Relativism in Contemporary American Philosophy - Continuum Studies in American Philosophy

8/6/2019 Relativism in Contemporary American Philosophy - Continuum Studies in American Philosophy

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Relativism inContemporary American

Philosophy

TIMOTHY MOSTELLER

Continuum


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R E L A T IV IS M IN C O N T E M P O R A R YA M E R I C A N PHILOSOPHY


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Continuum Studies in American Philosophy

Dorothy G. Rogers, Am erica's F irst W omen PhilosophersThorn Brooks and Fabian Freyerhagen (eds) , The Legacy of John RawlsJames Marcum, Thomas Kuhn's RevolutionJoshua Rust, John Searle and the Construction of Social RealityEve Gaudet, Quine on MeaningDouglas McDermid, The Varieties of Pragmatism


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RELATIVISM IN C O N T E M P O R A R YA M E R I C A N PHILOSOPHY

T I M O T H Y M O S T E L L E R

continuum


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Cont inuum In te rna t iona l Publ i sh ing GroupThe Tower Building 80 Maiden Lane1 1 York Road Suite 704London SE1 7NX New York, NY 10038www.continuumbooks.com

Timothy Mosteller 2006A ll rights reserved. N o par t of this pub lication may be reproduced or t ransmit ted in any formor by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or anyin formation storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writ ing from th epublishers.Timothy M osteller has asserted his right u nde r the Cop yright, D esigns and Paten ts Act, 1988,to be identified as A u t h o r of this work.British Library Cataloguing-in-Publ icat ion D a t aA catalogue record fo r this book is avai lable from th e Brit ish L ibrary.ISBN: 0-8264-8636-3 (ha rdback)

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Dedication

To Angela with Love


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Acknowledgements

This boo k wo uld not have b een possib le w i th ou t the pat ien t ,dedicated gu idan ce of H arvey Siegel. I am also very gra te fu l toDal las Wi l l a rd , J. P. M ore l and , Dou g Ge ive tt and S u s an H a a c k forthe ir s ign i f ican t in f luence in m y th ink in g ab ou t ep is tem ology andthe role of phi losoph y in w el l -being and w el l -doing.


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Contents

1 Epistemolog ica l Rela tiv ism A r t icu la tedIn t roduc t ionRela t iv i sm: genera l s t a tementT h e diff iculties with ERS u m m a r y

2 Recent Attempts to Generate A Non-problematic ERI n t roduc t ionMei l and : "N o t ranscendence, therefore re la t ivism"Devine: "N o neutra l i ty , therefore re la t ivism"Swoyer: "No common wor ld , therefore re la t iv i sm"Stich: "N o cogni t ive norms, therefore re la t ivism"S u m m a r y

3 Relat ivis t ic Tensions in MacIntyre ' s Epis temologyIn t roduc t ion : th ree key features of M a c I n t y r e ' sepis temologyRat iona l i t y within t radi t ionsDefeat ing t r ad i t ionsP u t n a m an d Ror ty on M ac In tyre ' s re la t ivis t ic tensions

4 Relat ivis t ic Tensions in Putnam's Epis temologyIn t roduc t ionReject ion of relat ivismRelat ivis t ic tensions in Putnam's epis temologyM a c I n t y r e an d Ror ty on P ut na m 's re la t ivis t ic tensionsConclusion

5 Relat ivist ic Tensions in Ror ty ' s "Epistemology"I n t roduc t ion

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1 5

1 71 72 126323540

4545

475763

777778951091 1 4

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Rorty's views on epistemologyRorty's views on epistemology and ERM a c I n t y r e a n d P u t n a m on Rorty's relativist ic tensionsConclus ion

6 Toward an ER-Free Epis temologyI n t ro d uc t i o nT h e s t an da rds con ju n c t as a necessary condi t ionfor epistemologyReject ing the no neu t ra l i ty con junc tAccept ing loca l neut ra l i tyConclus ion

BibliographyIndex

1241 3 51 4 1148

155155156

1601 6 1176

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Relativism in Contemporary American Philosophyiii


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Introduction

Epis temological re la t ivism h as been wi th u s from th e beg inn ing ofWestern ph i losophy . It is a powerfu l idea that h as a t t r ac t ed th eadm ira t ion and scorn of ph i losophers th ro ug ho ut the ages. This isn o less t r ue i n twen t i e t h - cen tu ry Amer i can ph i losophy . This w o r kis a cr i t ica l s tudy of epis temolog ical re la t ivism in the w o r k s of andth e deba tes be tween th ree con temporary Amer ican ph i losophers :A l asda i r Mac In ty re , H i l a ry Pu tnam and Richard Ror ty . Thesethree in te l lectu als have c on tr ibu ted grea t ly to the discuss ion of therole that re la t ivism should or should not p lay in an overal l accountof knowledge . In order to eva lua t e Maclntyre, P u t n a m an dRorty 's epis temologies an d their views on epis temological re la t i -vism, I will first a rgue that epis temological re la t ivism, towardwhich these epis temologies tend, fails. This f irst chap ter beg inswi th a c la r i f i ca t ion of epis temolog ical re la t ivism and i ts difficult ies.This chap ter wi l l be fol lowed in the second chap ter by a cri t icalaccount of four recent a t tempts to overcome those difficult ies. Iwill a rgue that these a t t empts fail . In Chapters 3 , 4 and 5 I wi l lpresen t an exposi t ion of the presenc e of epistem olog ical relat ivismin th e m a j o r w o r k s of M a c l n t y r e , P u t n a m and Ror ty , and I wil lexamine th e three-way deba te be tween these th inkers regard ingthe presence of epis tem ological re la t ivism in thei r w orks . InC h a p t e r 6 , I conc lude wi th an a c c o u n t of how a coheren tepis temology can be cons t ruc ted that is free from the dif f icul t ies ofepis temological re la t ivism.

Epistemoloffical Relativism ArticulatedChapter 1


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What is relativism? In developing a general statement of whatrelat ivism is , i t may be useful to examine several recent defini t ionsof relativism. Consider th e fol lowing: "Any doctrine could b e calledre la t ivism which holds that something exists, or has certainproperties or fea tures , or is true or in some sense obtains, nots imply but only in relation to something else" (Lacey, 1986, p. 2 0 6 ) .This definition is too broad. Its broadness lies in the phrase "only inrelation to something else." For example, philosophers whomaintain some kind of correspondence theory of truth might claimthat a proposition p is true in virtue of the relation that p has to afac t J\ p is true only in relation to f. A theistic philosopher mightargue that the universe exists and has the properties it has "only inrelation to" the mind of God. This defini t ion will not work since"only in relation to" includes, in the two examples just presented,alethic and ontological dependence (which is a relation of somethingwith something else) in the definition. B u t this is not what isordinarily meant by advocates of relativism. There are only certainkinds of relations that result in relativism.

Other defini t ions are too narrow. For example: "Relativism [is]the denial that there are certain kinds of universal truths" (Pojman,1995, p. 690). This definition puts an epistemic premium on whatrelat ivism is, bu t not al l fo rms of relativism need to have epistemicelementsalthough a ll fo rms of relativism have epistemic implica-t ions. Ontological relativism, according to which the existence and/or nature of some entity x is relative to l a n g u a g e ( s ) , concepts, etc.,does not seem to have an epistemic element to it. However, it seemsto have epistemic implications in that if the existence and/or natureof an entity x, is relative to language, then knowing that x exists andexists as such, will be dependent upon what x is like which isdependent upon language, concepts or whatever.1

Le t me propose th e fol lowing defini t ion of relativism which isbroad enough to encompass a wide variety of relativism and narrowenough to exclude other varieties:

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Relativism = df:the nature and existence of items of knowledge, qualities, valuesor logical entities non- t r iv ia l ly obtain their natures and/orexistence from certain aspects of human activity, including, b u tnot limited to beliefs, cultures, languages,etc.

Epistemological Relativism(ER)Throughout this work, I will be using Harvey Siegel's definition ofepis temological relativism as a starting point for evaluation ofMaclntyre's, Putnam's, and Rorty's epistemologies. Siegel definesepis temological relativism in the fol lowing two-part fashion. First,there is a "standards" conjunct which states:

For any knowledge claim p, p can be evaluated (assessed,es tab l ished, etc.)only according to (with reference to) one oranother set of background principles and standards of evaluationS j , ... Sn.

Second, there is a "no neutrality" conjunct which states:and, given a different set (or sets) of background principles andstandards s/, . . . sn', there is no neutral (that is, neutral withrespect to the two (or more) alternative sets of principles ands tandards ) way o f choosing between the two (or more) alternativesets in evaluating p with respect to truth or rational justification.j f r ' s truth an d rational just i f iabi l i ty a re relative to the standardsused in eva lu a t i n g / ? (Siegel, 1987, p. 6) .The key element of Siegel's defini t ion is the notion of there being

n o neutral (i.e. non-question begging) standard (s) b y means ofwhich to determine the "truth or rational justification" of anykn owledg e claim. Siegel's defini t ion is particularly he lp fu l in that i tdoes n ot specify an y particular standard, b u t leaves room for theapplication of any standard whatsoever.

Other contemporary defini t ions of relativism recognize this dualaspect of relativism: the relevance of "standards" and the absence of

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epistemic "neutrality."2 Relying on Siegel (1987) , Harre andKrausz state that a "strong form of epistemic relativism" would beone in which one holds to the assumption that "there could be nooverarching set of evaluative standards b y which each person'sevaluative standards could b e ranked with respect to i ts knowledgeengendering power" (Harre and Krausz, 1996, p. 75). They statethat this could be made stronger by adding the "further conditionthat along with each set of evaluative standards there is a differentset of background beliefs" or "epistemic frameworks" (p . 75).Similar ly , Bayley's description captures the standards aspect. Hes ta tes , "Relativism is usually understood as the claim thatstandards, rules, principles, ideals . . . for acceptability of a belieflack validity outside some limited, statable context" (Bayley, 1992,p. 2) .

Like Siegel, Harre and Krausz also recognize the "no neutrality"aspect of relativism. The notion of "no neutrality" is alluded towhen Harre and Krausz state that according to relativism "therewill be many distinct, irreducible knowledge corpora" (Harre andKrausz, 1996, p. 75). The key emphasis here is on "many" and"irreducible." Since no knowledge "corpus" is reducible to another,presumably this means that there is no neutral way in whichepistemic standards can be reduced to another. Thus, there is noneutral way in which they can themselves be evaluated: "There areindependent a n d irreducible thought-styles, sets o f absolutepresupposi t ions, paradigms, narrative conventions and so on" (p.94 ) also called "conceptual schemes" (p . 75) . 3

Similar ly , Gifford recognizes the no neutrality conjunct. H eindicates the importance of recognizing that the epistemologicalrelat ivist rejects any overarching criteria by means of which one canad j ud ica t e between competing or contradictory truth claims. "Therelat ivist . . . will deny that we can ever offer a single criterion bywhich we can determine the 'rightness' of what . . . we know willvary with the unique fea tures of a person or of a context or of aculture" (Gifford, 1983, p. x) .

The importance of this dual-aspect nature of relativism will beevident throughout this work. In Chapters 3 5 , key fea tures of theepis temological views of Maclntyre, Putnam and Rorty will be

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exam ined . Each of these phi losophers mainta in that epistemiceva lua t ion can only occur th roug h the u se of s t anda r ds of eva lua t ionw h ich are relat ive to t r ad i t ions (Maclntyre), concep tua l schemes( P u t n a m ) , a n d ethne ( R o r t y ) , and each phi losopher agrees that therecan be no neu t r a l i ty be tween compet ing s tandards of epistemicevaluat ion . However , these phi losophers mainta in that this does notlead to re la t ivism. Th e diff icul ty for these phi losophers is to avoidep is temolog ica l r e la t iv i sm whi le main ta in ing that there can be noneu t r a l i ty be tween compet ing ep is temic s tandards of eva lua t ion .Before proceeding to an eva lua t ion of those views, I t u r n now to anexam ina t ion of the diff icul t ies with epis temological re la t ivism(hence for th , ER).

The difficulties with ERER is self-defeatingFrom the history of philosophy , it appea rs that the first ar t icula t ion ofa relat ivist ic view of kno w ledge wa s given b y Protag oras in h is wo rkTruth, now lost but most widely known through Pla to 's presenta t ionof it in the Theaetetus.^ What exactly is Protagorean relat ivism?Protagorean relat ivism is a species of the genera l formula t ion ofepistemological relat ivism given above. It is simply the view that"things are for every m an w h at they seem to him to be" (Plato , 1997,p. 189, line 170a ) . Siegel claims,

Protag oras ' v iew is an extreme vers ion of re la t ivism: kno wled geand t r u th are relat ive to the person con templa t ing the proposi-tion in ques t ion , p is t rue ( for me) if it so seems; false ( for me) if i tso seems. Since th e f ina l arb i te r of t r u th and know ledge is theindividual , Protagoras ' v iew denies the existence of any s t anda r dor cr i ter ion h igher than the i nd iv idua l by which c la ims to t r u t hand know ledge can be adjudicated (Siegel, 1987, p. 4).

Harre and Krausz a lso recognize that Protagorean re la t ivism isext reme in its f o r m u l a t i o n . Part of w ha t m akes P r o t agor ean



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re la t ivism extreme lies in i ts c la im that knowledge is re la t ive to theind iv idua l . Harre and Krausz concur wi th Siegel when they s ta te ,

Protagorean relat ivism is an extreme form of truth relat ivism. It isextreme in the sense that it m akes the t r u th or w ar r an tedassertibility of proposit ions relat ive to individ ua l persons on un iqueoccasions. This is a most implausible doctr ine, in that we couldhard ly imag ine a coheren t form of life developing in suchcircumstances . B u t there are other varieties of epistemic relativismwhich are not so easily dismissed. One could concede thepossibility t h a t a very general relat ivism holds among large scalebelief systems with ou t em bracing extrem e Protagorean individu-alism (Har re and Krausz, 1996, pp. 7 3 4 ) .A s Harre and Krausz recogn ize , its ext reme ind iv idua l i sm

( am on g o the r o f i t s f e a t u r e s ) m akes P r o t a gor ea n r e la t iv ismproblematic.5 It is in teres t ing to no te t ha t the three phi losopherswhose work I wil l invest igate have each indicated th at the kind ofre la t ivism that Protagoras held is problematic.6 Maclntyre, P u t n a mand Rorty c la im that their ep is temological views avoid th is kind ofextreme Protagorean re la t ivism, but they do cla im that re la t ivismcan provide ins ights in to epis temology that are "not so easilydism issed." These phi losophers m ain ta in th at kno wled ge involvessome sor t of communal ac t iv i ty , cu l tu re , or peer g roup . Whetherthis wa y out of the individu al is t ic n atu re of Prota gorea n re la t ivismis successful remains to be seen. I wi l l argue that even though thesephi losophers do not hold to Protagorean re la t ivism, their ep is-temologies do have aspects which appear relat ivist ic, as epis temo-logical relat ivism is defined by Siegel above.

Siegel draws out two arguments from So crates' criticism s of ER inthe Theaetetus, both of which apply not only to Protagorean relat ivism,bu t to ER as it is defined above. First , there is the argu m ent th at"necessarily some beliefs are false" ( the N SBF a rgu m en t) (Siegel,1987, p. 6 ) . This argument can be summar ized as follows:

1. If there is a s t anda r d by w hich ER is j udged to be false, thenER is false.



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2 . There is a standard by which ER is judged to be false.3. Therefore, ER is false.What is the relativist to make of this argument? In order to avoid

this conclusion, the relativist must show that premise 1 is false. Inorder to deny premise 1, the relativist must deny that th e falsity ofER follows from its being judged to be false, b u t this is impossible forthe relativist, since on the very nature of the defini t ion of relativism,a ll propositions (including ER) are true or false just in case they a rejudged to be so. To deny premise 1, the relativist must deny th e verything asserted in the defini t ion of ER, namely, that t r u th / f a l s i t y isrelative to standards. So, the relativist in maintaining that ER istrue must allow that ER is false, if a standard judges i t to be so.

Maria Baghramian claims that the NSBF argument is proble-matic because i t fails to "distinguish between agent-relativism an dcontext-relativism" (Baghramian, 2004, p. 133), where the fo r me r iss imply a form of subjectivism, while th e latter "provides for anagent-independent or what may be called a 'context-relative'criterion of truth an d falsity" (p . 133). According to Baghramian,the NSBF argument doesn't apply to the context-relativist, becausethis type of relativist denies the the very distinction between beingright simpliceter and being right according to the standards ofevaluation of a particular context (e.g. cultural con tex ts ) . While thism ay make us "prisoners of our own culture" (p . 133), according toBaghramian, without f u r t he r argument as to why this is a problem,the NSBF argument doesn't apply.

Baghramian's distinction between agent and context-relativistsdoesn't militate against the NSBF argument. If we accept herdis t inct ion, we end up with two new arguments:NSBF-A:

1. If there is a standard held by an individual agent by whichER is judged to be false, then ER is false.

2 . There is a standard held by an individual agent by which ERis judged to be false.

3. Therefore, ER is false.



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NSBF-C:1. If there is a standard in a particular context by one or more

i nd iv idua l s b y which ER is judged to be false, then ER is false.2 . There is a standard in a particular context by one or morei nd iv idua l s b y which ER is judged to be false, then ER is false.

3 . Therefore, ER is false.Both NSBF-A and NSBF-C claim that regardless of whetherrelat ivism takes the standards of epistemic evaluation to be relativeto an agent's individual beliefs, or to a context in which an agent'sbeliefs are formed, as long as the relativist denies the possibility ofneutrality between her context-relativism (or agent relativism) andthe denial of her context-relativism, then necessarily, context-relat ivism (or agent relativism) will b e false.

In addition to the NSBF argument, Siegel presents the argumentthat ER should be rejected because it "undermines the very notionof Tightness" (Siegel, 1987, p. 4) , the UVNR argument. Thisargument can be summarized as follows:

1. "If ER is rationally jus t i f i ab le , [then] there must be some non-relative, neutral . . . framework or ground from which we canmake that judgment [i.e. that ER is rationally ju s t i f i ab le ]" (p.4 ) .

2 . B u t according to the defini t ion of ER there are no non-relative, neutral f r am ew o r k s or grounds.

3 . Therefore, ER is not a rationally jus t i f i ab le position.T h e relativist must take issue with premise 1 in this argument.

The relativist must claim that it is true that ER is rationallyjus t i f i ab le an d that it is false that a neutral f r a me wor k is required.However, whatever rational justification that th e relativist has forthe a f f i rma t ion of the antecedent and the denial of the consequent ofpremise 1, it cannot be a jus t i f ica t ion which is itself neutral, since th erelat ivist is seeking to deny the possibility of any such neutrality.The very notion of the Tightness or truth of a proposition has beenundermined in the very definition of relativism. Thus, if ER true, itw ould be false, since "there can be no neutral ground from which to



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assess the r a t iona l jus t i f iab i l i ty of any c l a im , i nc lud ing ER itself(Siegel, 1987, p. 8).

Using Siegel 's understanding of ER, i t is also possible to showthat ER leads to a reductio ad absurdum. Cons ider the fol lowing:1. If ER is a "rat ional ly jus t i f i ab le position," then "there are

good reason s for ho ldin g ER" (Siegel, 1987, p . 8) .2 . If there a re good reasons for ho ld ing ER , then those good

reasons are neutra l (by defini t ion of "good reason") .3 . A ccor d ing to the pr oponen t of ER, it is not the case that thosegood reasons are neu t r a l .4 . Therefore, according to the pr oponen t of ER, there are not

good reasons for holding ER.5 . Therefore, according to the pr oponen t of ER, ER is not a

r a t iona l ly jus t i f i ab le posit ion.The focal point of th is argu m en t is the t ru th valu e of premise 2 .

The not ion of ne utra l i ty required for th is arg um en t to w ork is oneaccord ing to w hich the good reasons for hold ing to ER are n e u t r a l"with respect to the pr esuppos i t i ons of r e la t iv i s t s and n o n -relativists" (p. 8). The pr oponen t of t h is a r gum en t s im p ly m a in t a in sthat i f one is to hold to ER, the n w ith respect to the deb ate as tow h e t h e r to hold ER or not , if there are good reasons to hold ER,then those reasons must be neutra l wi th respect to the deba tebe tween the relat ivist and the non-rela t ivis t .

With respect to premise 2 , the relat ivist must claim that it is falseb y c la iming that there can be good reasons for ho ld ing ER and thatthose good reasons can be non-neu t r a l (wi th r espec t to the deba tebetween rela t ivism and n on - re l a t i v i sm) . H owever , the reasons forthe relat ivist 's claim that good reasons can be non-neu t r a l , w i l lei ther b e neu t r a l ( w h ich m eans that relat ivism is g iven up) , or theywill be non -neu t r a l . How ever , if they are non -neu t r a l , t hen whyshould the denia l of the con sequent in prem ise 2 be accepted overth e a f f i rma t ion of the consequ ent? C er ta in ly the n on-rela t ivis t wi l lbe free to reject that denial . Siegel argues that "to defend relat ivismis to defend it non-rela t ivis t ica l ly , which is to give it up; to 'de fend 'it relat ivist ical ly is not to d e f e n d i t at all" (p . 9).

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Jordan's c la im tha t it follows from Socrates ' argument "only thatth at proposit ion is false for those to w h o m it seems so" is s imply false.H ere is wh y. A ll th at one needs to do in order to show th at i t is falseis ask the following simple question: For whom is it t rue "that t h a tproposit ion is false for those to w h o m it seems so"? If the answer is"for any su bject" then relat ivism is given up, and Socrates ' cr i t icismis successful in showing that relat ivism is self-refuting, con t r a ry toJordan's c la im. In fact, Jordan seems to indicate that th is would beProtagoras ' answer . He states, "If I am Protagoras , I will ascribe toany proposit ion 's denial of the s ta tus of being t rue for those w hobelieve it" (p. 16 ) . This appears to be a univer sa l c la im abou t then a t u r e of t r u th for all believing subjects. However, the im m ed ia t equest ion must be put to Jordan: what is the epis temic s ta tus of thisclaim i t s e l f ? If Jordan answers, it is t rue simpliciter, then relat ivism isgiven up, and the charge of self-refutation stands. However, i fJordan, or Protagoras , were to answer that this claim is true "forme" then we no longer have an a r g u m e n t or an assertion of any th ingmore than the relat ivist 's personal belief that relat ivism is t rue . Tom ak e this move, acc ording to Siegel, is to "fai l to join the issue withthe opponen t of relat ivism; it is to fail to assert the correctness orcog nitive supe riority of relativism " (Siegel, 1987, p. 2 4 ) .8

While Jordan is m istak en th at Soc rates ' version of the self-r e f u t a t i o n a r g u m e n t d o e s not w o r k a g a i n s t ER b e c a u s e itequivocates on "true," Jordan ul t imate ly a rgues against ER. Hedoes so by r ecogn izing tha t th e advoca te of ER is m a k i n g an assertiona b o u t something, and in doing so it shows tha t there mus t be somebasis for the relat ivist 's claims.9

ER and solipsismThe place of epistemological relat ivism in the epis temology ofH i l a r y P u t n a m w i l l be cons idered be low. However , in th isdiscussion of the general difficult ies with ER, I would l ike to pointthe way towards a po ten t ia l diff icul ty for ER , one t h at is raised byPu tna m . P u tn am 's c ri ti c ism beg ins wi th a considerat ion of how tom ake on e vers ion of re la t ivism consis tent wi th the cha rge th at i t i sself-refut ing.



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Pu tna m s ta tes tha t there is a way to genera te a consis tentre la t iv i sm by con s t r uc t i ng w ha t Pu tna m ca l ls " f i rs t -pe rson"rela t ivism. "If I am a relat ivist , and I def ine t r u th as to w h a t /agree with , or as w h a t I would agree with . .. then , as long as Icon t inu e to agree wi th m y own def in i t ion of t ru th , the a rgu m entt h a t my position . . . is self refuting, does not im m ed ia t e ly arise"(Pu tna m , 1992a , p . 73 ) . Pu tna m con t inues , "Solips ism has neverbeen a popular phi losophical posi t ion, and first-person relat ivismsounds dangerously close to solipsism. Indeed, i t is not clear how itcan avoid being solipsism" (p. 7 5) . Relat ivism ca nn ot avoid beingsolipsism, because

If you and I are not the first-person relat ivist in quest ion, then thet r u t h a b o u t me and a b o u t you and a b o u t the f r iends and thespouse of the first-person relat ivist is, for the first-person relat ivist ,s imply a fun cti on of his or her own disposit ions to believe. This iswhy f irs t-person relat ivism sounds l ike thinly disguised solipsism.But it is ha r d to see why cul tural re la t ivism is any bet ter of f , inthis respect . Is solipsism with a "we" any better than solipsismwi th an "I"? (p. 7 6 ) .1 0

The key not ion tha t Pu tnam recogn izes is t h a t the first-personre la t ivis t wi l l m ain ta in th at t ru th s are "simply a fu nc t ion of h is orher own disposit ions to believe." W hy is this sim ilar to solipsism?Consider the fo l lowing def in i t ion of solipsism: solipsism means

l i teral ly "self alone", and less l i teral ly "I a lone exist" or else "Ialone am conscious", yielding in the first case a m ore ideal is t formof solipsism queryin g the exis tence of an ind epe nd en t m ater ia lwor ld , and in the second case a more mater ia l i s t form a l lowingfor the (possib le) existence of a m ater ia l wo r ld but again notc o u n t e n a n c i n g the exis tence of o t h e r m i n d s or cen ter s ofconsciousness (Borst , 1992, p. 4 8 7 ) .The solipsist wi l l m ain ta in tha t the only th ing that exis ts is the

self, and her t hough t s . The first-person relat ivist , according toP utn am , is s imi lar to the sol ips is t becau se the re la t ivist ma kes w h at

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is t rue d epe nd en t on the existence and aspects of the consciou sness ofthe relat ivist . The solipsist must say of herself that she alone existsand that these th ings that appear to be different than hersel f areno th ing but her own t hough t s . The first-person relat ivist who m a k e stru th dep end ent on her own psychological s ta tes is in the sam eposition as the solipsist.

The first-person re la t ivis t might say t h a t he is not deny ing t ha tthere are other minds , but tha t o ther minds do the same th ing tha the does; they a lso make t ru ths to be func t ions of their disposit ions tobelieve. However, this way out of solipsism is not open to the first-person relat ivist . The first-person re la t ivis t , in making th is c la im, iss imply saying that th is t ru th too is a func t ion of his disposit ion tobelieve it to be true."

The first-person relat ivist has by Pu tna m 's def in i t ion i so la tedhimself from other minds. This kind of isolat ion is seen in ano the rdefini t ion of solipsism, where solipsism is unders tood to be "thedoctr ine that there exists a first person perspective possessingprivileged and i r reducible character is t ics , in vi r tue of w hich wes tand in va r ious kin ds of isola tion from any oth er persons or externa lth ings tha t may exist" (Vinci, 1995, p. 75 1 ) . The key aspect of thisdefini t ion is the "isolation" th at the solipsist ha s f rom other persons.

It is in this sense of solipsism as isolation f rom other minds tha tBurnyeat claims that i f the relat ivist tr ies to escape the self- refut ingc la im tha t "every j u d g m e n t is true for the person w hose j udg m en t itis" (p. 1 7 4 ) , by replacing it with the "completely solipsistic claim"(p . 191 ) , tha t it is on ly in the rela t ivis t ' s wor ld that th e relat ivist 'sclaim is t r ue for the re la t ivis t , then something is clear ly amiss .1 2Burnyea t ind ica tes tha t even the re la t ivis t ' s c la im must :

l ink j u d g m e n t s to som eth ing elsethe world . . . t h o u g h for arelat ivist the wor ld has to be relativised to each ind iv idua l . Tospeak of how th ings appear to someone is to descr ibe his s ta te ofm ind, bu t to say tha t th ings are for h im as they appear i s to pointbeyond his s ta te of m i n d to the way th ings actual ly are , notindeed in the wor ld tout court ( for P rotag oras [i .e . the relat ivist]there is no such t h ing ) , but in the wor ld as it is for h i m , in hiswor ld (Burnyea t , 1976 , p. 181) .



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Burnyeat claims that we can make no sense of the notion thatthere is a world that exists only for the relativist in which h is claim istrue. If the relativist does not maintain that his claim is "somethingwe can a l l discuss and, possibly come to accept, b u t simply assertssolipsistically that he, for his part lives in a world in which this is so,then indeed there is no discussion with him" (p . 191). Thus,relat ivism which maintains that there is only th e relativist's world,cannot even enter into discussion about the way the world is withany other inquirer. The relativist has isolated himself from any otherm i n d ( s ) , and this is similar to the position of the solipsist.

Putnam's criticism against one kind of epistemological relati-v i s m , namely "first-person relativism" seems to point thedirection to a very di f f i cu l t problem for relativism: i t leads tosol ips ism. But the question at hand is whether or not Putnam'sc l a i m s that first-person relativism leads to solipsism can also beapplied to ER, as it is def ined in this work. Does ER lead tosolipsism in the same way that first-person relativism leads tosol ipsism? There are two di f f icu l t ies that might stand in the way ofan application of Putnam's argument to ER. First, Putnam's first-person relativism makes that which is true a function of what ther e la t iv i s t believes, and this is much di f f e ren t than ER whichs im p ly maintains that knowledge claims can only be evaluatedwith reference to certain standards of evaluation and that givencompeting standards there i s no way of choosing on e standardover another. If it can be shown that the standards of evaluationto which ER refers are in f a c t the same thing as that whichdetermines what the relativist believes, then perhaps Putnam'sargument might be applied to ER.

B u t , this leads to a second diff icul ty in applying Putnam'sargument to ER, namely that ER need not rely on the standards orbeliefs of an individual, rather it could rely on the beliefs of a groupof individuals. So, in order to make Putnam's argument count atthis point, it must be shown that first-person relativism leads to ERand that a group understanding of ER is no different than theindividual nature of Putnam's f i rs t -person relativism. It is clear thatPutnam claims that it is hard to see wh y first-person solipsism is notdifferent than "group" solipsism, but in order to make Putnam's



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a rg u men t cou n t ag a in s t ER, add i t i on a l a rg u men t s are needed . Forth e purposes of t h is work , Pu tnam 's a rgu m en t s im ply represen t s anadd i t iona l diff icul ty that E R m a y face .

Summary

In th is chapter I have a t tempted first to present a clear s tatement ofthe essential features of ER. Second, I have indicated severaldifficulties with ER. The conclusions draw n from this chapter will beapplied to the fo l lowing chapters in order to consider whether or notMaclntyre, P u t n a m or Rorty hold to versions of epistemologicalrelat ivism which are problemat ic in the ways in which ER isproblem atic . H owever, before proceeding to that project ( the mainfocus of this work) I wil l now consider several recent at tempts byadvocates of ER to develop a version of ER that avoids the difficultiesindicated in th is chapter .

Notes

1. For an excellent discussion of the types of relat ivism and thedist inctions be tween ep is temic and ontological forms of relativism, seeO'Grady, 20 0 2 .

2 . Other phi losophers (Bagh ram ian, 2004 , p. 1; Bennigson, 1999, p.21 4 ) recognize the conjunct ive features in this defini t ion of re la t ivism,i.e. d e p e nd e nc e on s t anda rds of eva lua t ion and a denial of neut ra l i tybe tween s t anda rds . S he calls this relativism at i ts "most basic," butclaims t ha t it is too simple, as the term "relat ivism" has a very wideappl ica t ion. This is correct as far as it goes, but for the purposes ofeva lua t ing epis tem ic re la t ivism, this "m ost basic" defini t ion appl iescorrectly.

3 . It is the no t ion of "conceptua l scheme" tha t Hi la ry Putnam uses inhis f o r mu l a t i o n of the no neut ra l i ty con junc t ; there are vary ingco mpe t in g an d confl ict ing "concep tua l schem es ."

4. See a lso Bag hram ian, 2004 , pp. 2 1 3 6 . Bagh ramian ' s t r ea tmen t of the



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history of relativism from an t iqu i ty to the twenty- f i rs t century isexcellent, and deserves carefu l s tudy .

5. The problem is that it is self-defeat ing .6 . M a c l n t y r e states, "So we can learn from Socrates ' encounter with thefo rmula t ions of Protagoras in the Theaetetus that relativis ts must becareful not to allow themselves to be trapped into making some typeof universal se lf- referent ia l claim" (M ac ln ty re , 1987, p . 386 ) .Putnam warns agains t fa l l ing "into the self-refuting relativism ofProtagoras" (Putnam, 1990, p. 13 9). Sim ilarly, Ro rty claim s, "Ifthere were any relativists, they w ou ld, of cou rse, be easy to refute. Onewould merely use some variety of the self- referent ia l argumentsSocrates used against Protagoras" (Rorty, 1982, p. 167).

7 . For a concise t reatment of the connect ion between self-defeat ingrelativism a nd skepticism, see Lu per, 2 004.

8. See also Siegel, 1987, pp. 2 4 5 for additional cri t icism of Jordan'sposit ion.

9. For addi t ional formulat ions of the self-defeat ing difficulties withrelativism, see Lockie, 2003.10. W e might call this "group solipsism" or "sol-z-ism."

11. For the solipsist, the existenc e of all thing s is dep en den t on the m enta lstates of the solipsist, but for the epistemological relativist, the truthab o u t a ll th ings , including o ther minds , is dependen t on the men ta lstates of the relativist. T hu s, ER is like solipsism, but in a w eake r sensethat i t does not have a metaphys ica l commitmen t in which theexistence of other thing s is dep en den t on the relativis t 's m ind.12. Bu rn yea t is here considering Protagorean relativism which is some-wh a t different t h an P u t n a m ' s f irst-person relativism; the similari tybetween them is that the re is som e kind of isolation that occurs whenrelativism in either form is main ta ined .



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Introduction

In th is chapter I examine several a t tempts to develop a non-problem at ic vers ion of ER which a t tem pt to get arou nd thedifficulties with ER presented in the previous chapter . I will arguethat these a t tempts fail . Before consider ing these arguments , I willgeneral ize three arguments that ha ve relat ivism as their con clusions.

Siegel (2003) discusses two arguments for ER, the "no neutra l i ty ,therefore relat ivism" and the "no t ranscendence, therefore re la t i -vism" a rgumen t s . T h e fo rmer begins with th e assumpt ion that thereare no neu t ra l s t anda rds be tween com pet ing know ledge c la im s an dconcludes that knowledge c la ims are re la t ive to whatever non-neu t r a l f ramework from which that knowledge c la im is m a d e , an dthis a r g u m e n t r u n s as follows:

i . There are no n e u t r a l s t a n d a r d s b y appeal to w h i c hcompet ing knowledge c la ims can be ad judica ted .

ii. If there are no neu t r a l s t anda rds by appeal to whichcompet ing knowledge c la ims can be adjudica ted , then ERobta ins .i i i . Therefore, ER obta ins .

The key premise of th is a rgum en t is premise i. Is premise i t rue?A cco rding to Siegel, the relat ivist 's use of this prem ise hinges on anambigu i ty in the idea that there is no neu t ra l i ty be tween compet ingknowledge cla ims. I t may be the case that for any two compet ingknowledge cla ims there may no t be neu t ra l s t andards . There m ay

Chapter 2

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be no neu t r a l s t anda r ds w h ich are "neutral with respect for allpossible disputes . There may nevertheless be s t anda r ds w h ich . . . aren e u t r a l in the weaker sense that they do not un fa i r ly p re jud ice anypar t icular , l ive (a t a t ime) dispute" (Siegel, 2 00 3) .

Perhaps we can m a k e the dis t inct ion between "local" and"global" neu t r a l i ty . Whi le it may be the case that there is no g loba lneu t r a l i ty , that is neu t r a l i t y that applies to al l epistemic disputes , forany par t icular dispute , there may be loca l s tandards to w hich wecan appea l , s t andards which do not prejudice e i ther one of thec o n t e s t a n t s in a particular d i s p u t e . So, pr em ise i c o u l d bedisambigua ted in to the fol lowing:

i'. There are no globally neu t r a l s t anda r ds by appea l to w hichcompet ing knowledge c la ims can be ad j ud ica t ed .

i". There are no locallyneu t r a l s t anda r ds by appea l to whichcompet ing knowledge c la ims can be ad j ud ica t ed .

If the r e la t iv i s t main ta ins i', the ant i - re la t ivis t can allow thisp r em ise w h i l e m a in t a in ing that re la t ivism does not fol low, since i tmay be possible to m a i n t a i n that there may be loca l neu t r a l i ty , butw h a t if the r e la t iv i s t main ta ins i"? Does relat ivism fol low from th en o neu t r a l i ty a rgument l i s ted above? S iege l offers tw o reasons tot h ink that i t does not . First , Siegel argues that th e first premise isfalse. He states, "we have as yet no reason to t h ink that the w eakerform of ne ut ra l i ty [ local ne utra l i ty] required for the avo idance ofrelat ivism in any given [ local] case cannot be h a d " (p. 13) . Inaddi t ion, S iegel points out that there are in f ac t loca l ly neu t r a ls t a n d a r d s by m e a n s of w hich one can eva lua te com pe t ing know l -edge c la ims. For example , a l though there may be com pe t ings tan dard s of eva lua t ion for a par t i cu la r kno wledg e c la im, thereoften are som e s t anda r ds w h ich are considered to be loca l ly neu t r a lby those par t ies that are m aking those c l a im s , and the l aws of logicoften f u n c t i o n a s such loca l ly neu t r a l s tandards . However , th e l awsof logic themselves need not a lways be local ly neutra l , s inceknow ledge c la im s abou t t hem may also be d i spu ted . In cases wh erethe laws of logic are being considered as t rue or false, one c a n n o tappea l to the laws of logic as loca l ly neu t r a l a rb i te r s in the d ispu te .



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There may in f ac t be com pe t ing know ledge c l a im s abou t the l awsof logic , in wh ich case the laws of logic ca nn ot func t ion as a local lyn e u t r a l s t a n d a r d .However , suppose that the relat ivist gives very persu asive reaso nsto th ink that local neutra l i ty cannot be had. Does re la t ivism follow?T he answer is no, and this is the second reason that Siegel offers toth ink that re la t ivism as a conclusion of the "no neutra l i ty , thereforere la t iv i sm" argument fails. The re la t ivis t ' s c la im that there is nosuch thing as local neutral i ty, is ei ther i tself a neutral claim, or i t isnot . I f i t i s a local ly ne utra l c la im , then the c la im is false, because i tc la ims that there is no loca l neu t r a l i ty . If i t is not loca l ly neu t r a l ,t hen t he r e canno t be any persuas ive , that is n o n - n e u t r a l l ypersuasive reasons for asser t ing i t , and therefore it is ineffective inargu m enta t ion for the conc lusion of ER, which i t seeks to es tabl ish .

In addi t ion to the "no neu t r a l i ty , therefore r ela tiv ism" argu m ent ,S iegel presents a second argument , often used by de fen ders of ER ,the "no t ranscen dence , t he r e fo r e r e la t ivi sm " a r gu m en t . Thisa r g u m e n t r u n s as follows:

i*. One canno t t r anscend one ' s pe r spec t ive ( f r a m e w o r k /p a r a d i g m / c u l t u r e ) .

ii*. If one cannot t ranscend one 's perspect ive, then ER ob ta in s ,iii*. Therefore, ER obta ins .

In a way s imilar to t h a t in the "no neu t r a l i ty" a rgument above , the"no t r anscendence" a rgument h inges on an a m b i g u i t y in premise i.Siegel argues that i m i g h t be d i sam b igua ted by m a k i n g a dis t inct ionbe tween g loba l and local perspectives.1

i*'. One cannot g loba l ly t r anscend all perspectives,i*". One ca nn ot local ly t ranscen d "an y given perspective"

(Siegel, 2 000 , p . 2 8 ) .The ant i - re la t ivis t can agree with the relat ivist if the relat ivist

m a i n t a i n s i*'. The ant i - re la t ivis t can deny ER, and a lso main ta int h a t for any given c la im made wi th in a perspective, it may be thecase that there is no global t ranscendence ( i . e . no perspectiveless

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perspect ive) . The anti-relativist would add, however, that there arestill local perspectives which can be transcended. Does ER follow ifthe relativist maintains i*"? Are there counter examples which showthat there do in f ac t exist cases of local transcendence? Siegelprovides commonsense evidence that shows that it is quite commonto transcend locally any particular perspective (and to improve thatperspective) without global transcendence. These examples includethe psychological development of children transcending their localperspective of not being able to grasp th e concept of fract ions,locally transcending the perspective that there are not things whichcannot be seen with the naked eye, and locally transcending theperspective that women should be treated as mere objects. In eachcase the person in the first local perspective, simply moved into animproved perspective. These examples show that although "epis-temic agents always judge from some perspective or other . . . thereis no reason to think that they are trapped in or bound by theirperspectives such that they cannot subject them to critical scrutiny"(p . 17) . Therefore, the "no transcendence, therefore relativism"argument fails and ER does n ot fol low.

I would like to add a third form of argumentation for relativism.It is what I shall call, the "no common world, thereforerelativism" argument. It has two main fea tu res : i) the propertiesof objects in the world depend upon our conceptual schemes andi i) since dif fe rent conceptual schemes represent dif fe rent worlds,ou r knowledge of those worlds is relative to our conceptualschemes . However, as I will argue below, Swoyer's formulation ofthis argument (which I believe is also f o u n d in Putnam'sep is temology) is f a t a l l y f l awed . T h e main reason, as will b e shownbe low , is that conceptual schemes/frameworks themselves a re partof the world, and therefore must have determinate properties andbe objectively non- re la t iv i s t i ca l ly knowable by us or not. If theya re objectively knowable, then relativism is given up; if they a renot objectively knowable, then no claim can be made as to howthey allow us to represent dif fe rent worlds.



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In this section, I in tend to a r gue that J. W. Mei land ' s r e jo inder inhis ar t icle "Concepts of Relat ive Truth" ( M e i land , 197 7 ) toEdmund Husser l ' s ob jec t ions to relat ivism in his Logical Investiga-tions, fails. In that work, Husser l argues against the not ion that anabsence of t r anscendence be tween com pet ing s tan dards of ep is temiceva lua t ion leads to rela t ivism. M ei land takes issue with H usser l 'sobjec t ions to relat ivism, in favor of a posi t ion which concludes thatthere is no t ran scen denc e with respect to com pet ing con ceptu alschem es w i th in w h ich know ledge c l a im s are made, thereforerelat ivism follows. I wil l first s t a te w h a t M e il and un der s t andsH usser l 's object ion to relat ivism to be. Second, I wil l ind ica te w ha tMei land ' s r e jo inder on beha l f of the relat ivist is. Third, I willind ica te w h y th is re joinder fails to defeat Husser l ' s in i t ia l object ion .

Meiland's understanding of Husserl's objection torelativismHusser l ' s main object ion to re la t ivism, according to Mei l and ,cen ter s a round his a r g u m e n t s for the idea that "the not ion ofr e la t ive t ru th mus t con ta in or otherwise commit its user to thenot ion of abso lu te truth" ( Me i l and , p. 5 7 3 ) , and the relat ivist 'sfai lure to notice this causes the relat ivist 's claims to result in var iouscontradic t ions . Husser l ' s concern in discussing relat ivism at thebeg inn ing of the Logical Investigations is to cr i tic ize psych ologism , theview that "the essen t ia l theore t ica l founda t ions of logic lie inpsych ology" (H usser l , 1970, p . 90) . Husser l c la ims that psycholo-gism is a specific ins tan ce of re la t ivism in general , and he argues thathis cr it ic ism of psychologism , wi th the a pprop r ia te chan ges, wi l la m o u n t to a criticism of relat ivism in general .

Husser l begins his discussion and cr i t icism of relat ivism byfocusing specifical ly on anthropologism, the re la t ivis t ic view that" M a n as such is the m easu r e of all h u m a n t r u t h [in w hich ] [ejveryj udge m en t w hose r oo t s are to be found in w h a t is s p e c i f i c to m a n , inthe co nst i tu t ive laws of m an as speciesis a t rue jud g em en t for us

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human beings" (p. 138). Anthropologism is a species of relativism inwhich "all truth has its source in our common human constitution"(p . 142). This form of relativism can generate a contradiction. Forexample, suppose that the relativist maintains that the judgment"there is no constitution of the human species" (p . 575) is truebecause of the basis of the constitution of the human species. This isa clear example of how one species of epistemological relativism issel f-defeat ing.

It may be argued that this kind of objection only applies to casesof relativism in which truth is relative to the constitution of thehuman species. However, even the general statement of ER given bySiegel can still be used to show what kind of contradiction couldoccur for the relativist. Suppose the relativist maintains that thekn owledg e claim that there are no standards to evaluate knowledgecla ims is true, and i t is true because of the standards that therelat ivist herself has. This is certainly a contradiction that therelat ivist might face.

Husser l makes this kind of contradiction explicit in his criticism ofrelat ivism in general, which h e develops from h is criticisms of thesespecific instances of relativism (anthropologism and psycho log ism) .Husser l thinks that if there are any things which are not relativistic,the laws of logic would be good candidates. He argues that if somefea tu re of human existence is picked out as the determinant measureof truth (i.e. the standards in Siegel's "standards" conjunct), thenthe laws of logic a re going to be grounded in some contingent fac t .But if the laws of logic are grounded in contingent fact , then anylogical proof to the conclusion that some feature of human existenceis that which determines truth, will itself b e only merely contingent.T he relativist uses logical laws in an absolute (non-contingent) senseto argue that there are no truths in an absolute sense, but only in arelative sense (pp. 1445). This is roughly what Husserl has in mindwhen he begins his consideration of relativism by stating, "Thewors t objection that can be made to a theory, and particularly to atheory of logic, is that it goes against the self-evident conditions for thepossibility of a theory in general" (p . 135). One of the putatively self-evident conditions for the possibility of a theory is that there arelogical laws by means of which one can prove that theory to be true.



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Yet , the relat ivist seems to be using non-rela t ive logical laws toprove that t r u th is relat ive.

Husser l ' s main point is that any rela t ivist ic c la im in which t ru th isre la t ive to the cons t i t u t ion , or any o the r f ea tu r e ( i nc lud ingep is temic s tandards) of the human species, involves i tself in acon t r ad ic t ion . Husser l c la ims that there is a deep connect ionbe tween t ru th and the existence of the wor ld , where "world"i n c ludes any th ing that exis ts , including logical t ru ths . He states,"The relat ivi ty of t r u th en ta i l s the relat ivi ty of cosmic existence" (p.143) . The relat ivist 's claim that t r u th is relat ive to the h u m a nspecies impl ies the re la t ivi ty of the nature/s t ructure/exis tence of thewor ld to the hu m an spec ies. H owever, and this shows the absu r d i tyof the view, the human spec ies is itself a part of the wor ld . Husser lm a k e s th i s a rgument exp l ic i t when he states:

The relat ivi ty of t r u th en ta i l s the relat ivi ty of the wor ld ' sexistence. For the wor ld is no th ing o the r than the unif iedobject ive to ta l i ty cor responding to , and inseparable from th eideal system of a l l f ac tua l t r u th . O n e cannot sub jec t iv ize t ru th ,an d allow its object (which exists only provided that t r u t hsubsists) to c o u n t as absolute ly exis tent (in i tself). There w ouldtherefore be no wor ld in itself, b u t only a world for us, or for anyother chance species being. This . . . becomes dub ious once wepoin t out that the ego and its conscious contents [ i .e . epistemiccon ten ts which func t ion as s tandards] a lso per ta ins to the wor ld(p . 143) .2

I f H usser l 's argu m en t to the non -rela t ivi ty of the wor ld is sou nd ,then a le th ic re la t ivism w hich m akes t ru th re la t ive to any fea tu re ofthe hu m an species can not ge t o f f the g rou nd .

Husse r l ' s a r gum en t is sl ightly different than th e a r g u m e n t spresented above from Plato an d Siegel . Husser l ' s argument showsthat there is a contradic t ion in saying that t ru th is re la t ive to somefea tu re of human ex is tence , while at the same lime saying that thisfea tu re of human ex is tence is not i tself relative to any th ing e l se . A ssoon as one makes t ru th re la t ive, then th e wor ld becomes re la t ive,but if the w orld is relat ive, th en i t is relat ive to one of i ts pa r ts, w hic h

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is not relative; this is where the contradiction and absurdity in therelat ivist 's position lies. Like Plato, Husserl catches the relativist in acontradiction, b u t Husserl focuses slightly more on the metaphysicalimplications of relativism than does Plato. However, the contra-diction remains for the relativist whether on e considers th e epistemicor metaphysical implications of her claims.

Meiland's relativistic rejoinder to Husserl's objections torelativismMeiland's rejoinder to Husserl's objection is based on the relativist'ssuccess in "explaining the notion of relative truth in such a way thati t does n ot include th e notion of absolute truth" (p . 5 7 1 ) . Accordingto Meiland, this notion of absolute truth would consist of a two-termrelation between a truth bearer (sentence, proposition, statement,etc. . . . ) and a truth maker (fact, state o f affairs, etc. ...).T h erelat ivist , according to Meiland, must show that truth i s not merelya two-term relation but is rather a three-term relation betweentruth maker, truth bearer, and "either persons, world views, orhistorical a n d cultural situations" (p . 5 7 1 ) . Since truth involves thiss t rong three-term relation, there is an impossibility of getting out ofthis relation in order to transcend the third term of the relation, andtherefore relativism follows. Although Meiland does n ot present af u l l -b lown argument that truth involves a three-term relation, hes imply claims that th e relativist might b e able to develop ful ly sucha view of truth. According to Meiland, if the relativist weresuccessful, it would undermine the anti-relativist claim that truthdoes not involve the third term in the three-term relation. Thus, therelat ivist does n ot rely upon an absolute notion of truth in defendingre la t ivism.

Why Meiland's rejoinder to Husserl's objection failsMeiland fails to see that Husserl does have a good answer to his ownrejoinder. Husserl offers a lengthy account of just how truth isessentially a two-term relation which transcends any third term.3(Al though , Husserl claims that truth can, but need not stand in a



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relation to the third term which Meiland takes as essential for truth.)Husser l claims that when making any analysis of the nature of truththere are three things which can enter into this analysis. There is i) thetruth bearer (which according to Husserl is a proposition qua complexreferential qualit ies/universals), ii) an object (or fact or state of affairs)instantiating the universals of the proposition, and iii) someone'sparticular thought\statement\sentence about the object. However,according to Husserl, truth is always correspondence between i and ii ,and it is in this sense that truth is entirely independent of humancognition and therefore, not relative. Item iii in this list enters intoconsideration when a mind sees the relation between i and ii , or makesa truth claim about some particular proposition and its relation tosome object. When S makes a claim which is in fact true, the relationbetween i and ii is instanced in iii.4

Husse r l claims that truth is in many instances of iii, but i sindependent of all of them, and he argues that truth simpliciter is anIdea.5 The fo l lowing is an example of Husserl's positive claim ofthe non-relative, human cognition independent, Ideal nature oftruth:

Truth . . . is "eternal", or better put, it is an Idea, and so beyondtime. It makes no sense to give truth a date in time, nor aduration which extends throughout time. Naturally on e says oftruth that on occasion it "comes to mind", and is accordingly"apprehended" or "experienced" by us. But such "apprehen-sion", "experiencing" and "coming to consciousness", are spokenof in quite a different sense in relation to ideal being, from whatthey have in relation to empirical individualized being. We donot "apprehend" truth as we apprehend some empirical contentwhich comes up, and again vanishes, in the stream of mentalexperiences: truth is not a phenomenon among phenomena, butis th e experience on that totally different sense in which auniversal , an idea, is an experience. We are conscious of truth, asw e are in general conscious of a Species, e.g. of "the" Colour Red(Husser l , 1970, p . 148).

In addition, Husserl argues that for any statement, "it is the truth

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that . . . ," even if there were no minds that could see this truth, or seethe nature of truth in particular, "each truth, however, remains initself what it is; it retains its ideal being: it does not hang somewherein the void, but is a case of validity in the timeless realm of Ideas"(p . 149). Thus, an instance of truth can be understood as theadequation (the "fit") of thing an d intellect, b u t truth itself is anideal possibility of the adequation of thing and intellect and existslogical ly prior to any mind with which it might be instanced in anact of adequation. Thus, truth can be understood as a two-termedrelation, not a three-termed relation.Thus, contrary to Meiland, the relativist does use an absolutistnotion of truth in defending relativism, since truth is in fac t a two-term relation. Thus, Meiland's claim that he can "begin to showthat Husserl . . . [makes] a great mistake by assuming that relativetruth must be either nothing at all or else a variety of absolutetruth" (Meiland, 1977, p. 572) fails, just in case Husserl is successful.Whether Husserl's defense of truth as a two-termed relationsucceeds is another matter entirely and is beyond the scope of thiswork , but Husserl's account of truth as a transcendent two-termrelation points the way to an understanding of how to defea t a "notranscendence, therefore relativism" argument.

Devine: "N o neutrality, therefore relativism"

Philip E. Devine defends epistemological relativism, which heclaims is the view "that reasoning is possible only given sharedassumpt ions , and that there is a plurality of possible sets ofassum p t ions between whose adherents n o argument is possible"(Devine, 1984, p. 4 0 4 ) . This understanding of ER is sufficientlys imilar to Siegel's, and it is clear that Devine is talking about ER.Devine does tw o things in his article. First, he offers tw o briefresponses to two common rejections of relativism. Second, hepresents and defends five theses of relativism, with emphasis on onein particular on which th e others rest. In what follows I will offerobjec t ions to Devine's criticisms of anti-relativist arguments and



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then present reasons to think that the key thesis in Devine'sunderstanding of relativism fails.

First, Devine claims that the following argument againstrelat ivism fails:(1 ) T he relativist is committed to treating a ll statements as

ellipticali.e., as containing a suppressed reference to thestandards of some group.

(2 ) A n d that commitment extends to statements about f r ame-wor ks and the relationship between a framework andstatements within it. So,

(3 ) T he relativist's attempt to make assertions of any sort willlead to an infinite regress . . .

(4) In particular he will not be able to assert his own relativism(p . 408).

Devine thinks that this argument fails because th e relativist c anreject premise (1). Devine claims, "Relativism as here presenteddoes not assert that all statements are to be expanded to read,'According to framework F,p.' On the contrary, the relativist assertsthat all statements must be made within a framework, which neednot be treated as part of the statement itself (p. 408) .

Devine's response is inadequate. First, the claim that "allstatements must be made within a framework" appears to be af r a m e w o r k - i n d e p e n d e n t statement, or a statement that is madeouts ide of every framework. Second, if it is a statement that is withinsome particular framework, then i t applies to every possiblef r a me wor k , and if i t applies to every possible framework, thenthere is a framework that is independent of all frameworks.However, this is self-defeating if it is combined with the relativisticclaim that frameworks are dependent on particular contingencies ofparticular groups of people. Third, Devine's claim is also self-defea t ing if there is to be no rational adjudication betweencompeting truth statements. If someone claims that truth claimsare not made within frameworks (i.e. that frameworks as such do notexist) , then even though this person does n ot think that frameworksexist, the relativist must claim that from within that person's

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f r amework , f r ameworks do not exist. Clearly this is a contradiction,and is absurd.

Devine also claims, "Some critics of relativism have argued that arelat ivist cannot maintain the usual sense of 'true,' . . . whileadmitting that positions other than his own are, f rom some equallyvalid point of view, true" (p . 40 8) . Devine dismisses this objection torelat ivism by indicating that the relativist will simply allow there tobe other f r am ew o r k s that use "true" dif ferent ly, but analogously toh is own, "and that no rational argument is available to show thath is own (or his opponent's) position is true or preferable" (p . 408).Devine has misconstrued the objection made by the anti-relativist.The anti-relativist does not simply think that it is problematic thatposi t ions other than his own might not be true in some otherf r a me wor k . Rather, th e anti-relativist claims that th e a f f i rma t ion ofa proposition within one f r a me wor k cannot be true at the same timeas th e denial of the same proposition within another framework.The anti-relativist is simply trying to maintain the principle of non-contradiction. More will b e said on this below, since Devine seemsto maintain that th e principle of non-contradiction is unimportant.

For now, let us consider Devine's presentation of five theses onwhich h e claims relativism rests:

( z ) Whenever someone makes an assertion, he presupposessome standard, according to which h is assertion is to bejudged true or false, and on which i ts intelligibility depends.

( z ' z ) People have employed incompatible standards in makingassert ions about the same subject matter.

( z ' z ' z ' ) Sometimes these differences of standards are ultimate. Thatis to say, there is sometimes no f u r t h e r standard to whichappeal can be made in order to determine which of the rivalstandards is correct.

(iv) Where the condition described in ( z ' z ' z ) obtains, it is nonsenseto speak of one set of standards as correct. Suchf u n d a m e n t a l standards can only be described.

( v ) Hence, a decision to accept or reject some fundamentalstandard, to the extent that it lies within human power,m us t o f necessity be arbitrary (p . 409) .

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Devine claims that whether or not relativism is true depends onthe truth of (Hi).Devine recognizes that central to relativism is thenotion of "no neutrality" (i.e. the impossibility of adjudicatingbetween competing standards of evaluation of knowledge c la ims) .

The most interesting thing that Devine claims about (in) (andthis brings us back to the consideration of the principle of non-con t r ad i c t ion ) i s that neither (Hi) "nor i ts negation can beestabl ished directly b y philosophical argument" (p . 4 1 1 ) . SinceDevine maintains that neither ( H i ) nor ~(iii) can be establishedthrough argumentation, then the question arises regarding thestandards by means of which the truth of ( H i )or ~ ( H i )are to beestabl ished. If they are both on the same epistemic foot ing, then onew onder s why one should accept ( H i ) over ~ ( m ) , as the relativistdesires.

There are at least three ways of understanding what Devinemeans when he says that there is no way of establishing (Hi).First,Devine could mean that there is no evidence for ( H i ) or ~(Hi). IfDevine means this, then we are simply faced with an epistemologicalques t ion , but it need not lead to relativism in the strong sense thatthere are no such standards, or that such standards are per seimpossible. I f this is what Devine means, then ( H i ) cannot b e used inestabl ish ing ER, since ER requires something like ( H i ) to beestabl ished.

Second, Devine could also mean that this thesis and i ts negationare true. It is clear that Devine maintains that the principle of non-contradiction is not epistemically normative, that is that theprinciple of non-contradiction alone need not mean that we mustchoose between ( H i ) or ~ ( r a ) , in cases where ( H i ) or ~(iii) cannot beestabl ished. Devine claims that the principle of non-contradictioncannot func t ion as the point by means of which rival standards aread j ud ica t ed . He seems to indicate that the principle of non-contradiction is impotent in determining whether or not we shouldhold ( H i ) or ~ ( m ) ; he states, "rationality includes selective self-contradiction" (p . 414) which c a n b e pragmatically useful. ThusDevine concludes, "We may thus proceed in many practicalcontexts as i f relativism were true" (p . 417). However, thisconc lus ion need not trouble the anti-relativist. For example,



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relat ivism might b e pragmatically useful, although false, in certaincontexts. In a context in which one might wish not to hurtsomeone ' s feelings concerning a religious or aesthetic issue, onemight, for the sake of fami ly unity, simply grant that Grandma h asher opinions and Uncle Bob has his. However, this need not meanthat anything like ER is true, and so if this is what Devine has inmind, it does not amount to a very strong defense of ER.

T h e diff icul ty that arises for Devine is that he is faced with th equestion of how to adjudicate between competing knowledge claimsas to when precisely such "selective contradictions" are appropriate.For example, one person might claim that, given their epistemicposi t ion, practical context C is appropriate for utilizing "selectivecontradiction," and at the same time, another person might claimthat, given their epistemic position, C is not an appropriate practicalcontext for utilizing "selective contradictions." Thus, th e questionarises, what standard or criteria do these persons use to adjudicatebetween competing claims as to what counts as an appropriatepractical context for utilizing "selective contradictions"? But, this isj us t the problem that ( H i ) raises in the first place. I t appears thatDevine is trying to get around ( H i ) by appealing to "practicalcontexts" as a standard for epistemic decision-making, but hecannot do this and consistently maintain (in). Thus, Devine'sattempt to articulate a coherent epistemological relativism that restson ( H i ) fails.

A third thing that Devine could mean is that it is impossible toestabl ish the truth of ( H i ) or ~(iii). If Devine were to maintain this, itw ould seem to give up relativism, since the relativist must maintain,in some sense that ( H i ) is the right way to understand knowledgeand ~ ( H i ) is not. So, if this is what Devine means, nothing like ERhas been established at all.

What is asserted by ( H i ) is itself a very interesting notion forre la t ivism, especially for the philosophers whose works will b econsidered below. Does relativism follow f rom ( H i ) ? If one means by( H i ) that sometimes th e differences between standards are such thatit is epistemically impossible to get at some neutral standard toad j ud ica t e the dispute, then (Hi) need not entail relativism. B y"epistemically impossible," I simply mean that given the epistemic



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commitments of some particular group holding to certain standards,they lack the epistemic resources to access potential standards thatdo in fac t exist between the two rival positions. However, Devineapparently means something stronger than this. He means that att imes there can be no neutral standards between rival positions.

The anti-relativist might respond to Devine by questioning thenotion that it is impossible that for any given confl ict between rivalposi t ions, there may be no neutral standard to adjudicate theconfl ict . The anti-relativist might simply suggest that, in principle,w e can just go out and look at the way things are in order todetermine which of the competing claims is right.

For example, let us assume that two tribes on an island havecompeting claims about proposition p, where p is "the earth isround." Let us assume that tribe A maintains that /) is true based ontheir standards of evaluation, and tribe B maintains that p is falsebased on their standards. It would seem that the easiest way todetermine which tribe is correct would be to voyage around theearth and see if it is round. "What the world is like" would constitutethat to which one appeals and the "looking to see what it is like"w ould constitute the method used "in order to determine which ofth e rival standards is correct" (p . 4 0 9 ) . T h e anti-relativist might askDevine, w hy shouldn't w e think that a ll cases of differences betweenstandards are in principle similar to this example?

If the anti-relativist is right about this, then Devine would needto present some reasons to think that there are cases where wecannot go out and look, but this would just make the problem anepistemic one of not being able to determine how to settle thequestion. It would not, however, mean that there are no ways tosettle the question. Devine might respond by denying that reality issuch that there are objective fea tures of reality to which any neutralappeal can be made. But, considering the simple case of ther oundness of the earth, it begins to seem rather strange to think thatth e world is in fac t f lat for tribe B and round for tribe A . This soundss imilar to the point raised in the previous chapter by Burnyeat, thatif someone is going to use relativism to create a world where thingsa re true an d real for him, but not for others, then i t would seemimposs ib le to even enter into a discussion with this person. This



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seems also to be a diff icul ty f ac ing Devine ' s unders tanding of(H i ) ,and in t u r n for the argument tha t s ince there are no n e u t r a ls tandards, therefore re la t ivism follows.

Swoyer: "No common wor ld , therefore relat ivism"

Chr is Swoyer in his ar t icle "True For" a t tempts to use the "Nocommon wor ld , therefore r e la t iv i sm" form of a r g u m e n t a t i o n forre la t ivism, whi le t ry ing to avoid a sl ide into subjective idealism.Swoyer does not endorse ER, ra ther he is s imply t ry ing to be aschar i t ab le to ER as possible. Swoyer indicates that , " the veryn a t u r e of the relat ivist 's posit ion makes i t qui te difficult for h im tof o r m u l a t e coherent ly a c la im to the effect tha t t ru th i s relative"(Swoyer , 1982, pp. 856). Swoyer 's task in this ar t icle is tof o r m u l a t e relat ivism in the m ost p laus ib le way and to cons ider whatfollows from such a f o r m u la t ion . He focuses on the locut ion "truefor" as the centra l concept used by the relat ivist to m a i n t a i n t h a tt r u th or know ledge is rela t ive. H owever , S woyer asserts tha t m an yrelat ivist ic posit ions use the locution "true for" (p. 94) not torela t ivize t ru th to ind iv idua ls , but to concep tua l f r am ew o r k s . Hea t t em p t s to " formula te [ the no t ion] as p laus ib ly as we can" (p. 9 6 ) .H e a t t em p t s to do this by consider ing "condi t ions of adeq uacy foran a c c o u n t of this notion" (p. 9 6 ) .

Swoyer a t tempts to paint relat ivism in the best l ight possible.Thus , he c la im s tha t the re la t ivis t m ust first advance "a thesis aboutth e n a t u r e of , not the cr i ter ia for , truth" (p . 96 ) . Second, th erela t ivis t ought not deny tha t there are th ings which are t r ue apartfrom the beliefs of any pa r t icu lar indiv idua l and tha t the re is apossibili ty of false beliefs. These are th ings that the re la t ivis t and thenon-rela t ivis t have in c o m m o n in the i r unders tanding of t r u t h .However, Swoyer states, " the relat ivist and realist [non-relat ivist]part com pany over the quest ion of whether some ex t r a menta l ,extra- l inguis t ic real i ty determines a l l truth" (p . 9 7 ) . 6

Swoyer is quick to recognize that , in order to avoid a "slide intosubject ive ideal ism" (p . 9 7 ) , th e re la t ivis t must offer some accoun t of

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what exactly the constraints are on "what can be true in af r a m e w o r k " (p . 97). Swoyer states that th e relativist must, first,maintain that there is a concept-independent world which"provides the input which can be 'conceptualized' or 'organized'in a multiplicity of ways" (p. 97) by different f r ameworks . 7 T h esecond thing which a relativist needs in order to avoid subjectiveidealism is what Swoyer calls "collateral commitments" which arefea tures of one's noetic structure which allow additional truths to beadded to that structure (e.g. commitments to the continuity ofexperience or commitments to "logical and evidential relations"(p . 9 7 ) ) .

What does Swoyer's account of the most plausible version ofrelat ivism lead to? A lengthy quotation from Swoyer is in order:

The picture we have thus far is one in which "the world," togetherwith the central concepts and basic beliefs of a framework,somehow determine truth in that framework. We can see moreclear ly how this sort of picture often leads to a relativism withrespect to truth if we recall the relativistic argument that ourconcepts, language, or the like somehow help to constitute thewor ld as we know it ... [the relativist] must conclude that theonly notion of the world that has signif icant content is that of thewor ld as known an d that this is in part literally created by thecentral concepts and basic beliefs we employ. Truth then hassomething to do with the world . . . with a world constituted bysomeone 's mode of thought. In short, worlds are seen to berelative to f rameworks; truth involves the (or a) world; hence, ittoo becomes relative. Using the notion of correspondence loosely,w e can then view truth in [framework] F as correspondence to thefacts of F's world; it remains a semantic notion, but it nowinvolves a word-relativizedworld relation (p . 98).While Swoyer recognizes that this picture "is not lacking in

difficult ies," h e indicates this is the "most plausible version ofrelativism" (p. 99). However, the upshot of truth as "a word-relativized world relation" is that this strong version of relativismw ould maintain that some knowledge claim p could b e true in



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f r a me wor k F and false in ano ther f r a me wor k F'. However, Swoyerr ight ly points out that if "F and F' involve 'd i f ferent wor lds , ' as an at u ral in terpreta t io n of the s t rong re la t ivis t ic concept ion of t ru threquires, then how can a sentence of F mean, even rough ly , thesame th ing as one in F? The prob lem is that the sentences of F andF' are about different th ings , and any m ove f rom F to F' seem s s implyto involve a chan ge of subject" (p . 1 01 ) . Th us, the diff icul ty withany vers ion of re la tivism w hich m akes featu res of the w or ld, andthus our know ledge or t r u t h s a b o u t the wor ld , dependen t onconcep tua l schemes , cannot be a version of re la t ivism whichm a i n t a i n s that some t ru th or knowledge c la im can be t r ue in Fand false in F'; after all , the subjects or referents in F are differentthan the referents in F'.8 There is no iden t i ty or sameness betweenthe subjects or referents in F and F'.

Swoyer 's cr i t icism points out the diff icul ty that the relat ivist faceswhen re ly ing on the not ion that the wor ld "is in part l i teral lycreated by the centra l concepts and basic beliefs we employ" (p.98). However , there may be good reason to t h ink that we shou ld notgrant the re la t ivis t the not ion that the wor ld is made by our conceptsor consciousness or l a n g u a g e or whatever . Why shou ld we not t h inkthis? First , things (desks, people , cars) being what they are could notbe produ ced (g iven their ch arac ter is t ics) by consciousness orl a n g u a g e or concepts being what they are . This reason for d o u b t i n gth e rela t ivis t ' s ontological ground for her re la t iv i sm mus t b ecareful ly t h o u g h t out by the relat ivist . The re la t ivis t must showexact ly how our concepts or l a n g u a g e do th ings or give propert ies toth ings in the wor ld ( apar t from the t r ivial way in w hich ourconcepts guide us in m ak ing a r t i f ac t s ) . T he relat ivist owes someexp lana t ion of how exact ly ordinary objects in the wor ld areproduced by the f ea tu r es of h u m a n n a t u r e to which the relat ivistappeals . This a m o u n t s to a criticism of any sor t of epis temologicalrelat ivism in w h ich th e rela t ivis t mainta ins that know ledge isrela t ive to conceptual schemes where those conceptual schemesdeterm ine w ha t the wor ld is l ike .9

Second, and I t h ink m or e fatal ly to th i s a t tempt by the relat ivistto grou nd epis tem ological re la t ivism in on tological re la t ivism , is thefol lowing: if things take their propert ies f rom l a n g u a g e a n d / o r



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consciousness, th is wi l l be becau se of , or due to , w ha t la ng ua ge andconsciousness are. Th us, lan gu ag e an d consciousness wi l l hav e ade te r m ina te "nature" or s t ruc tu re , knowledge and t r u th s of w hichwil l not be, i ndeed cannot be, d e t e r m i n e d by l a n g u a g e orconsciousness upon pain of an inf in i te regress .1 0

While Swoyer a t tempts to make sense of the not ion "true for" insuch a way t h a t it al lows the relat ivist to have as s t rong a posit ion aspossible, it t u r n s out t h a t the s t rong no t ion of relat ivism in w hich at ru th c la im can be false in F and t r ue in F' is incoheren t . Itsincoherence s tems f rom th e fac t tha t there cannot be the same t r u t hc la ims in F and F' since F and F' refer to, or have as their objects,entirely different wor lds . In addi t ion , I w ould add , any form ofepistemological relat ivism which rel ies on an onto logy in w hich theworld or the propert ies of objects are determined by l a n g u a g e orconsciousness or hum an concep t s , c anno t be of service to there la t ivis t and ul t imately shows the incoherence of any form ofepis temological re la t ivism which re l ies on such an ontology.

Stich: "N o cogni t ive norms, therefore relat ivism"

Epistemological re la t ivism also appears to be defended b y StephenStich in his The Fragmentation of Reason (Stich, 1990) . In t h a t w or k ,St ich argues for w ha t h e calls "Normative cogni t ive p lural ism . . .[which] is a c l a im abou t good cognitive processesthe cognit iveprocesses that people ought to use. What it asserts is tha t there is noun ique system of cogni t ive processes tha t people shou ld use, becausevar ious systems of cognit ive processes that are very different f romeach other may all be equa l ly good" (p. 13 ) . N orm at ive cogn i tivep lura l i sm (hen cefor th N C P) appear s to be a version of ER sinceStich 's claims seem to f i t the two-par t def in i t ion of ER given above.First, Stich's defense o f NC P fits the s t anda r ds con j unc t of Siegel'sdefini t ion of ER. For example, S t ich c la ims that cogni t ive act ivi tycan be evaluated only with respect to ce r t a in s t anda r ds fo r m u la t edby the person w ho is cogn izing, na m ely h er values , in teres ts andgoals . Stich states, "A n ac co un t of cog nit ive eva lua tion is relat ivist ic



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if the assessments of cogni t ive systems it offers are sensitive to factsa b o u t the person or group us ing the system" (p. 136) . In addi t ion ,Stich 's defense o f NC P fits the no neu t r a l i t y con j unc t of Siegel'sdefini t ion of ER. Stich states that the view that he defends is one inw hich "there is no unique system of cognit ive processes that peopleshou ld use, because var ious systems of cognit ive processes that arevery different from each o ther may all be equal ly good" (p. 13)."That is, those processes will be good relat ive to the s t anda r ds thatare used by those w ho have those processes. S o, Stich seems to beaf f i rming someth ing very like ER. Th e qu est ion thu s becom es, isNCP pr ob lem a t i c as ER is? Stich c la ims that it is not .

S t ich c la im

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