1 Reflections on phronetic social science: a dialogue between Stewart Clegg, Bent Flyvbjerg and Mark Haugaard i . Abstract: Clegg, Flyvbjerg and Haugaard debate the relative strengths and weaknesses of a critique of power developed from Foucault (and Nietzsche) compared to a more Enlightenment liberal tradition, exemplified by Lukes and Habermas. Flyvbjerg and Clegg argue the Enlightenment pursuit of universal liberal normative principles and truth as reason without power, leads to forms of utopian thinking, tied to domination. Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition of phronesis, by contrast, they propose a radically contextualist form of critique that situates itself in analysis of local language games to render domination transparent. While Haugaard accepts there cannot be a universal view tat transcends the particularities of context, he argues that the phronetic approach is crypto-normative/verificationist because its normative purchase implicitly presupposes unacknowledged liberal normative premises; moreover, any use of ‘truth’ as a crirerion follows Enlightenment principles of verification. Key words: phronesis, power, truth, domination, critique. Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]. Mark Haugaard: By way of beginning to this exchange it might be useful to situate Bent’s phronetic approach relative to the wider context of the power debates. In particular, the opposition between Lukesian and Foucauldian approaches, which I will use as ideal type representations of the contrast between modern and post-modern methods. This will be followed by an analysis of the concept of tension points, which are key to phronesis.
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Reflections on phronetic social science: a dialogue between Stewart Clegg, Bent
Flyvbjerg and Mark Haugaardi.
Abstract: Clegg, Flyvbjerg and Haugaard debate the relative strengths and weaknesses
of a critique of power developed from Foucault (and Nietzsche) compared to a more
Enlightenment liberal tradition, exemplified by Lukes and Habermas. Flyvbjerg and
Clegg argue the Enlightenment pursuit of universal liberal normative principles and
truth as reason without power, leads to forms of utopian thinking, tied to domination.
Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition of phronesis, by contrast, they propose a radically
contextualist form of critique that situates itself in analysis of local language games to
render domination transparent. While Haugaard accepts there cannot be a universal
view tat transcends the particularities of context, he argues that the phronetic approach
is crypto-normative/verificationist because its normative purchase implicitly
presupposes unacknowledged liberal normative premises; moreover, any use of ‘truth’
as a crirerion follows Enlightenment principles of verification.
but one whose effects, in terms of the espousal of dogmatic and revelatory versions of
the truth, precludes reason defined in Kantian, Habermasian and liberal terms. Even in
what Mark calls weak contextualism characterized by multiple language games, not all
of them have family resemblances. Of course, the alternative is not full-blooded
acceptance of Schutz’s phenomenology, grounding meaning in the subjects’ own
understandings as an ultimate arbiter: nonetheless, subject’s meanings are important,
must be understood and sometimes accounted for in terms other than those that the
subject is disposed to believe.
There is a fundamental problem with trying to resolve scientific questions via a
democratically discursive approach. It presumes rationality. In a world in which the
ideal of scientific knowledge held true the judgments of expert knowledge would
determine the facts of the matter, irrespective of community opinion. However, in
many areas of the social sciences, and increasingly in natural science areas such as
climate change research, we do not operate in the world of the Enlightenment. The
standard model for scientific truth claims is that which Hamilton (2013) terms the
“information deficit” model of classical science that says, “people act irrationally
because their knowledge is deficient. Yet facts are no match against deeply held
values, the values embedded in personal identity.” In any account of people’s ‘real
interests’ that is non-trivial, whether dealing with religiosity, the body or climate
change, the specification of what these interests are and the appropriateness of the
science that establishes them is not something that democratic deliberation can
establish. It is not a matter of the ‘choices’ made by subjects that is important – to eat
unhealthily, to risk cancer, to cut oneself off from the ‘normal’ sense of community in
the external world – but of the relation between these as value based and the
determination that would be made by one committed to rationality who does not
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adhere to these values. Lukes’ relativism of the liberal, reformer and radical does not
help here because it merely specifies (some of) the variable grounds on which
assessment of practices that are values based are made. It does not help one determine
what the ‘real’ interests are. Implicitly, Lukes presumes that the radical has a closer
relation to the truth of the matter than the liberal or conservative. I doubt that such
determination is possible; additionally, I doubt that making such determinations and
seeking to have an exchange between practical and theoretically informed
consciousness counts for much because, as Hamilton suggests, “the debate ploy” may
seem entirely reasonable but such an approach only works if the intended audience can
effectively assess the arguments presented. Commitment to values above reason
precludes this approach. Hence, to concur once more with Bent’s position on the
Aalborg case, rationality as a device is weak when confronted with entrenched power
and values. The contextually powerful will ignore or evade reason when it suits their
values to do so.
Martin Luther King was a skilled rhetorician, schooled in Baptist rhythms, a
great orator. But did one speech constitute a decisive turning point in civil rights? I am
not sure any speech could have such a role – the subsequent assassination of King and
the riots and conflagration in the cities that followed, may well have had as much
impact in putting black civil rights, as a non-issue, onto the agenda of mainstream
politics as an issue. Finally, with respect to the death camps, systematic killing of
people is evil, especially in the name of ideology. The extinction of life itself on the
basis of categorical discrimination is unfortunately not something that liberal principles
inoculate against: as Mann (2011: 38) states, “Between them the British, French and
Dutch fought over 100 separate wars between 1870 and 1914, almost all in their
colonies, and European children read adventure stories lauding the heroism of soldiers,
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sailors and colonial administrator. War was normalized in this culture.” The culture
had an integral calculus in which the other to the enlightenment tradition was
disposable and outside of reason.
In conclusion, I think that conceptions of power have to steer a course between
two potential dangers: on the one hand, the imputation of interests made on the basis of
theoretical consciousness; on the other hand, the conflation of socialized habit to a
result of power effects. Weak contextualism does seem the best way forward: with
Salma Yaqoob I am insecure about the merit of proffering analysis of other people’s
problems as I define them and they do not. With Lukes, I am concerned that we do not
take the mechanisms of habit formed through socialization as power effects. In both
cases, I would not expect that others would necessarily accede to the Habermasian
norms that Mark elaborates. In the absence of an acceptance of these norms as an a
priori, it is difficult to see how theoretical consciousness can maintain an effective
dialogue with practical consciousness.
B.F. Mark comes out swinging by claiming Stewart and I are subject to 'self-
exception and self-deception', because we, according to Mark, (a) critique domination
without making explicit our own normative foundations and (b) claim we are not
ourselves making truth claims against domination. But Mark is wrong on both counts. I
make my normative foundations explicit throughout my work, including above with
the quote from Foucault that defines the normative foundation of phronetic social
science as, 'to challenge "every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the
victims".' If something is not explicit about this, the onus is on Mark to explain what it
is. Second, to the best of my knowledge I have never claimed I do not make truth
claims against domination, as Mark says, so he needs to tell me specifically where he
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thinks I made these claims so we can address the issue. In my own understanding, I
have repeatedly made the exact opposite claim in my work, namely that this is best
seen precisely as truth claims against domination, and, moreover, the truth claims I or
other phronetic social scientists put forward must live up to the same criteria for
validity and reliability that apply to truth claims from other work in the social sciences.
However, I do not claim to make objectivist, universal truth claims, which may be
what throws Mark, because in my analysis no one has demonstrated such claims may
be supported, as argued above. But that is not the same as not making truth claims.
Mark is fighting a straw man here, twice over.
From reading Mark's second round of comments above I now understand that
Mark, too, is not making universal truth claims. Mark explicitly states that 'liberal
principles are not Universal (with a capital U)'. He then goes on to make an inelegant
rhetorical maneuver that gives his game away, when he says, 'However, the
generalizability criterion is universal (small u) within liberal democratic theory'. In
short, Mark wants to have his cake and eat it. But to be 'universal within' something is
an oxymoron, if I ever saw one. It is similar to saying the universal exists within local
boundaries, which is nonsensical by the usual standards of philosophy of science.
Principles and theories may be universal or local, and to be local is defined precisely
by existing only within certain bounds. As a consequence, to be 'universal within'
something is at best to be local, in which case we should call it that based on the
epistemological principle of calling a spade a spade. At worst, to be 'universal within'
seems to be an obfuscation, serving as a false security blanket for those who are
unwilling to give up on the comfort of the illusion of having something outside their
socio-historical context in which to ground their beliefs and actions. The history of
philosophy, and indeed of humankind, shows this sentiment to be persistent and all-
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too-human, and as such very understandable. Nevertheless, Mark's idea of being
'universal within' seems to me as imaginary as the emperor's new clothes and serving
the same purpose: to give the illusion that the emperor, here Mark and other scholars
unwilling to let go of the idea of universals, is not stark naked.
In a more positive interpretation, I welcome Mark's giving up on Universals with
a capital U, because to me this is giving up on universals, period. It's an important step
beyond Kant and Habermas, the latter explicitly and pretentiously calling his
'universalization principle' 'U' with a capital U (Habermas 1990: 120-21). What I now
hear Mark saying is simply, 'I consider myself part of a group that subscribes to the
principles of liberal democratic theory and practice'. I'm happy to join Mark in this
group to fight the abuse of power by better understanding and better implementing
democracy, even though I might want to emphasize more than Mark does here what I
see as serious weaknesses, inequalities, and environmental strains in the way liberal
democracy is currently practiced. Moreover, I agree with Mark that, despite flaws and
setbacks, liberal democracy is a remarkably successful social and political project and
a project worth working for. But this brings us straight back to Foucault, because our
agreement, if it is there, is plainly us as a group of people deciding collectively, and
therefore non-idiosyncratically, in our specific socio-historical context that these are
our norms, this is what we want to work for, and there is nothing outside this context to
help us in that decision and that work, as far as I can see. This is a concrete example of
how the Foucauldian-Nietzschean tradition solves the problem of normative
justification through contextualism: the justification lies in our consensus (including
our consensus with other like-minded individuals and groups), and there is no
objective 'better argument' outside this consensus that may be used to justify it. In sum,
like Mark I'm happy to subscribe to the principles of liberal democracy, but unlike
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Mark I don't need these principles to be justified by being 'universal within' or other
rhetorical smoke and mirrors. Indeed, I take universal justification to be impossible and
observe that Mark has not supported his call for such justification with a demonstration
that it is possible, or even plausible. However, now that I've seen Mark give up on
Universals with a capital U, I trust he will soon also give up on universals with a small
u, the latter being a much smaller step than the former, in my analysis.
I would add here that only a superficial reading of Foucault could come away
with Mark's conclusion that 'Foucault expects his readers to supply the normative
evaluation' of his work. Foucault's work is self-admittedly normative through and
through in its choice of problematic, evidence, teasing out of implications for the
present, etc. It is true that Foucault, like any good writer, leaves space for readers to do
their own normative evaluations and encourages them to do so. But to equate this with
readers doing the full normative work is misleading and gets the point of Foucault's
interventions and methodology wrong, in my view.
Mark challenges me to give him 'an example of transparency, however
contextualist, that does not presuppose implicitly within it that "participants must
openly explain their goals and intention"' (Mark's emphasis), as if that would be a
difficult thing to do. But it's easy: the conduct of court cases in liberal democracies is
such an example. Court cases are aimed at establishing transparency, typically about a
conflict or a crime, so the judge (with or without a jury) can make an informed ruling
on the case. It is not required, however, that all participants openly explain their goals
and intentions. There is even a legal privilege that the defendant can keep silent, that is,
the main participant has the explicit and undisputed right to be the exact opposite of
open and to not explain anything at all, directly falsifying Mark's thesis. The
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prosecution and defense also do not have to explain their goals and intentions openly
or in a balanced way. The conduct of court cases allows for all sorts of strategic and
tactical behaviors not permitted in Mark's and Habermas's ideal world of the force of
the better argument. I encourage Mark and other Habermasians to think about why that
is, perhaps after attending a few court cases and comparing what happens there with
Habermasian discourse ethics. For me, the reason is that the people who invented and
developed our court systems understood the relationship between power and truth and
how to deal with it practically. We are lucky, it seems to me, that our courts were not
designed by idealistic theoreticians like Mark and Habermas, but by pragmatic realists.
Mark's idealism leads him to conclude, 'It seems to be obvious that to the extent
to which actors disguise their goals and intentions the process is not transparent and is
normatively reprehensible, whatever the context!' That's a very global statement –
Universal with a capital U ('whatever the context') and as such it immediately gets
Mark into trouble, because it is not obvious at all it would apply under any and all
circumstances. By this standard most court cases in liberal democracies would be
normatively reprehensible, and perhaps Mark thinks they are. I respectfully disagree
and have argued elsewhere that solving conflicts, including court cases, by means of
Habermas' five discourse-ethical principles would lead to deadlock and break down of
the court system (Flyvbjerg 2001: 106). As observed by Bernstein (1992: 221), any
society must have some procedures for dealing with conflicts that cannot be resolved
by argumentation, even when all parties are committed to rational argumentation.
Courts in liberal democracies secure this type of conflict resolution, among other
things. Mark's thinking here seems not only utopian but also sociologically naive.
Mark finds 'totally suspect', Machiavelli's observation that humans are
'ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers'. This may be because Mark misses the point
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Machiavelli is making. Mark thinks Machiavelli is out to make an 'essentialist claim',
in Mark's words, which indeed would be suspect, but which would also go completely
against character for Machiavelli, whose whole way of thinking and acting emphasized
pragmatism and actionable verita effettuale. With the above observation, Machiavelli
(1983: 111-12) simply wants us to remember that '[a]ll writers on politics have pointed
out ... that in constituting and legislating for a commonwealth it must be taken for
granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity
that is in their minds when opportunity offers.' This is worst-case thinking aimed at
protecting a state and its citizens against human evil, not a global statement about
human character. Machiavelli's point is that we will land in serious trouble if we
organize society based on idealist ideas, like Habermasian discourse ethics, that
assume away evil and thus contain no checks and balances – other than an abstract
appeal to reason – to control evil. History teaches us that utopian thinking that assumes
evil away typically gives free rein to evil. This is why Nietzsche (1968: 192-93)
emphatically says 'perhaps there has never before been a more dangerous ideology ...
than this will to good.' From this point of view the ideas of Mark and Habermas are
part of the problem, not the solution. And the lesson to be learned from Machiavelli
and Nietzsche is not so much that moralism is hypocrisy, but that the first step to
becoming moral is realizing we are not. The next step is establishing checks and
balances that adequately reflect this. The primary task is to reduce the scope for evil,
not to increase the opportunity for utopia, be it discourse ethics or any other ideal
construct. Mark asks, 'why should we care what Machiavelli (or Nietzsche) says?' This
is why. And of course Mark would be the last to see this, because he himself, or rather
his idealism, is the target of Machiavelli's and Nietzsche's critique. They understand
that idealist theoreticians like Mark and Habermas are ultimately dangerous, to the
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extent their ideas about power and truth were to serve as basis for designing real
institutions in real societies. And Machiavelli and Nietzsche are keen to alert us to this
danger and to explain how we may protect ourselves against it.
Mark makes a big deal of my winning the argument with the Aalborg alderman
by means of a solid packet of data (Flyvbjerg 2001: 156-61). I agree with Mark this is
truth prevailing over domination, and today I use different packs of data to similarly
influence power relations for megaprojects (Flyvbjerg 2013). But Mark seems to think
this undermines my understanding of the relationship between truth and power while
supporting that of Habermas. This is wrong. My understanding of truth and power is
exactly about understanding situations where truth may gain the upper hand as a
'weapon of the weak', and then acting on those situations, cf., my concept of 'tension
points' (Flyvbjerg 2012). However, there are many more situations where truth loses
out to power than the opposite, which means Mark is also wrong when he says that
Stewart's proposition that 'it is power relations that determine what becomes
legitimated as truth' is falsified by my work. On balance, my work, and that of other
phenomenologists of power, proves Stewart to be exactly right on this point, which
does not rule out individual instances of truth dominating power, needless to say, like
in the case of the alderman. Moreover, I maintain that Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and
Foucault are superior to Habermas for understanding the truth-power complex,
including grasping where and how truth may dominate power. But that's all I'm saying.
I'm not trying to refute or dodge anything, as Mark says I am ('That is not a proper
refutation'); I'm just pointing to what I consider the most valuable texts for anyone who
wants to understand the relationship between power and truth.
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Mark says, he 'does not know what it means to say that phronesis meets "the
conventional standards of validity for social science research".' That's interesting and
slightly disturbing. But here's a suggestion: Simply send a piece of research, phronetic
or not, to a peer-reviewed social science journal that you respect, and your peers will
tell you what the conventional scholarly standards are for those parts of your research
that in their view don't meet these standards. That's concretely how scholars learn the
conventional standards of their field, as shown by Thomas Kuhn, Bruno Latour, and
other sociologists of science; not by reading Habermas or Popper in the abstract.
However, for arguments sake I'm happy to accommodate Mark by accepting Popperian
falsification and Habermasian force-of-the-better-argument as two of many possible
criteria for establishing validity. That does not mean, however, I have to 'give up the
view that truth is inextricably tied to power', as Mark says I must. Truth about social
phenomena – maybe about natural ones, too, but let's leave that aside for the moment –
will always have power effects, for instance by strengthening one social position and
weakening another, and in this sense truth is always tied to power, no matter how the
validity of that truth was established, as long as it was accepted as valid truth.
Finally, a minor point of clarification. Stewart says that above I propose 'the
equivalence of "power" and "truth".' I hope not. I see power and truth as interrelated in
a way where power influences truth and truth influences power. But that is not
equivalence, because based on existing evidence I see the dominant relationship
running from power to truth, that is, power holds more sway over truth than vice versa.
To conclude, I agree with Stewart that today a difficulty in philosophy and social
science is maintaining an effective dialogue between theoretical and practical
consciousness. This dialogue must be open and alive if we want philosophy and social
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science to matter to society, and unfortunately it is not. However, the lack of effective
dialogue is a self-made problem created by philosophers and social scientists following
the rationalist tradition of Plato, Kant, and Habermas to its current dead end. The
antidote is right there under our noses, complete with theoretical justification,
methodological guidelines, and elaborate examples of application. It is the pragmatic
tradition of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Nietzsche, begun more than two thousand years
ago with Aristotle's critique of his teacher, Plato, for being too abstract and theoretical
to be useful in practical life, and later refined in Machiavellian verita effettuale,
Nietzschean wirkliche Historie, and Foucauldian genealogy with the explicit purpose
of looking for truth that may effectively change power and practice. If you want to
isolate yourself in theory and academia, the intellectual tradition of Plato, Kant, and
Habermas will serve you well. If you want your work to make a difference in practice,
I suggest the tradition of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Nietzsche will be the better
choice.
M.H: Well let me thank you both for participating in this lively debate. While we
have come to the end, in response to the above I would like to make just two brief
observations. First, I am not sure if the courtroom legal example stands on its own
procedural foundation, without legitimation from underlying immanent liberal
principles. If that were not the case, it would not make sense to say that a legal
judgment was legally, technically, correct but unjust. In fact, law and legal procedure
is revised if perceived to deliver unjust outcomes. Otherwise, the law falls into
contempt. Second, when I argue that these liberal principles are universal, with a
small u, I mean the following: a) that the principles are revisable and open to
falsification and b) that they are only universally applicable to societies which hold
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the underlying minimally liberal (with a small l) belief that society exists for the sake
of the individuals that make it up. This is in contrast to strongly communitarian social
orders, which believe that individuals exist for the greater glory of society, and its
metaphysical representations, which include, following Durkheim, God and totemic
representations of the sacred.
SC: some brief final words in response: first, the immanence of legal practice is
clearly discursive and based on nothing so much as usage as recorded in precedent in
the British system of common law; it is practice, not liberal principles, that
determines what is legal or not (as well as what is considered to be ‘liberal’); second,
while legal principles may be said to be a fundamental truth, and thus falsifiable, this
would seem to be a category error in the use of the terms ‘truth’ and ‘falsifiable’, as if
they had some essential meaning irrespective of context. I would argue that truth,
falsification and principle function according to different practices and procedures in
the courtroom compared to the laboratory and that both differ from practice in the
social sciences. Only in the very broadest sense that Pitkin (1972) suggests, of arguing
from premises that all can accept, through steps that all can follow, to conclusions
none can deny, is their commonality. But the specific ways of practicing this
rationality can differ considerable and is not all of the same stuff.
Pitkin, H. F. (1972) Wittgenstein and Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Notes on contributors:
Stewart Clegg is a professor at UTS – the University of Technology, Sydney. Among
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his many works are several volumes on power, including Power, Rule and Domination (1975; 2013), The Theory of Power and Organization (1979; 2013), Frameworks of Power (1989), Power and Organizations (2006 – with Courpasson and Phillips), The Sage Handbook of Power (2009; 2014 – with Haugaard), Power and Organizations 4 volumes (2012 –Clegg and Haugaard) and Power and Politics 4 volumes (2012 – Haugaard and Clegg). He has also been a participant in the phronesis debates: Clegg and and Pitsis (2012) ‘Phronesis, Projects and Power Research’, pp. 66-91 in B. Flyvbjerg, T. Landman, and S. Schram (eds) Real Social Science
Mark Haugaard is professor in the School of Political Science and Sociology, National University of Ireland, Galway. He is editor of the Journal of Political Power and Chair of IPSA RC 36, Political Power. His most recent publications include, Haugaard and Ryan (ed.) (2012) Power: The Development of the Field; Haugaard and Clegg (2012) (ed.) Power and Politics, 4 Volumes; and Haugaard and Clegg (ed.) (2009) The Sage Handbook of Power.
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