Reclaiming the Urban Jungle: Empowering Local Communities to Foster Security

Tyler Bembenek

P I P SThe Project on International Peace and SecurityInstitute for the Theory and Practice of International RelationsThe College of William and Mary

Brief No. 6.1

Reclaiming the Urban JungleEmpowering Local Communities to Foster Security

The Project on International Peace and Security

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Reclaiming the Urban Jungle Empowering Local Communities to Foster Security APRIL 2014

Tyler Bembenek

The Project on International Peace and SecurityInstitute for the Theory and Practice of International RelationsThe College of William and Mary

P I P S

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Reclaiming the Urban Jungle Empowering Local Communities to Foster Security

With few resources to provide services and security, many governments struggle to maintain control over rapidly growing urban districts and subsequently abandon impoverished areas as “no-go zones.” Lacking government presence, these districts are hotbeds of radicalism, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking, threatening U.S. national security. Washington should combat no-go zones by building community resilience, providing the necessary guidance, technical assistance, and financial support to empower grassroots security initiatives. This assistance should be based on a co-design approach, in which the United States works closely with local governments and communities to design and implement policy solutions. Although programs should be adopted on a case-by-case basis, community policing, community courts, and title reform are widely applicable.

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Introduction

U.S. attempts to foster urban security in allied states have focused mainly on building partner capacity through a combination of military assistance and development aid. Although effective at strengthening civil and military institutions, these efforts have largely failed to address the underlying social and economic issues leading to criminality and radicalism. As cities become more globally connected, the United States will be increasingly exposed to the negative externalities of this failure. Consequently, the radicalism, terrorism, and drug trafficking that proliferate in ungoverned urban areas across the world will have a greater impact on the United States. Ungoverned urban areas will become more common due to the emergence of megacities, urban areas with at least 10 million inhabitants. The vast scale of megacity slums, termed “megaslums,” makes them more difficult to police, especially for relatively poor developing countries where the majority of urban growth is occurring. Additionally, conditions within the megaslums are more severe and are thus more likely to lead to criminality and violence. While urban insecurity is not unique to megacities, the increasing prominence of these cities means that United States must be able to address even the most difficult scenarios. Instead of traditional top-down or bottom-up approaches, the United States should instead employ a co-design approach to build community resilience, working closely with local partners to identify and address the fundamental roots of urban insecurity. The role of the United States would be to provide guidance, technical assistance, and funding to enable the most promising local security initiatives. This approach is currently being employed by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), a multilateral counterterrorism body. The United States must increase the number of similar co-design initiatives to address urban insecurity more broadly. Within megaslums, the United States should especially support community policing and

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community court programs, policies that devolve government services to the community level. The United States also should encourage urban title reform to enable economic growth. ! The Rise of Megaslums and their Transition into No-Go Zones !

Imagine a great metropolis covering hundreds of square miles… [T]his sprawling urban environment is now a vast collection of blighted buildings… a territory where the rule of law has long been replaced by near anarchy in which the only security available is that which is attained through brute power.

- Richard Norton, 20031 Rapid population growth is outpacing many governments’ ability to provide services and security in urban communities, leading to the emergence of ungoverned areas. Violent sub-state actors fill this security vacuum, dominating the local population in so-called “no-go zones.” Rapid Urbanization and the Emergence of Megaslums Rapid urban growth and government neglect of informal settlements is leading to chronic insecurity within many cities. These trends are exacerbated within megacities.

• Rapid urbanization. The developing world is urbanizing at an unprecedented rate. Since 1950, there has been a 15-fold increase in the number of cities with at least 1 million inhabitants, currently estimated at over 600.2 Much of this urban growth, especially in the developing world, is in the form of informal settlements, termed slums, shantytowns, or squatter communities. There are currently over a billion people living in these squatter neighborhoods, a number which is projected to double by 2030.3 With limited funding, especially in the wake of the economic recession, governments are struggling to maintain current infrastructure, let alone expand capacity to accommodate the growing population.4 As a result, schools, hospitals, roads, and other public amenities are not being adequately constructed and maintained, leaving slums underdeveloped and destitute.5 Disparities between wealthy and impoverished areas in close proximity have led to highly visible political, economic, and social inequality.6

• Ungoverned areas. Slums are often left ungoverned, leading to a state of chronic

insecurity in which criminality and violence proliferates. Governments can neglect slums on the pretext that they were illegally constructed, refusing to provide basic services including police and security forces.7 While such marginalization hurts the interests of the government in the long term, it is politically expedient: the government hoards resources for powerful interest groups on whose support it relies to maintain power.8 Consequently, state largesse benefits favored districts. Meanwhile, with few resources remaining, squatter settlements are denied services, including the necessary security forces to maintain law and order.9 This security vacuum allows violent sub-state actors,

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such as gangs, paramilitaries, or vigilante groups, to dominate the area, forcing their will upon the population.10

• Megacities, megaslums. Perhaps more alarming than the breadth of urbanization is the emergence of massive megacities, urban areas with at least 10 million inhabitants. 11 Fed by high birth rates and vast numbers of rural migrants, countries across Asia, Africa, and North and South America have seen their cities grow exponentially: the populations of Dhaka, Kinshasa, and Lagos have increased by 40 times since 1950.12 Karachi, Pakistan is an extreme example of such rapid growth, its population having expanded by 80 percent between 2000 and 2010.13 The UN estimates there will be 37 megacities by 2025.14 By 2050, the number of megacities may increase by an additional 63 cities.15 Ninety-six percent of this expansion will occur in relatively poor countries, many of which will not have the resources to provide security in areas of new urban growth.16

Figure 1: Projected Megacities 2025

The vast size of megacities means that their slums are much harder to govern and secure. Even if municipal governments can provide services and security for the same percentage of the population as smaller cities, the marginal areas of megacities will still be larger in absolute size. The resulting megaslums can be massive, housing hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of residents, all of whom are deprived of basic services and security. The conditions in megaslums are particularly severe, making them even more dangerous. With less access to basic resources, such as food and water, competition for these goods is fierce, often leading residents to acts of criminality and violence.17 This increased insecurity is evident in Latin America where cities with over a million residents have a 70 percent higher rate of violence than cities with 50 to 100 thousand inhabitants.18

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Neglected by the central government, rapidly growing squatter communities are left marginalized, destitute, and chronically insecure. Because of their huge scale, this process is even more severe in megacities. The Creation of No-Go Zones With little or no government presence, megaslums are left in anarchy. Residents are often willing to accept the rule of violent sub-state actors because it provides some semblance of order and security.19 These non-state groups strengthen their control over the population by offering incentives, such as the provision of basic services, to garner goodwill.20 Once the majority of residents submit to sub-state rule, a district becomes a “no-go zone,” an area over which the government has effectively lost control. If the government attempts to reimpose its authority over an urban no-go zone, it is often fiercely opposed by the local residents, many of whom feel greater loyalty to sub-state actors. Government attempts to take back slums in cities such as Rio de Janeiro, Kingston, and Mogadishu highlight the difficulty of these operations. For example, when Jamaican police and military forces entered the Trivoli Gardens neighborhood of Kingston in May 2013 to capture Christopher Coke, a drug kingpin, the local inhabitants resisted them, sometimes violently.21 Many residents supported Coke’s Shower Posse gang by erecting barricades, slowing down the government forces. The operation required hundreds of officers and more than three days of fighting to pacify the neighborhood.22 Such operations will be even more difficult in the megaslums of the developing world due to their increased geographic area and large number of inhabitants. The inability of governments to cope with rapidly growing urban populations enables violent sub-state actors to take control of marginal districts, entrenching themselves in no-go zones. These groups are often hostile to the United States, posing a significant threat to U.S. national security. The Consequences of No-Go Zones for U.S. National Security !

Terrorist groups seek to evade security forces by exploiting ungoverned and undergoverned areas as safe havens to recruit, indoctrinate, and train fighters, as well as plan attacks on U.S. and allied interests.

- Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010 23 !

No-go zones breed radicalism, enable terrorism, and serve as hubs for drug trafficking. As no-go zones spread, potentially into Western megacities such as Paris or London, these threats will become increasingly prominent.

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No-Go Zones Breed Radicalism Although the exact processes of radicalization often remain unknown, the wide-scale poverty and highly visible inequality of ungoverned urban areas create the conditions necessary for the emergence of extremist ideologies.24 For example, where school systems are unable to handle the volume of students, urban residents turn to alternative education systems. In Pakistani cities such as Lahore and Karachi, many students attend radical madrassas, religious schools that espouse jihadist ideology.25 Governments frequently respond to the emergence of no-go zones through pacification, the use of disproportionate force in an attempt to drive out or destroy subversive organizations. Such blunt measures are often counterproductive as local residents may perceive these operations as government repression. Consequently, pacification measures often alienate the local population, further spreading radical ideology among the residents.26 These radicalized individuals are more likely participate in or support attacks against the United States and its allies. For example, Al Shabaab, a Somali jihadist group and avowed U.S. enemy, actively recruits amongst the marginalized slum population in Nairobi, Kenya.27 No-Go Zones Enable Terrorism Terrorists use urban no-go zones as staging grounds, infiltration routes, and safe havens, allowing militants to strike urban targets with relative impunity.

• Staging grounds. No-go zones serve as staging grounds for militant networks to plan and launch attacks. Because of their close proximately to urban no-go zones, high value targets, such as U.S. embassies, are increasingly vulnerable to attack.28 During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Shia militants used Sadr City, a no-go zone in the heart of Baghdad, as a base of operations from which they could assault government offices, U.S. military personnel, and the Sunni population throughout the city.29

• Infiltration routes. Militants use no-go zones to infiltrate urban areas undetected. For

example, by moving through slums, the assailants in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks were able to penetrate all the way into the city center before being detected by security personnel. Consequently, the militants managed to strike several prominent targets frequented by western tourists, killing over 150 individuals, including six Americans.30

• Safe havens.31 The lack of government presence in no-go zones makes them ideal

locations to harbor U.S. enemies, allowing terrorists to escape U.S. or allied forces and rebuild their strength. A number of senior Al Qaeda leaders, including Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the architect of the World Trade Center attacks, have sought refuge in Pakistani megacities.32 This challenge is further complicated by the presence of large numbers of civilians, which makes identifying enemies especially difficult. Furthermore, U.S. or allied strikes against militant targets are more likely to cause collateral damage, undermining counterterrorism efforts.33

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No-go zones serve as staging grounds, infiltration routes, and safe havens for terrorists, facilitating attacks against the United States and its allies. No-Go Zones are Hubs for Drug Trafficking Ungoverned urban areas serve as transit hubs for drug trafficking, a particular concern in Latin America and the Caribbean where the majority of trafficked drugs are destined for the United States.34 As DEA policies have clamped down on overland routes into the United States, traffickers are increasingly transporting drugs by air and especially sea.35 Since air and seaports tend to be located in urban areas, they are often in close proximity to no-go zones, making ungoverned slums ideal storage grounds. For example, drug cartels in Panama have effectively gained access to port infrastructure through coercion and bribery, allowing them to store narcotics in nearby slums before shipping them out in cargo containers.36 Ports across Latin America are similarly compromised, facilitating the flow of narcotics into the United States.37 By generating radicalism, enabling terrorism, and serving as hubs for drug trafficking, urban no-go zones pose a serious threat to the United States and its allies. The United States will need to address these challenges to protect its security interests. Building Community Resilience through Co-Design

Resilient communities, effective communities, sustainable communities… [Our goal is to] put local communities who are most at risk in the driver’s seat and give them the tools that they need to do something about it. - Secretary of State John Kerry38

The United States should combat urban no-go zones by building community resilience, empowering local residents to withstand violent sub-state actors. This objective would be best achieved through a policy of co-deign, working in tandem with residents to identify and address the roots of urban insecurity. Resilient Communities Counteract No-Go Zones In the depths of megaslums, local communities must endure conditions of extreme scarcity. If residents fail to manage this environment, they will be subject to deprivation and anarchy, leaving them vulnerable to violent actors, natural disasters, and other external forces. However, if communities can adapt to the situation at hand and achieve some measure of order and prosperity, they will be able to withstand greater adversity. In particular, economic opportunity and physical security decrease the impetus for residents to join radical or criminal groups, thus preventing the spread of no-go zones.39 Similarly, if squatter communities can generate wealth, there is a greater incentive for governments to include them in the political process. This

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demarginalization of slums reduces the political motivation for residents to join terrorist or other extremist groups. To achieve this end, the United States has traditionally provided development assistance to stabilize ungoverned areas. However, the sheer rate of growth prevents megaslums from ever achieving true stability through temporary assistance programs.40 A more sustainable approach is to strengthen the community’s resilience. The 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review defines resilience as “individual, community, and system robustness, adaptability, and capacity for rapid recovery.”41 Resilient communities have the solidarity, resourcefulness, and flexibility to endure conditions that would otherwise overwhelm them. In effect, building community resilience entails training and advising the residents to make the best of their situation. Outside actors assist the community, helping it to reduce its own insecurity and generate economic growth. The Global Counterterrorism Forum: A Precedent for Building Community Resilience In September 2011, the Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism created the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), an innovative program designed to build community resilience against radicalism and extremism.42 Although still young, GCTF has made promising strides in identifying essential civilian counterterrorism needs, developing solutions, and coordinating international action. GCTF supports promising local security initiatives with the expertise and funding they require. This assistance is enabled by the Global Fund for Community Engagement and Resilience, a public-private international fund, which is expected to raise over $200 million by 2023.43 While GCTF focuses exclusively on counterterrorism, leaving many areas of urban insecurity unaddressed, it nonetheless provides an encouraging precedent for future community resilience programs. Co-Design Builds Community Resilience Most Effectively The method by which assistance is planned and implemented is vital to its effectiveness. Traditional methods of development assistance are either top-down or, more rarely, bottom-up approaches. In a top-down model, outside actors, such as the United States, design a policy solution and apply it to the target community with little input from locals. As a result, these programs often fail to identify the root causes of urban insecurity.44 Furthermore, such policies can create blowback by unintentionally offending local custom or undermining beneficial local practices.45 The bottom-up model, in which residents are given funding without outside direction or guidance, is similarly flawed. While local residents may be able to identify the roots of insecurity, they often do not possess the expertise necessary to achieve their objectives. This deficiency is evident in the very nature of urban insecurity: if residents had the means to fix their problems, they would have already done so.46 Co-design combines the strengths of both the top-down and bottom-up models. It is a process in which local and outsider actors collaborate on all stages of policy design and application. Local residents and outsider experts work together as partners to devise and implement policy

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solutions.47 The strength of co-design is that it combines indigenous insight and initiative with outside expertise and funding. When applied to building community resilience, this synergy enables co-design policies to target the roots of urban insecurity while minimizing blowback, making co-design more effective than traditional approaches.

• Flexible. Co-design policies have the flexibility to target the root causes of urban insecurity. Because each affected community is unique, no single policy can successfully address urban insecurity in all cases. Programs that are effective in one area may be totally ineffective in another, making top-down policies difficult to implement across cases. The co-design model overcomes this challenge by working with local inhabitants to identify the main factors affecting each particular community. This local perspective enables co-design programs to devise policies specifically tailored to the situation on the ground, quickly and precisely targeting the root causes of insecurity.48

• Minimal blowback. Because co-design programs are planned and run by locals, they are

sensitive to indigenous customs and culture, minimizing the potential for blowback. Additionally, as co-design programs are dependent on local insight, they can respond rapidly to any changes in the situation on the ground. If a policy has an unintended side effect, such as alienating or offending the local community, it can be quickly adapted, reducing any negative ramifications.

Co-design is more effective than traditional top-down or bottom-up models due to its greater flexibility and minimization of blowback. Consequently, it is the best method for building community resilience in urban slums. The United States should combat urban no-go zones by building community resilience, empowering local residents to resist violent sub-state actors. This objective would be best achieved through a policy of co-deign, working in tandem with residents to identify and address the roots of urban insecurity.

Creating Community Resilience in Megaslums The vast scope and extreme resource scarcity of megaslums makes them a particularly challenging environment to create effective governance. Because megaslums are so large, many squatter communities are, in effect, completely isolated from the central government. Thus, to establish security and the rule of law, police and judicial services should be devolved to the community level through community policing and community court programs. Similarly, because megaslums are so resource scarce, special effort needs to be made to increase their economic efficiency. To that end, title reform is particularly useful as it legalizes much of the slum’s business activity, allowing for an expansion of microcredit and economic growth.

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Devolution of Government Services Because of the sheer size of megacities, governments are even less able to provide services to squatter communities, especially those in the heart of megaslums. Consequently, resilient communities will have to be even more self-reliant. In particular, they will need to provide their own security and judicial services through community policing and community courts.

• Community policing. The United States should promote community policing programs, creating local police forces that are responsible to both their communities and the central government. Recruited exclusively from local residents, these forces would be trained and equipped by the United States. Their mission would be purely defensive in nature, to police their neighborhoods and protect their communities. In keeping with the co-design approach, these forces would be commanded by respected locals, but would also be answerable to the central government. To provide guidance and oversight, advisors from both the central government and the United States should be embedded in these units. Existing community policing programs, such as Rio de Janeiro’s Police Pacification Units (UPP) and Afghan local defense forces, have proven effective at significantly reducing levels of violence.49 Since implementing the UPP program in 2005, Rio has seen the number of homicides per 100,000 residents drop from 42 to 26.50 While both the UPP and Afghan defense forces have their flaws, including alleged corruption and the use of excessive force, these failures can be overcome through co-design. 51 In particular, the foreign advisors embedded in each community policing unit will ensure proper behavior. If community police abuse their position, the United States can leverage its role as their primary financial backer to force a change of conduct.

• Community courts. The United States should promote community courts as vital

infrastructure to preserve security and economic growth. The role of these courts would be to mete out legal justice in accordance to the accepted practices of the local community and the laws of the central government. Community courts would be run by respected local residents, officials trained and advised by both the central government and the United States. This judicial infrastructure is necessary to increase economic security for slum residents. Without a functioning legal system, there is no guarantee that contracts will be enforced and thus risky economic transactions, such as loans, are less likely to be undertaken. This unpredictability stifles economic growth. For this reason, the Taliban have increasing focused on commercial and economic law to broaden their popular appeal. While the Taliban’s system of justice is not one to be imitated, their example demonstrates that there is significant demand for legal services in ungoverned areas.52 Consequently, community courts should place particular emphasis on commercial law.

Megaslum residents need to provide their own police and judicial services to preserve their physical and economic security. To that end, the United States should work with local governments and slum residents to implement community policing and community court programs.

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Title Reform for Economic Growth The illegal status of squatter communities is a major obstacle to economic development within megaslums. With no legal right to inhabit the land they occupy, residents have no means to protect their dwellings and possessions outside of physical force.53 For example, in the summer of 2013 slum residents in Manila, Philippines clashed with police forces to protect their communities from being demolished.54 Similar protests have broken out against redevelopment and “slum-upgrading” schemes in cities across the world. Furthermore, business activity within slums is also labeled as illegal, driving much of the economy underground. This illegality prevents residents from converting their assets into capital, greatly restricting economic growth.55 Slum inhabitants also lose a portion of their income to black market taxes, the costs that they would not have to pay if their trade was legal. The combination of these challenges keeps marginal communities locked in poverty. Although challenging to implement due to legal complexities, the United States should work with central governments and local residents to implement title reform policies.56 Title reform would alleviate many of the obstacles to economic growth. Slum residents would no longer have to fear for the safety of their dwellings and possessions. Similarly, much of the slum’s business activity would be legalized. When combined with other liberalizing policies, such as credit reform, title reform could significantly increase access to micro-credit and financial services, creating the means for economic growth.57 To build community resilience within megaslums, security and judicial services must be devolved to the community level through community policing and community court programs. In addition, title reform is required to legitimize local business activity and facilitate economic growth. These efforts would significantly reduce megaslums’ chronic insecurity, thus undermining urban no-go zones. ! Conclusion If current trends continue unabated, the next generation of Americans will be faced with a substantially more hostile world. A proliferation of globally connected urban no-go zones will enable radicals, terrorists, and drug traffickers to operate with impunity, threatening the United States and the international system. Meanwhile, these violent sub-state actors will undermine the stability of their home countries, cementing a vicious cycle of poverty, marginalization, and conflict. As U.S. allies are crippled by internal instability, Washington will find itself increasingly isolated and forced to take unilateral action. To safeguard American national security, the U.S. military will intervene against terrorist groups operating from foreign megacities. Consequently, American military units will be forced to operate in one of the most challenging combat environments, bogged down in the urban jungle. The United States must take immediate action to prevent this fate. Building community resilience through co-design offers Washington the most effective method of combating urban no-go zones. U.S. officials should work to identify those cities posing the greatest threat and

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begin implementing community resilience policies in collaboration with local partners. Furthermore, more research is necessary to identify the most effective policies for reducing urban insecurity.58 Community policing, community courts, and title reform are essential steps for securing megaslums, but additional analysis may yield further insights. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 Richard J. Norton, “Feral Cities,” Naval War College Review LVI (2003): 97. 2 Robert Muggah, “Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence,” (IDRC, May 2012), 40. 3 UN-HABITAT, “Slum Dwellers to double by 2030: Millennium Development Goal Could Fall Short,” United Nations, April 16-20, 2007, http://www.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/4631_46759_gc%2021%20slum%20dwellers%20to%20double.pdf. 4 Developing countries faced an estimated budget shortfall of between $270 and $700 billion in 2009 alone. See: David M. Theis, “Crisis Reveals Growing Finance Gaps for Developing Countries,” The World Bank, March 8, 2009, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22093316~menuPK:34463~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html. 5 Karachi, Pakistan is an illustrative example of this infrastructure shortfall. Despite its huge population growth, the city has failed to adequately increase its emergency response facilities: Karachi has 22 fire stations, about 1 per million residents. See: Taha Anis, “Playing with fire: Karachi needs 206 fire stations, it only has 22,” The Express Tribune, December 21st, 2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/648393/playing-with-fire-karachi-needs-206-fire-stations-it-only-has-22/; “Nigeria: Lagos, the mega-city of slums,” IRIN, September 5, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/report/60811/nigeria-lagos-the-mega-city-of-slums. 6 UN-HABITAT, “The Challenge of Slums—Global Report on Human Settlements 2003,” (Earthscan Publications, Ltd., 2003). 7 Victoria Baena, “Favelas in the Spotlight: Transforming the Slums of Rio de Janeiro,” Harvard International Review (2011): 34-7. 8 Brian L. Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World,” in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1992). 9 Robert Muggah and Albert Souza Mulli, “Rio Tries Counterinsurgency,” Current History (February 2012): 62-6. 10 James Brooke, “Gun Runners From Miami Give Brazilian Drug Gangs Lead in Arms Race,” New York Times, February 23, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/23/world/gun-runners-from-miami-give-brazilian-drug-gangs-lead-in-arms-race.html; Krista Mahr, “Karachi Vice: Pakistan’s Megacity is a Sweltering Gangland, Time, October 7, 2013, http://world.time.com/2013/10/07/karachi-heat-pakistans-megacity-is-a-sweltering-gangland/; Kevin Savage and Robert Muggah, “Urban Violence and Humanitarian Action: Engaging the Fragile City,” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, January 19, 2012; Colin Clarke, “Politics, Violence, and Drugs in Kingston, Jamaica,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 25 (2006): 420-440; Peter Engelke and Magnus Nordenman, “Megaslums and Urban Insecurity,” International Relations and Security Network, January 22, 2014, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=175893. 11 Robert Muggah, “The Rise of the Megacity,” International Relations and Security Network, October 24, 2013, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=171570. 12 Muggah, “Researching the Urban Dilemma,” 40. 13 Joel Kotkin and Wendell Cox, “The World’s Fastest Growing Megacities,” New Geography, April 9, 2013, http://www.newgeography.com/content/003630-the-worlds-fastest-growing-megacities. 14 United Nations “World Urbanization Prospectus: The 2011 Revision,” 2012, 6-7. 15 World Energy Council, “Global Transport Scenarios 2050,” 2011, 7. 16 Edith M. Lederer, “Twice As Many People Will Live In Cities By 2050: UN,” The Huffington Post, December 9, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/10/un-predicts-near-doubling_n_4415290.html. 17 Liotta and Miskel, The Real Population Bomb, 144-5. 18 Muggah, “Researching the Urban Dilemma,” 43. 19 Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (London: Cornell University Press, 2006): 264-6. 20 David Shunk, “Mega Cities, Ungoverned Areas, and the Challenge of Army Urban Combat Operations in 2030-2040,” Small Wars Journal (January 23, 2014). 21 Howard Campbell, “Jamaican dons like Christopher 'Dudus' Coke are considered role models: Extradition order for area enforcer triggered confrontation between armed thugs and security forces in west Kingston,” The Guardian,

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !May 25th, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/25/jamaican-don-christopher-dudus-coke?guni=Article:in%20body%20link. 22 CNN Wire Staff, “Dozens dead, more than 500 in custody after violence in Jamaica,” CNN, May 26th, 2010, “http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/05/26/jamaica/index.html?hpt=T2. 23 U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” February 2010, 27. 24 Maurizio D. Calabrese, “Emerging Threats and the War on Terrorism: The Formation of Radical Islamist Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005); Mustafa Kayaoglu, “Does Inequality Trigger Terrorism,” in Understanding Terrorism: Analysis of Sociological and Psychological Aspects, ed. Suleyman Ozeren et al. (Netherlands: IOS Press, 2007). 25 Liotta and Miskel, The Real Population Bomb, 83; Muhammad Khurshid Khan, “Projected Security Environments of Pakistan in Post-Afghanistan War Scenario,” IPRI XI (Summer 2011): 105. 26 Donna Bowater, “Gang gunfights loom over Rio de Janeiro's World Cup preparations,” The Telegraph, December 29, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/brazil/10541252/Gang-gunfights-loom-over-Rio-de-Janeiros-World-Cup-preparations.html. 27 “Al-Shabab recruiting Kenyan youths to fight,” Al Jazeera, November 15, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/2011111514535374673.html. 28 Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, “The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations,” RAND Corporation (1994): 18. 29 Dan Murphy, “Sadr army owns city's streets,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 4th, 2004. http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0804/p01s01-woiq.html 30 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (USA: Oxford University Press, 2013), 54-7. 31 Phil Williams, “From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of the State and U.S. Strategy,” Strategic Studies Institute (2008): 8. 32 Magnus Ranstorp, “The London Bombings and the Broader Strategic Context,” Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos (2005): 2. 33 U.S. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” February 2010, 20; Taw and Hoffman, “The Urbanization of Insurgency,” 20. 34 Claire Ribando Seelke et al., “Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs,” Congressional Research Service (2011): 1. 35 Charles Parkinson, “Police Report Shows Evolution of Drug Trafficking,” InSight Crime, October 10, 2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/regional-police-study-tackles-changing-face-of-drug-trade. 36 Rodolfo Palomino López et al, “Situational Analysis of Drug Trafficking: A Police Point of View,” Ameripol, 2013. 37 López et al, “Situational Analysis of Drug Trafficking.” 38 John Kerry, “Remarks at the Global Counterterrorism Ministerial,” (speech, New York City, NY, September 27, 2013) U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/214877.htm. 39 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” Strategic Studies Institute (November 2004): 4. 40 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (USA: Oxford University Press, 2013), 241-2. 41 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland,” February 2010, 15. 42 “Ministers Gathered in New York Support International Cooperation on Counterterrorism Capacity-Building, Upholding the Rule of Law in the Criminal Justice Sector, and Continuing to Counter Violent Extremism,” GCTF, accessed April 2, 2014, http://www.thegctf.org/web/guest;jsessionid=12285F75BFFD72EA81A810647EEFD53F.w142. 43 Office of the Spokesperson, “New York Co-Chairs' Fact Sheet: Creating a Global Fund for Community Engagement and Resilience” (speech, Washington, DC, September 27th, 2013) U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214853.htm. 44 Muggah and Mulli, “Rio Tries Counterinsurgency,” 62-6. 45 Burcu Savan and Jude C. Hays, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool: State Capacity, NGOs, and Aid Delivery Channels,” (paper presented at 2011 Visions in Methodology: A Workshop for Women in Political Methodology, Ohio State University, May 4-7, 2011). 46 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 243-4.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !47 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 255-9. 48 Caroline Moser, “Reducing Urban Violence in Developing Countries,” Brookings Institute, November 2006; Nick Michell, “Bringing an End to Urban Violence in Latin America,” CitiesToday, Auguest 3, 2012, http://cities-today.com/2013/08/bringing-an-end-to-urban-violence-in-latin-america-2/. 49 Muggah, “Researching the Urban Dilemma,” 56; Seth G. Jones and Arturo Muñoz, Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces (California: RAND Corporation, 2010). 50 Robert Muggah and Ilona Szabo de Carvalho, “Beyond Pacification in Rio de Janeiro,” The Huffington Post, August 13, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-muggah/beyond-pacification-in-ri_b_3744012.html. 51 Paul Kiernan, “Rio's Efforts to Pacify Violent Slums Face Crisis: Four Community Police Officers Have Died in Line of Duty Since February,” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/article_email/SB10001424052702303546204579439674173323590-lMyQjAxMTA0MDEwNTExNDUyWj; Austin Long, “For Afghan and Other Local Defense Forces, History Holds Warnings,” RAND Corporation (2013), http://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/rand-review/issues/2013/summer/for-afghan-and-other-local-defense-forces.html. 52 Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains, 122-3; Zachary Zaub, “The Taliban in Afghanistan,” The Council on Foreign Relations, February 25th, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link12-20140318&sp_mid=45383582&sp_rid=dHlsZXIuYmVtYmVuZWtAZ21haWwuY29tS0. 53 Liotta and Miskel, The Real Population Bomb, 201-2. 54 “Philippines Police Clash With Residents Of Manila Slum Set For Redevelopment,” The World Post, July 1st, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/01/philippines-police-clash-manila-slum_n_3527793.html. 55 Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 153. 56 Property speculation. Additionally, there are some concerns that title reform programs may actually serve as a means of displacing the urban poor. For example, in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, pacification measures are leading to soaring property prices. Because the slums are often built on what would otherwise be prime real estate, speculators are buying out favela properties to develop into high-income housing. Slum residents do not have the financial means to pay rising rents and are forced to sell out and move back into the marginalized periphery. While property speculation is a valid concern, it can be mitigated by restricting property transactions within designated districts. For example, a limit on how quickly a property can be resold after purchase may deter developers. Since developers usually want to buy and resell as quickly as possible, if they have to hold onto their purchases for a number of years their costs may outweigh their benefits. Gawad Kalinga, a title reform and housing assistance program in the Philippines, has avoided property speculation through such transaction restrictions. The United States should work in tandem with local governments and urban communities to address speculation concerns on a case-by-case basis. See: Muggah and Mulli, “Rio Tries Counterinsurgency,” 62-6; “Building Communities to End Poverty,” Gawad Kalinga, accessed March 26, 2014, http://www.gk1world.com/home. 57 Laura McKechnie, “Property Rights Reform in Peru: Why Titles do not Increase Access to Micro-Credit,” Journal of Development and Social Transformation 2 (Nov 2005). 58 Stephen Leahy, “Urban Violence in Africa, Asia and Latin America to Form Focus of $11m Study: Safe and Inclusive Cities Initiative Will Compare Existing Approaches as part of Drive to Tackle Urban Conflict,” The Guardian, September 16, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/16/urban-violence-africa-asia-latin-america; “Governance, Security, and Justice,” IDRC, accessed March 26, 2014, http://www.idrc.ca/EN/Programs/Social_and_Economic_Policy/Governance_Security_and_Justice/Pages/Safe-and-inclusive-cities.aspx.