Reformation and Scholasticism in · PDF fileReformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy VOLUME II AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE COSMONOMIC IDEA Herman

Reformation and Scholasticism

in Philosophy

VOLUME II

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE

ANTHROPOLOGY

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE

COSMONOMIC IDEA

Herman Dooyeweerd

The Paideia PressGrand Rapids

REFORMATION AND SCHOLASTICISM

IN

PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE

COSMONOMIC IDEA

AND THE

SCHOLASTIC TRADITION

IN

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

ContentsCHAPTER I

THE CALVINIST REVIVAL AND THE RISE OF THE IDEA OF

AN INTRINSICALLY REFORMATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

1. The Reformation of Philosophy and Its Relation to theReformation of One’s View of Life and the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

a. The Relation Between World View and Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1b. Why Relativism is no Genuine World and Life View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. The Calvinistic World and Life View is EntirelyRooted in the Ground-motive of Scripture. TheIntegral Character of this Ground-motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

a. The Dynamic, Reformational Character of thisGround-motive. Palingenesis as the New VitalRoot of Christian Scholarship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

b. Does Kuyper’s Basic Religious Conception of Christian ScienceNeed to be Corrected by Eliminating Palingenesis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

c. The Reversal of the Basic Religious Relation Betweenthe Creator and the Creature in the HumanisticGround-motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

d. The Ground-motive of the Divine Word-revelation as“Dunamis.” The Danger of Eliminating Palingenesis fromthe Foundations of Reformed Science. The CriticalReligious Character of the Reformational Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

e. Common Grace and the Roman Catholic View ofNature. Common Grace as an Antithetic Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

f. Kuyper’s Appreciation of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11g. The Danger of an Axiological Classification of the

Temporal Manifestations of the Christian Life. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12h. Kuyper’s View of the Relation Between Science and the

Other Spheres of Life According to Their Internal Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . 13i. Why the Reformational Principle Failed to

Affect Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14j. The Standpoint of Accommodation versus the Idea

of the Sphere Sovereignty of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15k. The True Significance of Kuyper’s Conception of

the Sphere Sovereignty of Science versus theDogma of the Autonomy of Theoretical Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

l. The Critical Religious Turn in Kuyper’s Viewof Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

2. Reformational Philosophy and the Spiritual Situationof Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

a. With its Radical Critique of the Foundations ofPhilosophical Thought the Philosophy of theCosmonomic Idea is to Some Extent in Tunewith the Contemporary Spiritual Situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

b. The Cause of the Emotional Prejudices againstthis Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

c. “Philosophy of Revelation” and ChristianPhilosophy. Schelling’s Critique of the Ideaof a Christian Philosophy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

d. A Description of the Spiritual Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22e. Dialectical Theology in Contrast to the Idea of

a Christian Philosophy. Barth contra Brunner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23f. The Problem of a Christian Philosophy in Roman

Catholic Circles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25g. A Brief Sketch of the Spirit of the Philosophy of the

Cosmonomic Idea in the Context of the PresentSpiritual Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

CHAPTER II

PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS

1. Theological Criticism of the Philosophyof the Cosmonomic Idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

a. A Brief Outline of this Theological Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

b. The Implications of this Line of Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30b. A Series of Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

2. Reformed Philosophy and the Reformed Confession. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35a. The Formalistic Conception of the Confession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35b. Can the Distinction between Dogma and Dogmatics

be Maintained?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36c. A Formalistic Conception of the Authority of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38d. A Parallel: The Relation Between the Practice

of Law and Dogmatic Jurisprudence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40e. Can the Science of Law be a Formal Source of Law?

Is Dogmatic Science of Law a Real Science? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40f. Legal Authority and Scientific Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41g. The Difference Between the Natural Sciences and

the Normative Sciences. Normative Principleand Human Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

h. The Science of History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43i. The Cultural Context of Science and Its Sphere

Sovereignty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43j. Holy Scripture is not Accessible to Science Without

Recognition of Its Character as Divine Word-revelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

3. The Point of Contact Between Philosophy and theChristian Religion. The Standpoint of Accommodation– a Philosophy Based on Theological Scholasticism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

a. Why Philosophy Cannot be Degraded to aHandmaiden of Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

b. The Unique Nature of Philosophic Inquiry.Philosophy and the Special Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

c. The Implications of the Reformation of Philosophyfor the Use of Scripture in Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

viii REFORMATION AND SCHOLASTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY VOLUME II

d. The Christian Religion Guarantees a Pointof Contact with Philosophy. The Route to theChristian Reformation of Philosophy Can onlybe Discovered Through a Transcendental Critiqueof Philosophic Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

4. Reformational versus Scholastic Tendencies ofAccommodation in Recent Calvinistic Thought.Reformed Science, the Kantian Critique ofKnowledge, and the Logos Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

a. The Universal Validity of the Structure ofPhilosophical Thought and the PrematureConclusion Drawn from it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

b. The Connection in Kuyper’s Stone Lectures BetweenHis Antithetical Standpoint in Science and HisScriptural View of the Religious Root ofHuman Nature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

c. The Role of Faith (Pistis) in Kuyper’s Theoryof Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

d. Why Official Philosophy Took so Little Noticeof Kuyper’s Critical Pistological Expositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

e. The Critical Basic Question of the Philosophy of theCosmonomic Idea and the Dogmatic Premise ofKant’s Critique of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

f. A Brief Summary of Kant’s Critique of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58g. Kant’s Chasm Between Theoretical and

Practical Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63h. Scholastic Philosophy and the Kantian Critique

of Knowledge. A New Accommodation in theCritical Realism of Mercier’s Neoscholasticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

i. The Calvinistic Line of Thinking Initiated by Kuyperin Opposition to the Kantian Critique of Knowledge.The Critical Realism of Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

j. The Origin of the Distinction Between Elements andRelations in the Object of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

k. The Theory of the logos in the Critical Realismof Kuyper, Bavinck, and Woltjer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

l. The Origin of the Logos Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69m. The Logos Theory of Philo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70n. The Logos Theory of Plotinus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71o. The Logos Speculation in Christian Thought before

the Council of Nicea (325). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76p. The Accommodation of the Logos Theory to the

Christian Doctrines of the Trinity and Creationafter the Councils of Nicea (325) andConstantinople (381) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

q. The Attitude of Hellenistic Philosophy towardChristianity and the Christian Philosophy ofAccommodation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

r. The Basic Conflict Between the Greek Logos Theoryand the Scriptural Doctrine of Creation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

s. How the Logos Theory Logicizes the Creation Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HERMAN DOOYEWEERD ix

t. The Basic Conflict between Kuyper’s Logos Theoryand His Theory of Sphere Sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

5. The Two Diverging Lines in Kuyper’s Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88a. The Reformational Line in Kuyper’s Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88b. The Cosmological Significance of Kuyper’s Concept

of Sphere Sovereignty. His Difference with Groenvan Prinsterer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

6. The Scholastic Line of Accommodation inKuyper’s Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

a. The Power of the Scholastic Tradition Liesin Its Alliance with Dogmatic Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

CHAPTER III

THE TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL

THOUGHT

1. The Theoretical Gegenstand Relation and ItsTranscendental Basic Problem. The Naive andthe Theoretical Attitudes of Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

a. How is Philosophical Thought Possible asTheoretical Thought? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

b. The Theoretical Gegenstand Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97c. The Naive Attitude of Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98d. First Formulation of the Transcendental Basic

Problem of Philosophy: What Does the TheoreticalAttitude of Thought, with Its Gegenstand Relation,Abstract from the Full Structure of TemporalReality as This is Given in Naive Experience; andHow is This Theoretical Abstraction Possible?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

(i) The consequence of starting from the theoretical

attitude of thought as an unproblematic datum.

the theoreticization of the given element

in knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

(ii) The senseless battle against the “naive realism”

of pre-theoretical experience. the misconception

of naive experience as a picture theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

(iii) The Aristotelian-Thomistic epistemology is not

naively realistic in the sense of a picture theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102e. The Fundamentally False Identification of the

Theoretical Gegenstand Relation with theSubject-Object Relation of Naive Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

f. The Structural Character of the Subject-ObjectRelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

g. Holy Scripture is always Concerned with NaiveExperience’s Concrete View of Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

h. Did Hume, Kant, and Fichte (in His Third Period)Take the Side of Naive Experience? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

x REFORMATION AND SCHOLASTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY VOLUME II

2. The Transcendental Basic Problem of TheoreticalSynthesis. Self-knowledge and the ArchimedeanPoint of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

a. The Movement from Theoretical Antithesis toTheoretical Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

b. The Structure of Human Consciousness Spans All theAspects of Temporal Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

c. The Effects of the Abstract Concept of the Animarationalis in the Abstract Conception of the HumanConsciousness. The False Definition of Psychologyas the Science of Conscious Phenomena and theDiscovery of the Unconscious . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

d. Second Formulation of the Transcendental BasicProblem. The Archimedean Point of Philosophy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

e. The Modal Structures of the Aspects as Constant APriori Frameworks for the Changing Phenomenaof Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

f. Why the Special Sciences Require PhilosophicalPresuppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

g. The Individuality-structures as Typical TotalStructures that Involve all the Aspects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

h. Can the Archimedean Point of Philosophy be Foundin the Individuality-structures?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

i. The Solution to the First Formulation of theTranscendental Basic Problem Presupposes theSolution to the Second. The Problem of theCommon Denominator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

j. The Problem of the Common Denominator of theModal Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

k. Why the Individuality-structures Offer Us NoArchimedean Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

l. The Path to the Archimedean Point is the Path ofCritical Self-reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

m. Can Philosophy by Itself Lead to Self-knowledge?The Immanence Standpoint and Its Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

n. The Sphere Universality of the Aspects andTheoretical Absolutization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

o. Theoretical Absolutization of a Modal Aspect Leadsto a Dogmatic Elimination of the GegenstandProblem. The Two Paths of the ImmanenceStandpoint. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

p. The “Critical” Immanence Standpoint. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123q. Kant and the Cartesian Cogito Ergo Sum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124r. The Transcendental-Logical Subject as the Archime-

dean Point of Kant’s Critique of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125s. The Transcendental-Logical Subject of Kant’s

Critique of Knowledge is not Identical with theTranscendent Root of the Human Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

t. Can Kant’s Transcendental-Logical Subject ofThought Really Function as the ArchimedeanPoint of His Critique of Knowledge? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HERMAN DOOYEWEERD xi

u. Kant’s Epistemology Dogmatically Eliminates theFirst Two Basic Problems in the TranscendentalCritique of Philosophic Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

v. Kant Recognizes the Gegenstand Relation Only inthe Theoretical Distance Between the Logical and thePsychical Aspects of Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

3. The Third Basic Transcendental Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132a. The Origin as Absolute Ground of Theoretic Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132b. The Tendency of the Creature to Seek Its Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133c. The Idea of Origin and the Absolute Ground of

Truth. The Criterion of Truth is of a ReligiousNature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

d. The Origin of the Dialectic Ground-motives inPhilosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

e. The Fundamental Difference Between Religiousand Theoretical Dialectics. The Confusion ofThese Two in Hegelianism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

f. The Central Place of the Religious Ground-motive asBrought to Light by the Transcendental Critiqueof Philosophic Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

g. There is Solidarity in The Fall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

CHAPTER IV

THE TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL

THOUGHT AND THE THOMISTIC THEOLOGIA NATURALIS

1. The Religious Determination of the Greek Ideaof “Theoria” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

2. The Axioms of Greek Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

3. The Religious Law of Concentration in Human Nature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

4. The Adaptation of the Greek Idea of “Theoria” to theGround-motive of Nature and Grace Causes a Shiftin Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

5. The Theory of the Analogia entis in ThomisticScholasticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

6. Analogical and Generic Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

7. The Two Classes of the Analogia of Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

8. Thomas’ Earlier Concept of the Proportional Analogy.The So-called Analogia proportionalitatis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

9. The Analogia proportionalitatis and theAnalogia proportionis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

10. The Genuine Divine Predicates. The GreekPrinciple of Form as the Criterion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

xii REFORMATION AND SCHOLASTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY VOLUME II

11. The Inherent Antinomy in the Synthesis BetweenAugustine’s Negative Theology and Aristotle’sConception of a Natural Theology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

12. Natural Theology in the Light of Our TranscendentalCritique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

13. The Scholastic Appeal to Holy Scripture forJustification of the Autonomous Theologia naturalis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

14. Why Thomas’ Proof of God’s Existence has aConvincing Power for Thomistic Scholasticismin spite of all Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

15. The “Speculative Imagery” in the Thomistic Proofsof God. The Task of the Transcendental Critique. TheDogmatic Prejudice in Kant’s View of the Latter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

16. Indubitable States of Affairs in Reality and theSo-called Theoretic Axioms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

17. The Five Ways of Thomas’ Proof for the Existenceof God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

18. The Reversal of the Axioms in the Ontology inHeraclitus’ Dynamistic Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

19. The Analogical Use of the causality Concept inAristotelian-Thomistic Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

20. Why Thomistic Scholasticism Cannot AbandonMetaphysical Natural Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANISTIC THINKING AS SEEN

IN THE LIGHT OF THE

TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE

1. The Primacy of the Nature Motive in Pre-KantianHumanistic Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

2. The Critical Turning Point in Humanistic Philosophy.Kant’s Epistemology Seen in the Light of the DialecticDevelopment of the Humanistic Ground-motive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

3. The New Religious Meaning of the Form-MatterMotive in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Why KantDid not Wish to Found His Critique of Knowledgein his So-called Practical Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

4. The Absolute Freedom Idealism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

5. The Transpersonalistic Conception of the “Idea ofFreedom” and the Origin of the New HistoricisticScience Ideal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

6. Humanistic Irrationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HERMAN DOOYEWEERD xiii

7. The Doctrine of the Folk Spirit and the Battle of theHistorical School against Humanistic Natural Law.The Influence of Schelling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

8. The Influence of the Historical School in theProtestant Christian (Anti-revolutionary) StateDoctrine. The Demand for Reformation, also here. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

9. The Dialectic Tension Between the New HistoricisticScience Ideal and the Humanistic Idea of Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

10. The Process of Internal Disintegration of HumanisticPhilosophy and the Timeliness of a TranscendentalCritique for Philosophical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

11. The Significance of the Transcendental Critique forHumanism and Roman Catholicism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

a. Calvinistic Thinking at the Crossroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

CHAPTER VI

THE COSMONOMIC IDEA AND THE BASIC STRUCTURES OF

TEMPORAL REALITY

A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

1. The Cosmonomic Idea as the TranscendentalBasic Idea of Philosophic Thinking and theModal Structures of Reality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

a. Summary of the Three Phases of the TranscendentalCritique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

(i) What is abstracted from full temporal reality

in the theoretic Gegenstand relation and how

is this abstraction possible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

(ii) From what standpoint can the aspects, which were

separated and opposed to each other in the

theoretical view of totality, be reunited?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

(iii) How is the choice or the Archimedean point

possible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201b. The Transcendental-Theoretic Idea as the Theoretic

Concept Carried to Its Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202c. The Scientific Significance of the Modal Idea: it later

Must Supply us with Insight into the Place of the AspectConcerned in the Order and Coherence of all Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

d. The Modal Nucleus in the Structure of the Aspect andIts Logical Irreducibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

2. The Thomistic View of the Analogy Leads toUndefined and Therefore Scientifically UselessAnalogical Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

xiv REFORMATION AND SCHOLASTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY VOLUME II

3. The Analogies and Anticipations in the ModalStructure of an Aspect. They are Qualified by theModal Nucleus of Meaning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

4. Closed and Disclosed Structure of a Modal Aspect. TheProcess of Disclosure and the Tendency TowardsIts Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

5. The Cosmic Order of the Modal Aspects and of theIndividuality-structures is a Real Order in Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

6. What is the Criterion of Distinguishing BetweenAnalogy and Anticipation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

7. The Two Boundary Aspects of Temporal Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

8. The First Transcendental Idea of Philosophyas a Guideline for the Method of ScientificConcept-formation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

9. The Structure of the Act of Theoretic Thinking is alsoFounded in this Coherence of Cosmic Time. And theAbstract Gegenstand Relation is Implicit in this Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

10. The Second Transcendental Idea of Philosophy:how to Relate the Theoretic Concept to the One RootCommon to all Modal Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

11. The Third Transcendental Idea: the Idea of the Originof the Modal Aspects we Have Set Apart in theGegenstand Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

12. The Synthetic Union of these Three Ideas in theTranscendental Basic Idea of the Philosophyof the Cosmonomic Idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

13. Kuyper’s Basic Religious Conception of Calvinism andthe Cosmonomic Idea of a Calvinistic philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

14. No Depreciation of Theoretic Thinking.The Perspectival Structure of the Horizon of HumanExperience and of Truth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

15. The Idea of the Law in a Narrow Sense.The Origin of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

16. Occam’s Doctrine Regarding the Potestas Dei absoluta.The Continued Influence of the Greek Matter-Principle in this View of the Sovereignty of God’s Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

17. Once more: The Dogma of the Autonomy of Reason.The Normative Aspects of the Law and of the HumanPerson Give Form to the Normative Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

18. The Law as the Boundary Between the Being of Godand Creature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

19. The Subject of Law is “Subjected.” Radical Excisionof the Polar Contrast Between Rationalism andIrrationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HERMAN DOOYEWEERD xv

20. The Deeper, Radical Unity of God’s Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

21. The Full Meaning of the Religious Command.The “Moral Law” as the Unity of Normin Scholastic Ethics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

22. The Consequences of Absolutizing the “Moral Law”as the Unity of Norm for Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

23. The Deeper Coherence of the So-called Laws ofNature in the Pre-logical Law Spheres withthe Norms of the Later Spheres. Natural Lawand Miracle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

24. The Light Refraction of the Divine Law in the ModalAspects of Law-Spheres within Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

25. The Idea of the Subject as the Correlate of the Idea ofthe Law. The Modal Subject-Object Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

26. The Limits of the Modal Subject-Object Relation. Canwe only See the Earlier Modal Functions in an Aspectas Object? A Correction of my Earlier Opinion inhis Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

27. The Sensory Objectification of the Manner in Whichthe Modal Functions that Follow that of Language inthe Cosmic Order of Time Can Become the Object ofSensory Observation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

28. The Subject-Object Relation as the Relation thatUnlocks, Realizes, and Actualizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

29. The Focusing of the Subject-Idea on the ThreeTranscendental Basic Problems of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

1. The Cosmonomic Idea and the Individuality-structures of Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

2. The Transcendental Problem of Unity in the TheoreticDiversity of the Individuality-structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

3. The Intrinsic Unity of the Modal Structure asthe Unity in the Theoretic Diversity ofStructural Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

4. The Unity of the Individuality-structures is alsoFounded inside the Horizon of Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

5. The Fundamental Error of the Metaphysical Way ofThinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

6. The Humanistic Science-ideal and the Tendency toDissolve the Individuality-structures in a ClosedSystem of Modal Relations. The Classical PhylogeneticDoctrine in Biology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

7. The So-called Pure Law Doctrine and the TypicalStructures of Human Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

xvi REFORMATION AND SCHOLASTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY VOLUME II

8. The So-called Pure Economics and the Individuality-structures of Human Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

9. The Universality of the Horizon of Structural Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

10. The Connection Between the Modal and theIndividuality-structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

11. The Application of our Cosmonomic Idea to theIndividuality-structures of Temporal Reality. TheseStructures too Can only be Approached in TheoryThrough Limiting Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

12. Metaphysics, Starting with the Autonomy of TheoreticThinking, Does not Penetrate to the Individual Wholewith Its Substance-concept but Remains Bound to theHorizon of the Modal Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

13. The Metaphysical Substance-concept is Necessarilyof a Dialectical Character . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

14. The Integral Character of the Individuality-structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

15. The Deepest Layer of Temporal Individualityis Inaccessible to Theoretic Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

CHAPTER VII

THE IDEA OF THE INDIVIDUALITY- STRUCTURE AND THE

THOMISTIC SUBSTANCE-CONCEPT, ESPECIALLY IN ITS

ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPLICATION

A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

1. The Scholastic-Thomistic Substance-concept, the Ideaof the Individuality-structure and Naive Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

a. The Point of Connection Between the Substance-concept and Things Given to Naive Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

b. The Greek Idea of Theoria in Its Religious-Contemplative Tendency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

c. Once More The Religious Ground-motive of GreekMetaphysics: The Form-Matter Theme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

d. The Thomistic Ontology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256e. Once More the Analogical Character of the Concept

of Being and the Scholastic Method of FormingConcepts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

f. The Four Transcendental Definitions of the ThomisticConcept of Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

g. The Connection Between the Four Transcendentaliawith the Greek Form-Matter Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

h. Potentiality and Actuality of Being. The Relationbetween the Scheme of Potentiality and Actuality andthat of Form and Matter. The Aristotelian Synthesis ofthe Form and Matter Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HERMAN DOOYEWEERD xvii

i. Has the Act-Potency Scheme Conquered the PolarDualism of the Form-Matter Motive? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

j. The Two Poles in the Aristotelian Scheme of Act andPotency. The Form-Matter Theme Remains Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

k. The Creation-doctrine of Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278l. The Dialectic Ground-motive of Greek “Theoria,” that of

Form and Matter, Nowhere Shows Its IntrinsicallyDualistic Character More Succinctly than in theScholastic View of Human Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

1. The Aristotelian Predicates or Categories of Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283a. The Basic Division of the Category into Substance

and Its Accidentia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283b. The Ignoring of the Cosmic Order of Time in This

Doctrine of Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286c. A Further Critique of the Aristotelian-Thomistic

Doctrine of Categories. A Comparison with theTheory of the Modal Structures of Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

d. The Basic Dualism of the Form-Matter MotivePermeates the Doctrine of Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290

e. The Category of Substance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291f. The Modern Concept of Function versus the

Substance-concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292g. The Substance-concept as Opposed to the Naive

Experience of Things. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292h. Definitive Critique of the Scholastic-Thomistic

Substance-concept. The Substance-concept as anUncritical Idea of the Radical Unity of a Thing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

i. The Religious Meaning of the Thomistic Substance-concept. The Eucharistic Dogma ofTransubstantiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294

C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

1. The Substance-concept and the Subject-ObjectRelation in Temporal Reality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

a. The Category of Relationship in ThomisticMetaphysics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

b. The Thomistic Doctrine Regarding Motion and Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300c. The Antinomy Between this Doctrine of Motion and

Time on the one Hand and the Substance-concept,on the Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

1. The Aristotelian-Thomistic Substance-conceptand the Problem of Individuality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

a. How Aristotle Formulates the Problem of Individuality . . . . . . . . . . . . 308b. The Individual and the Numerical Principle. Thomas'

Doctrine Regarding the “Materia quantitate signata”as an Individualizing Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312

c. The Controversy Regarding the Meaning of “Materiaquantitate signata” with Thomas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314

xviii REFORMATION AND SCHOLASTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY VOLUME II

d. The Aftereffect of Greek Atomism in this View ofIndividuality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

e. The Thomistic View of the Individual versus ModernMathematical Individualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320

f. The Dialectic Tension Between Form-type andthe Individual within the Aristotelian-ThomisticSubstance-concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

g. Once More the Scholastic Substance-concept and theNaive Understanding of a Thing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322

h. The Idea of the Individuality-structure and theConcept of a Thing in Naive Experience. TheIndividuality-structure as a Typical Structurein Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324

i. Individuality-structure and Individuality are Relatedas Law-type and the Subject Subordinate to it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

j. The Religious Depreciation of the Individual inAristotelian-Thomistic Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327

E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328

1. The Substance-concept in Thomistic Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328a. The Antinomy Between this View of Individuality and

the Church Dogma Concerning the Individual Survivalof the Human Soul. The Thomistic View ofAccommodation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328

b. Sertillanges’ Defense of the Thomistic Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331c. The Inner Antinomy in the Thomistic Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334d. The Thomistic Substance-concept and the Idea of

Human Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337e. The Ideas as Primal Forms of Individuality in Neo-

platonism. The Fundamental Differences Betweenthe Platonic Dialectic and Aristotelian Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339

f. The Influence This Neoplatonic Doctrine Exerted onThomas and the New Antinomy it Caused in HisDoctrine of Individuality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343

g. The Augustinian View of Individuality and the OlderFranciscan Current in Scholasticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

h. The Averroistic School of Siger of Brabant. TheDenial of “Individual Immortality” of theHuman Soul on the Basis of the AristotelianPrinciple of Individualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

i. The Battle Against Thomas’ Doctrine ofIndividualization and the InitialCondemnation of it by Church Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353

j. Negation and Form as an Individualizing Principlein the School of Henry of Ghent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354

k. The Dangers of This View for a ScholasticStandpoint, Nominalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357

l. The Epistemological Difference between the views ofThomas and Duns Scotus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362

m. Critique of Scotus’ Individuality Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HERMAN DOOYEWEERD xix

n. The Augustinian View Concerning the “Primamateria” and Its Significance for the View ofSoul and Body as Two Substances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367

o. The Stoic View Concerning “Prima materia”as Opposed to the Aristotelian View. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368

p. The Neoplatonic Conception of the “Logoi spermatikoi”:No Real Connection Between Form and Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369

q. The Augustinian View is Closer to the Stoa andAccepts a Connection of Form Potential andMatter in a Semi-Aristotelian Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371

r. The Doctrine Concerning the Plurality of SubstantialForms. The “Forma corporeitatis” and the Metaphysicsof Light in Augustinian Scholasticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373

s. Bonaventura’s View Concerning the Relation BetweenSoul and Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377

u. The Platonic and Aristotelian Views of the RelationBetween Soul and Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380

u. The Problem of the “Compositum” of Soul and Bodyin Scholasticism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383

v. Thomas’ Reversion to the Traditional Doctrine of HumanBeings as the “Compositum” of Two Substances andTheir Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386

w. Thomas’ Argumentation is Its Own Snare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394x. There is a Dialectic Necessity Inherent in the Substance-

concept. If One Accepts the Substantial Character of the“Anima rationalis,” One is again Forced to GiveIndependence to the “Corpus organicum.” And with thatOne is Forced to Abandon the Substantial Unity ofHuman Beings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396

y. How is the Lasting Influence of the View of the HumanSoul as an Immortal “Anima rationalis,” Independentof the Body, to be Explained? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396

z. Aristotelian and Thomistic Arguments for theIndependence of Theoretical Conceptual Activityvis-à-vis the Material Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399

aa. A Critical Examination of These Arguments. TheActivity of Theoretical Thinking Made Independent:a Spiritual Substance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402

bb. Thomas’ Erroneous Interpretation of the AristotelianView. Nuyens’ Refutation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404

cc. The Snare in the Aristotelian Argument.Substantializing the Gegenstand Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406

dd. The Concrete Acts in the Theoretical GegenstandRelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407

ee. Human Consciousness Embraces All Aspects of Realityin an Integral Fashion. The Influence of the Meta-physical Doctrine of the Soul on Epistemology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411

ff. The Transcendental-Logical Thought Subject inKant’s Epistemology and the “Isolated Intellect”in the Aristotelian-Thomistic Doctrine of the Soul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414

xx REFORMATION AND SCHOLASTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY VOLUME II

gg. The Acceptance of the Thomistic Doctrine Concerningthe Relation Between Body and Soul within ReformedScholasticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420

CHAPTER VIII

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND

THEOLOGY AND THE TUG OF WAR BETWEEN THESE

DISCIPLINES

1. Is Dogmatic Theology a Special Science? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

2. Is Theology a Science? Two Points of View Elicitinga Negative Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

3. Augustine’s Conception of the Relationship BetweenTheology and Philosophy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424

4. The Ambiguity in the Use of the Terms Theologyand Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425

a. The Thomistic Conception of Theology as theQueen of the Sciences and Its Relationshipto Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431

b. The Basic Difference Between the Standpoints ofThomas and Augustine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432

c. The Ambiguity of Thomas’ Terms Sacred Doctrineand Science of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433

5. Barth’s Conception Concerning the RelationshipBetween Philosophy and Dogmatic Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435

a. Kuyper’s View of This Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437b. Critique of Kuyper’s Conception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439c. We Need to Realize that even a Truly Christian Faith is

Bound to the General Modal Character of the PisticBoundary Aspect of Our Temporal Horizon ofExperience. Church and Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440

d. The Authentic Relationship Between DogmaticTheology and Philosophy in the Philosophy of theCosmonomic Idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442

e. The Basic Analogical Concepts of Theology: theAnalogia entis and the Analogia fidei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443

5. The Modal Structure of the Aspect of Faith. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445a. The Exceptional Character of the Aspect of Faith as

the Boundary Aspect of the Temporal Horizon ofExperience. Its Linkage to God’s Revelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446

b. The Modal Nucleus of Faith and Its StructuralAnalogies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446

c. The Moral Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448d. The Jural Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448e. The Aesthetic Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449f. The Economic Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450g. The Analogy of Social Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HERMAN DOOYEWEERD xxi

h. The Lingual Analogy: the Symbolism of Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451i. The Sacraments as Symbols of Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452j. The Historical Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452k. The Process of Positivizing the Norm of Faith and

Its Fiduciary Genetic Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454l. The Closed and Opened Structures of Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456m. The Process of Opening-up in Unbelief (Apistia) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461n. The Connection Between the Opening-up Process of

the Aspects of Faith and History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461o. The Logical Analogy in the Modal Structure of

the Function of Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465p. The Psychic Analogy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466q. The Biotic Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466r. Pistic Causation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467s. The Spatial Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469t. The Arithmetical Analogy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470u. The Pistic Aspect of Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471

6. The Tug of War Between the Faculties in theLight of the Transcendental Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473

a Aristotelian Logic and Dogmatic Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474b. The Attempt to Separate Theology and Philosophy from

the Outside; The Interference of the Dutch Government inthe Seventeenth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477

c. The Scholastic Criterion of this Separationof Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479

d. Kant’s Lectures on the Conflict of the Faculties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481e. Kant’s Humanistic Guidelines for Settling the Conflict Be-

tween the Theological and Philosophic Faculties. His Dis-tinction Between “Church Faith” and “Religious Faith” . . . . . . . . . . . . 483

f. Replacing the Ground-motive of Nature and Gracewith that of Nature and Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486

g. Two Important Points in Kant’s Argumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488h. The Battle Between the Scholastic Wing of Reformed

Theology and the Reformational Philosophy isNecessary and Takes Place on Philosophic Terrain,Although it Touches in a More Profound Sense theReligious Ground-motive of the Christian Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489

i. The Relationship of Christian Dogma to TheologicalExegesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490

xxii REFORMATION AND SCHOLASTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY VOLUME II