Regulations Safety Aviation AUSTRALIAN AIR PUBLICATION … · 2019-11-24 · Sect 1 Chap 1 . Deleted Annex B – Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual – Content and structure.

AUSTRALIAN AIR PUBLICATION

7001.048

DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM MANUAL

AL Status : 8 Original Date of Issue: 04 Sep 12

GN Davies, AO, CSC Air Marshal Defence Aviation Authority Issuing Authority Date: 15 Jul 16

Sponsor: DACPA File Reference: AB19145340

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Important Notice

RESPONSIBILITIES OF DISTRIBUTEE

AMENDMENTS TO PUBLICATIONS

PUBLICATION MANAGEMENT

1. This publication, although issued as an Australian Air Publication (AAP), is authenticated by the DefenceAviation Authority because the content has Departmental significance and authority. The single Service markings have been replaced by their Departmental equivalents as part of the formation of a proper, structured, binding DefencePublication System for airworthiness, aircraft, aircraft related equipment and other ‘air’ matters under the authority ofDI(G) ADMIN 20-31.

2. Procedures for the management, control and amendment of AAPs are outlined in AAP 5030.001 Defence Aviation and Australian Air Publication Systems and Specifications Manual.

Intellectual Property Protection

3. This publication is protected by Commonwealth of Australia Copyright. The contents of this publication may also be protected by other Intellectual Property Protection mechanisms, Government to Government Agreementsand/or Third Party Transfer restrictions; such as Original Equipment Manufacturer’s Copyright and/or InternationalTraffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

Notice to Contractors

4. This publication is issued to Contractors for information only and is to be returned intact on completion ofcontract to the relevant Commonwealth Contracting Authority.

Special Publication Instructions (SPI) Promulgated Publication Sponsor Changes

5. SPI promulgated publication sponsor changes are to be recorded in the table below:

DATE SPI NO NEW SPONSOR

COPYRIGHT COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

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Publication Improvement Report and ReplyAO 011 Revised 20 Apr 16

Defending Australia and its National Interestswww.defence.gov.au

AO 011 - Page 1 of 2 1.7.4

UNCLASSIFIED

20 Apr 16, 14:48:27

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InstructionsRefer AAP 5030.001 Section 6, Chapter 3

OriginatorOriginator's file reference

Sponsor details

Publication number Date of issue AL status Volume, Topic or Part number

Section number Chapter or WP number Page number Para, Fig or Table number

Data Module Code

Brief summary of deficiency and suggested amendments

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Defending Australia and its National Interestswww.defence.gov.au

AO 011 - Page 2 of 2

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20 Apr 16, 14:48:27

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AAP 7001.048 Change Status Page

CHANGE STATUS PAGE

AL 8 i

NOTE

• When amended, the Defence written portion of the text affected by an AL is identified by amendment indicators detailed in AAP 5030.001, Section 4, Chapter 2.

Page No AL

PRELIMINARY PAGES

Change Status Page i to iii 8

Notes to Readers i to viii 8

Amendment Certificate i to ii 0

Foreword i to ii 5

Table of Contents i to vii 8

BODY MATTER PAGES

SECTION 1

CHAPTER 1 1 to 10 8

1A-1 to 1A-9 5

1B-1 to 1 B-4 7

CHAPTER 2 1 6

CHAPTER 3 1 to 4 3

CHAPTER 4 1 to 5 6

CHAPTER 5 1 to 2 0

SECTION 2

CHAPTER 1 1 to 6 6

1A-1 to 1A-2 3

CHAPTER 2 1 to 6 8

2A-1 6

CHAPTER 3 1 to 5 6

CHAPTER 4 1 to 2 6

4A-1 to 4A-2 3

4B-1 to 4B-2 0

CHAPTER 5 1 8

CHAPTER 6 1 to 2 8

CHAPTER 7 1 to 2 6

7A-1 to 7A-2 6

CHAPTER 8 1 8

CHAPTER 9 1 to 2 0

SECTION 3

CHAPTER 1 1 to 5 6

CHAPTER 2 1 to 5 6

CHAPTER 3 1 to 5 6

CHAPTER 4 1 to 13 6

CHAPTER 5 1 to 3 6

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SECTION 3 (cont)

CHAPTER 6 1 to 7 6

CHAPTER 7 1 to 6 6

7A-1 to 7A-5 6

CHAPTER 8 1 to 4 6

CHAPTER 9 1 to 3 6

SECTION 4

CHAPTER 1 1 to 6 6

1A-1 to 1A-3 6

CHAPTER 2 1 to 3 6

CHAPTER 3 1 to 4 5

CHAPTER 4 1 to 3 6

SECTION 5

CHAPTER 1 1 8

CHAPTER 2 1 to 10 7

CHAPTER 3 1 to 5 6

3A-1 to 3A-6 4

3A1-1 to 3A1-5 4

3B-1 to 3B-2 4

CHAPTER 4 1 8

POST PAGES

Glossary 1 to 36 8

List of Abbreviations 1 to 9 8

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COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE

Certified that the publication has been page checked in accordance with the details on this page and the relevant Listof Effective Pages.

100% correct or with the following configuration errors

............................................................................................................................................................................................

............................................................................................................................................................................................

.................................................................... Signature (Distributee)

.................................................................... Rank or Title and Name

Date............................... ......................................................Appointment and Unit or Section

PUBLICATION INSPECTION RECORD

Certified that an annual inspection has been carried out and any anomalies reported to the Publications Manager in accordance with AAP 5030.001, Section 7, Chapter 6.

Printed Name Signature Date

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Typewritten Text

15 Jul 16

AAP 7001.048 Notes to Readers

AL 8 i

NOTES TO READERS

This AAP is managed in accordance with AAP 5030.001 - Defence Aviation and Australian Air Publication Systems and Specifications Manual. Reference is to be made to this publication for Unit management of AAP.

Media

This publication is only available in soft copy on the AAP On-Line Library website. Printed versions are not provided. Any printed copies that might be made are uncontrolled and will have a printed warning automatically printed as part of the print process to ensure awareness.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES – AMENDMENT LIST 8

Major change

- Sect 2 Chap 2

MILAVREG 2.1b and 2.1c deleted. All content has been moved to OAREG 5. (PIRR 14-7034 / AB22520067)

- Sect 2 Chap 5

MILAVREG 5 content moved to OAREG 5. Included in this is guidance material from Sect 5, Chap 1. (PIRR 14-7034 / AB22520067)

- Sect 2 Chap 8

MILAVREG 8 content moved to OAREG 8. Included in this is the guidance material from Sect 5, Chap 4. (PIRR 15-7806)

Minor changes

Edits

Typos, outdated references, name changes, etc as required. Edits are not identified with amendment list ‘mark up side bars’.

- Glossary

New or revised definitions of note are: Above Obstacles, Crowd Line, Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) Flight Test, Flying Display, Height Above Obstacles Within, Includes, May, Minimum Separation Distance, Must, Negative training, Opposition Manoeuvre, Should, Significant Change, Sponsor, Suitability for Flight, Qualification.

Deleted terms are: Synthetic Training Device, Single Aircraft Handling Display, Formation Handling Display, Aircraft Operational Display

- List of Abbreviations

New Abbreviations: AO, FSTD, HAOW, MSD

Removed Abbreviations:

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Previous Amendment Lists Previous amendment lists are provided for change tracking and situational awareness of regulatory development.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES – AMENDMENT LIST 7 Major change

- Sect 1 Chap 1

Para 36 and new Annex B – Enforcement Policy added (AB24515865).

Minor changes

- Sect 1 Chap 1

Deleted Annex B – Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual – Content and structure Figure 1-B-1 as TOC and bookmarking provides equivalent information.

- Sect 5 Chap 2 Annex A

Deleted. All content has been moved to the relevant OAREG 6 sub-regulations (GM in S9C1) or the DASP Master Glossary.

- Sect 5 Chap 2 Annex B

Deleted. AvSS management process flowchart has been moved into s5c2.

- Glossary

New terms1: Air Traffic Advisory (ATA), Aerodrome Apron Areas, Aerodrome Manoeuvring Areas, Aerodrome Movement Areas, Aerodrome Rescue And Fire Fighting (ARFF), Aircraft Captain, Aircraft Oxygen System, Alerting Service, Autonomous Aircraft, Autonomous Operation, Battlefield Airspace Control (BAC), UAS Command And Control (C2) Link, Defence Practice Area (DPA), Fast Jet, Flight Authorisation Officer, Flight Information Publication (FLIP), Flight information service (FIS), Foreign Object Debris (FOD), Forward Air Control–Airborne, Maritime Control Service (MCS) (PIRR-15-7017 / AB24978978), Meteorology (MET), Non-Defence Flight Test, Periodic Health Examination (PHE), Primary runway, RPA Observer, Safety Management System (SMS), Significant Change, Supplemental Oxygen, Switchover, Type Rated, UAS Command and Control (C2) Link, Competency, UAS Flight Termination System (AB24904795 for all new/modified UAS terms).

Modified terms: Air Traffic Control (ATC), Air Traffic Service (ATS), Air Vehicle Operator (AVO), Aircraft altitude, Aircraft Controller, ASOR Appointing Authority, Aviation Accident Investigation Team, Aviation Incident Investigation Team, Aviation Safety Audit, Aviation Safety Committee (ASC), Confidential Incident Report (CONFIR), Detect and Avoid, Flight Authorisation, Flight Test, Flight Test Permit, Generative Safety Culture, Hazard Report, Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA), Incident, Operational Hazard (OPHAZ) Report, RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine (IAM), Remote Pilot (RP)—replaced with ICAO term, Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS)—replaced Ground Control Station with Remote Pilot Station (RPS), Serious Incident, Sponsor, Substantial Change, Temporarily Medically Unfit For Flying (TMUFF), Terminal Attack Control (TAC), Unmanned Aircraft, Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). (AB24904795).

Deleted terms: Temporarily Medically Unfit For Control Duties (TMUCD).

Deleted terms—DDAAFS sponsored2 (AB24748974 / AB24719537): Comcare, Dangerous Incident, Environment, Ergonomics, Hierarchy of Controls, Impairment, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), Probability, Project Manager, Rehabilitation, Risk Control, Risk Identification, Risk Management, Serious Injury or Illness, Stress, Stressor, Thermal Stress, Toxic, WHS Act, WHS Incident, Work Health and Safety Duty, Workplace, Workspace, Workstation.

1 Not all terms are actually new. Many have been absorbed from the relevant AAP chapters to afford improved useability. Where a definition has been placed in the glossary, it is no longer spelled out in AAP text. 2 These terms are available in WHS publications

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Edits

Typos, formatting, outdated references, name changes, etc as required. Edits are not identified with amendment list ‘mark up side bars’.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES – AMENDMENT LIST 6 Major changes

- Defence State Register renamed Defence Register throughout the document (PIRR–14–7033 / AB22691634)

TOC

Sect 1: C1, C4

Sect 2: C1, C2, C2a, C3, C4, C5, C7

Sect 3: C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, C7a, C8, C9

Sect 4: C1, C1a, C2, C4

Sect 5: C1, C3

Glossary (modified): Application Identifier (AI), Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC), Aviation Systems, Defence Standard (DEF STAN) 00-970, Defence Register, Defence Registered Aircraft, Non Defence Registered Aircraft, Service Release (SR), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC).

- Sect 2 Chap 1

MILAVREG 1.5, 1.7 and 1.8 – OAA, TAA and FTAA responsibilities expanded to include provision of safety information to DASP Agency staff (PIRR–15–7009 / AB23822779).

- Sect 2 Chap 7 Annex A

Defence AA exemption for CAT 4 UAS operations within 3 nm of a Defence aerodrome or above 400 ft AGL added to GM for Defence UAS Categories (PIRR–14–7010 / AB22283236).

- Glossary

Glossary (new terms): Aviation Medical Certificate, Aviation Physiology Training Officer (APTO), Decompression illness (DCI), Dental Officer, Hypoxia, RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine, Senior Aviation Medical Officer (SAVMO), Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA), Specialist Employment Stream Annual Health Assessment (SESAHA), Sub-atmospheric DCI.

Minor changes

- Deleted annexes and appendices providing examples/proformas (PIRR 15-7013 / AB22637273). Readers referred to the ACPA website in lieu.

TOC.

Sect 3 Chap 4 Annex A – Example AMTC, TCDS, STC and Service Release.

Sect 3 Chap 6 Annex A – Example Airworthiness Directive for Defence involvement in Original Equipment Manufacturer flying activities.

Sect 3 Chap 6 Annex B – Example Special Flight Permit.

Sect 4 Chap 1 Annex A App 1 – Example Defence Airworthiness Directive.

Sect 5 Chap 1 Annex C App 1 – Ramp Inspection proforma.

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- Sect 1 Chap 2

Moved content from this ‘The Defence Register’ chapter to Sect 2 Chap 2 (Intro paras 1 and 3), MILAVREG 2, 2.2, the Glossary, Sect 3 Chap 1 (para 7), Sect 3 Chap 2 (paras 9–12, 19–22 and 26), Sect 4 Chap 1 (paras 11–12) (PIRR-15-7015 / AB23683219).

TOC amended accordingly

- Sect 4 Chap 1

para 20 – AAC purpose revised to include provision of advice on topics not yet regulated but in need of clarity (PIRR-15-7016 / AB23683736).

- Sect 5 Chap 1

para 19.c – Additional GM for ‘Approval to Operate’ term (PIRR/AB23988736).

- Glossary

Glossary (modified terms): Approval to Operate, Aviation Medical Officer (AVMO), Air Vehicle Operator (AVO), Noteworthy Risk.

Edits


SUMMARY OF CHANGES – AMENDMENT LIST 5 Major changes

- Sect 1 Chap 1

para 8 – DASP Master Glossary introduced (PIRR 14-7032 / AB21399105).

para 35 – DASP Regulatory Change Process introduced (AB20565663).

Annex A – DASP RCP incorporated (AB20565663).

- Sect 2 Chap 1

MILAVREG 1.10.b. (4) – DACPA as regulation approval authority for Minor and Edit changes (AB20565663).

- Glossary

All terms from AAP 7001.048, AAP 7001.053, AAP 8000.010, and AAP 6734.001 consolidated in the new DASP Master Glossary (AB20565663).

New or revised definitions of note are: acceptable level of safety, acceptable means of compliance, adequate aerodrome, Air and Space Interoperability Council, aircraft controller, aircrew, aviation medical officer, aviation medicine, crew, dangerous goods, Defence aircraft, exemption, flight crew, foreign register, guidance material, low flying, mission crew, mission essential passenger, operational clearance, segregated airspace, separation assurance, state aircraft (clarification note added), waiver, other edits.

Deleted terms are operational contingency loading, contingency loading and supplementary crew.

To afford recognition of terms that are being introduced in this AL that are not sourced from another DASP publication, terms that have been imported from the eTAMM or DASM Glossaries are not marked with an AL bar, unless the definition has been amended.

Minor changes

- Foreword

Updated for historical content.

- Sect 1 Chap 1

para 3 – last sentence ‘risk’ replaced with ‘safety’.

para 6 – last sentence ‘risk’ replaced with ‘safety’.

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AL 8 v

para 15.i – DDAAFS role clarified.

para 16.a– 3rd line ‘under DACPA’s direction’ added.

para 16.b – 3rd line ‘under DGTA’s direction’ added. Last sentence is new.

para 16.c – 3rd line ‘under DDAAFS’s direction’ added. DDAAFS provided general updates, such as ASMS term.

para 17 – 2nd line ‘with acceptable risk’ changed to ‘ALoS’.

para 18 – 2nd line ‘involving aircraft and any systems which impact the safety of aircraft’ replaced with ‘that may compromise aviation safety’.

para 22 – 1st line ‘functions’ replaced with ‘hazards’.

para 37.d – GM provided as relates to OAA and OAAR delegations when reading regulation.

para 38.d – GM provided for the use of the word ‘should’.

para 39 – new terms introduced for GM, AMC and alternate AMC.

para 41 – how to obtain information, clarification and formal advice amended.

Deleted old para 22 – Defence State Register information as this is covered under MILAVREG 2.

- Sect 1 Chap 2

para 15 – Introduction of generic term used for disposal agency (PIRR 14-7011).

- Sect 1 Chap 4

para 6 – 2nd line added ‘and continuing airworthiness management’ (PIRR 14-7022).

para 7 – completely revised by DGTA-ADF (PIRR 14-7022).

para 8 – para title added ‘authorisations and approvals’; rewritten by DGTA-ADF (PIRR 14-7022).

para 9 – rewritten by DGTA-ADF (PIRR 14-7022).

para 10 – 4th line ‘The TAR publishes minimum airworthiness design requirements in’ inserted (PIRR 14-7022).

para 17 – 1st line ‘preferred’ changed to ‘minimum’ (PIRR 14-7022).

para 20 – 5th line ‘preferred’ changed to ‘minimum’ (PIRR 14-7022).

- Sect 2 Chap 3

MILAVREG 3.1.a (2) TCDS guidance (PIRR 14-7023).

- Sect 2 Chap 4

MILAVREG 4.3.c – AwB recommendation for an Aw Instrument clarified (PIRR 13-023).

MILAVREG 4.3.d (1) – TAA changed to TAR (PIRR 13-023).

- Sect 2 Chap 6

MILAVREG 6 – Transition Responsibilities added (AB15096810).

- Sect 3 Chap 4

para 63 – Guidance amendment regarding who may amend or lift a SR limitation (PIRR 14-7024).

- Sect 3 Chap 7

para 14.e – Guidance added regarding potential for OAAR recommendation (PIRR 14-7028).

- Sect 4 Chap 3

para 14 – Guidance amendment regarding who may amend or lift a SR limitation (PIRR 14-7024).

- Sect 5 Chap 1

para 17 – Defence AA ACFS Light Sports Aircraft (LSA) exemption added to GM (AB20419230).

para 18 – Defence AA AAFC exemption added to GM (AB20744164).

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- Sect 5 Chap 2

para 5 – MILAVREG 6 Transition Responsibilities added (AB15096810).

- List of Abbreviations

revised list of abbreviations includes: ALoR, ALoS, AMC, ASIC, DGTA, DGTA-ADF, EASA, GM, SFARP.

Edits


Amendment List 4 Summary of Changes

Section 2 Chapter 3 – New MILAVREG 3.7 - Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP).

Section 2 Chapter 4 – MILAVREG 4.2 – Airworthiness Board Conduct revised to incorporate AwB requirements for non-Defence registered aircraft, AvSS and category 3 UAS.

Section 2 Chapter 7 – Revised Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) regulation supporting the introduction of

a four tier categorisation scheme for the airworthiness management of Defence UAS.

Section 2 Chapter 7 Annex A – Revised Defence UAS Categories.

Section 3 Chapter 4 – Additional guidance for UASOP.

Section 5 Chapter 3 – Revised guidance chapter for UAS.

Section 5 Chapter 3 Annex A – New annex for UAS categorisation and risk management.

Section 5 Chapter 3 Annex A Appendix 1 – New appendix of an example initial operational risk analysis for a potential category 2 UAS.

Section 5 Chapter 3 Annex B – New annex for the history and philosophy of UAS airworthiness.

Glossary

Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) and Remote Pilot (RP) added to reflect the changes from MILAVREG 7.

Amendment List 3 Section 1

DEFGRAM Number 630/2013 – Dissolution of the Aviation Safety Policy Review Committee (ASPRC) formally promulgated the dissolution of the ASPRC with effect from 31 November 13. Section 1 has been amended to reflect this change.

Section 2

MILAVREG 1.11 – MILAVREG to detail the Defence AA requirements for the aviation safety program appointment of Director Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS).

Annex A to Section 2 Chapter 1 has been amended to include the aviation safety program management qualification and competency criteria for DDAAFS.

MILAVREG 2.4 – Clarification for the issue of airworthiness instruments.

MILAVREG 4. Annex A to Section 2 Chapter 4 has been amended to include the Defence AA Airworthiness Board requirements for Synthetic training Devices.

MILAVREG 5.6 – Defence member changed to Defence personnel IAW with the DI(G) OPS 02-2 - Defence Aviation Safety Program.

MILAVREG 8.3 and MILAVREG 8.4 – Clarification of STD recommendations from the OAAR and DAR.

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Glossary

A number of changes within the glossary to reflect MILAVREG 6 changes, MILAVREG 7 terms and CH47 COI requirements.

List of Abbreviations

A number of changes within the glossary to reflect MILAVREG 6 and MILAVREG 7 terms.

Amendment List 2 General

The use of Amendment Bars has mostly been restricted to those amendments which change the intent of a regulation or significantly alter guidance material. Minor changes, made to improve readability, presentation, and layout and to satisfy the requirements of AAP 5030.001(AM1) and DEF(AUST) 5629B may or may not be identified by amendment bars. Significant changes resulting from this amendment are reflected in the following paragraphs.

Airworthiness Policy Review Committee (APRC)

DMO representation has been included on the APRC. Army and Navy APRC representatives have been amended.

Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM)

Inclusion of detail regarding NPRM as the recognised process for making regulatory change.

State Register administration responsibilities

Many of the State Register administration responsibilities have been delegated from the ADF AA to DACPA-ADF.

Suspension and resumption of ADF flying operations

Airworthiness Advisory Circular 002/2007 has been incorporated providing additional guidance on the notification process for suspension of operations, terminology and non-state registered aircraft.

Synthetic Training Devices (STD)

Recommendation for issue of STD Installation Operating Permits (IOP) has been delegated from DGTA to the relevant Design Acceptance Representative. Clarification that ‘Procedural Trainer’ simulators are not covered by the MILAVREGs and shall be managed at a local level.

AMTC, TCDS and Service Releases

Additional guidance has been provided regarding the acquisition process and introduction to service. Airworthiness Directive 019/2009 has been incorporated detailing the revised SOI endorsement and approval process.

Certificates of Airworthiness (CoA)

Airworthiness Directive 002/98 has been incorporated removing the requirement for aircraft in service with the ADF prior to 13 Mar 98 to have a CoA.

List of Effective Pages (LOEP)

The LOEP has been updated to identify the changes resulting from this amendment.

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Other changes

Other amendments associated with AL 2 are minor in nature. These include spelling/grammar corrections, updated references and minor re-formatting changes.

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AAP 7001.048(AM1) Amendment Certificate

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AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE

It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the undermentioned Amendment Lists have been incorporated in this copy of the Publication:

Amendment List Amended By

No Date of Issue Printed Name Signature Date

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17 Sep 14 Elizabeth Low Elizabeth Low 18 Sep 14

27 Apr 15 Elizabeth Low Elizabeth Low 01 May 15

4 Dec 12 Pauline Clevett P.Clevett 6 Dec 12

18 Sep 13 Elizabeth Low Elizabeth Low 3 Oct 13

30 Jun 14 Pauline Clevett P.Clevett 21 Jul 14

8 Sep 15 Pauline Clevett P.Clevett 10 Sep 15

30 Nov 15 Pauline Clevett P.Clevett 1 Dec 15

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Elizabeth Low

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Elizabeth Low

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15 Jul 16

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AAP 7001.048(AM1) Amendment Certificate

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Amendment List Amended By

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AAP 7001.048 Foreword

FOREWORD

AL 5 i

HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY

1. In early 1998, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) appointed the Chief of Air Force (CAF) as the single ADF Airworthiness Authority (ADF AA). This appointment flowed from decisions following the Army Black Hawk accident (June 1996) and also the Defence Reform Program (April 1997). CDF also tasked CAF to undertake a formal review of systemic and organisational issues within the ADF aviation environment with a particular emphasis on safety management (COSC Minute 2/98 refers). The Review of ADF Aviation Safety Management (RAASM) was conducted during 1998 and the Teams report was considered by COSC in early 19991. The RAASM report recommended an ADF airworthiness structure based on the following concept:

a. a single Airworthiness Authority

b. development of a framework of regulations to regulate operational and technical airworthiness

c. conduct of Defence aviation activities in accordance with the new framework

d. retention of an independent aviation safety and accident investigation body.

2. In addition, the RAASM team proposed a safety management system that included additional components to address a number of specific airworthiness management functions:

a. the Directorate of Flying Safety (DFS–ADF), later retitled the Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS)

b. the flight test authorities of AOSG and AMAFTU

c. the cargo loading and cargo handling authority of AMTDU

d. the airspace management organisations of Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE), later retitled Air Traffic Management and Air Battle Management (ABM)

e. selected aircraft simulators that were designed and acquired specifically to support the training of aircrew and tactics development.

3. The RAASM report also made a number of observations and recommendations with respect to the specific appointments responsible for operational and technical airworthiness regulation and management. Unlike arrangements for technical airworthiness, the report identified considerable confusion over extant arrangements and responsibilities of the three single service Operational Airworthiness Authorities (OAA) for both regulation and management, and also their precise relationship to the ADF AA. The RAASM report proposed the creation of new appointments for an Operational Airworthiness Regulator (OAR) and Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR). Following COSC consideration of the proposed revised arrangements, the ADF AA formally appointed DCAF as the OAR, and DGTA as the TAR. The TAR appointment would be combined with the earlier appointment of DGTA as the ADF Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA) post COSC consideration of Agendum 1/98 in January 1998.

4. The RAASM report also recognised the important earlier developments within Air Force with respect to creation of the Airworthiness Board (AwB) as an independent executive board of review2 and also creation of a technical airworthiness regulatory framework that flowed from the major review of RAAF Engineering (Blue Print 2020) in 1993. As a result, the RAASM report noted that the development and implementation of a technical airworthiness regulatory framework for the conduct of design and engineering support activities were already very mature. However, regulations for the conduct of maintenance and production/modification activity were still in development. Nevertheless, the RAASM report noted that a mature framework had already been established for the ongoing development and management of technical airworthiness regulations and the conduct of audit activity that could be applied across all ADF aviation and also provide a model for development of a similar operational airworthiness regulatory and audit framework.

5. The RAASM report also endorsed development of a single ADF Airworthiness Manual. The initial issue of AAP 7001.048 was titled the ADF Airworthiness Manual, and was authorised in 2001 through DI(G) OPS 02–2—ADF Airworthiness Management and promulgated details of the ADF airworthiness management framework and airworthiness management processes. In October 2004, the extant Operational Airworthiness Policy Review Committee (OAPRC) endorsed development of a more usable tiered-document structure for ADF airworthiness

1 COSC Agendum/Minute 8/99. 2 The first AwB was held in May 1991.

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AAP 7001.048 Foreword

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regulations. This tiered structure was to consist of high level Military Aviation Regulations (MILAVREG), supported by Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREG) and the extant Technical Airworthiness Regulations (TAREG). Draft new OAREG were approved by the OAPRC in May 2005 and initially issued within this manual. Subsequently the OAREG were removed from this manual and published separately in a new document, the AAP 8000.010 — ADF Operational Airworthiness Manual, renamed in 2011 as the Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual.

6. In July 2006, the OAPRC recommended ADF AA approval and issue of significant MILAVREG amendments. These amendments were initially promulgated in Issue 2 of this manual. The original guidance material on acquisition and in-service airworthiness management was substantially revised to integrate the requirements of the MILAVREG and the operational and technical regulations as they apply to higher level Defence airworthiness management. Policy governing the regulation of aviation safety within Defence will continue to evolve with updates to both the DI(G) OPS 02–2 and this manual. The TAREG promulgated by the TAR remained separate in AAP 7001.053—Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (TAMM).

7. In September 2011, DI(G) OPS 02-2 was reissued under the revised title of the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) to reflect a single integrated policy that addresses both the Airworthiness Management System (AMS) and the Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS). With incorporation of the ASMS into DI(G) OPS 02–2, the appointment of the ADF Airworthiness Authority (ADF AA) was retitled to the ‘Defence Aviation Authority’ (Defence AA) to better reflect the revised focus of this appointment as having a broad aviation safety responsibility that is relevant to, but also specifically limited to, the DASP. CAF responsibilities as the Defence AA do not extend beyond the DASP. Other significant changes associated with reissue of DI(G) OPS 02-2 included formally expanding the scope of the DASP to include non-Defence registered aircraft that are engaged by Defence and a number of Aviation Support Systems (AvSS). Subsequently, the AAP 7001.048 — ADF Airworthiness Manual was retitled the ‘Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual’.

8. The re-issue of MILAVREG 6 AvSS in October 2013 adopted better practice regulation (BPR) principles, which emphasised use of outcome-based regulation that specifies a required outcome; but does not prescribe ‘how’ the outcome must be achieved. Outcome-based regulation promotes flexibility for the application of airworthiness management by operational and technical stakeholders as it recognises the importance of a framework to support airworthiness decision making. Other significant regulatory reform in 2013 included the dissolution of the Aviation Safety Policy Review Committee with the maturation of the ACPA Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) process.

9. During 2014 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) regulation was introduced as MILAVREG 7 and OAREG 7. As per MILAVREG 6, outcome based regulation was used to afford flexibility for the regulated community. Continuing improvement processes saw the NPRM process evolve into the DASP Regulation Change Process (RCP) as endorsed by the Defence AA at AB20565663. The RCP ensures future regulation and aviation safety policy is developed, consulted, approved and documented in an appropriate manner.

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AAP 7001.048 Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION TO AIRWORTHINESS AND AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT

CHAPTER 1 DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM POLICY, STRUCTURE AND REGULATION

Introduction

Scope and purpose

Definitions

Defence Aviation Safety Program

Defence Aviation Safety Program Policy

The Airworthiness Management System

Aviation Safety Management Systems

Defence Aviation Safety Program Regulation

Additional Information or Clarification

Annex A – DASP Regulation Change Process

Annex B - DASP Enforcement Policy

CHAPTER 2 RESERVED

CHAPTER 3 OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION

Operational airworthiness

Responsibilities

Operational Airworthiness Regulations

Relationship of the regulatory elements

Implementation

The role of ACPA in operational airworthiness

Additional information or guidance

CHAPTER 4 TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION

Technical Airworthiness

Technical Airworthiness Regulation

Technical Airworthiness Authority

Airworthiness code

Technical airworthiness concepts and terms

Designs not affecting technical airworthiness

CHAPTER 5 AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT

To be issued

SECTION 2 MILITARY AVIATION REGULATIONS

CHAPTER 1 DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Military Aviation Regulation 1

MILAVREG 1.1 – Applicability

MILAVREG 1.2 – Exemptions and exclusions

MILAVREG 1.3 – Appointment of authority

MILAVREG 1.4 – Operational Airworthiness Regulator

MILAVREG 1.5 – Operational Airworthiness Authorities

MILAVREG 1.6 – Technical Airworthiness Regulator

MILAVREG 1.7 – Technical Airworthiness Authority

MILAVREG 1.8 – Flight Test Approval Authority

MILAVREG 1.9 – Airworthiness review responsibility

MILAVREG 1.10 – Director Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency

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MILAVREG 1.11 – Director Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety

Annex A - Aviation Safety Program management qualification and competency criteria

CHAPTER 2 DEFENCE REGISTRATION AND OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT


MILAVREG 2.1 – Determination of registration

MILAVREG 2.2 – The Defence Register

MILAVREG 2.3 – Introduction and modification of a Defence registered aircraft type

MILAVREG 2.4 – Operation of Defence registered aircraft

MILAVREG 2.5 – Change of operational status of a Defence registered aircraft

MILAVREG 2.6 – Suspension of flying operations

MILAVREG 2.7 – Removal from the Defence Register

MILAVREG 2.8 – Reinstatement to the Defence Register

MILAVREG 2.9 – Addition of fleet aircraft to the Defence Register

Annex A - Requirements for an Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan

CHAPTER 3 AIRWORTHINESS INSTRUMENTS


MILAVREG 3.1 – Australian Military Type Certificates

MILAVREG 3.2 – Supplemental Type Certificates

MILAVREG 3.3 – Service Release

MILAVREG 3.4 – Special Flight Permits

MILAVREG 3.5 – Flight Test Permits

MILAVREG 3.6 – Airworthiness Directives

MILAVREG 3.7 – Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit

CHAPTER 4 DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW


MILAVREG 4.1 – Airworthiness Board membership

MILAVREG 4.2 – Airworthiness Board conduct

MILAVREG 4.3 – Airworthiness Board outcomes

Annex A - Defence AA Airworthiness Board requirements for review of in-service airworthiness management of Defence Registered aircraft

Annex B - Defence AA Airworthiness Board requirements for review of SFP, AMTC, STC or Service Release of Defence Registered aircraft

CHAPTER 5 NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT AND FOREIGN MIILTARY AIRCRAFT

CHAPTER 6 AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS

Introduction

AvSS Determination


MILAVREG 6.1 – AvSS Conformance to other Regulations

MILAVREG 6.2 – AvSS Acquisition and In-service Management

MILAVREG 6.3 – AvSS Authority to Operate

CHAPTER 7 UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

Introduction


MILAVREG 7.1 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Annex A – Defence Unmanned Aircraft Systems Categories

CHAPTER 8 FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICES

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CHAPTER 9 AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT


To Be Issued

SECTION 3 ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS AND AVIATION SAFETY

CHAPTER 1 AIRWORTHINESS AND AVIATION SAFETY DURING THE ACQUISITION PROCESS OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

Fundamental concepts

Aim of airworthiness management

Defence Registration

Appointment of key personnel

Acquisition airworthiness strategy

The Type Certification process

Service Release

Role of the Defence AA Airworthiness Board

Introduction to service

Fleet addition and new models of an existing Aircraft Type

CHAPTER 2 DETERMINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF AIRCRAFT TYPE REGISTRATION

Determination of Registration

Configuration and role

Aircraft ownership and duration of operation

Application for Defence registration

Addition, removal and reinstatement to the Defence Register

Requirement for an aircraft to be registered

Addition of new aircraft to the Defence Register

Removal and reinstatement of aircraft on the Defence Register

Removal from the Defence Register

Changes to configuration and role during non-Defence registration

Reinstatement to the Defence Register

Additional information and guidance

CHAPTER 3 ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS - AUTHORITY AND MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

Overview

Acquisition airworthiness management planning

Delegation of authority

Acquisition organisational structure

Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plans and strategies

Involvement of DGTA-ADF, ACPA and OAA staff


CHAPTER 4 TYPE CERTIFICATION AND SERVICE RELEASE OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

Overview

Key concepts

Relationship between Type Certification and Service Release

Relationship between Type Certification and Design Acceptance

Determining Type Certification requirements

Statement of Operating Intent

Recognition of prior certification

Concurrent certification by recognised airworthiness authorities

Compiling the Certification Basis Description

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Endorsement of the Statement of Requirement

Finding compliance with Certification Basis requirements

Establishing a support network

Making compliance findings

Technical versus operational compliance findings

Finalising compliance findings

Managing airworthiness issues

Airworthiness Issue Papers

Resolving airworthiness issues

Preparing for Service Release

Requirements for Service Release

Issue of an AMTC/STC and Service Release

Defence AA requirements for an AMTC or STC

Defence AA requirements for Service Release

Obtaining OAA and TAA recommendations

Defence AA Airworthiness Board executive review

Issue of Airworthiness Instruments by the Defence AA

Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit


CHAPTER 5 ACQUISITION FLIGHT TEST

The role of flight test Acquisition flight test planning

The role of the FTAA Identifying the required scope of testing Implementing the test strategy Aircraft–stores compatibility certification Acceptance testing


CHAPTER 6 OPERATION PRIOR TO SERVICE RELEASE

Flying operations prior to Defence registration

Defence involvement in foreign OEM fight test

Operational airworthiness management of OEM flight test

Defence involvement in foreign flying training

Defence involvement in OEM flying activities within Australian airspace

Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan (AAMP)

Flying operations prior to Service Release

New aircraft undergoing acquisition development

Major changes to Type Design

Special Flight Permits (SFP)

Flight Test Permits (FTP)

OEM flight test on Defence Registered Aircraft


CHAPTER 7 DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW

Role of the Defence AA Airworthiness Board

Preparing for Defence AA Airworthiness Board review

Requirements for an Executive Review

Preparing the Airworthiness Board submission

Obtaining a TAA recommendation

Obtaining an OAA recommendation

Airworthiness Board submission for an SFP

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Airworthiness Board conduct

Airworthiness Board outcomes


Annex A - Preparation of an Accomplishment Summary

CHAPTER 8 CAPABILITY ACCEPTANCE INTO OPERATIONAL SERVICE OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

Key concepts

Airworthiness management of introduction to service

Issue of Certificate of Airworthiness

Airworthiness management of Production Acceptance Flight Tests

Annotation of the Defence Register

Acceptance into operational service

Demonstrating capability

Airworthiness management of AIOS-related test and evaluation

Conduct of OT&E


CHAPTER 9 FLEET ADDITION AND NEW AIRCRAFT MODELS

Determination of airworthiness requirements

Airworthiness management of fleet addition

Application for fleet addition

Defence registration of fleet addition aircraft

Acquisition Airworthiness Strategy

Consistent configuration and operational history

Inconsistent configuration and operational history


SECTION 4 IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT

CHAPTER 1 IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

In-service airworthiness management The purpose of in-service airworthiness management Airworthiness management appointments and authority

Specialist organisations Basis of operations

Changing the basis of operations Change of operational status

In-service flight test Other operations outside the established basis Suspension of flying operations Defence AA Airworthiness Board executive review Airworthiness Advisory Circulars

Additional Information and guidance Annex A - Defence Airworthiness Directives

CHAPTER 2 DETERMINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CHANGES OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

Initiation and classification of changes

Initiation of changes

Classification of technical changes

Classification of operational changes

Management of technical and operational changes

Major versus Substantial changes

Impact of technical changes on operational airworthiness

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Impact of operational changes on technical airworthiness


CHAPTER 3 SUSPENSION OF FLYING OPERATIONS

Suspending flying operations

Suspension mechanisms

Circumstances requiring suspension of operations

Communication of airworthiness issues

Commencement of operations following suspension

Commencement of operations following cancellation or limitation to Airworthiness Instruments

Non Defence registered aircraft


CHAPTER 4 IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

Key concepts In-service airworthiness management The role of the Airworthiness Board Scope of the Airworthiness Board review

Airworthiness Board conduct Requirements for organisations and systems under review

Further information and guidance

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SECTION 5 AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT

CHAPTER 1 RESERVED

CHAPTER 2 AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS

AvSS guidance

AvSS management process flow chart

CHAPTER 3 UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

MILAVREG 7 Guidance

Annex A – UAS Categorisation and Risk Management Annex A Appendix 1 – Example Initial Operational Risk Analysis for a Potential Category 2 UAS Annex B – History and Philosophy of UAS Airworthiness

CHAPTER 4 RESERVED

DASP MASTER GLOSSARY

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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AAP 7001.048 Sect 1 Chap 1

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DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM POLICY, STRUCTURE AND REGULATION

INTRODUCTION

1. Australia, as a contracting State of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), has an international obligation to establish systems whereby aviation operations are conducted in a safe and orderly manner. The Chicago Convention, including associated amending protocols, is set out in the Schedules to the Air Navigation Act 1920 (Clth), and further implemented through the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Clth), (the Act).

2. Consistent with Article 3 of the Chicago Convention, Section 4 of Part I of the Act states that references to aircraft or air navigation in the Act do not include references to State aircraft or air navigation by State aircraft. This explicitly excludes Defence Aviation from governance by the Act.

3. As a consequence the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and Secretary of Defence, through DI(G) OPS 02-2 - Defence Aviation Safety Program, have directed that Defence implement self-regulation of its aviation practices to meet the objective of Defence Aviation being conducted safely.

4. Defence is also bound by the provisions of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Clth) (the WHS Act). The safety policy for Defence is issued by CDF and the Secretary in DI(G) PERS 19-18 – Defence Work Health Safety Manual.

5. Additionally, Defence is bound by a duty of care for members participating in aviation activities, in the course of their duties, in aircraft that are not regulated by Defence.

SCOPE AND PURPOSE

6. DI(G) OPS 02–2 requires Defence to implement and maintain a Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) to meet the objective of Defence Aviation being conducted at ALoS.

7. This manual describes the philosophy, processes and framework of regulations comprising the DASP, and applies to all Defence Personnel and External Service Providers who are involved in Defence Aviation.

DEFINITIONS

8. The DASP Master Glossary provided within this publication applies to all aspects of Defence Aviation and provides the authoritative source material for use by the ADF Online Glossary and other Defence aviation documents for aviation related terms. The Glossaries of AAP 8000.010 – Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual, AAP 7001.053 – electronic Technical Airworthiness Manual (eTAMM) and AAP 6734.001 – Defence Aviation Safety Manual either reproduce in full or synchronise with the DASP Master Glossary as contained in this manual.

9. Whereas the DI(G) OPS 02-2 definitions of ‘aircraft’ and ‘airworthiness’ include both manned and unmanned machines or craft, for the purposes of regulation these two classes of air vehicles are treated separately.

DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM

10. The DASP supports safe operation based on the premise of military aviation being safe by operating aircraft where risk is eliminated or otherwise minimised so far as reasonably practicable. The DASP provides the framework for making judgements relating to managing risk, underpinning decisions by Service Chiefs and Group Heads regarding operational suitability and operational effectiveness. While the DASP is broad and has many activities, it acknowledges that required operational outcomes must be weighed against the potential for harm to people and/or property.

11. DASP Philosophy. Defence has adopted a unified approach to airworthiness and aviation safety management. The Airworthiness Management System (AMS) and Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS) have been included under DASP policy framework. Both systems are complimentary, and neither is considered subordinate to the other. Instead the two systems are co-dependent; both benefit from a healthy level of consultation and interaction. Supers

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12. Due to their close relationship, distinction between airworthiness management (both technical and operational) and aviation safety management may be confusing at times:

a. Technical airworthiness management is concerned with the aspects of the design, construction and maintenance of aircraft.

b. Operational airworthiness management is concerned with ensuring that aircraft are operated in approved roles, with correct mission equipment, by competent and authorised operators, according to approved procedures and instructions, under a system of supervision and monitoring.

c. Aviation safety management is concerned with the capability, attitude and professionalism of personnel in maintaining an awareness of aviation safety requirements and risk management, in addition to the independent investigation of aviation safety occurrences.

13. No aspect of the DASP can be treated in isolation. The management of either technical or operational airworthiness must be in full cognisance of the impacts on the other aspect of airworthiness. Aviation safety is dependent upon the effective implementation of both technical and operational airworthiness measures, and the manner in which flying operations are conducted.

14. DASP Functional Elements. A diagrammatic representation of the DASP functional elements and their relationship at the Program level and System level is at Figure 1-1.

Figure 1-1 DASP Structure

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KEY DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM APPOINTMENTS

15. The application of the DASP is controlled and supported by appointment of key individuals who perform aviation safety/airworthiness functions at various levels within the system through DI(G) OPS 02–2. The key DASP appointments are:

a. Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA). Chief of Air Force (CAF) is appointed the Defence AA. The Defence AA is accountable to the CDF and Secretary for establishing and managing the DASP. The Defence AA must also be responsive to Service Chiefs and Group Heads for airworthiness and aviation safety matters affecting aviation capability under their command.

b. Operational Airworthiness Regulator (OAR). Deputy Chief of Air Force (DCAF) is appointed the OAR. The OAR is accountable to the Defence AA for establishing and managing the operational airworthiness element of the AMS.

c. Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR). Director General Technical Airworthiness (DGTA) is appointed the TAR. The TAR is accountable to the Defence AA for establishing and managing the technical airworthiness element of the AMS.

d. Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA). An OAA is accountable to the Defence AA and responsible to the relevant Service Chief and Group Head for:

(1) determinations regarding the operational airworthiness of aircraft subject to the AMS

(2) determinations regarding operational aspects of Aviation Support Systems (AvSS)

(3) making informed decisions on the treatment of risks.

e. Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA). DGTA is appointed the TAA. The TAA is accountable to the Defence AA and responsive to Service Chiefs and Group Heads for:

(1) determinations regarding the technical airworthiness of aircraft subject to the Defence AMS

(2) determinations regarding technical aspects of AvSS

(3) communicating technical risks to the relevant OAA.

f. Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA). A FTAA is accountable to the Defence AA and responsible to the relevant Service Chiefs and Group Heads for:

(1) the airworthiness management of nominated flight test and evaluation activity

(2) determinations regarding an aircraft’s suitability for flight under specific flight test configurations and conditions

(3) determinations regarding the extent of testing necessary to demonstrate that an aircraft can be safely operated in its intended configuration, role and environment.

g. Director Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (DACPA). DACPA is accountable to the Defence AA and OAR for representing them on matters concerning airworthiness management and operational airworthiness management respectively. DACPA is also accountable to the Defence AA for maintaining the Defence Register.

h. Airworthiness Board (AwB) members. AwB members are accountable to the Defence AA for reviewing Defence Aviation elements as directed and providing recommendations regarding aircraft airworthiness and AvSS outputs.

i. Director Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS). DDAAFS is accountable to the Defence AA for the establishment of aviation safety policy, monitoring the effectiveness of the Defence Aviation Safety Management System, and acting as directed as the principle representative of the Defence AA on matters concerning Defence aviation safety management.1 DDAAFS is also responsible to Service Chiefs and Group Heads for the independent investigation of aviation safety occurrences.

1 The management of aviation safety is a command responsibility.

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DASP AGENCIES

16. In addition to the DASP appointments listed above, the three DASP Agencies that manage aspects of the DASP are:

a. Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (ACPA). ACPA performs the dual role of representing the Defence AA and the OAR on matters concerning Defence airworthiness management and operational airworthiness respectively. In both roles, under DACPA’s direction, ACPA staff develops policy, conducts safety assurance, coordinates airworthiness review board activities and maintains the Defence Register.

b. Directorate General Technical Airworthiness – ADF (DGTA–ADF). DGTA–ADF is the sponsoring organisation of the Technical Airworthiness Management Framework. Both the TAR and the TAA function are vested within this organisation. Under DGTA’s direction, DGTA–ADF staff develop technical airworthiness policy, prescribe and interpret airworthiness design standards and regulate technical airworthiness.

c. Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS). DDAAFS is the sponsoring organisation for aviation safety policy, including policy for the Defence Aviation Safety Management System. Under DDAAFS’s direction, DDAAFS staff also provide advice, services and tools to support commanders and their subordinates in the implementation and management of their Aviation Safety Management Systems (ASMS)2. DDAAFS maintains a specialised investigation capability for the investigation of Defence aviation accidents and may also investigate other occurrences that would benefit from a specialised investigation.

DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM POLICY

17. Risk Management. The outcome of effective aviation safety risk management is that aircraft are operated in their intended roles and environments safely. The level of risk authorised for military operations, even during peacetime, may exceed that allowed by civil authorities, and during conflict is a variable to be managed in light of the military situation.

18. Relationship to Other Defence Regulatory Systems. The DASP includes within its scope all Defence activities that may compromise aviation safety. The responsibilities for the technical integrity of other Defence equipment and processes are delineated in DI(G) LOG 4-5-012—Regulation of technical integrity of Australian Defence Force materiel.

THE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

SCOPE OF THE AMS

19. The AMS, as defined by DI(G) OPS 02-2, applies to all Defence Aviation, specifically the design, construction, maintenance and operation of:

a. any aircraft owned, leased, hired or chartered by Defence

b. any aircraft operated Exclusively for or on behalf of Defence

c. any aircraft for which Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has placed statutory airworthiness responsibilities on Defence

d. any Aviation Support System (AvSS).

20. The AMS does not apply to the following:

a. Defence Personnel or External Service Providers travelling as passengers on Australian or foreign public air transport

b. Defence Personnel or External Service Providers acting as crew or travelling as passengers on foreign military flights which are not exclusively for Defence use

c. Defence Personnel or External Service Providers participating in recreational flying.

21. The circumstances in paragraph 20 have been specifically excluded from the scope of the AMS; however, this does not relieve Defence or Defence Commanders and Managers from their responsibilities to exercise ‘duty of care’ over those Defence Personnel and External Service Providers under their command or management. As required, the CDF and Secretary, or subordinate authorities, may choose to issue Defence policy covering the above circumstances

2 The management of aviation safety is a command responsibility.

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where the AMS may not apply. Such policy may be informed by outcomes from the AMS; however, the policy would be established independent of the AMS.

AUDIENCE LEVELS AND AIRWORTHINESS FUNCTION

22. Airworthiness regulations are used as the mechanism through which airworthiness hazards are controlled and monitored. The regulations are directed at different audience levels within the Defence AMS. The audience level and structure of the key appointments is shown in Figure 1– 2 – Levels of Airworthiness Function. Defence airworthiness management, as described in this manual, is largely performed at Levels 1 and 2; however, some functions performed by acquisition and flight test organisations are also controlled by this manual. Some Level 2 functions and most Level 3 functions are controlled through separate, though interrelated, operational and technical airworthiness management systems.

RELATIONSHIP TO COMMAND

23. Airworthiness management does not affect the command of Defence aviation systems. Each Service Chief and Group Head remains responsible to the CDF for ensuring effective air operations and that airworthiness management of aviation systems under their respective command complies with the regulatory framework established under the authority of the Defence AA.

FIGURE 1–2 – LEVELS OF AIRWORTHINESS FUNCTION

Level 3

Level 2

Level 1 Defence AA

OAA x 3 OAR TAR / TAA

Management of Defence state registered aircraft and AvSS

AwB

Acquisition Organisations Management of

non-Defence registered aircraft

- -

Management of Flight Test

activity

Technical Management of aircraft and AvSS

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AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

24. Service Chiefs and Group Heads comply with the DASP through the auspices of an ASMS. The purpose of an ASMS is to preserve human and materiel resources and enhance the well-being of its members through continuous improvement in safety management. The specific goals of an ASMS to achieve this purpose are:

a. Preservation of the human and materiel resources of Defence aviation in order to maintain capability, improve quality and enhance readiness to perform the organisation’s mission.

b. Reduction in the rate of aviation accidents and serious incidents resulting from human, organisational and systemic deficiencies to zero3.

c. Establishment and maintenance of an effective hazard identification, reporting, investigation and management system, which eliminates, or reduces so far as reasonably practicable, aviation risks within Defence Aviation.

d. Establishment and maintenance of a generative aviation safety culture.

25. An ASMS is based on 12 elements and comprises written policies, procedures and plan, coupled with the attitude, beliefs, values and practices of the organisation that converge to promote aviation safety (see Figure 1–3 – Aviation Safety management System.

FIGURE 1–3 – AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

3 While a zero aviation accident rate may not be achievable, every accident is individually preventable. It is the continued commitment to aviation safety that will ensure a strong, resilient, and generative aviation safety culture, with the purpose of driving the accident rate to as close to zero as possible.

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SCOPE OF AN ASMS

26. An ASMS is applied to all Defence Aviation activities, Defence Personnel and External Service Providers who may detect, contain or eliminate hazards in Defence Aviation. All Defence Personnel and External Service Providers regardless of employment or specialisation may be involved with aviation to varying degrees and therefore have a role in the associated ASMS.

DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM REGULATION

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

27. In regulating airworthiness, the Defence AA provides flexibility to allow operational commanders to conduct operations with an acceptable level of safely and simultaneously exploit capability to the maximum possible extent. This is achieved through establishing the following core principles on which the regulations are based.

28. Aviation System Equipment. The design, construction and maintenance of aviation systems must be certified to specified standards based on user defined operating requirements. The certification process ensures that aviation system equipment limitations, methods of operation, and operator qualification and training requirements are known and documented:

a. Organisations and Processes. The organisations which conduct operations, engineering, and maintenance of aviation systems must have an established structure of authority, processes and manning to ensure there are sufficient resources and practices in place to support the airworthy operation of the system. The accreditation or recognition of organisations as competent provides the confidence that the aviation system will be adequately supported and operated when providing the expected capability.

b. Personnel. The people who design, construct, maintain and operate aviation systems must be appropriately trained, qualified and authorised to conduct the required tasks to provide the intended capability. Setting training and competency standards, authorising individuals and ensuring standards are met provides the confidence that personnel will make sound decisions regarding the operation of the system, and processes affecting the operation of the system.

c. Data. Information and data used to aid the design, construction, maintenance and operation of aviation systems must be accurate and applicable for the intended use. Control over the source, currency, and authority of data ensures the decisions made by personnel involved in aviation activities are based on valid information and data.

29. These principles allow capability decisions made by commanders to be supported by a known and sustainable state of airworthiness of their aviation systems.

FORMAT AND CONTENT OF THE DASP REGULATIONS

30. The DASP regulations are divided into three main groups:

a. Military Aviation Regulations (MILAVREG). MILAVREG are established by the Defence AA to implement and control the DASP. They provide a framework through which all military aviation activities by Defence registered aircraft, non-Defence registered aircraft, AvSS, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), synthetic training devices (STD) and members of Defence are managed. MILAVREGs reside in this manual.

b. Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREG). OAREG are established by the OAR to govern the operation of aviation systems in approved roles within established limitations and instructions by competent and authorised operators. The operational airworthiness regulatory system is described in AAP 8000.010—Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual.

c. Technical Airworthiness Regulations (TAREG). TAREG are established by the TAR to govern the design, construction and maintenance of Defence Aviation systems by authorised individuals acting as part of a competent organisation and using approved processes and data, whose work is certified as correct. The technical airworthiness management framework is described in AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (eTAMM). Though not regulatory, the framework is supported by airworthiness design standards contained in AAP 7001.054—electronic Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (eADRM).

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31. The relationship between MILAVREG, OAREG and TAREG is shown at Figure 1 – Hierarchy of DASP Regulatory Elements, which also identifies the main elements of the regulatory system.

32. Defence airworthiness regulations will generally be developed from the philosophical perspective that the implementation of safety and airworthiness regulations should be devolved to the lowest appropriate command or management level to preserve operational flexibility. Delegation of this responsibility will be supported through provision of appropriate Defence strategic regulation and coordination, while Service operational airworthiness authorities will determine operational instructions, including a rigorous system of assessing and managing operational and technical risks for implementation by subordinate Commanders.

FIGURE 1–4 – HIERARCHY OF DASP REGULATORY ELEMENTS

33. An overview of the operational and technical airworthiness management systems is contained in Section 1, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively. MILAVREG are discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.

MILITARY AVIATION REGULATIONS (MILAVREGS) – AAP 7001.048 MILAVREG 1 – Defence Aviation Safety Program Management MILAVREG 2 – Defence Registration and Operation of Aircraft MILAVREG 3 – Airworthiness Instruments MILAVREG 4 – Defence AA Airworthiness Board Review MILAVREG 5 – Non-Defence Registered Aircraft and Foreign Military Aircraft MILAVREG 6 – Aviation Support Systems MILAVREG 7 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems MILAVREG 8 – Flight Simulation Training Devices MILAVREG 9 – Aviation Safety Management (to be issued)

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATIONS (OAREGS) – AAP 8000.010

OAREG 1 – Operational Airworthiness Authority OAREG 2 – Conduct of Flying Operations OAREG 3 – New Aircraft and Modification OAREG 4 – Flight Test OAREG 5 – Non-Defence Registered Aircraft and

Foreign Military Aircraft OAREG 6 – Aviation Support Systems OAREG 7 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems OAREG 8 – Flight Simulation Training Devices OAREG 9 – Aviation Safety Management (to be

issued)

TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATIONS (TAREGS) – AAP 7001.053 TAREG 1 – Application of the Regulations and

Procedural Rules TAREG 2 – Type Certification, Service Release and

Design Acceptance TAREG 3 – Authorised Engineering Organisations TAREG 4 – TAR Approved Maintenance Organisations TAREG 5 – Aircraft Maintenance and Management

Procedures

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Focus of the MILAVREG

34. The intent of each MILAVREG is:

a. MILAVREG 1 – Defence Aviation Safety Program Management. This regulation defines the applicability, exemptions and responsibilities within the DASP. The regulation includes the qualifications and competencies necessary for appointment as a DASP airworthiness authority.

b. MILAVREG 2 – Defence Registration and Operation of Aircraft. This regulation prescribes the requirements for management of the Defence Register of aircraft types, and operation of such aircraft. This includes requirements to determine the registration and acquisition strategy for a new aircraft type or major modification, and the airworthiness requirements to manage the introduction of the capability.

c. MILAVREG 3 – Airworthiness Instruments. Airworthiness Instruments are the mechanism through which the Defence AA authorises or limits the operation of Defence aviation systems. This regulation defines the applicability of, and requirements for airworthiness instruments.

d. MILAVREG 4 – Defence AA Airworthiness Board review. This regulation describes requirements for the membership and conduct of an Airworthiness Board.

e. MILAVREG 5 – Non-Defence Registered Aircraft and Foreign Military Aircraft. This regulation prescribes minimum operating requirements for non-Defence registered aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence. This includes the application of the DASP to such aircraft.

f. MILAVREG 6 – Aviation Support Systems. This regulation contains requirements for the application of the DASP to Aviation Support Systems (AvSS).

g. MILAVREG 7 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This regulation contains requirements for the application of the DASP to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operated by or on behalf of Defence.

h. MILAVREG 8 – Flight Simulation Training Devices. This regulation contains requirements for Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD) operated as part of the training regime for a Defence aircraft.

i. MILAVREG 9 – Aviation Safety Management. To be issued.

DASP Regulation Change Process

35. By virtue of the changing nature of Defence technology and its operations, airworthiness processes, regulations and aviation safety policy will be subject to continual review and amendment. The DASP Regulation Change Process (RCP) ensures all future DASP regulation and aviation safety policy is developed, consulted, approved and documented in an appropriate manner. Interested parties may petition the Defence AA to repeal, modify or propose regulations IAW the DASP RCP. Such applications must be made to DACPA/DDAAFS/DGTA as appropriate in the first instance. The RCP is provided in Annex A.

DASP Enforcement Policy4

36. A key element of an effective regulatory framework is ensuring that regulated entities have a clear understanding of when, why and how Regulatory Authorities may take action in the event of regulatory breaches or unresolved aviation safety performance issues. The Enforcement Policy in Annex B outlines the overarching philosophy being adopted by DASP Regulatory Authorities in securing compliance with aviation safety regulations.

Guidance to the Regulations

37. Sections 3–5 of this manual contain guidance material to aid users of this publication. Guidance sections cover the following content:

a. Section 3 – Acquisition Airworthiness and Aviation Safety Management. This Section contains detailed guidance on the management of the process through which aircraft are added and removed from the Defence Register. Addition and modification of aircraft to the Defence Register largely occurs as a function of the materiel acquisition process. Therefore guidance on the airworthiness requirements and considerations for new aircraft and modifications are a significant inclusion in this Section.

b. Section 4 – In-service Airworthiness and Aviation Safety Management. This Section contains guidance on the continuing airworthiness management of Defence registered aircraft. This includes an overview of the application of operational and technical regulatory requirements,

4 Defence AA Decision Brief - Promulgation of DASP Enforcement Policy of 12 Oct 15 (AB24515865).

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consideration of changes to aircraft design or role, suspension of operations and ongoing airworthiness review requirements.

c. Section 5 – Application of the Defence Airworthiness and Aviation Safety Management Framework. This Section contains guidance on the application of the DASP framework to Aviation Systems which require tailoring of the regulations, such as AvSS, UAS and non-Defence registered aircraft.

Rules of Interpretation

38. In these regulations, unless the context states otherwise:

a. words importing the singular include the plural

b. words importing the plural include the singular

c. words importing the masculine gender include the feminine

d. where an airworthiness authority may delegate responsibility, the reader should assume this has occurred. For example, where text states ‘the OAA must…’ the reader may assume ‘the OAAR must...’.

39. In these regulations the words:

a. ‘must’ is used in the imperative sense. Use of other commonly used imperatives such as ‘shall, is to or will’ should not occur. Adopted European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR) may use the words shall or will in place of must.

b. ‘shall’ is used in some EMAR and is analogous to the word must.

c. ‘may’ is used in the permissive sense to state authority or permission to do the act described, and the words ‘no person may…’ or ‘a person may not’ mean that no person is required, authorised or permitted to do the act described.

d. ‘includes’ means ‘includes but is not limited to’.

e. ‘should’ is used to imply an act or process identified for inclusion in a desired outcome is complied with, unless sound reasoning may determine otherwise. The word should is not used in regulation text.

40. In these regulations the terms:

a. ‘Guidance material’ (GM) is used to provide non-binding explanatory and interpretation material on how to achieve the requirements contained in the regulation. It contains information, including examples, to assist the user in the interpretation and application of the regulation.

b. ‘Acceptable means of compliance’ (AMC) is used to provided a non-binding compliance method that can serve as a means by which the requirements contained in the regulation can be met.

c. Alternative AMC. Airworthiness authorities / commanders may elect to show compliance with the regulation using an alternative AMC. Should alternative AMC be used, notification to the Defence AA/OAR (through DACPA) or the TAR as appropriate will afford appropriate oversight of regulatory outcomes and also assist continuous improvements of the relevant regulations.

41. Precedence. Within these regulations, where any conflict occurs, a regulation always precedes AMC or GM.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR CLARIFICATION

42. Clarification of the intent or applicability of a MILAVREG may be directed to ACPA regulations staff via [email protected]. ACPA regulations staff may only provide informal advice. If formal advice is required this should be included in the request for information to ACPA staff, who will seek formal advice via DACPA IAW MILAVREG 1.10.

Annexes

A. DASP Regulation Change Process

B. DASP Enforcement Policy

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AAP 7001.048 Annex A to

Sect 1 Chap 1

AL 5 1A–1

DASP REGULATION CHANGE PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

1. When developing policy and regulation1 that underpins DI(G) OPS 02–2 Defence Aviation Safety Program

(DASP), clear and unambiguous guidance from DASP Leadership (Defence AA, OAR and TAR) along with a

coordinated approach to regulation development by the three DASP agencies is essential to ensure satisfactory

aviation safety outcomes for the regulated community.

2. The continued evolution and development of DASP regulation is critical to ensure policy remains relev ant

and appropriately directs the treatment of Defence aviation hazards and associated safety risks.

3. A co-ordinated approach to DASP regulation amendment and development is critical to ensure that the suite

of DASP documents is functional and work together. Figure 1 shows the DASP regulation relationships.

4. Defence AA, OAR or TAR regulatory intent is critical to ensure regulation development is focused and meets

DASP requirements.

DI (G) OPS 02-2

MILAVREG Jointly developed by DACPA

(OAR) and DGTA (TAR) with

DDAAFS visibility

OAREG Developed by DACPA with DGTA /

DDAAFS visibility

TAREG Developed by DGTA with DACPA /

DDAAFS visibility

Aviation Safety Policy Developed by DDAAFS with

DACPA / DGTA visibility

Figure 1 – DASP Regulation Relationships2

1 Differences exist between regulation and aviation safety policy. Aviation safety policy, for example the DASM, is

not regulation, but can have a similar effect upon the regulated community when proposing new policy and

procedures. To simplify the RCP and avoid confusion, the term regulation is used to refer to regulation,

guidance material and aviation safety policy. 2 DI(G) OPS 02–2 is a combined DASP Agency development sponsored by DACPA.

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1A–2 AL 5

DASP REGULATION CHANGE PROCESS

5. The DASP Regulation Change Process (RCP) facilitates the timely development, review and publication of

DASP regulation through a coordinated and consultative approach. The RCP is a disciplined process and enables

regulation changes by assigning clear responsibilities and accountabilities at all stages. All regulation changes will be

supported by documented decisions, made by DASP Agency Heads (Change Sponsors) and approval authorities. The

end state is delivery of well drafted regulation with a documented and auditable trail of reviews, comments and

decisions.

6. The DASP RCP initiator may be a Publication Improvement Report and Reply (PIRR)3 or other suitable

format that includes an initial assessment and categorisation of the proposed change, conceptual desig n, regulation

drafting, approval and publishing processes followed by a structured implementation of the regulation. Throughout the

process relevant consultation, endorsements and approvals are gained.

Categories of Regulation Change

7. DASP regulation change is modelled on the System of Defence Instruction (SoDI) Business Process and all

changes are categorised as either:

a. major

b. minor

c. editorial.

8. Each category is treated differently within the RCP to reflect the differing levels of risk, work, consultation

and approval required. The categorisation of regulation changes will necessarily require some judgement and where

doubt exists, the process for the higher change category should apply.

Major Change 9. Major changes bring significant DASP regulation change with a corresponding change to compliance

requirements for the regulated community. A major change would typically be an amendment to:

a. Address previously unrealised hazards to aviation safety

b. Amplify treatment to existing hazards where policy is ineffective

c. Fundamentally change the approach or intent of existing regulation

d. Remove regulation where hazards are already treated via alternative policy

e. Remove regulation where there is no benefit to aviation safety.

10. The DASP RCP for major change is depicted at Figure 1.

Minor Change 11. Minor changes should improve the regulation, but not change intent. A minor change should not impose new

regulation. A minor change would typically be an amendment to:

a. Improve clarity of regulatory requirements

b. Improve guidance material supporting a regulation

c. Remove guidance material where content is covered in other regulation or policy.

12. Minor changes do not require the same process overheads as major changes. The DASP RCP for minor

change is depicted at Figure 1.

3 Web form AO 011 - Publication Improvement Report and Reply (PIRR).

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Editorial Change

13. Editorial changes make editorial corrections to regulations and would typically address:

a. revised terminology

b. organisational change where name changes are required

c. formatting errors

d. grammatical errors

e. punctuation errors

f. spelling errors

g. internal document structure/reference errors (eg. broken hyperlinks, table of contents or index)

h. other minor errors of an editorial nature.

14. Editorial changes do not require the same process overheads as major or minor changes. The DASP RCP for

editorial change is depicted at Figure 1.

RESPONSIBILITIES

15. The key appointments and responsibilities that apply to this instruction are:

a. Approval Authority. The individual who will approve regulation changes as follows:4

(1) Defence AA: MILAVREG and DASM.

(2) OAR: OAREG.

(3) TAR: TAREG.

b. Regulated Community Heads. Represent the regulated community and may initiate regulation

change, provide feedback on proposed concepts and provide endorsement as required for changes.

Regulated community Heads include Service Chiefs, OAA, TAA, CJOPS and other Group Heads.

c. Change Sponsor. The DASP Agency Head responsible for the management and implementation of a

change under the RCP as follows:

(1) DACPA: DI(G) OPS 02–2, MILAVREG, and OAREG.

(2) DGTA: TAREG.

(3) DDAAFS: DASM.

d. Change Manager. The DASP Agency lead tasked by the Change Sponsor to manage the RCP.

4 DACPA is delegated approval authority under MILAVREG 1.10 for minor and editorial changes to MILAVREG

and OAREG.

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DASP REGULATION CHANGE PROCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

DASP Regulation Change Process

MAJOR MINOR EDITORIALCHANGE REQUIRED

Step 1

CHANGE INITIATOR

Step 2ASSESS REGULATION CHANGE

(Change Sponsor) MAJOR MINOR EDITORIAL

Step 8EXTERNAL

CONSULTATION(Change Sponsor)

Step 7aDASP AGENCY


Step 14PUBLISH REGULATION

(Change Sponsor)

Step 3CONCEPT

DEVELOPMENT(Change Sponsor)

Step 6INITIAL DRAFT REGULATION

(Change Sponsor)

Step 10FINAL DRAFT REGULATION

(Change Sponsor)

Step 13aAPPROVAL

Step 13cAPPROVAL

Step 13bAPPROVAL

Step 15IMPLEMENT / PROMOTE / EDUCATE

(Change Sponsor)

CONTINUOUSIMPROVEMENT

Step 9EXTERNAL FEEDBACK

(Change Sponsor)

Step 4CONCEPT

ENDORSEMENT(Change Sponsor)

Step 12FINAL DRAFT

ENDORSEMENT(Change Sponsor)

Step 7bDASP AGENCY


Step 11FINAL DASP


Step 5APPROVAL

Figure 1 - DASP RCP

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Sect 1 Chap 1

AL 5 1A–5

Step 1 – Regulation Change Initiation

16. A variety of circumstances may lead to the requirement for DASP regulation change. Accordingly, an

auditable trail of change initiation requests is essential. The RCP will be initiated by the Change Manager after receipt/

or production of a change initiator form.5 This form should be retained in an enduring manner.

Step 2 – Regulation Change Assessment 17. Upon receipt of a change initiator, the Change Manager will undertake a regulation change assessment to

determine the validity of the change request and the change category. Once assessed, for major and minor changes the

Change Manager should seek Change Sponsor endorsement of the assessment. If a change is endorsed as a major

change, proceed to Step 3 – Concept Development. If a change is endorsed as minor change, proceed to Step 6 –

Initial Draft.

18. If the Change Manager assesses the change as an editorial change the Change Manager may proceed to Step –

10 Final Draft without seeking Change Sponsor endorsement.

19. Regulation Impact Statement (RIS). A RIS is a decision making tool that helps ensure Defence is compliant

with Government requirements regarding regulation. The RIS helps determine if change is required in the first

instance, or to ascertain if non-regulatory options might be a better outcome. The RIS is achieved by answering the

following 7 RIS6 questions (adapted for Defence aviation):

a. What is the hazard the change intends to address?

b. Why is Defence action needed?

c. What are the policy options available?

d. What is the likely net benefit of each option?

e. Who should be consulted?

f. What is the best option being presented?

g. How will the option be implemented?

20. Completion of a RIS will support the concept development of Major regulation change.

5 The DASP RCP change initiator may be Web form AO 011 - Publication Improvement Report and Reply (PIRR) or

another suitable document. 6 The RIS questions provided in this SI are an extract from the Australian Government Regulation Impact Statement

(RIS) (www.cuttingredtape.gov.au), which provides broad guidance for RIS assessments.

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Step 3 – Regulation Change Concept Development

21. Major change should undergo development and endorsement of a regulation change concept. The regulation

change concept will define the conceptual design for the new or revised regulation and address desired outcomes,

including limitations and constraints. The concept development for a major change should include a Regulation

Impact Statement (RIS). The Change Sponsor should determine the level of external consultation required during this

phase acknowledging that significant knowledge and expertise resides in the regulated community. Concept

development should include:

a. Affected regulation

b. Scope of the regulation change (product of concept development)

c. Reason for regulation change (product of concept development)

d. Outcome sought from regulation

e. Summary of RIS questions

f. Priority of change:

(1) High: Aviation safety / airworthiness critical regulation is published ASAP

(2) Medium: Aviation safety / airworthiness significant regulation is published <6 months

(3) Low: Resource / capability impact improvement is published <12 months

(4) Routine: General regulation improvement is published <24 months

g. Implementation schedule

h. Other affected regulation, policy and/or publications.

22. Unless allocated high or medium priority, a major change may take a substantial period of time to complete;

therefore, the concept development and endorsement process can ensure that intent is not lost over time.

Step 4 – Regulation Change Concept Endorsement

23. Once the change concept is developed the Change Sponsor will send the concept to DASP Agency and

relevant regulated community heads for concept endorsement.

24. Endorsement of the regulation change concept is critical in achieving major DASP regulation change and it

assures the regulated community is expectant of change and formally engaged at concept development stage. Where

concept is not endorsed the Change Sponsor may:

a. negotiate with the applicable authority to refine the scope of the concept, or

b. elevate the decision to the approval authority where the aviation safety implications of not

implementing change outweigh the disagreement.

Step 5 – Regulation Change Concept Approval

25. Once the regulation concept has received endorsement the Change Sponsor will seek approval from the

approval authority to develop the major regulation change.

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Sect 1 Chap 1

AL 5 1A–7

Step 6 – Regulation Drafting

26. Draft regulation change should be developed in line with:

a. The DASP 10 Ways to Better Aviation Regulation Handbook

b. The Australian Government Guide to Regulation

c. The Office of Parliamentary Council (OPC)7 regulation development tools, such as the OPC Plain

English Manual

d. The Defence Writing Manual (DWM).

27. Draft regulation should involve relevant working level stakeholders in the first instance, both internal and

external. In this manner, the regulation change process is likely to be more successful as significant issues will have

already been identified and negotiated by the Change Manager.

Step 7 – DASP Agency Consultation 28. A DASP Agency internal consultation phase is critical to ensure inter-agency agreement of major (Step 7a)

and minor (Step 7b) regulation draft change is reached prior to commencing external consultation with the regulated

community.

29. Step 7a. The DASP Agency internal consultation phase for major change is as follows:

a. The Change Sponsor proposes a timeline for review/outputs8 and distributes the regulation pack

(Forms at Appendix 1 & 2 may be used) to the other two DASP Agency Heads . The regulation pack is

documented, tracked and filed IAW respective DASP Agency internal processes .

b. DASP Agency Heads will conduct an internal review of the regulation pack and provide written

feedback to the Change Sponsor, including advice if the Agency is not affected by the change and

therefore has no comment.9

c. The Change Sponsor will consider and incorporate changes to the draft regulation as appropriate.

d. A Summary of Responses Report (Form at Appendix 3 may be used) is then provided with a revised

draft to the DASP Agency Heads for endorsement, unless a Head has endorsed already. The revised

regulation should be returned to the Change Sponsor within ten working days10

indicating endorsed or

not endorsed.

e. Depending on the internal DASP Head positions advised, the change may:

(1) re-enter the DASP agency consultation process

(2) be provided to the regulated community as part of the external consultation phase11

(3) be directed to the next suitable authority for arbitration should the DASP Heads be unable to

reach agreement.

f. The DASP internal consultation phase process should be completed before formal external

consultation occurs.

30. Step 7b. The DASP Agency internal consultation phase for minor change is an informal process that affords

flexibility regarding levels of consultation. It enables regulation SME input without increasing oversight unnecessarily

before Final Drafting (Step 10).

7 http://www.opc.gov.au/

8 A representative timeframe for review is 10 working days

9 This ensures a closed loop feedback process.

10 As the document will have already received required attention during the initial review phase, ten days is

reasonable. 11

Should a DASP Head not endorse the change, this should not automatically prevent the change from being

distributed to the regulated community for comment as issues that exist may be resolved via this process.

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Step 8 – External Consultation

31. Prior to formal external consultation, it is expected that informal consultation will have occurred with relevant

stakeholders.

32. Once the DASP internal consultation phase is complete, the Change Sponsor will provide the draft regulation

to the regulated community and request feedback. The entire regulated community may provide change feedback

direct to the Change Sponsor, but any ‘indirect’ feedback obtained should be provided to the relevant OAA, FTAA,

TAA or Group Head so this feedback may be moderated as part of the formal reply(Forms at Appendix 1-3 may be

used).

33. With respect to external consultation, the following aspects should be considered:

a. Regulation change may require key DASP stakeholder inputs such as HASD, DMO and CDG

b. Each OAA, TAA, FTAA and Group Head will determine the level o f engagement required within their

organisation for obtaining proposed change feedback

c. Feedback may drive significant change to the initial draft, such that a further round of external

consultation may be required before seeking approval to publish the regulation.

34. The majority of engagement will occur via correspondence. Additionally the bi-annual AwB convocation

provides a regular forum for each OAR, TAR, OAA, FTAA, TAA, DACPA and other key stakeholders to discuss

regulation development or associated concerns if required. Where necessary DACPA will ensure regulation

development is an agenda item at convocations.

Step 9 – External Feedback 35. While all feedback may be considered by the Change Sponsor, only the feedback that has been moderated by

the OAA, FTAA, TAA or Group Head must be formally responded to by the Change Sponsor.

Step 10 – Final Draft Regulation 36. The Change Sponsor will ensure final draft regulation is produced after considering the change feedback

received.

Step 11 – Final DASP Consultation 37. The process is as per Step 7 and is the final DASP Agency opportunity to apply aviation safety and regulation

SME advice and endorsement to the Final Draft Regulation. Should the feedback from Step 7 DASP Agency

consultation not include any negative comments of substance, the Change Sponsor may elect to skip Step 11. If so, the

Change Sponsor should advise the DASP Heads of this decision.

Step 12 – Final Draft Endorsement 38. The Change Sponsor will send the draft regulation to the relevant OAA, TAA, FTAA or Group Head seeking

endorsement prior to seeking approval to publish. Should the feedback from Step 8 External consultation not include

any negative comments of substance, the Change Sponsor may elect to skip Step 12. If so, the Change Sponsor should

advise the relevant authorities of this decision.

Steps 13a, 13b and 13c – Approval

39. The Change Sponsor will request approval to publish and implement the regulation from the appropriate

approval authority.

Step 14 – Publish Regulation

40. The Change Sponsor will publish the regulation after receiving written approval from the approval authority.

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Step 15 – Implement Regulation

41. The Change Sponsor will implement the regulation change by ensuring:

a. An implementation transition strategy is advised

b. Promotion and education of the regulation change is provided for the regulated community

c. An oversight and enforcement strategy is advised

d. Regulation review schedule is planned.12

Continuous Improvement 42. Once a regulation is published it is subject to continuous improvement.

12 Major changes may require a review after a defined period to confirm that they are having the desired effect. This is

likely to be the case when introducing regulation for a new capability.

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AAP 7001.048 Annex B to Sect 1 Chap 1

AL 7 1B–1

DASP ENFORCEMENT POLICY

1. DI(G) OPS 02-2 Defence Aviation Safety Program places responsibility on the Defence Aviation Authority to establish and maintain the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) to assure the safe and effective generation of Defence aviation capability. This is achieved in part through implementation of a regulatory framework consisting of Military Aviation Regulations (MILAVREGs), Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREGs) and Technical Airworthiness Regulations (TAREGs).

2. A key component of an effective regulatory framework is ensuring that regulated entities have a clear understanding of when, why and how DASP Regulatory Authorities may take action in the event of regulatory breaches or unresolved safety performance issues. The DASP Enforcement Policy supports compliance with Defence aviation regulations through application of a consistent enforcement framework and has been developed with due consideration of the Defence aviation environment and associated Commonwealth legislation.

3. The DASP Enforcement Policy communicates the enforcement approach taken by DASP Regulatory Authorities to securing compliance with aviation safety policy and regulation.1

4. The term Enforcement pertains to all activities that may be undertaken by DASP regulatory authorities to address regulatory breaches or remedy identified safety issues. This policy is applicable to all regulated entities (both Defence and External Service Providers) operating under the DASP.

5. Compliance date. Finalisation of DASP Regulatory Authorities' enforcement artefacts, templates and subordinate processes to support full implementation of this policy is anticipated by Jun 16.

6. Principles. The DASP Enforcement Policy is founded on the following principles:

a. Principle 1: Enforcement action may be taken in the event of regulatory non-compliance.

(1) The decision to take enforcement action will give due and equitable consideration to distinguish consistent or premeditated non-compliance from unintentional errors or deviations.

b. Principle 2: Enforcement action shall be fair and proportionate.

(1) Full details of the nature of non-compliance will be given.

(2) The response to non-compliance will be proportionate to the identified breach and the underlying safety risk(s).

(3) Enforcement action will relate directly to the non-compliance and associated risks.

(4) In the interests of procedural fairness regulated entities will be afforded the opportunity to review and respond to identified non-compliance(s) prior to enforcement action being initiated.

c. Principle 3: Enforcement action shall be graduated.

(1) Enforcement action shall commence at the lowest level possible and should escalate only when necessary to secure compliance.

(2) Decisions on the speed of escalation are to be made cognisant of underlying safety risk(s) and an organisation or individual’s motivational stance, prior interaction and capacity to meet the regulations.

1 This policy articulates the approach to be adopted by DASP Regulatory Authorities in response to identified regulatory non-compliances or unresolved aviation safety issues. Enforcement action taken by DASP Regulatory Authorities is not a replacement for, and must not be confused with, disciplinary or administrative processes that may be utilised by the command chain where Defence personnel have committed offences or demonstrated significant professional failings

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d. Principle 4: Independent and evidence based decisions.

(1) Enforcement decisions must be independent, transparent and based upon objective evidence.

(2) Enforcement decisions must not be influenced by personal, political or financial considerations.

Enforcement Actions

7. Breaches of regulations and safety performance shortfalls may occur for a variety of reasons ranging from a genuine misunderstanding of the regulations through to a consistent and deliberate disregard for aviation safety. A graduated and proportionate approach to enforcement recognises and takes account of relevant compliance motivators when determining the type of enforcement action to be taken in response to identified breaches.

8. DASP Regulatory Authorities have a range of enforcement options available to effectively address regulatory/safety obligations dependent upon the context and circumstances. Enforcement actions may include:

a. Provision of support and education to assist entities who demonstrate a genuine commitment to resolving regulatory breaches or safety deficiencies.

b. Use of formal and/or corrective measures to secure compliance where entities lack a genuine commitment to resolving regulatory breaches or safety deficiencies.

c. Variation, suspension or cancellation of approvals/authorisations where entities consistently and deliberately fail to meet regulatory or safety obligations.

9. The DASP Enforcement Triangle (Figure 1–B–1) details the suite of enforcement options that may be taken in response to regulated entity compliance attitudes and performance.2

Figure 1–B–1: DASP Enforcement Triangle

2 Serious breaches involving recklessness or gross negligence may result in a criminal investigation that falls outside DASP jurisdiction. Such action would not prejudice DASP Regulatory Authority ability to take enforcement action where appropriate.

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10. Imposing a sanction that suspends or removes an organisational permission may not always be in the interests of the Service. However this must remain a real and credible course of action as part of a graduated response to serious and/or continuing non- compliances. If DASP Regulatory Authorities are considering limiting, suspending or removing an organisational certificate/approval, the relevant Service Chief and/or capability manager will be consulted as the action may impact operational output(s).

Enforcement Action and Commercial Organisations

11. The requirement for commercial service providers to comply with DASP policy and regulatory requirements and maintain relevant organisational certifications/approvals is generally secured through contractual provisions. Where DASP Regulatory Authorities are considering taking enforcement action against a commercial service provider that may impact contractual agreements, the relevant Defence contract management authority will be consulted.

Administrative Action

12. Disciplinary proceedings or administrative action may be taken by the command chain where Defence personnel have either committed offences or demonstrated significant professional failings. Whilst such action does not constitute part of the DASP Enforcement Policy, it is envisaged that the DASP Regulatory Authorities may, in appropriate circumstances, be required to provide documentation and/or data in support of command initiated administrative processes.

Coordination with External Regulatory Authorities

13. In certain circumstances DASP Regulatory Authorities may identify a regulatory breach or safety concern that falls under the jurisdiction of an external National or Military Aviation Authority. Where this occurs, DASP Regulatory Authorities will coordinate and consult with external agencies as necessary to ensure that appropriate enforcement/remedial action is undertaken.

DASP ENFORCEMENT POLICY APPEAL PROCESS

14. If an accountable person3 subject to formal enforcement action wishes to appeal an enforcement decision, the appellant may do so in writing to the appropriate DASP Regulatory Authority in accordance with the process outlined below.

Standards for Handling Appeals

15. The standards for handling appeals against DASP enforcement action are as follows:

a. Appeals will be accepted in writing by email or letter.

b. Appellants will be treated fairly and courteously.

c. Appeals will be dealt with promptly:

(1) The relevant authority will acknowledge initial receipt of a written appeal within 5 working days of receipt.

(2) The relevant authority will send a full response within 20 working days of receipt.

(3) If the relevant authority cannot respond fully within 20 working days of receipt, an explanation why will be provided to the appellant together with the date by which the full reply will be provided.

16. The appellant’s personal information will be handled in accordance with the requirements of the Privacy Act 1988.

3 An accountable person may include 1) The Senior Executive of an approved organisation; or 2) Holder of a delegated operational Authority (OAA; OAAR; FTAA).

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2 Stage Appeal process

17. Stage 1 – Initial Review. The appellant should write to the appropriate Regulatory Authority:

a. Stating their appeal (providing the detail of the enforcement action they are appealing).

b. Providing details of who issued the DASP enforcement action.

c. Including any documents or correspondence in support of the appeal.

18. On receipt of the written appeal, the relevant DASP Regulatory Authority will identify an independent member of their organisation with suitable authority to review the case and they will be directed to contact the appellant to discuss their concerns and commence an independent review of the enforcement action. In line with the principle of addressing issues at the lowest possible level it is anticipated that most appeals will be resolved at this stage.

19. Stage 2 – Further Review. If the appellant is dissatisfied with the result of the Stage 1 – Initial Review, the appellant may choose to seek a further review of the DASP enforcement action. Upon receipt of a written submission explaining why the initial appeal has failed to resolve the matter, the relevant Regulatory Authority will submit the appeal for further review to the appropriate DASP appointment as detailed in Table 1–B–1:

Table 1–B–1: Reviewing Authorities for Stage 2 Reviews

Enforcement Action Appeal reviewed by4

Certificate/Approval Removal Defence AA

Certificate/Approval Suspension Defence AA

Certificate/Approval Limitation Defence AA

Formal Warning OAR/TAR

Advisory Letter OAR/TAR

4 Removal of an operational certificate or organisational permission is undertaken by the Authority who issues the original certificate/permission. Where an appeal relates to enforcement action undertaken by the Defence AA, the appeal will be reviewed by an independent Senior Officer appointed by the Defence AA.

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RESERVED

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SECTION 1

CHAPTER 3

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION

INTRODUCTION

1. The intent of the operational regulatory framework established by the OAR is to ensure that Commanders have the greatest flexibility to exploit the capability of their Aviation Systems, while assuring the airworthiness of aircraft under their command or management. Noting this objective and the disparate operating environments within which Defence aircraft systems must operate, the operational airworthiness regulations promulgated in AAP 8000.010—Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual represent the minimum requirements to assure operational airworthiness and allow flexibility in meeting the intent to suit local or service specific operating requirements. The responsibility for implementation and safe operation of aviation systems primarily rests with the Operational Airworthiness Authorities (OAAs) and their delegates. Accordingly, the regulations provide a framework through which commanders can achieve operational capability in a safe and effective manner. The Defence AA requirements with respect to operational airworthiness management by the OAR, OAAs and Flight Test Approval Authorities (FTAAs) are contained in MILAVREG 1.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter outlines the operational airworthiness regulatory framework.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter is applicable to all Defence flying operations, or operations involving Defence Personnel in the course of their duty.

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS

RESPONSIBILITIES

4. DCAF is appointed the OAR through DI(G) OPS 02–2—Defence Aviation Safety Program and is responsible for establishing the regulatory framework within which operational airworthiness processes and procedures are implemented.

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATIONS

5. Airworthiness is a management concept supporting determinations by airworthiness authorities that an aircraft is suitable for flight. Airworthiness regulations are rules regarding the design, construction, maintenance and operation of Defence aircraft that are intended to ensure the airworthiness of that aircraft type.

6. Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREG) prescribe a framework according to which operational airworthiness is managed, so as to ensure that Service Chiefs and Group Heads have the greatest flexibility to exploit the capability of their Aviation Systems within a management system that preserves the airworthiness of aircraft under their command or management.

7. The OAREG elements are derived by audience and operational airworthiness function. The main audience groups are:

a. OAAs. Each OAA is responsible for management and regulatory assurance of operational airworthiness of Aviation Systems as directed by their respective Service Chief or Group Head. Each OAA must manage operational airworthiness aspects of aviation systems under their command or management in a manner to be compliant with the regulations in this manual and in AAP 8000.010.

b. OAARs and flying organisations. OAARs and flying organisations are responsible for the operational airworthiness management system within their command, as delegated by OAAs.

c. OAAR Acquisition (OAAR(Acq)) and acquisition organisations. OAAR(Acq)s and acquisition organisations are responsible for the operational airworthiness management of acquisition activities, as delegated by OAAs.

d. FTAAs and flight test organisations. FTAAs and flight test organisations are responsible for the operational airworthiness management of flight test activities and recognition of competent organisations to conduct flight test. They exercise authority to ensure the impact of aircraft designs on airworthiness is appropriately assessed and that flight test operations are conducted in a safe manner by qualified and competent aircrew and systems specialists.

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Relationship of the regulatory elements

8. While the OAREGs are focussed respectively at the audiences listed in paragraph 7, in reality aspects of each OAREG element are applicable to each audience and organisation. For example, an FTAA is required to comply with aspects of OAREG 2 tailored to the flight test environment. The relationship between the audiences and the OAREG elements is shown in Figure 3–1.

Figure 3–1 Relationship between OAREG elements

Implementation

9. The OAREGs are built on the premise that Aviation Systems must be certified to approved operating requirements, operated to approved rules and limitations, within an established Flying Management System (FMS) by appropriately trained and qualified operators.

10. The Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). The SOI is the overarching document which defines the roles and operating environment for an Aviation System. The SOI is intrinsically linked to the Type Certification and Service Release of an aircraft type as it defines the applicable operating requirements for which the Certification and Service Release has been, or will be, achieved. The SOI is established or amended through the new aircraft acquisition or modification process and is managed in-service by the applicable OAA (and/or OAAR) and the TAR (and, as delegated, the Design Acceptance Representative (DAR)).

11. In-service operation. In-service flying organisations have established FMS which include processes and procedures for, among other things, management of the SOI, flight authorisation, competency management, management of Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP), aviation safety management, and aviation risk management (AVRM). The flying organisation operates to approved rules and limitations in the form of flight manuals, Service Release limitations, authoritative flight information documents and OIP governing low flying, role limitations etc. Minimum training and qualification requirements are stipulated for general aviation operations, such as basic flying training, Crew Resource Management (CRM), aviation safety and AVRM.

12. New aircraft, modifications and flight test. New aircraft, or changes to the type design, role or environment of existing aircraft, must undergo processes to ensure the operational airworthiness of the type is known and documented. Typically, this is achieved through a process of design and test with close cooperation between operators, engineers, logisticians and flight test specialists. The assessment of aircraft systems, and compliance with design standards, is established by the specialist application of test techniques by suitably qualified and experienced operators. During this process the limitations and operational airworthiness management arrangements required to operate the system according to the SOI are established and documented. This then forms the basis of decisions by the Defence AA to Type Certify and Service Release new systems for operational use.

13. Individual Service implementation. Each of the three Services has developed policy and instructions regarding operational airworthiness management. The RAAF has a range of Defence Instructions (Air Force) which cascade into Air Command Standing Instructions (SIs), supported by subordinate Group, Wing and Unit SIs, and

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Group, Wing and Unit Flying Orders (FOs). The Army takes cognisance of DI(AF)s, noting that these may not always have been drafted with reference to an Army aviation context. Consequently, the Army uses SIs and Special Flying Instructions to supplement DI(AF)s. In addition to DI(N), many of which parallel DI(AF), the RAN has a range of Australian Books of Reference (ABRs), with ABR 5150—RAN Aviation Instructions as the primary reference for Navy airworthiness instructions, supported by a range of subordinate documents.

The role of ACPA in operational airworthiness

14. ACPA is the staff of the OAR and therefore represent the OAR on matters concerning operational airworthiness. DACPA may interpret OAREGs on behalf of the OAR, and provide authoritative advice. ACPA sponsor regulatory development, under the direction of the OAR, following consultation with stakeholders through the ASPRC. Petitioners seeking to propose, amend or repeal regulations may do so in accordance with the OAREGs. DACPA sponsors AAP 8000.010.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR GUIDANCE

15. AAP 8000.010 contains detailed information on the applicability and application of the OAREGs. Additionally, AAP 8000.010 contains further guidance on the implementation of the operational regulations. AAP 8000.010 will continue to be updated by amendment as the guidance evolves to suit user requirements. ACPA should be consulted for further guidance or interpretation in the first instance.

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TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION

INTRODUCTION

1. Technical airworthiness management is the process by which Defence assures that aircraft and aeronautical product (AP) are airworthy and for Aviation Support Systems (AvSS) are suitable for operation in approved configuration, roles and environment.

2. Chief of Service Committee (COSC) determination 2/98, agreed to the establishment of a joint Technical Airworthiness Agency (DGTA–ADF) with DGTA as head to: develop, implement, manage and undertake compliance with the technical aspects of a regulatory framework; determine airworthiness certification requirements; and manage in-service technical standards for all Defence aircraft. This has been reiterated in DI(G) OPS 02–2—Defence Aviation Safety Program and MILAVREG 1—airworthiness management however the scope has been increased to include AvSS.

3. DGTA’s title when regulating with respect to technical airworthiness is the TAR. Note, that DGTA is also appointed as the TAA for determining the technical suitability and communicating risks to the OAA for all Defence aircraft and AvSS.

PURPOSE

4. This chapter describes the technical airworthiness framework.

APPLICABILITY

5. This chapter is applicable to the conduct of all design, construction and maintenance of Defence aircraft, AP, and AvSS.

TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS

TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATION

6. The TAR is accountable to the Defence AA for establishing and managing the technical elements of the AMS. This includes design, construction, maintenance and continuing airworthiness management of all aircraft, AP and AvSS subject to the DASP. The TAR will consider regulation of:

a. materiel design standards

b. design, construction and maintenance processes

c. competencies for engineering and maintenance personnel.

7. The TAR provides the regulatory framework for the promulgation of regulations; education of regulatory requirements to affected personnel and organisations; certification and ongoing assessment of compliance of regulated organisations; and the assessment of compliance to design standards for aircraft, AP and AvSS. Supporting the framework are:

a. key organisational and individual delegations and approvals

b. DGTA-ADF staff

c. AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical Airworthiness Management Manual

d. processes for urgent and advisory material (Technical Airworthiness Directives and Technical Airworthiness Advisory Circulars)

e. processes for seeking feedback on proposed regulatory changes.

8. Organisational Authorisations and Approvals. The TAR approves maintenance organisations and authorises engineering organisations supporting aircraft, AP, and AvSS.

9. Centres of Expertise. The TAR has a support network consisting of centres of expertise (CoE) in key airworthiness disciplines not supported by DGTA-ADF staff. These organisations provide support in revising, prescribing and interpreting airworthiness standards relevant to specific disciplines including stores clearance, aerial delivery, life support equipment, fuel and lubricants and explosive ordnance. The TAR personally delegates the senior engineer within each CoE as an Airworthiness Standards Representative (ASR).

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10. Regulations. There are two complimentary aspects of the technical regulatory framework: engineering management (focussed on the design, construction and maintenance processes) and design standard management (focussed on the product). TAREG for engineering and maintenance management are promulgated in AAP 7001.053. The TAR publishes minimum airworthiness design requirements in AAP 7001.054—Electronic Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual.

11. Standards. A design standard lays down the various requirements that an aircraft, AP or AvSS should meet in order to assure airworthiness. There are standards for design, construction and maintenance. These are determined by the TAR or delegate and include, but are not limited to:

a. materials (eg grades of aluminium or steel)

b. parts (eg nuts and bolts)

c. processes (eg welding, bonding, electroplating or wiring)

d. facilities (eg clean rooms)

e. major systems (eg an airworthiness code for an aircraft).

12. Changes to airworthiness standards can affect the requirements for certification. In general, the following conditions constitute a need to change an airworthiness standard:

a. the previous standard produces a level of airworthiness which is no longer acceptable

b. the previous standard does not provide, either adequately or at all, for a particular aspect of airworthiness

c. new technology or methods of analysis and design require additional standards

d. a standard previously expressed in general terms needs expression in more specific terms

e. the use of an aircraft in different types of operations or in a different environment requires the specification of new standards.

13. The first step in airworthiness control is the establishment of design requirements (a TAR function) and the second step involves the certification of compliance with these standards (a TAA function). These steps establish a baseline to which airworthiness and any changes can be compared. In other words, the assurance of continued airworthiness is based on a philosophy that the standard (of airworthiness) acquired is (at least) the standard maintained.

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TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY

14. The TAA is accountable to the Defence AA and responsive to Service Chiefs and Group Heads for:

a. determinations regarding the technical suitability of aircraft and AP subject to the DASP

b. determinations regarding technical suitability of AvSS

c. communicating technical risks to the relevant OAAs.

15. Personal Delegations. The Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) is delegated authority by the TAA, to perform Design Acceptance on behalf of the Commonwealth. The DAR’s role, for those Defence aircraft, AP or AvSS they are delegated authority, is to assess their technical suitability and where necessary communicate risk to the OAA.

Airworthiness Code

16. Defence does not have the resources to develop and maintain a complete Airworthiness Code, ie a complete set of airworthiness design standards. To administer its own Type Certification programs, Defence relies extensively on design standards that are recognised by other civilian and military airworthiness authorities. Some of these design standards are comprehensive and directly applicable to Defence. Others may meet many of our requirements, but require supplementation or tailoring to account for:

a. Defence’s particular Configuration, Role and/or operating Environment (CRE)

b. deficiencies in the level of safety provided by the design standard, detected by Defence through local research or experience (eg investigations into aircraft incidents)

c. intentional ambiguities in the design standard, where it is assumed the standard will be tailored to meet the needs of the specific application

d. Defence’s particular approach to through-life support.

17. AAP 7001.054 documents the TAR minimum design standards, and any tailoring they require to address known shortfalls. The manual also presents the TAR’s underlying design philosophy for key aircraft technologies or functions. Together, this information presents a benchmark level of safety for the design of Defence aircraft. Any design shortfalls against this benchmark must be analysed and evaluated, so that informed risk treatment decisions can be made.

18. Application of Current Airworthiness Design Requirements to Older Systems. Where Defence is either: acquiring an aircraft that has been manufactured and certified to an earlier airworthiness code or conducting a major modification to such an aircraft; there is a requirement for the TAA to make a ruling on the applicable airworthiness code for Defence certification (ie the Certification Basis). If a new standard has been added, or an existing standard revised, it is necessary to determine if the standard should be applied retrospectively. Where an older standard is used in place of an updated standard, the reasons for using the older standard must be formally documented and endorsed by the TAA. TAA policy for application of airworthiness requirements is detailed in AAP 7001.053.

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TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS CONCEPTS AND TERMS

19. Type Certification. Type Certification is the process through which compliance with the airworthiness design requirements contained in the Certification Basis Description (CBD) is established through the development of the Type Design to meet the operating roles and environment contained in the SOI. It has both operational and technical airworthiness elements. The process leads to the award of an AMTC or an STC. The AMTC or STC, issued by the Defence AA on the advice of the TAA and OAA, and following independent review by the AwB, provides :

a. Formal recognition that an aircraft design, as documented, is safe to operate in its intended roles and operating environments

b. A list of operating and maintenance instructions and design standards underlying that recognition, and to be observed in all on-going engineering undertaken with respect to that aircraft type.

20. Certification Basis. The Certification Basis forms part of the total set of requirements that must be satisfied before a design can be accepted by Defence. It is the comprehensive set of airworthiness requirements, drawn for example from DEF STAN 00–970, FARs and military or company standards, which must be met to assure the Commonwealth that the Aircraft Type is airworthy. The TAA will compare any proposed certification basis with the minimum set of airworthiness standards identified in AAP 7001.054(AM1). The TAA policy for development and approval of a certification basis is provided in AAP 7001.053.

21. Recognition of Prior Certification (Acceptance). Type Certification of a new aircraft or major upgrade can be based upon prior certification (acceptance) by another authority, provided that the TAA is satisfied that:

a. The authority responsible for the prior certification is recognised by Defence as a competent national or international, civil or military airworthiness authority.

b. The basis for the prior certification is adequately disclosed to the Commonwealth.

c. The certification basis is relevant to the Defence configuration and the intended roles and operating environment.

d. Evidence exists that the civilian or military airworthiness authority applied a level of oversight to the design commensurate with the consequences of system failure.

e. Any risk treatments, including risk retentions, agreed to by the airworthiness authority are comprehensively disclosed.

22. Configuration, Role and Environment. While an airworthiness code is applied to an aircraft (specific configuration) to assess its inherent airworthiness, Defence also pays particular attention to the aircraft role and operating environment when applying that code. These terms encompass, but are not limited to:

a. Configuration. The functional and physical characteristics of existing or planned hardware, firmware, software or a combination thereof as set forth in technical documentation.

b. Role. Consideration of flight profiles, day/night operations, external stores carriage, cargo configurations, operating weights and operating limits (eg, airspeeds, and altitudes) associated with performing the role.

c. Environment. Consideration of atmospheric parameters, structural loading conditions, corrosive environment, ground movement and parking conditions, runway surface and arrest conditions, the electromagnetic environment, the airspace environment, Defence policies and other factors associated with the intended operating environment.

23. Systems Safety. Systems safety engineering is a key element of the airworthiness assurance process underpinning type certification. It is a method by which the level of safety provided by a system design is established, and aims to identify and hence control the hazards and risks associated with the design, operation, maintenance and disposal of an item. TAR regulation and guidance on systems safety engineering is provided respectively in AAP 7001.053 and AAP 7001.054.

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24. Acceptable Risk. Defence aircraft should have an equivalent level of inherent safety to that of civilian aircraft types; however, this objective is not always practicable for military aircraft where designers trade-off attributes such as manoeuvrability, speed and payload for redundancy. Normally high performance aircraft do not involve the same potential loss of life in a catastrophic accident as a large transport aircraft, and egress systems provide an additional mechanism to preserve life. Similarly, the introduction of unmanned aircraft can increase the level of acceptable risk in terms of catastrophic loss of the aircraft, although the level of acceptable risk to other equipment or personnel is unaffected. Whereas civilian airworthiness specify particular probabilities for aircraft catastrophic failures (for example, the FAA requires less than 1 x 10-9 occurrences per flight hour for large aircraft), the determination of appropriate failure probability figures for Defence registered aircraft systems needs to be agreed with the TAA and OAA prior to system development or certification.

25. Compliance Findings. Airworthiness compliance findings are engineering decisions that the aircraft or equipment complies with the certification basis requirement. Compliance is typically assessed through inspection, analysis, demonstration, test or similarity. While compliance findings are termed ‘engineering decisions’ they do broach both technical and operational aspects of airworthiness. Compliance findings should be made by the agency best positioned to assess compliance. This would normally be project engineering staff, but some complex compliance findings may be made by specialist CoEs or DGTA-ADF technology specialists. DGTA-ADF staff are responsible for auditing compliance and providing specialist guidance and advice. TAA policy and guidance for completing certification basis compliance findings is provided in AAP 7001.053(AM1).

26. Type Record. The Type Record is an index to the Type Design of, or a major change to, an Aircraft Type. The Type Record is a summary document that defines a type design, at the time of certification or acceptance by the Commonwealth, by reference to the issue status of all type design data. It should incorporate all type design data (eg data, drawings, specifications, operating procedures etc) submitted in support of the design. The TAR requirements for a Type Record are detailed in AAP 7001.053.

Designs Not Affecting Technical Airworthiness

27. The primary aim of the technical airworthiness regulatory framework is to establish a minimum standard for engineering and maintenance activities to ensure that they do not compromise airworthiness or safety of flight. These regulations also form the basis of the TAR’s requirements for the management of engineering and maintenance of AvSS.

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AAP 7001.048(AM1) Sect 1 Chap 5

1

SECTION 1

CHAPTER 5

AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT

- TO BE ISSUED -

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DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

The operation of aviation systems1 by or on behalf of Defence is conducted within the purview of the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP). This program is invoked by exception under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (the Act) whereby State aircraft are not regulated under the Act. The only exception to this is for Australian civil registered aircraft operating as State aircraft where other agreements between CASA and Defence may be in place.

Individuals within the DASP are appointed with authority, through DI(G) OPS 02-2— Defence Aviation Safety Program, to exercise airworthiness and aviation safety management judgements in order to operate aviation systems. The authority is exercised within a framework of operational, technical and safety regulations, which assure airworthiness and aviation safety. The operation and regulation of aviation systems is independently reviewed to assess ongoing airworthiness and aviation safety management, and the applicability and function of the DASP. Safety is assured through the interaction of these functions which results in sound judgements concerning an aircraft’s suitability for flight.

The outcome required by this regulation is that appropriate decisions are made regarding the operation of Defence Aviation systems in light of the risk posed to members of Defence and the public by the conduct of those operations.

MILITARY AVIATION REGULATION 1

MILAVREG 1.1 – APPLICABILITY

a. MILAVREG are applicable to all aircraft and AvSS:

(1) owned, leased, hired or chartered by Defence

(2) operated exclusively for or on behalf of Defence

(3) any aircraft for which CASA has placed statutory airworthiness responsibilities on Defence.

b. All Defence personnel and organisations must comply with these regulations whenever they are engaged in, or seeking to engage in the design, construction, maintenance, operation or support of Defence Aviation operations under MILAVREG 1.1a.

c. All contractor or civilian personnel and organisations must comply with these regulations whenever they are engaged in, or seeking to engage in the design, construction, maintenance, operation or support of Defence Aviation operations under MILAVREG 1.1a.

d. A Defence organisation must not engage a commercial or private entity in the design, construction, maintenance, operation or support of Defence Aviation operations within the scope of these regulations unless the terms of operation are subject to these regulations through a legally binding agreement which is acceptable to the Defence AA.

1 Includes Aviation Support Systems (AvSS).

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MILAVREG 1.2 – EXEMPTIONS

a. The Defence AA may:

(1) Exempt Defence registered aircraft from airworthiness certification requirements.

(2) Authorise operation of a Defence registered aircraft without a valid AMTC or SFP.

(3) Authorise operation of a Defence registered aircraft in an unapproved role or after major changes that in normal circumstances would require Supplemental Role Approval (SRA) or a STC.

(4) Authorise operation of an AvSS without an AvSSC.

(5) Exempt any person or organisation from compliance with these regulations.

GUIDANCE

• Any person or organisation seeking an exclusion from these regulations by the Defence AA may be required to support the application with a risk based assessment to demonstrate how the airworthiness integrity of the affected aviation system will be maintained.

• The relevant authority may satisfy themselves that such systems continue to be operated in a safe manner and that competent and reasonable decisions are made regarding the operation of those systems in light of the risk posed to members of Defence and the public by the conduct of those operations. The relevant authority may also take into consideration the existing command structure and monitoring of these systems with regard to it meeting the intent of the regulations.

b. The pilot-in-command of an aircraft, where presented with the most compelling emergency circumstances, may only undertake a course of action which contravenes these regulations when absolutely necessary in the interests of safety.

c. An operational commander, where presented with the most compelling emergency or contingency circumstances, may only adopt or authorise a course of action which contravenes these regulations where the risk is assessed as acceptable in light of the operational necessity.

d. Exemptions authorised under MILAVREG 1.2.b or 1.2.c must be advised to the Defence AA through the relevant OAA and notified to the TAR in writing as soon as possible.

MILAVREG 1.3 – APPOINTMENT OF AUTHORITY

a. Individuals within the DASP appointed in accordance with DI(G) OPS 02–2 must exercise their authority in accordance with that Instruction and these regulations.

b. An OAA and FTAA will be appointed by the Defence AA as nominated by Service Chiefs and Group Heads.

c. Except when exempted by the Defence AA, DASP appointees must meet the qualification and competency criteria identified in annex A.

d. Airworthiness Board members will be appointed by the Defence AA. Qualification and competency criteria for Airworthiness Board members are in annex A.

MILAVREG 1.4 – OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATOR

a. The OAR must establish and maintain an operational airworthiness framework for the operation of aircraft and a management framework for the operation of AvSS, within the scope of these regulations.

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MILAVREG 1.5 – OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITIES

a. An OAA must:

(1) Ensure the operational airworthiness management of aircraft types and the management of AvSS within the scope of their appointment complies with the airworthiness and management frameworks established by the OAR.

(2) Make informed decisions on the treatment of risk.

(3) Make recommendations to the Defence AA, through DACPA, regarding the issue of airworthiness instruments for aircraft types within the scope of their appointment.

(4) Not authorise or appoint any person to act on their behalf as an OAA.

(5) On return from absence, review any airworthiness decisions made by a person appointed by the Defence AA to act in their stead, as soon as practicable.

(6) Ensure that relevant safety information is provided to DASP Agency staff on request without unnecessary delay.

b. An OAA may:

(1) Make determinations regarding operational airworthiness within the scope of their appointment.

(2) Delegate operational airworthiness management, as permitted by the OAR.

(3) Make recommendations to the Defence AA, through their Service Chief or Group Head, regarding the appointment of a temporary OAA in their absence.

GUIDANCE

• DI(G) OPS 02–2 is the instrument through which the CDF and Secretary appoints responsibility for the DASP management. For OAA and FTAA appointments, the scope of this authority is limited to those aviation systems and activities delegated to them by the Defence AA in accordance with their individual appointments.

MILAVREG 1.6 – TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS REGULATOR

a. The TAR must:

(1) Establish and maintain a technical airworthiness regulatory framework for the design, construction and maintenance of all aircraft, and a technical management framework for Aeronautical Product (AP), AvSS and related equipment subject to the DASP.

(2) Assure the technical airworthiness management of aircraft types, AP, and AvSS within the DASP complies with the technical airworthiness regulatory framework.


b. The TAR may:

(1) Interpret technical airworthiness regulations in the context of design, construction, and maintenance processes.

(2) Define and prescribe technical airworthiness design, construction and maintenance requirements.

(3) Further delegate technical airworthiness regulatory authority.

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MILAVREG 1.7 – TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY

a. The TAA must:

(1) Make recommendations to the Defence AA, through DACPA or the relevant OAA, regarding the issue of airworthiness instruments for aircraft types and AvSS within the scope of the DASP.

(2) Communicate technical risks to the relevant OAA.



b. The TAA may further delegate technical airworthiness authority in accordance with TAREG.

MILAVREG 1.8 – FLIGHT TEST APPROVAL AUTHORITY

a. An FTAA must:

(1) Ensure the operational airworthiness management of aircraft types allocated for the purposes of flight test complies with the operational airworthiness management framework established by the OAR.

(2) Must ensure the technical airworthiness management of aircraft types allocated for the purposes of flight test complies with the technical airworthiness management framework established by the TAR.

(3) Except as provided by MILAVREG 1.8.b.(1), issue a FTP in accordance with MILAVREG 3.5 to authorise flight test of a Defence registered aircraft, and UAS with a valid UAS Operating Permit (UASOP), within the scope of their appointment.

(4) Not authorise or appoint any person to act on their behalf as an FTAA.



b. An FTAA may:

(1) Within the scope of their appointment, authorise flight test of a Defence registered aircraft, and UAS with a valid UASOP, without an FTP as permitted by the OAR.

(2) Within the scope of their appointment, further delegate flight test approval authority as permitted by the OAR.

(3) Make recommendations to the Defence AA, through their Service Chief or Group Head, regarding the appointment of a temporary FTAA in their absence.

MILAVREG 1.9 – AIRWORTHINESS REVIEW RESPONSIBILITY

a. The Airworthiness Board must independently review the operational and technical airworthiness management and aviation safety of aviation systems within the DASP.

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MILAVREG 1.10 – DIRECTOR AIRWORTHINESS COORDINATION AND POLICY AGENCY (DACPA)

a. DACPA must:

(1) Act as directed as the principle representative of the Defence AA on matters concerning Defence airworthiness management.

(2) Formulate Defence airworthiness policy on behalf of the Defence AA.

(3) Act as the principal adviser to the Defence AA on Defence airworthiness management.

(4) Develop OAREG on behalf of the OAR in consultation with each OAA.

(5) Act as the principal adviser to the OAR on operational airworthiness management.

(6) Liaise with external airworthiness authorities on behalf of the Defence AA.

(7) Monitor the effectiveness of the DASP on behalf of the Defence AA.

(8) Maintain the Defence Register.

b. DACPA may:

(1) Interpret MILAVREG.

(2) Interpret OAREG.

(3) Issue Defence Airworthiness Advisory Circulars (AAC).

(4) Approve minor and editorial changes as described under the DASP Regulation Change Process.2

c. As the custodian of the Defence Register, DACPA must:

(1) Maintain a register of all Defence registered aircraft operating under an SFP or AMTC and SR.

(2) Maintain a register of all airworthiness instruments issued by the Defence AA.

(3) Coordinate input from applicable stakeholders for Airworthiness Boards.

(4) Manage Airworthiness Corrective Action Requests (ACAR) resulting from a review required by MILAVREG 1.9, including a record of closure action.

(5) Advise the CASA of any addition or removal of aircraft to the Defence Register.

2 Defence AA Decision Brief of 19 Jan 15 (AB20565663)

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MILAVREG 1.11 – DIRECTOR DEFENCE AVIATION AND AIRFORCE SAFETY (DDAAFS)

a. DDAAFS must:

(1) Act as directed as the principal representative of the Defence AA on matters concerning Defence aviation safety management.

(2) Formulate Defence aviation safety policy on behalf of the Defence AA.

(3) Act as the principal adviser to the Defence AA on Defence aviation safety management.

(4) Monitor the effectiveness of the Defence Aviation Safety Management System (Defence ASMS) on behalf of the Defence AA.

(5) Provide advice, services and tools to commanders and their subordinates in the implementation and management of their Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS).

(6) Investigate all Defence aviation accidents on behalf of Service Chiefs and Group Heads.

(7) Provide aviation safety education and training.

(8) Develop strategies and programs to enhance Defence aviation safety.

b. DDAAFS may:

(1) Provide independent and direct advice to the Service Chiefs on the aviation safety health of their respective Services.

(2) Advise Service Chiefs and commanders at all levels on methods of developing their ASMS.

(3) Investigate Defence aviation safety matters and aviation safety occurrences not classified as accidents.

(4) Liaise with external aviation safety authorities on behalf of the Defence AA.

(5) Liaise with appropriate allied Services, government departments, education authorities and other organisations on aviation safety matters.

GUIDANCE

• DDAAFS also has responsibilities and accountabilities relating to Air Force Work Health and Safety (WHS) management on behalf of the Chief of Air Force (CAF).

Annex:

A. Aviation Safety Program management qualification and competency criteria.

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AAP 7001.048 Annex A to Sect 2 Chap 1

AL 3 1A–1

AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT QUALIFICATION AND COMPETENCY CRITERIA

INTRODUCTION

1. DI(G) OPS 02–2—Defence Aviation Safety Program formally appoints CAF as the Defence AA, DCAF as the OAR, and DGTA as the TAR and TAA. The remaining aviation safety program appointments are nominated by their respective Service Chiefs and Group Heads and formally appointed by the Defence AA. This annex indentifies the desirable attributes that an individual appointed to the respective aviation safety program appointment should possess.

2. An individual may be exempted from these requirements in accordance with MILAVREG 1.2—Exemptions and exclusions. An exemption request should show that the nominated individual has the appropriate experience and competence to assume the aviation safety program appointment.

APPOINTMENTS

OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITY

3. Officers appointed by the Defence AA to a designated OAA position must be aligned with senior key appointments in the Service or Group chain of command and be a member with broad and extensive level of command and Service experience.

FLIGHT TEST APPROVAL AUTHORITY

4. An officer appointed by the Defence AA as an FTAA must:

a. be an aircrew or engineer member who has been qualified as a long course trained test specialist by a recognised flight test training institution;

b. possess a broad and extensive level of experience with Defence flight test operations within the relevant organisation, including:

(1) operation and test of a range of aviation systems operated by Defence;

(2) operation and test involving aircraft stores compatibility clearance; and

(3) command of flight test operations;

c. possess a high level of experience with, and knowledge of, the operational airworthiness regulatory framework;

d. possess a high level of experience with, and knowledge of, acquisition flight test operations; and

e. possess a high level of knowledge of civilian or OEM flight test operations.

AIRWORTHINESS BOARD PANEL MEMBERS

5. Officers appointed by the Defence AA to the Airworthiness Board panel must:

a. Be star rank officers of the permanent forces, or reserve forces on active duty.

b. Possess either:

(1) an operational background with extensive experience in the Defence operation of aircraft types or aviation support systems (AvSS); or

(2) a technical background with extensive experience in Defence technical management of aircraft types or AvSS.

DIRECTOR AIRWORTHINESS COORDINATION AND POLICY AGENCY

6. An officer appointed by the Defence AA as DACPA must:

a. be an aircrew member with a high level of experience in Defence Aviation operations;

b. have previously fulfilled a command position within a Defence flying organisation;

c. possess experience with, and knowledge of, aviation acquisition or modification processes; and

d. possess experience with, and knowledge of, Defence airworthiness management and operational airworthiness regulations.

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DIRECTOR DEFENCE AVIATION AND AIR FORCE SAFETY

7. An officer appointed by the Defence AA as DDAAFS must:

a. be an Air Force aircrew member with a high level of experience in Defence Aviation operations;

b. have previously fulfilled a command position within a Defence flying organisation;

c. possess experience with, and knowledge of, Defence Aviation Safety Management System application; and

d. possess experience with, and knowledge of, Air Force Work Health and Safety Management System application.

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AL 8 1

DEFENCE REGISTRATION AND OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT

INTRODUCTION

Under the DASP, aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence are defined as ‘Defence registered aircraft’ or ‘non-Defence registered aircraft’. MILAVREG 2—Defence registration and operation of aircraft contains:

a. the requirements for determining whether an aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence may be listed on the Defence Register

b. management of the Defence Register.

Defence operations require that aviation systems are managed to allow safe, effective, ready and sustainable combat power that is sufficient to meet operational requirements. Airworthiness in support of this goal is established through a process of Type Certification and Service Release (SR). Aircraft which are Type Certified, or granted a limited scope of flying under a SFP are recorded in the Defence Register. Type Certification and SR are therefore intrinsically linked to the acquisition of new aircraft or significant new capabilities which require an aircraft type to undergo major modification. Accordingly, Defence registration provides the authority and necessary conditions and limitations for the operation of an aircraft type by Defence.

DACPA is the custodian of the Defence Register and is responsible to ensure the validity of the Defence Register. MILAVREG 2 requires that relevant agencies notify ACPA whenever additions or changes to the Defence Register are required.

The outcome required by this regulation is that Defence registered aircraft are designed, constructed, operated and maintained safely within approved roles, standards and limitations by competent and authorised personnel.


MILAVREG 2.1 – DETERMINATION OF REGISTRATION

a. An aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence must be Defence registered when:

(1) the aircraft is predominantly operated in a military configuration, role or environment by Defence or non-Defence personnel

(2) the aircraft is owned by Defence

(3) the aircraft is predominantly operated by members of Defence in the course of their duties.

GUIDANCE

• The registration and airworthiness management requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are contained in MILAVREG 7.

MILAVREG 2.2 – THE DEFENCE REGISTER

a. For all Defence registered aircraft types, the Defence Register must include:

(1) the Airworthiness Instrument number and issue date

(2) an application identifier unique to each aircraft type and tail number

(3) manufacturer name and current OEM authority

(4) the aircraft models designated within each type

(5) the engine and propeller model designations, as appropriate

(6) reference to any STCs issued which supplement the aircraft Type Design

(7) details of when the aircraft was added to the Defence Register and its current operational status

(8) if an individual aircraft has been removed from the Defence Register, the date and reason for removal.

b. An applicant seeking to add an aircraft type to the Defence Register must:

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(1) upon government approval of acquisition, apply to DACPA for an application identifier unique to the aircraft type

(2) identify a tail number unique to each aircraft to be certified

(3) complete all activities required by MILAVREG 2.3.

c. DACPA must advise CASA when a new aircraft type has been added to the Defence Register.

MILAVREG 2.3 – INTRODUCTION AND MODIFICATION OF A DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT TYPE1

a. An applicant seeking to introduce a Defence registered aircraft type to Defence service must:

(1) establish and maintain an SOI2. appropriate to the intended operating roles and environment of the aircraft

(2) maintain an AAMP in accordance with annex A

(3) ensure that, prior to Defence registration, the aircraft is operated in accordance with MILAVREG 5

(4) comply with operational and technical airworthiness requirements regarding the acquisition of the aircraft type

(5) when documented in the AAMP, seek airworthiness instruments to support type certification activity and introduction to service in accordance with MILAVREG 3

(6) present appropriate proofs to the Defence AA Airworthiness Board in accordance with MILAVREG 4.

b. An applicant seeking to make a change to a Defence registered aircraft classified as ‘Major’3 in accordance with TAREG 2.5.3—Classification of changes in Type Design must:

(1) maintain an AAMP in accordance with annex A

(2) ensure that, for any period of non-Defence registration, the aircraft is operated in accordance with MILAVREG 5

(3) comply with operational and technical airworthiness requirements regarding the modification of the aircraft type

(4) when documented in the AAMP, seek airworthiness instruments to support supplemental type certification activity and introduction to service in accordance with MILAVREG 3

(5) present appropriate proofs to the Defence AA’s Airworthiness Board in accordance with MILAVREG 4.

c. AAMP issued under this regulation can only be approved by the Project Manager following endorsement by the TAA, DACPA and the relevant OAA.

MILAVREG 2.4 – OPERATION OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

a. The OAA must operate a Defence registered aircraft under an authorised airworthiness instrument IAW MILAVREG 3.

b. Except as provided under MILAVREG 2.4. c, the OAA must ensure that Defence registered aircraft are operated and maintained:

(1) within the limitations and conditions established under MILAVREG 2.4. a

(2) in accordance with the operational and technical regulatory frameworks established by the OAR

(3) in accordance with any directives issued by the Defence AA, OAR or TAR

(4) such that the Certification Basis is not compromised.

1 Section 3, Chapter 4 contains guidance on the processes and requirements to achieve Defence registration of an aircraft type. 2 Section 3, Chapter 4 contains guidance on the processes and requirements to achieve Defence registration of an aircraft type 3 The determination of ‘Major’ and ‘Minor’ changes to the Type Design of an aircraft is described in AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (eTAMM)

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c. A Defence registered aircraft must only be operated outside the limitations and conditions established under MILAVREG 2.4. b:

(1) when specifically authorised to do so under an approved airworthiness instrument as provided by MILAVREG 3.6;

(2) when authorised to conduct flight test:

i. by an FTAA; or

ii. by an aircraft OEM recognised by the Defence AA as competent to conduct the required operations;

(3) when permitted by the OAA under relevant OAREG

(4) following issue of a STC and SR for a Major change to the Type Design, as provided by MILAVREG 3.2

(5) following approval of a supplemental role by the relevant OAA for a new or Substantial change to the operational role or environment as provided by OAREG 3.5; or

(6) when exempted under MILAVREG 1.2.

d. The airworthiness management of Defence registered aircraft must undergo review in accordance with MILAVREG 4.

MILAVREG 2.5 – CHANGE OF OPERATIONAL STATUS OF A DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

a. The OAA for an aircraft type must advise the Defence AA through DACPA when the airworthiness Certification Basis of an aircraft is compromised to the extent that either:

(1) the aircraft or aircraft type becomes temporally un-airworthy such that suspension of operations is required under MILAVREG 2.6

(2) the aircraft or aircraft type becomes permanently un-airworthy for the SOI roles and environment.

b. The logistics manager for an aircraft type must advise DACPA of a change to the operational status of an aircraft following completion of an approved transfer off the Defence Register.

MILAVREG 2.6 – SUSPENSION OF FLYING OPERATIONS4

a. An OAA, OAAR, or operational commander must suspend personnel, aircraft or organisations from flying operations under their command or management where necessary in the interests of safety.

b. An OAA, OAAR or operational commander must suspend or restrict flying operations under their command or management:

(1) Following TAA advice:

i. indicating that the technical condition of an aircraft or aircraft type no longer supports safe operation in the SOI roles or environment

ii. indicating there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the technical condition of an aircraft or aircraft type will no longer support safe operation in the SOI roles or environment

iii. indicating that the technical airworthiness arrangements supporting the operation of the aircraft type have become insufficient to assure safety in the SOI roles or environment.

(2) When the operational airworthiness arrangements supporting the operation of the aircraft type become insufficient to assure safety in the SOI roles or environment.

(3) When the logistics arrangements supporting the operation of the aircraft type become unavailable or insufficient to assure safety in the SOI roles and environment.

(4) When any other factors exists which, could compromise the safe operation of the aircraft type in the SOI roles or environment.

4 Section 4, Chapter 3 contains guidance on the processes and requirements for suspension and resumption of flying operations.

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c. The OAA must inform the Defence AA through DACPA and the TAA of any fleet wide suspension of operations.

d. Where suspension of flying operations are less than fleet wide, the OAA, OAAR or operational commander must inform the Defence AA through DACPA and the TAA as there may be wider Defence and/or civil implications which are not readily apparent to the respective commander.

e. The Defence AA may limit or cancel the Service Release, SFP or AD of any aircraft type whose flying operations have been suspended.

f. A suspension of flying operations, which is not fleet wide, must only be lifted by the relevant operational commander following advice from the appropriate technical authority.

g. Where the Airworthiness Instrument has not been limited or cancelled, a fleet wide suspension of flying operations must only be lifted by the OAA, following a recommendation for resumption of flying operations by the TAA and implementation of appropriate measures to assure safety.

h. Where the Airworthiness Instrument has been limited or cancelled, a fleet wide suspension of flying operations must only be lifted by the Defence AA on application through DACPA, following recommendation from the OAA and the TAA and implementation of appropriate measures to assure safety. Where the AMTC and/or Service Release have been withdrawn, these can only be reissued by the Defence AA on advice from the applicable OAA and TAA and will require a Defence AA Airworthiness Board.

MILAVREG 2.7 – REMOVAL FROM THE DEFENCE REGISTER

a. An applicant seeking to remove an aircraft from the Defence Register must seek approval from DACPA.

b. An application submitted for a temporary removal under MILAVREG 2.7. a must:

(1) identify the reason for removal of the aircraft from the Defence Register

(2) describe the process to temporarily or permanently remove Defence registration markings and Defence insignia, where appropriate

(3) where applicable, reference the plans and agreements endorsed by the TAA which define the technical airworthiness requirements for returning the aircraft to the Defence Register

(4) where applicable, reference the plans and processes endorsed by the relevant OAA and the TAA which describe the intended certification of any modification to the aircraft, prior to return to the Defence Register.

c. An application submitted for a permanent removal under MILAVREG 2.7. a must:

(1) identify the reason for removal of the aircraft from the Defence Register;

(2) describe the process to remove Defence registration markings and Defence insignia, where appropriate;

(3) where applicable, reference the plans and agreements endorsed by the capability manager of the aircraft type which describe the process for aircraft disposal; and

(4) where applicable, identify the subsequent owner and registrar of the aircraft.

d. With OAA concurrence, DACPA must approve an aircraft’s removal from the Defence Register when satisfied that:

(1) The aircraft will no longer be operated or maintained, or perceived to be operated or maintained, by Defence.

(2) For a temporary removal:

i. the TAA is satisfied that the aircraft will be returned in an airworthy condition

ii. the relevant OAA and the TAA are satisfied that any modification to the aircraft prior to its return to the Defence Register will be adequately certified, where applicable.

e. A change of operational status of aircraft removed from the Defence Register must be advised to the Defence AA in accordance with MILAVREG 2.5.

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f. When removing aircraft details from the Defence Register, DACPA must:

(1) remove the aircraft details from the Defence Register

(2) advise the applicant, Defence AA and CASA of the date and time of any temporary or permanent removal of the aircraft from the Defence Register

(3) where applicable, advise the subsequent owner and registrar of the removal of the aircraft from the Defence Register.

g. The date and time recorded for a temporary or permanent removal from the Defence Register must be a time or the time of an event nominated by DACPA.

MILAVREG 2.8 – REINSTATEMENT TO THE DEFENCE REGISTER

a. An applicant seeking to reinstate an aircraft to the Defence Register must:

(1) where subject to a Major change to the Type Design, an aircraft must only be returned to the Defence Register following issue of an SFP or STC and Service Release by the Defence AA; otherwise

(2) apply to DACPA (through the TAA and relevant OAA) to endorse an aircraft’s return to the Defence Register, or

b. When requested to reinstate an aircraft to the Defence Register, ACPA staff must:

(1) Update the aircraft details in the Defence Register, and

(2) Advise the applicant, Defence AA and CASA of the date and time of reinstatement of all aircraft to the Defence Register.

c. The specified date and time recorded for an aircraft acceptance on to the Defence Register must be a time or the time of an event nominated by DACPA.

MILAVREG 2.9 – ADDITION OF FLEET AIRCRAFT TO THE DEFENCE REGISTER

a. An applicant seeking to add additional aircraft to an existing fleet operating under an AMTC must make an application to DACPA.

b. An applicant seeking to add additional aircraft to an existing fleet operating under an AMTC must maintain an AAMP in accordance with MILAVREG 2.3.

c. Applications submitted under MILAVREG 2.9. a must:

(1) Identify the AMTC under which the proposed aircraft will be certified

(2) Reference the necessary documents pertinent to the fleet addition aircraft which describe:

i. the acquisition airworthiness management strategy

ii. the aircraft configuration or configurations

iii. the history of previous operational use, including the roles and environment

iv. the maintenance history

v. the engineering history

vi. evidence that the aircraft has been removed from any previous aircraft register.

(3) Describe the validity of the existing AMTC as a basis for Type Certification.

(4) Identify any exceptions or differences between the aircraft configuration and usage history to that covered by the existing AMTC.

(5) Be endorsed by the relevant OAA and the TAA.

d. Where the evidence submitted under MILAVREG 2.9. b indicates that the configuration and operational history are largely consistent with the extant AMTC, DACPA must approve the addition of the aircraft to the Defence Register subject to:

(1) The satisfaction of the OAA and TAA that all necessary activities to support the technical and operational airworthiness have been completed.

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(2) The satisfaction of the logistics manager for the aircraft type that all necessary logistics arrangements to support the continued airworthiness of the additional aircraft have been accommodated.

(3) Issue of Certificates of Airworthiness (CoA) for each additional aircraft in accordance with TAREG.

e. Where the evidence submitted under MILAVREG 2.9. b indicates that the configuration and operational history constitute significant variation from the extant AMTC, the Defence AA may approve the addition of the aircraft to the Defence Register subject to:

(1) The satisfaction of the OAA and TAA that all necessary activities to support the technical and operational airworthiness have been completed.

(2) The satisfaction of the logistics manager for the aircraft type that all necessary logistics arrangements to support the continued airworthiness have been accommodated.

(3) Recommendation by the Defence AA’s Airworthiness Board that the technical, operational and logistics requirements have been satisfied and that there are sufficient arrangements in place to support ongoing airworthiness.

(4) Amendment to the extant AMTC and Service Release to reflect the additional model numbers or type variations covered by the AMTC.

(5) Issue of CoA for each additional aircraft in accordance with TAREG.

f. When advised to add an aircraft to the Defence Register, DACPA must:

(1) Add the aircraft details to the Defence Register.

(2) Advise the applicant, Defence AA and CASA of the date and time of the addition of the aircraft to the Defence Register.

g. The specified date and time recorded for an aircraft accepted on to the Defence Register must be a time or the time of an event nominated by DACPA.

Annex:

A. Requirements for an Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan.

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AL 6 2A–1

REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT PLAN

1. An AAMP maintained under MILAVREG 2 must:

a. Detail the scope of the acquisition activity to introduce a new aircraft type or UAS to service or make a major change to an existing aircraft type or UAS, including:

(1) a description of the aircraft, technical equipment or system to be introduced

(2) a description of the intended roles and environment, or reference to the SOI

(3) identification of the acquisition phases and a schedule of key milestones for the operation of the new or modified system

(4) identification of the intended arrangements and responsibilities for the design, construction, operation, maintenance and logistics support of the system both prior to and following Service Release or issue of a UASOP.

b. Describe the strategy and identify the supporting plans to achieve and maintain airworthiness for the specified scope of acquisition activity, including:

(1) a description of the overarching strategy to support the airworthiness of the aircraft type or UAS during and after introduction to service

(2) a description of any current or planned type certification and operation of the aircraft type or UAS under an NAA and/or MAA prior to Defence registration

(3) a schedule of key airworthiness milestones, including issue of airworthiness instruments

(4) reference to any necessary plans which identify:

(a) technical and operational airworthiness certification requirements; and

(b) activities and tasks supporting the certification activity and compliance with operational and technical regulatory requirements.

(5) reference any necessary plans which identify the logistics support arrangements to ensure the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft or UAS when operating:

(a) during any specified limited scope of operations prior to Service Release or issue of a UASOP

(b) in the intended roles and environment following Service Release or issue of a UASOP , at the rate of effort expected at the commencement of operations as a Defence registered aircraft or UAS.

(6) a description of the process to manage and resolve airworthiness issues that arise during the acquisition activity.

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AL 6 1

AIRWORTHINESS INSTRUMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Determinations of airworthiness involve consideration of a range of factors which contribute to the condition of an aircraft and the judgement for its suitability for flight. Airworthiness Instruments provide clear and unambiguous direction based on sound and considered criteria and advice from relevant specialists within the DASP. This direction provides authority for the safe operating limits and conditions established in support of the airworthiness of an Aviation System. Airworthiness Instruments are therefore the mechanism which signify the completion of necessary airworthiness activity, direct a course of action or advise circumstances to maintain airworthiness. This regulation defines the applicability and requirements for Airworthiness Instruments issued by the Defence AA, or OAA or FTAA depending on the instrument.

The outcome required by this regulation is that declarations regarding the airworthiness of Defence registered aircraft are unambiguous and are based on the satisfactory completion of sound airworthiness processes to assure the safety of an aircraft within specified conditions and limitations.


MILAVREG 3.1 – AUSTRALIAN MILITARY TYPE CERTIFICATES (AMTC)

a. The Defence AA may issue an AMTC for a new aircraft type following:

(1) completion of all activities required by the OAR and TAR

(2) compilation of a Type Certification Data Sheet for inclusion with the AMTC which includes a list of applicable aircraft and approved instruments, and summarises the aircraft basis of certification by identifying or recording:

i. the Certification Basis Description (CBD) and critical equivalent safety finding

ii. the aircraft role and environment

iii. aircraft configuration

iv. operating and maintenance instructions

v. limitations and special conditions.

GUIDANCE

• While the TCDS supports issue of AMTC, the TCDS is a separate document to AMTC.

(3) recommendations by the applicable OAA and the TAA regarding the airworthiness of the aircraft in the intended roles and environment, when operated by qualified and competent personnel

(4) a review by the Defence AA Airworthiness Board of the technical and operational airworthiness activities supporting the application for an AMTC, as required by MILAVREG 4.

b. Following issue of an AMTC by the Defence AA, the TAA must ensure a Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA) is issued in accordance with TAREG for each aircraft complying with the physical and functional configuration identified in the AMTC. Until a CoA is issued, aircraft operating under an alternate Airworthiness Instrument prior to award of AMTC may continue to operate as per that instrument, unless direction specifically to the contrary accompanies award of AMTC.

GUIDANCE

• CofA are issued against the Type Design. Where the Type Design subject to AMTC is known, CofA may be issued prior to award of AMTC. Further guidance regarding issue of CofA should be sought through the TAA.

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MILAVREG 3.2 – SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATES

a. The Defence AA may issue an STC for a major change to an aircraft type following:

(1) completion of all activities required by the OAR and TAR

(2) amendment to the Type Certification Data Sheet which includes all changes to the aircraft CBD resulting from the STC and documents the STC as an additional instrument

(3) recommendations by the applicable OAA and TAA regarding the airworthiness of the modified aircraft in the intend roles and environment, when operated by qualified and competent personnel

(4) a review by the Defence AA Airworthiness Board of the technical and operational airworthiness activities supporting the application for the STC, as required by MILAVREG 4.

b. Following issue of an STC by the Defence AA, the TAR must ensure certificates of airworthiness are amended in accordance with TAREG for each modified aircraft complying with the physical and functional configuration identified by the STC.

MILAVREG 3.3 – SERVICE RELEASE

a. The Defence AA may issue Service Release for a new aircraft type or major change to the type design following:

(1) issue of an AMTC or STC

(2) completion of all activities supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft type required by the OAR and TAR

(3) recommendations by the applicable OAA and TAA regarding the acceptability of the arrangements supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft in the intend roles and environment

(4) a recommendation by a logistics representative appointed within the command of the relevant Service Chief regarding the acceptability of the logistics arrangements supporting the intended roles, environment and planned usage

(5) a review by the Defence AA Airworthiness Board of the technical, operational, and logistic arrangements supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft, as required by MILAVREG 4.

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MILAVREG 3.4 – SPECIAL FLIGHT PERMITS

a. The Defence AA may issue an SFP to permit a limited scope of flying operations prior to Service Release of a new aircraft for the purposes of:

(1) flight test in support of type certification activity

(2) flight test in support of development, production, acceptance or operational evaluation

(3) initial pilot training where required prior to the commencement of operations

(4) other limited flying operations as allowed by the Defence AA.

b. The Defence AA may issue an SFP to permit a limited scope of flying operations prior to Service Release of a major change to the type design, for the purposes of:

(1) flight test in support of type certification activity, unless authorised under an FTP issued by an FTAA

(2) flight test in support of development, production, acceptance or operational evaluation, unless authorised under an FTP issued by an FTAA

(3) initial pilot training where required prior to the commencement of operations

(4) other limited flying operations as allowed by the Defence AA.

c. The Defence AA may issue an SFP for operations specified under MILAVREG 3.4 for a set duration following:

(1) completion of sufficient activities required by the OAR and TAR to support the limited scope of operations sought under the SFP

(2) completion of sufficient activities required by the OAR and TAR to support the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft type for the limited scope of operations sought under the SFP

(3) recommendations by the applicable OAA and the TAA regarding the airworthiness of the new or modified aircraft for the purpose and duration of the limited scope of operations sought under the SFP

(4) for a new aircraft, review by the Defence AA Airworthiness Board of the technical and operational airworthiness of the aircraft for the purpose and duration of the limited scope of operations sought under the SFP, as required by MILAVREG 4.

d. The Defence AA may require Airworthiness Board review of a major change to the type design prior to issue of an SFP, based on the recommendations of the applicable OAA and TAA.

e. The Defence AA may issue an SFP to permit a limited scope of flying operations prior to Supplemental Role Approval of a new role or substantial change to an existing role for the purposes of flight test in support of the Supplemental Role Approval, unless authorised under an FTP issued by a FTAA.

f. The Defence AA may issue an SFP for operations specified under MILAVREG 3.4 for a set duration following:

(1) completion of sufficient activities required by the applicable OAA to support the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft type for the limited scope of operations sought under the SFP; and

(2) recommendation by the applicable OAA regarding the airworthiness of the aircraft for the purpose and duration of the limited scope of operations sought under the SFP.

g. An applicant seeking to change or extend an existing SFP must submit an application to the Defence AA (through DACPA) which:

(1) describes the additional scope of activities or duration required; and

(2) demonstrates that the activities required under MILAVREG 3.4 are sufficiently complete to accommodate the change or extension.

h. Changes or extensions to an SFP must only be approved by the Defence AA where the basis established under MILAVREG 3.4 is sufficient to accommodate the proposed change.

i. The continuing validity of an SFP must be reviewed at a date or event specified within the instrument which is appropriate to the scope of operations to be conducted under the SFP.

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MILAVREG 3.5 – FLIGHT TEST PERMITS

a. Except as provided under MILAVREG 3.5, an FTAA may issue an FTP to permit flight test of a Defence registered aircraft or UAS with a valid UASOP:

(1) in support of Supplemental Role Approval

(2) beyond existing approved operating limitations

(3) in a modified configuration prior to or without:

i. Defence AA issue of an SFP or Service Release

ii. service release issued in accordance with TAREG 3.

b. An FTAA must refer the authorisation of flight test operations to the Defence AA for conduct under an SFP when:

(1) the required testing is beyond the scope of the FTAA appointment

(2) the required testing involves a new aircraft type which has not been Defence registered under an SFP or AMTC issued by the Defence AA

(3) the testing is significantly complex or specialised such that, in the opinion of the FTAA, authorisation of the flight test operations is required by the Defence AA

(4) the residual risk from an AVRM assessment of the required testing is beyond the approval level of the FTAA.

c. An FTP must only be issued by an FTAA:

(1) for specific test operations with a limited duration; and

(2) in accordance with OAREG 4.1.

MILAVREG 3.6 – AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

a. The Defence AA may issue an AD to:

(1) immediately prescribe operational or technical conditions or limitations regarding the operation of an aircraft or aviation system to maintain airworthiness

(2) immediately prescribe operational or technical conditions regarding the airworthiness management arrangements supporting the operation of an aircraft or Aviation System

(3) authorise or restrict a course of action to maintain or establish the airworthiness of an aircraft or aviation system

(4) provide interpretation or definition of an airworthiness regulation in the context of new or unique operational circumstances

(5) prescribe any other immediate and mandatory direction in the interests of airworthiness.

b. An AD must only be cancelled, extended or changed:

(1) at the discretion of the Defence AA

(2) in accordance with any conditions contained in the AD which permit cancellation, extension or amendment

(3) following submission to, and consideration by, the Defence AA (through DACPA) of an application to cancel, extend or amend the AD.

c. An AD specifying a permanent limitation must be cancelled following incorporation as a Service Release limitation or condition by the Defence AA following review at the next scheduled Airworthiness Board. Sup

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MILAVREG 3.7 – UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATING PERMIT

GUIDANCE

• A Category 1 UAS requires AMTC and SR/SFP prior to operation. Category 4 UAS requirements are detailed at OAREG 7.

• Guidance on the requirements of a UASOP is contained in Section 3 Chapter 4 – Type Certification and Service Release for Defence Registered Aircraft and Section 5 Chapter 3 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

a. The Defence AA must issue a UASOP for operation of a Category 2 UAS following compilation of supporting documentation for inclusion with the UASOP, that identifies or records:

(1) documents supporting Categorisation determination

(2) the UAS configuration, role and environment (CRE)

(3) the approved SOI

(4) approved technical configuration

(5) the UAS Risk Analysis

(6) the authoritative operating and maintenance documentation

(7) operational restrictions imposed

(8) any other limitations or special conditions

(9) recommendation by the TAA regarding the Technical airworthiness of the UAS in the intended CRE

(10) inclusion of the UAS on the Defence Register

(11) completion of other activities required by the OAR and/or TAR.

b. An OAA must issue a UASOP for operation of a Category 3 UAS following compilation of supporting documentation for inclusion with the UASOP, that identifies or records:

(1) documents supporting Categorisation determination

(2) the UAS configuration, role and environment (CRE)

(3) the approved SOI

(4) approved technical configuration

(5) the UAS Risk Analysis

(6) the authoritative operating and maintenance documentation

(7) operational restrictions imposed

(8) any other limitations or special conditions

(9) completion of other activities required by the OAR and/or TAR.

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DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Within the DASP, the Defence AA’s Airworthiness Board provides independent executive review and oversight commensurate with the risk and complexity of acquisition activities and in-service operations of Defence Aviation. This systematic consideration by experienced officers of the technical, operational, safety and logistical factors which contribute to the safe operation of an aircraft assures that a satisfactory basis for airworthiness has been established and is maintained. This regulation defines the requirements of members and applicants for initial and in-service Airworthiness Boards for Defence Aviation. This executive review process may be utilised for Defence AA review of non-Defence registered aircraft, Aviation Support Systems and UAS.

The outcome required by this regulation is that the design, construction, operation and maintenance of any aviation system within the scope of the DASP as defined by DI(G) OPS 02-2, is subject to appropriate oversight to assure that an adequate basis exists to establish and sustain airworthiness.


MILAVREG 4.1 – AIRWORTHINESS BOARD MEMBERSHIP

a. The Airworthiness Board must be comprised of at least one operational and one technical member who meet the eligibility criteria contained in MILAVREG 1.

MILAVREG 4.2 – AIRWORTHINESS BOARD CONDUCT1

a. The Airworthiness Board must convene to review the operational and technical airworthiness aspects of:

(1) a case supporting an in-service aircraft, as required by MILAVREG 2

(2) an application for an SFP, AMTC, STC, Service Release or Category 2 UASOP, as required by MILAVREG 3.

b. At the discretion of the Defence AA, the Airworthiness Board must convene to review the operational and technical airworthiness aspects of:

(1) a non-Defence registered aircraft

(2) an Aviation Support System

(3) a Category 3 UAS.2

c. The Airworthiness Board must only convene to consider an application submitted under MILAVREG 4.2 following submission of supporting evidence by the applicant which demonstrates that:

(1) the Certification Basis identified in the relevant AMTC TCDS remains valid for the configuration, ongoing roles and operating environment of the aircraft; and

(2) the supporting operational, technical and logistical arrangements are sufficiently maintaining the airworthiness of the aircraft for operations in accordance with the current SOI and Service Release.

d. The evidence submitted under MILAVREG 4 must include the information and documents specified in annex A and any additional supporting information at the discretion of the Airworthiness Board.

e. The Airworthiness Board must only convene to consider an application submitted under MILAVREG 4 following submission of supporting evidence by the applicant which demonstrates that:

(1) for an SFP, AMTC, STC or Category 2 UASOP, the operational and technical certification activity required by the OAR and TAR is sufficient to ensure the airworthiness of the aircraft within the specified roles and environment when operated by appropriately qualified and competent personnel; and

1 Guidance material is provided in Section 3 Chapter 7 regarding the agenda and conduct for an acquisition-related AwB and in Section 4 Chapter 4 regarding the agenda and conduct for an in-service AwB. 2 For Category 2 or 3 UAS the initial requirement for Airworthiness Board should be determined during categorisation (see MILAVREG 7).

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(2) for a SFP or Service Release, the operational, technical and logistical supporting arrangements are sufficient to maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft for operations in accordance with MILAVREG 4.

f. The evidence submitted under MILAVREG 4.2 must include the information and documents specified in annex B and any additional supporting information at the discretion of the Airworthiness Board.

MILAVREG 4.3 – AIRWORTHINESS BOARD OUTCOMES

a. The Airworthiness Board must raise any concerns as deemed necessary in the interests of airworthiness.

b. The Airworthiness Board must recommend corrective actions be issued by the Defence AA where deemed necessary in the interests of airworthiness.

c. The Airworthiness Board must only recommend issue of an Airworthiness Instrument or Service Release to the Defence AA:

(1) where the OAA and the TAA have recommended issue of the Airworthiness Instrument; and

(2) in the case of Service Release, where the OAA and the TAR have recommended Service Release; and

(3) where they are satisfied that the aircraft type may be safely operated and maintained in the intended roles and environment, subject to any conditions and limitations as deemed necessary in the interests of airworthiness.

d. The Airworthiness Board must only recommend continuation of Service Release to the Defence AA:

(1) where the OAA and TAR have recommended continuation of the Service Release; and

(2) where they are satisfied that the aircraft type will continue to be safely operated and maintained in the intended roles and environment, subject to any conditions and limitations as deemed necessary in the interests of airworthiness.

GUIDANCE

• Such conditions and limitations may include serious deficiencies resulting from a shortfall in the design against the certification design requirements or a shortfall in support arrangements that warrants documentation in the AMTC or Service Release so that the Defence AA is required to remove them. Section 3 Chapter 4 contains further guidance on limitations to Service Release.

e. ACPA must record all concerns, corrective actions or recommendations raised by the Airworthiness Board.

Annexes:

A. Airworthiness Board requirements for review of in-service airworthiness management of Defence Registered Aircraft.

B. Airworthiness Board requirements for review of SFP, AMTC, STC and Service Release of Defence Registered Aircraft.

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DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REQUIREMENTS FOR REVIEW OF IN SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF

DEFENCE STATE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

1. Guidance on the preparation of a summary in support of continuing Service Release of an in-service aircraft is contained in Section 4, Chapter 4.

2. The evidence submitted to the Airworthiness Board in support of the continuing Service Release of an aviation system must include:

a. a summary of outstanding actions from the previous Airworthiness Board, including closure action;

b. a summary of the operations conducted since the previous Airworthiness Board, including the nature and extent of any deployed operations within the reporting period;

c. the current TCDS and a description of any changes since the previous Airworthiness Board;

d. a description of any changes to the SOI including any new or modified roles approved by the OAA since the previous Airworthiness Board;

e. a summary of the state of the relevant FMS and the adequacy of operational management activity conducted since the previous Airworthiness Board;

f. a summary of the state of the relevant synthetic training devices and adequacy of evaluation activity conducted since the previous Airworthiness Board;

g. a summary of the state of the relevant maintenance organisation and adequacy of maintenance activity conducted since the previous Airworthiness Board;

h. a summary of the flying safety incidents, trends and corrective or preventative actions since the previous Airworthiness Board;

i. a summary of the state of the relevant engineering organisation and adequacy of engineering activity conducted since the previous Airworthiness Board;

j. a summary of any activity conducted on the aircraft type by a specialist organisation including the impact and outcome of such activity; and

k. if necessary, a list of recommended limitations to the existing Service Release resulting from any operational, technical or logistical activity since the previous Airworthiness Board.

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AAP 7001.048(AM1) Annex B to Sect 2 Chap 4

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DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REQUIREMENTS FOR REVIEW OF SFP, AMTC, STC OR SERVICE RELEASE OF DEFENCE

STATE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT NOTE

• Guidance on the preparation of a summary in support of an SFP, AMTC, STC or Service Release is contained Section 3, Chapter 7.

1. The evidence submitted to the Airworthiness Board in support of a SFP, AMTC, STC or Service Release must include:

a. a current version of the AAMP, documented in accordance with MILAVREG 2;

b. the SOI as approved by the OAA;

c. the certification basis description as endorsed by the TAA;

d. a summary of the project activity to date;

e. a summary of the certification history of the aircraft;

f. a summary of activity and outcomes which demonstrate compliance with:

(1) operational certification requirements; and

(2) applicable operational airworthiness regulations;

g. a summary of activity and outcomes which demonstrate compliance with

(1) technical certification requirements; and

(2) applicable technical airworthiness regulations;

h. for an AMTC or STC, a Type Certification Data Sheet or update compiled in accordance with Section 3 Chapter 4;

i. for an SFP or Service Release, a summary of activity and outcomes which demonstrate that the supporting logistical arrangements are satisfactory for the commencement of the intended scope of operations; and

j. a description of any outstanding issues affecting the certification or supporting arrangements of the aircraft which impact airworthiness.

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NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT AND FOREIGN MILITARY AIRCRAFT

REFER OAREG 5

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AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS

INTRODUCTION

The Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) applies to all Defence Aviation Support Systems (AvSS).

The criteria used to determine if a system or service may be an AvSS is that it:

a. is Defence-owned or operated exclusively for or on behalf of Defence

b. has a functional or physical interface with aircraft

c. has the potential to compromise suitability for flight.

The outcome of MILAVREG 6 is to regulate the AvSS so that suitability for flight is not compromised.

AvSS DETERMINATION

AvSS may be:

a. ground-based, ship-based, aircraft-based or space-based; and

b. fixed or deployable.

AvSS is viewed from a functional nature, both technically and operationally, vice being directly linked to the organisational structure to which the service or system belongs.

The following systems, including their relevant sub-systems and services, are AvSS:

a. Defence aerodromes

b. Aerodrome rescue and fire fighting (ARFF)

c. Aeronautical information

d. Air battle management (ABM)

e. Air cargo delivery (ACD)

f. Air traffic management (ATM)

g. Air weapons ranges (AWR)

h. Meteorology (MET)

i. Ship aviation facilities (SAF)

j. Terminal attack control (TAC)

k. Joint personnel recovery (JPR)

l. Medical.

MILAVREG 6 guidance provides AvSS determination reasoning, AvSS descriptions and the manner in which an AvSS can compromise suitability for flight.

GUIDANCE

• Before applying the requirements of MILAVREG 6 to a system not identified under AvSS determinations, the responsible OAA should seek a determination from the OAR or TAR (as appropriate) on whether the system should be determined as an AvSS.

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TRANSITION RESPONSIBILITIES

Compliance assurance events against MILAVREG 6 align to the first planned formal compliance assurance events against the regulations. Should an AvSS not be scheduled for an AwB in 2015, the first formal compliance events against the regulations must align with the scheduled OAA compliance activities in 2015.

MILAVREG 6.1 – AvSS CONFORMANCE TO OTHER REGULATIONS

a. The OAR and TAR must consider AvSS compliance with International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 1988 and Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) to assure interoperability with non-Defence aviation activities.

b. The OAR and TAR must consider if existing Commonwealth regulations and/or controls are adequate for achieving AvSS compliance vice being regulated under MILAVREG 6.

GUIDANCE

• MILAVREG 1.4 and MILAVREG 1.6 provide the OAR and TAR requirements regarding the AvSS management framework.

MILAVREG 6.2 – AvSS ACQUISITION AND IN-SERVICE MANAGEMENT

a. The OAA must approve an AvSS Certificate (AvSSC), or equivalent document, prior to introduction into service and ensure the AvSSC remains current for as long as the AvSS remains in–service in order to ensure that the AvSS will not compromise suitability for flight.

b. The OAA must approve a Statement of Operating Intent (SOI), or equivalent document, which details the intended AvSS configuration, roles and operating environments (CRE) and provides the context of how the AvSS will be utilised in those CRE.

c. The OAA must approve an AvSS Management Plan (AvSSMP), or equivalent document, which details the implementation and the ongoing in-service management.

d. The OAA must obtain an Accomplishment Summary, or equivalent document, from the organisation executive sponsoring the AvSS prior to AvSSC approval, which assures the SOI and AvSSMP requirements regarding design, construction, maintenance and operation have been achieved.

e. The TAA must ensure a Certificate of Conformance, or equivalent document, is obtained that confirms compliance with the approved AvSS design for multiple instances of a system intended to operate under a single AvSSC as identified in the AvSSMP.

f. The OAA and/or TAA must ensure that a system is established that provides appropriate review of in–service AvSS modifications that can determine if a modification is a Substantial Change, and if found to be a Substantial Change, the AvSSC is reviewed as required.

MILAVREG 6.3 – AvSS AUTHORITY TO OPERATE

a. The OAA must approve an AvSS Authority to Operate (AUTHOP) that confirms the ongoing logistic, technical, and operational arrangements supporting the AvSS are satisfactory.

1 MILAVREG 6 guidance is contained in Section 5 Chapter 2.

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UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

INTRODUCTION

An Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) is that system whose components include the necessary equipment, network and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft (UA). Depending on the system in question, such as civilian equivalents, a UAS may also be referred to as a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS). UA are air vehicles that fly under remote control or autonomous programming without a human operator on board. The air vehicle component of a UAS is designed to be recovered and reused and may be classified as a UA, Remotely-Piloted Aircraft (RPA) or Unmanned Aerial Target (UAT). Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles and other guided weapons are not considered UA under this regulation.

All UAS owned, leased or chartered, and operated by or on behalf of Defence, must be managed within the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP). For the purposes of airworthiness management, UAS risk management is achieved though the use of four broad UAS categories. The intended outcome of MILAVREG 7 is to assure that Defence related UAS operations are conducted at an acceptable level of safety to other aircraft, people and property.

Further guidance on the Airworthiness Management of UAS is contained in section 5, chapter 3.

TRANSITION RESPONSIBILITIES

Compliance assurance events against MILAVREG 7 will align with the scheduled AwB from 2015 onwards. Should an UAS not be scheduled for an AwB in 2015, the first formal compliance assurance events against the amended regulations will align with the scheduled OAA/OAAR compliance assurance activities.1

The OAA must complete categorisation/re-categorisation determination process of existing UAS, delegated/or under their oversight, by 30 Jun 15.

The OAA may continue to operate an existing UAS IAW approved UASOP until 30 Jun 15, should transition to the revised regulations be impractical or unachievable beforehand.


MILAVREG 7.1 – UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

a. The OAA must, with recommendation from the TAA and in accordance with the UAS categories in Annex A:

(1) make recommendation to the Defence AA to categorise a UAS as Category 1 or 2; or

(2) categorise a UAS as Category 3.

b. The OAA must, in accordance with the UAS categories in Annex A, categorise a UAS as Category 4.

c. The OAA must manage UAS airworthiness according to UAS Category as follows:

(1) Category 1 UAS: in accordance with MILAVREG 2 – Defence Registration and Operation of Aircraft under issue of a SFP or AMTC / SR, unless managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft under MILAVREG 5.

(2) Category 2 UAS: in accordance with MILAVREG 2 – Defence Registration and Operation of Aircraft under issue of a UAS Operating Permit (UASOP), unless managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft under MILAVREG 5.

(3) Category 3 UAS: under issue of a UASOP, unless managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft under MILAVREG 5.

(4) Category 4 UAS: in accordance with the requirements of the OAR.

1Defence AA Decision Brief: Publish DASP UAS Regulation Amendments as an Airworthiness Directive of 7 Jul 14 (AB18514571)

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d. An OAA must obtain Defence AA approval for any Category UA to:

(1) carry humans, or

(2) carry or employ weapons.

e. A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 1 or 2 UAS to Defence service must seek categorisation of the UAS through the relevant OAA IAW MILAVREG 7.1.a.(1).

f. A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 3 UAS to Defence service must seek categorisation of the UAS IAW MILAVREG 7.1.a.(2).

g. A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 4 UAS to Defence service must seek categorisation of the UAS IAW MILAVREG 7.1.b.

Annex:

A. Defence Unmanned Aircraft System Categories

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DEFENCE UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM CATEGORIES

1. The Defence UAS Categories are:

Category 1 UAS

a. A Category 1 UAS, when operating in the intended Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE), is a system for which the outcome of a catastrophic failure can reasonably be expected to result in death or serious injury, or significant damage to property.

b. Category 1 UAS are characterised by a requirement to operate in any class of Airspace, over populated areas.

Category 2 UAS

a. A Category 2 UAS, when operating in the intended CRE, is a system for which the outcome of a catastrophic failure may result in death or serious injury, or significant damage to property.

b. Category 2 UAS are characterised by a requirement to operate in any class of Airspace with appropriate operational restriction; including limited flight over populated areas.

GUIDANCE

• Populated and sparsely populated areas are used to guide OAA risk determinations against people and property on the ground. Category 2 UAS flight over populated areas should not be authorised as a matter of flight planning convenience.

Category 3 UAS

a. A Category 3 UAS, when operating in the intended CRE, is a system for which the consequence of a catastrophic failure is unlikely to result in death or serious injury, or significant damage to property.

b. Category 3 UAS are characterised by operations in Segregated Airspace only, where the UA of the system has a requirement to operate over sparsely populated areas, mission essential personnel and associated property, with appropriate operational restriction.

• Exemption. MILAVREG 7 is intended to ensure UAS operations do not compromise suitability for flight within legally enforceable airspace boundaries; however, Segregated Airspace requirements outside of national airspace boundaries will be problematic. Where UAS operations will occur outside a country’s national airspace, the ATMP/UASOP should list available means to ensure the UAS operation will not compromise suitability for flight.

GUIDANCE

• To satisfy the intent of MILAVREG 7, a ship operating in international waters desiring to employ a Category 3 UAS may utilise several mitigations to ensure the operation will not compromise suitability for flight. These might include:

utilising ship radar surveillance, when UA operations are within range of the sensor;

broadcasting UAS advisory messages over marine band radio where suitable; and

notification of UAS operations to other naval operators via mission planning tools, such as air tasking orders.

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Category 4 UAS

a. A Category 4 UAS, when operating in the intended CRE, is a system for which the consequence of a catastrophic failure can reasonably be expected not to result in death or serious injury, or significant damage to property.

b. Category 4 UAS are characterised by the UA of the system having a collision energy contribution of less than 42 Joules, and operations confined to airspace less than 400’AGL and greater than 3 nm from an aerodrome.

• Exemption.1 MILAVREG 7 is intended to ensure UAS operations do not compromise suitability for flight within legally enforceable airspace boundaries; however, operational requirements may exist for Category 4 UAS to operate within 3 nm of an aerodrome or above 400 ft AGL. Category 4 UAS are granted the following exemptions:

- Operation within 3 nm of a Defence aerodrome. Should operation of a CAT 4 UAS be required within 3 nm of a Defence aerodrome:

* Written agreement is required from the Senior ADF Officer (or delegate) for the relevant Defence aerodrome that details how CAT 4 UAS operations will interact safely with other aviation activity.

* If an Air Traffic Service (ATS) is provided at the Defence aerodrome, written agreement is required from the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO) that details how CAT 4 UAS operations will interact safely with other aviation activity, including a provision for the ATS provider to suspend CAT 4 UAS operations for safety reasons.

* Where CAT 4 operations will occur outside of ATS hours and the airspace will revert to Class G (uncontrolled) airspace, compliance with CASR 1998 Part 101 – Unmanned Aircraft and rockets is required.

- Operation within 3 nm of a civil aerodrome. Should operation of a CAT 4 UAS be required within 3 nm of a civil aerodrome, compliance with CASR 1998 Part 101 – Unmanned Aircraft and rockets is required.

- Operation above 400 ft AGL. Operation of CAT 4 UAS above 400 ft AGL is only permitted where:

* The operating airspace is provided an ATS or is Restricted Airspace (RA).

* Written agreement is obtained from the relevant airspace authority that details how CAT 4 UAS operations will interact safely with other aviation activity.

1 Defence AA Decision Brief – CAT 4 UAS operations within 3 nm of a Defence aerodrome or above 400 ft AGL of 12 Jun 15 (AB22283236).

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FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICE

REFER OAREG 8

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SECTION 2

CHAPTER 9

AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT


TO BE ISSUED

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AIRWORTHINESS AND AVIATION SAFETY DURING THE ACQUISITION PROCESS OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

INTRODUCTION

1. Acquisition is a management process through which Defence purchases and brings into service new items of capital equipment and appropriate supporting systems. The term is typically applied to completely new systems, such as a new class of ship or aircraft type; however, may equally be applied to capability modifications of significant scope and complexity. The acquisition process for a new aircraft type or capability upgrade begins during capability development, where evolving operational requirements are defined and potential solutions investigated. The airworthiness and aviation safety management process for that aircraft type or upgrade begins at the commencement of these acquisition activities. Acquisition airworthiness and aviation safety management remains inextricably linked with the acquisition process before, during and following the introduction to service of the new or modified aircraft. Whilst the broader tasks involved with acquisition in general, such as determination of operational requirements and assessing the effectiveness of the acquired capability, is not within the scope of airworthiness management, the airworthiness and aviation safety of the system must support operations in all roles that are intended for the capability.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter provides an overview of the acquisition airworthiness management process and to describe the relationship between MILAVREG, OAREG and TAREG that underpin the process.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter is applicable to a new acquisition or ‘Major change’ to the Type Design of a Defence registered aircraft type. New Defence registered aircraft require Type Certification by the Defence AA. A Major change to an existing Type Design of an aircraft is one deemed by the TAA to be of sufficient technical scope and complexity such that Supplemental Type Certification by the Defence AA is required.

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS

AIM OF AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT

4. The aim of airworthiness management is to assure adequate levels of safety whilst simultaneously allowing operational commanders to exploit capability to the maximum possible extent. Importantly, airworthiness and aviation safety management allows commanders to make operational judgements based on a known and sustainable of their aviation assets. Airworthiness and aviation safety regulations should not be an obstacle to capability; rather, regulations should provide the maximum possible flexibility in their implementation in an outcome based manner. In considering the application of the regulations, two key factors should always be considered:

a. Intent. What is the intent of the regulation? In other words, what hazard is being treated by complying with the regulation? Satisfying the intent, in most cases, will satisfy the regulation.

b. Compliance. Through what process or mechanism is compliance established? Is this method appropriate to meet the substance or intent of the regulation?

5. Ultimately, the Defence AA, the OAR (both represented by DACPA) and the TAR provide authoritative advice on the interpretation and application of the regulations. Early involvement of ACPA and DGTA–ADF staff, along with the relevant OAA staff, in the acquisition process is essential to assist the acquisition agency to apply and manage the airworthiness and aviation safety requirements that will underpin the capability.

DEFENCE REGISTRATION

6. An important decision that occurs early in the acquisition process of a new aircraft type is whether or not the aircraft will be ‘Defence registered’. A Defence registered aircraft type is one which has been Type Certified by the Defence AA through issue of a Special Flight Permit (SFP) or Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC). MILAVREG 2.1—Determination of registration, requires that virtually all Defence owned aircraft with a military configuration and role are Defence registered.

7. Defence registration through SFP. At the expiration of a SFP the applicable aircraft effectively ceases to be a Defence registered aircraft unless a subsequent SFP is issued or an AMTC is issued for the type and subsequent certificates of airworthiness are issued for each Commonwealth accepted aircraft.

8. The decision to type certify an aircraft other than through Defence registration is to be made in accordance with MILAVREG 2.1. Where any doubt exists, DACPA should be consulted. An existing Defence registered aircraft

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undergoing a Major change to Type Design will continue to be Defence registered, except where one or more individual aircraft are removed from the Defence Register for extensive development and test activity by an appropriately authorised Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). The determination and management of aircraft type registration is addressed in detail in Section 3, Chapter 2.

APPOINTMENT OF KEY PERSONNEL

9. At the inception of an acquisition project, key appointments involved with the project are identified to manage airworthiness throughout the acquisition phase. Initially this should include an operational representative, engineering manager and logistics manager knowledgeable with both the acquisition process, and the configuration, role and environment of the likely aircraft type required to meet the designated capability. During the early stages of the project, these appointments will be responsible for defining the acquisition airworthiness and aviation safety strategy in consultation with ACPA, DGTA-ADF and the relevant OAA staff. As the project activity increases, airworthiness authority may be delegated by the OAA to an Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (OAAR) Acquisition (Acq) and by the TAA to a Design Acceptance representative (DAR). The requirements for delegation of operational and technical airworthiness authority are specified at OAREG and TAREG. Appointment and management of an acquisition team to achieve airworthiness outcomes is covered in detail in Section 3, Chapter 3.

ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS STRATEGY

10. The acquisition airworthiness strategy includes the plans and processes that will be implemented to support:

a. Type Certification and Service Release (SR) of the aircraft for Defence use in the intended roles and environment;

b. safe operations involving Defence personnel prior to Defence AA issue of an SFP or SR;

c. the issue of airworthiness instruments by the Defence AA during the acquisition process; and

d. the appropriate management of airworthiness issues that arise during the acquisition process.

11. MILAVREG 2.3—Introduction and modification of a Defence registered aircraft type, requires the acquisition agency to maintain an AAMP for any new aircraft acquisition or Major change to the Type Design. The AAMP must document the strategy identified above in conjunction with an Operational Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP), and a Project Design Acceptance Strategy (PDAS), which are operational and technical airworthiness documents required by OAREG 3.2.1—Operational airworthiness management strategy, and TAREG 2.2.3—Issue of a Design Acceptance Certificate for new aircraft or Major changes. The AAMP should also identify the logistics strategy or plan to support the airworthiness of the aircraft type at the expected rate of effort at the commencement of operations as a Defence registered aircraft.

12. The AAMP should not duplicate the information contained within the OAMP, PDAS or logistics support plans. Rather, the AAMP should focus on bringing together the outcomes of operational, technical and logistics activities to provide a cohesive basis for airworthiness and safety before and after SR. Additional detail on the acquisition airworthiness strategy is contained in Section 3, Chapter 3.

13. Needs and Requirements phases. Formal airworthiness documentation is not normally required during the capability development phase. However, ACPA, DGTA-ADF and OAA staff should be engaged to ensure proper consideration of airworthiness regulations. More definition may be required if a project decides to pursue an offer definition phase between first and second pass. In any case, regulatory agency input is recommended as the feasibility or time to staff airworthiness instruments for a particular certification and/or test strategy can adversely affect a program’s schedule or outcome.

THE TYPE CERTIFICATION PROCESS

GUIDANCE

• Section 3, Chapter 4 contains detailed guidance on Type Certification.

14. MILAVREG 2.4—Operation of Defence registered aircraft requires any new Defence registered aircraft or major change to the Type Design to be Type Certified. Following selection of an aircraft type or modification to meet capability requirements, two co-dependant factors form the basis of the Type Certification process.

a. The Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). The SOI describes all intended aircraft roles and the operating environment which have been derived from the capability requirements in light of the particular aircraft type or modification chosen for acquisition. The SOI provides the operating parameters within which the aircraft type must safely operate. The SOI is an operational airworthiness document required by OAREG 3.2—New Aircraft and Major changes to Type Design.

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b. The Type Design. The Type Design is comprised of the aircraft design specification to meet the capability requirements and the SOI, a description of the aircraft type configuration, operating and maintenance instructions, and all necessary test data, analysis and evidence which demonstrates that the aircraft type configuration meets the specification when operated and maintained in accordance with the approved instructions. TAREG 2.2—Type Certification, governs the technical aspects of the Type Certification process in order to achieve an acceptable Type Design.

15. Certification Basis Description (CBD). The CBD provides the link between the SOI and the Type Design. The CBD is essentially a list of airworthiness requirements against which compliance must be achieved, in conjunction with a system safety assessment, to assure the safety of the aircraft type, when operated in accordance with approved instructions and limitations, throughout the roles and environment in the SOI. Verification evidence in the form of design data, analysis and test reports in conjunction with operating and maintaining instructions are used to show compliance with each individual element of the CBD. The content and compilation of the CBD is covered in AAP 7001.054—Airworthiness design requirements manual. Whilst the custodian of the CBD is the DAR appointed by the TAA, the CBD itself should account for both technical and operational aspects of the design. Many CBD elements will require assessment by operational representatives appointed by the OAAR (Acq) or FTAA.

16. Type Certification. Type Certification is the process through which compliance with the airworthiness design requirements contained in the CBD is established through the development of the Type Design to meet the operating roles and environment contained in the SOI. Once sufficient compliance findings have been established and the operating instructions are adequately described to form a safe operating basis for the aircraft, an AMTC or STC may be issued by the Defence AA following OAA, TAA and Airworthiness Board recommendation. MILAVREG 3.1—Australian Military Type Certificates and MILAVREG 3.2—Supplemental Type Certificates contain the Defence AA requirements for issue of an AMTC or STC.

17. Statement Of Requirement (SOR). The SOR is the formal mechanism through which the Commonwealth identifies all requirements of the commercial contracting organisation in developing and delivering the capability, including Type Certification. The SOR will contain the specification for the aircraft type or modification including the airworthiness design requirements that form the CBD. Additionally, the SOR articulates the mechanisms through which compliance with the specification are demonstrated, requirements for organisations participating in the development activity, and requirements for the delivery of data and evidence which comprises the Type Design. In acquisition terminology, the SOR comprises the Functional Performance Specification (FPS), and the acquisition Statement of Work. OAREG 3.2.2—OAA endorsement of the Statement of Requirement and TAREG 2.2.4—ADF Statement of Requirement for new aircraft and Major changes contain the OAR and TAR requirements for the content and endorsement of the operational and technical airworthiness aspects of the SOR respectively.

SERVICE RELEASE (SR)

GUIDANCE

• Section 3, Chapter 4 contains detailed guidance on SR.

18. In parallel with Type Certification activity, the acquisition agency must procure or sponsor sufficient infrastructure and logistics support to allow the sustained safe operation of the aircraft type at the expected rate of effort within the approved SOI roles and environment. This will include measures to ensure appropriate operational, maintenance and engineering management arrangements are in place, there are sufficient trained and qualified personnel to operate and maintain the aircraft type, and there are adequate logistics arrangements in place to sustain operations at the expected rate of effort. This activity should be structured to accommodate the intended operating purpose and roles documented in the SOI.

19. The SR is a declaration that these support and management arrangements are in place and are sufficient to sustain the airworthiness of the aircraft type when operated as described in the SOI. The Defence AA may issue a SR for a new aircraft type only after an AMTC or STC has been achieved, and following the recommendations of the relevant OAA, TAA and the Defence AA Airworthiness Board. Deficiencies in meeting airworthiness requirements contained in the CBD, or in the supporting arrangements may be accounted for by limiting SR. MILAVREG 3.3—Service Release contains the Defence AA requirements for issue of a SR.

Acquisition flight test and operations prior to Service Release1

20. Acquisition development activity normally requires the aircraft type to be flown under test conditions to gather data and evaluate the compliance of the system with the specification. Closer to delivery to Defence, the aircraft type may be required to undergo a period of flight testing to demonstrate that the specification requirements have been met, and the aircraft type is acceptable for use by suitably trained and qualified Defence personnel. Additionally, each 1 Section 3, Chapters 5 and 6 contain detailed guidance on acquisition flight test and operations prior to SR.

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production aircraft must be shown to conform physically and functionally to the Type Design via issue of a Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA) after AMTC is awarded. Prior to AMTC, the SFP or other airworthiness instrument includes airworthiness requirements and fulfils the role of a CoA.

21. The location of such testing will largely determine how the airworthiness for these events is managed. For a new aircraft type, much of the early developmental flight test activity will occur at an overseas OEM facility. Such activity will be certified under an experimental type certificate or exemption issued by the National Airworthiness Authority (NAA), or Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA) of that country. Notwithstanding, the Defence AA has a duty of care to ensure Defence personnel participating in such testing are afforded at least an equivalent level of safety to that provided by the DASP. MILAVREG 5 and OAREG 4 contain Defence AA and the OAR requirements regarding the involvement of Defence personnel in such flying activity.

22. For a new or non-Defence registered aircraft type, where flying operations are to be conducted within Australia and the acquisition development activity does not yet warrant issue of an AMTC or STC and SR, the aircraft may only be operated by Defence personnel following issue of a Defence AA temporary airworthiness instrument. This may also include operation of individual aircraft prior to its’ transfer to the Defence Register. Depending on the circumstances, the Defence AA temporary airworthiness instruments issued may be:

a. Special Flight Permit (SFP). Prior to flight testing for development, acceptance or operational evaluation by Defence, an SFP must be issued by the Defence AA. An SFP specifies the scope of limited operations authorised, the applicable aircraft tail numbers and the operational, maintenance and engineering arrangements supporting the limited flying activity. This includes airworthiness requirements for individual aircraft being accepted under the SFP. A SFP may also be used for other limited flying activities prior to SR such as ferry flights or limited initial transition training. A SFP Defence registers the participating aircraft. MILAVREG 3.4—Special Flight Permits stipulates the Defence AA requirements for issue of a SFP.

b. Airworthiness Directive (AD). Where an aircraft is to be operated temporarily by an aircraft OEM within Australian airspace prior to transfer to the Defence Register, the OEM may be required to apply to the CASA for an exemption from civil Type Certification requirements and from holding an Air Operator Certificate (AOC) applicable to the intended scope of flying. An AD may be used to permit the participation by Defence aircrew in flying activity with such an aircraft and define the terms and controlling arrangements for such operations. MILAVREG 3.6—Airworthiness Directives stipulates Defence AA requirements for issue of an AD.

23. For a Defence registered aircraft type which has undergone a major modification, or for subsequent operations following issue of a SFP, MILAVREG 3.5—Flight Test Permits (FTP) allows flight test of such an aircraft under a FTP issued by an FTAA. The airworthiness management arrangements for all operations prior to SR are to be documented in the AAMP.

ROLE OF THE DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD2

24. The Airworthiness Board provides an independent executive review of the acquisition activities supporting the Type Certification and SR of a new aircraft type or Major change to the Type Design. Whilst all reasonable efforts will have been made by the acquisition agency, the OAA and the TAA to ensure the system meets all necessary airworthiness requirements, the Airworthiness Board provides an additional level of oversight to the process and a recommendation to the Defence AA regarding the award of AMTC and SR. In some cases at the Defence AA’s discretion, the Airworthiness Board may also be required to review a case supporting issue of a SFP. Importantly, the Airworthiness Board will not convene to review any case for the issue of an Airworthiness Instrument without supporting recommendations to the Defence AA through DACPA from the OAA and the TAA. To enable the Airworthiness Board to consider an application for the issue of an airworthiness instrument, MILAVREG 4.2—Airworthiness Board conduct requires the acquisition agency submit evidence supporting the airworthiness of the aircraft type or major modification.

INTRODUCTION TO SERVICE3

25. Following issue of SR by the Defence AA the aircraft may be used operationally. Often, the SR will limit operations with a stepped approach to role expansion toward full SOI operations, and/or pending the resolution of airworthiness issues or implementation of additional supporting arrangements. Furthermore, individual aircraft delivered to Defence may only be used once their physical and functional configuration has been certified as meeting the Type Design, and any deviations have been appropriately accounted for. To achieve this, the TAR requires that CoA are issued for each individual qualifying aircraft after AMTC award. Where the SR is in respect of a major

2 Section 3, Chapter 7 contains detailed guidance on the conduct and requirements for an acquisition Airworthiness Board. 3 Section 3, Chapter 8 contains detailed guidance on the considerations for the introduction to service.

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modification, the existing aircraft CoA must be cancelled as each aircraft enters the modification program and a new CoA issued for each modified aircraft once an STC has been awarded and the aircraft confirmed as meeting the new Type Design. MILAVREG 3.1—Australian Military Type Certificates, MILAVREG 3.2—Supplemental Type Certificates, and TAREG 2.6.3—Issue of Certificates of Airworthiness, contain the requirements for CoA.

FLEET ADDITION AND NEW MODELS OF AN EXISTING AIRCRAFT TYPE4

26. Where the acquisition agency seeks to augment a fleet or Type Certify a new model of an existing aircraft type, the process of Type Certification and SR can be tailored according to the degree of similarity of the new aircraft to those operating under the extant AMTC. MILAVREG 2.9—Addition of fleet aircraft to the Defence Register contains the requirements for addition of such aircraft to the Defence Register.

4 Section 3, Chapter 9 contains detailed guidance on addition of fleet aircraft and new models of an existing aircraft type (ie. adding aircraft under and existing AMTC).

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DETERMINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF AIRCRAFT TYPE REGISTRATION

APPLICABLE REGULATIONS

MILAVREG 2.1—Determination of registration

MILAVREG 2.7—Removal from the Defence Register

MILAVREG 2.8—Reinstatement to the Defence Register

INTRODUCTION

1. Where Defence seeks to acquire a new aircraft type, the strategy for registration of the aircraft will largely determine the overarching airworthiness and aviation safety requirements that are applied to most aspects of the design, construction, maintenance and ongoing support of the aircraft. Whilst most Defence aircraft will require Defence registration, there are some circumstances where the application of a non-Defence registered aircraft will be appropriate. MILAVREG 2.1—Determination of registration contains the requirements regarding the determination of registration.

2. Where an existing Defence registered aircraft is undergoing a Major change to the Type Design, the acquisition strategy may include removal of one or more individual aircraft from the Defence Register. Where an acquisition strategy is implemented that includes removal and reinstatement of Defence registered aircraft, specific requirements must be observed to ensure the airworthiness continuum of the aircraft is not compromised. MILAVREG 2.7—Removal from the Defence Register and MILAVREG 2.8—Reinstatement to the Defence Register contain the requirements regarding removal and reinstatement of aircraft to the Defence Register.

3. The purpose of MILAVREG 2 is to describe the considerations for determining the registration requirements for new aircraft acquired by Defence, and to describe the process through which Defence registered aircraft may be removed and reinstated to the Defence Register.

DETERMINATION OF REGISTRATION

4. Most aircraft types acquired for Defence use are Defence registered. However, MILAVREG 2.1 accounts for situations where Type Certification other than through Defence registration may be acceptable. The decision regarding the registration of an aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence will be determined through consideration of three main factors:

a. configuration and role

b. aircraft ownership

c. duration and type of operation by Defence.

CONFIGURATION AND ROLE

5. Where an aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence is operating in a military configuration and role, the aircraft must be Defence registered. Civil type certification requirements do not take into account the complexities of military operation and are inadequate to form the full basis of certification of a military specific aircraft type. Examples of military roles include, tactical air combat, strike and reconnaissance, tactical airlift, maritime patrol, close air support, etc. Aircraft operated in these roles by Defence will be listed on the Defence Register. Where an aircraft type is not specifically performing these roles, but is of such a configuration that the design basis of the aircraft clearly intends a military role, then the aircraft may also be Defence registered. Examples where this might not occur include aircraft belonging to the military, customs or police forces of a foreign country that are operating within Australian airspace. Such foreign aircraft operations are permitted by recognised countries on the basis that the aircraft type is foreign registered within the country of origin.

6. Defence aircraft operating in a configuration and role substantially similar to an equivalent civil aircraft type may, at the discretion of the Defence AA and with the agreement of CASA, undergo type certification as a non- Defence registered aircraft only where the certification basis is essentially equivalent to a civil aircraft operating under an existing type certificate issued by a recognised NAA. In this instance, the aircraft type certificate would be issued by CASA, however under the definition of ‘State Aircraft’ in the Act, the Defence AA is obliged to ensure the civil type certification remains applicable and airworthiness management of the aircraft continues to be acceptable. The operational airworthiness management of any civil registered aircraft utilised by Defence aircrew and flying organisations, remains the responsibility of the OAA in command of the operating organisations.

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AIRCRAFT OWNERSHIP AND DURATION OF OPERATION

7. The Defence AA prefers that all aircraft owned and operated by Defence are Defence registered, however as previously described, the Defence AA will accept that a civil type certification provides an acceptable level of safety under some circumstances. Where a civil aircraft type is leased for long term use by Defence, non-Defence registration may also be acceptable due the conditions of the lease or any existing civil type certificate and civil accreditation of engineering and maintaining organisations already in place. Where the aircraft is not owned by Defence and the duration of a lease or agreement for operation by Defence personnel or on behalf of Defence is relatively short, Defence registration will most likely be impractical. The Defence AA will consider the appropriateness of the registration and airworthiness management arrangements for non-Defence-registered aircraft to be acquired by Defence on a case by case basis through examination of the AAMP developed by the acquisition agency.

8. Guidance on operations involving commercial owned aircraft operated by Defence personnel for the purposed of acquisition flight test and development prior to Defence registration is contained in Section 3, Chapters 5 and 6. MILAVREG 5—Airworthiness management of non-Defence-registered aircraft and foreign military aircraft contains the Defence AA’s requirements for the operation and management of non-Defence-registered aircraft. Section 5, Chapter 1 contains guidance on the airworthiness management of non-Defence-registered aircraft and foreign military aircraft. Technical airworthiness requirements regarding the acquisition of leased civil aircraft are contained in TAREG 2.7.

APPLICATION FOR DEFENCE REGISTRATION

9. Upon government approval of an acquisition, the agency responsible for bringing a Defence registered aircraft type into Defence service is required to apply to DACPA for the issue of a unique AI. The AI is a key reference, used to both identify the aircraft type, and also within the logistics management system as a key element of technical management codes. The acquisition agency must then maintain an Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan (AAMP), which identifies the overarching airworthiness strategy that will be utilised to achieve Type Certification and Service Release of the aircraft type in the intended operational roles and environment. Similarly, an agency seeking to make a major modification to an aircraft type, which requires Defence AA issue of a STC and Service Release, must maintain an AAMP which satisfies the Defence AA’s requirements.

10. For new aircraft types, the agency responsible for bringing specific aircraft into service must nominate the tail numbers for each individual aircraft. The tail numbers will be listed on the Type Certification Data Sheet (TCDS) and each tail number is appended to the AI to form each aircraft’s specific registration number. Tail numbers are typically derived from the last three digits of a manufacturer’s build (or serial) number (eg a manufacturer serial number of XX5440 may become aircraft serial number 440 for a given type). In cases where additional aircraft have been purchased and a large production number of the type has meant a possible duplication of tail numbers, a unique numbering system must be applied. In most cases this will be a sequential numbering that does not conflict with that of the previous numbering, eg from 001 onwards.

11. A Defence registered aircraft registration number is formatted as the AI followed by a hyphen and then the tail number. For example, AP–3C Orion aircraft are registered A9–751 to A9–760 and A9–656 to A9–665, where ‘A9’ denotes the aircraft type as an AP–3C Orion and the hyphenated three digit number identifies each individual aircraft of that type.

12. Regulations regarding the acquisition and Defence registration process are contained in MILAVREG 2. Requirements for AMTC, STC, SFP and Service Release (SR) are contained in MILAVREG 3—Airworthiness Instruments. Guidance on the process of acquisition airworthiness management and Defence registration of aircraft is contained in Section 3.

ADDITION, REMOVAL AND REINSTATEMENT TO THE DEFENCE REGISTER

REQUIREMENT FOR AN AIRCRAFT TO BE REGISTERED

13. MILAVREG 2.1 provides Regulations governing when a Defence registered or non-Defence aircraft may be operated by or on behalf of Defence. The term ‘operated’ is defined as any activity involving an aircraft which may lead to the aircraft becoming airborne. For a fixed wing aircraft, this is usually when the aircraft speed in a high speed taxi approaches a speed which may result in flight. For rotor-wing aircraft, this is where the aircraft engine is turning and is engaged to the main rotor.

ADDITION OF NEW AIRCRAFT TO THE DEFENCE REGISTER

14. An aircraft may be added to the Defence Register through a number of processes:

a. through inclusion of the tail number in a SFP

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b. through issue of AMTC

c. through addition of aircraft to the Defence Register post issue of AMTC where the additional aircraft were considered as part of the initial Service Release

d. through the fleet addition process of MILAVREG 2.9

e. through another process approved, such as issue of an AD.

15. Addition of aircraft through issue of AMTC. The Accomplishment Summary prepared to support issue of an AMTC and Service Release should identify all aircraft approved for acquisition, which are to be operated under the AMTC and Service Release. An application for AMTC must include a draft TCDS. The draft TCDS should list all aircraft to be operated under the AMTC at the time the AMTC is issued. Where the draft TCDS also includes aircraft which have not been confirmed as conforming to the Type Design, the TCDS should indicate this. By including all aircraft to be operated under the Service Release within the Accomplishment Summary, the TAA, OAA and AwB can consider the Service Release provisions in place for all aircraft including those yet to be added to the Defence Register. Where all aircraft to be operated under the Service Release are listed in the Accomplishment Summary at the time AMTC is issued, there is no requirement to complete the MILAVREG 2.9 process to add tail numbers to the Defence Register.

16. Once the Defence AA has issued AMTC and Service Release for an aircraft type, all aircraft already listed on the Defence Register will be considered to be operating under the AMTC. The Defence Register is to be updated to indicate that the Defence registered aircraft are operating under the AMTC. The DAR is to issue Certificates of Airworthiness as required by TAREG 2.6.3 and advise ACPA and the TAA within 28 days of the issue of AMTC. Aircraft already on the Defence Register may continue to operated under the AMTC and Service Release during this period.

17. Addition of aircraft post issue of AMTC. Where an AMTC has been issued and the Service Release aspects have already been approved by the Defence AA to cover additional aircraft, an applicant wishing to add new aircraft to the Defence Register must request that DACPA approve the addition of the new aircraft to the Defence Register. The application should provide ACPA with the following information:

a. the manufacturers serial number and corresponding proposed aircraft tail number

b. confirmation that the Commonwealth has Accepted the aircraft

c. confirmation that the aircraft is not on any other aircraft register, which may be either:

(1) confirmation that the aircraft has never been registered on an aircraft register, or

(2) evidence that the aircraft has been removed from the previous aircraft register (eg. a copy of the ‘Loss Message’ or temporary airworthiness instrument which clearly stated an expiration date or event for aircraft registration)

d. confirmation that the aircraft conforms to the Type Design of the aircraft, or that all deviations have been Accepted, which may be provided:

(1) prior to issue of AMTC, normally under an SFP, through evidence that the DAR has competed a verification process verifying that the aircraft confirms to the documented Type Design; or

(2) post issue of AMTC, through evidence that the DAR has issued a Certificates of Airworthiness for each aircraft.

18. Where an AMTC has been issued and the Service Release aspects have already been approved by the Defence AA to cover additional aircraft, a TAA and OAA position is not required. Where the Defence AA has not previously considered the Service Release implications of adding new aircraft to the Register, MILAVREG 2.9 applies.

REMOVAL AND REINSTATEMENT OF AIRCRAFT ON THE DEFENCE REGISTER

19. Aircraft may be removed from the Defence Register under several conditions including the following:

a. Disposal (sale, termination or expiry of lease).

b. Determined to have Category 5 damage (crashed, written off or destroyed).

c. Reduction to spares or reclassification to training aids.

d. When subject to extended modifications and test activities by an aircraft OEM.

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20. The disposal process usually occurs through a ministerial approval that is sought by the Capability Manager. The agency responsible for Defence disposals will effect the disposal of an aircraft and the appropriate logistics management agency is responsible for stripping the aircraft of classified components and removing military markings, as required. ACPA is usually notified by the disposal agency of the completion of disposal action, including the ministerial documentation. Upon receipt of disposal correspondence, ACPA staff will remove the aircraft from the Defence Register, annotating the type of disposal action and, where appropriate, inform new owners of the respective aircraft’s removal.

21. Aircraft that are leased by Defence must be removed from the Defence Register upon termination of a contracted lease or on the expiry of a lease, at which time registration of the aircraft will be transferred (in most cases) back to the Australian Civil Register.

REMOVAL FROM THE DEFENCE REGISTER

22. The requirement to remove an aircraft from the Defence Register usually originates from the logistics management or acquisition organisation responsible for the management or modification of an aircraft type, in conjunction with the Capability Manager.

23. A Defence registered aircraft type undergoing an extensive capability upgrade that introduces a Major change to the Type Design may be required to operate for a period of time as a non-Defence-registered aircraft. Usually, all required acquisition and modification activity can be achieved without the need to remove an aircraft from the Defence Register. An acquisition agency should only consider temporary removal from the Defence Register as part of their airworthiness strategy as a last resort. Reasons to adopt this approach may include:

a. the unavailability or incapacity of existing Defence agencies to authorise or conduct the required developmental flying activity; or

b. the requirement to register a Defence aircraft under a national or military airworthiness authority of a foreign country for development and modification by an OEM.

24. When necessary under these conditions, MILAVREG 2.7 requires the acquisition agency to apply to DACPA for temporary removal of an aircraft from the Defence Register. The application is to justify the necessity for removal of the aircraft from the Defence Register and describe or reference the strategy to ensure that the aircraft will be returned in a known state of airworthiness which is satisfactory to the OAA and TAA. This strategy may be captured in the Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan required by MILAVREG 2.3. The strategy adopted will largely depend on whether or not the aircraft is to be operated within Australian airspace or by Defence aircrew following removal from the Defence Register.

25. Participation of Defence personnel in production acceptance testing, ferry flights, flight testing or other limited flying operations before an aircraft is Defence registered, or while temporarily non-Defence registered, is governed by MILAVREG 5 The airworthiness arrangements required by these regulations are to be documented in the AAMP, including identification of the flying management systems and procedures implemented to ensure airworthiness is maintained for operations involving Defence personnel.

26. Aircraft temporarily removed from the Defence Register for the purposes of modification, test or upgrade by an aircraft OEM must be sufficiently managed to ensure the airworthiness condition is known and is acceptable prior to reinstatement.

27. Removal from the Defence Register for operations within Australian airspace. DACPA will only approve an application to remove an aircraft from the Defence Register for acquisition development and test activity within Australia when there are no other means available to authorise the necessary operation of the aircraft within the DASP. For an aircraft type with a military configuration or role, the subsequent non-Defence operating organisation may be required to apply to CASA for an exemption from civil type certification requirements and from holding an Air Operators Certificate applicable to the intended scope of flying. Where such an exemption is granted, or where CASA is otherwise satisfied that the organisation may safely operate the aircraft within Australia, DACPA will direct the transfer of the relevant aircraft from the Defence Register. Any involvement of Defence personnel in the flying activity or where airworthiness management responsibilities are assigned to Defence by CASA, the Defence AA will issue a temporary airworthiness instrument (AD) that stipulates any requirements for the participation of Defence Personnel. CASA may require concurrence from Defence that the aircrew required to operate the aircraft under the temporary civil registration are appropriately trained, qualified and current. Such determinations may be made by the relevant OAA of the aircraft type or the relevant FTAA, with conditions applicable to the operational airworthiness management of the aircraft specified in the AD.

28. Removal from the Defence Register for operations outside Australian airspace. DACPA will approve an application to remove an aircraft type from the Defence Register for acquisition development and test activity outside Australian airspace when the test aircraft are required to be registered under an experimental type

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certificate or exemption from a recognised NAA or MAA of a foreign country. A recognised NAA or MAA is one whose airworthiness system has been determined and documented by the TAA and the Defence AA as providing at least an equivalent level of safety to that provided by Defence. Following agreement by the relevant NAA or MAA, DACPA may transfer the aircraft off the Defence Register. Operations with such an aircraft by Defence personnel are subject to the provision of MILAVREG 5 and OAREG 4. The acquisition related involvement of Defence personnel in such flying activities is covered in more detail in Section 3, Chapters 5 and 6.

CHANGES TO CONFIGURATION AND ROLE DURING NON–DEFENCE REGISTRATION

29. Prior to transfer off the Defence Register, DACPA must be satisfied that the aircraft will be returned in an airworthy condition. Such a condition may include:

a. where a minor change to the aircraft Type Design has been made during any period of non–Defence registration; or

b. where a Major change to the Type Design has been made.

30. The TAR must be satisfied that the organisations conducting any design, modification and maintenance activity on the aircraft are subject to an acceptable regulatory system, and will therefore adequately carry out and record any design, modification and maintenance activity on the aircraft. The design and maintenance organisations may have already achieved an authorisation from the TAR for an inclusive scope of acquisition activity, or may be subject to the requirements of an NAA or MAA recognised by the TAR.

31. Lastly, the terms of the loan of the aircraft to the non–Defence organisation must be specified in a formal agreement which is acceptable to the relevant OAA and TAA. The agreement should specify the requirements for the return of the aircraft to the Defence Register, and the process to certify any modification to the aircraft configuration or role.

REINSTATEMENT TO THE DEFENCE REGISTER

32. Minor or no change to the Type Design. Where an aircraft has undergone a minor or no change to the Type Design, DACPA may approve the aircraft’s return to the Defence Register. This requires the DAR to reissue the aircraft’s certificate of airworthiness, and requires the endorsement of both the TAA and relevant OAA. The TAA and the relevant OAA must be satisfied that the existing Service Release for the aircraft type remains valid and that:

a. any minor design change to the aircraft is treated in accordance with technical airworthiness regulations

b. any new or modified role or capability resulting from a minor design change is treated in accordance with operational airworthiness regulations

c. substantial changes to the aircraft role or capability undergo Supplemental Role Approval in accordance with OAREG 3.5 prior to re-commencement of in-service operations with the modified aircraft.

33. Major change to the Type Design. Where an aircraft has been subject to a Major change to the Type Design during the period of non-Defence registration, the aircraft may only be returned to the Defence Register following issue of an SFP or STC by the Defence AA. Further guidance on Type Certification, Service Release and operations under an SFP are contained in Section 3, Chapters 4 and 6. Where the acquisition airworthiness strategy includes incorporation and de-modification of a Major change to the Type Design during the period of non-Defence registration, the acquisition agency and the aircraft DAR should seek advice from the TAA regarding the requirements for reinstatement to the Defence Register.

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ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT


MILAVREG 1.5—Operational Airworthiness Authorities

MILAVREG 1.7—Technical Airworthiness Authority

MILAVREG 2.3—Introduction and modification of a Defence registered aircraft type

INTRODUCTION

1. Early in the acquisition process, a strategy for the airworthiness management of the acquisition activities must be implemented. The strategy normally includes delegation of authority to key personnel, and appropriate technical and operational airworthiness management plans to ensure that the acquisition activities will assure the airworthiness of the aircraft, both prior to Service Release during development, and in the SOI roles and environment following Service Release.

2. MILAVREG 1.5—Operational Airworthiness Authorities and MILAVREG 1.7—Technical Airworthiness Authority allow OAAs and the TAA to delegate their authority in accordance with Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREG) and Technical Airworthiness Regulations (TAREG), including authority for acquisition activities. MILAVREG 2.3—Introduction and modification of a Defence registered aircraft type requires the acquisition agency to maintain an Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan (AAMP) for new aircraft acquisitions, or Major changes to the Type Design.

PURPOSE

3. This chapter describes the overarching principles for the airworthiness management of acquisition activities within the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP).

APPLICABILITY

4. This chapter is applicable to all acquisition activities to introduce a new Defence registered aircraft type, or make a Major change to the Type Design of an existing Defence registered aircraft type.

OVERVIEW

5. Acquisition airworthiness management encompasses a number of elements of the acquisition process. The main considerations include:

a. delegation of authority to personnel and organisations to conduct and manage aviation safety during acquisition

b. formulation and implementation of a strategy to manage the airworthiness and safety of flying activities involving Defence personnel prior to Service Release

c. formulation and implementation of a strategy to achieve Type Certification and Service Release.

6. The AAMP required by MILAVREG 2.3 is the top level mechanism through which each of these elements are managed. The AAMP is supported by subordinate technical, operational and logistics strategies to assure airworthiness throughout the acquisition process.

ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT PLANNING

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

7. A fundamental premise of the DASP is that competent individuals are appointed or delegated airworthiness authority within their area of training, qualification and experience. MILAVREG 1.5—Operational Airworthiness Authorities, MILAVREG 1.6 – Technical Airworthiness Regulator, and MILAVREG 1.7—Technical Airworthiness Authority allow the OAA, TAR and TAA to make such delegations in accordance with OAREG and TAREG. In the acquisition context, operational and technical airworthiness authority is delegated to appropriately competent personnel to ensure that sound decisions and judgements are made regarding the operational and technical design characteristics of the new aircraft type or major change. Fundamentally, the operational and technical delegates are responsible for ensuring that the new aircraft or Major change is operationally and technically acceptable, and that appropriate supporting arrangements are in place to sustain the airworthiness of the aircraft following Service Release.

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8. Operational Airworthiness Authority delegation. OAREG 1.2.2 allows an OAA to appoint through a written delegation an Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative Acquisition (OAAR(Acq)), who may exercise airworthiness authority on behalf of the OAA for a specified scope of acquisition activities. For a new aircraft type or Major change to the Type Design of an existing aircraft, OAREG 3 describes the responsibilities typically delegated to an OAAR(Acq).

9. Technical Airworthiness Authority delegation. TAREG 1.2 contains the TAR’s requirements for delegation of technical airworthiness authority. The TAR may delegate an appropriately qualified and competent person as a Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) to determine the technical acceptability of an aircraft for service use on the TAR’s behalf. The authority required to act as a DAR for a new aircraft type or Major change to the Type Design is usually specified in the scope of a written delegation provided by the TAR. TAREG 2 contains the majority of the TAR requirements for the conduct of acquisition activities by the DAR.

10. Unlike OAREG, TAREG do not discriminate between a DAR delegation for in-service and acquisition activities. The reason two separate delegations are specified in the OAREG is because the activities performed by an OAAR are distinct from those performed by an OAAR(Acq). An OAAR is primarily concerned with operational airworthiness relating to the operation and management of in-service aircraft types. An OAAR(Acq) is primarily concerned with the operational airworthiness impact of the design characteristics of the new or modified aircraft. Conversely, an aircraft DAR is concerned with the technical acceptability of a design regardless of whether the aircraft is a new type, undergoing a major modification, or undergoing a minor in-service modification.

11. Flight Test Approval Authority delegation. MILAVREG 1.8 allows a FTAA to delegate a defined scope of Flight Test activity to a suitably qualified representative. Acquisition activity to introduce a new aircraft type will normally include an extensive program of ground and flight testing to verify that the development activity demonstrates specification requirements have been met. In such cases, a more appropriate OAAR(Acq) appointment during the development phase may be a Qualified Test Pilot (QTP) nominated by an FTAA. Appointment of a QTP as the OAAR(Acq) for an acquisition involving a Major change to the Type Design may be appropriate in some circumstances, however the relevant OAA and FTAA should agree on the required delegation of authority on a case by case basis. Some circumstances may require a QTP or other flight test systems specialist as a part of the acquisition team, with operational airworthiness responsibility retained by the OAAR(Acq).

ACQUISITION ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

12. At the inception of an acquisition project for a new aircraft or major change to the Type Design, the acquisition agency will be required to appoint personnel responsible for various aspects of the required capability. Notwithstanding project management and financial functions, a component of the project team will comprise personnel responsible for performing activities related to the technical and operational airworthiness, and the logistics support of the new capability. The project management strategy adopted may vary significantly from project to project, however the acquisition agency must ensure that the organisational arrangements satisfy the Defence AA’s requirements for airworthiness management.

13. Prior to making determinations relevant to the development of the Functional Performance Specification (FPS) or the acquisition Statement of Work (SOW) which comprise the SOR, the relevant OAA and the TAA should appoint an OAAR(Acq) and a DAR with a scope of airworthiness management responsibility relevant to the acquisition activities to be performed. Such appointments may be within or outside the project management structure, depending on the stage of the project or the scope of the acquisition. A typical initial project organisational structure showing lines of airworthiness authority is shown in Figure 3–1. Solid lines represent a direct management or command relationship and dashed lines represent the airworthiness management relationships. In this scenario, the OAAR(Acq) and DAR remain external to the project structure, however are responsible for ensuring the project staff are sufficiently supported to conduct acquisition activities in cognisance of airworthiness requirements.

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FIGURE 3–1 INITIAL PROJECT AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

14. A more mature project structure indicative of a new aircraft acquisition after a formal contract with an OEM has been established is shown in Figure 3–2. In this scenario the aircraft OAAR(Acq) and DAR are within the project organisation. For the acquisition of a new aircraft type, this structure may be suitable until Service Release where elements of airworthiness authority will transition to an operating command and in-service engineering and maintenance organisations. This management structure provides the acquisition project with a large degree of autonomy and flexibility in conducting acquisition activities; however the OAREG and TAREG require that the operational and engineering activities are conducted within an appropriate flying management system and an authorised engineering organisation.

FIGURE 3–2 –MATURE PROJECT AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR A NEW AIRCRAFT TYPE

FLYING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

AUTHORISED ENGINEERING ORGANISATION

OPERATING COMMAND

OAA

DGTA-ADF

TAR/TAA

ACQUISITION ORGANISATION

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

OTHER PROJECT FUNCTIONS

ENGINEERING MANAGER

(DAR)

LOGISTICS MANAGER

PROJECT ENGINEERING STAFF

PROJECT LOGISTICS STAFF

FLIGHT TEST MANAGER (QTP

AND OAAR(ACQ))

PROJECT TEST/ OPERATIONAL STAFF

FLIGHT TEST ORG

FTAA

DGTA-ADF OPERATING COMMAND

ACQUISITION ORGANISATION

PROJECT

OTHER PROJECT FUNCTION

ENG MANAGER

LOG MANAGER

AUTHORISED ENGINEERING ORGANISATION

OAA

OAAR(ACQ)

TAR

DAR

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15. Ultimately, the organisational structure of the acquisition project should suit the scope and complexity of the capability under development without compromise or ambiguity of airworthiness control. The acquisition organisational structure should also be supported by a network of operational, design and test specialists and agencies. OAA, ACPA, DGTA–ADF and a relevant FTAA staff should be consulted early in the project to provide advice regarding the development of the acquisition organisational and supporting structures.

ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT PLANS AND STRATEGIES

16. OAREG 3.2.1 and TAREG 2.2.3 require that the OAAR(Acq) and the DAR document the airworthiness strategy through which the airworthiness of the new capability will be demonstrated. MILAVREG 2.3 requires that the acquisition agency identify the overarching strategy to combine the operational and technical activities to enable the introduction to service of the new capability. These plans should be developed at the commencement of acquisition activities. MILAVREG 2.3 requires the acquisition agency to develop and maintain an AAMP from the commencement of acquisition activities. This effectively means prior to the development of the SOR, or activities which significantly contribute to the SOR, such as a Request for Tender or similar document.

17. If a particular airworthiness management strategy is central to a project’s timeframes and will be included in RFT or contract documentation, the desired strategy should be documented by the project and endorsed by the TAA, the relevant OAA and DACPA prior to RFT release or the commencement of contract negotiations.

18. Operational Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP). The OAMP describes the strategy and scope of operational airworthiness activities and responsibilities identified to achieve and maintain operational airworthiness prior to and following Service Release. The OAMP identifies the organisational arrangements, personnel, processes and supporting networks that have been or will be implemented to achieve the required operational airworthiness outcomes. Additionally, the OAMP is required to identify the approved SOI, operational input to the development of the SOR, and a strategy to assess critical operational aspects of the design in support of compliance finding and Design Acceptance by the aircraft DAR. Applicable aspects of the acquisition derived OAMP should be included in the in-service OAMP (normally at the OAA/OAAR level) at the appropriate point of transition into service.

19. Project Design Acceptance Strategy (PDAS). The PDAS is a technical airworthiness document required to similarly identify the organisational arrangements, personnel, processes and supporting networks that have been implemented to achieve the required technical airworthiness outcomes. The PDAS also documents the development of the SOR to confirm that the Certification Basis Description is adequate, and that sufficient evidence exists or will be provided to justify recognition of prior certification by recognised airworthiness authorities. Due to the similar aim of both the OAMP and the PDAS, these documents could be combined where convenient, however OAAR(Acq) and TAA endorsement of the relevant parts of the document is required.

20. Logistics Support Plans. MILAVREG 2.3 identifies the requirement to demonstrate that the logistics arrangements implemented to support operational and technical airworthiness are adequate to sustain operations in accordance with the approved SOI. OAAR(Acq) and DAR input and review of logistics support plans and activities is important to ensure that appropriate measures will be available to support the introduction to service. The OAAR(Acq) must be satisfied that the planned operational infrastructure, such as training devices and syllabi, aircrew publications and procedures, and other flying management system arrangements are adequate. The DAR must be satisfied that appropriate technical infrastructure is provided, such as authorised engineering and approved maintenance organisations, ground crew training and technical publications to support operations at the required rate of effort.

21. Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan (AAMP). The AAMP is required to identify the overall strategy to introduce the new aircraft type or major change to service. Importantly, the AAMP should not duplicate the content of the PDAS or the OAMP. Rather, the AAMP should provide the context for development of these subordinate documents, identifying the overarching acquisition airworthiness strategy and bringing together the planned outcomes of the operational, technical and logistical activity to provide a cohesive basis for the airworthiness of the aircraft before and after Service Release. The audience of the AAMP is the acquisition project staff and supporting agencies, the OAA, TAA, FTAA and the Defence AA. The Defence AA requirements for the content of an AAMP include the following:

a. Endorsement. MILAVREG 2.3 requires that the AAMP is endorsed by the TAA, DACPA and the relevant OAA, and approved by the Project Manager to confirm that the identified strategy is realistic and achievable. Airworthiness strategies relying substantially on flight test by Defence agencies should include endorsement by the relevant FTAA.

b. Scope. The AAMP should describe the scope of acquisition activity to meet the capability requirements. The scope should include a brief description of the aircraft or technical equipment under acquisition and a summary of the required aircraft roles and environment. Reference to the approved SOI may be included to cover much of this detail. The aim of this section is to provide the audience with an understanding of the operating requirements which will drive the design activity.

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c. Acquisition schedule. The AAMP should identify the planned acquisition phases and a schedule of key milestones for the operation of the aircraft. The schedule should include the duration of the major activities supporting the introduction to service and identify when supporting Airworthiness Instruments are required to be issued by the Defence AA. The aim of this section is to identify achievable objectives for the introduction of the capability which can be supported by the DASP.

d. Responsible organisations and personnel. The AAMP should identify the delegation and organisational mechanisms through which airworthiness authority for the acquisition activities will be assigned. This should include the level of oversight or support to be provided by the TAA, OAA and an FTAA, and a list of supporting organisations and their function. Much of the detail of this section may subsequently reside in the OAMP and PDAS in which case the AAMP need only include a brief summary and reference to the supporting documentation. The aim of this section is to identify the key personnel and organisations directly involved with or supporting the acquisition activities.

e. Certification Basis Description (CBD). The AAMP should contain or provide reference to the CBD against which compliance of the Type Design must be demonstrated to meet the approved SOI.

f. Strategy. The AAMP should identify the strategy to achieve Type Certification and Service Release of the new aircraft or major change. This should typically describe the methodology adopted to compile the CBD and include the mechanisms through which the acquisition agency plans to meet the technical and operational certification requirements. The strategy should draw on or reference information contained in the OAMP, PDAS, logistics plans and other documents as required to describe compliance with operational and technical regulatory requirements and how Type Certification and Service Release will be achieved. Section 3, chapter 4 provides detailed guidance on Type Certification and Service Release.

g. Operations prior to Service Release. The AAMP should identify any planned operations involving Defence personnel during the acquisition development activity. The description should include any operations to be conducted under a type certificate or exemption issued by a foreign National Airworthiness Authority (NAA) or Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA). The AAMP should identify what airworthiness arrangements have been or will be implemented to ensure an appropriate level of safety is provided for operations involving Defence personnel, including Defence AA recognition of foreign airworthiness authority were necessary. Where operation within Australia will be required under a temporary airworthiness instrument, the AAMP should identify, in conjunction with the schedule and strategy, the likely scope of operations, timeframe and duration of operations to be authorised. Further guidance on the management of acquisition related operations prior to Service Release is contained in section 3, chapters 5 and 6.

h. Introduction to service. The AAMP should describe how the acquisition agency intends to transition the new aircraft or major change into Defence service. This should include allocation and addition of aircraft tail numbers to the Defence Register, transfer of individual and organisational airworthiness authority, and the implementation of adequate and timely arrangements to support the planned build up of operations following Service Release. Further guidance on the introduction to service is contained in section 3, chapter 8.

i. Resolution of airworthiness issues. Finally, the AAMP should identify a mechanism to manage and resolve airworthiness issues that arise during the acquisition activity. Airworthiness issues may include any design or operating feature which precludes a finding of compliance with an airworthiness standard in the CBD, resulting in an operating limitation or other mitigating strategies to assure the safety of operations until the issue can be resolved. Further guidance on managing airworthiness issues is contained in section 3, chapter 4.

INVOLVEMENT OF DGTA-ADF, ACPA AND OAA STAFF

22. DGTA–ADF, ACPA and the relevant OAA staff will be involved with the acquisition activity throughout the life of the project. This should begin at project inception to ensure the ongoing level of interaction and oversight required is agreed. Initial project activities will include development of the AAMP, OAMP and PDAS in consultation with the airworthiness authorities and relevant specialist agencies. Initially, these documents need only outline the anticipated arrangements and strategy to identify applicable airworthiness management requirements. The AAMP, OAMP and PDAS will need to be mature prior to receiving OAA and TAA endorsement of the SOR for the required capability.

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TYPE CERTIFICATION AND SERVICE RELEASE FOR DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT


MILAVREG 2.1—Determination of registration


MILAVREG 2.4—Operation of Defence registered aircraft

MILAVREG 3.1—Australian Military Type Certificates

MILAVREG 3.2—Supplemental Type Certificates

MILAVREG 3.3—Service Release

INTRODUCTION

1. Type Certification and Service Release are the means through which an airworthy basis to operate a Defence registered aircraft is established. The Defence AA issues AMTC to signify the completion of sufficient design, test and certification activities to meet established airworthiness standards to operate safely within specific roles and environment. The Service Release is a declaration by the Defence AA that the infrastructure, personnel training and availability, organisations, and supporting arrangements are sufficient to support operations within the designated roles at a sustained rate of effort. The Type Certification process begins at the commencement of acquisition activities for new aircraft or Major changes to the Type Design.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter describes the process to achieve Type Certification, Service Release, or the issue of a Category 2 UASOP by the Defence AA.

APPLICABILITY

3. Type Certification and Service Release is applicable to all new Defence registered aircraft types, or Defence registered aircraft types undergoing a Major change to the Type Design in accordance with TAREG 2.5.3—Classification of changes in Type Design. Similarly, the issue of a UASOP is applicable to Defence registered Category 2 UAS.

OVERVIEW

KEY CONCEPTS

4. The Principles Behind Type Certification and Service Release. Type Certification and Service Release are based on the following fundamental principles:

a. a particular aircraft type is chosen for acquisition on the basis that it will satisfy the operational capability requirement when performing designated roles in a defined operating environment;

b. the design and method of operation of the aircraft type is such that the aircraft may safely perform the designated roles with an acceptable risk of; loss of life or injury to aircrew and passengers, loss or damage to the aircraft, and equivalent loss to other personnel or property as a direct consequence of operating the aircraft;

c. established airworthiness standards are used as the basis to assess the capacity of the design to safely perform the designated roles;

d. the design is found to comply with the established airworthiness standards when operated in the designated roles by appropriately qualified and competent aircrew; and

e. ongoing operations can be sustained by adequate infrastructure and supporting arrangements. Sup

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5. Key Certification Terms. Key certification concepts are defined in Section 3, Chapter 1. A summary of these definitions is included as follows:

a. Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). The SOI describes all intended aircraft roles and the operating environments and the operating parameters within which the aircraft type must safely operate.

b. Type Design. The Type Design describes the complete aircraft configuration and design, including all supporting data.

c. Certification Basis Description (CBD). The CBD provides the link between the SOI and the Type Design and is a list of airworthiness requirements against which compliance must be achieved, in conjunction with a system safety assessment, to assure the safety of the aircraft type.

d. Compliance Finding. Compliance Finding is the process of formally documenting that applicable verification data or evidence has been examined in relation to an airworthiness requirement contained in the CBD and that the data has shown that the requirement has been satisfied.

e. Type Certification. Type Certification is the process through which compliance with the airworthiness design requirements contained in the CBD is established through the development of the Type Design to meet the operating roles and environment contained in the SOI.

f. Service Release. The Service Release is a declaration that sufficient supporting arrangements are in place to sustain the airworthiness of the aircraft type when operated as described in the SOI.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE CERTIFICATION AND SERVICE RELEASE

6. For most acquisition projects seeking to introduce a new aircraft type or Major change, much of the project activity which underpins Type Certification and Service Release must occur concurrently to achieve timely introduction to service. Consequently, the distinction between those activities contributing to Type Certification and those related to Service Release can be confusing at times. In reality, the functions performed by the Type Certification and the Service Release are distinctly different. Type Certification relates to the technical and operational aspects of the aircraft system design and the accompanying instructions which define how the system is operated and maintained. Service Release relates to the ‘readiness’ of the supporting elements to commence and sustain operations with the aircraft at a designated rate of effort.

7. Importantly, in relation to the operation of a Defence registered aircraft, Type Certification and Service Release are co-dependent. An AMTC or STC must be issued prior to Service Release, however without Service Release an AMTC or STC is ineffective. An aircraft conforming to the Type Design cannot be operated as a Defence registered aircraft prior to Service Release, unless authorised for temporary operations under a SFP or FTP as appropriate. Consequently, airworthiness planning normally requires that Type Certification and Service Release are achieved simultaneously to enable the capability of the system to be realised at the earliest possible opportunity. MILAVREG 2.4 contains the Defence AA’s requirements for the operation of Defence registered aircraft.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE CERTIFICATION AND DESIGN ACCEPTANCE

8. The distinction between Type Certification and Design Acceptance can be confusing due to their close relationship. The Design Acceptance process seeks to assure the technical acceptability of a particular design against all Defence requirements documented in the functional performance specification, including airworthiness, performance, mission, appearance etc. Type Certification is concerned with only those requirements in the specification which comprise the airworthiness standards listed in the CBD to assure the design safety of the aircraft. The Type Certification process also provides an additional level of oversight by the TAA, OAA and the Defence AA for issue of an AMTC or STC to be issued. Importantly, activities conducted as part of the design acceptance process to verify that the aircraft system meets particular airworthiness requirements listed in the specification should normally be sufficient for Type Certification purposes, provided that a formal record of each compliance finding is made. There should be no reason for an acquisition agency to duplicate or require specific additional verification activity to meet Type Certification requirements.

9. Additional guidance on the Design Acceptance Process is contained in AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical airworthiness management manual (eTAMM). Sup

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DETERMINING TYPE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

10. MILAVREG 2.1 specifies the Defence AA’s requirements for determining the registration of a new Defence aircraft. Following a decision to Defence register a new aircraft type, the Defence acquisition agency, in conjunction with the OAA, TAA, FTAA and DACPA, must determine the detailed Type Certification requirements as part of a comprehensive airworthiness management strategy. MILAVREG 2. requires the acquisition agency to maintain an AAMP to describe the airworthiness arrangements supporting the acquisition activities, Type Certification and Service Release. The composition of an acquisition team and guidance on documenting an airworthiness strategy are contained in Section 3, Chapter 3.

STATEMENT OF OPERATING INTENT

11. The SOI forms a cornerstone of the Type Certification process and is required by OAREG 3.2. The SOI contains all the roles and environments in which the aircraft type is intended to operate. For a new aircraft type, development of the SOI should begin during capability development where the aircraft roles and environment are derived from the Defence capability requirements. Following selection of an aircraft type to meet the capability requirement, the SOI should be fully developed by the OAAR(Acq) in consultation with OAA staff, ACPA and DGTA–ADF. The SOI will inform a significant component of the Statement of Requirement (SOR) so must therefore be sufficiently mature to enable OAA and TAA endorsement of the SOR prior to contract signature. As an operational airworthiness document, development of the SOI is described in detail in AAP 8000.010—ADF Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual. The SOI is necessary as a starting point for determining type certification requirements because it defines:

a. the aircraft roles which, in conjunction with aircraft and mission subsystem equipment, are used to determine the applicable airworthiness requirements to include in the CBD

b. the role and environmental parameters against which compliance with the airworthiness requirements documented in the CBD must be achieved

c. the expected usage spectrum to determine the aircraft and engine structural certification requirements

d. the likely stores, life support and role equipment necessary to meet the designated roles.

12. OAAR(Acq)s are responsible for ensuring the SOI is developed as part of the acquisition activities, as required by OAREG 3.2. SOIs require approval of the relevant OAA prior to inclusion as part of an SOR. For a new aircraft type, OAREG 3.2 requires the OAA under whose command the aircraft will operate following Service Release to approve the SOI.

Changes to the SOI

13. For a Major change to the Type Design, the SOI must be amended to incorporate any new roles, environmental parameters or usage introduced by the new capability or modification. In such cases the existing certification basis must be examined in conjunction with the SOI amendment and the new aircraft and mission subsystem equipment to determine:

a. any new airworthiness certification basis requirements which need to be added to the CBD

b. those existing certification basis requirements affected by the change to which compliance must be re-established.

14. OAREG 2.1.2 requires changes to the SOI to be advised to the aircraft DAR and a determination made regarding the impact of the change. For changes to the Type Design classified as ‘Major’ under TAREG 2.5.3, any corresponding change the SOI is managed in accordance with OAREG 3.2—New aircraft and Major changes to Type Design.

15. In accordance with OAREG 2.1.2 , all changes to the SOI are to be endorsed by the TAA, or the DAR when so delegated by the TAA, prior to being approved by the OAA.

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RECOGNITION OF PRIOR CERTIFICATION

16. Prior certification by recognised airworthiness authorities can greatly simplify the Defence Type Certification process. Where a new aircraft type has partially or completely undergone type certification by such a recognised agency, Defence may accept that an adequate level of safety of the design has already been established, providing that the configuration, role and operating environment are substantially similar to that required by Defence . The acquisition agency should always consider prior certification as part of their acquisition strategy because this can significantly reduce the effort required by Defence agencies to establish the airworthiness of the aircraft type.

17. Recognition of prior certification need not be restricted to the entire aircraft Type Design. A new aircraft type developed to meet the SOR may comprise an existing Type Certified aircraft plus a role or capability modification to meet any new or Defence unique requirements. For example, the RAAF Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft is based on an existing Boeing 737–700 Increased Gross Weight (IGW) type design certified by the United States (US) Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), plus equipment and mission system modifications to provide an airborne air defence capability. Where the existing Boeing 737–700IGW certification basis requirements are unaffected by the modification, the FAA Type Certificate may be used as part of the basis to achieve an AMTC. Since the FAA is a recognised airworthiness authority, the Defence certification activity may therefore be limited to those new certification basis requirements, or those affected by the modification to which compliance must be re-established. Such a strategy is contingent upon the provision by the aircraft manufacturer of the existing applicable Type Certificate and sufficient information, including a continuing level of disclosure, to indicate the design configuration, role and environment are sufficiently similar to the Defence aircraft type variant.

18. Technical Versus Operational Recognition. TAREG 2.2.7 contains the TAR requirements for recognition of prior certification for a new or modified aircraft type design. Importantly, the recognition of certification by other airworthiness authorities is based on assessment by the TAR that an equivalent level of safety is provided by that authority. Whilst recognition may be provided by the TAR through examination of the processes and methodology utilised by the external airworthiness authority, such a mechanism is not necessarily appropriate to satisfy Defence operational airworthiness requirements. Technical airworthiness can generally be established through the application of universal engineering principles resulting in quantitative outcomes which can be measured against defined standards. Conversely, operational airworthiness can depend largely on qualitative factors such as operational culture, flying philosophy, training methods and human machine interface. Where recognition of prior certification is included as part of an acquisition strategy of a new aircraft or Major change to a Type Design, the aircraft DAR and OAAR(Acq), in consultation with an FTAA, should carefully consider what aspects of the existing type certified aircraft may still require assessment from an operational airworthiness perspective to ensure the aircraft type is suitable for use by Defence .

CONCURRENT CERTIFICATION BY RECOGNISED AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITIES

19. Defence may consider the acquisition of a new aircraft type concurrent with a foreign military force of a recognised country. The acquisition strategy may include a collaborative approach to Type Certification for those aspects of the design that share the same configuration, and where the role and environment are substantially similar to that intended by Defence . For example a variant of the Eurocopter Tiger aircraft acquired to meet Army’s Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) capability was being acquired by the French Armed Forces in a similar configuration and role. The Defence acquisition airworthiness strategy included participation by the French military airworthiness authority Directorate General de l’Armament (DGA). DGA compliance findings for the French Tiger variant were applicable to the ARH Tiger and were therefore recognised by the TAA for the common aspects of the certification program.

20. Such a concurrent Type Certification program requires the agreement of both airworthiness authorities. Where an acquisition agency seeks to utilise this approach as part of their acquisition airworthiness strategy, advice from DGTA–ADF and ACPA should be sought prior to negotiating any such agreement.

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COMPILING THE CERTIFICATION BASIS DESCRIPTION

21. Once the Type Certification strategy has been formulated, the acquisition agency must ensure the CBD is properly compiled, including a system safety program. The Defence approach to establishing the CBD for new aircraft types, or for a Major change to an existing aircraft Type Design, is described in detail in Section 3, Chapter 12 of AAP 7001.053. TAREG 2.2.5 contains the TAR requirements for the airworthiness standards which comprise the CBD.

22. Composition of CBD Elements. Whilst AAP 7001.053 provides detailed guidance on compiling the CBD, the following two aspects are fundamental to the process:

a. each CBD element contains an airworthiness standard, or part of a standard, to which compliance must be found

b. each element contains an acceptable verification method to demonstrate compliance.

NOTE

• The OAAR(Acq) and the aircraft DAR should identify the verification method in consultation with an FTAA and the TAA when compiling the CBD. However, where recognition of prior certification is used as part of the acquisition strategy, those elements subject to the prior certification need not be re-verified other than through provision of adequate documentation to support the prior certification as a whole.

23. Use of Foreign Airworthiness Standards. As the custodian of the CBD, the aircraft DAR is responsible for developing the CBD content in accordance with the ADRM requirements, however significant emphasis should be placed on the original or proposed set of airworthiness standards applied by the aircraft Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM). Where the OEM of the aircraft type is operating subject to a recognised airworthiness authority, the design methodology utilised will most likely include the airworthiness standards of the country of origin. Defence utilises the UK Defence Standard (DEF STAN) 00–970/971 as the airworthiness code normally prescribed by the Defence, plus some additional Defence -specific requirements. However, the application of DEF STAN 00–970/971 by default may not be appropriate to a US designed aircraft for example, where the design is subject to FAA and US military standards. In all cases the acquisition agency should request the OEM propose the applicable airworthiness standards and verification method as a part of tendering activities. Clearly, mandating a set of airworthiness standards unfamiliar to the OEM would result in a significant increase in effort and cost, with no real additional benefit to Defence. Importantly, only the TAA and designated ASR have the authority to prescribe airworthiness standards for Defence aircraft. Therefore, any such proposed use of airworthiness standards other than those contained in the ADRM must be endorsed by the TAA prior to issue of SOR.

ENDORSEMENT OF THE STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENT

24. The SOR is the basis upon which Defence establishes a formal contract with the OEM to develop and deliver an aircraft type or modification to meet the Defence capability requirements. In acquisition terminology, the SOR comprises the Functional Performance Specification (FPS) and the acquisition Statement of Work (SOW). The FPS contains the detailed functional and physical requirements of the aircraft system, whereas the SOW describes the Defence requirements of the OEM in developing and delivering the aircraft system, and all necessary data, instructions and support required to operate and maintain the system.

25. Functional Performance Specification. The FPS details the intended roles and capability requirements. Supporting these functional aspects are the detailed design requirements including all the airworthiness standards which form the CBD. Accordingly, the FPS must be consistent with both the SOI and the CBD, and should contain an acceptable verification method for each CBD requirement.

26. Acquisition Statement of Work. The SOW normally contains detailed requirements for OEM delivered plans, procedures and reports which will be used to demonstrate compliance with the FPS. TAREG 2.2.4 requires the acquisition agency to include contractual measures which enable sufficient Defence visibility of the design and test activity, and delivery of the resulting data. Where recognition of prior certification forms part of the acquisition airworthiness strategy, delivery of extant type certificates and configuration data must be included in the SOW. Importantly, performance of the verification activities listed against the CBD requirements must be identified in the SOW, including Defence involvement, to provide an opportunity for compliance finding.

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27. Involvement of Flight Test. The OAAR(Acq) and the aircraft DAR should develop the SOW in close consultation with an FTAA to ensure that the scope of testing identified is sufficient to meet the verification requirements listed in the FPS. Defence involvement in the ground and flight testing identified in the SOW will underpin a significant proportion of the Type Certification activity. Acquisition flight test activity is covered in more detail in Section 3, Chapter 5 of this manual.

28. Linkage of Contractual and Airworthiness Milestones. Whilst Type Certification and Service Release form fundamental airworthiness milestones during the acquisition of a new aircraft type or Major change to a Type Design, direct linkage of these activities to financial milestones must be avoided. Achievement of Type Certification and Service Release for a subset of the contracted roles and environments may be possible at several points during the certification program. Linking these airworthiness milestones to contractual milestones will place undue emphasis on issue of an airworthiness instrument, rather than on delivered capability. Rather, the acquisition agency must identify what capability is required at various milestones, and then implement an airworthiness strategy to support achievement of the capability. Airworthiness authorities will be unwilling to endorse a strategy where airworthiness and contractual milestones are combined.

29. OAA and TAA endorsement. OAREG 3.2.2 and TAREG 2.2.4 require OAA and TAA endorsement of the SOR prior to inclusion with the acquisition contract. The OAA and TAA endorsement of the SOR signifies their satisfaction that the FPS and the SOW contain sufficient provision to demonstrate the operational and technical airworthiness of the aircraft type to achieve Type Certification and Service Release in the SOI roles and environment.

30. Changes to the SOR. The SOR may require amendment or update during the life of the acquisition for a variety of reasons. Following endorsement, the aircraft DAR may approve a change to the SOR, or the CBD, providing that there is no reduction in the level of safety. Where changes to the CBD or the SOR do result in a reduction in the level of safety provided, or the resulting level of safety is unclear, the TAA (or relevant ASR) and OAA (or FTAA) must endorse the change.

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FINDING COMPLIANCE WITH CERTIFICATION BASIS REQUIREMENTS

ESTABLISHING A SUPPORT NETWORK

31. TAREG 2.2.11 and OAREG 3.2.3 require that competent and authorised persons make Type Certification compliance findings. During acquisition airworthiness planning, the OAAR(Acq) and the aircraft DAR should identify positions within the project team with the necessary prerequisite operational or engineering experience and qualifications to make and review compliance findings for components of the acquisition activity. However, formation of an acquisition project team with all the necessary skills and experience to make compliance findings against all CBD elements may be impractical. In such cases, the acquisition agency should identify additional personnel and agencies external to the project to support compliance finding activity. TAREG 2.2.11 and OAREG 3.2.3 require that persons and agencies authorised to make compliance findings are documented in the Project Design Acceptance Strategy (PDAS) and Operational Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP). Further guidance on the formation of an acquisition project team and acquisition airworthiness strategies is contained in Section 3, Chapter 3 of this manual.

MAKING COMPLIANCE FINDINGS

32. Compliance findings are made on the basis of data obtained through inspection or test of the aircraft, data obtained through Defence involvement in inspection or test activity, and type design data provided by the OEM or relevant design agency. Evidence used as a basis for compliance findings are usually contained in formal document deliveries required under the SOW, or through access provisions. Similarly, Defence involvement in OEM ground and flight test activities, and the requirement for the OEM to make sufficient demonstrations to Defence to enable compliance finding activity, can also be included in the SOW. However, informal involvement or witnessing by the acquisition project team of test or developmental activities may also provide a basis to make a compliance finding, combined with reference to formal data or documentation.

33. Normally, a compliance finding is made for each certification basis element of the CBD, although depending on the applicability of verification evidence, a number of CBD elements may be covered by a single compliance finding. TAREG 2.2.11 and OAREG 3.2.3 require that compliance finding are only made when the authorised person is satisfied that:

a. the evidence provided by the design agency shows that the certification basis requirement has been met, and

b. the method used to demonstrate compliance is appropriate.

TECHNICAL VERSUS OPERATIONAL COMPLIANCE FINDINGS

34. The aircraft DAR, as custodian of the CBD, is responsible for managing compliance finding activity. However, many certification basis elements will require a both a technical and operational person to agree the finding. OAREG 3.2.3 requires any certification basis requirements which impacts operational airworthiness be assessed by a person authorised by the OAAR(Acq). These may include, for example, any aspect of the design which impacts cockpit layout, avionics symbology, warnings and cautions, engine performance, stores jettison envelopes, etc. Where the compliance finding relates to aircraft handling qualities or crew workload, a qualified test pilot or relevant flight test systems specialist is to agree the finding in accordance with OAREG 3.2.6.

35. During acquisition airworthiness planning, the aircraft DAR and OAAR(Acq) should determine those certification basis requirements which require both technical and operational compliance finding. However, compliance finding activity should be centrally managed, and each applicable compliance finding should record both technical and operational agreement.

36. Flight test staff assigned to the acquisition project team usually carry out operational airworthiness compliance findings. However where resources are limited, or a finding requires specialist input from outside the acquisition agency, other competent operational staff from Defence flight test or operating units may make compliance findings provided they have the required competencies and are authorised through the OAMP.

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FINALISING COMPLIANCE FINDINGS

37. The progress of compliance finding activity should be tracked via a certification database or similar tool. Accumulation of sufficient compliance findings for a designated configuration operating in defined roles and environments will enable an application to be made to the Defence AA for Type Certification. In managing compliance finding activity, the DAR should ensure that sufficient compliance findings have been made to support Type Certification in the intended roles and environment.

38. Compliance findings remain valid for the aircraft configuration unless a modification is embodied which specifically affects the finding, in which case compliance must be re-established. Similarly, a change to the role or environment may require a compliance finding be re-established where the verification evidence previously provided is insufficient to satisfy the certification basis requirement under the modified operating conditions.

39. The database of compliance findings applicable to the aircraft type for the purposes of Type Certification effectively becomes part of the Type Record when Design Acceptance Certification is performed by the aircraft DAR. Design Acceptance is a prerequisite to obtaining a TAA recommendation for Type Certification. The TAR requirements for compilation of the Type Record are contained in TAREG 2.2.9 and Section 3, Chapter 12, annex G of AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical airworthiness management manual (eTAMM).

MANAGING AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES

40. An airworthiness issue occurs where compliance with a certification basis requirement cannot be established for the required role and environment. Such non-compliance may be acceptable if the OEM can demonstrate an equivalent level of safety through other means. Otherwise, where the issue cannot be immediately resolved, TAREG 2.2.2 and OAREG 3.2.8 require that airworthiness issues are managed through Airworthiness Issue Papers.

AIRWORTHINESS ISSUE PAPERS

41. An Airworthiness Issue Paper describes the specific non-compliance with the airworthiness standard comprising the certification basis requirement. The acquisition agency must document the raising and management of issue papers in the AAMP as required by MILAVREG 2.3. The issue paper should:

a. reference the certification basis requirement

b. describe the specific non-compliance

c. describe the mitigating factors implemented to temporarily limit or restrict operations with the aircraft

d. document a process to resolve the airworthiness issue.

42. Any mitigating factors implemented to permit further operations with the aircraft must take cognisance of the roles or environment for which the compliance data is valid. For example, an aircraft role may include flight to 600 KCAS with a specific stores configuration. Flutter testing and analysis to meet a certification basis requirement may only have satisfactorily demonstrated a flutter free envelope up to 500 KCAS in the same configuration. An issue paper is raised to document and manage the non-compliance for operations up to at 600 KCAS, however test operations may resume with an airspeed limitation of 500 KCAS imposed.

43. Issue papers require both the OAA and the TAA approval. Further guidance and an example of an Airworthiness Issue Paper can be found in AAP 7001.053—eTAMM.

RESOLVING AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES

44. Airworthiness issues may be resolved through several means. These predominantly include the following:

a. additional testing or analysis is undertaken to subsequently demonstrate compliance with the certification basis requirement

b. whilst not specifically compliant with the certification basis requirement an equivalent level of safety is established through other means which is acceptable to the relevant OAA and the TAA

c. a reduction in the level of safety is accepted by the relevant OAA and the TAA

d. a permanent role or environment restriction is imposed.

45. Approved Airworthiness Issue Papers that remain open awaiting resolution must only be closed following endorsement by the OAA and the TAA.

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PREPARING FOR SERVICE RELEASE

REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE RELEASE

46. Operational Airworthiness Requirements. The operational airworthiness component of Service Release relates mainly to the operational infrastructure implemented to support flying operations at the expected rate of effort within the designated roles and environment. The OAR provides for this infrastructure through implementation of a FMS within the Defence organisation. OAREG 2 contains the OAR requirements of flying organisations with respect to implementing a FMS. In order to obtain an OAA recommendation for Service Release, the acquisition agency must ensure:

a. a FMS has been established which meets the requirements of OAREG 2.1 to the extent necessary to safely manage flight operations within the SOI roles and environment;

b. a system of operational rules, limitations and instructions have been documented in relevant OIPs, as required by OAREG 2.2, which are approved by the relevant OAA or OAAR to safely conduct flight operations;

c. the training, qualification, and competency criteria have been established in accordance with OAREG 2.3 and have been approved by the relevant OAA or OAAR to safely operate the aircraft; and

d. there are sufficient trained aircrew to manage and operate the aviation system at the expected rate of effort, within the SOI roles and environment.

47. Technical Airworthiness Requirements. The technical airworthiness component of Service Release relates mainly to the capacity for the engineering and maintenance organisations to adequately support the operation of the aircraft in the intended roles and environment. These requirements are regulated by the TAR through accreditation of AEO and AMO. TAREG 3 contains the TAR requirements for AEOs and TAREG 4 and TAREG 5 are the TAR requirements for AMO and the conduct of aviation maintenance activity. In order to obtain a TAA recommendation for Service Release, the acquisition agency must ensure:

a. a STC or AMTC has been or will be issued;

b. a strategy for the issue of Certificates of Airworthiness in accordance with TAREG 2.6.3 is in place;

c. a DAR has been delegated responsibility for the Design Acceptance of the aircraft following Service Release;

d. an AEO is in place, including a design support network, to provide configuration item management of the aircraft in accordance with TAREG 3.5 following Service Release;

e. appropriate aircraft and engine structural integrity management systems are in place for the aircraft in accordance with TAREG 3.5.4—Aircraft structural integrity management and TAREG 3.5.5; and

f. a maintenance support network including AMOs has been established.

NOTE

• Implicit in the establishment of the maintenance support network is that qualified and competent ground crew and technicians with adequate training on the new aircraft system are available to conduct maintenance activity.

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48. Logistics Requirements. The logistics component of Service Release relates to the provision of adequate logistics supporting infrastructure and arrangements to enable the ongoing operation of the aircraft at a designated rate of effort. In providing logistics support for the operation of the aircraft type, the acquisition agency must ensure:

a. supply support to replenish items of aircraft equipment is adequate to support the planned Rate of Effort;

b. adequate training has been provided for all aspects of the aircrew and ground crew operations and maintenance with the aircraft type and supporting equipment;

c. adequate personnel are in place to manage and provision the support for operations and maintenance;

d. sufficient approved technical data and publications are available at the operating, engineering and maintaining organisations; and

e. adequate facilities and supporting equipment are in place to support operations and maintenance.

Implementation Mechanisms

49. Acquisition activities in support of Service Release are normally managed concurrent to Type Certification. The OAAR(Acq) and aircraft DAR must ensure that these activities will be adequate to support operation of the aircraft type in the SOI roles and environment, however in reality, most of the activities supporting Service Release are managed by the logistics element of the acquisition team. The AAMP should briefly describe the strategy to implement arrangements in support of Service Release and should identify those plans which document the activities in detail.

50. Operational Implementation. Provision of appropriate operational infrastructure should be managed in conjunction with the operating command of the aircraft type. For a new aircraft type, the acquisition team may include one or more Qualified Flying Instructors (QFI) who have converted to type prior to Service Release. These QFIs in conjunction with OAA staff should ensure appropriate operational arrangements are identified to manage operations to the required rate of effort following Service Release. This may include mechanisms to provide training to additional QFIs on a variant aircraft type in service with the military forces of the country of origin, or through a program of flying training offered by the OEM. Provision of sufficient publications, training devices and materials, and training packages is normally included as part of the acquisition SOW. For a Major change to the Type Design, the OAAR(Acq) in conjunction with the existing Defence operating units should determine the best approach to implementing the new capability within the extant flying management system. Initial operations involving the new aircraft or Major change following Service Release will also need to be identified. These may include initially involve training and OT&E to demonstrate the effectiveness of the system and develop operational tactics.

51. Technical and Logistic Implementation. Provision of adequate arrangements to support the technical and logistic aspects of Service Release is normally included within the scope of the acquisition SOW. Where a new aircraft type is being introduced to Service, an additional contract for the Through Life Support (TLS) of the capability may be tendered by Defence. Technical airworthiness regulations require that any commercial organisation engaged in design or configuration management activities in support of Defence aircraft are held accountable to the TAREG through a legal instrument. Therefore, provision for compliance with TAREG, and timely implementation of technical and logistics supporting arrangements needs to be included in the TLS SOW. Notwithstanding; the acquisition organisation will need to ensure the relevant Defence agencies are appropriately resourced to manage operations at the expected rate of effort. This may include increase in the scope and level of engineering authority for an existing aircraft DAR, and provision of initial funding and personnel offsets to enable an Defence logistics organisation to manage the aircraft Type Design for a designated period. The aircraft DAR and project logistics manager, in conjunction with the operating headquarters’ logistics staff, must ensure these arrangements are in place prior to, or at the time of Service Release. This may include any contracts for the ongoing supply of equipment or engineering and logistics support as necessary to sustain operations.

NOTE

• Ultimately, a logistics representative of the operating command should be satisfied that the logistics arrangements are adequate to support the planned operations. Sup

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ISSUE OF AN AMTC/STC AND SERVICE RELEASE

DEFENCE AA REQUIREMENTS FOR AN AMTC OR STC

52. MILAVREG 3.1 and MILAVREG 3.2 contain the for issue of an AMTC or STC. Prior to issue of and AMTC or STC, the Defence AA requires:

a. completion of all activities required by the OAR under OAREG 3.2 and TAR under TAREG 2.2

b. compilation or amendment of a Type Certification Data Sheet (TCDS) which summarises the aircraft certification basis as part of the AMTC or STC

c. recommendations from the OAA and TAA regarding the airworthiness of the aircraft in the intended roles and environment, when operated by qualified and competent personnel

d. a recommendation for issue of the AMTC or STC by the Airworthiness Board.

53. Type Certification Data Sheet. The TCDS for a specific type will underwrite the AMTC by documenting the approved instruments and summarising the basis of certification for all models of the aircraft certified by Defence. For example, the TCDS for the C130 must have data on the H and J models. The TCDS will provide a summary of the basis of certification which identifies information contained in Defence approved records, or in records approved by other recognised airworthiness authorities.

54. The TAR is to ensure that the TCDS is compiled for the aircraft type in accordance with MILAVREG 3.1. An example TCDS is available from the ACPA website. The DAR is responsible for ensuring the on-going validity of the TCDS and is to ensure that the current TCDS is presented at each AwB for review and endorsement.

DEFENCE AA REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE RELEASE

55. MILAVREG 3.3 contains the Defence AA requirements for the issue of Service Release. Prior to issuing Service Release, the Defence AA requires:

a. issue of an AMTC or STC

b. completion of all activities supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft type required by the OAR under OAREG 3.4, and by the TAR under TAREG 2.4

c. recommendations by the relevant OAA and TAA regarding the acceptability of the arrangements supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft in the intend roles and environment

d. a recommendation by a logistics representative appointed within the command of the relevant Service Chief regarding the acceptability of the logistics arrangements supporting the intended roles, environment and planned usage

e. a recommendation for Service Release by the Airworthiness Board.

56. Limitations to Service Release. Incomplete certification activity, open airworthiness issues, or immature supporting arrangements may result in limitations to the Service Release. Limitations may include, restricted flying hours prior to completion of certain certification activities, flight envelope limitations, stores configuration limitations, or any other limitation deemed necessary in the interests of safety. Where the acquisition agency wishes to proceed with Type Certification and Service Release, the OAAR(Acq) and the DAR must disclose all current airworthiness issues and recommend a strategy to limit the Service Release or otherwise restrict operations to maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft type. These limitations will be considered by the relevant OAA, TAA and the Airworthiness Board prior to recommending Type Certification and Service Release to the Defence AA.

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OBTAINING OAA AND TAA RECOMMENDATIONS

57. OAA and TAA recommendations to the Defence AA for Type Certification and Service Release are obtained following completion of all activities required by the OAR and TAR. The OAA and TAA recommendations signify their satisfaction that the airworthiness activities performed to assure the safety of the type are adequate for the intended roles and environment.

58. In seeking these recommendations, both the OAA and the TAA require the acquisition agency to compile a summary of accomplishments made against the operational and technical airworthiness strategies. This accomplishment summary is used as a basis for the OAA and the TAA to provide their recommendations to the Defence AA. Prior to seeking an OAA recommendation, the acquisition agency must first ensure a recommendation from TAA has been provided. In seeking these recommendations, the OAAR(Acq) and DAR normally provide the accomplishment summary to the TAA, who then on forwards the documentation to the OAA if a favourable recommendation is provided, subject to any conditions and limitations. If the OAA concurs with the TAA, he will make his recommendation available to the Airworthiness Board, including any recommended limitations to the Service Release.

59. OAREG 3.2.9 and TAREG 2.2.2 contain the requirements to achieve OAA and TAA recommendations for Type Certification. Similarly, OAREG 3.4.1 and TAREG 2.4 contain the requirements to achieve OAA and TAA recommendation for Service Release. Section 3, Chapter 7 contains further guidance on compilation of an accomplishment summary.

DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD EXECUTIVE REVIEW

60. The accomplishment summary is also the mechanism used by the Airworthiness Board to review the case supporting the issue of a Type Certificate and Service Release. The information provided to the OAA and TAA in the accomplishment summary satisfies most of the requirements for review by the Airworthiness Board. Unlike the OAA and TAA, the accomplishment summary is likely to be the first occasion the Airworthiness Board members are exposed to detailed information on the acquisition activities and strategies implemented to achieve Type Certification and Service Release. For this reason, the Airworthiness Board members require some additional information to enable a comprehensive, yet independent, review of the progress made to achieve Type Certification and Service Release. The process and conduct of an acquisition Airworthiness Board is described in detail in Section 3, Chapter 7 of this manual.

61. Following review the Airworthiness Board will provide a recommendation to the Defence AA for the issue of the AMTC or STC, and Service Release, including any limitations of conditions.

ISSUE OF AIRWORTHINESS INSTRUMENTS BY THE DEFENCE AA

62. DACPA collates the recommendations of the TAA, OAA and coordinates a review by the Airworthiness Board. Following a successful Airworthiness Board for the issue of an airworthiness instrument and Service Release, DACPA makes the OAA, TAA and Airworthiness Board members’ recommendations available to the Defence AA. ACPA staff also draft the airworthiness instruments for signature by the Defence AA. The time required to issue the actual airworthiness instruments depends on the availability of the Defence AA to consider the recommendations. Any further questions or concerns the Defence AA may have must also be satisfied prior to issue. Service Release limitations imposed by the Defence AA may only be amended or lifted following implementation of an agreed course of action to the satisfaction of a nominated representative. Unless the Defence AA states otherwise in a limitation, the nominated representative has the authority to amend or lift a limitation. DACPA will advise the acquisition agency, operating units and other capability stakeholders once the airworthiness instruments have been issued to enable operations.

63. An example of an AMTC, STC, TCDS and Service Release are available from the ACPA website.

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UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATING PERMIT

64. A UASOP enables a Category 2 or 3 UAS to operate in its designated Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE). This includes both certification of the system to operate in accordance with the CRE and assurance of the management arrangements supporting the continuing airworthiness of the system. A UASOP is issued to support a defined level of capability of the system required for operations. This may include operation for the purposes of system qualification, acceptance, or in limited roles prior to the acceptance into service of the system. Issue of a UASOP, as with other airworthiness instruments, does not automatically imply that the system has met defined capability objectives.

65. A UASOP should:

a. identify the UAS

b. reference the approved SOI or OIP defining CRE

c. reference appropriate design documentation which identifies the approved technical configuration(s)

d. identify operational restriction applied to mitigate the risk the UAS presents to personnel, property and other aircraft

e. identify, or reference, any unique airworthiness management arrangements required for ongoing operations with the UAS type

f. identify operational, maintenance and engineering authority for the UAS

g. identify the approved UAS operational units

h. identify the authoritative operating and maintenance documentation

i. identify any applicable operating limitations resulting from:

(1) the immaturity of the supporting management arrangements

(2) technical issues affecting the system’s suitability for the SOI purpose and scope

(3) T&E activities performed prior to issue of the UASOP.

66. Further guidance is contained within Section 5 Chapter 3 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

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ACQUISITION FLIGHT TEST


MILAVREG 1.8—Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA)


INTRODUCTION

1. Most acquisition projects involving some degree of developmental activity rely on some level of flight testing in the execution of their airworthiness strategy. In terms of airworthiness, flight testing provides a large proportion of essential data in the compilation of Type Certification compliance findings. Additionally, flight testing provides the opportunity to demonstrate that an aircraft type is suitable for flight in the intended roles and environment, by appropriately qualified and competent Defence aircrew.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter describes the role of flight test during acquisition activities leading to Type Certification.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter is applicable to acquisition activities involving the flight test of a new aircraft type, or a change to the Type Design classified as Major in accordance with Technical Airworthiness Regulation (TAREG).

THE ROLE OF FLIGHT TEST

4. For the purposes of Type Certification, flight testing includes any activity conducted for investigative, developmental or demonstration purposes on new aircraft or modifications prior to Service Release or beyond existing approved operating limitations. In an acquisition context, flight testing is utilised for several purposes. These include:

a. gathering of data to support design development;

b. gathering of data to assess design performance;

c. verification that particular aspect of the design specification has been met; and

d. demonstration that the aircraft or modification satisfies those parts of the Functional Performance Specification (FPS) which require verification by flight test.

5. Flight testing is important to establishing the airworthiness of a new aircraft or Major change to the Type Design because:

a. test data forms a significant part of the Type Design developed in the context of the SOI;

b. test data is used as verification evidence in support of Type Certification compliance finding and design acceptance;

c. flight testing provides an opportunity for involvement of Defence personnel in support of Type Certification compliance finding; and

d. flight testing is used as the mechanism to assess the acceptability for Defence use of those aspects of the design which impact operational airworthiness, eg. human-machine-interface (HMI), handling qualities, cockpit workload, etc.

6. Flight testing is also integral to demonstration of many of the capability requirements which are not part of the Certification Basis Description (CBD), such as performance verification. Typically, flight testing for both airworthiness and capability related purposes is managed centrally so some aspects of this chapter will be applicable to both.

ACQUISITION FLIGHT TEST PLANNING

THE ROLE OF THE FTAA

7. FTAAs are the appointed authority for the management of aircraft allocated for the purposes of flight test. For acquisition flight test activity, the scope of this authority includes:

a. appointing qualified and competent test personnel to participate in, and manage acquisition flight test activity;

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b. endorsing that the scope of test activity documented in the Statement of Requirement (SOR) is adequate to support the Type Certification process;

c. determining the adequacy of operational airworthiness management arrangements for acquisition flight test;

d. determining the adequacy of specific flight test activity to demonstrate verification of airworthiness requirements contained in the CBD; and

e. determining the acceptability of operational elements of compliance findings which impact the aircraft’s suitability for flight in the intended roles and environment by Defence aircrew.

8. FTAA Representative. MILAVREG 1.8 allows an FTAA to delegate flight test approval authority to suitably qualified and competent individuals to exercise authority on their behalf. In the case of an acquisition project for a new aircraft, this could be a Qualified Test Pilot (QTP) posted as part of the acquisition team. Detailed guidance on the formation of an acquisition team and acquisition airworthiness authority is contained in Section 3, Chapter 3.

IDENTIFYING THE REQUIRED SCOPE OF TESTING

9. MILAVREG 2.3requires the acquisition agency to maintain an AAMP which identifies the strategy to achieve Type Certification and Service Release. The requirements of the AAMP include reference to any necessary plans which identify:

a. activities and tasks supporting the certification activity such as verification and test and evaluation

b. compliance with operational and technical regulatory requirements both for the conduct of acquisition activity and management arrangements following Service Release.

10. Detailed guidance on determining Type Certification requirements is contained in Section 3, Chapter 4. FTAA involvement in both the development and planned verification methodology of certification basis requirements is essential to the process. The CBD including acceptable verification methods is normally issued as part of the Functional Performance Specification (FPS). The mechanisms to achieve compliance and provide data in support of Type Certification are documented in the acquisition Statement of Work (SOW). The SOR comprises both of these documents.

11. Test and Evaluation Master Plan. The document which normally describes the Defence approach to satisfying all test related requirements is the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The TEMP should identify the program of testing required to meet the test obligations contained in the SOW. The TEMP is normally developed from a Test Concept Document offered as part of, or developed in conjunction with, tender documentation by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) which identifies the broad strategy proposed to meet both airworthiness and capability requirements. The TEMP should identify the mechanisms to carry out the required testing and identify a schedule to satisfy all required flight test for the purposes of providing data in support of Type Certification. In terms of airworthiness, the TEMP is important as it provides a means for the FTAA or representative to assess the adequacy of the proposed scope of testing to meet all certification basis requirements contained in the CBD. Operational Airworthiness Regulation (OAREG) 3.2.4 identifies the OAR requirements with respect to identifying an adequate scope of flight testing supporting Type Certification activity.

12. Operational and technical airworthiness compliance. OAREG 3.2.4 also requires the OAAR(Acq) to ensure all testing is carried out in accordance with OAREG 4. The implications of the OAREG for the conduct of acquisition flight test activity are described in detail in Section 3, Chapter 6.

IMPLEMENTING THE TEST STRATEGY

13. The strategy documented in the TEMP defines the overarching test requirements to achieve verification of airworthiness and capability requirements. The TEMP is normally supported by OEM developed plans and procedures which document the verification or acceptance test methods or processes to satisfy one or more FPS requirements. The FTAA representative, and the relevant Defence test and engineering staff, typically reviews each test procedure and provides endorsement that the documented test process is adequate to demonstrate the particular requirement under test, and that the testing may be conducted safely. Subsequent test reports produced by the OEM are provided to enable the acquisition agency to make compliance findings and determine contractual acceptability against FPS requirements.

14. Further guidance on the methodology and conduct of flight testing to satisfy certification basis, or other requirements should be obtained from the relevant FTAA.

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AIRCRAFT–STORES COMPATIBILITY CERTIFICATION

15. Aircraft which carry and employ stores require aircraft–stores compatibility (ASC) certification requirements included as part of the CBD. The Defence approach to ASC certification relies substantially on a program of ground and flight testing to demonstrate technical and operational airworthiness when using the aircraft stores configurations in designated roles. An ASC certification plan developed by the OEM may be implemented in conjunction with the TEMP to document the strategy to demonstrate both ASC airworthiness certification basis and ASC related capability requirements. ASC certification plans typically identify additional requirements to enable Service Release with designated aircraft stores capability.

16. The likely ASC requirements should be determined as part of development of the SOR. The Aircraft Stores Clearance Engineering (ASCENG) agency is the Defence centre of expertise for ASC-related certification requirements and test procedures. ASCENG staff should be consulted during development of the SOR and ASC Certification Plan and in the compilation of ASC related compliance findings. TAREG 3.5.9 requires that compliance findings relating to aircraft stores compatibility are made or reviewed by ASCENG.

ACCEPTANCE TESTING

17. Relationship between airworthiness and acceptance testing. In acquisition terminology, acceptance testing is any test event used to demonstrate compliance with contractual FPS requirements. This includes both airworthiness requirements documented in the CBD, and other FPS requirements related to performance and capability. Acceptance testing is used as the mechanism through which the aircraft OEM offers the Type Design for formal assessment by Defence in the configuration intended for operational use. Acceptance testing therefore provides the opportunity for the acquisition agency to make operational airworthiness compliance findings associated with the use of the aircraft in the intended roles and environment. OAREG 3.2.6 requires the compliance findings associated with Human Factors resulting from HMI, crew workload, handling qualities etc. to be assessed by a QTP or other suitably qualified and competent representative appointed by an FTAA. With respect to airworthiness, the outcome required of acceptance testing is a determination that the aircraft is safe and suitable for use in the intended roles and environment by the intended Defence aircrew.

18. Acceptance testing not impacting operational airworthiness. Where the suitability for flight of a new aircraft or Major change to the Type Design has been established in a specified configuration, non-QTP aircrew may participate in or conduct acceptance test sorties for performance or capability related assessments. The use of operational aircrew may be appropriate where those aircrew are intimately experienced with the context of operational use of the aircraft type, eg QFIs assessing the contractual acceptability of a training aircraft performing designated training roles.

19. Changes to configuration, role and environment. Acceptance of subsequent changes to the configuration, role and environment beyond that already assessed by the QTP or FTAA representative should be evaluated in accordance with OAREG 3.1. Changes equivalent to a Major change to the Type Design must undergo reassessment by the QTP or FTAA representative to ensure that operational airworthiness compliance findings remain valid in the new configuration and role. Role or environment changes equivalent to a Substantial operational change may undergo acceptance testing by operational aircrew only where the FTAA or representative is satisfied that the operational airworthiness characteristics of the change have been adequately considered and the participating aircrew are suitably qualified and competent.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE

20. Further guidance on the airworthiness management of flight test activities is contained Section 3, Chapter 6. Further information and guidance on flight test techniques and procedures relevant to airworthiness management of acquisition testing should be sought from the relevant FTAA staff within Aerospace Operational Support Group (AOSG) or Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Trials Unit (AMAFTU). Detailed guidance on aircraft stores compatibility related testing and compliance finding should be sought from ASCENG.

21. Further guidance on the application of airworthiness policy to flight test activities should be sought from ACPA.

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OPERATION PRIOR TO SERVICE RELEASE



MILAVREG 3.4—Special Flight Permits

MILAVREG 3.5—Flight Test Permits

MILAVREG 3.6—Airworthiness Directives

MILAVREG 5.1—Registration requirements for non-Defence registered aircraft

MILAVREG 5.2—Airworthiness management of aircraft prior to Defence registration

MILAVREG 5.7—Operation of non-Defence registered aircraft

INTRODUCTION

1. Acquisition activities to introduce a new aircraft type or Major change to the Type Design normally require that the aircraft is operated prior to Service Release. This may include operations both before and after the aircraft has been Defence registered by the Defence AA. Operations involving Defence personnel are provided a level of regulation and oversight sufficient to discharge the Defence AA’s duty-of-care to provide and preserve a safe working environment. For non-Defence registered aircraft operations involving Defence personnel, the Defence AA requires that the airworthiness of those operations provides at least an equivalent level of safety to that provided by Defence. The operation of a Defence registered aircraft prior to Service Release is only permitted under a temporary Airworthiness Instrument issued for a specified scope and duration of flying. The mechanism utilised by Defence to enable such flight operations will depend on the nature of the flying activities to be undertaken.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter describes the airworthiness management requirements for authorisation and conduct of operations prior to Service Release.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter is applicable to operations prior to Service Release of a new aircraft type, or an aircraft undergoing a modification classified as Major in accordance with TAREG 2.5.3—Classification of changes in Type Design which fall within the scope of Defence AMS. These include:

a. flight test operations by the aircraft Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) involving Defence personnel outside Australian airspace;

b. flying training or other flying operations by any foreign flying organisation involving Defence personnel outside Australian airspace;

c. flying operations by the aircraft OEM involving Defence personnel within Australian airspace; and

d. any flying operations by the Defence prior to Service Release.

FLYING OPERATIONS PRIOR TO DEFENCE REGISTRATION

DEFENCE INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN OEM FIGHT TEST

4. The development of a new aircraft type or Major change to the Type Design invariably requires an extensive program of ground and flight testing by the OEM. The involvement of Defence personnel in this testing is important to assist with the compilation of compliance findings against the Certification Basis Description (CBD) and for design and contractual acceptance of the aircraft. The process of making compliance findings and managing the CBD is addressed in detail in Section 3, Chapter 4 of this manual. Acquisition flight test activity in support of Type Certification and acceptance is the subject of Section 3, Chapter 5.

5. Depending on the extent or complexity of the test program, the involvement of Defence personnel could include any activity from observation to captaincy of the aircraft throughout multiple test sorties. During early development phases of the acquisition project, this flying activity will most likely occur at an overseas OEM facility.

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6. Aircraft registration requirements. Whilst the aircraft remains the property of the OEM and is not Defence registered, MILAVREG 5.1—Registration requirements for non-Defence registered aircraft requires that the involvement of Defence personnel in operating such an aircraft is subject to:

a. Type Certification of the aircraft by a recognised NAA or MAA; or

b. issuance of an experimental Type Certificate or exemption by a recognised NAA or MAA applicable to the scope of developmental flying to be conducted.

NOTE

• For the purposes of MILAVREG 5.1, a recognised NAA or MAA is one whose airworthiness system has been assessed as providing an equivalent level of safety to that provided by the Defence. MILAVREG 5.9— Defence AA recognised airworthiness authorities lists the NAAs and MAAs that have a standing Defence AA recognition.

• For recognition of an extant foreign Type Certificate, the airworthiness authorities listed under TAREG 2.2.7—Informed Recognition of prior acceptance are applicable.

7. Airworthiness management requirements. MILAVREG 5.2 requires that appropriate airworthiness management arrangements are in place to support operations involving Defence personnel. For OEM flight test activities, Defence involvement is subject to:

a. satisfaction of the relevant FTAA that operational airworthiness management arrangements are adequate to safely support the intended operations;

b. satisfaction of the TAR that the scope and conduct of maintenance activity is sufficient to support the intended operations safely; and

c. accreditation of the OEM engineering organisation supporting the flying operations to an appropriate scope and level by:

(1) the TAR through issue of an Engineering Authority Certificate; or

(2) an NAA or MAA recognised by the TAR under TAREG 2.2.7.

8. Operating requirements. MILAVREG 5.7t requires that the flight test operations are conducted within the limitations and conditions of the aircraft certifying authority and subject to any requirements of the relevant OAA or FTAA. Limitations and conditions for flight test operations are normally contained within a flight test plan addressing each test event. The management of test activities to support Type Certification is described in Section 3, Chapter 5.

Operational airworthiness management of OEM flight test

9. The requirements to satisfy the FTAA that the operational airworthiness management arrangements supporting the OEM flight testing are adequate are contained in OAREG 4.3. This regulation allows the participation of Defence aircrew in OEM flight testing through recognition that:

a. the flight test organisation is certified to conduct an applicable scope of flight test operations under a recognised NAA or MAA; or

b. the flight test organisation (including the participating Defence aircrew) has been assessed by the FTAA or representative as adequate to safely conduct the test operations.

10. Flight test Flying Management System. To meet the requirements of these regulations, Defence participation is subject to the existence of adequate flight test flying management processes and procedures. Section 3, Chapter 3 describes the requirement for Defence aircrew to operate within defined flying management system arrangements. These may include those processes and procedures implemented by the OEM to control flight test operations locally, but may also include procedures and processes implemented by the acquisition agency governing the participation of the Defence aircrew. Ultimately, the acquisition agency is responsible for ensuring the involvement of Defence aircrew in flight test operations meet the requirements of the Defence airworthiness regulations, however the relevant FTAA or appointed representative should be consulted to confirm that the flying management arrangements are adequate. Aspects of the flight test flying management system implemented to satisfy the FTAA may include:

a. Interim Design Certificate. Interim Design Certificates, or a similar vehicle to document design configuration and aircraft conformance to design, should be presented by the OEM prior to the

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commencement of that phase of testing relevant to a particular element of design. The design certificate should identify that the specific design is considered airworthy for the planned test flights.

b. Aircraft configuration conformance. The OEM should identify the physical and functional configuration of the aircraft and confirm that the aircraft conforms to the configuration identified in the design certificate.

c. Test documentation. The test documentation should include:

(1) the flight test plan or procedures endorsed by the acquisition agency, including specific test points to be completed;

(2) identification of instrumentation or data recording requirements;

(3) identification of the required aircraft configurations to support each test flight; and

(4) identification of all applicable operating conditions and limitations relevant to the scope of the testing, or reference to appropriate operating manuals.

d. Safety review. The OEM should ensure that hazards associated with a specific flight test activity have been identified, documented and appropriately mitigated. Such activity is typically addressed through the conduct of a flight test hazard (or risk) assessment that is subsequently formally reviewed by acquisition agency as part of the test plan or procedure endorsement. Importantly, the acquisition agency should ensure that appropriate approval authorities are identified for low, medium and high risk test activities.

e. Maintenance and operating manuals. The maintenance and operating manuals, including any temporary procedures and limitations, should be current for each flight test activity. Amendments to the maintenance and operating manuals should be prepared by the OEM and circulated for review. A provisional or draft flight manual and other operating instructions necessary to support aircraft operations should be available.

f. Test Readiness Review. The Test Readiness Review (TRR) may be tailored for the conduct of each flight test, however in general should be equivalent to standard flight test practices normally expected by the FTAA. The FTAA or representative should be consulted during the development of procedures defining the conduct of the TRR.

g. Pre–flight briefing. A pre-flight briefing should be convened immediately before each flight in the test program to verify that the participating aircrew, engineers and test specialists are prepared and understand the sequence of testing to be conducted.

h. Flight authorisation. Flight authorisation for the participating Defence aircrew should be granted by an appropriate authorising officer.

i. Maintenance release. The test aircraft should be subject to a maintenance release only where the aircraft is serviceable for the intended flight and is configured as required in flight test plan or procedure.

DEFENCE INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN FLYING TRAINING

11. The airworthiness requirements for Defence aircrew participating in overseas flying training are similar to those required prior to Defence aircrew participation in flight test. The aircraft registration requirements and airworthiness management requirements remain subject to MILAVREG 5. However, in the case of aircrew training, the OAA must be similarly satisfied that the flying management system arrangements supporting the flying training are adequate to provide an equivalent level of safety for the participating aircrew as that provided by Defence. This may require assessment of the proposed training operations by the OAAR(Acq) or other representative appointed by the OAA. The assessment should include examination of not only the extant operational procedures used by the foreign flying organisation, but also the impact on operational airworthiness of Defence aircrew participation within that flying organisation. Factors such as, language, flying philosophy, safety culture and instructional techniques should be carefully considered to ensure the interaction of Defence aircrew with the established processes does not compromise safe operations. The command to which the participating aircrew belong is responsible for ensuring the airworthiness factors for overseas flying training are appropriately considered, in consultation with the relevant OAA.

DEFENCE INVOLVEMENT IN OEM FLYING ACTIVITIES WITHIN AUSTRALIAN AIRSPACE

12. Operation of a new aircraft type may be required prior to Defence registration within Australian airspace for the purpose of production acceptance testing, ferry flights, limited flight testing or other limited flying operations. In such cases the OEM may require an exemption from the CASA from holding an Australian Type Certificate for the

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aircraft and from holding an Air Operators Certificate for the proposed scope of flying operations. Participation in such testing by Defence aircrew remains subject to the requirements of MILAVREG 5. Within Australian airspace and following exemption by CASA, the involvement of Defence personnel is only permitted following issue of an AD by the Defence AA which stipulates any requirements or considerations relevant to the Defence participation. These may include direction to an OAA or FTAA to provide operational airworthiness oversight for the participating aircrew in accordance with the requirements of an appropriate Defence flying organisation. MILAVREG 3 contains the Defence AA requirements for issue of this instrument. An example AD used for the purpose of Defence involvement in OEM flying activities within Australian airspace is available from the ACPA website.

ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT PLAN (AAMP)

13. In all cases listed above, the airworthiness management arrangements are to be documented in the AAMP required by MILAVREG 2.3. The AAMP should identify the flying management systems and procedures implemented to assure airworthiness is maintained for operations involving Defence personnel.

FLYING OPERATIONS PRIOR TO SERVICE RELEASE

14. Most aircraft owned and operated by Defence are Defence registered. The determination of registration for Defence aircraft types is described in detail in Section 3, Chapter 2. A new aircraft type undergoing Australian Military Type Certification will require Defence registration prior to the conduct of operations with that aircraft by Defence. MILAVREG 2.4 requires that aircraft must only be operated as Defence registered aircraft following issue of an AMTC and Service Release, or under a SFP. An existing Defence registered aircraft may be operated prior to Service Release in accordance with an SFP, or under a FTP issued by an FTAA.

NEW AIRCRAFT UNDERGOING ACQUISITION DEVELOPMENT

15. Defence normally requires the operation of a new aircraft type prior to Service Release for several reasons. These may include:

a. the conduct of developmental testing supporting type certification and performance evaluation,

b. the conduct of acceptance testing,

c. ferry flights,

d. initial operational test and evaluation to exercise the operational arrangements supporting the capability, or

e. the conduct of initial QFI training in readiness for the introduction to service.

16. Conduct of operations by Defence may only occur following Defence registration. The Defence registration process assigns ‘ownership’ of the certification basis to Defence and signifies that sufficient activities have been completed, and adequate arrangements implemented such that the airworthiness of the aircraft has been established and can be sustained. Initially, this basis may only provide for limited operations that do not warrant Type Certification and Service Release to the full roles and environment documented in the SOI. In such cases, the mechanism through which the aircraft is Defence registered is through issue of an SFP.

MAJOR CHANGES TO TYPE DESIGN

17. Operation prior to Service Release of a Defence registered aircraft which has been subject to a Major change to the Type Design may be required for similar reasons as a new aircraft. Since the aircraft type is already Defence registered, Defence is the custodian of the certification basis. Therefore, operation prior to Service Release involving flight test may be authorised under a FTP issued by an FTAA or, where the intended flying operations do not involve flight test or the testing involves complex, unique or high risk considerations beyond the scope of the FTAA’s authority, the scope of flying may be authorised under an SFP issued by the Defence AA.

SPECIAL FLIGHT PERMITS (SFP)

18. Application for an SFP. The requirement for an SFP should be identified in the AAMP when the airworthiness strategy to introduce the aircraft to service is defined. MILAVREG 3.4 contains the Defence AA’s requirements for issue of an SFP. Similar to the AMTC and Service Release, applications for an SFP require OAA and TAA recommendation. In respect to applying for an SFP, operational airworthiness requirements are contained in OAREG 3.3.2 and technical airworthiness requirements are contained in TAREG 2.3. An application for an SFP is based on the following:

a. Scope, purpose and duration of operations. The SFP application must identify the required scope, purpose and duration of operations. The scope of operations provides the basis against which

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the adequacy of certification activity and supporting arrangements are assessed in support of airworthiness. For flight test activities to be authorised under an SFP, the flight test plan or TEMP normally documents the specific flying to be conducted.

b. Design Acceptance. The SFP application must be supported by an aircraft type configuration which is technically acceptable for the proposed scope and duration of operations. Sufficient compliance findings must have been established to assure the safety of the aircraft Type Design at the given state of development when operating within the designated scope of operations by designated aircrew.

c. Risk assessment. The scope of flying must be subject to an Aviation Risk Management (AVRM) assessment applicable for all flying to be conducted under the SFP. For flight test operations, the risk assessment must be documented as part of the flight test plan in accordance with OAREGs.

d. Operating instructions and manuals. Sufficient operational instructions and manuals must be available for use and must have been assessed as adequate by the test aircrew to support the proposed flying operations. Any applicable orders, instructions or procedures supplementing the operating or maintenance manuals must be available.

e. Supporting technical arrangements. Appropriate technical infrastructure must be in place to support the proposed scope of operations including engineering and maintenance organisations with an adequate level of authority to perform engineering and maintenance throughout the proposed operating duration.

f. Supporting operational arrangements. Appropriate operational arrangements must be in place to sustain airworthy operations. These include, designated qualification and competency requirements for aircrew, a documented flight authorisation process relevant to the scope of flying and nominated authorisation officers for the duration of the limited operation.

19. OAA and TAA recommendation for an SFP. To obtain OAA and TAA recommendations for issue of an SFP, OAA recommendation requirements are contained in OAREG 3.3.3 and TAA recommendation requirements are contained in TAREG 2.3. OAA and TAA recommendations are based on the Authority being satisfied that sufficient operational and technical certification activity has been completed to support airworthy operation of the aircraft within the proposed scope of flying, and that the operational and technical supporting arrangements are sufficient for the proposed duration of flying. In order to obtain OAA and TAA recommendations, sufficient evidence must be provided by the acquisition agency to support the application. This evidence should include:

a. the SFP application;

b. the draft SFP, which:

(1) identifies the specific aircraft configuration/s to which the SFP applies;

(2) summarises the scope, purpose and duration of flying to be authorised;

(3) lists any applicable geographic or airspace restrictions applicable to the intended operations;

(4) identifies or references the operating limitations, manuals, procedures and AVRM plan implemented to ensure flying is only conducted within the established certification basis;

(5) identifies any prerequisite conditions prior to operation, or to progressing operations under the SFP;

(6) identifies the specific aircraft tail numbers which conform to the authorised configuration and are intended to be used for the scope of flying; and

(7) identifies a date or event to trigger a review of the continuing applicability of the SFP.

c. a design acceptance certificate including a document that identifies the applicable aircraft configuration;

d. current versions of the AAMP, Project Design Acceptance Strategy (PDAS) and Operational Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP);

e. a document which summarises the current status of certification activity supporting the intended scope of operations, including:

(1) identification of those certification basis requirements against which compliance has not been fully established,

(2) identification of any issues through previous test and evaluation, and

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(3) mitigation of the uncertified or unacceptable elements of the design through implementation of conditions and limitations.

f. attestations from appropriate operational, technical and logistics representatives that the supporting arrangements are sufficient for the intended scope and duration of operations.

20. Defence AA Airworthiness Board executive review. For new aircraft types undergoing Defence registration, MILAVREG 3.4 requires the Airworthiness Board review of the case supporting the issue of an SFP. This is because the issue of the SFP signifies Defence registration of the aircraft type and transfers ‘ownership’ of the certification basis to the Defence. For a Major change to the Type Design, Airworthiness Board review is not automatically required prior to issuing an SFP. However, the Defence AA may require Airworthiness Board review of an SFP application for a Major change if the acquisition activity involves complex, unique or high risk operations warranting an additional level of oversight. The requirement for Airworthiness Board review of an SFP application for a Major change to the Type Design should be clarified with ACPA during compilation of the AAMP. Detailed guidance on preparations for Airworthiness Board review, including compilation of an Accomplishment Summary, is contained in Section 3, Chapter 7.

21. Issue of an SFP. ACPA coordinates the issue of the SFP on behalf of the Defence AA. ACPA will process the application for the SFP and collate the OAA, TAA and, if necessary, Airworthiness Board recommendations for consideration by the Defence AA. Once the SFP is signed, ACPA will provide a copy of the SPF to all stakeholders and identify any additional conditions and limitations required by the Defence AA. An example SFP for a new aircraft type is available from the ACPA website.

22. Use of an SFP for Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). An SFP may be utilised to authorise flying operations with a new aircraft type or Major change to the Type Design by an operational organisation for the purposes of OT&E prior to Service Release. This may be required to exercise the operational airworthiness system under controlled test conditions to confirm the suitability of the operational arrangements for more general operations following Service Release. Such testing may be conducted by the operating organisation under an SFP where the Defence AA is satisfied that the scope of testing, participating personnel and technical and operational supporting arrangements are adequate to assure airworthiness for the duration of the testing. The operating organisation remains the custodian of the operational test objectives; however, these objectives may be set in consultation with the FTAA and the acquisition organisation where the operational experience with the new capability is not extensive.

23. Relationship between an SFP and a TEMP. Where an SFP cites a TEMP or other test plan as the permitted scope of operations authorised under the SFP, those documents effectively become part of the SFP. As such, a change the scope of the test documents is effectively a change to the SFP and may only be permitted with the agreement of the Defence AA.

24. Changes to SFPs. Changes to SFPs should only be considered under exceptional circumstances. In such cases, MILAVREG 3.4 requires the acquisition agency to apply to the Defence AA (through DACPA) to make the change. Changes to the SFP scope or duration will only be granted where the established certification basis supports such a change. This must be justified by the acquisition agency and may require OAA and TAA endorsement. Incremental amendment to an SFP will not normally be accepted by the Defence AA as part of an airworthiness strategy to introduce a new or modified aircraft type.

FLIGHT TEST PERMITS (FTP)

25. Applicability of an FTP. An FTP is an airworthiness instrument, which can be issued by an FTAA, to authorise the operation of a Defence registered aircraft for the purposes of flight test. The FTP performs a similar function as an SFP, however may only be used for flight test operations within the scope of the issuing FTAA. The primary prerequisite for issue of an FTP is a current AMTC or SFP for the aircraft type. In the acquisition context, the circumstances where an FTP may be used to authorise the operation of an aircraft include:

a. flight test of a new aircraft type which has been Defence registered through issue of an SFP and prior to issue of an AMTC and Service Release,

b. flight test of a Defence registered aircraft undergoing a Major change to the Type Design prior to issue of a STC and Service Release. and

c. flight test prior to Service Release of a new aircraft type which has achieved an AMTC.

26. The flight test activity may be any acquisition related testing within the scope of the FTAA’s authority including developmental, acceptance, and operational test and evaluation. MILAVREG 3.5 contains the Defence AA’s requirements for the applicability and issue of an FTP. OAREG 4.1.3 contains the detailed requirements for FTAA issue of an FTP for specific test activities.

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27. Purpose of an FTP. The purpose of an FTP is to authorise flight test operations beyond the established certification basis. However, OAREG 4.1.3 requires that the FTAA is satisfied that the operational and technical airworthiness aspects are adequate to commence the testing safely. The established certification basis is that identified by the extant SFP or AMTC. Flight testing under an FTP may therefore build on the existing certification basis to support subsequent issue of an AMTC or STC and Service Release.

28. SFP versus FTP. For a new aircraft type, an SFP and an FTP need not be issued for the same scope of flying activity. The SFP must first be initially issued to Defence register the aircraft and may include a limited scope of operations based on the certification status of the aircraft. The scope and duration of the SFP may include allowance for subsequent flight testing conducted under an FTP issued by an FTAA. FTPs may then be issued to authorise flight testing beyond the certification basis established for issue of the SFP. For a Major change to the Type Design, an FTP may be used to operate the aircraft beyond the extant certification basis identified in an AMTC and any STCs without the need for an SFP. In each case, however, the FTAA may only authorise testing within their authority. Testing involving unique or complex circumstances may require elevation for conduct under an SFP. Such a case would include the involvement of overseas test agencies outside Australian airspace. The interaction with other NAAs or MAAs and any implications of such involvement may be addressed more appropriately through issue of an SFP by the Defence AA. Subsequent flight testing under an FTP may then be appropriate. The AAMP should describe the strategy for flight test of the new or modified aircraft and should identify the airworthiness mechanism to support the flying operations. The use of SFPs and FTPs for specific flying activities in the acquisition program can then be confirmed in consultation the FTAA and ACPA.

29. Issue of an FTP. The requirements for activities leading to issue of an FTP are contained in OAREG 4. Guidance on flight testing in support of acquisition activities is contained in Section 3, Chapter 5.

OEM FLIGHT TEST ON DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

30. OEM test and evaluation on Defence registered aircraft associated with the development and certification of a Major change to the Type Design may be achieved through one of two mechanisms. The process applied depends on whether the aircraft is maintained as Defence registered aircraft, or whether it is removed from the Defence Register for the period of the development and modification activity.

31. Retention of Defence Registration. Where one or more aircraft are provided for OEM flight test and their Defence registration is maintained, the acquisition agency should seek issue of an SFP or AD to ensure the Defence AA's requirements for the operation of the aircraft are appropriately captured. The considerations for such operations are similar to those described throughout this chapter; however, ACPA should be consulted when OEM flight test on a Defence registered aircraft is being considered as part of the acquisition airworthiness strategy.

32. Removal from the Defence Register. For an extensive program of modification and test, the Defence AA will consider removing the specific aircraft from the Defence Register for the duration of the development activity. The requirements for removal and reinstatement to the Defence Register are contained in MILAVREG 2. Guidance on removal and reinstatement to the Defence Register is contained in Section 3, Chapter 2.


33. Further guidance on the management of flight test supporting Type Certification is contained Section 3, Chapter 5.

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DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW

Applicable Regulations




MILAVREG 3.4—Special Flight Permits

MILAVREG 4.2—Airworthiness Board conduct

MILAVREG 4.3—Airworthiness Board outcomes

INTRODUCTION

1. Acquisition activities leading to the Type Certification and Service Release require an additional level of oversight to assure that the airworthiness of the new aircraft type or Major change to Type Design has been established and can be sustained. The Airworthiness Board provides an independent review of the acquisition activities to provide assurance to the Defence AA that the DASP requirements have been satisfied, and that a satisfactory basis exists to commence operations within designated roles and environments at a defined and manageable rate of effort.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter describes the role of the Airworthiness Board in relation to acquisition activities leading to Type Certification and Service Release, and to provide guidance on meeting the requirements of an acquisition Airworthiness Board review.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter is applicable to acquisition activities involving new aircraft and Major changes to the Type Design leading to Defence AA issue of an AMTC, STC and Service Release. For new aircraft types, this chapter is also applicable to acquisition activities leading to Defence AA issue of a SFP.

ROLE OF THE DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD

4. The Airworthiness Board is comprised of two star-rank officers, one with extensive technical experience and the other with extensive operational experience. The role of the Airworthiness Board in relation to acquisition airworthiness is to independently review the activities leading to the Type Certification and Service Release of a new aircraft or Major change to the Type Design. MILAVREG 3 requires that the Airworthiness board review the case supporting the issue of an AMTC, STC or Service Release by the Defence AA. Following the executive review, the Airworthiness Board provides a recommendation to the Defence AA for issue of the relevant airworthiness instrument with any condition and limitation caveats in the interests of airworthiness. MILAVREG 3 also requires the Airworthiness Board to similarly review the case supporting issue of a SFP for a new Defence aircraft type undergoing Defence registration.

5. The Airworthiness Board also regularly reviews the airworthiness management of in-service Defence aircraft types and Aviation Support Systems. The role and conduct of the Airworthiness Board for this purpose is described in Section 4, Chapter 4. The Airworthiness Board may be required to review the acquisition airworthiness activities of non-aircraft Aviation Systems as required by the Defence AA. The application of the Airworthiness Board process for these systems is described in Section 5 relative to the particular system under development.

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PREPARING FOR DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW

REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EXECUTIVE REVIEW

6. MILAVREG 4.2 contains the requirements for an acquisition airworthiness board. For a review of the case supporting the issue of an AMTC, STC or SFP, the acquisition agency is required to submit evidence which demonstrates the airworthiness of the aircraft within the specified roles and environment when operated by appropriately qualified and competent Defence personnel in accordance with approved instructions. For a review of the case supporting issue of Service Release or an SFP, the acquisition agency must also demonstrate that the operational, technical and logistical supporting arrangements are sufficient to maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft within the intended roles and environment at the expected rate of effort.

7. Demonstration of these requirements by the acquisition agency is achieved through two means:

a. preparation of a documentary submission

b. presentation of the key aspects of the submission to the Airworthiness Board.

8. The documentary submission satisfies the dual purpose of providing a basis to achieve TAA and OAA recommendations and allows the Airworthiness Board to familiarise themselves with the scope of the acquisition project and the operational and technical evidence underpinning airworthiness. The documentation required to achieve TAA and OAA endorsement is a subset of that required by the Airworthiness Board. This is because the OAA and the TAA (and members of their staff) will have been involved with the acquisition activity throughout the project through endorsement of the AAMP, involvement in the compilation of the Certification Basis Description (CBD) and Statement of Requirement (SOR), assessing the competency of organisations involved in the development activity, and making of compliance findings. Conversely the Airworthiness Board is not directly exposed to any project activity until they are provided with the opportunity to review the documentary submission. Consequently, some additional information should be provided to describe the scope and achievements of the acquisition activity which may not be required to achieve OAA and TAA recommendations. Notwithstanding, the compilation of the Airworthiness Board submission should not be an onerous task, as much of the required information will already be contained in existing project, operational and engineering documentation.

9. The presentation to the Airworthiness Board provides the acquisition agency with the opportunity to describe the airworthiness activities and events supporting the airworthiness of the aircraft type. Additionally, the presentation provides a forum for the Airworthiness Board members to question the acquisition agency over any airworthiness matter identified from the submission or presentation. Presentations should be attended by all primary operational, technical and logistics stakeholders of the acquisition activity to ensure as many questions or concerns raised are addressed during the conduct of the Airworthiness Board.

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PREPARING THE AIRWORTHINESS BOARD SUBMISSION

10. The requirements for the submission to the Airworthiness Board are outlined in annex B to Section 2, Chapter 4 (MILAVREG 4). Generally, the documentation required for inclusion in the submission for an AMTC, STC, SFP and Service Release includes the following:

a. Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan. The current AAMP for the acquisition activity which has been endorsed by the OAA, TAA and Defence AA is required to identify the airworthiness strategy utilised by the acquisition agency. Subordinate documents, such as the Operational Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP) and Project Design Acceptance Strategy (PDAS) are required to obtain an OAA and TAA recommendation.

b. Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). An approved version of the SOI is required to identify the roles and environment in which the aircraft type is required to operate. For an SFP submission, a detailed scope of the intended flying in the form of a flight test plan or similar may be provided instead of the SOI.

c. Certification Basis Description (CBD). The CBD which has been endorsed by the OAA and TAA is required to identify the scope of certification compliance activity undertake. The compliance status of each CBD requirement should be identified relevant to the roles and environment to be authorised under the AMTC, STC or SFP.

d. Accomplishment Summary. The accomplishment summary provides an overview of the activities underpinning the airworthiness of the aircraft and includes:

(1) A brief description of the project scope and activity to date.

(2) A summary of the certification history of the aircraft.

(3) A summary of activity and outcomes which demonstrate compliance with operational certification requirements and applicable operational airworthiness regulations as provided to obtain the OAA recommendation.

(4) A summary of activity and outcomes which demonstrate compliance with technical certification requirements and applicable technical airworthiness regulations as provided to obtain the TAA recommendation.

(5) For an SFP or Service Release, a summary of activity and outcomes which demonstrate that the supporting logistical arrangements are satisfactory for the commencement of the intended scope of operations.

(6) Description of any outstanding issues affecting the certification or supporting arrangements of the aircraft which impact airworthiness.

(7) Attestations regarding the status of operational, technical and logistics activity supporting the airworthiness of the aircraft type through endorsement of the accomplishment summary by the relevant appointments.

NOTE

• Further guidance on the content and format of the accomplishment summary is included in annex A.

e. TAA and OAA Recommendations. TAA and OAA recommendations are essential to the enable conduct of the Airworthiness Board. The Board will not be held unless both the TAA and the OAA recommend issue of the airworthiness instruments sought. Further detail on obtaining the TAA and OAA recommendations is contained in the following paragraphs.

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OBTAINING A TAA RECOMMENDATION

11. TAA Recommendation for Type Certification. The requirements to obtain a TAA recommendation for issue of an AMTC or STC are listed in TAREG 2.2.2. In order to obtain a recommendation from the TAA in support of Type Certification, the acquisition agency must provide the TAA with:

a. A relevant Design Acceptance Certificate, which attests that the Type Design (TAREG 2.2.8) and the product or system meets the SOR (all airworthiness and functional requirements), or provide an equivalent level of safety appropriate to the configuration, role and operating environment as documented in the SOI.

NOTE

• The Design Acceptance Certificate is issued by the DAR and should reference or include a summary of Compliance Findings from operational and technical staff.

b. A current version of the PDAS.

c. A summary of technical accomplishments to meet the requirements of the PDAS and AAMP.

d. Copies of all Issue Papers and attestations by the DAR that the Issue Papers adequately cover all airworthiness matters and are being managed to resolution (TAREG 2.2.11).

NOTE

• The technical accomplishments and attestations for Type Certification should be provided as part of the Accomplishment Summary. Detailed guidance on preparing the technical component of the Accomplishment Summary for Type Certification is included in annex A.

12. TAA Recommendation for Service Release. The requirements to obtain a TAA recommendation for Service Release are listed in TAREG 2.4.1. In order to obtain the TAA’s recommendation in support of Service Release by the Defence AA, the acquisition agency must provide the TAA with evidence that:

a. An AMTC or STC has been or will be issued

b. A DAR has been delegated responsibility for the aircraft following Service Release

c. An Authorised Engineering Organisation is in place, including an appropriate design support network (TAREG 3)

d. An Authorised Maintenance Organisation is in place, including an appropriate maintenance support network (TAREG 4 and TAREG 5)

e. Appropriate aircraft and engine structural integrity management systems are in place (TAREG 2.2.3s, TAREG 3.5.4, and TAREG 3.5.5)

f. There is a process that provides assurance that all applicable aircraft or modification activities conform to the Type Design through issue of Certificates of Airworthiness (TAREG 2.6.3).

NOTE

• The evidence supporting the TAA recommendation for Service Release should be provided as part of the Accomplishment Summary. Detailed guidance on preparing the technical component of an Accomplishment Summary for Service Release is included in annex A.

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OBTAINING THE OAA’S RECOMMENDATION

13. OAA Recommendation for Type Certification. The requirements to obtain an OAA recommendation for issue of an AMTC or STC are listed in OAREG 3.2.9. In order to obtain a recommendation from the OAA in support of Type Certification, the acquisition agency must provide the OAA with:

a. A supporting recommendation by the TAA in respect of the technical aspects of the type certification of the new aircraft or Major change

b. A current copy of the endorsed OAMP

c. The current approved SOI

d. A summary of operational accomplishments to meet the Type Certification requirements of the AAMP and OAMP

e. Where an Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (OAAR(Acq)) is appointed, a recommendation from the OAAR(Acq) regarding the extent to which the aviation system is suitable for flight in the SOI roles and environment.

NOTE

• The operational accomplishments and OAA recommendation should be provided as part of the Accomplishment Summary. Detailed guidance on preparing the operational component of the accomplishment summary for Type Certification is included in annex A.

14. OAA Recommendation for Service Release. The requirements to obtain an OAA recommendation for Service Release are listed in OAREG 3.4.1. In order to obtain an OAA’s recommendation in support of Service Release by the Defence AA, the acquisition agency must provide the OAA with:

a. A supporting recommendation by the TAA in respect of the technical aspects of Service Release of the new aircraft or Major change.

b. A current copy of the endorsed OAMP.

c. A summary of operational accomplishments to meet the Service Release requirements of the AAMP and OAMP.

d. If necessary, a list of recommended Service Release limitations resulting from:

(1) the immaturity of the FMS

(2) technical issues affecting the aircraft’s suitability for the SOI roles or environment, as advised by the TAA

(3) operational limits resulting from T&E activities performed prior to Type Certification.

e. While not required by OAREG 3.4.1, the acquisition agency should liaise with the OAA's staff to confirm whether the OAA requires an OAAR recommendation.

NOTE

• The operational accomplishments and list of recommended limitations should be provided as part of the Accomplishment Summary. Detailed guidance on preparing the operational component of the accomplishment summary for Service Release is included in annex A.

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AIRWORTHINESS BOARD SUBMISSION FOR AN SFP

15. The requirements for an Airworthiness Board submission for issue of an SFP for a new aircraft type are essentially the same as that required for issue of an AMTC and Service Release. The exception is that the summary of technical and operational accomplishments need only justify the operation of the aircraft for the intended scope of operations for the specified limited duration. This may include certification activity and supporting arrangements which are immature and would otherwise be unsuitable as justification for an AMTC and Service Release. However, the acquisition agency must also demonstrate that any inherent risks associated with the immature state of the acquisition development activity have been appropriately mitigated. Such mitigation would normally be documented in the accomplishment summary or supporting documentation. Additionally, the application for the SFP described in Section 3, Chapter 6 must be provided with the Airworthiness Board submission.

16. The operational and technical airworthiness requirements to achieve an OAA and TAA recommendation for an SFP are contained in OAREG 3.3.3 and TAREG 2.3.1.

AIRWORTHINESS BOARD CONDUCT

17. DACPA coordinates the activities of the Airworthiness Board on behalf of the Defence AA. The likely timeframe for the conduct of an Airworthiness Board should be forecast by the acquisition agency in the AAMP. Nonetheless, acquisition agencies should liaise with DACPA several months in advance of completing activities leading to issue of an airworthiness instrument to ensure that an Airworthiness Board can be accommodated from a schedule perspective. This will enable ACPA staff to make the necessary arrangements and confirm the Airworthiness Board members’ availability.

18. The submission is required to be finalised at least six weeks prior to the scheduled date of the Airworthiness Board. This timeframe is required to enable sufficient time for TAA and OAA review and recommendation, and a subsequent review of the submission by the Airworthiness Board members prior to the scheduled date. The acquisition agency should address the submission to DGTA and the relevant OAAR, and provide an information copy to DACPA. The covering minute should request DGTA to provide a TAA recommendation regarding issue of the relevant Airworthiness Instrument to the Defence AA (through DACPA) and to forward a copy of the recommendation to the OAA with information copy to DACPA. The OAA will review the TAA recommendation, the submission and any recommendations from the OAAR and provide a recommendation regarding the issue of the relevant Airworthiness Instrument to the Defence AA (through DACPA). ACPA will then provide the submission and recommendations to the Airworthiness Board members at least two weeks prior to the scheduled Board.

19. DACPA will coordinate the agenda for the Airworthiness Board and provide this to all stakeholders. A draft agenda will be provided by DACPA with the formal notification minute for the Airworthiness Board approximately 12 weeks before the Board convenes. The presentation to the Airworthiness Board usually requires participation from the DAR or Engineering Manager and the operational representative (eg OAAR(Acq) or other suitable delegate). For Service Release, representation from the relevant logistics management organisation and operating organisation is also required. ACPA staff will act as the secretariat for the Airworthiness Board and will record any notes, concerns and recommendations of the members.

AIRWORTHINESS BOARD OUTCOMES

20. Notes or concerns raised by the Airworthiness Board may be addressed satisfactorily during the presentation; however, those concerns which remain unresolved may be recommended for management through an Airworthiness Corrective Action Request (ACAR). An ACAR carries the authority of the Defence AA and orders mandatory action or resolution in the interests of airworthiness. One or more ACARs may preclude the Airworthiness Board recommending to the Defence AA for issue of the relevant Airworthiness Instrument or may result in a temporary limitation to Service Release. Other limitations recommended by the TAA or OAA will be considered by the Airworthiness Board for the impact on the issue of the relevant Airworthiness Instrument.

21. At the conclusion of the Airworthiness Board the members will summarise the findings and provide feedback to the acquisition agency and stakeholders present. Following the Airworthiness Board review, DACPA will provide the Airworthiness Board Report to all relevant agencies along with any ACARs and a summary of any conditions and limitations resulting from the Airworthiness Board. ACARs are managed to closure by ACPA staff. Where issue of the relevant Airworthiness Instruments is recommended, DACPA will provide the recommendations to the Defence AA along with the relevant Airworthiness Instruments for signature. Following signature, DACPA will advise all stakeholders and provide copies of the instruments to all stakeholders.

Annex:

A. Preparation of an Accomplishment Summary

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PREPARATION OF AN ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY INTRODUCTION

1. The Accomplishment Summary is the means through which an acquisition agency collates and summarises the acquisition activity supporting the airworthiness of a new aircraft or major change to the Type Design. The accomplishment summary serves the purpose of providing sufficient information for Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA), Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA) and Airworthiness Board review and recommendation to the Defence AA for issue of an Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) and Service Release. The accomplishment summary is similarly used to support the Defence AA issue of a Special Flight Permit (SFP), in conjunction with an application for an SFP.

PURPOSE

2. This annex describes the structure and format of an accomplishment summary.

APPLICABILITY

3. This annex is applicable to acquisition activities to introduce a new aircraft or a Major change to the Type Design where an AMTC, STC, Service Release or SFP is sought from the Defence AA. Major changes to the Type Design of an existing Defence aircraft are normally those which, in accordance with Technical Airworthiness Regulation (TAREG) 2.5.3:

a. introduce a new capability, or significantly varying an existing capability; or

b. have an appreciable effect on the weight, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the system.

4. The Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (ACPA) should always be consulted to determine what review requirements the Defence AA has for such changes to the aircraft’s design or role. The acquisition agency should appoint a coordinator to liaise with, and obtain the necessary inputs from, the TAA, OAA, Systems Program Office (SPO) (and other DMO agencies) and Force Element Group (FEG) staff. The acquisition agency should regularly liaise with the TAA, OAA and ACPA staff for guidance and clarification on meeting their requirements, including the evidence required for submission.

ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY – COVERING PAGES

SIGNATORIES AND ATTESTATIONS

5. The signatories to the accomplishment summary are those personnel required to attest that the acquisition activity has been completed as described. Use of the accomplishment summary for this purpose obviates the need for each stakeholder to provide separate attestations to the acquisition agency and simplifies the preparation of the summary.

6. AMTC/STC or SFP signatories. The signatories to the accomplishment summary for an AMTC/STC or SFP should include:

a. Project Engineering Manager (PEM). The PEM is normally responsible for preparing the accomplishment summary and compiling the required documentation from technical, operational and logistics agencies involved in the acquisition activity. Signature by the PEM attests that the accomplishment summary and supporting documentation meets the necessary requirements for review and recommendation by the TAA, OAA and the Airworthiness Board.

b. Aircraft Design Acceptance Representative (DAR). Signature by the DAR attests that all technical airworthiness activity supporting the issue of the relevant airworthiness instruments by the Defence AA has been completed. For a new aircraft acquisition where the DAR is also the PEM, this attestation will cover both aspects.

c. Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (Acquisition) (OAAR(Acq)). Signature by the OAAR(Acq) attests that all operational activity supporting the issue of the relevant airworthiness instrument by the Defence AA has been completed. For a major change to the Type Design where an OAAR(Acq) has not been appointed, endorsement of the accomplishment summary by the OAAR for the aircraft type or other appointed representative is appropriate.

7. SFP or Service Release signatories. For an accomplishment summary for issue of an SFP or Service Release the signatories listed above should also cover the respective Service Release aspects of the submission. Additional signatories to the accomplishment summary containing evidence in support of an SFP or Service Release should include:

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a. Project Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Manager. Signature by the ILS manager attests that the logistics arrangements supporting the operation of the aircraft are sufficient for the planned scope of operations following Service Release or issue of the SFP.

b. Officer Commanding (OC) the SPO. Signature by the OC of the relevant SPO attests that the engineering and logistics organisations are suitably prepared and resourced to manage operations with the aircraft at the expected rate of effort following issue of the SFP or Service Release.

c. Officer Commanding the operating organisation. Signature by the OC of the Wing (or equivalent) organisation operating the aircraft attests that sufficient operational airworthiness, maintenance and logistics arrangements and resources have been implemented to manage operations with the aircraft type following issue of the SFP or Service Release.

ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY – INTRODUCTORY SECTION

INTRODUCTION

8. Provide a brief background to the submission and identify the aim of the Airworthiness Board review. The aim will typically be to support Airworthiness Board recommendation and issue by the Defence AA of an SFP or AMTC/STC and Service Release.

PROJECT SCOPE AND ACTIVITY TO DATE

9. Briefly identify the scope of the acquisition project including the major equipment and capability under acquisition. Include a brief history of the major project activities or phases completed leading to Type Certification and Service Release.

CERTIFICATION STATUS OF THE AIRCRAFT TYPE

10. Identify the existing certification status of the aircraft type. If the aircraft is already Defence registered, cite the extant SFP or AMTC and STCs. For non-Defence registered aircraft, identify any prior certification upon which the Defence aircraft type is based and cite any expired SFPs which have been issued to allow previous operations with the aircraft.

11. Where the Type Certification strategy has relied substantially on prior certification by a recognised airworthiness authority, identify the configuration, role and environment relevant to the prior certification and cite any differences to that required by Defence. Identify the scope of any Defence unique certification activity to account for these differences.

ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY – AMTC/STC COMPONENT

OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

12. The operational aspects of the submission for an AMTC or STC are those required to achieve an OAA recommendation, including:

a. Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). Reference the approved SOI and summarise developments or changes made to account for the role, environment and planned usage. Identify how these have been accounted for in the OAA endorsed Statement of Requirement (SOR). Where a major change to the Type Design does not introduce or change any roles or the environment, identify how this was assessed and approved (OAREG 3.2.2).

b. Compliance finding. Provide a summary of the operational compliance finding activity which demonstrates that the elements of the certification basis are acceptable and the system is operationally suitable for the approved roles and environment. Include a summary of who has been involved in operational compliance finding activity or provide reference the OAA endorsed Operational Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP) (OAREG 3.2.3).

c. Test and evaluation. Provide a summary of the test and evaluation activity which demonstrates that the activity has been sufficient to show compliance with the certification basis and has identified all necessary operating limitations and procedures. Identify which agencies have been involved or reference to the OAA endorsed OAMP (OAREG 3.2.4).

d. Human factors. Provide a summary of human factors assessments which demonstrate that the system can be safely operated in the intended roles and environment by Defence aircrew. Identify the agencies and activities which have determined this outcome (OAREG 3.2.5).

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e. Aviation safety. Provide a summary of any aviation safety hazards and occurrences and a description of mitigation activity which demonstrates that each hazard or occurrence has been adequately addressed (OAREG 3.2.6).

f. Orders, Instructions and Publication (OIP). Provide a summary of assessment of aircrew publications which demonstrates that all limitations and procedures necessary to safely operate the system have been captured. State the outcome of the assessment and who has been involved (OAREG 3.2.7).

g. Issue papers. Provide a list of current issue papers which are being managed to resolve outstanding airworthiness issues identified for any of the certification activities listed above (OAREG 3.2.8).

h. Exemptions. Provide a list of exemptions to Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREGs) granted by the Operational Airworthiness Regulator ( OAR) including the scope and duration (OAREG 1.1.1).

13. Throughout this section, where any aspect of the certification activity remains incomplete or unresolved, the accomplishment summary must describe the mitigating activities and identify any resulting conditions and limitations, or reference the relevant issue paper. The recommended conditions and limitations are to be summarised in the conclusion.

TECHNICAL ASPECTS

14. The technical aspects of the submission for an AMTC or STC are those required to achieve a TAA recommendation, including:

a. Statement of Requirement. Provide reference to TAA endorsement of the SOR, and notification of amendments to the SOR (which might be detailed within the certification basis description) that reduced the level of safety established by the airworthiness standards. Requirements traceability from the specification to the product should be evident (TAREG 2.2.4).

b. Type Record. Provide an assessment of the acceptability of the Type Record (or definition of Type Design if interim product or system is to enter service) (TAREG 2.2.9).

c. Design Agency competency. Identify the establishment and maintenance of design agency Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) certification, including a summary of compliance assurance outcomes.

d. Design development. Briefly describe the outcomes of major steps in the design process, including design reviews, Functional Configuration Audits and Physical Configuration Audits.

e. Design Approval. Identify or reference the Design Approval certificate (TAREG 3.4.3).

f. Certification Basis Description (CBD). Identify or reference the airworthiness CBD which shows or references compliance findings made against the SOR (TAREG 2.2.11). An assessment of the suitability of the CBD to the Defence configuration, role and environment by the DAR is also required. A list of airworthiness requirements, where the acquisition agency is not confident the evidence shows the requirement has been met, and is likely to result in limitations or mitigations being required of operators or maintainers, should be separately included in the Design Acceptance certificate provided with the submission. The CBD may be included as a separate document or as an annex to the accomplishment summary.

g. Instructions for continuing airworthiness. Provide an assessment of the acceptability of the instructions for continuing airworthiness (eg instructions to enable the product or system to be maintained in accordance with its CBD).

15. Throughout this section, where any aspect of the certification activity remains incomplete or unresolved, the accomplishment summary must describe or provide reference to another document in the submission which describes mitigating activities and identifies any resulting conditions and limitations, or reference the relevant issue paper. The recommended conditions and limitations are to be summarised in the conclusion. Supers

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ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY – SERVICE RELEASE COMPONENT

OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

16. The operational aspects of the submission for Service Release are those required to achieve an OAA recommendation, including:

a. Scope of flying. Describe of the scope of flying to be undertaken following service release.

b. Flying Management System. Provide a summary of the status of each element of the flying management system require by OAREG 2.1—Flying Management System. For a Major change to the Type Design, include a brief summary of the changes made to the Flying Management System to account for the new capability, roles or environment.

c. Orders, Instructions and Publication (OIP). Identify the approval status and availability at the operating organisation of OIP necessary to safely conduct flight operations, including those procedures and instructions implemented or modified as part of the Flying Management System (OAREG 2.1).

d. Training and qualification requirements. Identify the approval status of training and qualification requirements necessary to operate the new aircraft or capability in the required roles and operating environment.

e. Aviation risk management (AVRM). Provide a summary of the AVRM conducted to address initial operations including appropriate risk mitigation.

f. Aircrew availability. Identify the availability of trained and competent aircrew to operate at the expected rate of effort following Service Release.

g. Limitations. If necessary, identify any Service Release limitations resulting from:

(1) the immaturity of the flying management system;

(2) technical issues affecting the aircraft’s suitability for the SOI roles or environment; and

(3) operational limits resulting from T&E activities performed prior to type certification.

17. The Service Release limitations are to be summarised within the conclusion.

TECHNICAL ASPECTS

18. The technical aspects of the submission for Service Release are those required to achieve a TAA recommendation, including:

a. AMTC/STC. Where an AMTC or STC has already been issued, provide reference to the instrument. Where the submission includes evidence in support of an AMTC or STC, that component of the accomplishment summary is sufficient.

b. DAR delegation. Confirm that a DAR has been delegated responsibility for the aircraft following Service Release with an appropriate scope of engineering authority.

c. Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO). Confirm that an AEO is in place with an appropriate scope of engineering authority, including an appropriate design support network (TAREG 3).

d. Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO). Confirm that an AMO is in place with an appropriate scope of maintenance authority, including an appropriate maintenance support network (TAREG 4 and TAREG 5).

e. Engineering Management Plans. Confirm that appropriate Maintenance Engineering Analysis (MEA), Aircraft Structural Integrity (ASI) and Engine Structural Integrity (ESI) management systems are in place (TAREG 2.2.3, TAREG 3.5.3, TAREG 3.5.4, and TAREG 3.5.5).

f. Certificates of Airworthiness. Confirm that there is a process that provides assurance that all same or similar products or systems meet the Type Design (TAREG 2.6.3—Issue of Certificates of Airworthiness).

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LOGISTICS ASPECTS

19. The logistics aspects of the submission support the technical and operational evidence for recommendation and issue of Service Release. The logistics aspects of the submission should include:

a. Engineering activities. Confirm that there is the capability to manage engineering activities; including sufficient competent staff and training systems, publication management systems etc.

b. Maintenance activities. Confirm that maintenance activity can be adequately performed (ie there are sufficient competent staff and an ongoing training system for maintenance personnel). Confirm there is an appropriate maintenance management system (eg CAMM2, LSAR, TMP, Type Record, MEAP, etc.)

c. Availability of publications. Confirm that appropriate and useable instructions, including sufficient technical publications, TMPs and servicing schedules, weight and balance procedures, configuration control procedures etc.

d. Tools and facilities. Confirm that there are sufficient support equipment, tools, test equipment and maintenance handling equipment and facilities to enable necessary engineering, maintenance and other logistics support functions to be carried out.

e. Logistics support elements. Confirm there are sufficient integrated logistics support elements in place, ie spares and consumables combined with arrangements for their continuing availability, sufficient competent logistics staff and a training system (eg established repair pipelines, contracts, and contractor software support).

f. Aircraft stores capabilities. Confirm that any necessary stores clearances have been completed, and are appropriately reflected in operating instructions and limitations.

20. Any unique or special arrangements to account for the above elements should be included in the submission. Any deficiencies in the logistics management arrangements which impact airworthiness, including mitigation strategies, should be identified. Any salient limitations should be summarised in the conclusion.

ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSION

21. Summarise the case supporting the issue of the AMTC/STC and Service Release (as applicable) including statements that operational, technical and logistics aspects are sufficient for the intended scope of operations, subject to the limitations identified in the submission and by the TAA and OAA. A cross-reference matrix to the requirements for issue of an AMTC/STC and Service Release may be included to aid the review by the TAA, OAA, ACPA staff and the Airworthiness Board.

RECOMMENDATIONS

22. The submission should recommend issue of the AMTC/STC and Service Release (as applicable) subject to the identified limitations. A summary list of recommended Type Certification and Service Release limitations should be included.

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CAPABILITY ACCEPTANCE INTO OPERATIONAL SERVICE OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT





INTRODUCTION

1. The process of introducing a new aircraft or Major change to the Type Design into Defence service involves both the assurance of airworthiness through the issue of a Type Certificate and Service Release, and the acceptance of operational capability. Additionally, following Service Release, each aircraft operating under the Type Certification must be assured as conforming to the Type Design reflected in the AMTC or STC.

2. Whilst the Type Certification and Service Release enable the commencement of operations within the SOI roles and environment, Type Certification and Service Release do not in isolation signify achievement of an effective and suitable capability. The achievement of capability objectives supporting the acceptance into operational service is the responsibility of the acquisition agency. Processes to accept aviation system capabilities into Defence service is the responsibility of the relevant Service Chief under whose command the aviation system will operate.

PURPOSE

3. This chapter describes the airworthiness processes associated with introducing a new aircraft type or Major change to a Type Design into service following Service Release. This chapter will also highlight the considerations associated with acceptance into operational service and to distinguish those issues from the requirements for assurance of airworthiness.

APPLICABILITY

4. This chapter is applicable to any new Defence registered aircraft type, or one undergoing a Major change to the Type Design.

KEY CONCEPTS

5. The introduction to service process involves:

a. Type Certification and Service Release of the aircraft type through which the Defence AA advises the relevant Service Chief that:

(1) the aircraft is designed and constructed to acceptable standards and meets applicable airworthiness requirements;

(2) the aircraft will remain airworthy in approved roles when operated and maintained in accordance with approved procedures and instructions; and

(3) an adequate technical airworthiness and operational airworthiness infrastructure is in place to facilitate the maintenance of continuing airworthiness of the aircraft;

b. following Type Certification, issue of Certificates of Airworthiness (CofAs) to bring individual aircraft tail numbers onto the Defence Register in a certified airworthy condition; and

c. acceptance into operational service (AIOS) by the relevant Service Chief on the basis that the Aviation System meets capability requirements.

6. Type Certification and Service Release. The process of Type Certification and Service Release is covered in detail in Section 3 Chapter 4. Airworthiness processes supporting Type Certification and Service Release are described throughout Section 3.

7. Certificates of Airworthiness. MILAVREG 3 requires that a CofA is issued for each new or modified aircraft that conforms to the Type Design, following AMTC or STC. TAREG 2.6.3 contains the TAR requirements for the content and issue of a CofA. Issue of a CofA is the mechanism through which individual aircraft are brought onto the Defence Register following issue of an AMTC.

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8. Aircraft being flown on a SFP prior to AMTC or STC may not be issued a CofA as the Type Design is not yet approved and may not be finalised. The airworthiness requirements for these aircraft are to be embodied within the SFP instrument.

9. The requirement to issue a CofA does not apply for aircraft in Defence service prior to 13 Mar 98.

10. Acceptance into Operational Service (AIOS). Defence policy governing AIOS is provided in DI(G) OPS 45–2—Capability Acceptance into Operational Service. AIOS signifies acceptance by the Capability Manager (the individual in the command chain of the respective Service Chief who is responsible for managing a particular aviation system) that the aviation system meets the intended operational requirements and is ready to be used on operations. AIOS may be defined progressively depending on capability requirements for provision of an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and Final Operational Capability (FOC). The assignment of capability levels is determined in consultation between the Capability Manager and the acquisition agency, and is beyond the scope of this manual. AIOS is typically achieved through a process of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) to measure the operational effectiveness and operational suitability of the aviation system in providing the required capability, defined as follows:

a. Operational effectiveness. Operational effectiveness is: The ability of a system to perform its intended function over its intended operational spectrum, in the expected environment, and in the face of the expected threats when operated by typical operational personnel (DI(G) OPS 43–1—Defence test and evaluation policy).

b. Operational suitability. Operational suitability is: The capacity of the system, when operated and maintained by typical operational personnel in expected numbers, at the expected level of competency, to be reliable, maintainable, available, logistically supportable, compatible, interoperable, safe and is ergonomically satisfactory (DI(G) OPS 43–1).

NOTE

• Initial phases of AIOS may also be supported by acquisition acceptance test outcomes and limited OT&E prior to Service Release.

AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF INTRODUCTION TO SERVICE

ISSUE OF CERTIFICATE OF AIRWORTHINESS

11. TAREG 2.6.3—Issue of Certificate of Airworthiness (CofAs) requires that the aircraft DAR issue a CofA for new aircraft to certify that individual aircraft conform to the Type Design cited in the AMTC, after AMTC issue. For a Major change to the Type Design, the DAR is required to amend or reissue an existing CofA after STC issue. The issuance or amendment of a CofA by the DAR may be supported by:

a. a physical configuration audit of each individual production aircraft by the OEM or production contractor with a certified record provided to the acquisition agency which shows that the aircraft conforms to the Type Design, subject to any deviations;

b. a record of all production or other deviations from the Type Design which have been design approved by an appropriate Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) and design accepted by the aircraft DAR;

c. functional configuration audit through conduct of maintenance testing to confirm the serviceability of the complete aircraft and subsystems in accordance with approved maintenance instructions;

d. production acceptance flights which confirm the airborne functionality of the aircraft in accordance with an approved production or maintenance flight test procedure; and

e. issue of a Commonwealth supplies acceptance certificate which transfers ownership of the aircraft to Defence.

AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF PRODUCTION ACCEPTANCE FLIGHT TESTS

12. New aircraft. Prior to issue of a CofA, individual aircraft of a new type are not deemed to be Defence registered under the AMTC, with the exception of specific aircraft tail numbers authorised for production acceptance flying under a current SFP. The involvement of Defence personnel in the operation of a non-Defence registered aircraft undergoing Type Certification is subject to specific airworthiness conditions. The involvement of Defence personnel in operations prior to Defence registration is addressed in detail in Section 3 Chapter 6. As covered by MILAVREG 5.2(a) and (b), the involvement of Defence personnel in production acceptance test flying while the aircraft is still owned by the OEM will typically be approved:

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a. through the issue of an AD by the Defence AA where the aircraft is to be operated in Australian airspace, or

b. through the approval of a FTP by the FTAA or OAMP by the OAA where the aircraft is to be operated outside Australian airspace.

13. Major change to Type Design. Except where the aircraft has been removed from the Defence Register for the period of modification, individual Defence aircraft that have undergone incorporation of a Major change to the Type Design may be operated by Defence personnel following Service Release in accordance with an approved maintenance or production test schedule for the purposes of production acceptance.

ANNOTATION OF THE DEFENCE REGISTER

14. Issue of individual CofA must be formally advised to DACPA who will then initiate entry of the aircraft tail number onto the Defence Register under the relevant AMTC. Typically, each tail number will be entered into the Defence Register prior to Service Release however, the operational status will be listed as ‘Not active’. Following issue of the CofA, the Defence registration entry for the relevant tail number will be amended to ‘Active’. The requesting body/organisation must receive confirmation of Defence registration prior to commencement of flying operations.

15. DACPA must be advised prior to aircraft commencing flying operations under an SFP. Each aircraft operating under an SFP is to have an appropriate note entered on the Defence Register. The requesting body/organisation must receive confirmation of Defence registration prior to commencement of flying operations.

ACCEPTANCE INTO OPERATIONAL SERVICE

DEMONSTRATING CAPABILITY

16. Policy for the transition of an aircraft into Service is determined by the Service Chief responsible for the particular aircraft. A collaborative approach between the Capability Manager (in the command chain of the Service Chief) and the acquisition agency may be adopted to ensure that activities associated with AIOS can be conducted, to varying degrees, throughout the acquisition and introduction to service phase. The introduction to service phase may be separated into three elements, depending on the scope of the acquisition or modification:

a. Pre–acceptance. Whilst the aircraft is under development and is owned by the contractor Defence may undertake certain elements of AIOS through the conduct of acceptance testing that demonstrates particular operational capabilities. Such testing is normally associated with Functional Performance Specification (FPS) items which reflect discrete system performance requirements, for example, weapon accuracy, max climb rate, manoeuvre envelope, etc. However, the acquisition agency should be cautious to ensure that acceptance test results produced under test conditions by Qualified Test Pilots are applicable to operational Defence aircrew for the purposes of AIOS. In such cases, involvement of operational aircrew may be appropriate where the OAAR(Acq) is satisfied the state of the aircraft and operating arrangements provide an airworthy basis for such operations.

b. Pre–AMTC/Service Release. Following Acceptance, the aircraft is operated under the authority of the Defence AA, typically on the basis of an SFP or FTP (see Section 3 Chapter 6). The Commonwealth may undertake OT&E, supportability assessments, and conduct transition training in support of AIOS prior to AMTC and Service Release.

c. Post–AMTC/Service Release. The aircraft is operated under the authority of the Type Certificate and Service Release but has not yet reached the capability readiness requirements. Any remaining OT&E and supporting activities necessary to achieve AIOS would be completed in this final phase of transition into service.

AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF AIOS-RELATED TEST AND EVALUATION

17. Acceptance testing. Airworthiness management provisions for the conduct of acceptance testing are addressed in detail in Section 3 Chapters 5 and 6.

18. Operations prior to Service Release. Airworthiness management provisions for Defence conduct of operations prior to Service Release under and SFP or FTP are addressed in detail in Section 3 Chapter 6.

19. OT&E following Service Release. Operational capability development or assessment through OT&E requires involvement of an FTAA where the testing involves the exercise of new aircraft roles equivalent to ‘Substantial’ operational changes. A Substantial change is defined at OAREG 3.1.2—Changes to an aircraft operational role, environment or capability as one which has an appreciable affect on aircrew training curriculums,

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competency management, cockpit workload, human-machine-interface or flight authorisation considerations. Although flying in the designated SOI roles is authorised under the AMTC or STC and Service Release, the OT&E may involve the exercise of the new roles or capability with limited operational experience with the system. Accordingly, although a FTP is not required, FTAA endorsement of the flight test plan is appropriate to ensure:

a. the planned testing may be safely conducted, and

b. the identified flying operations are sufficient to assess the test objectives.

CONDUCT OF OT&E

NOTE

• The operating organisation remains responsible for defining the test objectives and determinations regarding AIOS. The sponsoring organisation in conjunction with the operating organisation conducting the OT&E is responsible for ensuring airworthiness requirements are met.

20. Policy for the conduct of OT&E is beyond the scope of this manual. However, OT&E is a key element of the assessment of operational suitability and operational effectiveness of the aircraft/aviation system in support of AIOS. Each Service has unique processes which address AIOS. Further information regarding OT&E, or flight testing in support of AIOS, should be sought from an appropriate FTAA and Group (or equivalent) Headquarters staff.


21. Further information and guidance on CofAs should be sought from DGTA–ADF. Further information and guidance on airworthiness policy for flight testing, operations prior to Service Release, or Defence registration should be sought from ACPA. Further information on flight test conduct should be sought from an appropriate FTAA. Direction regarding AIOS should be sought from within the operating command chain of the respective Service Chief.

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FLEET ADDITION AND NEW AIRCRAFT MODELS


MILAVREG 2.9—Addition of fleet aircraft to the Defence Register

INTRODUCTION

1. Defence may seek to add additional aircraft of the same type to the Defence Register under an existing AMTC. This may be in response to expanded capability requirements, increased requirements for availability, or to satisfy additional training roles without compromising an established operational rate of effort. Whilst in-service airworthiness management arrangements are likely to be in place for existing Defence aircraft, their immediate application to the newly acquired fleet addition aircraft may not be totally appropriate. A tailored approach to the Defence Type Certification process is therefore used to register new aircraft modes of the same type, or add additional fleet aircraft to the Defence Register.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter describes the airworthiness considerations for adding fleet addition or new aircraft models to the Defence Register under an existing AMTC.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter is applicable to the addition of aircraft to the Defence Register where an existing AMTC is extant for a similar aircraft type.

DETERMINATION OF AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS

AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF FLEET ADDITION

4. The addition of production aircraft to the Defence Register is described in Section 3 Chapter 8. MILAVREG 2.9 contains the requirements for the acquisition of additional fleet aircraft, or aircraft models which are substantially similar to the existing type already certified under and AMTC. The airworthiness strategy to manage the acquisition of fleet aircraft depends on the degree of similarity between the existing and new aircraft. An assessment of the similarity must consider the following:

a. the aircraft configuration or configurations;

b. the history of previous operational use, including the roles and environment;

c. the maintenance history; and

d. the engineering history.

5. MILAVREG 2.9—Addition of fleet aircraft to the Defence Register requires the acquisition agency to apply to DACPA for approval to add the additional aircraft to the Defence Register under the existing AMTC. The assessment of similarity considering the factors listed above will largely determine DACPA’s requirements for addition of the aircraft to the Defence Register.

APPLICATION FOR FLEET ADDITION

6. Applications for fleet addition must first identify the extant AMTC under which the aircraft is proposed to be Type Certified. The acquisition agency must then establish the validity of the extant AMTC as a basis to Type Certify the additional aircraft. The validity is established through assessment of the configuration and usage history of the aircraft.

7. Configuration. Configuration similarity is a major consideration for any fleet addition aircraft acquisition. Differences in configuration between the fleet aircraft and the existing Defence Type Design must be identified. The assessment of configuration provides the basis for the OAA and the TAA to determine whether an existing AMTC is applicable, or whether issue of a new AMTC or STC is warranted. The configuration assessment also contributes to the basis for implementation any operational or technical airworthiness arrangements, beyond that currently established, to manage the aircraft in service.

8. Used aircraft. Where the fleet addition aircraft have been previously used, the assessment provided by the acquisition agency must justify that the integrity of the existing certification basis has not been undermined, and that

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sufficient arrangements can be implemented to manage any issues resulting from the usage history. This is achieved through assessing the following:

NOTE

• Examination of the factors associated with the usage history of the aircraft and differences identified from the existing Defence aircraft provide a means for the TAA and OAA to assess the suitability of the aircraft to operate in the Defence roles and environment. The assessment may also contribute to the basis for any operating limitations or implementation of any additional operational or technical airworthiness arrangements beyond those currently established.

a. Operating history. The role and environment under which the aircraft was previously operated and associated management practices should be identified. The acquisition agency needs to compare the operation of the aircraft by the previous operators against the existing SOI roles and environment. Differences in structural and engine operating history need to be clearly identified.

b. Maintenance history. The assessment of the past maintenance history of the aircraft should identify any differences between the previous operators maintenance philosophy and that existing within Defence. Differences or discrepancies in maintenance history resulting in an unknown or reduced level of safety will require specific additional maintenance requirements for the new aircraft.

c. Engineering history. The engineering history of the aircraft must be assessed to identify how the aircraft has been previously managed, and what data exists to support both the identified configurations and the ongoing airworthiness management of the aircraft. Primary considerations include aircraft structural and engine life accrual, and the previous technical airworthiness management arrangements which assure that the documented history of the technical management confirms the identified configuration.

DEFENCE REGISTRATION OF FLEET ADDITION AIRCRAFT

ACQUISITION AIRWORTHINESS STRATEGY

9. MILAVREG 2.9—Addition of fleet aircraft to the Defence Register requires the application for fleet addition to be endorsed by the TAA and the OAA. In examining the assessment of the additional aircraft, the TAA will consider whether the differences between the Defence aircraft and the new aircraft warrant issue of a new AMTC in accordance with Technical Airworthiness Regulation (TAREG) 2.5.4—Changes requiring a new AMTC or an STC in accordance with TAREG 2.5.5—Supplemental Type Certification. The application will then be forwarded to the OAA who will consider whether the additional aircraft may be suitable for operation in the intended roles and environment, subject to implementation of any required supporting operational airworthiness arrangements.

10. Based on the OAA and TAA recommendations, the Defence AA will determine whether a new AMTC or STC is required, or whether the acquisition of the additional aircraft may be managed within the provision of MILAVREG 2.9—Addition of fleet aircraft to the Defence Register. Aircraft requiring a new AMTC or an STC are to be managed in accordance with MILAVREG 2.3—Introduction and modification of a Defence registered aircraft type. Where no new AMTC or STC is required, the acquisition airworthiness strategy required will depend on the extent of the assessed differences between the existing Defence aircraft and the proposed fleet addition aircraft.

CONSISTENT CONFIGURATION AND OPERATIONAL HISTORY

11. Where the application provided to DACPA demonstrates that the fleet addition aircraft are largely similar to that Type Certified under the extant AMTC, the additional aircraft may be Defence registered through issue of a Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA) by the aircraft DAR. Issue of CofAs is subject to:

a. the satisfaction of the TAA and OAA that all technical and operational airworthiness activities have been completed with respect to the design, configuration and operating and maintaining instructions;

b. the satisfaction of the TAA and the OAA that the technical and operational airworthiness infrastructure will adequately support operation of the additional aircraft in the intended roles and environment at the expected rate of effort; and

c. the satisfaction of the relevant logistics manager that operations may be sustained by existing or augmented logistics support arrangements.

12. Following issue of a CofA DACPA will amend the register to include the additional aircraft. For a new aircraft model, the acquisition agency must submit an amended Type Certification Data Sheet (TCDS) which includes

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the new aircraft model details for inclusion with the extant AMTC. Guidance on compiling the TCDS is contained in Section 3 Chapter 4.

13. Additional production aircraft. Production aircraft acquired following Service Release of a new aircraft type in addition to those included under the initial acquisition contract may be added to the Defence Register under existing arrangements for issue of a CofA following approval of an application by DACPA which has been endorsed by the TAA and the OAA which confirms:

a. the additional tail numbers to be added to the Defence Register; and

b. the adequacy of existing operational, technical, and logistics arrangements to account for the additional aircraft.

INCONSISTENT CONFIGURATION AND OPERATIONAL HISTORY

14. Where the application submitted to DACPA identifies that the configuration and operational history of the fleet addition aircraft constitute significant variation from the extant AMTC, the aircraft may only be Defence registered following:

a. the satisfaction of the TAA and OAA that all technical and operational airworthiness activities have been completed with respect to the design, configuration and operating and maintaining instructions;

b. the satisfaction of the TAA and the OAA that the technical and operational airworthiness infrastructure will adequately support operation of the additional aircraft in the intended roles and environment at the expected rate of effort;

c. the satisfaction of the relevant logistics manager that operations may be sustained by existing or augmented logistics support arrangements;

d. recommendation by the Airworthiness Board that the technical, operational and logistics requirements have been satisfied and that there are sufficient arrangements in place to support ongoing airworthiness;

e. amendment to the extant AMTC and Service Release to reflect the additional model numbers or type variations covered by the AMTC; and

f. issue of a CofA for each additional aircraft in accordance with the TAREG.

15. Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan (AAMP). The acquisition agency should compile an AAMP to describe the acquisition airworthiness strategy to introduce the additional aircraft to Defence service. Guidance on the preparation of an AAMP is contained in Section 3 Chapter 3. In each case, the acquisition agency should liaise with DGTA–ADF, the OAA staff and ACPA during compilation of the AAMP to determine the requirements to bring the additional aircraft onto the Defence Register. The strategy will largely depend on the differences identified in the application for fleet addition, and the ramifications of those differences on airworthiness.

16. Airworthiness Board requirements. The requirements for Airworthiness Board executive review for fleet addition aircraft whose configuration and operational history are extensively different to that identified in the extant AMTC are largely similar to that required for an STC. Tailoring of the Airworthiness Board review requirements will depend on the extent of the differences. During compilation of the AAMP, the acquisition agency should liaise with ACPA to identify the likely scope of the Airworthiness Board review. Airworthiness Board review requirements for AMTC, STC and Service Release are contained in Section 3 Chapter 7.

17. Introduction to service. The introduction to service and Defence registration process for fleet addition aircraft whose configuration and operational history are extensively different to that identified in the extant AMTC is the same as that required for new aircraft. Section 3 Chapter 8 contains further guidance on the introduction of aircraft to Defence service.

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IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT


MILAVREG 1.4—Operational Airworthiness Regulator

MILAVREG 1.5—Operational Airworthiness Authorities

MILAVREG 1.6—Technical Airworthiness Regulator

MILAVREG 1.7—Technical Airworthiness Authority

MILAVREG 1.8—Flight Test Approval Authority

MILAVREG 1.9—Airworthiness review responsibility


MILAVREG 3.5—Flight Test Permits

INTRODUCTION

1. In-service airworthiness management of Defence operated aviation systems is achieved through the operational and technical airworthiness management frameworks regulated by the OAR and the TAR respectively. TAREG for the management of engineering and maintenance organisations, including personnel, processes and data, are published in AAP 7001.053—Technical Airworthiness Management Manual. OAREGs for the management of flight operations with in-service aircraft types are published in AAP 8000.010—Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual. Effective interaction between the operational and technical regulatory frameworks is required to achieve sound airworthiness management.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter describes the operational and technical airworthiness management principles that are necessary for the management of the continuing airworthiness of Defence registered aircraft. An overview of the operational and technical airworthiness frameworks is provided in Section 1, Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.

APPLICABILITY

3. This Chapter is applicable to the in-service airworthiness management of Defence registered aircraft. That is, aircraft which have been Type Certified by the Defence AA through issue of an Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC) or Special Type Certificate (STC) and Service Release (SR).

IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT

THE PURPOSE OF IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT

4. The purpose of in-service airworthiness management is to ensure that:

a. an aircraft continues to meet the airworthiness requirements and standards defined in the certification basis which was established through Type Certification (see Section 3, Chapter 4); and

b. the technical and operational airworthiness infrastructure that was established at Service Release remains effective in assuring the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft.

AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT APPOINTMENTS AND AUTHORITY

5. The DASP is implemented and controlled by appointed individuals with authority for various aspects of airworthiness management. DI(G) OPS 02–2— Defence Aviation Safety Program is the appointing instruction and defines high level requirements for Defence airworthiness management. The role of the airworthiness appointments is described in detail in Section 1, Chapters 1, 3 and 4. For in-service airworthiness management, the roles of the airworthiness appointments are as follows:

a. Operational Airworthiness Regulator. DI(G) OPS 02–2 appoints DCAF as the OAR. The OAR manages the operational airworthiness framework and the process for prescribing the OAREG. The OAR conducts compliance assurance of the OAA to OAREG. MILAVREG 1.4 lists Defence AA requirements of the OAR. It is desirable that the officer appointed to this position should:

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(1) be an aircrew member with a broad and extensive level of experience in Defence aviation operations including:

(a) Defence registered aircraft types;

(b) non-Defence registered aircraft types; and

(c) aviation support systems;

(2) possess a substantial level of experience and knowledge of the operational airworthiness regulatory framework;

(3) possess a substantial level of knowledge of civil operational airworthiness regulatory frameworks; and

(4) possess a substantial level of experience with flight test and training operations.

b. Operational Airworthiness Authority. An OAA has a command responsibility for the effective and safe operation of delegated Defence Aviation systems. The OAA is responsible for implementing an in-service management system to assure the operational airworthiness of delegated Defence aircraft and aviation systems. The OAA normally delegates operational airworthiness management responsibility for specific types to an OAA Representative (OAAR). MILAVREG 1.5 lists the OAA requirements. It is highly desirable that the OAA should:

(1) be an aircrew member with a broad and extensive level of experience in Defence Aviation operations within the relevant command (or equivalent), including:

(a) command and operations with the aircraft types within the relevant command (or equivalent); and

(b) operations with aviation support systems (AvSS) within the relevant command (or equivalent);

(2) possess a substantial level of experience with, and knowledge of, the operational airworthiness regulatory framework.

If an OAA does not meet the highly desirable attributes then it is essential that an OAA immediate/direct subordinate in the chain of command does.

c. Technical Airworthiness Regulator. DI(G) OPS 02–2 appoints the DGTA as the TAR. The TAR manages the technical airworthiness framework and the process for prescribing that are prescribed by the TAR through a proposal, review and amendment process. The TAR provides authoritative airworthiness advice to in-service engineering and maintenance organisations regarding the interpretation of TAREG. The TAR also accredits competent organisations to conduct engineering and maintenance activity on Defence registered aircraft and conducts compliance assurance to the TAREG. MILAVREG 1.6 lists the Defence AA requirements of the TAR. An officer appointed to the designated TAR position must:

(1) be an aerospace engineer with postgraduate qualifications in an aeronautical engineering discipline;

(2) possess a broad and extensive level of experience in Defence aviation engineering including:

(a) extensive experience in Defence in-service design and maintenance practices;

(b) previous appointment as a Senior Design Engineer with responsibility for one or more aviation system, or flight test engineering and

(c) substantial experience in flight test and acquisition engineering activities;

(3) possess a substantial level of experience with, and knowledge of, the Defence technical airworthiness regulatory framework; and

(4) possess a substantial level of knowledge of civil technical airworthiness regulatory frameworks.

d. Technical Airworthiness Authority. DI(G) OPS 02–2 appoints the DGTA as the TAA. The TAA prescribes airworthiness standards for in-service engineering activity where they are not already defined or following cancellation of existing standards. The TAA may delegate technical airworthiness authority for the in-service management of specific Defence aircraft types to Design Acceptance Representatives (DARs). MILAVREG 1.7 lists the Defence AA requirements of the TAA. The competency criteria for the TAA are equivalent to those for the TAR.

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e. Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA). A FTAA manages the airworthiness of in-service Defence aircraft allocated for the purposes of flight test. This will normally be in support of flight test prior to service release of a Minor design change or prior to Supplemental Role Approval by an OAA. Flight test operations with new aircraft types or aircraft undergoing a Major change to the Type Design are described in Section 3, Chapter 6. MILAVREG 1.8y lists the Defence AA requirements for a FTAA.

Specialist organisations

6. In-service airworthiness management is supported by specialist organisations that perform roles unique to the skills, experience and capability of their organisation. Specialist Defence organisations include:

a. Aerospace Operational Support Group (AOSG). An FTAA appointed in AOSG may authorise flight test of a Defence registered aircraft in accordance with Defence airworthiness regulations. AOSG encompasses several specialist organisations including:

(1) Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU). ARDU plan, conduct and report flight test activities under the authority of an FTAA. ARDU also provide authoritative advice regarding flight test airworthiness and conduct in accordance with FTAA direction.

(2) Aircraft Stores Compatibility Engineering (ASCENG). ASCENG are a centre of expertise for aircraft stores compatibility engineering and related flight test practices.

(3) Joint Electronic Warfare Support Unit (JEWOSU). JEWOSU provide engineering and capability support for Defence electronic warfare systems.

(4) Institute of Aviation Medicine (AVMED). AVMED provide specialist advice regarding the physiological effects of aviation activities on Defence personnel. AVMED also sponsor Defence aviation medicine training.

b. Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Trials Unit (AMAFTU). Commanding Officer (CO) of AMAFTU, if appointed by the Defence AA as an FTAA, and in conjunction with an aircraft DAR and Commander Fleet Air Arm, may authorise the conduct of flight test of naval specific systems including the interaction of Defence rotary wing aircraft with ship-based aviation facilities.

c. Air Movements Training and Development Unit (AMTDU). AMTDU are recognised as competent to conduct flight testing within approved operating limitations related to aerial delivery and external carriage of cargo from Defence aircraft prior to service release of an Aerial Delivery Clearance.

d. Guided Weapons and Munitions Branch (GWB and MunB). These provide engineering and logistics support services for Defence weapons and items of Explosive Ordnance (EO). Some non EO stores may managed by GWB and MunB, however most stores suspension equipment and aircraft unique stores (such as external fuel tanks) are managed by the parent SPO.

e. Maritime Patrol Systems Program Office – Aeronautical Life Support Logistic Management Unit (MPSPO-ALSLMU). MPSPO-ALSLMU provides engineering and logistics support services for Defence aeronautical life support equipment.

f. Joint Fuels and Lubricants Agency (JFLA). JFLA are a centre of expertise and provide engineering and logistics support services for Defence aviation fuels and lubricants.

7. Additional guidance on operational airworthiness specialist organisations should be sought through the relevant command chain.

BASIS OF OPERATIONS

8. MILAVREG 2.4 stipulates the Defence AA requirements for establishing a basis of operation of a Defence registered aircraft. This basis includes:

a. Statement of Operating Intent (SOI). The SOI describes the approved roles and operating environment in which the aviation system is to be operated. The structure of an SOI is described in AAP 8000.010.

b. Type Design. The Type Design contains the specification, description of configuration and all the test data, analysis, drawings, evidence and operating and maintaining instructions necessary to underwrite the operation of the aircraft. TAREG 2.2.8—Type Design contains the TAR requirements

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for the Type Design. The Type Design provides the basis to operate the aircraft within the approved SOI where the aircraft has been found to meet certification basis requirements only where:

(1) the design has been formally approved by a competent agency; and

(2) the design has been formally accepted by Defence as meeting specified Defence requirements.

c. AMTC. The AMTC documents, and their accompanying Type Certification Data Sheets (TCDS) that underwrite them, document the SOI, certification basis and Type Design underpinning operations. The process to achieve an AMTC is contained in Section 3 of this manual.

d. Service Release. The Service Release provides the determination by the Defence AA that an aviation system is airworthy if operated in a certified configuration throughout the roles and environment listed in the SOI. Any limitations affecting operation to the extent of the SOI are listed on the Service Release. The process to achieve Service Release of an aircraft type is contained in Section 3 of this manual.

e. Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP). The operating procedures, limitations and performance data provided in the Flight Manual and associated operating publications are collectively called OIP, the equivalent of technical Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA). The OAAR is responsible for the management of OIP specific to a delegated aircraft type, the authoritative data that is established at AMTC and Service Release.

f. Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA). The technical instructions for continuing airworthiness are authoritative data established at AMTC and Service Release. The delegated technical airworthiness authority for the management of instructions for continuing airworthiness is the DAR of the applicable aircraft, which is normally the Chief Engineer of the System Program Office managing the engineering and logistics activities for the aircraft type.

g. Flying Management System. Flying management systems are implemented by an OAA and delegated OAAR at the command level appropriate to the effective operation of an aircraft type. A flying management system is a framework of processes, rules and training to effectively manage in-service flying operations of a particular aircraft type. The OAR requirements for flying management systems are described in detail in OAREG.

h. Authorised Engineering Organisations (AEOs) and Approved Maintenance Organisations (AMOs). AEOs and AMOs are accredited by the TAR as competent to provide a specified scope and level of engineering and maintenance services for the in-service management of Defence registered aircraft. Detailed requirements for AEOs and AMOs are contained in AAP 7001.053—Technical airworthiness management manual.

i. Logistics organisation. The logistics organisation for an aircraft type or types performs the vital function of sustaining operations through the provision of spares, test and support equipment, facilities, and resources for the engineering, maintenance, and operation of Defence aircraft. In Defence, Systems Program Offices (SPO) normally encompass both the logistics organisation and the AEO for relevant aircraft types. Logistics organisations are responsive to operational, engineering and maintenance organisations in sustaining the both the airworthiness and capability of Defence aircraft types.

Changing the basis of operations

9. Changes to the SOI. Changes to the SOI are managed in accordance with OAREG. SOI changes include any change to the aircraft roles, operating environment or capability determined as ‘substantial’ in accordance with OAREG 3.1.2. A substantial change is one which has an appreciable affect on aircrew training syllabi, competency management, cockpit workload, human machine interface or flight authorisation considerations. Substantial changes to the SOI must undergo Supplemental Role Approval in accordance with OAREG 3.5. The determination and management of operational changes is described in more detail in Section 4, Chapter 2.

10. Changes to the Type Design. Changes to the Type Design are managed in accordance with TAREG. Changes to the Type Design are classified as either ‘Major’ or ‘Minor’ depending on the scope, complexity and impact of the change on technical airworthiness. Major changes also require Supplemental Type Certification and SR by the Defence AA. Minor changes are managed within the extant Type Certification and SR through the relevant SPO in-service engineering and design change management processes. The classification and management of changes to the Type Design is described in more detail in Section 4, Chapter 2.

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Change of Operational Status

11. Whilst aircraft are listed on the Defence Register their operational status may be subject to change (eg individual aircraft may be placed in storage). The logistics agency responsible for an aircraft type is required to notify DACPA of any change in the operational status of an aircraft, by type and/or tail number, as appropriate, in accordance with MILAVREG 2.5—Change of operational status of a Defence registered aircraft. The change of status will then be annotated in the appropriate section of the Defence Register.

12. Similarly, where an aircraft’s airworthiness certification is compromised as a result of action or inaction during operation or maintenance activity which renders the aircraft incapable of performing in the intended roles and environment, the Defence AA is to be advised through the TAA and the relevant OAA.

IN-SERVICE FLIGHT TEST

13. Flight test is used by the OAA to underwrite Supplemental Role Approval for Substantial changes to the SOI and to assess operational effectiveness and operational suitability through the conduct of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). Similarly, the AEO uses Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) to support verification of both capability and technical airworthiness requirements in support of the design change process. MILAVREG 3.5describes the scope of activities which constitute flight test. In-service flight test activities are normally limited to:

a. operations in support of Supplemental Role Approval;

b. operations outside established operating limitations for investigative purposes; and

c. operations prior to service release of a Minor change to the Type Design in accordance with TAREG 3.5.13.

14. Flight test by an FTAA. FTAA organisations are specialist flight test organisations (FTO) whose technical and operational capabilities allow conduct of flying outside an established certification basis. FTO maintain an Airworthiness Management Plan which describes the application of OAREG and TAREG to the conduct of test activities. A FTAA may issue a Flight Test Permit (FTP) in accordance with OAREG 4.1.3—Flight Test Permit to permit such operations.

15. Test and evaluation by organisations without an FTAA. In-service test and evaluation (T&E) activities by a non-FTAA flying organisation are permitted within the scope of the OAREG for:

a. operations prior to service release of a Minor design change;

b. operations in support of Supplemental Role Approval; and

c. Operational Test and Evaluation.

16. Conduct of test and evaluation by organisations without an FTAA. The conduct of T&E activities by non-FTAA flying organisations may be achieved in accordance with OAREG 4.2 through one of three means:

a. under an FTP issued by an FTAA; or

b. under a letter of authorisation from the FTAA specifying a scope of test activity; or

c. through FTAA endorsement of a flight test plan detailing the conduct of the test operations.

GUIDANCE

• Approval to conduct T&E by non-FTAA organisations is subject to the FTAA satisfaction that the testing may be safely conducted and the scope of intended operations is sufficient to satisfy the test objectives.

OTHER OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE ESTABLISHED BASIS

17. In exceptional circumstances, the DASP allows the operation of an aircraft without normal levels of technical or operational assurance of airworthiness. Such action is only justifiable under certain conditions and where either, the operational benefits outweigh the level of risk posed by the activity, or the activity warrants acceptance of risk at higher levels of airworthiness authority. Other than flight test, MILAVREG 2.4 allows several options for in-service operations outside the established basis of operations.

18. Operational Clearance. Operational Clearance is a regulated under OAREG 2.

19. Exemptions. Exemptions to Defence airworthiness regulations are regulated under MILAVREG 1.

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20. Airworthiness Directives (AD). An AD may be used by the Defence AA to prescribe or direct a course of action in the interests of airworthiness, such as being used to permit flying operations outside the established basis of operations in justifiable circumstances. Such occasions may be beyond the scope of the aircraft DAR and OAAR to resolve and are therefore addressed through issue of an AD. Further guidance on the issue of an AD is contained in Annex A.

SUSPENSION OF FLYING OPERATIONS

21. The suspension of flight operations is regulated under MILAVREG 2. . The Defence process for identification and resolution of airworthiness issues with potential for a temporary or permanent suspension of flying operations is described further in Section 4, Chapter 3.

DEFENCE AA AIRWORTHINESS BOARD EXECUTIVE REVIEW

22. The Defence AA conducts a periodic review of the airworthiness processes associated with specific aircraft types and associated organisation as required by MILAVREG 1.9 and IAW MILAVREG 4.

AIRWORTHINESS ADVISORY CIRCULARS

23. An AAC is normally issued by the Defence AA, but may be issued by DACPA when appropriate. An AAC does not introduce new regulation; rather, it enhances compliance understanding for existing regulation or provides policy guidance for aviation issues not yet regulated that require further understanding.

Annex:

A. Airworthiness Directives

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DEFENCE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

APPLICABLE REGULATION

MILAVREG 3.6—Airworthiness Directives

BACKGROUND

1. Where an airworthiness deficiency has been identified in either an aircraft or the airworthiness management system, the Defence AA may issue an AD to describe the unacceptable condition and to prescribe procedures, conditions and limitations, if any, under which operations may continue. ADs are usually of a temporary nature and are cancelled when the deficiency has been rectified or permanent management procedures have been implemented to manage the risk of continued operation. ADs, once issued, form part of the certification basis for an aircraft.

2. Civil airworthiness authorities such as the FAA and CASA issue ADs to address deficiencies in civil aircraft airworthiness. Where Defence operates similar aircraft those ADs may apply. However, before the implementation they must be reviewed by the appropriate OAA or delegate and the applicable DAR. Where such ADs are applicable, they may be issued as an:

a. STI where technical airworthiness is in question; or

b. Defence AD where operational airworthiness is involved.

3. The difference between Defence and civilian ADs, is that Defence typically uses:

a. the STI as an equivalent for a civil AD; and

b. the Defence AD to address deficiencies with either an aircraft or the airworthiness management system.

PURPOSE

4. The Defence AA’s requirements for issue of an AD are contained at MILAVREG 3.6—Airworthiness Directives. This chapter describes:

a. the situations requiring the promulgation of an AD,

b. the process for developing an AD,

c. the endorsement and approval requirements for an AD, and

d. the in-service administration of an AD.

5. An example AD is available from the ACPA website.

SITUATIONS REQUIRING AN AD

6. Operational airworthiness. Operational airworthiness requirements necessitating an AD are normally associated with either:

a. the requirement for a clearly defined operational airworthiness management framework for a specific scenario; or

b. the requirement to conduct temporary flight operations in a condition which is not addressed within the extant certification basis (ie increased limits, alternate role, alternate environment or modified configuration).

7. Technical airworthiness. Technical airworthiness processes that address airworthiness deficiencies include, but are not limited to:

a. defect reports,

b. technical investigations,

c. STIs, and

d. Carried Forward Unserviceabilities (CFUs).

NOTE

• Technical airworthiness processes are managed by the applicable in-service AEO. Where an aircraft is required for flight operations, and the DAR believes that there

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exists an airworthiness deficiency that cannot be managed within existing Engineering Authority, then an AD may be used for authorisation.

8. Airworthiness deficiency. The types of airworthiness deficiency that are typically addressed by ADs include:

a. The requirement to operate an aircraft with an uncertified modification installed (ie the certification basis (configuration) has been compromised).

b. The requirement to operate an aircraft at a gross weight exceeding that which was addressed in the certification basis.

c. Requirement for the establishment of an interim operational airworthiness management framework for the conduct of specific aviation operations.

Examples

AD 003/99—Kiowa Maximum All Up Weight (MAUW) increase for contingency operations. This AD authorised the use of this aircraft fitted with Kiowa Interim Aerial Reconnaissance Capability (KIARC) equipment and crew protection armour at an MAUW greater than the aircraft’s flight manual MAUW limit for internal load, enabling sufficient fuel to be carried for missions of 180 minutes endurance. This was required to meet operational requirements in East Timor.

AD 004/99—Carriage of passengers in RAAF transport aircraft. This AD authorised the carriage of passengers in RAAF C–130 and Caribou aircraft, with some restrictions. These aircraft were never certified to carry passengers.

AD 002/2000—Hawk Lead-in Fighter operational airworthiness oversight prior to aircraft acceptance. This AD directed that CDR ACG provide operational airworthiness oversight of BAe Systems flight operations from RAAF Base Williamtown, and supported a CASA Civil Aviation Order that covered the conduct of production flight test of the Hawk aircraft prior to Defence registration of individual aircraft.

9. Caveat. Any flying activities that require operation of the aircraft incorporating a major change to the type design prior to the issue of a STC and Service Release will require the issue of a SFP or FTP (see Section 3, Chapter 6). This could include developmental, production or type acceptance test and evaluation flights, proof of concept or demonstration flights, ferry flights or operational test and evaluation flights prior to the issue of an STC and Service Release. However, SFPs and FTPs do not provide an adequate basis of certification to underwrite use of an aircraft for operational tasks. Consequently, operational tasking is prohibited while operating under an SFP.

NOTE

• ADs differ from SFPs in that they provide a mechanism for underwriting the use of a Defence aircraft for operational tasks or general training. However, ADs are not intended to circumvent the DASP.

REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUE OF AN AD

10. The applicant is required to assemble an application for an AD, which should include supporting documentation and endorsements from the TAA and the relevant OAA.

11. Supporting documentation. Supporting documentation is required by both the relevant OAA and the TAA to support endorsement of the AD. Such documentation includes, but is not limited to:

a. for modifications, engineering documentation as detailed in the electronic Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (eTAMM) AAP 7001.053 and TAREG 2.3—Special Flight Permits;

b. a list of known technical limitations, deficiencies and anomalies, with suggested work-arounds noted;

c. operating manuals and procedures for new equipment;

d. assessment and verification of aircraft performance and flying qualities (where applicable);

e. flight test reports if AOSG or AMAFTU have been involved;

f. flight manual amendments;

g. Flying Orders (FOs) or Special Flying Instructions (SFIs) detailing new operating procedures and any new operating limits that must be complied with;

h. flight authorisation procedures, if special authorisation is required;

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i. AVRM assessment of the proposed AD; and

j. documentation of training and proficiency required for aircrew.

12. TAA endorsement. The operation of Defence aircraft under an AD may have implications for the ongoing technical airworthiness management. Operations may affect aircraft usage (and hence fatigue accrual), or may require changes to inspection or servicing intervals. Consequently, the TAA endorsement may be qualified by additional limits or conditions.

13. OAA endorsement. The OAA’s endorsement will take into consideration the fact that an AD may authorise the full range of operational tasking that Defence is likely to encounter. The OAA may choose to include additional restrictions or conditions to ensure the ongoing operational airworthiness of a particular aviation system.

ACPA STAFF ACTION

14. AD drafting. The applicant must forward copies of the TAR and OAA endorsements and any relevant supporting documentation to ACPA. ACPA staff will draft the AD, in conjunction with the requesting organisation. The following details, if applicable, should be addressed in a draft AD covering Defence aircraft operations:

a. the existing operational limitation or restriction,

b. the specific aircraft configuration for which the AD applies,

c. the outcome of any documented reports or flight trials carried out,

d. the flight manual amendment detailing changed operating limits or restrictions,

e. flying orders detailing new operating procedures, and

f. any additional limits, restrictions or conditions identified by the TAA or OAA.

15. AD approval. ACPA will staff the draft AD through the office of the Defence AA. Once authorised, the AD will be forwarded to the applicant, operators and relevant organisations. The original copy will be held on file at ACPA.

Changes to existing ADs

16. Any changes requested to existing ADs will result in the issue of a new AD. Changes to operating limits or operating procedures not specifically documented in an AD do not constitute a change to an AD. Such limits or procedures may have been documented in other publications (eg flight manuals, FOs or SFIs) which are referenced in the AD. As long as the original references remain valid, an amendment to a referenced document does not require reissuing an AD.

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DETERMINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL CHANGES OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT



INTRODUCTION

1. Throughout the in-service life of an aircraft type the configuration, role and environment will evolve to suit operational circumstances and to ensure the type design continues to provide capability in the roles and environment documented in the SOI. Accordingly, the aircraft type will undergo both operational and technical changes. The Defence operational and technical regulatory systems are structured to adequately manage in-service changes and to take full cognisance of the impact of changes in either domain on the alternate aspect of airworthiness. Accordingly a collaborative approach is adopted to manage changes to the configuration, role or environment to ensure a cohesive introduction to service of such changes.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter describes considerations for the airworthiness management of operational and technical changes to ensure appropriate consideration is afforded to the alternate aspect of airworthiness. Detailed requirements on the management and conduct of operational and technical changes are contained in AAP 8000.010—Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual and AAP 7001.053—Technical Airworthiness Management Manual.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter is applicable to any operational or technical change to an in-service Defence registered aircraft.

INITIATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF CHANGES

INITIATION OF CHANGES

4. Changes to the configuration, role and environment of an in-service aircraft type may be initiated for operational or technical reasons. A change may be required to meet a new operational capability requirement, to enhance an existing capability, or to enable performance of an existing role with alternate mission equipment or stores. Changes may also result from a technical requirement to correct a defect to maintain the established airworthiness certification basis or as a result of changes to sub-system components supplied from a third party.

CLASSIFICATION OF TECHNICAL CHANGES

5. Technical changes are managed by the designated AEO and the DAR delegated engineering authority for the aircraft type. Changes to the configuration, capability, role or environment of an aircraft type may incur a technical change requiring the application of a formal design change process managed by the aircraft AEO. TAREG 2.5.3allows the aircraft DAR to assume all such changes are Minor except where the change:

a. introduces a new capability or significantly varies an existing capability; or

b. has an appreciable effect on the weight, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the system.

6. Where the design change meets these criteria the DAR must consult the TAA in classifying the change as ‘Minor’ or ‘Major’. Importantly, a change which meets these criteria is not automatically classified as Major. In consulting the TAA, the DAR may present a case supporting classification of the design as Minor. Major changes warrant additional airworthiness oversight and require Supplemental Type Certification (STC) by the Defence AA. Where the TAA is satisfied that the change does not require the additional level of oversight, the change may be classified as Minor.

7. Management of Major changes to Type Design. Major changes to type design are managed through the Type Certification and Service Release process documented in Section 3. The technical and operational airworthiness frameworks contain respective airworthiness management requirements for such changes.

8. Management of Minor changes to Type Design. Minor changes to type design are managed within the operational and technical airworthiness frameworks. Detailed guidance on technical change management processes are contained within AAP 7001.053—electronic Technical Airworthiness Management Manual.

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CLASSIFICATION OF OPERATIONAL CHANGES

9. Operational changes are managed by the OAAR or an appointed member of operational airworthiness staff within the Force Element Group (FEG) or equivalent operational headquarters. Operational changes must be judged as either ‘Substantial’ or ‘Non-Substantial’ in accordance with OAREG. The OAAR may assume all operational changes to aircraft capability, role or environment are Non-Substantial, except where:

a. the change introduces a new configuration, role or environment to the aircraft type; or

b. the change modifies an existing configuration, role or environment such that there is an appreciable affect on aircrew training syllabi, competency management, cockpit workload, human machine interface or flight authorisation considerations.

10. Where the operational change meets these criteria, the OAAR must seek classification of the change from a Flight Test Approval Authority with flight test expertise with the aircraft type. The FTAA provided experience in the conduct of test and evaluation activities is applicable to assessing the nature of the operational change, and the likely test requirements to fully determine the scope of supporting changes required of the relevant flying management system, or any new operational limitations. The FTAA should make the determination in consultation with the OAAR to ensure the appropriate scope of operations resulting in the role change is being considered. Where the FTAA considers that FTAA oversight of flight testing is required to fully evaluate the impact of the change on operational airworthiness, the change is to be classified as ‘Substantial’.

11. Management of Substantial operational changes. Substantial operational changes must undergo ‘Supplemental Role Approval’ by the relevant OAA in accordance with OAREG. Substantial changes usually result in amendment to the SOI for the aircraft type.

12. Management of Non–Substantial operational changes. Non-Substantial operational changes are managed within the FMS of the relevant aircraft type through review and amendment to procedures, orders, and instructions, and adjustments to training curriculum.

MANAGEMENT OF TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL CHANGES

MAJOR VERSUS SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES

13. By virtue of the scope and complexity involved, a Major change to the Type Design usually involves a substantial operational change to the aircraft capability, roles or environment. In such cases, the operational aspects of the Type Certification and Service Release (SR) processes adequately address the operational requirement for Supplemental Role Approval. Therefore, issue of an STC and SR, including development and approval of the SOI, negate the requirement for a separate process addressing only the operational airworthiness requirements. Accordingly, Supplemental Role Approval need only be conducted for Substantial operational changes where no corresponding technical change, or where a Minor technical change to the aircraft is required.

IMPACT OF TECHNICAL CHANGES ON OPERATIONAL AIRWORTHINESS

14. Whilst the DAR and AEO for an aircraft type operate predominantly within the technical airworthiness framework, technical staffs are obliged to take cognisance of the impact of minor technical changes to the Type Design on operational airworthiness. This should be evident throughout the Design Acceptance process, beginning with specification development where consultation with operational staff is appropriate to ensure the specification for the change, including any airworthiness requirements, adequately covers the operational requirement. Verification activity may include participation by flight test agencies to evaluate the impact of the change on operational airworthiness. Such participation is mandatory where Minor change to the Type Design involves a Substantial operational change (and thus requires Supplemental Role Approval). Prior to Design Acceptance, the aircraft DAR must be satisfied that all operational airworthiness considerations have been appropriately accounted for. Prior to incorporation of the change onto the aircraft, TAREG 3.5.12 requires that the operating instructions have received operational endorsement for any change which affects functional performance or other operational characteristics of the aircraft.

15. Configuration Control Boards (CCB). The CCB is a mechanism through which the operational aspects of a Minor technical change may be considered. Each stakeholder in the change management process is usually represented at the CCB including technical, operational, logistics and financial management staff. Proposed design changes will be raised at the CCB where the operational representative should consider what further operational airworthiness action may be required to support the change. Where a technical change impacts operational airworthiness, the change should be referred to the OAAR or appointed representative for operational airworthiness classification. CCBs held to approve incorporation and Service Release of Minor design changes are normally subject to the satisfaction of the operational representative that operational airworthiness considerations have been appropriately accounted for.

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IMPACT OF OPERATIONAL CHANGES ON TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS

16. Changes initiated by Capability Managers, or operational units concerned with operating the aircraft type, must similarly undergo an assessment by technical personnel to determine whether a resulting design change will be required. Operational changes are normally managed through amendment of the SOI. Where a proposed operational change is sought, the operational headquarters must confirm that the change can be technically supported. OAREG 2.1.2—Management of the SOI requires that the aircraft DAR is notified of any change to the SOI. The DAR will assess the impact of the change on the existing certification basis of the aircraft and will determine whether a resulting technical change is required. Where no design change is necessary, technical airworthiness consideration of the change is required to ensure the impact of the change on ongoing airworthiness management is appropriately accounted for. This may include aircraft or engine structural integrity management, maintenance management, logistics planning, etc.

17. Supplemental Role Approval. Where Supplemental Role Approval is required for a Substantial change to the operational capability, role or environment, the OAAR must ensure corresponding technical and logistics implications have been assessed and accounted for. Prior to approving the supplemental role, the OAA must confirm the adequacy of technical and logistics arrangements supporting the new or modified role or environment.

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SUSPENSION OF FLYING OPERATIONS


MILAVREG 2.6—Suspension of flying operations

INTRODUCTION

1. At times the condition of an aircraft or an organisation supporting the operation of an aircraft may no longer support airworthy operations. At such times, or when reasonable doubt exists regarding the condition of an aircraft such that it may not support safe operations, operational commanders must suspend flying operations appropriate to the circumstances. The nature of the causal factors will largely dictate the extent of the suspension and will similarly impact the course of action to re-commence operations. MILAVREG 2.6—Suspension of flying operations contains the Defence Aviation Authority’s (Defence AA) requirements for the suspension of operations of Defence aircraft.

PURPOSE

2. This chapter describes the circumstances resulting in a suspension of operations and the mechanisms to recommence flying activity.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter is applicable to operations involving any Defence aircraft.

SUSPENDING FLYING OPERATIONS

SUSPENSION MECHANISMS

4. Several mechanisms are available to suspend the flying operations of an aircraft:

a. Command or Aircraft Captain Temporary Cessation of Flying Operations. This describes any situation where an officer in the operational chain of command (Detachment Commander, Commanding Officer, Officer Commanding or Force Element Group Commander, or equivalent) decides to temporarily cease operation of one or more aircraft within the officer’s command. Command may also suspend operation of aviation system equipment impacting flying operations. A decision to apply a command suspension of flying is to be immediately referred to the Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA) or Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (OAAR) with appropriate recommendations.

b. OAA or OAAR Suspension of Flying Operations. The OAA, or the OAAR if so delegated, decides to temporarily cease operation of one or more aircraft for which the officer is responsible.

c. Cancellation of Service Release, Special Flight Permit (SFP) or Airworthiness Directive (AD). The Defence AA, on the basis of recommendations from either the OAA, TAA or the Airworthiness Board, may remove the Service Release, SFP or AD for any of the following reasons:

(1) Certification of an aircraft against the certification basis has been compromised to the extent that the Australian AMTC has been withdrawn.

(2) Certification of an aircraft against the certification basis has been compromised to the extent that the Interim Type Certificate is no longer valid.

(3) Maintenance, engineering or operational organisations are unable to comply with the airworthiness regulations and, hence, aircraft airworthiness cannot be assured.

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CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING SUSPENSION OF OPERATIONS

5. Unserviceability. The aircraft captain or maintenance crew report an unserviceability that warrants further action. An unserviceability affecting the airworthiness of the aircraft that cannot be simply handled within normal maintenance procedures must immediately be advised to the aircraft DAR and OAAR. Where the unserviceability affects the ability of the aircraft to operate safely, suspension of operations with that aircraft is required until the unserviceability can be rectified. Where the unserviceability affects, or is suspected to affect, part or all of the aircraft fleet, a fleet wide suspension of operations may be warranted. The DAR is required to advise the TAA in accordance with TAREG 2.6.5—Notification of unairworthy conditions, and the appropriate operational commander. Based on the recommendation of the DAR, the commander may elect to impose a command suspension of operations and advise the OAA and OAAR.

6. Unsafe Operational Condition. Operation of Defence aircraft within normal operating limits may result in the occurrence of an unsafe operational condition. Normally, such occurrences are managed through the Aviation Safety Occurrence Reporting (ASOR) and Operational Hazard (OPHAZ) reporting process. However, where the occurrence of the unsafe condition affects routine operations, or cannot be predictably identified, a suspension of operations may be appropriate until further investigation under flight test conditions has occurred. The OAAR may elect to suspend flying operations in consultation with the aircraft DAR and Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA). The suspension of operations must be advised to the OAAR and OAA. Where the certification basis is compromised to the extent that the AMTC is no longer valid, the Defence AA, based on the advice of the TAA and OAA, may consider withdrawing the Type Certificate and Service Release for the aircraft. For aircraft operating under a temporary Airworthiness Instrument, where the certification of an aircraft against the certification basis has been compromised to the extent that the interim type certification is no longer valid, the Defence AA, based on the advice of the TAA and OAA, may consider withdrawing the temporary Airworthiness Instrument for the aircraft.

7. Engineering Deficiency or Service Bulletin. The Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) for an aircraft type may determine that an engineering deficiency exists through routine activities or following issue of an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Service Bulletin. Where such a deficiency affects, or is suspected to affect, the immediate airworthiness of the relevant Defence aircraft type, the DAR must advise the TAA in accordance with TAREG 2.6.5—Notification of unairworthy conditions, and the relevant operational commander. Based on the advice of the DAR, the operational commander may elect to enforce a command suspension of operations and advise the OAA and OAAR. Where the certification basis is compromised to the extent that the AMTC is no longer valid, the Defence AA, following the advice of the TAA and OAA, may consider withdrawing the Type Certificate and Service Release for the aircraft. For aircraft operating under a temporary Airworthiness Instrument, where the certification of an aircraft against the certification basis has been compromised to the extent that the interim type certification is no longer valid, the Defence AA, following the advice of the TAA and OAA, may consider withdrawing the temporary Airworthiness Instrument for the aircraft.

8. Organisational Issues. There are instances where commanders, the DAR, the OAA, the TAA, or Airworthiness Board may consider that the organisation or organisations that underpin safe flying operations (i.e. the operating organisation, the maintenance organisation or the engineering organisation) are incapable of doing so. In such cases, the OAA or TAA may recommend to the Defence AA that the Service Release (SR), SFP or AD be limited or cancelled until the deficiencies can be rectified. The Defence AA may limit or remove the SR, SFP or AD for the affected aircraft type thus suspending or restricting operations.

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COMMUNICATION OF AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES

9. Underpinning the mechanisms for suspension of operations is the expectation that:

a. at the operating and AEO level, there is timely and effective communication between technical airworthiness and operational airworthiness staff

b. there is timely and effective communication of:

(1) capability issues through the chain of command to the applicable Service Chief

(2) airworthiness issues through the TAA and OAA to the Defence AA (through DACPA).

10. Where flying is suspended through Defence AA removal of SR, SFP or AD, the OAA, TAA, OC or equivalent of the relevant System Program Office, OAAR and/or OAAR(Acq) are to be advised.

NOTE

• The use of differing terms such as Operational Pause or Pause in Flying Operations in place of Suspension of Flying Operations is to be avoided. The use of alternative terms does not negate the intent of MILAVREG 2.6 and all actions required by the regulation.

COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOLLOWING SUSPENSION

11. Mechanisms to enable the recommencement of flying operations include:

a. Restriction of Flying Operations. A restriction of flying operations places limitations on the operation of an aircraft type or system pending resolution of airworthiness concerns and is usually promulgated through Flying Orders (FOs) or Special Flying Instructions (SFIs). Commanders may at any time limit the operations of aircraft or systems under command while seeking OAAR or OAA action.

b. Special Technical Instruction (STI). An STI is a mechanism for issuing urgent design change and continuing airworthiness instructions, prescribed inspections, and conditions and limitations under which the aircraft or system may continue to be operated. The DAR of the AEO responsible for the aircraft type may issue a STI in accordance with TAREG 3.5.11—Special Technical Instructions.

12. Isolated Airworthiness Problem. Suspension of operations of a limited number of aircraft may be lifted following implementation of measures to assure the safety of operations with those aircraft. Typically, these will be determined between the DAR and operational commanders through implementation of a FO, SFI or STI with advice of the action taken provided to the TAA and OAA.

13. Fleet-wide Airworthiness Problem. Following a fleet wide suspension where a SR has not been cancelled or limited, regardless of who imposed the suspension, operations may resume following a TAA recommendation and subsequent approval by the OAA that the mechanisms implemented to assure airworthiness are adequate. On initial determination that there may be a fleet-wide airworthiness deficiency and, that continued flying might present an unacceptable risk, the responsible commander will consider a command suspension of flying operations to assure safety and initiate an investigation. Following notification to the OAA and TAA, outcomes from the investigation may include:

a. The aircraft type DAR and operational commander agree a way forward to manage aircraft operations as required to assure airworthiness. Mechanisms to achieve this will include the use of a STI, FO or SFI and such flying suspension or operating restrictions necessary to accommodate implementation.

b. An operational commander decision to recommend to the OAA that either:

(1) operations can resume with caveats described in a FO or SFI

(2) suspension of flight operations be formalised through an AD or a limitation to Service Release or SFP. Sup

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COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOLLOWING CANCELLATION OR LIMITATION TO AIRWORTHINESS INSTRUMENTS

14. Cancellation of Service Release, SFP or AD. Only the Defence AA can reissue the Service Release, SFP or AD and may do so following advice from the OAA and TAA and Airworthiness Board that appropriate measures have been implemented to assure safety, and that operations may commence subject to any conditions and limitations. Limitations to Service Release, SFP or AD may be amended or lifted by the nominated representative following completion of any necessary activities specified by the Defence AA. DACPA normally manages limitations to SR, SFP and AD on behalf of the Defence AA.

15. Withdrawal of AMTC. If, after completing all necessary investigation to quantify and resolve the airworthiness deficiency, the OAA and TAA believe that the aircraft type can no longer be safely operated in the Defence roles, then the OAA may recommend to the Defence AA to remove the AMTC (and consequently, the Service Release). The resumption of flying operations for the affected type will then only occur following a formal Type Certification or Supplemental Type Certification process and recommendation from the OAA, TAA and the Airworthiness Board.

NON-DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

16. Where a suspension of flying operations involves a non-Defence registered aircraft, the OAA and commanders might have less control over rectification of the issue; however, they retain a duty of care for Defence personnel using the aircraft. The processes outlined in MILAVREG 2.6 provides a suitable basis for an OAA and commanders to ensure appropriate Defence agencies are involved in the suspension and resumption of flying of these platforms.


17. Further information on airworthiness policy relating to the suspension of operations should be sought from ACPA.

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IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT


MILAVREG 1.9—Airworthiness review responsibility


MILAVREG 4.2—Airworthiness Board conduct

MILAVREG 4.3—Airworthiness Board outcomes

INTRODUCTION

1. MILAVREG 1.9 and MILAVREG 2.4 require each Defence registered aircraft type to undergo a periodic review of the basis of certification and Service Release by the Defence AA executive review board, the Airworthiness Board. Requirements for the conduct and outcomes of the Airworthiness Board are contained in MILAVREG 4. The airworthiness/aviation safety management of each aircraft type is reviewed at an Airworthiness Board to ensure that they are being maintained and operated within the roles defined in the SOI, the basis of certification remains valid, the integrated logistics support arrangements are still relevant to the defined aircraft roles and that the safety management system remains appropriate and effective. The objective of the review is to validate the currency of the existing Service Release (SR).

PURPOSE

2. This chapter describes the process by which the basis of Type Certification and SR of a Defence registered aircraft is reviewed.

APPLICABILITY

3. This chapter is applicable to the Airworthiness Board review of Defence registered aircraft and organisations who manage the airworthiness of Defence registered aircraft.

KEY CONCEPTS

IN-SERVICE AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT

4. In-service airworthiness is managed within the context of the operational and technical airworthiness frameworks established by the OAR and the TAR. An overview of the in-service airworthiness management is described in Section 4 Chapter 1. An overview of the operational and technical regulatory frameworks is described in Section 1 Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.

THE ROLE OF THE AIRWORTHINESS BOARD

5. The DASP includes a review function for the in-service operation of Defence registered aircraft. The airworthiness of Defence registered aircraft is established through a process of Type Certification and SR (see Section 3) and is maintained through management by competent organisations in accordance with the OAREG and TAREG. The aim of an Airworthiness Board is:

a. to review the basis of certification as identified in the relevant Type Certification Data Sheet (TCDS) to ensure the continued validity of the relevant AMTC; and

b. to review the conduct of operational, maintenance, engineering, logistical and safety management activities supporting the ongoing operation under the extant Service Release.

6. Airworthiness Board reviews are not limited to aircraft types. Organisations and aviation support systems may also be subject to independent review. Supers

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SCOPE OF THE AIRWORTHINESS BOARD REVIEW

7. The cornerstone of the Airworthiness Board review is the verification that the operational, maintenance, engineering, logistics and safety management aspects covered in annex A to MILAVREG 4.2—Airworthiness Board conduct (Section 2, Chapter 4, annex A) are sufficient to support operation in the roles approved in the SOI. In general, the presentation should concentrate on significant operational, maintenance, engineering, logistics support and safety management criteria and provide a detailed breakdown of any important changes or reason for non-compliance.

8. Developments. The Airworthiness Board must be made aware of any significant changes affecting the way aviation activities are conducted. The following list describes significant key activities that the Airworthiness Board must be briefed on:

a. Special conditions or limitations for in-service needs that are put into effect by either a SFP or an AD;

b. Activities conducted under an Operational Clearance.

c. New roles approved by the OAA through Supplemental Role Approval, including action taken to implement the role into the flying management organisation;

d. Special developments such as the advancement of Aircrew Training Accreditation on certified simulators; and

e. Any operational or engineering changes that are deemed to improve or affect the way roles are fulfilled.

AIRWORTHINESS BOARD CONDUCT

9. Notification. Formal notification for each Airworthiness Board will be forwarded by DACPA to airworthiness managers approximately 10 weeks before the Airworthiness Board convenes.

10. Submissions. Written submissions are to be raised by the airworthiness managers as nominated in the notification and forwarded to ACPA four weeks before the Airworthiness Board. This timeframe is required to enable sufficient time for ACPA staff to review and collate the submissions and forward them to the Board members. Each submission should expand on the MILAVREG 4 requirements and cover all of the airworthiness management and Service Release aspects that are detailed in the submission template provided by ACPA with the notification. Each submission template also provides detailed guidance on the information required. The draft agenda, outlining the order of conduct of an Airworthiness Board, is also provided by ACPA with the notification.

11. Collation. ACPA is to collate all written submissions received from the nominated airworthiness managers. The assembled submissions are to be presented to the Airworthiness Board members for their review, approximately two weeks before the Board. Copies of the information forwarded to the Airworthiness Board members, along with the final agenda are made available to other stakeholders by electronic means.

12. Attendance. Sufficient personnel should attend the Airworthiness Board to address any questions the Board members may raise in the course of proceedings. This may include personnel from operational, engineering, maintenance, test, aviation safety or regulatory domains. As well as responsible officers, a senior technician from the operating unit(s) under review should attend to provide specialist maintenance comment if required.

13. Outcomes. The proceedings and outcomes of the Airworthiness Board are documented in an Airworthiness Board Report (ABR). The ABR formally records all Observations, Notes and Concerns raised by the AwB members and incorporates any ACARs requiring closure to maintain the Service Release. The ABR is forwarded to the Defence AA through the DACPA with a recommendation concerning the continuation of Service Release.

14. ACPA monitors ACAR status and resolution progress.

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REQUIREMENTS FOR ORGANISATIONS AND SYSTEMS UNDER REVIEW

15. Defence registered aircraft types. The five functional areas responsible for submissions to the Airworthiness Board are as follows:

a. Force Element Group (FEG), OAAR or OAAR (Acq). The operating OAAR/OAAR (Acq) is responsible for reporting to the Airworthiness Board on the operations and operational maintenance elements of the submission including:

(1) reporting on each element of the FMS required by OAREG 2.1 for the aircraft type;

(2) reporting on any changes to the SOI including approval of supplemental roles by the OAA; and

(3) reporting on maintenance activity supporting operation with the aircraft type.

b. Long term detachment (more than 30 days), isolated Units and Ships Flights. Ships Flight Commanders, Detachment Commanders or Commanding Officers are responsible for providing:

(1) a summary of how operational airworthiness oversight was achieved

(2) a summary of how technical airworthiness oversight was achieved

(3) reporting on the continuing adequacy of maintenance arrangements and the extent of maintenance conducted.

c. Systems Program Office (SPO) and DAR. The SPO is responsible for:

(1) reporting to the Airworthiness Board on the conduct of in-service engineering activities for the aircraft type

(2) reporting to the Airworthiness Board on the adequacy of the in-service logistics support infrastructure.

d. Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS). DDAAFS is responsible for reporting to the Airworthiness Board on any aviation safety matters affecting the aircraft type.

e. Directorate General Technical Airworthiness–ADF (DGTA–ADF) and TAA. DGTA–ADF staff are responsible for:

(1) reporting to the Airworthiness Board on the aircraft structural integrity management program

(2) reporting on any systems integrity issues that are applicable to the aircraft type

(3) reporting on any significant outcomes of compliance assurance activity.

16. Flight test organisation (FTO). Airworthiness Board FTO review requirements are similar to Defence registered aircraft with the following differences and exceptions:

a. a brief summary of major flight test activities conducted by the FTAA should be provided including those conducted by external organisations for which FTAA oversight has been maintained

b. operational airworthiness and maintenance activities with aircraft which have been allocated for flight test should be briefed by the FTAA in relation to the flight test Airworthiness Management Plan rather than the aircraft SOI

c. airworthiness management of aircraft permanently allocated to the flight test organisation should be included

d. engineering activities should be limited to those conducted by the engineering element of the flight test organisation

e. logistics support aspects specific to flight test systems which support the airworthiness of operations, such as logistics support for non-standard modifications, management of instrumentation and telemetry equipment.

17. Other organisations. The application of the Airworthiness Board process to non-Defence registered aircraft, AvSS and UAS is described in Section 5. Policy regarding the application of the Airworthiness Board process to such systems is under development and may be promulgated via amendment.

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RESERVED

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MILAVREG 6 – AVIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS

GUIDANCE MATERIAL AND ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE

MILAVREG 6.1.a

The OAR and TAR must consider AvSS compliance with International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 1988 and Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) to assure interoperability with non-Defence aviation activities.

1. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that Aviation Support Systems (AvSS) are sufficiently regulated so that suitability for flight is not compromised.

2. As advised in Section 1, Chap 1–Introduction para 2, the Chicago Convention, including associated amending protocols, is set out in the Schedules to the Air Navigation Act 1920 (Clth), and further implemented through the Civil Aviation Act (CAA) 1988 (Clth) (the Act). Consistent with Article 3 of the Chicago Convention, Section 4 of Part I of the Act states that ‘except where the expression state aircraft is used, references in Part III or IIIB or section 98 to aircraft or air navigation do not include references to state aircraft or air navigation by state aircraft. A significant consideration is that the use of the term state aircraft may not exempt all Defence AvSS from the Act because Defence provides AvSS to civil aircraft, which are required to comply with the Act, therefore the Defence services provided to civil aircraft must also comply in order to be interoperable. Civil aircraft operate in Defence controlled airspace, and Defence aircraft operate in civil controlled airspace; as such, Defence is well motivated to align with the Act to ensure interoperability between Defence and civil aviation.

3. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is the agency responsible for implementing Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (CAR) and Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) 1998, which are derived from the CAA 1988 and other Acts.

4. The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) implements the requirements set by the Chicago Convention through the distribution of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS). ICAO publishes Annexes to the Convention that contain SARPS and Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) documents that provide guidance and information facilitating the uniform application of the SARPS.1 ICAO Annexes2 have a higher status than PANS documents, therefore MILAVREG 6 will normally only make mention of ICAO Annexes when used for acceptable mean of compliance. As States may also exempt themselves from ICAO SARPS, any significant differences to ICAO SARPS should be documented as an exemption as identified in ICAO Annex 15, Appendix 1 section GEN 1.7.

MILAVREG 6.1.b

The OAR and TAR must consider if existing Commonwealth regulations and/or controls are adequate for achieving AvSS compliance vice being regulated under MILAVREG 6.

5. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensue that AvSS is regulated for safety only and no more.

6. Commonwealth regulations can include building codes, civil engineering standards, and other civilian rules and practices. Defence regulations used to manage Defence resources and logistics in support of an AvSS output may also be applicable.

1 ICAO Doc 7231/11. 2 MILAVREG 6 refers to Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation simply as ICAO Annexes.

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MILAVREG 6.2.a

The OAA must approve an AvSS Certificate (AvSSC), or equivalent document, prior to introduction into service and ensure the AvSSC remains current for as long as the AvSS remains in–service in order to ensure that the AvSS will not compromise suitability for flight.

7. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that an AvSS has been designed, constructed, and can be maintained and operated for its intended purpose.

8. An AvSSC fulfils a similar purpose for AvSS that an AMTC does for aircraft. Certification is the end result of a process which formally examines and documents compliance of a product against predefined standards, to the satisfaction of the certificating authority.3

9. The OAA chooses how AvSSCs are managed. AvSS may be interchangeable among various platforms, each providing the same output but may not be entirely approved under the same regulations as far as equipment is concerned. For example, should an AvSS service be provided from an aircraft or ship (vice a land based system) the aircraft or ship systems utilised to provide the service are certified as part of the aircraft’s AMTC or the ship’s equivalent document vice MILAVREG 6 requirements. Therefore, only the service provider’s operational staff would be captured under AVSS regulations. Such flexibility allows for effective regulatory integration in order to assure suitability for flight is not compromised regardless of the platform used.

10. The management process should account for multiple types and occurrences of AvSS. However, while multiples of the same type of AvSS can be included on a single AvSSC, different types of AvSS can not be combined (eg aerodrome and ATM).

11. An AvSSC can be approved for a limited scope of activity such as T&E or operational activities. For example testing of NAVAIDs and duration of deployment are scope limitations.

12. An AvSSC is supported by the following documents:

a. A Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) or equivalent document.4

b. An AvSS Management Plan (AvSSMP), or equivalent document.

c. An Accomplishment Summary, or equivalent document.

13. Supporting documents. The AvSSC supporting documents ensure that AvSS management begins at the commencement of the acquisition process (SOI), continues throughout the life cycle of the system (AvSSMP) and provides the appropriate summary used to make AvSSC determinations (Accomplishment Summary). MILAVREG 1.7 requires the TAA to ensure that the AvSS complies with the AvSS management frameworks established by the TAR, and to make recommendation to the OAA regarding the issue of the AvSS instruments, which include the AvSSC supporting documents. To afford ease of verifying the TAA has provided appropriate recommendations, the OAA approval and the TAA recommendation signatures for all AvSSC supporting documents should be co-located on each document.

14. Equivalent document. An equivalent AvSSC document may be any document that achieves the same purpose as the required outcome under MILAVREG 6, including those superseded Installation Operating Permits (IOP) and Limited Operating Permits (LOP) and their supporting documents. As these documents are reviewed and updated, the AvSS is expected to use the document identified in the relevant regulation. Over time, this implementation process will standardise Defence AvSS management without imposing unnecessary resource expenditure.

15. Legacy systems. Legacy systems are those AvSS that have been in service before MILAVREG 6 was established. The resources required to produce all AvSSC supporting documents for legacy AvSS may exceed the benefit. Should existing documents achieve the intent of MILAVREG 6, then the OAA may consider those documents to be a suitable equivalent. Should a legacy system be subject to a Substantial Change then it is expected that MILAVREG 6 be complied with using the supporting documents identified in the regulation. Existing Defence aerodromes are examples of legacy systems.

3 DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program – Annex A definitions para g. 4 In the case of an aerodrome an equivalent document is an aerodrome manual (refer to OAREG 6). Aerodromes are distinctly different than other AvSS, if for no other reason than their ‘static nature’ and the large amount of civil engineering requirements that control the aerodrome build process. The replacement of the SOI with an aerodrome manual ensures a standard for aerodromes that captures required operational information, affords a reduction in resource requirements.

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16. Waivers. While some AvSS service providers will utilise more than one AvSSC in support of the overall service output, other AvSS service providers may not need an AvSSC at all should the equipment utilised already be regulated elsewhere, or the AvSS is an intellectual output vice equipment based. Where practicable and justifiable the OAA may provide a waiver to any or all AvSSC supporting documents. For example, it may be a legacy system that has a different process but still can demonstrate suitability for flight will not be compromised, or it may be that the AvSS has little relevant equipment to certify and the process exceeds the benefits, hence not IAW the ALARP process.

17. Unless the OAA determines otherwise, and noting that other OAREG or TAREG may still apply as determined by the OAR/TAR, the following AvSS do not require an AvSSC:5

a. ARFF

b. Aeronautical information (if the TAR considers another system provides sufficient oversight)

c. ACD

d. AWR6

e. Medical

f. JPR

g. MET

h. TAC.

18. The OAA will seek and obtain TAA technical advice regarding AvSSC and supporting documents as required. MILAVREG 1.7 requires the TAA to make recommendations and communicate technical risks to the relevant OAA.

19. Should the OAA authorise a waiver, in order to ensure the waiver is retained within the AvSS management system, the waiver process used should:

a. Follow the AvSSC approval process.

b. In place of expected AvSSC supporting document requirements, the AvSSC should record the reasons for the waiver, including any supporting criteria.

20. An AvSSC template is available from the ACPA website.

21. The AvSSC information should include:

a. The identity of the AvSS.

b. A reference to the approved SOI, or in the case of an aerodrome the approved aerodrome manual.

c. A reference to the approved AvSS Management Plan (AvSSMP).

d. For aerodromes, state the:

(1) classification (if approved as a heliport)

(2) category.

e. Any AvSS restrictions, limitations or waivers. An AvSS restriction is an imposed condition that is intended to restrain the use of an AvSS even though it may be able to achieve the desired output. For example, an ABM system intended for ATC use might be restricted to military aircraft only depending on the certification outcomes.

f. The review period, if any.

g. The AvSSC expiry date, if any.

h. Other OAA stipulations.

5 If an AvSSC is not required, then by extension any AvSSC supporting documents are also not required. 6 As advised under the AvSS determination section, AWR (infrastructure only), medical and JPR are exempt from MILAVREG 6 and are included here to ensure awareness of their status.

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MILAVREG 6.2.b

The OAA must approve a SOI, or equivalent document, which details the intended AvSS CRE and provides the context of how the AvSS will be utilised by those CRE.

22. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that the AvSS will be operated outside of approved configuration, roles and environments (CRE).

23. A SOI should address the following details:

a. The identification and configuration of those AvSS elements that have a functional or physical interface with aircraft, and have the potential to compromise suitability for flight so that only those elements of the AvSS that need to be regulated are regulated.

b. A description of the AvSS operational roles.

c. A description of the environment in which the AvSS is expected to operate.

24. For aerodromes, an aerodrome manual is an equivalent SOI document.

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MILAVREG 6.2.c

The OAA must approve an AvSSMP, or equivalent document, which details the implementation and the ongoing in-service management.

25. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensue that the scope and requirements of an AvSS are managed over the full lifecycle.

26. The AvSSMP should be updated at the beginning of each phase of the capability lifecycle. The capability lifecycle phases for new AvSS are described in the Defence Capability Development Handbook.

27. An AvSSMP will vary depending on the type of AvSS supported. An AvSSMP is not intended to be an overly detailed document; rather it is the regulator desired outcome that will ensure appropriate AvSS requirements have been considered and addressed. While noting each AvSSMP will be different, the AvSSMP should include references or information which may include:

a. A description of the AvSS, including any CoC requirements that will attest that a product conforms to its intended design.

b. A reference to the approved SOI. If the SOI has not yet been approved at the initial planning stages of a project, provide detail on the expected operating CRE. Once the AvSS has achieved 1st Pass Approval in the Defence Major Capability process, or equivalent if the new AvSS is being obtained by Defence using another process, the SOI should be available and the AvSSMP should then reference the applicable SOI vice listing CRE separately within the AvSSMP.

c. An outline of the scope of the acquisition activity to introduce an AvSS, or to make a Substantial Change to an existing AvSS. The outline is intended to provide basic awareness of the overall process to be followed. It should only make reference to any complex documents or processes, vice including any substantial detail in the AvSSMP.

d. The technical and/or operational regulations that apply to the AvSS. The degree of regulatory oversight of the design, construction, maintenance and operation of an AvSS requires tailoring to specific systems to suit the AvSS CRE capabilities. The OAA, in conjunction with the TAA, should determine the system rigour required to ensure an AvSS can achieve the intended output.

e. The system safety requirements that apply to the AvSS. System safety requirements should consider what the AvSS will be used for and from this activity invoke appropriate limitations on resources in order to assure that the AvSS is neither over nor under designed. For example, a system used to ensure collision avoidance or separation assurance would require a higher degree of availability and reliability than a system used to provide advisory information.

f. Operational and technical training requirements. The detail need only provide basic concepts of the requirements that directly relate to the AvSS, such as training course duration and training provider details.

g. A reference to any design acceptance and operational certification requirements. Test and evaluation (T&E) planning details should be broadly provided or a reference provided for the location of the T&E plan to be utilised. The T&E information should also advise the funding provided as part of the contract to develop the system.

h. A reference to any activities and tasks supporting the certification activity and compliance with operational and technical regulatory requirements.

i. Logistics, technical and operational activities undertaken in support of the AvSSC.

j. A schedule of the milestones for providing the key documentation and plans.

k. The AvSS organisational responsibilities and any delegations.

l. The responsible organisations for compliance with technical regulatory oversight of the AvSS.

m. The responsible organisations for compliance with operational regulatory oversight of the AvSS.

n. Other required activities.

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MILAVREG 6.2.d

The OAA must obtain an Accomplishment Summary, or equivalent document, from the organisation executive sponsoring the AvSS prior to AvSSC approval, which assures the SOI and AvSSMP requirements regarding design, construction, maintenance and operation have been achieved.

28. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that the results of any activity necessary to achieve an AvSSC are provided to the relevant authority to substantiate the assurances required in order to approve an AvSSC. Such assurances may include:

a. Reference to the approved SOI and/or the AvSSMP.

b. Design acceptance outcomes, including limitations or adverse findings.

c. Status of technical, logistics and infrastructure support availability.

d. Status of relevant Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP) management framework. The titles and amendment status of relevant OIP should be included, and any outstanding issues identified.

e. Status and availability of qualified, trained and competent maintenance and operational personnel. Personnel reports should indicate whether sufficient capability does in fact exist.

f. Compliance with the integrated Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS), including a safety case that nominates hazards present within the system and retained risks. The basic requirement is to identify that an ASMS exists and point to its location.

g. Results of any other required activities.

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MILAVREG 6.2.e

The TAA must ensure a Certificate of Conformance (CoC), or equivalent document, is obtained that confirms compliance with the approved AvSS design for multiple instances of a system intended to operate under a single AvSSC as identified in the AvSSMP.

29. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to afford a means to reduce compliance costs when other activites can provide required assurances to achieve the intended outcome

30. A CoC is a certificate attesting that an individual instance of an AvSS that will have multiple installations has been examined and conforms to the intended AvSS design. A single instance of an AvSS, or the first of multiple AvSS installations does not require a CoC.

31. Utilisation of a CoC for identical AvSS instances (except the initial instance) minimises resource expenditure, as the AvSSC and supporting AvSSC documents have already been approved in the first instance.

32. An example of multiple instances of an AvSS is an ATM system that will install an identical design at more than one location. The initial ATM installation would obtain an AvSSC based upon the SOI, AvSSMP and accomplishment summary, but would not require a CoC. Any follow on installations would only require a CoC in order to be utilised, as the first installation already has all required system documentation.

33. A CoC is normally obtained from the contractor and may use any format accepted by the TAA. A CoC may be recorded separately or appended to the AvSSC. Once obtained, the CoC validity should be confirmed concurrently with any relevant AvSSC review.

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MILAVREG 6.2.f

The OAA and/or TAA must ensure that a system is established that provides appropriate review of in–service AvSS modifications that can determine if a modification is a Substantial Change, and if found to be a Substantial Change, the AvSSC is reviewed as required.

34. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that appropriate oversight is proved to in–service AvSS that maintains the AvSS integrity.

35. A Substantial Change is one that may introduce a potential for an in-service AvSS to compromise suitability for flight. Changes to AvSS that could be deemed Substantial include:

a. CRE

b. HMI

c. operator training syllabi

d. competency management

e. operations authorisation processes

f. design basis of the system

g. any other AvSSC approval considerations.

36. Not all changes to in-service AvSS will require an OAA and/or TAA assessment. The system established to determine which changes require OAA and/or TAA determinations may be as simple as the normal filter process that is associated with routine staffing and management of AvSS requirements.

37. For a Substantial Change to an existing in–service AvSS, the AvSSMP should be updated before the change is developed and implemented.

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MILAVREG 6.3.a

The OAA must approve an AvSS Authority to Operate (AUTHOP) that confirms the ongoing logistic, technical, and operational arrangements supporting the AvSS are satisfactory.

38. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that the overall service output of an AvSS, which may include use of more than one AvSSC, is only provided once the relevant authority is satisfied that the ongoing operational suitability7 and operational effectiveness8 of an AvSS service output will not compromise suitability for flight.

39. The AUTHOP is a declaration by the OAA, after conducting an appropriate review, that confirms the ongoing operational suitability9 and operational effectiveness10 of an AvSS service output, including its applicable subsystems. An AUTHOP is issued to an AvSS service provider in recognition of the OAA confidence in the service provider’s ability to deliver the intended output. An AUTHOP fulfils a similar purpose for AvSS that Service Release does for aircraft.

40. Not all AvSS will require the same rigour when determining AUTHOP requirements. AUTHOP requirements should be determined by the complexity of the organisational influences that are required in order to produce service output requirements.

41. To ensure an AUTHOP remains valid the OAA should develop an AUTHOP review process. An AvSS that is operating as intended should be considered for an AUTHOP review every three years.

42. Unless the OAA determines otherwise, and noting that other OAREG or TAREG may still apply as determined by the OAR/TAR, the following AvSS do not require an AUTHOP:

a. Aeronautical information (if the TAR considers another system provides sufficient oversight)

b. AWR (if the airspace safety system element is included as part of another suitable review)

c. Medical11

d. JPR

e. MET (unless product is provided by a Service)

f. TAC.

43. MILAVREG 6 does not control how the OAA manages an AUTHOP. The AUTHOP is intended to be flexible, allowing the AvSS to be managed efficiently and cost consciously. For example, while aerodromes may be certified or registered, the OAA may use one AUTHOP for all aerodromes, or could approve an AUTHOP for certified aerodromes and another for registered aerodromes.

44. The OAA may approve an AUTHOP to allow operation of an AvSS, yet restrict the AvSS capability in certain ways in order to maintain capability output yet safeguard areas of concern. This is particularly advantageous for an AvSS that provides multiple services, such as an individual air capable ship or deployable systems versus fixed systems.

45. Use of MILAVREG 4 as the means to conduct an AvSS AUTHOP review may occur when:

a. the OAA makes a request to the Defence AA (through DACPA) for the review and the Defence AA approves, or

b. the Defence AA deems a MILAVREG 4 review would be beneficial.

46. Defence may require AvSS to be provided from non-Defence entities within Australia. In such cases, the service provider may be CASA endorsed, which can then be recognised by Defence. If no CASA endorsement exists, an AUTHOP may consider the provider’s technical and operational management processes and if deemed acceptable in comparison to Defence requirements, an AUTHOP may be approved.

47. Figure 2-1 details the AUTHOP management process.

7 DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program – Annex A definitions para t. 8 DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program – Annex A definitions para s. 9 DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program – Annex A definitions para t. 10 DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Defence Aviation Safety Program – Annex A definitions para s. 11 AWR (infrastructure only), medical and JPR are exempt from MILAVREG 6 and are included here to ensure awareness of their status.

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AvSS Certificate

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Does the AvSS have an approved AvSS

Certificate?

No Yes

Statement of Operating Intent

AvSS Management Plan

Accomplishment Summary

AvSS Certificate approved

AUTHOP

No Is the AvSS identical?

Yes

AvSS Certificate

Certificate of Conformace

Figure 2–1 AvSS Management Process

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UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS


MILAVREG 7—Unmanned Aircraft Systems

MILAVREG 3.7 — Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit

INTRODUCTION

1. The outcome of MILAVREG 7 is to assure UAS operations are conducted at an acceptable level of safety to other aircraft, people and property.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance supporting the airworthiness management of UAS operated by, or on behalf of, Defence.

APPLICABILITY

3. MILAVREG 7 and guidance is applicable to all UAS operated by, or on behalf of, Defence.

MILAVREG 7 GUIDANCE

4. Categorisation guidance for all UAS categories is provided at Annex A.

MILAVREG 7.1.a(1)

The OAA must, with recommendation from the TAA and in accordance with the UAS categories at Annex A; make recommendation to the Defence AA to categorise a UAS as Category 1 or 2.

5. The authority required to determine the category of UAS is representative of the risk to safety presented by the operation of the UAS.

6. A recommendation to the Defence AA (through DACPA) to categorise a UAS as either Category 1 or 2 requires robust analysis of the planned operating environment, known/planned technical capabilities, any planned operational restriction and the resultant potential for a catastrophic failure of the UAS to result in death, serious injury, or significant damage to property. Documents that may assist a categorisation or a re-categorisation recommendation include:

a. An SOI.

b. UAS Risk Analysis or equivalent document.

c. An AAMP or equivalent document.

d. An ATMP.

e. A UASOP.

f. Other OAA approved OIP.

MILAVREG 7.1.a(2)

The OAA must, with recommendation from the TAA and in accordance with the UAS categories at Annex A; make recommendation to the Defence AA to categorise a UAS as Category 1 or 2; or categorise a UAS as Category 3.

7. Category 3 UAS present a reduced level of risk to property and people though the application of controls such as segregation of airspace and operating over sparsely populated areas. Through the application of this regulatory requirement the OAA acceptance of risk to safety for the operation of Category 3 has been determined to be appropriate.

MILAVREG 7.1.b

The OAA must, in accordance with the UAS categories at Annex A, categorise a UAS as Category 4

8. Category 4 UAS are managed under OAREG 7.

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MILAVREG 7.1.c(1)

The OAA must manage UAS airworthiness according to UAS Category as follows: Category 1 UAS: in accordance with MILAVREG 2 – Defence Registration And Operation Of Aircraft under issue of a SFP or AMTC / SR, unless managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft under MILAVREG 5.

9. Category 1 UAS airworthiness management is equivalent to manned aircraft due to the level of risk posed by the operation of a Category 1 UAS throughout all categories of airspace, over populated areas. The application of MILAVREG 2 and 5 to Category 1 UAS operations is as appropriate for the UAS as it is for manned aircraft; therefore, operator qualification and a recognised certification basis are essential.

10. The technical assurance process should assure that the overall safety risk to personnel, other airspace users and property is appropriately identified, analysed and evaluated and if necessary communicated to the appropriate authority for treatment. Any restrictions on the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) operating over populated areas are to be documented within the Service Release Limitations (SRLM).

11. A foreign military Category 1 UAS operating in Defence exercises or under sustained operations within Australian Airspace will comply with all applicable DASP regulations. The acceptability to Defence of operations involving non-Defence registered Category 1 UAS is predicated on the demonstration that an appropriate level of airworthiness oversight and management has been achieved in each case. Non-Defence registered Category 1 UAS will normally hold an extant type certification or permit issued by a foreign national or military airworthiness authority. However, UAS airworthiness management is still maturing, so Defence does not automatically recognise extant UAS certifications, under MILAVREG 5. Rather, operations of non-Defence registered Category 1 UAS will be approved by the Defence AA on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the recommendations of the OAA and TAA. Any extant UAS type certification or permit issued by a foreign national or military airworthiness authority could be a contributing factor in the approval process.

MILAVREG 7.1.c(2)

The OAA must manage UAS airworthiness according to UAS Category as follows: Category 2 UAS: in accordance with MILAVREG 2 – Defence Registration And Operation Of Aircraft under issue of a UAS Operating Permit (UASOP), unless managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft under MILAVREG 5.

12. The level of technical assurance required by Category 1 UAS may not be achievable for some UAS, or required when the UAS may be operated at an acceptable level of safety without AMTC. Therefore, the airworthiness management for Category 2 UAS is conducted under a UASOP as alternative instrument to AMTC/SR.

13. The UASOP is an airworthiness instrument issued by the Defence AA (Category 2 UAS only) which summarises the UAS basis of certification, key airworthiness restrictions and special conditions to balance the operational requirements with the risk of the UAS operation.

14. The application of MILAVREG 2 for a Defence Registered Category 2 UAS should be no different to the process followed for an aircraft/Category 1 UAS receiving AMTC/SR, with the notable exception being the issue of the UASOP as the applicable airworthiness instrument (MILAVREG 3.7). Accordingly, MILAVREG 4 equally applies.

15. A Category 2 UAS managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft in accordance with the requirements of MILAVREG 5 may not require a UASOP, however, using the UASOP as a template document may provide the OAA an acceptable means of complying with the requirements of MILAVREG 5. A Cat 2 UAS requires an AAMP that should be tailored as applicable whilst ensuring that any identified risks are adequately addressed.

16. A foreign military Category 2 UAS operating in Defence exercises or under sustained operations within Australian Airspace is required to comply with all applicable DASP regulations (MILAVREG 5 and 7). The acceptability to Defence of the risk from operations involving non-Defence registered Category 2 UAS is predicated on the demonstration that an appropriate level of airworthiness oversight and management has been achieved. Operations of non-Defence registered Category 2 UAS will be approved by the Defence AA on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the recommendations of the OAA and TAA. Any extant UAS type certification or permit issued by a foreign national or military airworthiness authority could be a contributing factor in the approval process. Sup

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MILAVREG 7.1c(3)

The OAA must manage UAS airworthiness according to UAS Category as follows: Category 3 UAS: under issue of a UASOP, unless managed as a Non-Defence registered aircraft under MILAVREG 5.

17. Correctly categorised, Category 3 UAS operations present a lower level of risk to safety than Category 1 and 2 UAS operations due to their restricted operating areas. However they present a greater risk than Category 4 UAS and therefore like Category 2 UAS, the airworthiness management of a Category 3 UAS is conducted under a UASOP (issued by the OAA).

18. A Category 3 UAS operating under a valid UASOP is appropriately managed in accordance with the requirements set by the OAR and TAR. Accordingly, understanding and applying the requirements of the OAR and TAR is essential for Category 3 operations.

19. An AAMP (MILAVREG 2 Annex A) may be used to document the acquisition airworthiness process. Using the AAMP as a template document can provide the OAA an acceptable means of complying with the requirements of MILAVREG 7.

MILAVREG 7.1c(4)

The OAA must manage UAS airworthiness according to UAS Category as follows: Category 4 UAS: in accordance with the requirements of the OAR.

20. Due to the negligible risk presented by a correctly categorised Category 4 UAS, the Defence AA has delegated the responsibility for determining the airworthiness management regulatory requirements to the OAR.

MILAVREG 7.1.d

An OAA must obtain Defence AA approval for any Category UA to carry humans, or carry or employ weapons.

21. The weaponisation or carriage of humans by UAS carries increased risk. Therefore, the Defence AA has decided to retain authority to approve any Category UAS to be inhabited by humans, or to carry or employ weapons, noting that the physical size constraints of Category 4 UAS make it unlikely that a UA of this size would be able to carry humans.

22. Laser pointers, range finders, laser spot trackers and designators are not considered weapons under this regulation; however, all risk to safety from lasers will require assessment and appropriate approval for use.

MILAVREG 7.1.e

A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 1 or 2 UAS to Defence service must seek categorisation of the UAS through the relevant OAA IAW MILAVREG 7.1.a(1).

23. Defence UAS airworthiness management is predicated on UAS being correctly categorised in accordance with the UAS Categorisation system described at MILAVREG 7 Annex A. MILAVREG 7.1—Unmanned Aircraft Systems requires that UAS operations are conducted at an acceptable level of risk to personnel, other aircraft and property. The level of rigour applied to the certification process is intrinsic to achieving the intended UAS category and CRE. Timely and appropriate engagement with the applicable OAA is an important consideration of this process, and is essential to achieving the intended capability.

24. The AMTC / SR process for new aircraft type can be useful to an organisation acquiring UAS; however, the degree to which they are applied will vary depending on the UAS Category. Applicants intending to introduce a Defence UAS into service need to understand the level of risk posed by the operation of the system and correctly categorise the UAS to ensure an appropriate level of airworthiness oversight is applied.

25. The introduction into service process for Category 1 and 2 UAS is shown in figure 3-1.

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FIGURE 3–1 INTRODUCTION INTO SERVICE PROCESS FOR CATEGORY 1 AND 2 UAS.

26. A Defence organisation submitting a categorisation application should provide a compilation of supporting documentation as proofs for the categorisation determination as per MILAVREG 7 Annex A including:

a. An SOI which describes the intended CRE applicable to the UAS operation;

b. An AAMP , including any risk mitigation strategy proposed for the UAS;

c. Reference to, or documentation of, an ATMP which details the airspace management procedures for where the UA is to be operated and how the UA is to be operated in conjunction with other military and/or civilian aircraft; and

d. A covering document which identifies the proposed airworthiness categorisation and references any relevant supporting justification.

27. Processing of a categorisation application for a new UAS follows:

a. An applicant seeking to introduce a UAS to Defence service prepares an application to be submitted to the TAA, with an information copy provided to the relevant OAA and DACPA.

b. With the advice of the TAA, the applicant submits the application to the relevant OAA. The OAA, once satisfied, will make the recommendation to the Defence AA (through DACPA) to categorise the UAS (Category 1 or 2). Applications for the operation of Category 1 or 2 UAS will be endorsed by the OAA and the TAA prior to submission to the Defence AA.

c. If satisfied, the Defence AA will endorse the AAMP as acceptable for the airworthiness management of the system. Note – For category 2 UAS, the OAA, with recommendation from the TAA, may then recommend the Defence AA issue a UASOP.

MILAVREG 7.1.f

A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 3 UAS to Defence service must seek categorisation of the UAS IAW MILAVREG 7.1.a(2).

28. Defence UAS airworthiness management is predicated on UAS being correctly categorised in accordance with the UAS Categorisation system (MILAVREG 7 Annex A). MILAVREG 7.1 requires that UAS operations are conducted at an acceptable level of risk to personnel, other aircraft and property. The level of rigour applied to the technical certification process is intrinsic to achieving the intended UAS category and CRE. Timely and appropriate engagement with the applicable OAA is an important consideration of this process, and is essential to achieving the intended capability.

29. The Type Certification and Service Release process for new aircraft type can be useful to an organisation acquiring an UAS; however, the degree to which they are applied will vary depending on the Category of the UAS. Applicants intending to introduce a Defence UAS into service need to understand the level of risk posed by the operation of the system and correctly categorise the UAS to ensure an appropriate level of airworthiness oversight is applied. The introduction into service process for Category 3 and 4 UAS is shown in figures 3-2 and 3-3. Sup

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FIGURE 3–2 INTRODUCTION INTO SERVICE PROCESS FOR CATEGORY 3 UAS

MILAVREG 7.1.g

A Defence Organisation Head seeking to introduce a Category 4 UAS to Defence service must seek categorisation of the UAS IAW MILAVREG 7.1.b.

30. Defence organisations should seek guidance from the relevant OAA prior to Category 4 UAS acquisitions.

FIGURE 3–3 INTRODUCTION INTO SERVICE PROCESS FOR CATEGORY 4 UAS


31. Further advice regarding airworthiness management of UAS is available from ACPA or DGTA-ADF staff.

Annexes:

A. UAS Categorisation and Risk Management

B. History and Philosophy of UAS Airworthiness

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UAS CATEGORISATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT


MILAVREG 7 —Unmanned Aircraft Systems

MILAVREG 3.7 — Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit

INTRODUCTION

1. UAS risk analysis should be conducted against the risk to other aircraft, people and property. With respect to people, use of first, second and third party can help assure identification of risk. As Unmanned Aircraft (UA) do not carry people unless Defence AA approval is granted under MILAVREG 7, first party will not normally apply. Second party is considered to be Mission Essential Personnel. Third party is considered to be the general public.

UAS Risk Analysis

2. The UAS Risk Analysis (RA) is a mechanism that may be used to achieve the robust identification, analysis, evaluation and proposed treatment (eg mitigation, retention, etc) of UAS risk to other aircraft, people and property. It encompasses:

a. risks posed by the system in the context of the intended roles and environment documented in the SOI;

b. risk to other aircraft, people and property anticipated to be in the area of operations; and

c. risks due to systems carried by the UA that may endanger other aircraft, people and property during all phases of operation (both normal or abnormal operations), for example, laser designation systems. Importantly, when assessing the failure modes of the system and the associated risks, the most hazardous activity forms the basis for consideration in determining the categorisation of the system.

3. The inputs to the RA should be derived by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of the UAS, in conjunction with operational requirements and an initial SOI provided by Defence. The RA should include both technical and operational risks; some of the common sources of risk are suggested below.

4. Technical Analysis. Technical analysis should consider those critical factors that may impact the technical integrity of the system. These may include:

a. Flight control system failure.

b. Engine Failure.

c. Autonomous Recovery Systems/Flight Termination Systems failure.

d. Positional information system failure.

e. Failure of any component of the ground based infrastructure critical to the operation of the system.

f. Data link failure.

g. Launch and recovery systems failure.

5. Technical risks should be identified through the application of a system safety process acceptable to the TAA.

6. Operational Risk Analysis. Operational analysis should identify those critical factors which may impact the airworthiness of the system. These may include:

a. Mid air collision resulting from inadequate mission planning or operator induced error.

b. Controlled flight into terrain.

c. Uncontrolled flight into people on the ground and/or property.

d. Loss of control through operation outside approved limits.

e. Incorrect use of on-board mission systems e.g. laser designation systems.

7. The RA may provide support for:

a. UAS categorisation or re-categorisation determination process.

b. Determine appropriate operational restriction.

c. Development of an ATMP.

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d. The issue of an appropriate airworthiness instrument.

8. The process used to identify operational risks should be consistent with Defence approved risk management processes.

9. ATMP. An ATMP should be developed as part of the operational RA process to address the specific risks of collision with other airspace users. Operational or airspace limitations may be considered in the analysis; however, where it is impractical to consider these factors in absolute terms, the ATMP development may need to consider:

a. Mid–air collision risk analysis. Depending on the complexity of the UAS and the intended area of operations, the ATMP may consider mid-air collision risks; however, the difficulty of modelling the likelihood may require the risk to be considered in absolute, worst case terms, i.e. the likelihood that a collision will occur is assumed to be certain if the aircraft is operating within a certain density level or volume of airspace. Similar to ground impact, it may also be possible to model the likelihood of a mid-air collision event. However, this type of modelling is considerably more complicated than that available for ground impact risk because it is necessary to:

(1) model space in three dimensions;

(2) consider the speed of both the aircraft and RPA;

(3) consider the respective trajectories of each in terms of head-on, following or some crossing angle; and

(4) consider the reliability and effectiveness of any collision avoidance systems fitted to the aircraft and/or RPA.

b. Mathematical modelling. It might be possible to mathematically model risk posed by the system. The extent of mathematical modelling would depend on the category of the UAS and its intended operating environment

10. Risk Mitigation. There are several means available to reduce the risk posed by a UAS to other aircraft, people and property:

a. Design mitigation. Design mitigation concerns the application of appropriate rigour to the design and construction process such that system’s likelihood of catastrophic failure is known and controlled. Through the application of more rigorous design standards, or integration of systems designed to support safe operation, the likelihood of failure can be reduced to acceptable levels appropriate to the operational role and environment.

b. Operational mitigation. Operational mitigation concerns the application of restrictions and limitations to the operating environment of the system. This may include such measures as limiting operation to exclusive airspace, over designated ground safety template or restricting flight over populated areas.

c. Systemic mitigation. Systemic mitigation concerns the application of regulatory standards to organisations involved in the design, construction, maintenance and operation of the system. Systemic mitigation is designed to reduce the occurrence of organisational and human errors which can contribute to failure of a system. Systemic mitigation supports both the design and operational mitigation, and assures an appropriate level of safety of activities supporting the ongoing airworthiness of the system.

11. UAS Acquisition. Where a new UAS is to be developed to meet emerging operational requirements the risk mitigation measures should be specifically designed to maximise the operational capability of the system in the required roles and environment. For example, where the operating environment includes operations over populated areas and/or within airspace occupied by other users, the design (including airworthiness standards) should be appropriately specified to include all required on board safety systems and an appropriate level of design rigour. Alternatively, systems may be developed that inherently (due to very small size and overall design) pose an insignificant risk to other airspace users and personnel and property on the ground and therefore do not need onboard safety systems or the same level of design rigour.

12. The acquisition of an existing UAS limits the level of mitigation that can be applied because the design of the system, and therefore its likelihood of failure, will be more or less fixed. Where Defence requires a system to operate in a role and environment against which the system has already been certified, then appropriate design mitigation may have already been applied. However, where Defence seeks to expand the operational role of an existing UAS, modification of the system or operational restrictions may be the only avenues open to the OAA enable operations at an acceptable level of risk.

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Categorisation of UAS

13. The category of a particular UAS is defined by the operational capability requirement (SOI CRE), and the mitigated consequence of catastrophic failure of the system in relation to the capacity of any part of the failed system to cause death or serious injury to personnel, or significant damage to property and other aircraft when operating in the intended CRE.

14. The TAR may publish minimum technical design requirements, safety targets, population density and any additional guidance to enable quantitative or qualitative assessment of the technical airworthiness of a given UAS.

15. In considering the risk that UAS operations present to people and property on the ground, the terms Populated and Sparsely populated areas are used throughout the Categorisation system, and are defined in the glossary.

Category 1 UAS

16. Category 1 UAS are intended to operate in all classes of airspace, both Civil and Military administered, with flight over populated areas and therefore require the ability to act and respond as manned aircraft do

17. A Risk/consequence summary derived from an analysis of the risk of a ‘potential’ Category 1 UAS (when operated in its planned SOI CRE), should arrive at the outcome that the consequence of a catastrophic failure of a Category 1 UAS will be death, serious injury or significant damage to property. The purpose of such an assessment is to assure that Category 1 UAS risk is treated with clarity.

18. Notwithstanding, all risks should be treated and mitigation strategies documented (AMTC/SR, AAMP, ATMP) to provide an acceptable level of safety, such that the likelihood of a catastrophic event would be considered rare and the subsequent risk is low for safety.

19. Technical Design. To undertake its role a potential Category 1 UAS may have:

a. Approved navigation and communication capability; (ability to navigate and communicate IAW ICAO rules with an appropriate level of redundancy). Key factors include:

(1) The ability of the UA to be controlled by a ‘remote pilot’;

(2) Ability to act as a communications relay between remote pilot and ATC;

(3) Transaction time and continuity of communications link;

(4) Required navigation performance; and

(5) Timeliness of UA response to ATC instructions.

b. Approved means of self separation and/or collision avoidance or Certified detect and avoid capability. Detect and avoid is the ability of a UAS to remain well clear and avoid collisions with other airborne traffic, terrain and potentially weather. A Detect and avoid1 system should have the ability to:

(1) Detect traffic and avoid collisions;

(2) Identify and avoid terrain; and

(3) Identify and avoid severe weather.

c. Approved Recovery/ Launch system may have the:

(1) ability to launch and recover from joint user aerodromes (military/civilian) complying with traffic flow and regulation;

(2) ability to recognise and understand aerodrome signs, markings and lighting; whilst providing visual separation from other aircraft and vehicles; and

(3) ability to recover UA safely under abnormal/emergency conditions (loss-link, power plant failure etc).

d. Approved operators and maintenance personnel.

1 Detect and avoid provides the intended functions of self-separation and collision avoidance as a means of compliance with regulatory requirements to “see and avoid” compatible with expected behaviour of aircraft operating in the airspace system. UA operations beyond line of sight may require an automated detect and avoid system due to potential communication latencies or failures. This ability need not be organic to the UAS. Potential detect and avoid options include terrestrial (ie ATC/Surveillance) or airborne (ie AEW&C or chase/escort aircraft) systems.

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Category 2 UAS

20. Category 2 UAS are intended to operate in any class of Airspace, civil or military administered, with appropriate operational restriction, including limited flight over populated areas.

21. The risk/consequence summary derived from an initial analysis of the risk of a ‘potential’ Category 2 UAS (when operated in its planned SOI CRE), should arrive at the outcome that a catastrophic failure of the Category 2 UAS may result in death, serious injury or significant damage to property. The purpose of such an assessment is intended to assure that Category 2 UAS risk is treated with clarity.

22. The risk treatments should include a combination of minimum systems safety requirements and application of operational airworthiness mitigations (via UASOP, AAMP, ATMP) to provide the acceptable level of safety, such that the likelihood of a catastrophic event occurring is rare for peacetime operations2 and the subsequent risk is low for safety.

23. Appendix 1 provides an example of an initial operational risk analysis to support risk assessment and categorisation determination of a potential Category 2 UAS. This example is not meant to provide a comprehensive template; rather, it identifies many issues that require critical evaluation if a UAS is to be used in an airspace and ground environment that would normally be the province of a Category 1 UAS.

24. Technical design. Some UAS designs may not meet all the certification requirements of a Category 1 UAS. However, the reasons for desiring a Category 2 UAS over a Category 1 may range from value for money to an absence of other UAS being able to achieve Defence capability requirements. Therefore in addition to Defence UAS data, it may be necessary to consider other existing UAS certifications and/or data from other NAA/MAAs when undertaking a technical analysis.

25. For Category 2 UAS where the design integrity cannot be assured against an approved technical standard, or the design integrity of the system cannot be assured through certification in the manner of a Category 1 UAS, the OAA will determine appropriate operational restrictions to manage the risks that the UA will pose to other aircraft, people and property and then apply risk mitigations via the UASOP and/or other OIP. A Category 2 UAS may have:

a. Approved navigation and communication capability suitable for any airspace (as per Category 1 UAS), or operational restriction and mitigation measures to enable operation in the required airspace;

b. Approved means of self separation and/or collision avoidance or Certified detect and avoid capability (as per Category 1 UAS), or operational restriction and mitigation measures to enable separation in the required airspace, such as Air Traffic services (ATS) in controlled airspace;

c. Approved recovery/launch system (as per Category 1 UAS) or appropriate operational restriction; and

d. Approved operators (as per Category 1 UAS) or suitably trained operators restricted to operate in specific airspace only, and approved maintenance personnel (as per Category 1 UAS).

26. Populated Areas. Where limited flight over a populated area is required for completion of essential mission objectives by a Category 2 UAS, specific operational restrictions and limitations will be applied to ensure the risk of a catastrophic failure that may result in death, serious injury or significant damage to property, particularly third party (general public), will be low by treating the likelihood of such an event being able to occur.

27. The intent of the regulation is that a Category 2 UAS should maintain its operations over sparsely populated areas, and only fly over populated areas by exception. Examples where limited flight over populated areas may be permitted are:

a. Sensor limitations of the UAS require extended loiter over a populated area to achieve an essential National security objective;

b. A limited series of UA launches/recoveries, in support of a Defence joint exercise will require short duration transit overhead populated areas on arrival/ departure, because there are no alternative reasonably practicable launch/recovery sites that do not require overflight of populated areas; or

c. A limited series of short duration transits over populated areas are required to access an operating area for essential training and there are no reasonably practicable alternative routes that avoid overflight of populated areas.

28. Each of the above examples exhibits a common theme, namely that there is an overriding and substantial capability imperative for flying over the general public. Further, all reasonably practicable steps would have been

2 Higher risk levels may be tolerable for some Category 2 UAS operations (warlike conditions, Counter Terrorism, etc) and would be authorised by the appropriate authority.

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considered to reduce the general public’s risk exposure. Where such an argument cannot be mounted, either the flights should not be authorised or a Category 1 UAS should be employed. Loitering over populated areas for training purposes, for example, is reserved for Category 1 UAS.

29. Ultimately, Category 2 operations over the general public involve a measure of risk retention, and this retention should be an exception rather than a routine occurrence.

Category 3 UAS

30. Category 3 UAS are only permitted to operate in Segregated Airspace, over Sparsely Populated areas and over Mission Essential Personnel and associated Property3, with appropriate operational restriction.

31. The risk/consequence summary derived from an analysis of the risk of a potential Category 3 UAS, when operated in its SOI CRE, should arrive at the outcome that a catastrophic failure of a Category 3 UAS is unlikely to result in death, serious injury or significant damage to property. The combination of Segregated Airspace operations, flight over sparsely populated areas and flight above mission essential personnel and property combined with technical assurance and operational airworthiness mitigations (UASOP, ATMP) will provide an acceptable level of safety.

32. Sparsely Populated Areas. Flight over Sparsely Populated Areas is essential for completion of mission objectives by a Category 3 UAS; however, specific operational restrictions may be applied by the OAA to the respective UASOP to ensure the UAS presents an acceptable level of risk to people and property on the ground.

33. Segregated Airspace. In considering the risk that UAS operations present to other airspace users the term segregated airspace is used. Segregated Airspace is airspace of specified dimensions allocated for use by a UA. Mixing of other aircraft (manned or unmanned) and a UA within a Segregated Airspace intended for use by the UA should be limited. Specific operational restrictions pertaining to UA flight within Segregated Airspace (sustained, limited or otherwise), should be identified within the ATMP to ensure the UAS presents an acceptable level of risk to other airspace users. Airspace Control Measures (ACM) may be used to facilitate the containment means of a Category 3 UAS within Segregated Airspace. 4

34. Additional considerations for segregated airspace include air traffic density, particularly if the UAS airspace is other than controlled airspace, as other aircraft may be able to enter the airspace volume without a clearance. Avoidance of Danger areas designed for General Aviation (GA) transit and similar flight paths should be avoided. Importantly, the see and avoid principle is a main safety defence for any shared UAS airspace and the inclusion of UAS active strobe lights to enhance visibility could enhance safety.

35. The OAA will need to be assured that Category 3 UAS operations will remain within the allocated Segregated Airspace by assessing expected performance vs required performance and determine the level of confidence that an airspace incursion will not occur. Factors that may affect the performance of the UAS include:

a. communications performance,

b. controller experience, and

c. maturity of procedures.

36. For example, a UAS is allocated Segregated Airspace volume of 10nm x 10nm. An assessment of the level of performance and confidence of the UA’s ability to remain confined to that airspace volume is conducted. Due to a reduced level of confidence (based on, for example, inexperienced controllers), in order to provide an adequate airspace buffer in the event of degradation in expected navigation performance, the UA may be further constrained to operate within a reduced airspace volume of 5nm x 5nm thereby reducing the risk of the UAS exiting the Segregated Airspace volume via a 5nm airspace volume buffer.

37. Category 3 UAS whilst limited to operations over sparsely populated areas, may have a requirement to operate over mission essential personnel and associated property. An OAA will need to ensure that the operational restriction applied to a Category 3 UAS operation results in an acceptable level of risk in keeping with its categorisation.

3 Personnel and associated property whose conduct or presence is essential to the successful execution of an operational or military training UAS mission (e.g. supported troops, critical infrastructure, survivors from a SAR task, UA launch/recovery equipment/ personnel etc). 4 The Joint Airspace Coordination Centre (JACC) at HQJOC may provide guidance for the implementation of airspace ACM that can achieve segregated airspace requirements.

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38. Category 3 UAS should have:

a. flight control, navigation and communication capability with appropriate redundancy that enable safe operation within the Segregated Airspace over sparsely populated areas or MEP,

b. suitably trained and authorised operations personnel, and

c. suitably trained and authorised maintenance personnel.

Category 4 UAS

39. Refer to OAREG 7.

Appendix:

1. Example – Initial Operational Risk Analysis for a potential Category 2 UAS

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AAP 7001.048 Appendix 1 to Annex A to Sect 5 Chap 3

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EXAMPLE

INITIAL OPERATIONAL RISK ANALYSIS FOR A POTENTIAL CATEGORY 2 UAS

GUIDANCE

• This example is not intended to provide a comprehensive template; rather, it identifies many of the issues that might require critical evaluation if a UAS is to be used in an airspace and ground environment that would normally be the province of a Category 1 UAS

INTRODUCTION

1. A requirement for operation of an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) UAS within Australia may be required to satisfy Government objectives.

2. Potential Category 2 UAS employment:

a. A requirement to provide continuous overwatch of a CBD in support of National Objectives. Solution is to fly Category 2 UAS ISR missions from a nearby aerodrome.

b. Category 2 UAS ISR training OPS (Day and Night) are required within training airspace (over sparsely populated areas) to prepare for national tasking.

c. Infrequent Category 2 UAS ISR missions (Day and Night) out of an aerodrome over a Defence operating area (over mission essential personnel) to support multi-national large force exercises.

d. Basic Category 2 UAS profile required to support employment: Depart launch and recovery site, when safe to do so manoeuvrer to operate over sparsely populated area, climb to safe transit altitude, establish in operating area for sensor pattern operations between 5000’- 20000’, return to base maintaining area transit over sparsely populated where possible.

3. Assumptions from relevant airworthiness regulations:

a. Where a UAS will not be categorised as Category 1 (lack of type certification), yet the required operation presents a credible risk to personnel or property, it will be categorised as Category 2 or 3. (MILAVREG 7 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems)

b. The TAA will make a technical recommendation/ or conduct a systems safety analysis to identify the presence (or lack thereof) of TAREG defined critical elements of UAS design required to support operation of UAS at acceptable levels of risk IAW SOI CRE (MILAVREG 1.7 – Technical Airworthiness Authority).

c. The OAA will gain a TAA recommendation before seeking a Category 2 UAS determination from the Defence AA (MILAVREG 7.1 – Unmanned Aircraft Systems).

d. The OAA will apply appropriate operational restriction to the Category 2 UAS, in addition to OAREG requirements, to mitigate the risk of operation of the UAS in its SOI CRE, prior to seeking a Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP) from the Defence AA (MILAVREG 3.7 – UASOP)

4. The following pages provide an example of initial risk analysis, in preparing a case to support the operation of a Category 2 UAS for the scenarios described at paragraph 2.

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EXAMPLE BOW TIE ANALYSIS OF A CATEGORY 2 UAS

5. Hazard. Phases of UAS Mission where Category 2 UA (the Hazard) poses a safety risk to personnel/property:

a. Start/Taxi/Take-Off (Launch).

b. Departure / Transit (Launch to Operating Airspace).

c. Operating Airspace.

d. Transit / Arrival (Operating Airspace to Recover).

e. Land (Recover) / Taxi / Shutdown.

6. Top Events:

a. Loss of Control of UA.

b. Breakdown in separation between UA and airborne traffic.

c. Breakdown in separation between UA and ground traffic.

d. Loss of Situational Awareness resulting in unacceptable proximity to terrain.

7. Threats:

a. Technical Failure:

(1) Design Flaw of critical component for safe flight.

(2) Failure of critical component for safe flight.

b. Operational Failure

(1) Operator error.

(2) Operator violation.

c. External factor:

(1) Other aircraft errors/violations.

(2) Other aircraft technical failures.

(3) Incapacitation of UAS operator.

d. Environmental Threats:

(1) Weather.

(2) Terrain.

(3) Aviation Support Systems.

8. Consequences:

a. Crash resulting in death or serious injury to Third Party (civilians on ground).

b. Crash resulting in death or serious injury to Second Party (Mission Essential Personnel on ground).

c. Crash resulting in significant damage to property (ground).

d. Impact with other aircraft resulting in death or serious injury to Third Party (civilian aircraft).

e. Impact with other aircraft resulting in death or serious injury to Second Party (military aircraft).

f. Impact with other aircraft resulting in significant damage to property (airborne).

9. Controls:

a. Preventive Controls – Technical:

(1) Other NAA/MAA Certification.

(2) TAA Systems Safety Analysis.

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(3) Standard Maintenance Practices (regular servicing, etc).

(4) Trained and competent maintenance personnel.

(5) Secondary Data Link.

(6) Secondary GCS.

(7) Accuracy/redundancy of positional information (3D – Alt & GPS).

(8) Reliable engine.

(9) Reliable flight controls.

(10) Reliable airframe.

(11) Reliable/redundant communication of position with other airborne aircraft.

(12) Reliable/Redundant Communication with ATC.

(13) Reliable/redundant awareness of other aircraft.

b. Recovery Controls – Technical:

(1) Autonomous Safe Recovery.

(2) Autonomous Safe Flight Termination.

c. Preventive Controls – Operational:

(1) Tow UA on/off runway.

(2) Qualified ground crew.

(3) Qualified Remote Pilots.

(4) Avoid flight in icing, thunderstorms, severe turbulence, etc.

(5) Increased or restricted application of separation standards between UAS and other aircraft.

(6) Flight is monitored by active surveillance measures.

(7) Flight under the IFR (Rules of the Air).

d. Recovery Controls – Operational:

(1) Limit flight over populated areas to only that which is necessary to complete the mission.

(2) Minimum Operating Height over populated areas (safe glide range).

(3) Avoid direct over flight of MEP unless essential.

(4) Trained and competent Pilots (Rules of the Air and In-flight Emergency (IFER) Management).

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APPLICATION

10. Assumptions: HERON UAS is the potential Category 2 UAS.

11. FACTS:

a. Heron, known in France as the SIDM HARFRANG has been issued with a French DGA Type Certificate. If the basis for issue of this Type Certificate is disclosed, and the scope of operations permitted under the Type Certificate is understood (for example, does the certificate specify limitations that are consistent with MILAVREG 7), it might serve as a basis for UAS review, or support a Category 2 recommendation regarding systems integrity for an equivalent Australian UAS platform.

b. Heron UAS1 has demonstrated the platform is able to safely operate over extended periods (years) at an Afghanistan airfield and surrounding airspace, an aerodrome supporting heavy jets (B747, C5, etc), fighter aircraft and medium and light fixed and rotary wing aircraft that regularly conducted greater than 500 daily arrivals and departures over sustained periods (years).

c. Heron UAS has demonstrated the ability to safely operate in complex, high density airspace within Afghanistan for prolonged periods supported by ATC service, ABM service, and sound airspace control measures (ACM). The platforms physical size and external aircraft lighting also allows other aircraft are able to sight and avoid the UA. Similarly, the USA MQ–1 and MQ–9 UAS have amassed over 1 million flight hours and are surpassing manned aircraft for positive flight safety percentages in relation to aircraft crashes2 and people harmed.

d. Heron UAS operations employ qualified military pilots. This ensures Rules of the Air are complied with in a professional manner under an approved FMS (as stipulated under OAREG) and that IFER management is conducted at a high standard.

OPERATIONAL MITIGATION

12. The following scenario provides examples of restrictions and limitations that can achieve a Category 2 safety outcome for HERON. A Category 2 UAS will launch from a suitable Aerodrome (eg Amberley or Rockhampton) in order for the UAS to complete an assigned mission. A suitable aerodrome would be an aerodrome that is reasonably accessible for pre-positioning of the UA and has the required support services, such as runway capability, NAVAID and ATC services. Specific operational restrictions and/or limitations that can ensure operational risk will be low might include:

a. Limiting UA taxi on the aerodrome when preparing for departure or post arrival, such as towing of the UA to and from positions that remove potential conflict with other ground traffic.

b. As runways are aligned to environmental factors, flight over populated areas would only be conducted during takeoff until the UA flight stability parameters allow turning the aircraft in the direction of accessible airspace over a sparsely populated area.

c. Similarly, on arrival at the aerodrome, flight is maintained in accessible airspace over a sparsely populated area until flight parameters requires the UA to assume the approach design parameters intended for the runway in questions, such as a GNSS approach.

d. Use of UAS flight routes that minimise or avoid tracking over populated areas enroute to the intended operating area. Limitations for such tracking will be dictated by environmental conditions on the day.

e. ATC services, or Air Battle Management (ABM) services (such as Wedgetail, Vigilare or ship based ABM) are employed to maintain observation of the UAS in relation to other aircraft.

f. The calculated use of minimum transit heights for Category 2 UAS transit will enable gliding range to a sparsely populated or unpopulated area in the event of engine failure.

g. Ensure the remote pilot has qualifications that ensure in flight emergency response (IFER) will be managed in an equivalent manner to manned aircraft.

h. Utilisation of sensor stand off capability to avoid flight over populated areas, noting the sensor suite will have limitations and will be affected by environmental factors.

1 AS of 2014, the RAAF Heron UAS has logged over 20,000 operational Flight Hours in a highly complex and harsh operating environment with no incidents resulting in loss of life, serious injury or significant damage to property. 2 US DOD.

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i. Ensuring the UAS intended for Category 2 employment has a system reliability that can help assure that suitability for flight will not be compromised due to failure of the UA flight control or power systems. For example, Heron has operated in a high traffic density during OP SLIPPER employment with one technical failure in over 20,000 hours3 resulting is a crash, noting the consequence of the crash did not to result in harm to second or third party partially due to IFER management decisions that ensured likelihood remained improbable and risk therefore low.

j. Applying the Rules of the Air to the UA as per manned aircraft.

k. Where possible, maintain UA operation within controlled airspace or other segregated airspace. When operating in Class G airspace, NOTAM advice and use of available surveillance services are employed to enhance traffic awareness.

l. Within controlled airspace operate under the same ATC standards and procedures applied to manned aircraft, including the following separation standard application techniques:

(1) When applying visual separation standards, ensuring ATC are instructed to treat the UA as the passive aircraft only. For example, the active aircraft will always be a manned aircraft, or for two UA visual standards would not be employed at all.

(2) When applying vertical separation standards, ensuring ATC are advised of aircraft characteristics that may require increased vertical separation standards. For example, Heron may change altitude in response to throttle manipulation, as such ATC may add an additional 10004 feet to the applied vertical separation standard.

3 140508 – email –Director Unmanned Aircraft Systems. 4 Estimate only, not an authoritative number.

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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF UAS AIRWORTHINESS


MILAVREG 7 —Unmanned Aircraft Systems

INTRODUCTION

1. An Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) is a system whose components include the necessary equipment, network and personnel to control an Unmanned Aircraft (UA). UA are fixed wing, rotary wing, or lighter than air vehicles that fly without a human operator on board under remote control or autonomous programming. The air vehicle component of a UAS is generally designed to be recovered and reused and may be classified as a UA, Remotely-Piloted Aircraft1 (RPA) or Unmanned Aerial Target (UAT) drone.2 Other components of the UAS include payload, data communication links, control stations, ground support equipment, launch and recovery equipment, and ground operators.

2. The safety risk posed by UAS operations, considering the spectrum of current and future systems, ranges from negligible to exceeding that posed by manned aircraft. The objective of the UAS airworthiness regulations is to ensure that UAS operations are conducted at an acceptable level of risk to other aircraft, people and property without undue compromise to operational flexibility.

3. Airworthiness management of a UAS begins at the commencement of the acquisition process and continues throughout the life of the system. Assessing UAS airworthiness according to the same criteria as manned aircraft, whilst ideal, may be problematic for some UAS. In particular, the size and development path and intended operating environment for many UAS means that designing and constructing them to manned aircraft standards may not be possible or practicable. Consequently a paradigm shift is required in airworthiness management of UAS and alternative means of assuring the risk to people, property and other airspace users is acceptable. These alternative means of managing risk carry operational limitations; therefore the degree of regulatory oversight of the design, construction, operation and maintenance of UAS requires tailoring to specific systems to suit the type, role and capabilities of the system.

OVERVIEW

Key concepts

4. Airworthiness management of UAS is based on the following fundamental principles:

a. A particular UAS type will be chosen for acquisition on the basis that it will satisfy the operational capability requirement when performing designated roles in a defined operating environment.

b. A particular UAS when operating in its intended CRE will present a level of risk to other aircraft, people and property, given its characteristics and intended operating environment.

c. The level of airworthiness management3 applied to a UAS must be determined by the level of risk that the system poses and it’s operational capability requirement.

d. A UAS Categorisation system based on risk and desired operational capability forms the basis for application of the DASP Regulatory framework to UAS, such that:

(1) Category 1 UAS. As far as reasonably practicable, established manned aircraft airworthiness standards are to be used as the basis to assess the capacity of the design to safely perform the designated roles.

(2) Category 2 and 3 UAS. The technical airworthiness assessment and operational constraints must ensure that the overall risk posed by the UAS, when operated in its intended configuration, role and environment (CRE), is acceptable to the relevant OAA.

1 ICAO define RPA as an aircraft piloted by a qualified “remote pilot” situated at a “remote pilot station” located external to the aircraft (i.e. ground, ship, another aircraft, space) who monitors the aircraft at all times. The remote pilot can respond to instructions issued by ATC, communicate via voice or data link as appropriate to the airspace or operation, and has direct responsibility for the safe conduct of the aircraft throughout its flight. An RPA may possess various types of auto-pilot technology but at any time the remote pilot can intervene in the management of the flight. This concept equates to manned aircraft being flown either by an auto–pilot system or manually by the onboard pilot. 2 Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles and other guided weapons are not considered UA under this regulation. 3 The airworthiness management must be applied to the whole UAS, not just the unmanned aircraft (UA) component.

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(3) Category 4 UAS. The operating environment must ensure that the overall risk posed by the UAS is unlikely to cause a ground fatality or pose an unacceptable risk to other aircraft or property.

Unmanned Aircraft System Airworthiness

5. The UAS comprises not just the air vehicle, it also consists of the Ground Control Station (GCS), communications/data link system, the maintenance system and the operating personnel. The airworthiness regulations are designed to cover the entire UAS to the extent necessary to mitigate the risks posed by the whole system when operated in the intended roles and environment. (Figure 3-A-1) shows the key elements of a typical UAS.

Figure 3–B–1 KEY ELEMENTS OF A TYPICAL UAS

Technical airworthiness management

6. The technical airworthiness management of UAS concerns the design, construction and maintenance of those components of the system that form the basis of the system’s suitability for flight in the intended role and environment. This includes those ground based elements critical to the operation of the UAS that may include the control interface, data link and other communication facilities and not just the physical design of the air vehicle component.

Operational airworthiness management

7. The operational airworthiness management of UAS concerns the ability for trained and qualified personnel to safely operate the system within approved limitations and procedures in the intended roles and environment. Operational airworthiness also impacts the design of the ground and air vehicle components in that the system must be controllable, and provide sufficient warnings and indications to operators appropriate to safe operation in all intended roles and environments.

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RESERVED

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AAP 7001.048 Glossary

GLOSSARY

AL 8 1

1. This is the DASP Master Glossary, which provides authorised terms for use in Defence aviation. Collectively the terms are maintained by ACPA, via an individual DASP Agency, on behalf of the Defence AA1. The DASP Glossary is synchronised within:

a. AAP 7001.048 – Defence Aviation Safety Program (the master copy of the DASP Master Glossary to ensure DASP synchronisation)

b. AAP 7001.053 – Technical Airworthiness Management Manual

c. AAP 6734.001 – Defence Aviation Safety Manual

d. Australian Defence Glossary (ADG).

2. To identify terminology sponsorship, a superscript symbol placed after each term to denote which DASP agency carries prime responsibility for maintaining the identified term as follows:

a. * – ACPA

b. ^ – DDAAFS2

c. # – DGTA-ADF.

Navigation Bookmarks A Ae Ai Al Au Av B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S Se Sp Su T U V W X Y Z

1 Defence AA Decision Brief of 28 Feb 15 (AB13999105). 2 DDAAFS sponsored terms updated (AB24748974 and AB24719537)

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http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/results.asp


DEFINITIONS

A (back to top)

Above Obstacles (AO) *

The vertical distance between an aircraft and the highest obstacle on the terrain or water surface

Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS) * The level of safety accepted by the relevant authority in making risk based decisions after identified hazards and associated risks are understood and retained using an approved contemporary risk management process.

Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) *

A non-binding regulatory compliance method that can serve as a means by which the requirements contained in the regulation can be met.

Acceptance Test and Evaluation (AT&E) *

An acceptance function used by Defence to verify that a system complies with the defined acceptance requirements. AT&E is used to establish specification compliance and verify airworthiness.

Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan (AAMP) * A document that describes the strategy and scope of airworthiness activities identified to achieve and maintain the airworthiness of new or modified aviation system prior to and following Service Release.

Adequate Aerodrome * An aerodrome on which an aircraft can be operated, taking account of the applicable performance requirements, runway characteristics3 and other relevant support facilities and services.

ADF Cadets * A collective reference to the three cadet organisations, namely, the Australian Navy Cadets, Australian Army Cadets and Australian Air Force Cadets.

Ae (back to top)

Aerial Delivery * The process of dispatching cargo or equipment from an operating aircraft.

Aerial Delivery Equipment (ADE) # Equipment employed on transport or rotary wing aircraft in the aerial delivery of material; including slings, platforms, containers, parachutes, rigging materials, cloths, cords, tapes, threads and webbing. ADE does not include equipment employed in the aerial delivery of personnel.

Aerodrome * A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations, and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.4

Aerodrome apron areas * The surfaces intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading or unloading air cargo, passengers, fuelling, parking or maintenance5, excluding hangars.

Aerodrome manoeuvring areas * The surfaces of the aerodrome used for the take-off, landing, and taxiing of aircraft6, excluding aprons.

3 EASA EU No. 965/2012 Annex 1 – Definitions 4 ICAO Annex 14 Vol. I – Aerodromes – Definitions page 1–2 5ICAO Annex 14 Vol. I – Definitions, page 1–3.

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Aerodrome movement areas * A term describing the combined manoeuvring areas and apron areas, excluding hangars.

Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) * A service whose principal objective is the preservation of life and materiel in the event of an aircraft accident or incident occurring at, or in the immediate vicinity of, an aerodrome.

Aeronautical Product * Any aircraft system, sub-system, component, part or material, including computer systems software/firmware and fuels, oils and lubricants whose intended end-use is to form a physical part of an aircraft.

Aeronautical Information * Information and other required data necessary for the safety and efficiency of air navigation.

Aeronautical Information Service Provider (AISP) * An organisation responsible for the provision of aeronautical information and other required data that is necessary for the safety and efficiency of air navigation.

Aeronautical Life Support Equipment (ALSE) Essential safety or mission equipment to be carried or worn by crew or passengers when operating aircraft in a military configuration, role or environment.

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Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC) * The ASIC is comprised of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Unites States Air Force and United States Navy; who work together to resolve interoperability issues affecting combined air and space operations. (see ASIC documents).

Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC) Documents * ASIC documents relate to technical, procedural and material aspects of air and space operations. When ratified as Air Standards, ASIC documents are implemented through Defence procedural and material publications and instructions, Defence standards or Defence technical publications or instructions. ASIC documents are not stand alone documents and each ASIC document will list the national implementation documents (see ASIC).

Air Capable Ship * A sea based facility from which aircraft can take-off, be recovered, or routinely receive and transfer logistic support.

Air Cargo Delivery (ACD) * A process that involves the loading of air cargo, whatever it may be including passengers, freight, paratroopers, animals and EO materials, and the subsequent unloading of the air cargo, either on the ground or while in the air.

Air Operator Certificate (AOC) * A certificate granted by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) permitting the conduct of commercial flying activities.

Air Traffic Advisory (ATA) * An ATS subcategory provided within advisory airspace to help ensure separation, in so far as practical, between aircraft7 through the provision of advisory information that may be used by pilots to avoid collision with other aircraft.

4ICAO Annex 14 Vol. I – Definitions, page 1–6. 12

ICAO Annex 11 – ATS – Definitions.

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Air Traffic Control (ATC) * An ATS subcategory that includes area control service, approach control service or aerodrome control service provided for the purpose of:

a. preventing collisions between aircraft

b. on the manoeuvring area, preventing collisions between aircraft and obstructions

c. expediting and maintaining an orderly flow of air traffic.8

Air Traffic Management (ATM) * A generic term encompassing the dynamic, integrated management of air traffic and airspace in a safe, economical and efficient manner through the provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration with all parties9 involving airborne and ground-based functions.10

Air Traffic Management Plan (ATMP) * The approved systems and processes used to ensure the safe operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in conjunction with other air traffic.

Air Traffic Service (ATS) * A generic term meaning variously, flight information service, alerting service, air traffic advisory service, air traffic control service, battlefield airspace control and maritime control service.

Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) * A qualification awarded to a trained and competent individual who controls a Category 3 or Category 4 UAS during flight time.

Air Weapons Range * A Defence Practice Area used for aviation activities involving:

a. air to surface, air to air, or air to sub-surface weapons release, be they live weapons, inert practices or tests, or

b. ground based firing activities involving the use of targets towed by manned or unmanned aircraft.

Aircraft * Any machine or craft, including an unmanned machine or an unmanned craft, which can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air.

Aircraft altitude * The aircraft altitude above mean sea level (AMSL). Example: 21 000 ft AMSL.

Aircraft Captain *

A Type Rated pilot designated as being in command and charged with the safe and effective conduct of the aircraft during flight. Analogous with “pilot–in–command”11.

Aircraft Controller *

A generic term used by aviation medicine describing those specialist personnel who may issue control or advisory information to aircraft that the pilot may base flight decisions upon.

8 ICAO Annex 11 – ATS – Definitions (expanded) 9 Doc 4444 PANS ATM Chapter 1 – Definitions 10 Ground based functions include maritime based functions 11 EASA Glossary.

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Aircraft Maintenance Documentation (AMD) # An aircraft’s maintenance and operational certificate, maintenance forecast and technical particulars record. The AMD may be paper based, electronic or a combination of both.

Aircraft oxygen system *

A means to store and supply aviators’ breathing oxygen.

Aircraft Related Equipment # Aircraft-related equipment can be aircraft airborne equipment or aircraft non-airborne equipment whose performance could directly affect airworthiness.

Aircraft Store # Any device, excluding air cargo, intended for internal or external carriage and mounted on aircraft suspension and release equipment, whether or not the item is intended to be separated in flight from the aircraft. Stores include missiles, rockets, bombs, mines, torpedos, gun ammunition, grenades, pyrotechnic devices, sonobuoys, signal underwater sound devices, fuel and spray tanks, dispensers, pods (refuelling, thrust augmentation, gun, electronic countermeasures, etc), targets, chaff and flares from countermeasures dispensing systems, and suspension equipment (racks and pylons).

Aircraft–Stores Compatibility (ASC) * The ability of each element of specified aircraft–stores configuration(s) to coexist without unacceptable effects on the physical, aerodynamic, structural, electrical, electromagnetic or functional characteristics of each other under specified ground and flight conditions.

Aircraft Stores Configuration * Refers to an aerospace platform, incorporating a stores management system(s), combined with specific stores suspension equipment and aircraft store(s) loaded on the aircraft in a specific pattern. An aircraft/stores configuration also includes any downloads from that specific pattern resulting from the release of the store(s) in an authorised employment or jettison sequence(s).

Aircraft Type * A specific design (make and model) of aircraft. A type is the baseline from which models and variants are derived and is the origin for subsequent lineage. Examples of aircraft types within the Defence inventory include the C–130 Hercules and the F/A–18 Hornet.

Aircrew * A generic term describing personnel whose primary duties are conducted within the confines of an aircraft during flight time. Not all aircrew are flight crew. Unless authorised as crew or as a mission essential passenger for the specific aviation mission, aircrew are deemed passengers.

AIRSAFE Program ^

The RAN AIRSAFE Program, operated under the direction of CN, enables the management of flying safety policy affecting the Fleet Air Arm.

Airspace * The zone next to the earth consisting of atmosphere capable of sustaining flight.

Airspace Management * The design, allocation, integration, and regulation of airspace, including the application of airspace usage procedures to ensure the airspace is appropriate for the mission or activity.

Airworthiness * A concept, the application of which defines the condition of an aircraft and supplies the basis for judgement of the suitability for flight of that aircraft in that it has been designed, constructed, maintained and operated to approved

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standards and limitations, by competent and authorised individuals, who are acting as members of an approved organisation and whose work is both certified as correct and accepted on behalf of Defence. 12

Airworthiness Basis * Justification or substantiation of a regulatory requirement in terms of the risk to safety posed or averted.

Airworthiness Board (AwB) * An independent board of review appointed by the Defence AA to advise and make recommendations on airworthiness certification and to review the in-service management of Aviation Systems such that continuing airworthiness can be assured.

Airworthiness Directive (AD) * An Airworthiness Instrument issued by the Defence AA which promulgates immediate and binding requirements to authorise or restrict a course of action in relation to an Aviation System.

Airworthiness Instrument * A binding document issued to certify, authorise or restrict operation of a Defence aviation system under specified conditions.

Airworthiness Regulator * The individuals (TAR and OAR) responsible for establishing and maintaining the regulatory framework for the airworthiness management of their respective area of responsibility.

Airworthiness Standards # The design requirements, including where appropriate the means of demonstrating compliance, prescribed for the purposes of establishing adequate levels of safety.

Airworthiness Standards Representative (ASR) * A Commonwealth employee to whom the TAR may delegate authority to prescribe and revise airworthiness standards for Defence.

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Alerting service * An ATS subcategory provided to notify appropriate organizations regarding aircraft in need of search and rescue aid, and assist such organisations as required13.

Allocated Baseline (ABL) #

The initially approved documentation describing an item’s functional, interoperability and interface characteristics that are allocated from those of a system or a higher level configuration item, interface requirements with interfacing configuration items, additional design constraints, and the verification required to demonstrate the achievement of those specified characteristics.

Application Identifier (AI) * The A or N prefix of the Defence registration number. For example A41 for C-17 Globemaster III, N48 for MH-60R Seahawk.

Appointing Authority ^

The command appointment that appoints an Investigating Officer, Aviation Accident Investigation Team, Aviation Incident Investigation Team or Board of Inquiry to investigate an aviation safety occurrence.

12 DI(G)02-2 – Defintions. 11ICAO Annex 11 – ATS – Definitions.

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Approval to Operate * Authorisation to operate a non-Defence registered aircraft.

Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO) * An organisation that has been approved by the TAR to conduct maintenance of aircraft and/or aeronautical product.

As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) * ALARP is a principle. A risk is ALARP when it has been demonstrated that the cost of any further risk reduction, where the cost includes the loss of defence capability as well as financial or other resource costs, is ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the benefit obtained from that risk reduction.14

ASOR Appointing Authority ^ Command appointment that appoints an Investigating Officer to investigate an aviation safety occurrence. In the first instance, the ASOR Appointing Authority is the originating squadron/unit commanding officer/officer commanding (CO/OC), ATS flight commander, senior maintenance manager (SMM) or squadron detachment commander. Depending on the classification of the occurrence, the Appointing Authority may be from higher within the command chain (e.g. in the event of an accident or serious incident).

ASSIST Program ^

The Army Aviation Safety, Standardisation Inspection and Support Team (ASSIST) Program, operated under the direction of the Chief of Army and the direction of the Commander Aviation Support Group, conducts compliance audits and reviews of safety and operational airworthiness matters within Army Aviation.

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Australian Aircraft * An aircraft which is registered in accordance with section 9(1) (e) of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and is subject to regulation by CASA.

Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC) * A document issued by the Defence AA, on advice from the TAA and OAA, following independent review by the Airworthiness Board, signifying compliance with the Defence airworthiness requirements for Type Certification as a Defence registered aircraft.

Authorised Engineering Organisation (AEO) * An organisation that has been certified (awarded an Engineering Authority Certificate) by the TAR to provide design or engineering management services to Defence.

Authorised Maintenance Data # Those instructions, approved for use by the responsible AEO, required to retain aircraft and aircraft-related equipment in an airworthy condition. These instructions include, but are not limited to, maintenance manuals, technical maintenance plans, servicing schedules, component lifing policies and inspection programs. Authorised Person (AMO specific) #

An individual who is authorised by the Senior Maintenance Manager, or delegate acceptable to the TAR, as being competent to perform specific activities in the AMO.

Authorised Tradesperson #

An individual, operating as part of an Approved Maintenance Organisation, who is authorised by the Senior Maintenance Manager or delegate as being competent to carry out a specific scope of maintenance activities.

14 DI(G) OPS 02–2 Glossary

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Authority to Act

An authorisation for a designated organisation to act as a Flight Test Organisation (FTO).

Authority to Operate (AUTHOP) * An AUTHOP confirms the ongoing operational suitability and operational effectiveness of an Aviation Support System (AvSS) service output, including its applicable subsystems. An AUTHOP fulfils a similar purpose for an AvSS that Service Release does for aircraft.

Autonomous Aircraft * An unmanned aircraft that does not allow pilot intervention in the management of flight.

Autonomous Operation * An operation during which an unmanned aircraft is operating without pilot intervention in the management of flight

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Aviation Accident ^ An occurrence that:

a. did affect the safety or airworthiness of the Aviation System, or safety of third parties

b. where system defences were inadequate/absent to limit the severity of the occurrence resulting in a critical/catastrophic consequence to safety or airworthiness.

Aviation Accident Investigation Team ^ A team of personnel, led by a qualified aviation safety investigator, appointed to investigate an aviation accident in order to determine the factors that contributed to the occurrence and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Aviation Hazard Review Board ^ A Board appointed by the FEG commander (and OAAR (Acqs) of ADF projects conducting flying operations) to ensure all accepted recommendations of reported aviation hazards are actioned to completion within reasonable timeframes.

Aviation Incident Investigation Team ^ A team of personnel, led by a qualified aviation safety investigator, appointed to investigate an aviation incident or serious incident in order to determine the factors that contributed to the occurrence and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

Aviation Materiel # Aircraft, aeronautical product and technical equipment which directly supports ADF aviation capability.

Aviation medical certificate *. A document provided by an AVMO attesting to the medical fitness of a person to conduct flying related duties.

Aviation Medical Officer (AVMO) * A medical practitioner who is recognised by the Surgeon General ADF as being appropriately trained and authorised to provide aviation medicine support to Defence Aviation.

Aviation Medicine (AVMED) * The component of military medicine that is concerned with the interaction between the aerospace environment and human physiology, psychology and pathology.

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Aviation Physiology Training Officer (APTO) * A person who is recognised by a SSAMA as being appropriately trained and authorised to provide supplemental aviation medicine training support.

Aviation Risk Management (AVRM) * A description of the application of Standards Australia Risk Management Standards in the context of Defence aviation operations. AVRM offers a systematic, logical approach to identifying and treating risks to Defence aviation resources and missions, while supporting initiative, flexibility and adaptability.

Aviation Safety * The state of freedom from unacceptable risk of injury to persons or damage to aircraft and property.

Aviation Safety Audit ^ An audit aimed at ensuring compliance with the Defence ASMS, operational and technical orders, regulations, instructions, doctrine, guidance and publications concerning aviation safety against a set standard.

Aviation Safety Committee (ASC) ^ A management tool that brings people together to assist commanders in the management of their Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS).

Aviation Safety Management * Aviation Safety Management is integral to the function of safe flying operations and requires processes and procedures to ensure competence of commanders and all personnel associated with flying operations, adherence to authorised orders and instructions, promotion of and maintenance of high levels of aviation safety awareness, and systematic evaluation and management of risk in operations.

Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS) ^ A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, policies, procedures and plans. Aviation safety is progressed when the ASMS is coupled with the positive attitudes, beliefs, values and practices of the personnel within an organisation.

Aviation Safety Occurrence ^ Any occurrence which adversely affects, or could adversely affect, the safety or airworthiness of an Aviation System, or safety of third parties.

Aviation Safety Occurrence Report (ASOR) ^ A hazard report submitted via the Defence Aviation Hazard Reporting and Tracking System (DAHRTS) to notify required agencies of all Defence Aviation safety occurrences, including operations, Air Traffic Control (ATC) / air defence, technical and ground based activities.

Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) ^ A member appointed by the relevant aviation commander, to be responsible for supervising and managing all aspects of the commander's Aviation Safety Management System.

Aviation Safety Survey ^ A survey aimed at identifying hazards, and improving the safety culture and effectiveness of the organisation’s ASMS. Ultimately the aim is to reduce the number of aviation safety occurrences.

Aviation Support System (AvSS) * The systems or services that are Defence-owned or are operated exclusively by or on behalf of Defence, have a functional or physical interface with aircraft, and have the potential to compromise suitability for flight.

Aviation Support System Certificate (AvSSC) * An instrument that confirms an AvSS has been designed and constructed to approved standards and limitations, and can be maintained and operated for its intended purpose.

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Aviation Support System Management Plan (AvSSMP) * A management system intended to capture the scope and requirements of an AvSS over its lifecycle.

Aviation System * The integration of equipment, personnel, organisation, publications and procedures to achieve an aviation role. Aviation systems include: Defence registered aircraft types, non-Defence registered aircraft types, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Aviation Support Systems (AvSS).

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Basic Flight Trainer (BFT) * A device, which does not meet the requirements for categorisation as a Flight Simulator or a Flight Training Device, approved for the purpose of permitting experience acquired therein to be credited towards meeting a sub-set of requirements for flight crew qualification, categorisation or currency.

Battle Damage Repair (BDR) # A maintenance process used to restore sufficient strength and serviceability to permit damaged aircraft to fly additional operational sorties. BDR comprises assessment, design, approval, acceptance and repair.

Battlefield airspace control (BAC) * An ATS subcategory provided in assigned airspace that supports the air, land or amphibious scheme of manoeuvre by providing airspace management, coordination and de–confliction of joint fires and effects in that airspace in order to facilitate safe and efficient access to airspace through a combination of coordination with adjoining civil/military agencies and through the application of both procedural and positive control methods.

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Cabin altitude * The pressure altitude inside the hull of an aircraft. Example: 21 000 ft CA

Carried Forward Unserviceability (CFU) * A deferred unserviceability that does not prejudice the airworthiness of an aircraft, or safety of personnel in flight.

Centre of Expertise (CoE) * A Defence recognised and authorised organisation within which there exists qualified, competent and approved specialists in particular disciplines, such as a flight test organisation (FTO).

Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA) * A document, issued by the DAR, certifying that a particular aircraft, at the date of issue, conformed to the Type Design recorded in the Type Record.

Certificate of Conformance (CoC) * A document attesting that an individual instance of an AvSS that will have multiple installations has been examined and conforms to the intended AvSS design.

Certification * Certification is the end result of a process which formally examines and documents compliance of a product, against predefined standards, to the satisfaction of the certificating authority.

Certification Basis * The complete set of airworthiness design requirements against which a design (or type) is certified as airworthy and is described in AAP 7001.054 — Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual.

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Charter * The commercial renting of a complete aircraft, crew and maintenance system for tasking undertaken within the bounds of a legally binding contract.

Civil Register * The CASA maintained civil aircraft register. Aircraft on this register are referred to as civil registered aircraft and will be appropriately marked with a ‘VH’ registration.

Civil Registered Aircraft * An aircraft that is registered by a civilian airworthiness authority.

UAS Command and Control (C2) Link The data link between a remotely piloted aircraft and a remote pilot station for the purposes of managing flight.

Competency * The capacity of an individual to effectively and safely complete a task to a required standard of performance through the application of appropriate skills, knowledge and attitude.

Compliance Finding * A record of verification evidence which establishes that an airworthiness Certification Basis requirement has been met.

Concern * An AwB outcome which remarks on a critical airworthiness issue that if not addressed by a specified date and managed in the interim could require amendment or withdrawal of the airworthiness instrument and/or Service Release.

Confidential Incident Report (CONFIR) * A report that may be used when an individual wants others to learn from an aviation related experience, which they thought alarming or even dangerous. It is used when an individual is reluctant, or unable, to report through the normal safety reporting system.

Configuration # The functional and physical characteristics of existing or planned hardware, firmware, software or a combination thereof, as set forth in technical documentation (which includes specifications, standards and drawings) and ultimately achieved in a product.

Configuration Control Board (CCB) # A group comprising of technical and logistics members as required and which controls the process of creation, change and deletion of CIs and their associated Configuration Records. The CCB's role is to maintain the required level of system integrity, capability and supportability through the review, approval and monitoring of change requests.

Configuration Item (CI) # An item of aircraft or aircraft-related equipment designated for configuration management separately from the aircraft.

Configuration Management Plan (CMP) # A document that defines CI management responsibilities and overall configuration management processes for a particular system or related groups of systems.

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Configuration, Role and Environment (CRE) * The specified configuration (functional and physical characteristics), role ( warfighting function15 )and environment (eg physical and meteorological conditions) specified in an aviation system’s Statement of Intent.

Consequence *

The outcome of an event or situation expressed qualitatively or quantitatively, being a loss, injury, disadvantage or gain.

Contractor / Sub-contractor ^ A company, firm, organisation or any person, other than a Defence employee, contracted to provide goods and services to the Defence Organisation.

Construction * The production of materiel through manufacture, fabrication and assembly of approved parts and materials to meet an approved design.

Contingency Maintenance (CMAINT) #

Those maintenance activities that are performed during a declared contingency operation. CMAINT involves revised servicing schedules, component lifting strategies (plans) and repair philosophies, including Battle Damage Repair, which will maximise operational availability while constraining and managing risk.

Corrective Maintenance # Those maintenance tasks necessary to restore items to a specified condition or to restore it to serviceability after failure.

Crew * Competent and authorised individuals, including personnel authorised to undertake aircraft type qualification training, who may operate or interface with an aircraft's systems during flight specific aviation mission, including temporary equipment installations. Crew is broken into subsets of flight crew and mission crew in order to distinguish between airworthiness roles and capability roles.

Crew Resource Management (CRM) * The process or act of effective and cohesive aircrew or operator teamwork which contributes to aviation safety.

Crew Station * A position, seated or otherwise, within an aircraft from which a crew member may perform an operational function.

Critical / Catastrophic Consequence to Safety ^ Fatal injury of any person (safety consequence), and/or Category 5 damage (i.e. unrepairable, missing, or inaccessible for recovery) to an Aviation System (capability consequence).

Crowd line * The forward edge of the area(s) intended for spectators during a Flying Display from which aircraft safety distances may be calculated.

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Dangerous Goods * Articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety, property or the environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in authoritative technical instructions or which are classified according to those instructions.16

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15 AAP 1000-D – Air Power Manual.

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Dangerous goods include explosives, flammable liquids, gases, corrosives and chemically reactive or acutely (highly) toxic substances. Authoritative technical instructions include ICAO – Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air and IATA –- Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) Manual.

Day #

Any calendar day.

Decompression illness (DCI) * A term referring to a group of clinical conditions that may result from exposure to a change in ambient pressure.

Defence Flight Test * Flight test conducted on Defence registered aircraft.

Deeper Maintenance (DM) # Complex or extensive maintenance performed on an application or item. It includes overhaul and major repair of items involving major disassembly and repair. DM normally requires specialised technical skills, support equipment and workshop facilities.

Defence Controlled Workspace ^ Any location, whether Commonwealth premises or area of operations, in which an undertaking of the Defence Organisation is carried out by Defence employees (as opposed to workplaces that are under the control of a contractor).

Defence Organisation ^

The Australian Defence Force and the Department of Defence.

Defence Practice Area (DPA) * An area intended to protect public safety by giving notice of a practice, prohibiting entry to, and allowing the removal of unauthorised people, vehicles, vessels or aircraft from a DPA when an authorised Defence operation or practice is in progress. DPA’s may also be referred to as Defence training areas and ranges.

Deferred Maintenance # Maintenance tasks, inclusive of both Corrective and Preventive Maintenance, for which the rectification or effect of required actions has been deferred on a calendar, interval or event basis. The decision to defer is made by the SMM or delegate and supported where required by the responsible AEO.

Defect * A fault, other than by fair wear and tear, which renders an item unsuitable for its intended use. The fault may be in design or deviation of a dimension, finish or other functional characteristic from specified requirements or from recognised standards of engineering practice.

Defence * Civilian and Service elements of the Defence portfolio.

Defence Aircraft * Those aircraft listed on the Defence Register and non–Defence registered aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence.

Defence Aviation * The design, construction, maintenance and operation of any aircraft owned, leased, hired or chartered by Defence; any aircraft operated exclusively for or on behalf of Defence; any aircraft for which CASA has placed statutory airworthiness responsibilities on Defence; and any AvSS.

16 ICAO Annex 18 – Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods

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Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) * The Defence AA is accountable to the CDF and Secretary for establishing and managing the Defence Aviation Safety Program.

Defence Employee * A person employed in the Department of Defence under section 22 of the Public Service Act 1999.

Defence Member * A person as defined in section 3 of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982, means (1) a member of the Permanent Navy, the Regular Army or the Permanent Air Force; or (2) a member of the Reserves who is rendering continuous full-time service or is on duty or in uniform.

Defence Personnel * Defence Personnel means all Defence Employees, Defence Members, ADF Cadets and ADF Cadet Staff and equivalents from other defence organisations on exchange to Defence.

Defence Standard (DEF STAN) 00–970 * DEF STAN 00–970 is the UK Ministry of Defence standard containing design and airworthiness requirements for Service aircraft and engines. This airworthiness code has been adopted by Defence as the baseline code for validation of a Defence registered aircraft’s certification basis.

Defence Register * The Defence aircraft register maintained by ACPA.

Defence Registered Aircraft * An aircraft type listed on the Defence Register.

Dental Officer * Any Defence member or Defence employee who is authorised to provide dental care to Defence personnel as a registered Dentist.

Design # The process or act of creating or changing a product and related technical process descriptions through the application of scientific and engineering effort (verb), or the outcome of that process (noun). The design therefore encompasses not only the configuration of the product, but also the test and evaluation needed to validate that the design meets performance and safety requirements; the manufacturing processes (including production test requirements) which require special control to ensure the product meets requirements; the in-service monitoring requirements, the maintenance processes and authorised repairs; the maintenance lives and intervals and fatigue life; and operating procedures and limits.

Design Acceptance # The process whereby a design or design change (ie an output of the design process) involving aircraft or aircraft-related equipment is determined to be technically acceptable for ADF use based on a determination that the specified requirements and design standards are sufficient and applicable (to the ADF authorised configuration, maintenance policy and procedures, and operations) and that the quality of the design has been proven to the satisfaction of the responsible DAR. Generally, design quality is assured through approval of the design by an AEO against the approved design requirements and standards plus an acceptable basis of design verification.

Design Acceptance Certification # The final act of the Design Acceptance process whereby a DAR provides a certified record of the technical acceptability of a change to aircraft or aircraft-related equipment Type Design.

Design Acceptance Representative (DAR) # A Commonwealth employee with delegated TAA authority to perform Design Acceptance certification of changes to aircraft or aircraft related equipment.

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Design Approval Certification #

The act of approval of design output resulting from a process that formally examines and documents compliance of a design (or design change) with specified requirements and design standards.

Design Change #

A change to the approved configuration documentation of an item or a proposed deviation from the approved design configuration.

Design Control #

The control of a product design, a design change or design service performed for another AEO.

Design Engineer #

A Design Engineer (DE) is a professional engineer within an AEO with assigned authority from the Senior Design Engineer to perform certain engineering activities, including judging the significance of design changes and undertaking design review of significant design changes.

Design Output Data # All data produced in developing the design as provided by TAREG 3.4. Following Incorporation Approval of the design, design output data is used to update the Type Design data.

Design Reference Data # Type Design data and any other data, including design manuals and handbooks, airworthiness design standards, specifications, technical standards and technological practices, engineering reports and reference material, and drawings, used as an input to a design activity.

Design Review # The act whereby a design (or design change) is independently checked by an authorised person (other than the person who developed the design) to: verify the validity of the assumptions, conditions, data and methods used in design development; and to verify that the design output meets the specific design input requirements.

Design Support Network (DSN) #

A group of agencies that provide design support to an AEO.

Detect and Avoid *

The capability to see, sense or detect conflicting traffic or other hazards and take the appropriate avoiding action.

Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) # An engineering function used by the manufacturer, or a nominated test agency, to establish that a system complies with the design requirements. DT&E is typically an iterative process resulting in a final design that is considered, by the contractor, to be specification compliant. An outcome of a successful DT&E process is assurance that the aircraft is airworthy and specification compliant.

Deviation # A configuration change where: one or a limited number of Configuration Items (CI) within a population departs from the current approved type design; or where the entire population of a CI departs from the current approved type design for a limited time.

Disability ^

Any restriction or lack of ability (resulting from an impairment) to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered for a normal human being.17

17 Defence Safety Manual (SAFETYMAN) Volume 1, General

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Dry lease *

A Defence aircraft lease for an aircraft that does not include crew, maintenance or insurance requirements.

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Employee *

A member of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) or a civilian employee of the Department of Defence (DoD).

Employer * The Commonwealth, or acting for the Commonwealth – the Defence Organisation (i.e. the ADF and the Department of Defence). Group executives, commanders/executives and supervisors represent the employer.

Engineering Authority (EA) # The authority assigned expressly to an organisation (AEO) or to an individual within an organisation to undertake specific engineering activities.

Engineering Authority Certificate (EAC) #

The certificate awarded by the TAR to an organisation to operate as an AEO.

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Engineering Change # A change to the current approved configuration documentation of a configuration item (CI) at any point in the life cycle of the CI.

Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) # A proposed change to the current approved configuration of a CI and the supporting design documentation via which the change is described, justified and submitted to the Configuration Control Board (CCB). Although proposals in the initial stage may use different terminology such as System/Software Change Request or Software Trouble Report, all formal proposals to change the current approved configuration documentation are categorised as ECP.

Engineering Management Plan (EMP) # A controlled quality document containing the details of an organisation’s Engineering Management System (EMS) including references to all engineering plans, processes and procedures to which the organisation must comply. The EMP describes all of the requirements that are satisfied by an organisation to become, and to remain, an AEO.

Event ^

An occurrence that had the potential to affect the safety or airworthiness of the Aviation System, or safety of third parties, but did not due to:

a. system defences that were adequate to prevent a compromise to safety or airworthiness, or

b. system tolerance that was sufficient to prevent any degradation to safety or airworthiness.

Exemption * Documented approval from the relevant regulator authorising non–compliance with a particular regulation for a specified period.

External Service Providers * Contractors, consultants and professional service providers engaged by Defence.

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Fast jet * A term referring to high performance, extremely manoeuvrable aircraft. For example a Super Hornet.

Flight Authorisation * The assessment process through which the Aircraft Captain is charged with the safe conduct of the flight.

Flight Authorisation Officer * A person authorised to make suitability for flight assessments and flight authorisation decisions.

Flight Crew * Crew members, including personnel authorised to undertake aircraft type qualification training, who are charged with duties essential to the safe operation of an aircraft during flight time, including remotely piloted aircraft. Flight crew is a subset of crew.

Flight Information Documents (FID) * FID include Flight Information Publications (FLIP) aeronautical maps, aeronautical charts and similar documents that support aviation activities.

Flight Information Publication (FLIP) * An enduring term that describes various aeronautical information designed for use primarily in the cockpit environment.

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Flight information service (FIS) * An ATS subcategory provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flight.18

Flight Safety Critical Item # Any part, assembly or installation containing a critical characteristic whose failure, malfunction or absence could cause a catastrophic failure or an uncommanded engine shutdown, resulting in loss or serious damage to the aircraft or an unsafe condition.

Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD)* An FSTD is any device that simulates an aircraft or part of an aircraft used to train personnel who interact with aircraft flight controls or power plant controls to manoeuvre the aircraft in flight and/or on the ground, and meets approved standards for the purpose of permitting experience acquired therein to be credited towards meeting requirements for operator qualification, categorisation or currency.

Flight Simulator (FS) * See Flight Training Device (FTD).

Flight Test * The operation of an aircraft for the purposes of Test and Evaluation.

Flight Test Approval Authority (FTAA) * An officer appointed by the Defence AA as responsible for the airworthiness management of Aviation Systems required for, or undergoing Flight Test

Flight Test Organisation (FTO) * An organisation recognised as competent by an FTAA to conduct flight test activities within a specified scope.

Flight Test Permit (FTP) * An instrument that authorises the conduct of Flight Test.

Flight Test Representative * A suitably qualified person (usually qualified test aircrew) appointed by an FTAA to make assessments and determinations within specified guidelines regarding the airworthiness management of flight test activities and the suitability of a system to be operated in designated operational roles by trained and qualified Defence aircrew.

Flight Training Device (FTD) * A Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) for a specific type (or a specific make, model and series) of aircraft. An FTD is a device that simulates the aircraft in ground and flight operations to the extent of the systems installed in the device and comprises a full size replica of the instruments, equipment, panels and controls in an open flight deck area, or an enclosed flight deck of the aircraft, but does not, in every respect, simulate the aircraft in ground and flight operations. An FTD includes the necessary software and equipment, and the way that the equipment is interconnected.

Flying Management System (FMS) * A system of processes and procedures within a flying organisation centred on aircraft types or AvSS which establishes the management practices, operational rules, and operator training and qualification requirements that support operational airworthiness.

Flypasts *

A flight by one or more aircraft tasked to pass over a specific location on a constant track and at a constant altitude at a specified time.

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ICAO Annex 11 – ATS – Definitions.

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Flying display * A planned display of sequence(s) by one or more aircraft for an assembled group of people that may include demonstrations of handling and operational capabilities within the approved envelope for the type.

Foreign Military Aircraft * A military aircraft of any foreign nation, expected to be certified for flight under the owning country’s Military Aviation Authority.

Foreign object debris (FOD) * A substance, debris or article alien to a vehicle or system that has potential to cause damage to aircraft. Examples of FOD are aircraft parts, rocks, broken pavement, ramp equipment, and vehicle parts.

Foreign register * A civil aircraft register or military aircraft register maintained by any country other than Australia.

Forward Air Control–Airborne * See Terminal Attack Control

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Generative Safety Culture ^ The ultimate state where safety performance is maximised and safety behaviour is fully integrated into the management system as well as the conduct, values and attitudes of all members of the organisation.

Ground Safety * The implementation of policies, practices and procedures which results in establishing a secure, safe work place with the aim of preventing injury, illness and death.

Ground Support Equipment (GSE) * The ancillary maintenance equipment necessary to maintain an aircraft during servicing.

Guidance material (GM) * Non-binding explanatory and interpretation material, including examples, intended to assist the user on complying with the regulatory requirement.

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Hazard #

A source of potential harm or a situation with a potential to cause loss.

Hazard Log # A data base of identified hazards. It is a formal record of all data and tasks associated with identifying and resolving hazards.

Hazard Report ^ A DAHRTS report (OPHAZ, ASOR or SASOR) used to report any identified aviation hazard, which has the potential to, or has caused an aviation safety occurrence.

Hazard Tracking Authority (HTA) ^ An appointment or appointments–made by aviation Force Element Group (FEG) commanders–responsible for tracking actions and recommendations from FEG aviation safety reports to completion.

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Height Above Obstacles Within (HAOW) * The vertical distance between an aircraft and the highest obstacle on the terrain or water surface within a specified lateral radius from the aircraft’s position. For example, ‘500ft HAOW 600m’ means 500 feet of vertical separation between the aircraft and the highest obstacle within 600 metres of that aircraft.

Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) * A defined area that may be used by helicopters for the purposes of landing or taking off, including infrequent, opportunity and short term basis for all types of operations. It may or may not be located on an Aerodrome. It may also be referred to as a helipad.

Helipad * See Helicopter Landing Site.

Heliport * An Aerodrome or a defined area on a structure intended to be used wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of helicopters.19

Human Factors ^ The multi-disciplinary science that applies knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of human performance to all aspects of the design, operation, and maintenance of products and systems. It considers the effects of physical, psychological, and environmental factors on human performance in different task environments, including the role of human operators in complex systems.

Hypoxia * A lack of oxygen to the tissues sufficient to cause impairment of function.

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Immediate Safety Report ^ Reports to notify, as soon as possible, ADF aviation safety occurrences including accidents, serious incidents, and those occurrences which have immediate implications for either safety of flight, public safety or possible media exposure.

Incident ^

An occurrence that:

a. did affect, or could affect, the safety or airworthiness of the Aviation System, or safety of third parties, and

b. where system defences were:

(1) adequate to limit the severity of the occurrence such that the consequences to safety or airworthiness were less than major or

(2) inadequate/absent to limit the severity of the occurrence, however system tolerance limited the consequences to safety or airworthiness to less than major.

Includes (rules of interpretation) * ‘includes’ means ‘includes but is not limited to’.

Incorporation Approval # The formal process of permitting a design change to proceed from the design to the incorporation phase and has the effect of committing whatever resources are required for implementation. Incorporation Approval is granted by the Senior Executive or a nominated representative.

19ICAO Annex 14 Vol. I – Definitions page 1–4.

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Independent * In the context of, or similar to, ‘independent board’ or ‘independent inspection’ and within these Regulations means independent of the chain of command which is being assessed or inspected.

Independent Maintenance Inspection (IMI) # A discrete conformance activity utilised to verify the conformance of the maintenance task or component against a prescribed standard carried out by an authorised person who was not involved in the performance of the maintenance being inspected.

Inspection # The process of determining compliance with engineering standards and applicable maintenance documents.

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Key Staff * Appointments within an engineering, maintenance or flying organisation which contribute to the safe operation of an aviation system.

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Letter of Engineering Authority (LEA) # An attachment to an Engineering Authority Certificate (EAC) which defines the scope of activity and any caveats and limitations under which the EAC is issued.

Long Term Lease * The dry or wet leasing, renting or hiring of an aircraft by Defence, usually for more than a year, to support ongoing Defence activity.

Lost Link * The loss of command and control link contact with a remotely-piloted aircraft during flight time.

Low Flying * By day, night or in IMC, flight below the OAA authorised minimum height above and within a defined lateral distance of an obstacle. Low flying does not include flight associated with: a published instrument arrival, approach and departure procedure; or takeoff and landing.

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Maintenance # All actions taken to retain material in or restore the materiel to a specified condition or to restore it to serviceability. It includes inspections, condition monitoring, servicing, replenishment, repair, overhaul, testing, calibration, rebuilding, reclamation, upgrades, modification, recovery, classification and the salvage of technical equipment.

Maintenance Approval Certificate (MAC) # The certificate awarded by the TAR to certify an organisation as an AMO. The certificate includes an accompanying schedule that lists the certified level and scope of maintenance.

Maintenance Authority (MA) # The authority to undertake specific maintenance activities.

Maintenance Certification # The act of authorised persons signing (electronically or physically) that they have discharged their responsibilities regarding the maintenance performed.

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Maintenance Certifier # The person responsible for either: performing the maintenance as a Self Certifying Tradesperson (SCT); or supervising the maintenance as a Trade Supervisor.

Maintenance Management Plan (MMP) # A document which details all activities in an AMO affecting the maintenance of aviation material. It specifies processes to control maintenance and material management activities to assure the technical integrity of all material, as required by the TAR to become, and to remain, an AMO.

Maintenance Management System # A documented system that describes every one of the procedures and processes for managing the conduct of all maintenance in an AMO.

Maintenance Manager (MM) # An authorised person who is responsible for the management of maintenance activities on nominated aircraft type or aeronautical product within an Approved Maintenance Organisation.

Maintenance Personnel # Maintenance personnel are those personnel authorised to plan, perform, supervise, inspect, and certify maintenance.

Maintenance Support Network (MSN) # A group of agencies that provide maintenance support to an AMO.

Maintenance Task # An activity having a defined start and finish and where the responsibility for completion is assigned to a single tradesperson. The task may include one or more actions which will be potentially effective in preventing or detecting failures, will restore equipment to a serviceable condition or prepare an aircraft for a particular mission. Such maintenance activities include replenishment, scheduled servicing and rectification. A particular maintenance task may rely on other maintenance tasks for completion.

Maintenance Test Flight # A flight to ensure that an aircraft meets specification in regard to performance and handling characteristics and to establish, on prescribed occasions, that no deterioration of that standard has occurred during maintenance.

Major Change * Any technical or configuration change to the Type Design that has an appreciable affect on weight, balance, structural strength, performance, power plant operation, flight characteristics or other parameters that impact airworthiness, and/or introduces a new capability or significantly varies an existing capability such that additional airworthiness oversight is required.

Maritime Control Service (MCS) * A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment to support military aircraft operations conducted to/from air capable ships and transiting the maritime operating area that may include positive, advisory or broadcast control.

May (rules of interpretation) * ‘may’ is used in the permissive sense to state authority or permission to do the act prescribed, and the words ‘no person may’ or ‘a person may not’ mean that no person is required, authorised or permitted to do the act described.

MCS Advisory safety control * Analogous to an Air Traffic Advisory service. A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit will provide adequate warnings of hazards affecting aircraft safety. The aircraft commander is responsible for the aircraft’s navigation and collision avoidance.

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MCS Broadcast control * Analogous to Flight Information Service (FIS). A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit, when possible, provides adequate warnings of hazards but the aircraft commander is responsible for aircraft navigation and collision avoidance.

MCS Positive safety control * Analogous to ATC. A service provided to military aircraft operating in the maritime environment where the controlling unit is responsible for taking actions for collision avoidance such as ordering necessary alterations to heading, speed, and altitude to maintain separation criteria.

Meteorology (MET) * A service that provides area and terminal weather information services that safely support aviation activities, such as flight planning and enroute diversion decisions based upon changing weather conditions.

Minor Change * Any technical or configuration change to the Type Design that is not deemed as Major by the aircraft DAR and the TAA.

Major Consequence to Safety ^ Serious injury or illness (safety consequence), and/or Category 4 damage (i.e. repairable in more than 14 days) to the Aviation System (capability consequence).

Materiel * Product that is used in the manufacture of components and in the maintenance and operation of aircraft, including fuels, oils and lubricants.

Meteorology (Met) * A service that provides area or terminal weather information that safely supports aviation activities.

Minimum Separation Distance (MSD) *

A spherical distance around the aircraft that no obstacle or hazard is to penetrate.

Mission Crew * Personnel who may or may not be qualified on aircraft type, but their qualifications are essential for the successful outcome of a specific aviation mission. Mission crew is a subset of crew.

Mission Critical Item # An item whose failure will seriously degrade an aircraft’s ability to complete an assigned mission or lead to a mission being aborted.

Mission Essential * Personnel, equipment or cargo required to successfully conduct a specific aviation mission.

Mission Essential Passenger * A passenger whose carriage aboard an aircraft is directly associated with the specific mission being conducted. A mission essential passenger may include a boarding party, medical patient, paratroops, troops, deploying personnel or survivors from a SAR task.

Mission Essential Personnel (UAS operations context) * Personnel whose conduct is essential to the successful execution of an operational or military training UAS mission (e.g. supported troops, survivors from a SAR task, UA launch/recovery personnel etc).

Model * An aircraft or system model is a derivative of an aircraft or system type that follows a unique lineage. For example a C–130 is an aircraft type, while a C–130J is a model.

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Modification * A change to the physical or functional characteristics of an item of technical equipment.

Modification Installation # For the purpose of TAREG 3.5.20, Modification Installation means the incorporation of changes to an existing Type Design following Incorporation Approval, with the exception of trial modifications.

Must (rules of interpretation) * ‘must’ is used in the imperative sense. Use of other commonly used imperatives such as ‘shall, is to or will’ should not occur.

N (back to top)

Negative Training * Negative training involves techniques learned or practiced in the FSTD which do not translate to correct actions during a safety-critical activity in the airborne environment as a result of incorrect training, fidelity or fit out of the FSTD.

Noise ^

Any unwanted sounds which have numerous separate frequencies and are not generated to convey meaning or information.

Non Compliance # The failure of a plan or procedure to comply with DASP requirements.

Non Conformance # The failure of a product, process or system to meet its regulatory, specification, drawing, or quality requirements.

Non-Defence Flight Test * Flight test conducted on non-Defence registered aircraft which includes participation by Defence members.

Non-Defence Registered Aircraft * Any aircraft that is not recorded on the Defence Register, be it civil registered or foreign registered.

Non Substantial Change * Any operational change to the CRE SOI which is not determined as Substantial by the OAA in consultation with the FTAA.

Note * An AwB outcome which identifies a significant airworthiness issue that is being addressed but requires further attention.

Noteworthy Risk # A risk requiring DAR or higher level of authority retention in accordance with the TAR-approved System Safety Program Plan (SSPP), typically with a risk level equivalent to Medium or above, as defined by MIL-STD-882C.

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Observation * An AwB outcome which highlights an airworthiness issue worthy of comment.

On-Board Recording (OBR) ^ A recording of sounds or images in the control area of an aircraft, including crew stations. Recordings made on personal devices carried by personnel on board an aircraft can be deemed to be OBR.

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On-Board Recording Information ^ Any part of an on-board recording (OBR), any transcript from an OBR, or any information obtained from any part of an OBR.

Obstacle * Is all fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile objects, or parts thereof, that are located on an area intended for the surface movement of aircraft; or extend above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight; or stand outside those defined surfaces and that have been assessed as being a hazard to air navigation.20

Operation * The process and action of operating aircraft following the initial and continual acceptance of the design, construction and maintenance processes, acts and actions by the operational chain of command at an acceptable level of risk as to the suitability of flight of that aircraft in the operational environment.

Operational Airworthiness * An element of Airworthiness concerned with ensuring aircraft are operated in approved roles, with correct mission equipment, by competent and authorised individuals, according to approved procedures and instructions, under a system of supervision and monitoring.

Operational Airworthiness Authority (OAA) * An officer, as nominated by the relevant Service Chief or Group Head, appointed by the Defence AA through DI(G) OPS 02–2—Defence Aviation Safety Program as responsible for the operational airworthiness management of aircraft types and AvSS within the scope of their appointment.

Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (OAAR) * An officer delegated by the OAA to perform a specified scope of operational airworthiness management.

Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative – Acquisition [OAAR (Acq)] * An officer delegated by the OAA to perform operational airworthiness functions relating to the acquisition of a new aviation system, or one undergoing a Major change to the Type Design or a Substantial operational change.

Operational Airworthiness Management Plan (OAMP) * A document that describes the strategy and scope of operational airworthiness activities and responsibilities identified to achieve and maintain the operational airworthiness elements of a new or modified Aviation System prior to and following Service Release.

Operational Airworthiness Regulator (OAR) * Deputy Chief of Air Force (DCAF) is appointed the OAR. The OAR is accountable to the Defence AA for establishing and managing the operational airworthiness element of the AMS.

Operational Clearance * An approval to deviate from an aviation system’s approved configuration, role, environment, limitation or condition, when mission requirements cannot be achieved otherwise.

Operational Contingency Loading *

Deleted from glossary. Included for reference only as this term existed in cancelled OAREG 2.2.14.

Operational Effectiveness * The ability of a system to perform its intended function over its intended operational spectrum, in the expected operational environment, and in the face of expected threats when operated by typical operational Defence Personnel in accordance with DI(G) OPS 43–1—Defence Test and Evaluation Policy.

20 ICAO Annex 14 Vol 1 - definitions

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Operational Evaluation * The condition of systematic assessment of an Aviation System which requires operation of an aircraft within existing approved operating limitations and within approved aircraft certification bases including: operation of configurations prior to Service Release of a Minor Design Change, Non-Substantial operational role or environment changes, and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).

Operational Hazard (OPHAZ) Report ^

A DAHRTS format used for reporting aviation and aviation-related hazards, before such hazards result in an occurrence.

Operational Maintenance (OM) # Maintenance activities directly related to the preparation of equipment for immediate use, recovery and minor repair of the equipment after use. OM tasks require a limited range of support equipment and may involve the limited use of workshop facilities.

Operational Suitability * The capacity of the system, when operated and maintained by typical operational Defence Personnel in expected numbers, at the expected level of competency, to be reliable, maintainable, available, logistically supportable, compatible, interoperable, safe and is ergonomically satisfactory (DI(G) OPS 43–1—Defence Test and Evaluation Policy).

Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) * OT&E is not an airworthiness function. The user Service conducts OT&E to assess operational effectiveness and suitability. The OAA and the FTAA are obliged to conduct OT&E within the provisions of the operational airworthiness regulatory framework.

Opposition Manoeuvre *

A manoeuvre where flight vectors of aircraft are opposing each other in close proximity.

Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP) * A suite of advisory, informative, procedural, directing and mandating documents that support the operations of an aviation system. OIP may include: aircrew manuals specific to type; general aircrew publications; Defence Instructions; Standing Instructions; command and unit issued Flying Orders, Special Flying Instructions and standard operating procedures.

Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) #

A manufacturer listed as the approved source of manufacture for components in the Type Certificate data sheet. The OEM owns and controls the source drawings, ie the design of the component.

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Passenger *

Any person who is on board an aircraft other than a member of the authorised crew.

Periodic Health Examination (PHE) * A more comprehensive assessment that periodically replaces the SESAHA IAW Defence policy. Also considered an aviation medical certificate assessment when conducted by an AVMO.

Personnel ^

Employees and contractors in Defence-controlled workplaces. Visitors are not personnel and are referred to as third parties.21

21 Defence Safety Manual (SAFETYMAN) Volume 1, General, First Edition 2002

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Populated Area * For the purpose of assessing the risk to personnel on the ground from operating a UAS, a populated area is considered analogous to the congested areas of cities, towns or settlements, or any area with an open-air assembly of persons.

Preventative Maintenance # Those actions that reduce the probability of a known failure mode in items with predictable wear-out characteristics by retaining materiel and restoring it to a specified condition.

Primary runway *

The runway used most frequently or that provides the best overall aerodrome capability.

Procedure # A documented course of action to be followed to ensure a consistent outcome.

Production #

The manufacture and assembly of new Configuration Items, related Aeronautical Product, or complete aircraft.

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Qualification (FSTD Context) * The verification and validation of the functionality and fidelity of a Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) against an accepted standard. The end result of a process which formally examines and documents compliance of a FSTD, against predefined standards, to the satisfaction of the relevant authority.

Qualified Flight Test Staff * Personnel who have attained Defence recognised qualifications and are competent to conduct some or all aspects of flight testing. These include test pilots, flight test engineers, flight test system specialists and other personnel trained and recognised as competent by an FTAA for specific flight test functions.

Quality Management System (QMS) * All activities of the overall management function that determine the quality policy, objectives and responsibilities and implement them by means such as quality planning, quality controls, quality assurance and quality improvement.

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RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine (IAM)* The ADF Centre of Excellence for aviation medicine related issues.

Ramp Inspection * Related to the operation of non-state registered aircraft chartered for temporary use by Defence. The Ramp Inspection is an acknowledged means of providing confidence in a charter aircraft’s fitness for purpose and assessing the suitability of a charter supplier.

Reliability * The ability of an item to perform a required function under stated conditions for a specified period of time.

Remote Pilot (RP) * A person charged by the operator with duties essential to the operation of a Category 1 or 2 remotely piloted aircraft and who manipulates the flight control, as appropriate, during flight time.

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) * An unmanned aircraft that is controlled by a remote pilot or air vehicle operator.

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RPA Observer * A trained and competent person designated by the operator who, by visual observation of the remotely piloted aircraft, assists the remote pilot in the safe conduct of the flight.

Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) * A subset of an unmanned aircraft system (UAS), a RPAS is a system consisting of the remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), together with any Remote Pilot Station (RPS), communications/data links, maintenance, launch and recovery systems. This includes the network and personnel required to fly the RPAS. A RPAS may also be referred to as a UAS.

Remote Pilot Station * A station at which the remote pilot manages the flight of an unmanned aircraft.

Residual risk ^ Risk remaining after risk treatment.

Risk ^ The effect of uncertainty on objectives (AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 – Risk Management—Principles).

Risk Hazard Analysis (RHA) * A process of identifying, categorising and mitigating the hazards and risks associated with the use and operation of any system.

Risk Mitigation * The strategy and methods employed to reduce potential mishap risk presented by a hazard.

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Safety *

The control of recognised hazards to attain an acceptable level of risk.

Safety Assessment Report (SAR) # The comprehensive evaluation of the risk being assumed prior to test or operation of the system or at contract completion. It identifies all safety features of the system, design and procedural hazards that may be present in the system and specific procedural controls and precautions that should be followed.

Safety Case Report (SCR) # A reasoned summary argument, supported by referenced evidence that justifies the system is acceptably safe from a design, integration, operation, maintenance and disposal perspective.

Safety Climate ^ A sub-set of safety culture and a measure of employee perceptions of the organisation's safety policies, practices and procedures.

Safety Critical Area * A working environment assessed as having a heightened risk to the physical safety of personnel, or where key operational decisions are made. For example an aircraft flight deck or an ATC Control Tower.

Safety Critical Items and Systems (SCIS) # Items or systems whose loss of function could, in a worst credible representative environment, directly affect the aircraft’s ability for continued safe operation.

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Safety Culture ^ The product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation's safety management systems.

Safety Management System (SMS)*

A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures.22

Se (back to top)

Segregated Airspace (SA) * Airspace of specified dimensions allocated for use by specific user(s), such as UAS.

Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO) * An internationally recognised civil/military term describing the person commanding and/or managing the ATC unit responsible for the ATS delivery at a specific aerodrome and the airspace relevant to the aerodrome. At Defence aerodromes, the SATCO may also hold an administrative command title appropriate to the ATS unit concerned.

Senior Aviation Medical Officer (SAVMO) * An AVMO, who the Surgeon General ADF recognises as having advanced AVMO qualification and experience and who may provide the OAA aviation medical advice.

Senior Design Engineer (SDE) # The senior professional engineer within an AEO, responsible to the senior executive for overall adequacy of the engineering activities conducted by the AEO and for ensuring compliance with the regulations. The SDE is also authorised to approve significant design changes and to assign engineering authority to other competent personnel within the AEO. Overall responsibility for the Engineering Management System (EMS) is the responsibility of the SDE.

Senior Maintenance Manager (SMM) # The senior appointment within an Approved Maintenance Organisation, with accountable responsibility for all maintenance functions performed.

Separation Assurance * The assurance provided by the ATC service provider that if the pilot complies with ATC control instructions an aircraft will maintain a prescribed minimum separation standard from another aircraft or object.

Serious Incident ^

An occurrence that:

a. did affect, or could affect, the safety or airworthiness of the Aviation System, or safety of third parties

b. where system defences were:

(1) only just adequate to prevent an accident – if there was a consequence to safety or airworthiness the severity was less than critical/catastrophic or

(2) inadequate/absent and an accident almost occurred – if there was a consequence to safety or airworthiness it was only system tolerance that limited the severity to less than critical/catastrophic.

Service Release (SR) * A declaration by the Defence AA, on advice from the Airworthiness Board (AwB), that operational, engineering, maintenance and logistics systems are adequate to ensure the continued airworthiness of a Defence registered aircraft

22 ICAO, Annex 19

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Short Term Lease * The dry or wet leasing, renting or hiring of an aircraft by Defence, usually for less than one year, to support specialised Defence activity.

. Should (rules of interpretation) * ‘should’ is used to imply an act or process identified for inclusion in a desired outcome is complied with unless sound reasoning may determine otherwise. The word should is not to be used in regulation text.

Side Number * A unique RAN number that differs from the ‘tail number’ and is applicable to RAN aircraft only. The side number is normally the identifier used in call signs and for flight planning purposes. The side number is not normally included in the Defence Register.

Significant Aircraft Maintenance Activity # Modification installation activity, performed concurrently with aircraft deeper maintenance, and requiring substantial dismantling of primary structure, or involving an extended period of maintenance by the organisation to support an SFP or limited aircraft operations.

Significant Change * A change to the type-certificate significant to the extent that it changes at the product level one or more of the following: general configuration, principles of construction, or the assumptions used for certification, but not to the extent that to be considered a Substantial change (under EASA Part 21).

Single Service Aviation Medical Advisor (SSAMA) * An AVMO who represents a single Service, is recognised by the Surgeon General ADF as being qualified to provide authoritative aviation medical advice and is responsible for the implementation of aviation medicine policies.

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Sparsely Populated Area * An area considered outside the areas of cities, towns or settlements characterised by rangeland grazing, desert, uncultivated landscapes, wilderness, infrequent homesteads, large land holdings, extensive uncleared land, salt lakes, adjacent coastal waters and open ocean or navigable tracts of water with infrequent water traffic.

Special Flight Permit (SFP) * An Airworthiness Instrument issued by the Defence AA authorising a Defence registered aircraft for flight for specified purposes for a specified period. For example, conducting test flights or ferry flights.

Specialist Employment Stream Annual Health Assessment (SESAHA) * A generic term that may be used to describe an aviation medical certificate assessment.

Specification # A document defining the essential function and performance requirements of a product, which also identifies the relevant standards for the acquisition process. Specifications, in contrast to standards, provide a more complete description and include the basis for establishing conformance (particularly during test and evaluation), and hence validation for the acceptance of material.

Sponsor * The authority responsible for defining the required aviation outcome, receives or uses the outcome and is responsible for funding the related activities, processes, project or products required to safely achieve the outcome.

Standard # A description of a material, product, doctrine or process meant for repeated applications by many users. A Technical Standard is an established norm or requirement. It is usually a formal document that establishes uniform engineering or technical criteria, methods, processes and practices.

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State Aircraft (Australian context) * Aircraft of any part of the Defence Force (including any aircraft that is commanded by a member of that Force in the course of duties as such a member); and aircraft used in the military, customs or police services of a foreign country.23

Statement of Operating Intent (SOI) * A document authorised by the OAA describing the approved roles, operating envelope, usage spectrum and operating environment for a particular aircraft type. The SOI differentiates between tasks for which the type has been certified and tasks that are planned but will require certification action before flight can be authorised.

Statement of Requirement (SOR) # A document or documents defining the complete set of DAR requirements on a design agency to allow DAR acceptance of an aircraft or aircraft-related equipment design or design change. The SOR includes or references a Specification, which is the document defining the specific essential function and performance requirements for the product design or design change.

Stores Suspension Equipment # All aircraft devices such as racks, adaptors, missile launchers, internal guns, countermeasure dispensers and pylons, used for carriage, employment and jettison of aircraft stores. Aircraft guns and countermeasure dispensers for flares and chaff must be considered to be stores suspension equipment.

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Sub-atmospheric DCI * The term used to describe cases of DCI induced by exposure to pressures less than sea level equivalent, such as encountered during flight. DCI is a potentially lethal condition and should be treated as a medical emergency. The term is referred to simply as DCI in this regulation.

Substantial Change Any operational change to the SOI which has an appreciable affect on operational training curriculums, competency management, cockpit workload, human-machine-interface, flight authorisation considerations or other factors that impact operational airworthiness.

Substitution # A configuration change where a new part is authorised for use in a Configuration Item (CI ) as an alternative to or replacement for, a currently approved part. The configuration change must have no other effect on the functionality, physical and performance properties, or interface characteristics of the affected CI(s).

Suitability for Flight * An assessment that flight of the aircraft within designated configuration, role and environment where risk is eliminated or otherwise minimised, so far a reasonably practicable for:

a. loss of life or injury to aircrew and passengers

b. loss to other personnel or property as a direct consequence of the flight

c. loss of, or damage to, the aircraft.24

Supervisor # A person (civilian or military) who, at any level, has the day-to-day responsibility for employees’ workplace activities.

23 Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Clth) Part 1 Sect 3. In the Australian context, State aircraft includes those aircraft listed on the Defence Register, but may also include non-Defence registered aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence that are held on the Australian civil aircraft register or a foreign aircraft register. When deemed a State aircraft, appropriate DASP oversight is required. 24 DI(G) OPS 02-2 – Annex A Definitions

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Supervision of Maintenance # Personal observation to the extent necessary of the performance of maintenance and includes guiding, directing, and correcting the person being supervised.

Supplemental Oxygen * Refers to acceptable aviators’ breathing oxygen that is available for use whenever required.

Supplemental Role Approval * A process of examination and evaluation of a Substantial change to an aircraft CRE or capability culminating in approval of the new CRE or capability by the relevant OAA and amendment of the SOI.

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) * A document issued by the Defence AA, on advice from the AwB, signifying compliance with the airworthiness requirements for Type Certification of a Major change to the Type Design for a Defence registered aircraft.

Supplementary Crew * Discontinued term. See Mission Crew.

Supplementary Aviation Safety Occurrence Report (SASOR) ^ A report that amplifies a previously submitted (partially complete) Aviation Safety Occurrence Report (ASOR) by adding information gained from further investigation, which was not available at the time of dispatch of the associated ASOR.

Switchover * The act of passing command and control of a RPA from one data link to another within the same RPS.

System Safety # The application of engineering management principles, criteria and techniques to optimise the safety of a ‘system’, within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time and cost throughout all phases of the life cycle.

System Safety Engineering # An engineering discipline requiring specialised professional knowledge and skills in applying scientific and engineering principles, criteria, and techniques to identify and eliminate hazards, in order to reduce the associated risk.

System Safety Management # A management discipline that defines System Safety Program (SSP) requirements and ensures planning, implementation and accomplishment of system safety tasks and activities consistent with the overall program requirements.

System Safety Program # The combined tasks and activities of system safety management and system safety engineering.

System Safety Program Plan # A description of the planned tasks and activities to be used to implement the required system safety program. This description includes organisational responsibilities, resources, methods of accomplishment, milestones, depth of effort, and integration with other program engineering and management activities and related systems.

System Tolerance ^ The inherent ability of the Aviation System to compensate for inadequate/absent defences.

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Tail number * The tail number is the unique numerical identifier, which is appended to the AI, and identifies each individual aircraft.

Task Authorisation # The legal authority allowing a person to perform a specified maintenance task, recognising that the person has completed the prerequisite training relevant to the task and has demonstrated competency in performance of the task. Task authorisations are recorded in the persons ‘A’ card, AATTR or RAAFRTE or equivalent document.

Technical Airworthiness # An element of airworthiness concerned with ensuring aircraft are designed, constructed and maintained to approved standards by competent and authorised individuals, using approved data and working within approved organisations under a system of certification and acceptance.

Technical Airworthiness Advisory Circular (TAAC) # The means used by the TAR to promulgate technical airworthiness related information but does not mandate any actions by recipients.

Technical Airworthiness Alert Information (TAAI) # Technical information relating to unsafe conditions in an aircraft type, or changes to a Type Design which will affect the safety of an aircraft type.

Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA) # The TAA (DGTA) is accountable to the Defence AA and responsive to Service Chiefs and Group Heads for determinations regarding the technical airworthiness of aircraft subject to the AMS, determinations regarding technical aspects of AvSS and communicating technical risks to the relevant OAA.25

Technical Airworthiness Directives (TAD) # The means by which the TAR issues direction on urgent technical airworthiness matters to address situations or conditions that are considered either unsafe or unsatisfactory.

Technical Airworthiness Management # The process of ensuring suitability for flight of Defence aircraft through regulation, authorisation and audit of all aspects of the design, manufacture and maintenance of aircraft.

Technical Airworthiness Regulator (TAR) # The TAR (DGTA) is accountable to the Defence AA for establishing and managing the technical airworthiness element of the AMS.

Technical Control # The provision of specialist and technical advice by designated authorities for the management and operation of forces. Of note - Technical control is exercised by capability managers, or by designated authorities through the capability manager; for forces assigned to operations, technical control is exercised through Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS), where it directly affects operations only; and technical control advice may not be modified but may be rejected in part or in total by a commander in consideration of operational factors. (Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1 — Command and Control).

Technical Data # Technical Data encompasses all recorded information of a scientific, technical and engineering nature relating to a weapon system. Technical data includes all types of specifications, standards, engineering drawings, instructions, reports, manuals, tabular data, test results and software documentation used in the development, production, in-

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service operation and logistics support (such as maintenance, provisioning, codification, testing and modification), and disposal of a weapon system.

Technical Equipment # Technical equipment is specifically used in support of operations and includes weapon platforms and systems. Technical equipment normally requires engineering processes to ensure that its design, configuration, performance and availability satisfy operational and safety requirements.

Technical Information (TI) # Information relevant to the continuing airworthiness and technical integrity of a Configuration Item (CI).

Technical Integrity # An item’s fitness for service, safety, and compliance with regulations for environmental protection.

Temporary Airworthiness Instrument # An Airworthiness Instrument issued by the Defence AA to permit a limited scope of flying operations for a limited duration; typically an Airworthiness Directive or Special Flight Permit.

Temporary Maintenance Authority (TMA) # An authorisation issued by the Senior Design Engineer of an ADF AEO to an organisation to conduct limited maintenance for a defined period of time not to exceed 12 months.

TEMPORARILY MEDICALLY UNFIT FOR FLYING (TMUFF) * A generic term that applies to aircrew, remote pilots and aircraft controllers where a member is medically unfit to perform specialist flying related duties, but may perform non-flying related duties.

Terminal Attack Control (TAC) * A tactical control or advisory information service, from a forward position, that supports the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air support activities. When conducted from an airborne position, TAC may also be referred to as Forward Air Control–Airborne (FAC–A); however the functional outcome is the same.

Test and Evaluation (T&E) * T&E is a process to obtain information to support the objective assessment of a Capability System with known confidence, and to confirm whether or not a risk is contained within acceptable boundaries across all facets of a system’s life cycle. The individual terms are defined as: a test is an activity in which a scientific method is used to obtain quantitative or qualitative data relating to the safety, performance, functionality, contractual compliance, and supportability of a system; and evaluation is analysis of test results to determine (verify) or prove (validate) something.26

Type Certification * The process through which compliance with the airworthiness design requirements contained in the Certification Basis Description is established through the development of the Type Design to meet the operating roles and environment contained in the Statement of Operating Intent (SOI).

Type Design # The physical design description of a specific aircraft Type as referenced in the Type Record.

Type Design Data # Data that has been defined at TAREG 2.2.8.

Type Rated * A pilot or other flight crew member that is qualified to operate a particular aircraft type.

26 DI(G) OPS 43-1 Defence Test and Evaluation Policy, 2007.

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Type Record # A summary document that defines the aircraft Type Design at the time of acceptance by the Commonwealth, by providing an index to the issue status of all Type Design data. The Type Record is updated to reflect changes in Type Design.

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UAS Command and Control (C2) Link The data link between a remotely piloted aircraft and a remote pilot station for the purposes of managing flight.

UAS Flight Termination System * A control system that can immediately terminate flight of a UA safely.

Unapproved Aeronautical Product # Any part, component or material that has not been manufactured and certified as conforming with the technical data against which type certification is provided.

Unmanned Aircraft (UA) * An aircraft that uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable. Ballistic or semi ballistic vehicles, cruise or guided missiles and artillery projectiles are not considered UA.

Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) * The entire system consisting of the unmanned aircraft (UA), together with any Remote Pilot Station (RPS), communications/data links, maintenance, launch and recovery systems. This includes the network and personnel required to fly the UA.

Unmanned Aircraft System Category * A determination resulting from an assessment of risk to people or property that a particular UAS may pose when operating in the intended CRE.

Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP) *

A UASOP is an instrument which performs a similar purpose as the AMTC and SR does for manned aircraft.

Unpopulated Area * An area cleared of personnel (e.g. Military Firing Range).

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Variant * A variant of an aircraft or system is derived from a ‘model’. For example the C–130J is a model of the C–130 type, and the C–130J–30 is a variant of the C–130J model.

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Waiver # Documented approval from the relevant airworthiness authority authorising non–compliance with a particular order, instruction or publication controlled under their authority for a specified period.

Warbird, Historic and Replica Aircraft (WHRA) * A non–Defence registered aircraft that is an ex-armed forces (Warbird) aircraft, a historic aircraft or a replica aircraft.

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Wet Lease * A lease where an organisation provides Defence with an aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance for Defence tasking.

Working Day # A working day is the normal working routine for the unit, be it one or two shifts, with the usual complement of personnel.

Working Week # The working week begins on Monday and ends on Friday. Saturday is considered the last day of the week, with Sunday the first day of the new week.

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AAP 7001.048 List of Abbreviations

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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Abbreviations Definition

AAC Airworthiness Advisory Circular

AAP Australian Air Publication

AAMP Acquisition Airworthiness Management Plan

ABL Allocated Baseline

ABM Air Battle Management

ABR Australian Book of Reference (Navy)

ACAR Airworthiness Corrective Action Request

ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System

ACAUST Air Commander Australia

ACB Aviation Coordination Board

ACD Air Cargo Delivery

ACG Air Combat Group

ACM Airspace Control Measures

ACO Air Combat Officer

ACPA Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency

Acq Acquisition

AD Airworthiness Directive

ADFP Australian Defence Force Publication

ADMIN Administration

ADRM Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual

AEO Authorised Engineering Organisation

AEP Aerodrome Emergency Plan

AERO Aeronautical Engineer

AESSO Aerospace Equipment Systems Support Office

AF Air Force

AFC Aviation Facilities Certificate

AI Application Identifier

AINS Acceptance into Naval Service

AIOS Acceptance into Operational Service

AIRAC Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control

AIS Aeronautical Information Service

AISP Aeronautical Information Service Provider

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

ALoR Acceptable Level of Risk

ALoS Acceptable Level of Safety

ALSE Aeronautical Life Support Equipment

AMAFTU Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Trials Unit

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AMC Acceptable Means of Compliance

AMD Aircraft Maintenance Documentation

AME Aeromedical evacuation

AMG Air Mobility Group

AMO Approved Maintenance Organisation

AMS Airworthiness Management System

AMTC Australian Military Type Certificate

AMTDU Air Movements Training and Development Unit

AO Above Obstacles

AOC Air Operator Certificate

AOSG Aerospace Operational Support Group

AP Aeronautical Product

APTO Aviation Physiology Training Officer

ARDU Aircraft Research and Development Unit

ARFF Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting

ARH Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter

AS Accomplishment Summary

ASC * Aircraft–stores compatibility

ASC ^ Aviation Safety Committee

ASCENG Aircraft Stores Clearance Engineering

ASI Aircraft structural integrity

ASIC Air and Space Interoperability Council

ASIMP Aircraft Structural Integrity Management Plan

ASM Aviation safety management

ASMS Aviation Safety Management System

ASOR Aviation Safety Occurrence Report

ASR Airworthiness Standards Representative

AvSS Aviation Support System(s)

AvSSC Aviation Support System Certificate

AvSSMP Aviation Support System Management Plan

AT&E Acceptance test and evaluation

ATA Air Traffic Advisory

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATE Aircraft Test Equipment

ATECH Aviation Technician

ATM Air Traffic Management

ATMP Air Traffic Management Plan

ATS Air Traffic Service

ATSB Australian Transport Safety Bureau

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AUSCANUKUS Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States

AUTHOP Authority to Operate

AVMED Aviation medicine

AVMO Aviation Medical Officer

AVO Air Vehicle Operator

AVRM Aviation risk management

AwB Airworthiness Board

AWR Air Weapons Range

BAC Battlefield airspace control

BASO Base Aviation Safety Officer

BFT Basic Flight Trainer

BOM Bureau of Meteorology

CAA Civil Aviation Authority (of New Zealand)

CAAP Civil Aviation Advisory Publication

CAF Chief of Air Force

CAMM2 Computer Aided Maintenance Management version 2

CAR Corrective Action Request

CAR Civil Aviation Regulation

CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority

CASG Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group

CASR Civil Aviation Safety Regulation

CBD Certification Basis Description

CCB Configuration Control Board

CDF Chief of Defence Force

CDR Commander

CFU Carried Forward Unserviceability

CI Configuration Item

CJOPS Chief of Joint Operations

CM Capability Manager

CMAINT Contingency Maintenance

CMP Configuration Management Plan

CoA Certificate of Airworthiness

CoC Certificate of Conformance

CoE Centre of Expertise

COMD Commander

COMFAA Commander Fleet Air Arm

CONFIR Confidential Incident Report

COSC Chiefs of Service Committee

CRE Configuration, Role and Environment

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CRM Crew resource management

CTAF Common Traffic Advisory Frequency

CVR Cockpit Voice Recorder

DACPA Director Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency

DAPA Defence Airspace Policy Authority

DAR Design Acceptance Representative

DASM Defence Aviation Safety Manual

DASP Defence Aviation Safety Program

DASSPA Director of Aerospace Simulator and Special Purpose Aircraft

DCAF Deputy Chief of Air Force

DCI Decompression illness

DDAAFS Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety

DDA Defence Disposal Agency

Defence AA Defence Aviation Authority

DEF STAN Defence Standard

DGTA Director General Technical Airworthiness

DGTA-ADF Directorate General Technical Airworthiness– Agency

DI Defence Instruction

DM Deeper Maintenance

DOTAM Directorate of Operations and Training Area Management

DPA Defence Practice Area

DSN Design Support Network

DT&E Developmental test and evaluation

EA Engineering Authority

EAC Engineering Authority Certificate

EASA European Aviation Safety Agency

E&IG Estate & Infrastructure Group

ECP Engineering Change Proposal

EO Explosive Ordnance

ELS Effective Level of Safety

EMP Engineering Management Plan

ENGO Engineering Officer

ENGR Engineer

ESI Engine structural integrity

ESIMP Engine Structural Integrity Management Plan

FAA Federal Aviation Administration (US)

FAC-A Forward Air Controller - Airborne

FAR Federal Aviation Regulations

FCI Fighter Combat Instructor

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FDR Flight Data Recorder

FEG Force Element Group

FID Flight Information Documents

FIR Flight Information Region

FIS Flight Information Service

FLIP Flight Information Publication

FMS Flying Management System

FO Flying Order

FOC Full/Final Operational Capability

FOCFT First of Class Flight Trial

FOD Foreign Object Debris

FPS Functional Performance Specification

FS Flight Simulator

FSTD Flight Simulation Training Device

FTAA Flight Test Approval Authority

FTD Flight Training Device

FTP Flight Test Permit

FTO Flight Test Organisation

FUA Flexible Use Airspace

G General

GM Guidance Material

GCS Ground Control Station

GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System

GSE Ground Support Equipment

GTESPO Ground Telecommunications Equipment System Program Office

GWEO Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Branch

HAOW Height Above Obstacles Within

HASD Head Aerospace Systems Division

HHSD Head Helicopter System Division

HLS Helicopter Landing Site

HMI Human machine interface

HQ Headquarters

HTA Hazard Tracking Authority

IAM RAAF Institute of Aviation Medicine

IATA International Air Transport Association

ICA Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

IGW Increased gross weight

ILS Integrated Logistics Support

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IMI Independent Maintenance Inspection

IOC Initial Operational Capability

IOP Installation Operating Permit

IRE Instrument Rating Examiner

ISO International Standards Organisation

JAA Joint Aviation Authorities

JAR Joint Airworthiness Requirements

JEWOSU Joint Electronic Warfare Support Unit

JFLA Joint Fuels and Lubricants Agency

JPR Joint Personnel Recovery

JUA Joint User Airspace

KCAS Knots Calibrated Air Speed

KIARC Kiowa Interim Aerial Reconnaissance Capability

LEA Letter of Engineering Authority

LOADM Loadmaster

LOAS List of Assessed Spares

LOG Logistics

LSAR Logistic Support Analysis Record

LSE Life Support Equipment

LVP Low Visibility Procedures

MA Maintenance Authority

MAA Military Airworthiness Authority

MAC Maintenance Approval Certificate

MATS Manual of Air Traffic Services

MAUW Maximum All Up Weight

MCS Maritime Control Service

MDR Maintenance Deficiency Report

MEA Maintenance Engineering Analysis

MEAP Maintenance Engineering Analysis Plan

MEL Minimum Equipment List

MET Meteorology

MILAVREG Military Aviation Regulation

MM Maintenance Manager

MMP Maintenance Management Plan

MoD UK Ministry of Defence

MOS Manual of Standards

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MP Management Plan

MSD Minimum Separation Distance

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MSN Maintenance Support Network

MTOW Maximum Take-Off Weight

NAA National Airworthiness Authority

NAS Naval Air Station

NPRM Notice of Proposed Rule Making

NZ New Zealand

OA Operational Airworthiness

OAA Operational Airworthiness Authority

OAAR Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative

OAAR(Acq) Operational Airworthiness Authority Representative (Acquisition)

OAMP Operational Airworthiness Management Plan

OAR Operational Airworthiness Regulator

OAREG Operational Airworthiness Regulation

OBR On-Board Recording

OC Officer Commanding

OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer

OFI Operational Flying Instructor

OIP Orders, Instructions and Publications

OLS Obstacle Limitation Surfaces

OM Operational Maintenance

OPHAZ Operational Hazard

OPS Operations

OSN Operational Support Network

OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation

PCN Pavement Classification Number

PDAS Project Design Acceptance Strategy

PEM Project Engineering Manager

PERS Personnel

PHE Periodic Health Examination

PLT Pilot

PPR Prior Permission Required

PRD Prohibited, Restricted and Danger (areas)

QAI Qualified Aviation Instructor

QFI Qualified Flying Instructor

QHI Qualified Helicopter Instructor

QMS Quality Management System

QTP Qualified Test Pilot

RA Restricted Area

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force

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RAN Royal Australian Navy

RDS Runway Distance Supplement

RHA Risk Hazard Analysis

RP Remote Pilot

RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft

RPAS Remotely Piloted Aircraft System

RPT Regular Public Transport

RTS Raise, Train and Sustain

RVR Runway Visual Range

SA Segregated Airspace

SAF Ship Aviation Facility

SAR Search and rescue

SARPS Standards and Recommended Practices (ICAO)

SASOR Supplementary Aviation Safety Occurrence Report

SATCO Senior Air Traffic Control Officer

SAVMO Senior Aviation Medical Officer

SB Service Bullet

SCIS Safety Critical Items and Systems

SCR Safety Case Report

SDE Senior Design Engineer

SESAHA Specialist Employment Stream Annual Health Assessment

SFI Special Flying Instruction

SFARP So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable

SFP Special Flight Permit

SHOL Ship Helicopter Operating Limits

SI Standing Instruction

SI(AVN) Standing Instructions (Army Aviation)

SMM Senior Maintenance Manager

SMS Safety Management System

SOI Statement of Operating Intent

SOR Statement of Requirement

SOW Statement of Work

SPO Systems Program Office

SR Service Release

SRA Supplemental Role Approval

SSAMA Senior Service Aviation Medical Advisor

STC Supplemental Type Certificate

STD Synthetic Training Device

STI Special Technical Instruction

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T&E Test and Evaluation

TAA Technical Airworthiness Authority

TAAC Technical Airworthiness Advisory Circular

TAAI Technical Airworthiness Alert Information

TAC Terminal Attack Control

TAD Technical Airworthiness Directives

TAR Technical Airworthiness Regulator

TAMM Technical Airworthiness Management Manual

TAREG Technical Airworthiness Regulation

TCDS Type Certification Data Sheet

TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan

TI Technical Information

TLS Through Life Support

TMA Temporary Maintenance Authority

TMP Technical Management Plan

TMUFF Temporarily Medically Unfit For Flying related duties

TRR Test Readiness Review

UA Unmanned Aircraft

UAS Unmanned Aircraft System

UASOP Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit

UAT Unmanned Aerial Target

UK United Kingdom

UPT User Preferred Trajectories

USA United States of America

WHMP Wildlife Hazard Management Plan

WHRA Warbird, Historic and Replica Aircraft

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