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PP. 157–174 EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Vol 11, No 3 (2019) DOI: 10.24204/ejPr.v11I3.3034AuthOr:
[email protected]
Religion foR natuRalists and the Meaning of Belief
Natalja DengYonsei University
Abstract. This article relates the philosophical discussion on
naturalistic religious practice to Tim Crane’s The Meaning of
Belief: Religion from an Atheist’s Point of View, in which he
claims that atheists can derive no genuine solace from religion. I
argue that Crane’s claim is a little too strong. There is a sense
in which atheists can derive solace from religion and that fact is
worth acknowledging (whether or not this counts as ‘genuine’
solace).
i. intRoduction
There are naturalists who feel an affinity with some religion,
perhaps because they have been brought up in it, or perhaps because
they are close to people who belong to it, or for some other
reason. This phenomenon raises some in-teresting philosophical
questions. How should we think of the role religious doctrines play
in religion, and to what extent can those who reject religious
beliefs enter into aspects of the religious life? Thinking about
these leads one to consider the prior question of what it is that
demarcates religion from oth-er endeavors. Talk of ‘naturalistic
religious practice’ implies both that there is an intelligible
distinction between naturalism and religion in theory, and that
there is some middle ground between the two in practice.
The aim of this article is to relate the philosophical
discussion on natural-istic religious practice to Tim Crane’s
conception of religion and to his claim that atheists can derive no
genuine solace from religion. I’ll argue that there is a sense in
which atheists can derive solace from religion, and that that fact
is worth acknowledging (whether or not this counts as ‘genuine’
solace).
The main aim of The Meaning of Belief is to correct what Crane
sees as short-comings in the New Atheists’ conception of religion
(where by ‘New Atheists’, he
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Natalja DeNg158
means such writers as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam
Harris, Christo-pher Hitchens, and A. C. Grayling).1 As will become
clear, I find Crane’s concep-tion of religion interesting and
accurate to a large extent (I say a bit more about what I mean by
this in section 3). But I’d like to emphasize that the value of the
book as a corrective measure to the New Atheist movement is not my
topic here; i.e. I’m not discussing the extent to which Crane’s
critique of the New Atheists succeeds. What follows is intended to
be compatible with the New Atheists’ writ-ings containing a wealth
of important insights. I’m commenting merely on the re-lation
between Crane’s conception of religion and naturalistic religious
practice.
Let me start with some terminological remarks. By ‘naturalism’ I
mean the view that there are no supernatural aspects to reality.
Naturalism implies atheism, which is the claim that the theistic
God does not exist. By ‘theism’, I mean the view that there is a
God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and om-nibenevolent, who created
the world, and who is still actively involved in the world. I won’t
attempt to define ‘supernatural’, but I mean to include at least
all claims about entities like gods or angels, and/or about the
actions of such entities, like creation, miracles, or salvation,
and/or about states of affairs in-volving holiness or heaven or
hell.
Section 1 outlines Crane’s conception of religion and his
critical remarks on the possibility of ‘atheistic religion’.
Section 2 develops a version of religious fic-tionalism that can
function as a basis for naturalistic religious practice, defends it
from objections and recommends it over an alternative version.
Section 3 re-turns to Crane’s position. The upshot will be that
there is a sense in which natu-ralists (including atheists) can
derive solace from religion, and that this sense is all the more
significant if one takes on board Crane’s claim that religious
belief is inherently paradoxical, which I’ll provide some support
for.
ii. the Religious iMpulse and identification
Crane acknowledges that one may well wonder at the outset what
is meant by ‘religion’. He points out that few things can be
rigorously defined, and that there is likely to be no single
essence of religion, but proposes that we think of the phenomenon
as follows. Religion is “a systematic and practical attempt
1 Tim Crane, The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an Atheist’s
Point of View (Harvard Univ. Press, 2017).
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Religion foR natuRalists and the Meaning of Belief 159
by human beings to find meaning in the world and their place in
it, in terms of their relationship to something transcendent”.2 One
of these transcendent entities is the God of Western theism.
This is the phenomenon Crane is offering a conception of. The
concep-tion has two key ingredients: the religious impulse, and
identification. By ‘re-ligious impulse’, Crane means a belief (or
the tendency towards forming a belief) with a certain complex
content. Quoting William James, he says this is the belief ‘that
there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in
harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto’.3 It’s the belief that
“this can’t be all there is; there must be something more to the
world”, something that gives life as a whole meaning.4 He also
calls this belief in the transcendent. This belief gives the
believer’s life meaning because it is a belief in an unseen order,
align-ment with which makes life as a whole meaningful. So it’s a
belief about what the world is like, but one with important
practical implications, regarding the behaviors that are likely to
produce alignment with that unseen order.
Crane thinks this notion of the religious impulse differs in
several key ways from the New Atheists’ understanding of religious
belief. First, the con-tent of the religious impulse is not
intended as a hypothesis in the scientific sense. It’s not intended
to provide an explanation by fitting an explanandum into a general
pattern, and/or by relating it to something simpler and more
intelligible.5 Secondly, according to Crane, the content of the
religious im-pulse is inherently mysterious. There are inbuilt
limits to how intelligible that unseen order can become to us. (I
return to these claims in section 3.)
The second ingredient in Crane’s conception of religion is the
element of identification, which he takes to be about religious
practice. He takes the key features of religious practice to be
repetition, i.e. the historical dimension of religious practice,
and a social dimension, i.e. the fact that one typically en-gages
in these actions with other people. ‘Identification’ is intended to
stand for both of these features.
2 Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 6.3 William James, The Varieties
of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (Longmans, Green
and Co, 1902), 53.4 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience,
38.5 For some worries about the view of science implicit in this,
see Arif Ahmed, “The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an Atheist’s
Point of View, by Tim Crane”, Mind 127, no. 508 (2018):
1265.
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Natalja DeNg160
Note that Crane prefers talk of the transcendent to talk of the
supernatu-ral. At least he rejects the New Atheists’ use of the
term ‘supernatural’ as at once too sophisticated (“religious
believers need not operate with the clear-cut idea of the
supernatural attributed to them by today’s philosophers and
scientists”) and too simplistic (“the idea of God is not simply the
idea of a supernatural agent who made the world”).6 But as I’m
using ‘supernatural’, it is not at all clear-cut (though useful
nonetheless). Moreover, while theism is, amongst other things, a
thesis about a supernatural agent, this is compatible with there
being more to its content, as well as with the possibility that its
content is quite complex (see section 3).
Consider now Crane’s stance on the possibility of naturalistic
religious practice. Even though it is not his main concern, Crane
touches on this topic at various points in the book. For example,
when commenting on Ronald Dworkin and Alain de Botton, he makes two
points. The first is that what-ever each of these authors is
proposing, it shouldn’t be called Religion (as in Dworkin’s
Religion without God, or De Botton’s Religion for Atheists), since
neither proposal involves the religious impulse, one of the key
ingredients of religion.7 I agree: what these authors are proposing
involves a rejection of the supernatural (and of the transcendent).
That feature will make what they are proposing importantly
different from the original phenomenon. And it does matter that we
not stretch terms (‘religion’) beyond the limits of usefulness. So
what these writers are proposing can’t literally be an atheistic
religion; nor could anyone else propose anything that is best
described as such.
Crane’s second point, though, is the following:I share these
thinkers’ opposition to the New Atheists. But I don’t think an
atheist can find genuine solace in religion. There are things to
admire in the religious traditions in the world, but it is one
thing to admire aspects of a religion and another to try to adopt
its practices without believing its doctrines.8
While there may be much to disagree with in De Botton’s and
Dworkin’s pro-posals (who are, after all, Crane’s targets in this
passage), it is worth situating these remarks with respect to the
recent philosophical literature on the topic.
6 Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 12–13.7 Ronald Dworkin, Religion
without God (Harvard Univ. Press, 2013); Alain Botton, Religion for
Atheists (Penguin, 2012).8 Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 23.
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Religion foR natuRalists and the Meaning of Belief 161
When we zoom into the practical grey area between religion and
naturalism, we do find room for naturalistic religious
practice.
I should note right away that Crane may not disagree with
anything that follows, since he allows that there can be people who
participate in religious practices without any sense of the
transcendent, i.e. without the religious im-pulse.9 He also
suggests that many Jews and Christians are deeply embed-ded in
their respective religious traditions, while nevertheless lacking
what Thomas Nagel calls ‘the religious temperament’, which is the
need for an as-piration “to live not merely the life of the
creature one is, but in some sense to participate through it in the
life of the universe as a whole”.10 For Crane, these Jews and
Christians are religious in a sense, even though they lack a
religious temperament, and even though many of them also lack the
religious impulse.
What, then, is the sense in which they are religious? And, is it
really the case that none of them can find solace in religion, when
“[i]t is of supreme importance in their lives that they are [for
example] Jews, that what they are doing is what their parents and
grandparents did, and that their lives would not make any real
sense without it”?11
iii. Religious fictionalisM
To get clearer on what is available to naturalists here, let’s
consider the posi-tion known as fictionalism, which has been
deployed in a variety of philo-sophical domains. One particular
variety of fictionalism will be most relevant to our
purposes.12
9 Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 106.10 Thomas Nagel, Secular
Philosophy and The Religious Temperament (OUP, 2010), 5.11 Crane,
The Meaning of Belief, 52.12 For some recent applications of
fictionalism to the religious domain, see e.g. Peter Lipton,
“Science and Religion: The Immersion Solution”, in Realism and
Religion: Philosophical and Theological Perspectives, ed. Michael
Scott and Andrew Moore (Taylor and Francis, 2007); Benjamin Cordry,
“A Critique of Religious Fictionalism”, Religious Studies 46,
no. 1 (2010); Andrew Eshleman, “Religious Fictionalism
Defended: Reply to Cordry”, Religious Studies 46, no. 1
(2010); Victoria Harrison, “Philosophy of Religion, Fictionalism,
and Religious Diversity”, International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 68, no. 1-3 (2010); Christopher Jay, “The Kantian Moral
Hazard Argument for Religious Fictionalism”, International Journal
for Philosophy of Religion 75, no. 3 (2014); Natalja Deng,
“Religion for Naturalists”, International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 78, no. 2 (2015); Robin Le Poidevin, “Playing the God
Game: The Perils of Religious Fictionalism”, in Alternative
Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics
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Natalja DeNg162
Take an approach to the language in a given domain that combines
the following three claims. (1) The sentences in that domain are
truth-apt (they can be true or false) and ordinarily express
beliefs; (2) at least some of them are about what they seem to be
about — that is, they are not entirely figura-tive or metaphorical;
but (3) our attitudes towards these sentences need not be
truth-normed. Although the sentences in question purport to
describe reality, our attitude towards them need not depend on
their truth or falsity. Our atti-tude can be one of non-doxastic
acceptance. This is supposed to be a distinctive kind of state of
commitment that doesn’t involve belief. The value involved in
believing sentences in this domain is independent of whether our
attitudes are non-doxastic. Elsewhere, I have called this view
‘Weak Evaluative Fictionalism’ or WEF.13 (Note that religious WEF
can also be explored in connection with ag-nosticism. But the focus
here will be on its uses for understanding naturalistic (including
atheistic) religious practice.) I will call the conjunction of (1)
and (2) a realist approach to the language in a given domain.14
In the background of religious WEF and of realism about
religious lan-guage, is the assumption that there are such things
as sentences with a religious subject matter, and that it makes
sense to enquire into their meaning. Exam-ples of religious
sentences might include ‘For God so loved the world that he gave
his one and only Son’, ‘He will come again in glory to judge the
living and the dead’, or ‘God is our refuge and strength’. This
basic assumption contrasts with approaches such as those of William
Alston and (according to some) Lud-wig Wittgenstein.15 For example,
Wittgenstein in some places implies that the meaning of religious
utterances (‘There will be a Last Judgement’) is so radi-cally
context-dependent that their meaning cannot be approached by
thinking about the meaning of religious sentences. He contends that
when a religious person says ‘There will be a Last Judgement’ and a
non-religious person says ‘There will not be a Last Judgement’,
they do not contradict one another.
of the Divine, ed. Andrei A. Buckareff and Yujin Nagasawa (OUP,
2016); Finlay Malcolm, “Can Fictionalists Have Faith?”, Religious
Studies 54, no. 2 (2018); Michael Scott and Finlay Malcolm,
“Religious Fictionalism”, Philosophy Compass (forthcoming).13 Deng,
“Religion for Naturalists”.14 Some authors include in the
definition of a ‘realist’ semantics for a language the claim that
some of the sentences in question are true. As I’m using the term,
that is not part of it.15 See Michael Scott, “Religious Language”,
Philosophy Compass 5, no. 6 (2010).
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Religion foR natuRalists and the Meaning of Belief 163
Any plausible approach to the semantics of religious language
has to take into account the considerable role that context plays
in determining the meaning of religious utterances. Nonetheless, it
seems plausible that religious sentences, like other sentences,
have some stable semantic content. After all, we seem able to
communicate about religious matters, and to voice diverging
opinions about them.
Realism about religious language also opposes expressivist and
reduc-tionist approaches to the semantic project by maintaining
that religious sen-tences are ordinarily used to express beliefs
(rather than merely plans, atti-tudes, or emotions), and that at
least some religious sentences are about what they seem to be
about. At least some religious sentences are not just codified ways
of talking about aspects of the natural or social world. WEF’s
distinc-tive addition to this is the claim that the value
associated with the religious domain is independent of whether we
believe the sentences in question, or merely non-doxastically
accept them.
That can sound quite incredible. Consider such values as solace
or hope. How can the naturalist derive any such thing from
non-doxastically accept-ing religious sentences? Some of these
sentences state that there is reason to think that there is an
after-life, during which one will see one’s loved ones again.
Similarly, some others state that there is a divine being who
guides all that happens in the universe, and who deeply cares for
each of us. If truth and falsity make no difference to the
acceptability of these sentences, then when do they matter? Surely
the values in question are inaccessible to naturalists.
One reaction one might have to these questions is to weaken
religious WEF somewhat. Perhaps not all of the value accessible to
religious believers is independent of belief, but some of it is.
The problem with this weaker form of religious WEF is one that also
afflicts the stronger one: it’s unclear how one can
non-doxastically accept anything. Non-doxastic acceptance is
intended to be acceptance in all ‘ordinary’, ‘non-critical’
contexts. Roughly, the idea is that as long as one is not doing
philosophy, or otherwise critically probing one’s beliefs, one
assents to the sentences in question, but in ‘critical contexts’,
one dissents. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that there is a
principled distinction between ‘critical’ and ‘non-critical’
contexts.16 All we can say is that in any
16 See Zoltán G. Szabó, “Critical Study of Mark Eli Kalderon
(ed.) Fictionalism in Mataphysics”, Noûs 45, no. 2 (2011).
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Natalja DeNg164
given context, a variety of considerations are potentially
relevant, and we usu-ally choose to bracket some but not others.
Since non-doxastic acceptance is defined as assent in all but
‘critical’ context, this is a serious problem for WEF, even in a
weakened form. This means that WEF does not achieve its aim: it
doesn’t really offer a principled way for naturalists to use
religious language, in a way that allows them to live just as if
the religion were true. Assuming that we want to avoid periodic
wavering, hypocrisy, and mental fragmenta-tion, we have not yet
found a viable basis for naturalistic religious practice.
But there is such a basis. If we want, we can still call this a
version of re-ligious fictionalism (though not of WEF).17 A note of
caution before we pro-ceed: what follows is a description of a
fictionalist basis on which naturalists can engage in religious
practice. The kind of naturalist I’m addressing feels an affinity
with some religions, or with a particular religion. This suggests
that in some sense they think religious practice has some value.
For my purposes, we can just take this to mean that they think
religious practice achieves some-thing that they value, such as
inspiration, comfort, personal or spiritual or moral growth, a
sense of purpose, or a sense of community. So I’ll assume, for the
purposes of this discussion, that such things are available to some
people by religious means. I won’t, however, assume anything about
whether religion also has dis-value, or about whether that
dis-value outweighs any value it may have, either in the case of
believers or even in the case of the naturalist practi-tioner I’ll
describe. A fortiori, it’s no part of my proposal that naturalists
who don’t feel such an affinity should become religious
practitioners.
Unlike (perhaps more properly so-called) fictionalist positions
in many other domains, the version that best fits the religious
domain does not make use of the notion of non-doxastic acceptance.
It does not aim to allow the naturalist to live a life that is
indistinguishable from a believer’s in all but ‘critical contexts’.
Instead, it simply emphasizes the possibility of treating a
re-ligious tradition and its texts like a story, and of engaging in
a game of make-believe.18 For example, when taking part in a
religious service, one immerses
17 It was pointed out by referees that it makes sense to retain
the ‘fictionalist’ label for the view I’m proposing. I wouldn’t
insist on the label though.18 Richard Joyce, when advocating
fictionalism about morality, talks of a spectrum of stances
(Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality (CUP, 2001), Ch. 7). At the
near end of the spectrum, there is the stance we all take with
respect to fiction, for example when we tell a story or otherwise
engage with one. At the far end, there is non-doxastic acceptance.
The position
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Religion foR natuRalists and the Meaning of Belief 165
oneself in a story, and becomes an actor within the fictional
world of that religion’s world view. As Le Poidevin has pointed
out, the mere experience of the religious service can have the
power to engage one’s emotions,
to the extent that a religious service is capable of being an
intense experience. The immediate object of our emotions is the
fictional God, but there is a wider object, and that is the
collection of real individuals in our lives. In the game of
make-believe (for example, the Christian one), we are presented
with a series of dramatic images: an all- powerful creator, who is
able to judge our moral worth, to forgive us or to condemn, who
appears on Earth in human form and who willingly allows himself to
be put to death. What remains, when the game of make-believe is
over, is an awareness of our responsibilities for ourselves and
others, of the need to pursue spiritual goals, and so on.19
In a similar way, the naturalist can take part in a variety of
religious rituals and forms of worship.
One of the objections often raised for fictionalism in this and
other do-mains is this: isn’t the fictionalist practitioner
constantly expressing beliefs they don’t have, and thereby lying to
those around them? This can seem particu-larly worrying in the
religious case, given the intimate role that religion plays in many
believers’ lives. But it’s important to keep in mind that on the
version of fictionalism proposed, the naturalist is not acting just
as if the religion were true. They are not hiding their rejection
of the supernatural. Rather, they are consciously and transparently
engaging with a religious tradition by treating it and its texts as
a story. Religious practices are for them tools for creating
certain atmospheres - namely ones that will instill a sense of
something sacred.
Le Poidevin defends a different form of religious fictionalism
from the one proposed here. His version, like WEF, is more
susceptible to the ob-jection discussed in the previous paragraph.
On Le Poidevin’s version, the truth-conditions of religious
sentences are as follows: “any given [religious sentence] p is true
if and only if it is true in the theological fiction that p”.20 Le
Poidevin thinks that this version, involving a ‘fictionalist
semantics’, is prefer-able to the one advocated here, which accepts
a realist semantics and adds talk of a distinctive fictionalist
attitude of make-believe:
I’m describing is located on the near end of Joyce’s spectrum,
near more familiar activities of make-believe (see Deng, “Religion
for Naturalists”).19 Robin Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism: An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Routledge, 1996),
119.20 Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, 178.
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Natalja DeNg166
[I]t is not clear that the attitude is rationally sustainable
independently of the corresponding semantics. On the other hand,
treating theological statements as if they were true clearly fits
comfortably with the supposition that they are in fact fictional.
That, arguably, is the purer position.21
Thus, according to Le Poidevin, it makes more sense to combine
the fictional-ist attitude of make-believe with a ‘fictionalist
semantics’.
I have two related worries about this. The first is that, as Le
Poidevin is no doubt aware, the fictionalist semantics proposed
(according to which e.g. ‘God gave his only Son’ is true if and
only if ‘according to Christianity/the theological fiction, God
gave his only Son’) fares rather badly as a semantics for the
religious sentences as used by believers. This is not what
religious be-lievers mean when they use religious sentences.
Religious believers are mak-ing statements about the world, not
about the theological fiction advocated by their religious
institution. Le Poidevin’s position seems to be that those who take
a realist view of the semantics (including religious believers, but
also atheists and agnostics) are right about the semantics of
religious sen-tences as used by them, while fictionalists are right
about the semantics of religious sentences as used by
themselves.22
But that’s a bit strange. Suppose a religious fictionalist (of
the kind Le Poidevin is interested in) encounters some
non-fictionalists, either in the context of a religious service, or
while talking about religion. Of course, the fictionalist can use
the religious sentences to mean something different from everyone
else, but presumably they can’t deny that they understand what the
others are using them to mean. After all, there is nothing unclear
about using the sentence ‘God loves us’ to say that God loves us
(as opposed to that ac-cording to some theological fiction, God
loves us). Given that the fictionalist understands this, it seems
odd to decide to ignore this straightforward mean-ing and instead
use the same sentence to mean something entirely different. Why not
use a different sentence (such as, ‘according to some theological
fic-tion, God loves us’) to mean that according to some theological
fiction, God loves us? This worry relates back to the objection
discussed above. It’s hard to imagine why the fictionalist would
adopt such a non-standard semantics, other than for the reason that
they want to blend in and give the impression
21 Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism, 181.22 Le Poidevin,
“Playing the God Game”, 182.
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Religion foR natuRalists and the Meaning of Belief 167
of more agreement than there really is. Better to accept the
realist semantics, and just to adopt a fictionalist attitude (of
make-believe) — which, after all, is what really matters to Le
Poidevin’s fictionalist too.
The second worry is more serious, because it concerns the very
ability of Le Poidevin’s fictionalist to adopt the fictionalist
attitude in question. On the ‘fic-tionalist semantics’ proposed,
there seems to be no room for a fictionalist atti-tude. ‘God gave
his only Son’ is simply true, on that semantics, because it means
that according to the Christian theological fiction, God gave his
only Son. So there is nothing for the fictionalist to adopt a
fictionalist attitude towards: it wouldn’t make sense to
make-believe that according to Christianity, God gave his only Son.
That’s just something we all believe and know to be the case.23
Let’s return to the version of fictionalism proposed here. There
is even the possibility of a fictionalist version of prayer.
Elsewhere I have called this ‘make-believe prayer’.24 Le Poidevin
too emphasizes this possibility. He con-cedes that there are kinds
of prayer that are not available to the fictionalist, for example
petitionary prayer (asking God for things) or seeking
compan-ionship with God. But he suggests that the fictionalist may
still be able to use prayer to align their will with what they
imagine would be God’s will. Sup-pose the idea of God represents
for them an ideal of perfect love.
[The fictionalist] might find it helpful to voice, in her head,
her own thoughts, as if they were addressed to another person, and
imagine what someone motivated only by love would say in response.
And, without there being any actually hallucinatory experience,
answers may come to her as if they did not have their origin in her
own thoughts. Phenomenologically, this could have a great deal in
common with the experience of prayer that many realists have.25
It might seem strange to want to dedicate feelings of gratitude
or humility to a being one believes is not there. But if one
resonates with the idea of an all powerful, all-loving creator who
is able to hear and listen to one’s concern, then it can make
experiential sense to momentarily dedicate feelings of grati-tude,
or humility, to that fictional God. In Petru Dumitriu’s words: “I
cast my
23 Scott and Malcolm, “Religious Fictionalism” point to further
problems with Le Poidevin’s version of religious fictionalism.
Actually, as they also note, many of these problems are not
specific to the application of this kind of fictionalism to the
religious domain.24 Deng, “Religion for Naturalists”.25 Le
Poidevin, “Playing the God Game”, 187.
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Natalja DeNg168
gratitude into the void, I want to call out in the void. If
there is no one there, I want to address myself to that strange
absence”.26
iV. MysteRy and optiMisM
One can acknowledge the possibility of meaningful naturalist
religious prac-tice without losing sight of the distinction between
religion and naturalism.
Recall the two key ingredients of religion according to Crane,
the reli-gious impulse, and identification (repetition and the
social dimension). The religious impulse is a belief in the
transcendent, an unseen order, alignment with which gives our lives
meaning, while “[t]he element of identification consists in the
fact that religion involves institutions to which believers be-long
and practices in which they participate”.27
I said at the outset that Crane’s conception seems accurate to a
large ex-tent. What do I mean by ‘a large extent’? Here is one
general point about the scope of what follows. Consider Arif
Ahmed’s review of Crane. Ahmed is commenting on the extent which
Crane’s critique of the New Atheists suc-ceeds, and he argues that
it does not. Interestingly, he prefaces his criticism with the
following:
I can imagine many humane and thoughtful Jews, Christians and
Muslims finding in this book an almost unimprovable articulation of
their own approaches to faith. I myself have learnt, and I expect
many atheists will learn, much more than I thought could
intelligibly be said about what religious belief could and perhaps
should be. What it is, is another question.28
To my mind, the first sentence implies that Crane has an
accurate conception of the religion practiced by some people,
namely those humane and thought-ful theists. I take myself to be
focusing on just them; this is the scope of what follows. Let’s
call their version of theism humane theism. It might be nice to be
able to offer some empirically grounded estimates of the size of
this group, but I won’t attempt that here. If it turns out to be a
much smaller group than I imagine, so that this is a large
concession towards the New Atheists, so be it. What follows is just
about humane theism.
26 Petru Dumitriu, To the Unknown God (Au Dieu Inconnu) (Seabury
Press, 1982), 106.27 Crane, The Meaning of Belief, 23.28 Ahmed,
“The Meaning of Belief ”, 1261.
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Religion foR natuRalists and the Meaning of Belief 169
Let’s now return to Crane’s discussion of ‘atheistic religion’.
I said that he’s right to point out that there can be no such
thing. Dworkin’s proposal lacks both elements of religion. De
Botton’s proposal aims to make room for the el-ement of
identification, but it leaves no place for the religious impulse —
un-surprisingly, since that impulse is a belief the naturalist
rejects. There can’t literally be a naturalistic religion (nor an
atheistic religion); a naturalist can’t take over religion and its
practices without altering its nature.
But we can see now that Crane’s overall assessment isn’t right:
there is a sense in which a naturalist can find solace in religion
(that is, in naturalistic religious practice). Not in the sense of
the conviction, or even hope, of an afterlife or of an unseen order
that provides for us and sees to it that justice is done in the
end.29 Nor in the sense of knowing, or even hoping, that a di-vine
being is listening to and caring for one’s concerns in the present.
What is available has to do not with (degrees of) belief, but
merely with thoughts: the very thought of such an unseen
transcendent order can elicit a positive emotional reaction. This
is in principle no more puzzling than thoughts of disaster (such as
one’s house burning down) eliciting negative emotional re-actions,
even if one knows that these thoughts have nothing to do with
real-ity. And though the reactions are momentary, one can choose to
elicit them repeatedly. Compare this also to aesthetic experience.
Music too elicits reac-tions only in a given moment, but people
choose to consume it repeatedly.
Naturalistic religious practice, then, can involve both
identification (in both the historical and social senses), and some
connection to the (content of the) religious impulse. Though a
naturalist rejects the belief in an unseen order, they can choose
to repeatedly entertain thoughts of it, and to let specific
religious stories about the nature of that unseen order engage them
emotion-ally. Moreover, the naturalist practitioner can spend as
much time within the religious game of make-believe as they choose.
They can even include ideas and practices from different religious
traditions. Theirs is a sui generis form of engagement with
religion (though one that I think already exists).
29 I think it is possible, without irrationality, to wish for p
while disbelieving p; but I do not think the same holds for hoping
that p while disbelieving p (cf Malcolm, “Can Fictionalists Have
Faith?”, 228; for further discussion see Einar Duenger Bohn, “The
Logic of Hope: A Defense of the Hopeful”, Religious Studies 54, no.
1 (2018)). Moreover, I do not think the naturalist practitioner
necessarily needs to hope or wish that the religious story be true.
One need not want a story to be true in order to find aspects of it
beautiful or otherwise engaging.
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Natalja DeNg170
One could now insist that all this doesn’t amount to solace in a
substantial sense. Without getting distracted by quibbles over what
counts as ‘genuine’ solace, the important point is that one
shouldn’t be too quick to dismiss the value of what is available to
some naturalists in this way. This becomes even clearer if one
reflects on what exactly is available to the believer at various
points during their lives. Crane points out that the religious
impulse is rather more complex than is often assumed. Talk of the
afterlife is just as often an expression of a fragile hope as it is
an expression of a comforting conviction. Crane also describes what
he calls the essential paradoxicality of the content of the
religious impulse, quoting Alfred N. Whitehead:
Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind
and within the passing flux of immediate things; something which is
real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote
possibility and yet the greatest of present facts; something that
gives meaning to all that passes and yet eludes apprehension;
something whose possession is the final good and yet is beyond all
reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless
quest.30
This point seems to me relevant to the question of how
significant we should take naturalist religious practice to be,
because it refines our picture of what is available to the
believer. It’s not just that the believer struggles with
main-taining belief in the face of suffering, though that is a very
real struggle.31 It’s that, at least in many religious traditions,
the very nature of the transcend-ent — and with it, the very nature
of what it is one does when engaging with ideas about the
transcendent — has to remain mysterious. It’s not just beyond human
understanding how, if God exists, the world can contain the
suffering it contains. Ultimately, it’s beyond human understanding
even what it would be for God to exist. And when that is part of a
story, the value of engaging with that story becomes to an
additional degree independent of belief or hope. Part of what
matters in religious practice is simply opening oneself up to the
feeling of existential uncertainty, by repeatedly engaging with the
very idea of the transcendent.32
30 Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Free
Press, 1967), 192.31 This struggle is probably one that is not
accessible to the naturalist (though see Le Poidevin, “Playing the
God Game”, 187, for the suggestion of a fictionalist
counterpart).32 It might be objected here that not all religious
traditions involve mysticism, and that their interpretation should
not overemphasize this element of mystery and paradoxicality. Crane
an-
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Religion foR natuRalists and the Meaning of Belief 171
One reason some naturalists might want to do this is that they
too may in-clude mystery somewhere in their world view, even if
they don’t connect that mystery to anything transcendent. That is,
the world according to a naturalist may be mysterious in some
secular sense (as Crane himself seems to suggest in places).33 If
in addition, they find some religious story a beautiful reaction to
that mystery, then they too can appreciate that story. But even if
a naturalist finds no place for anything worth calling ‘mystery’ in
their world view, if they feel an af-finity with some religious
tradition, they can still engage in that tradition’s prac-tices,
and experience some of the same sense of the sacred as a believer
might.
One other point from The Meaning of Belief is relevant here.
Crane makes a distinction between what he calls ‘pessimistic
atheists’ and ‘optimistic athe-ists’. Pessimistic atheists (of
which he says he is one) find the religious impulse intelligible
and acknowledge that the transcendent would give life meaning of a
kind it can never actually have. They also acknowledge that
religious believ-ers are able to appreciate religious art and music
in a way no secular person can. Optimistic atheists, as Crane
thinks of them, are inclined to disagree on both points. They think
their experience of works of religious art shows that they too can
fully appreciate them. Moreover, the Cranean optimistic atheist
finds the religious impulse unintelligible. They think the idea of
the ‘enchant-ment’ of the world, of the world really harbouring an
unseen order that gives life as a whole meaning, is a kind of
confusion. So they won’t concede that a naturalist world view is in
any sense bleak, because what the naturalist has rejected didn’t
make sense in the first place.
Religious fictionalism of the kind described here, and the
naturalistic reli-gious practice it grounds, have a distinctly
optimistic flavor. But neither relies on the optimist’s claim that
the religious impulse is unintelligible, in the sense that there
was never anything there to hope for. The religious impulse makes
enough sense to be an object of hope, and the naturalist does not
share that
ticipates this objection: “This is not to say that orthodox
versions of Judaism, Islam, and Chris-tianity should be regarded as
mystical faiths, but only that they place certain epistemic limits
on believers: that is, limits about what they can know” (Crane, The
Meaning of Belief, 57). Admit-tedly, there is a difference between
there being limits to what can be known (or said) and there being
hardly anything that can be known (or said), and talk of an
‘ultimate’ mystery can mask a slide between these two claims. But
it seems to me that in practice, the element of mystery Crane
describes does play a central role even in orthodox versions of
Western theistic religions.33 E.g. Crane, The Meaning of Belief,
159.
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Natalja DeNg172
hope (see footnote 28). Since they believe there is no
transcendent aspect to reality, they cannot, without periodic
wavering or mental fragmentation, live just as if the religion were
true, or even just as if it might be true. Naturalistic religious
practice, on this version of religious fictionalism, is
fundamentally different in nature from a believer’s practice.
Nonetheless, as we’ve seen, the naturalist is able to access
some experi-ences that are similar to those of the believer, and
one reason for this does have to do with how intelligible the idea
of the transcendent can become. The strange situation we are in
with respect to the demarcation of religion is this. As Crane
acknowledges (despite his criticism of the New Atheists’ focus on
cosmological elements), the religious impulse is a key feature of
religion. Since naturalism is defined in terms of the belief(s) it
rejects, the religious impulse lies at the heart of what separates
religious believers from naturalists. And yet the content of the
religious impulse is inherently paradoxical and ultimately has to
remain mysterious.34
V. concluding ReMaRks
The theme of this collection of articles, ‘Philosophy, Religion,
and Hope’, is open to a variety of interpretations. The
interpretation I’ve focused on is, what is the role that religious
doctrine plays in religion, and to what extent can natu-ralists
enter into aspects of the religious way of life? My aim was to
relate the philosophical discussion on these questions to Tim
Crane’s The Meaning of Be-lief, especially his claim that atheists
can derive no genuine solace from religion.
I’ve argued that while there are limits to naturalistic
religious practice, there is an experientially significant
remainder accessible to naturalists who feel so inclined. Whether
or not this remainder involves anything properly describ-able as
‘genuine’ solace, it can be of enough value to the naturalist to be
worth engaging in, and it need involve no mental fragmentation or
hypocrisy. I’ve also suggested that there is a version of
fictionalism that can underwrite this practice, on which one treats
a religion as a story to be imaginatively entered into and brought
to life. Moreover, the significance of this kind of activity is
all
34 Is there a tension between this talk of mystery in the
content of the religious impulse and taking a realist approach to
the semantics of religious language? I am not sure there is: a
stable semantic content is not the same as a definite or
non-mysterious semantic content.
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Religion foR natuRalists and the Meaning of Belief 173
the greater if one is prepared to take on board Crane’s claim
that religious belief is inherently paradoxical, for which I’ve
provided some support.
A different way to interpret the theme ‘Philosophy, Religion,
and Hope’ would be this: when it comes to matters of
inter-religious dialogue, includ-ing dialogue between the religious
and the non-religious, is there reason to be hopeful? And, can
philosophy help? Though not an academic philoso-phy book, The
Meaning of Belief demonstrates how philosophy can help. The book’s
closing sentences highlight the connection between these two ways
of interpreting the theme:
The problems the world is facing are practical political
problems, problems whose solutions need cooperation, coordination,
and compromise. Any view about how atheists and theists should live
together and interact must ultimately confront the fact that
neither religion nor secularism is going to disappear. The least we
can hope for is peaceful coexistence, while the most we can hope
for is a kind of dialogue between those who hold very different
views of reality. A genuine dialogue of this kind will be very
difficult to achieve, but the first step must be for each side to
gain an adequate understanding of the views of the other.35,36
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