological interpretations onconflict resolution.

In terms of the institutional structure of the Christian churches, the theologicalconsiderations of faith leaders and the role of religion in individuals’ lives, theEpistemic Communities approach as proposed here, differs from the one that hasbeen employed to account for the scientists’ influence on politics. Despite thedifferences, however, it is one of the most suitable perspectives since it recognisesboth national and international dimensions of the influence of the religiousnetworks as well as the importance of a shared knowledge and technical aspects ofthe public theology. The epistemic communities in both cases consisted of expertsin theology who met regularly, shared theoretical and practical ideas and wereconfident in their capability to use their theological knowledge to change theunderstandings that created the conflict.

78 Tom Hayden, ‘Northern Ireland’.


The cases briefly investigated in this article show that changes in the dominantpublic theologies of the mainstream religious institutions contribute to theestablishment of stabilising political arrangements. In South Africa, DRC, whichwas initially one of the key supporters of the Apartheid regime, later changed itsstanding completely and recognised the validity of an inclusive public theologybased on racial equality. This became possible only after decades – long interactionamong international religious platforms and other local religious institutions. InNorthern Ireland, four main churches initially did not want to get involved in anintensifying conflict and they were even accused of perpetuating the divisionbetween the Protestant and Catholic communities. However, similar to the SouthAfrican case, the ambitious initiatives of the individual religious leaders wereaccompanied by a later change in the institutional perspectives. The 1980switnessed an introspection of the institutional perspectives of the churches and anincreased level of ecumenical activities in Northern Ireland, which later reflected itsinclusive character in political arrangements. In both cases, religious actors playedthe role of epistemic communities by producing new and systematised theologicalperspectives that influenced the politics of conflict.

The next step for scholars of International Relations interested in theorising theprocesses of conflict and the involvement of religious actors in politics, is to lookat the cases which involve faith leaders from different traditions, comparing theepistemological approaches and the levels of activism. For example, do faithleaders in Islam, which is a religious tradition that has radically differenthierarchical structures from Christianity, play similar roles in their societies, say inIraq, Iran or India? Can individual religious leaders come up with innovativeinterpretations of a text, challenge dominant, violent and local theologies, and getsupport from the international community of Islamic scholars, similar to the waywe have seen in the South African and Northern Irish cases? The same questionis worth asking for other faith traditions, like Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism.It is crucial to analyse the details of the mechanism by which expert communitiesof different religions affect policymakers under varying conditions. This articlelooked at intra-church (South Africa) and interdenominational (Northern Ireland)issues in Christianity. In a similar vein, it would be worthwhile to investigatewhether the leaders of two different religious traditions, like Islam and Judaism aspractised by Palestinians and Israelis, can make up one epistemic community andinfluence policymakers in the area of conflict transformation.


Religious actors as epistemic communities in conflict transformation: the cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland

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