REDUCING THE RISK OF PROPULSION LOSS

REDUCING THE RISK OF PROPULSION LOSS

Operational guidance for preventingblackouts and main engine failures

Move Forward with Confidence

Le Triangle de l’arche - 8 cours du TriangleCS50101 - 92937 La Défense Cedex

Corporate website : www.bureauveritas.com/marine-and-offshoreMarine client portal : www.veristar.com

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50 Leman Street London E1 8HQ - UK

Telephone: +44 (0)20 7772 8000 Email: [email protected]

www.londonpandi.com

Standon House - 21 Mansell Street London E1 8AA - UK


www.tmcmarine.com

This document, and more, is available for download from Martin's Marine Engineering Page - www.dieselduck.net

3 INTRODUCTION

4 GLOSSARY

5 POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF PROPULSION LOSS

6 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF PROPULSION LOSS7 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF MAIN ENGINE FAILURE7 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ALTERNATOR FAILURE7 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF EMERGENCY GENERATOR FAILURE8 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF BLACKOUTS

9 RECOMMENDATIONS9 PREVENTIVE ACTIONS13 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

14 AREAS OF SPECIFIC FOCUS14 EMERGENCY GENERATOR

14 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK15 GENERAL

16 LOAD SHEDDING OR OTHER EQUIVALENT ARRANGEMENTS16 DEFINITIONS16 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK17 PREFERENCIAL TRIPPING SYSTEM

18 FEEDING BACK POWER FROM THE EMERGENCY SWITCHBOARD TO THE MAIN SWITCHBOARD

19 RECOVERY AFTER BLACKOUT20 ISM CODE

22 SUMMARY

23 CASE STUDIES

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this booklet isto provide general guidance

and practical advice to marineengineers and ship owners onblackout and main engine failures,the risks associated with propulsionloss and the precautions tomanage these risks.

It is not intended to replaceofficial IMO regulations andguidance notes or any documentthat forms part of a vessel’ssafety management system.

Blackouts, propulsion limitations,total loss of propulsion and lossof steering capability are allserious incidents.

When they occur during navigationin non-congested waters,incidents such as these increasethe risk to the vessel andpersonnel but rarely result indangerous or life-threateningoutcomes.

However, when they occur duringmanoeuvring in restricted areassuch as traffic lanes, whenentering or leaving port, or whena vessel is navigating close to acoast during heavy weather,these risks become critical andmay result in a major casualty.

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REDUCING THE RISK OF PROPULSION LOSS REDUCING THE RISK OF PROPULSION LOSS

Modernengine roomwith twomediumspeed mainengines


BLACKOUT

According to MSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1paragraph 6 (Interpretation ofSOLAS Chapter II-1 Regulations 42 & 43 paragraph 3.4), it means a “dead ship” condition initiatingevent. According to the BV RulesPart C Chapter 2 Section 1paragraph 3.29.1, a “blackoutsituation” means that the main andauxiliary machinery installations,including the main power supply,are out of operation but theservices for bringing them intooperation (e.g. compressed air,starting current from batteries,etc.) are available.

DEAD SHIP CONDITION

According to SOLAS Chapter II-1Regulations 3 paragraph 8 and toMSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1 paragraph3.1 (Interpretation of SOLASChapter II-1 Regulations 26paragraph 4), it is the conditionunder which the main propulsionplant, boilers and auxiliaries arenot in operation due to the absenceof power. In addition, no storedenergy for starting and operatingthe propulsion plant, the mainsource of electrical power andother essential auxiliaries isassumed to be available.

AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator

LSMGO Low Sulphur MGO

MGO Marine Gas Oil

SECA Sulphur Emission Control Area

STCW Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for seafarers

ULSMGO Ultra LSMGO

UPS Uninterruptible Power System

The main serious consequencesfor the ship that might occur asthe result of a blackout orpropulsion loss are contact,collision and / or grounding.

The consequences of third partyclaims may be substantial – intime, expense and reputation. Theimplications of propulsion lossmay be significant either affectingor stopping navigation altogetherin ports and their approaches, incanal systems, in waterways fordays, weeks and months. Claimsas a result of collisions, groundings,consequential pollution and ‘off-hire’, transhipment costs – all inaddition to any repair costs - aswell as claims from shore basedfacilities operators of loading anddischarge equipment and facilitiesare all likelihoods in the event ofdamage. Media and stakeholderinterests will all need to beaddressed.

4 51 On the top photo, the glass jar is here to highlight the degree to which the shell plating is set in.

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF PROPULSION LOSS

GLOSSARY


Bottom damages as a consequence ofmachinery failures1


Main engine failures and blackoutswhich result in large claims tend tooccur when a ship is at its mostvulnerable. The stable electricalconsumption which is a characteristicof a ship during deep sea passageis replaced by more volatile orvariable consumption requirementsdue to additional load placed on theelectrical generation equipmentwhen the ship begins manoeuvringin more confined waters (e.g. by

starting supplementary machinerysuch as additional steering motors,starting and stopping bow thrusters,starting general service pumps,powering up hydraulic equipmentand running deck machinery).Compliance with the low sulphurfuel regulations and changes fromone grade of fuel to another hasadded to incidents of propulsionfailures and power interruptions.

The main causes of propulsion loss by the London P&I club members’ships and for which P&I investigation was required during the last five fullP&I years are as follows: Blackout

Fuel oil poor quality orcontamination (e.g. fines, water orbacteria inside the tank)Insufficient attention to properfuel changeover procedure whenentering or exiting SECAFailure of starting air (insufficientpressure in the bottle). High orexcessive numbers of engine startsand stops while manoeuvring willdeplete pressure in the mainengine start bottles. This may leadto the engine failing to start with aconsequent loss of navigationalcontrol at critical times, such aswhen docking. It is important thatthe start air pressure is monitored

while the ship is being manoeuvredand also vital that the pilot and bridgeteam are made aware of themaximum number of consecutiveengine starts they can demand.Insufficient or ineffectivemaintenance of electronic andpneumatic control systems (forexample, filters in pneumaticcontrol systems are oftenneglected)Loss of control air pressureLoss of lubricationEngine automated shut down oreven slow down at a critical timeShaft intermediate bearing failureStern tube bearing failure

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF PROPULSION LOSS


POSSIBLE CAUSES OF MAIN ENGINE FAILURE

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ALTERNATOR FAILURE

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF EMERGENCY GENERATORFAILURE

Load share issuesLoss of exciter voltage due tofailure of diodes

Failure of AVR

6 7

Fire

Other

Equipmentfailure

24%

17%

6%

Human Error

Insufficient orineffective

maintenance

29%

24%

Batteries in poor conditionFailure of starting systemSwitchboard selector switch not in “auto” start position

Fuel oil poor quality orcontamination Fuel oil starvation


RECOMMENDATIONS


8

The following guidance is drawnfrom our experience and may be thedifference between an occurrenceof a problem being a minorproblem and a major casualty.

PREVENTIVE (considered to be good practice)

Ensure correct maintenance ofall equipment: engines (includingtheir control and automationsystems), purifiers, filters, fuelsystems and sealing arrangements.

Ensure that no maintenance iscarried out on filters and fuelsystems when on standby orapproaching restrictednavigational areas.

Ensure fuel oil viscosity andtemperature control equipmentis accurate and fully operational.

Ensure that all engineers areaware of how to isolate onecylinder on the main engine inthe event of failure, so that thisdoes not have to be stopped untilconvenient.

Wait for the results of tests onnewly supplied fuel oil to ensurethat the fuel is ‘on spec’ beforechanging-over to the new one.

It is recommended not to mixbunkers from two differentsuppliers in the same tanks.

Ensure water is regularly drainedfrom fuel oil tanks, in order toprevent water build up andcarryover in the fuel and to lessenthe risk of bacterial contamination/ microbial infestation. Removalof water or reducing its presenceto a minimum is the best methodto prevent microbial infestation.

Ensure that system temperatureand pressure alarms, fuel filterdifferential pressure transmitters,etc. are accurate, tested andoperational.

Ensure that engineers are fullyfamiliar with all engine roomsystems and their pipelines,including the changeoverprocedures from heavy fuel oil toMGO / LSMGO / ULSMGO andvice versa. Engineers shouldalso be familiar with the methodof changing from remote controlto local control of valves andequipment.

Establish ‘failure to start’ /blackout procedures / checklistas well as emergency responsemanual / procedures / checklist/ instructions. These shouldinclude familiarisation withoperation locally and from theengine control room, as well asinformation to ensure control ofthe vessel’s propulsion whenoperating on emergency power.

Human errorControl equipment failures (e.g.governor failures, defective tripsfor high temperature cooling orlow lube oil pressures)Main engine failure whilst usingshaft generator (e.g. shaftgenerator tripping whilst autostart and load share of auxiliarygenerators inoperative)Automation failure (e.g. AVRdefect or auxiliary load control /sharing failures)Electrical failure (e.g. overload,reverse power trip orpreferential trip device failure)

Fuel issue, e.g.:- blocked filters - poor changeover procedures - failure to bleed the stand by

filter before putting it back inuse

- Poor quality (for instance,water in fuel)

- fuel supply piping and pumpfailures (fuel starvation)

- loss of air control supply to fueltank valves

Mechanical failure, e.g.:- lack of compression - engine seizure - loss of lubrication - overheating - scavenge firesOther causes (e.g. fire inelectrical panel / main

A significant number of blackouts are caused by electrical failures whenstarting bow thrusters and deck machinery - such as mooring winches orcranes - when insufficient electrical power is available. Awareness isrequired that the starting current of electrical motors may be several timesthe full ‘on load’ current. Starting large motors may trip breakers and lead toblackouts. Despite built-in safety features in modern ships to prevent suchan occurrence, it is a sensible precaution to establish routines to ensure theavailability of adequate generating power before starting large electricalmotors. Many modern ships have automation to ensure that before itemssuch as the bow thruster can be started there must be sufficient electricalcapacity available; however it is not unknown for the automation to fail.

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF BLACKOUTS



RECOMMENDATIONS

During manoeuvring operationsor when on standby, run two (ormore) generators in parallelwhilst ensuring sufficient poweravailability should one eitherstop or trip. Monitor and balanceswitchboard power loadsequally. All watchkeepingengineers should be trained inmanually operating load share,putting generators on the boardand taking generators off theboard. It is self-evident; however,practicing these techniquesshould be done regularly so thatthese are second nature.

Test the astern operation of themain engine prior to arriving atthe pilot station and, if practical,before approaching the berth.This test should be carried outon the fuel which the vessel willuse for manoeuvring (i.e. after

any changeover has been carriedout) and suitable entries made inboth the deck and engine roomlogbooks.

Establish procedures to ensure thatthere is adequate electrical capacityavailable before starting up lateralthrusters, mooring equipment orother heavy equipment, bearing inmind that simultaneous startingof large electric motors will lead toa large power surge andpossible overload. A protectiveinterlock prevents the bowthruster from starting oroperating on one generator (butthis can fail).

Tests of the lateral thrusters andmooring equipment should becarried out well before enteringrestricted waters and undertakingcritical manoeuvres.

Blackout / engine failure /emergency propulsion controldrills should be carried out atleast every quarter2 and it shouldrealistically simulate anemergency, in order for the crew tobe ready to respond to thesituation. To be well prepared,trained and practiced avoids panic.Such procedures should be partof the ship’s Safety ManagementManual (SMM) / System (SMS).

Ensure the manning level / teamcomposition in the engine(control) room is compliant withthe international (e.g. STCWconvention), national and localregulations when entering andleaving ports, manoeuvring or inhazardous situations.

Ensure that any loss of powerand/or propulsion incident isinvestigated and a root causedetermined, by properly trainedpersonnel.

Ensure the corrective actions ofa possible previous loss ofpropulsion / electrical powerhave been duly implemented inorder to prevent reoccurrence.

Ensure that weekly tests of theemergency generator are carriedout with the battery chargerdisconnected from the mains. Itis important to check the condition

of the batteries as there may beno local indicator that informsthe crew that the batteries aredischarged. Electrically drivenstarter motors take power from thebatteries, however if the batteriesremain connected to the batterycharger during test starts of theengine this may be masking thefact that the batteries are unableto hold a charge. Batteriesshould be checked as part of theweekly routine.

Ensure that all means of startingthe emergency generator aretested and that all crew membersare familiar with them. It isrecommended that the startinginstructions for all means ofstarting of the emergencygenerator are posted in theemergency generator room sothat these can be referred to bycrew members.

Ensure that the emergencygenerator is operated on load asclose to the maximum capacityas possible, for at least onehour, every month3.

Ensure the starting air pressureis monitored by the watchkeepingengineers when manoeuvring andensure that the deck departmentis aware of the limitations ofstarting air availability.

2 Due to the more frequent change-over of crew (many who spend no more than four months on board), it is essential to carry out drills with each cohort of crew so that all are familiar with the procedures.3 The UK Marine Safety Agency in the Marine Guidance Note (MGN) 52 recommends that this is done weekly.

Typical aircompressors on a vessel


Ships fitted with shaft generatorsshould, where appropriate, switchto auxiliary generator power wellbefore entering restricted watersand well before undertakingcritical manoeuvres.Manufacturer’s guidelines shouldbe followed and ship’s staffguided accordingly.

Engineers should change over tomanoeuvring mode and bestanding by in the Engine ControlRoom (ECR) prior to the vesselentering the port’s seawardapproaches. A nominated pointat which the machinery status isto be changed from sea mode tomanoeuvring mode or an end ofsea passage position should be

included in the passage plan.Over-current tests for the vessel’smain generator breakers have tobe carried out to the satisfactionof the classification societyduring periodic surveys.A regular thermographic surveyof the switchboard should becarried out to monitor for looseconnections or overheatingequipment.The alarm printer, where fitted,should be maintained correctly,such that the printout is legible,as this is often a valuable sourceof information regarding thecause of the blackout.

CORRECTIVE

Master to follow the company SMSprocedures for loss of propulsion,often described in a stand-alonedocument called the “EmergencyProcedures Manual”.Position of the vessel and time needto be recorded accurately in the decklog book and in the engine log book.Anchors may have to be dropped inorder to reduce the ship’s speed.When manoeuvring in confinedwaters the anchors should be‘cleared’ for immediate use.Good and efficient communicationbetween the engine room and thebridge. The bridge and engineroom should exchange criticalinformation so that key personnelhave a full understanding of thesituation and can make informeddecisions. Each department mustquickly inform the other departmentof what they require, what ishappening at their station, whatproblems they are experiencing,and what risks are present. Ifbridge and engine roompersonnel do not exchangecritical information during anemergency, there is a risk thatkey personnel will not be fully aware of the situation andmay make ineffective decisions.

Crew member(s) may have to be sent to the emergency generatorroom in case this generator didnot automatically start and inorder to try to start it.Crew member(s) may have to be sentto the steering room in order to usethe emergency steering but themaster and deck officers shouldbe aware that this is less effectivewith the engine stopped and thevessel’s forward movement throughthe water is reduced belowsteerage speed.In order to restore power to themain switchboard during a blackout,the power from the emergencyswitchboard can be fed back tothe main switchboard (refer to therelevant section below).In case of an overload of current,the reset button may have to beused to reset the electricalbreaker after it has been trippeddue to an overload of current.It will probably be necessary tobring the engine to STOP in orderto enable the restart. Controlshould be taken by the engineroom until the power has beenfully restored.

RECOMMENDATIONS


Digital and thermal images of a switchboard breaker fault


AREAS OF SPECIFIC FOCUS


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MSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1 paragraph6 (interpretation of SOLAS ChapterII-1 regulations 42 & 43) states thatemergency generator storedstarting energy is not to be directly

used for starting the propulsionplant, the main source of electricalpower and/or other essentialauxiliaries (emergency generatorexcluded).

General

An emergency generator is fitted in case none of the vessel’s normalgenerator capacity is available forthe supply of electrical power. Asper the rules and regulations itshould be able to run for 18 hourscontinuously.

The emergency generator will notsupply power to all the equipment.Power will only be supplied tomachinery and equipment that arenecessary and of criticalimportance.

Emergency transformerLocal firefighting main panelFire detection system controlcabinetNavigational light indicator panelE/R control consoleSmoke detection systemEmergency D/G room lightingUPS for C02 release alarm systemPublic address main unitBridge control console

Battery charger & distribution boardM/E control system power supplyunitBattery charger for rescue boatOne steering gear motorEmergency fire pumpEmergency fire pump room fanLocal fire fightingMain air compressorBreathing air compressorElevator

Examples of machinery fed through the emergency generator include4:Regulatory frameworkAccording to SOLAS Chapter II-1regulations 42 & 43 paragraph3.1.2, where the emergency sourceof electrical power is a generator,it shall be started automaticallyupon failure of the electrical supplyfrom the main source of electricalpower and shall be automaticallyconnected to the emergencyswitchboard. The automaticstarting system and thecharacteristic of the prime movershall be such as to permit theemergency generator to carry itsfull rated load as quickly as is safeand practicable, subject to amaximum of 45 seconds. Unless asecond independent means of

starting the emergency generatingset is provided, the single source ofstored energy shall be protected topreclude its complete depletion bythe automatic starting system.

SOLAS Chapter II-1 regulations 42 & 43 paragraph 3.4 requiresthat for ships constructed on orafter 1 July 1998, where electricalpower is necessary to restorepropulsion, the capacity [of theemergency source] shall besufficient to restore propulsion tothe ship in conjunction with othermachinery, as appropriate, from adead ship condition within 30minutes after blackout.

EMERGENCY GENERATOR

4 It may differ from vessel to vessel and the crew should be fully aware of what is supplied from theemergency generator on their own vessel.This document, and more, is available for download from Martin's Marine Engineering Page - www.dieselduck.net



16 17

Regulatory frameworkAccording to SOLAS Chapter II-1 Regulation 54paragraph 2, the main source of electricalpower shall comply with the following:

Where the electrical power can normallybe supplied by one generator, suitableload-shedding arrangements shallbe provided to ensure the integrity ofsupplies to services required forpropulsion and steering as well asthe safety of the ship. In the case ofloss of the generator in operation,adequate provision shall be made forautomatic starting and connecting tothe main switchboard of a stand-bygenerator of sufficient capacity topermit propulsion and steering andto ensure the safety of the ship withautomatic restarting of the essentialauxiliaries including, wherenecessary, sequential operations.If the electrical power is normallysupplied by more than one generatorrunning in parallel operation, provisionshall be made (for instance by loadshedding) to ensure that, in case of lossof one of these generating sets, theremaining sets are kept in operation,without overload, to permit uninterruptedoperation of propulsion and steering,and to ensure the safety of the ship.

According to SOLAS Chapter II-1 Regulation 41paragraph 5.1.2:

The load shedding or other equivalentarrangements shall be provided toprotect the generators required bythis regulation against sustained

Definitions

(MSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1 paragraph 4 > interpretation of SOLAS Chapter II-1Regulation 41 paragraph 5.1.2):

Primary essential services

are those services which needto be in continuous operationto maintain propulsion andsteering.

Secondary essential services

are those services which neednot necessarily be incontinuous operation tomaintain propulsion andsteering but which arenecessary for maintaining thevessel’s safety.

Services for habitability arethose services which need tobe in operation for maintainingthe ship’s minimum comfortconditions for the crew andpassengers.

LOAD SHEDDING OR OTHER EQUIVALENTARRANGEMENTS

overload.According to the interpretation inMSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1 paragraph 4.9:

Primary essential services shouldnot be included in any automaticload shedding or other equivalentarrangements;Secondary essential services maybe included in the automatic loadshedding or other equivalentarrangement provided disconnectionwill not prevent services requiredfor safety being immediately availablewhen the power supply is restoredto normal operating conditionsServices for habitability may beincluded in the load shedding orother equivalent arrangement.

According to the interpretations inMSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1 paragraph 5.4.3 andIACS UI SC157 paragraph 2.3:

The load shedding should beautomatic.The non-essential services,services for habitable conditionsmay be shed and where necessary,additionally the secondary essentialservices, sufficient to ensure theconnected generator set(s) is/arenot overloaded.

According to BV Rules Part C Chapter 2Section 3 paragraph 2.2.18 (f):

On ships having remote control ofthe ship’s propulsion machinery fromthe navigating bridge, means areprovided, or procedures are inplace, so as to ensure that suppliesto essential services aremaintained during manoeuvring

conditions in order to avoid ablackout situation.

Preferential tripping systemThe preferential trip is a part of theship’s generator protection system. It isthe electrical arrangement on shipswhich is designed to disconnect thenon-essential circuits (i.e. supplyingnon-essential load) from the mainbus bar in case of partial failure oroverload of the main supply.The non-essential circuits or loadson ships are air conditioning, exhaustand ventilation fans, and galleyequipment which can be disconnectedmomentarily and can be connectedagain after fault finding. The mainadvantage of preferential trip is that ithelps in preventing the operation ofmain circuit breaker trip and loss ofpower on essential services and thusprevents blackout and overloading ofgenerator.The preferential trip operates at timedintervals and the load is removedaccordingly. If the overload still persists,then an audible and visual alarm issounded. The preferential trip is animportant electrical circuit which helpsremove excessive load from the mainbus bar, thus preventing a blackout.The crew should be familiar with theequipment which is shed on theoperation of the preferential trip. Thisis often a multi stage process with firstand second stage tripping arrangedto shed load. The items are usuallyindicated on the switchboard to show




18 19

In order to restore power to the mainswitchboard after a blackout, the powerfrom the emergency switchboard canbe fed back to the main switchboard.

According to the IMO circularMSC.1/ Circ.1464/Rev.1 paragraph3.1.2 (interpretation of SOLASChapter II-1 regulation 26paragraph 4), where theemergency source of power is anemergency generator whichcomplies with regulation II-1/44,IACS SC185 and IACS SC124, thisgenerator may be used for restoringoperation of the main propulsion plant,boilers and auxiliaries where anypower supplies necessary for engineoperation are also protected to a similarlevel as the starting arrangements.

This can be accomplished byshedding all nonessential load fromthe main switchboard i.e. fans,galley non-essentials etc. and

closing the feedback breakerthereby allowing the emergencygenerator to power the mainswitchboard.

When ready to restore power to themain switchboard from the maingenerators, it will be necessary toopen the tie-in breaker in the controlroom. This will isolate the emergencygenerator from the main switchboard.It is now possible to close the maingenerator breaker, which will in turnopen the emergency generatorbreaker. To restore power to theemergency switchboard, crank thetie-in breaker and close. Thefeedback breaker (emergencygenerator room) will open and maybe closed by pressing the pushbutton on the main switchboard.

Before back-feeding power from theemergency switchboard, breakersfor non-essential equipment must

FEEDING BACK POWER FROM THE EMERGENCYSWITCHBOARD TO THE MAIN SWITCHBOARD

RECOVERY AFTER A BLACKOUT

During blackout and failure to startthe emergency generator the standby generators may be able to bemanually started possibly afterreset of trips. It is not unknown forship staff to concentrate too muchon starting the emergencygenerator but failing to recognisethat the auxiliary generators maybe available for start.

Before starting the generatorset, start the pre-lubricationpriming pump if the supply forthe same is given from theemergency generator; if not, thenuse the manual priming handle(provided on some auxiliaryengines).

Start the generator and take it on

load. Then immediately start themain engine lube oil pump and mainengine jacket water pump as per theprocedure put forward in the SMSfor such recovery after blackout.

Reset breakers and start all theother required machinery andsystem. Then reset breakers thatare included in preferential trippingsequence (non-essentialmachinery). Again these start upprocedures should be part of theSMS.

Once power has been restored on vessels with an “auto restartsequence” for electricalequipment, personnel should bedelegated to ensure that allessential equipment has started

Typicalswitchboardon amodernvessel

Topplatform of a largeslow speedmarineengine




20 21

The “International Managementcode for the Safe operation ofships and for pollutionprevention” (ISM code) at section9.1 requires that the SMS shouldinclude procedures ensuring thatnon-conformities, accidents andhazardous situations arereported to the company, areinvestigated and analysed withthe objective of improving safetyand pollution prevention.

We have mentioned under thesection on preventive actionsabove the importance of a rootcause analysis and theimplementation of the findings ofany investigation. This is arequirement of the ISM code.

Section 10 of this code, asamended, covers requirementsfor maintenance of the ship withthe below excerpts given tohighlight what the company andvessel staff should put in placefor main engine and electricalequipment maintenance andsafe operation :

10.1 The company should establishprocedures to ensure that theship is maintained in conformitywith the provisions of therelevant rules and regulationsand with any additionalrequirements which may beestablished by the company.

10.2 In meeting theserequirements the companyshould ensure that:1 inspections are held at

appropriate intervals;2 any non-conformity is

reported, with its possiblecause, if known;

3 appropriate corrective action is taken

Procedures should be developedto ensure that maintenance,surveys, repairs and dry-dockingare carried out in a planned andstructured manner with safety asa priority.

Maintenance procedures shouldinclude (amongst others) :- steering gear;- main engine and auxiliary

machinery;- emergency lighting

The company should arrange forinspections of its vessels to becarried out at regular intervals.These inspections should be

ISM CODE

executed in compliance with theappropriate procedures bycompetent and qualifiedpersonnel.

There should be procedures forreporting non-conformities anddeficiencies that should include atime scale for completion ofcorrective action. 10.3 The company should identify

equipment and technicalsystems the sudden operationalfailure of which may result inhazardous situations (i.e.critical equipment). The SMS should provide forspecific measures aimed atpromoting the reliability ofsuch equipment or systems.These measures shouldinclude the regular testing ofstand-by arrangements andequipment or technicalsystems that are not incontinuous use.

10.4 The inspections mentioned in 10.2 as well as themeasures referred to in 10.3should be integrated into the ship’s operationalmaintenance routine.

Once the critical systems have beenidentified, procedures should bedeveloped to ensure reliability of

these systems or the provision ofalternative arrangements in theevent of sudden failure. Theprocedures implemented shouldinclude the regular testing ofstand-by systems in order toensure that one failure does notresult in the total loss of thatcritical function. Maintenanceroutines should include theregular and systematic testing ofall such critical and stand-bysystems.

Critical equipment listings mayinclude (amongst others) :- generators including

emergency generator;- steering gear;- fuel systems;- lubricating oil systems;- emergency stops and remote

closing devices;- communications systems;- main engine propulsion systems.

IACS have produced a nine pageguidance document entitled “IACSRecommendation 74 “A GUIDETO MANAGING MAINTENANCEIN ACCORDANCE WITH THEREQUIREMENTS OF THE ISMCODE”” and we wouldrecommend that this documentis made available onboard inaddition to this Guideline.


SUMMARY CASE STUDIES

REDUCING THE RISK OF PROPULSION LOSS REDUCING THE RISK OF PROPULSION LOSS

22 23

Whether a blackout or loss ofpropulsion incident gives rise to $5 or $50 million claim dependsmainly on vessel location at thetime of the incident. However, aswe have said above, by investigatingall incidents properly and takingpreventive and corrective actions, it

is much more likely that when anincident does occur theconsequences will be muchreduced. We must all rememberthat if an incident has occurred inbenign conditions, it can and willhappen again when the conditionsare not so benign.

A.A converted ferry carrying out a harbour pleasure cruise with 400 revellers on a New Year’sparty, lost propulsion when thedrive coupling between thegearbox and the propeller shaftsheared causing a collision with a multi-million dollarmotor cruiser.

The converted ferry had beentaken out of service after manyyears. It was of an older designwith propellers at each end (i.e. a double ended ferry) and thecrew should have been able totransfer control to the otherend. It appears that no oneknew how to transfer control orthe crew lost situationalawareness due to a lack oftraining and practice.

The vessel was eventuallyassisted by some marine safetytugs that were setting upfireworks for New Yearcelebrations.

This is considered to be acollision caused by a lack ofproperly documented andprepared procedures. In additionthe value of proper induction /familiarisation of on-signingofficers and crew is also wellillustrated by this incident.

B.The vessel was using shaftgenerator in restricted waters.The engine room was on stand-by, as the vessel navigatedbetween buoys in a dredgedchannel proceeding up river.Approaching a much largervessel coming down river, thevessel moved towards the edgeof the channel. The interactionwith the bank resulted in themain engine slowing down. The decrease in main enginespeed was sufficient to causethe shaft generator breaker toopen, and a blackout occurred.The interaction with the bankpushed the bow of the vesselback across the channel at 90 degrees to the originalcourse. The larger vesselcoming down stream collidedwith the subject vesselamidships. The subject vesselsank closing the channel forseveral days until such time asthe vessel was refloated.

If the correct procedures hadbeen followed, i.e. twoalternators in operation duringstandby while in restrictedwaters, the casualty would havebeen avoided.

C.A vessel which used only marinediesel oil as fuel on boardbunkered at a port in NorthernEurope. At this port the vesselalso loaded a full cargo of grain.Shortly after departure the mainengine stopped due to blockageof the filters and failure of thefuel pumps (the alternators alsofailed). Investigation revealedsignificant quantities of water inthe fuel oil settling and servicetanks and heavy bacterialcontamination.

The vessel had to be towed toport where the fuel pumps werereplaced, the tanks, includingdouble bottom storage tanks,cleaned and treated with abiocide to remove thecontamination. This tookapproximately 10 days.

A root cause analysis identifiedthe failure of ship’s staff tooperate the purifier whentransferring fuel from thesettling to the service tank andthe failure to drain water on aregular basis from the serviceand settling tanks as thedominant causative factors.

From our perspective it is considered that all propulsion loss incidentsshould be treated with the same level of urgency of investigation androot cause analysis; regardless of the overall severity of the situationexperienced. We note that a large proportion of propulsion lossinvestigations identify that the blackout or main engine failure has ahistory of previous occurrence; and that proper detailed root causeanalysis and near miss investigation could have prevented thesubsequent casualty.



Operational guidance for preventingblackouts and main engine failures

Move Forward with Confidence

Le Triangle de l’arche - 8 cours du TriangleCS50101 - 92937 La Défense Cedex

Corporate website : www.bureauveritas.com/marine-and-offshoreMarine client portal : www.veristar.com

BC

050

DC

M R

00 -

Sep

tem

ber

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