Problem univerzalija realizam vs nominalizamRealizam
(filozofija) , Realizam(termin potie iz latinskog jezikares
stvar,realis stvaran, predmetan) je vieznaan pojam koji se javlja
uumetnosti,knjievnostiislikarstvu,filozofiji.[] 1Problem
univerzalija 1.1Platonistiki realizam 1.2Nominalistiki izazov
1.3Realistiki odgovor 1.4Sinteza konceptualizam 1.5Stanje danas
2Druga znaenja pojma "realizam" u filozofiji 3LiteraturaProblem
univerzalija[]Ufilozofijise pojamrealizampojavljuje u ranom
srednjem vijeku u raspravi ouniverzalijama, koja se vodila u
teologiji i filozofiji, uglavnom na podruju zapadnog (latinskog)
hrianstva. (Slina se rasprava u isto vrijeme vodila i uislamskoj
filozofiji). Rije je o problemuontolokogstatusa
optihpojmova(ideja), odnosno vrsta i rodova: da li opti pojmovi,
kao "konj", "trougao", "dobro" i sl. postoje realno (da li
posjedujusupstancijalnost), sami po sebi, izvan pojedinanih stvari?
Ako postoje, da li su tjelesni ili netjelesni?Problem se pojavio
pri tumaenjuAristotelovogspisaKategorije, jednog od rijetkih
Aristotelovih spisa koji je bio poznat hrianskome svijetu (i na
zapadu i na istoku) nakon pada Rimskog carstva.
NeoplatoniarPorfirijeukazao je na taj problem u svojemUvodu u
Aristotelove kategorije, ali nije dao odgovor.Boetijeje taj spis
preveo na latinski i tako je on postao poznat i na
zapadu.Platonistiki realizam[]Nadovezujui se naPlatonaiplatonizam,
realisti smatraju da je odgovor pozitivan. Platon je smatrao da
ideja ne samo da samostalno postoji, nego da je svijet ideja najvia
stvarnost i uzrok one stvarnosti, koju opaamo ulima: uopte ne bi
moglo postojati nita dobro da mu ontoloki ne prethodi ideja
"dobrote", ne bi mogao postojati pojedinani konj da ne postoji opta
ideja "konja" itd. Ovakvo shvatanje u filozofiji se
nazivaobjektivni idealizam, a srednjovjekovni realizam jedan je od
njegovih oblika.Platonu se suprotstavio njegov savremenik,
drugiSokratovuenik, kinikAntisten, koji je rekao da vidi konja, ali
ne moe vidjeti "konjstvo". Antisten je tako formulisao gledite koje
e u srednjem vijeku biti nazvanonominalizam, naime uenje, da samo
pojedinane stvari postoje realno (imaju supstanciju), dok su
pojmovi samo imena (nomen) za niz slinih predmeta. Platonov je
odgovor naravno glasio da se radi o "gledanju" umom, do kojeg se
pojedinac moe dovinuti samo kroz naporno obrazovanje u
filozofiji.Aurelije Avgustin, koji se prije prihvatanja hrianstva
dobro upoznao sa neoplatonskom filozofijom, prihvatio je realistiki
stav, tumaei ga meutim u okviru hrianske teologije: ideje ne tvore
samostalno podruje, kako je mislio Platon, nego opstoje u Bojem
umu. Ideje su misli koje Bog misli, ali za ovjeka one su objektivna
stvarnost, koja se shvata umom, uz posredovanje vjere. Prouavanje
pojedinanih stvari, pristupanih ulima, ne moe dovesti ni do kakve
vrijedne spoznaje.Realisti, nastavljajui se na Avgustina, gledaju u
optim pojmovima (dakle, Bojim mislima) uzroke pojedinanih stvari, u
okviru opte "Rijei",Logosa, kojom Bog stvara svijet. Logos je,
odbacivanjemarijanskoguenja definisan kao bogu istobitan i
izjednaen sa Hristom, kao jedna od osoba bojegtrojstva.Tokom
slijedeih pet stoljea nije bilo znaajnih diskusija na tu temu.Jovan
Skot Eriugena(810-880) dovodi hrianski novoplatonski realizam do
ekstremnog oblika: ono to je optije, to je i realnije, a
najrealnije je ono najoptije: Bog, koji sve stvara a nije stvoren,
koji sve obuhvata i koji se ne moe pojmiti.Nominalistiki
izazov[]Tek u 11. stoljeu, kada na zapadu dolazi do rasta uenosti
(sa sreditem u Parizu), obnavlja senominalistikouenje u
djeluRoscelina, (1050-1123), koji je bio proglaenjeretikomi njegovi
spisi uniteni, pa o njegovom uenju znamo samo iz spisa njegovih
protivnika. On je zastupao ekstremni nominalizam: svaki pojam, sve
ono opte, to nema podlogu u onome to se ulima moe zapaziti, samo je
prazan zvuk (latinski:flatus vocis), kojim ovjek daje skupno ime
nekoj grupi stvari; ta skupna imena korisna su za komunikaciju meu
ljudima, no ona nemaju supstancu, koja pripada samo pojedinanim
stvarima. Svoje je uenje on primijenio i na hriansku dogmu,
dokazujui da je koncepcijatrojstvau sebi proturjena, to je i dovelo
do osude za jeres.Realistiki odgovor[]Najznaajniji predstavnik
realizma, u polemici sa Roscelinom, bio jeAnselmo od Canterburyja,
(1033-1109). Anselmo istie prvenstvo vjere nad razumom: prvo se
mora vjerovati, da bi se uopte smjelo raspravljati o Svetom Pismu,
inae primjenadijalektikedovodi dojeresi, kao to se desilo
Roscelinu. Nadovezujui se na Eriugenu, Anselmo je skovaoontoloki
dokaz postojanja Boga.Drugi znaajni realist bio jeVilim iz
Champeauxa, (1070-1121). On smatra da sutina (bit, bitnost) postoji
samo u optem (rodu), a pojedinane se stvari razlikuju samo
uakcidencijama. Iako je sam Vilim kasnije, pod utjecajem Abelardove
kritike, odustao od radikalne formulacije, a drugi realisti traili
umjerenije formulacije, realizmu je teko
izbjeipanteistikukonsekvencu, da u svim pojavama svijeta treba
vidjeti samo jednu boansku supstanciju. Takvo je uenje, istiu
kritiari, sumnjivo sa gledita hrianske pravovjernosti. Crkva je
meutim generalno prihvatala realizam, koji daje filozofsku pozadinu
za nauk o trojstvu i o nasljednom grijehu.Sinteza
konceptualizam[]Najznaajniji mislilac u ovom sporu bio
jeAbelar(1079-1142), koji je bioivo, svestrano djelujue sredite
borbe oko univerzalija( Windelband , str. 343). Njegovi su uitelji
bili nominalist Roscelin i realist Vilim. U polemici protiv
obojice, on je razvio svoje "srednje" uenje, koje je ipak blie
nominalizmu, nazvanokonceptualizamilisermonizam. Realno postoje
samo pojedinane stvari, ali pojmovi imaju znaaj u intelektu i nisu
samo "prazan zvuk"; bez njih, nikakva ljudska spoznaja ne bi bila
mogua. Njegova koncepcija ima bitan znaaj za dalji razvoj
filozofije, jer naglaava aktivnu ulogu ljudskoga uma u stvaranju
optih pojmova.Time je Abelard ukazao na put iz upljeg skolastikog
formalizma koje ne brine o odnosu svojih spekulacija prema ulnoj
stvarnosti, iako je sam faktiki jo unutar tog formalizma ostao.
Stoljee i pol kasnije,Toma Akvinskiponovo prihvaa Aristotelovu
koncepciju odnosa opteg i posebnog, koja je sadrajnija i daje via
poticaja za dalja istraivanja. (To je bilo omogueno injenicom da su
tek u 13. st. glavni Aristotelovi spisi postali ponovno poznati u
hrianskim zemljama, zahvaljujui hebrejskim i arapskim
prevodima.)Stanje danas[]Ove rasprave mogu u 21. stoljeu izgledati
posve daleke i apstraktne. One su naravno bile uklopljene u teoloke
diskusije koje su tada, a i danas, bile posve nerazumljive velikoj
veini hrianskih vjernika (ali se zbog njih moglo i na lomai
zavriti), a kamoli drugima.Meutim, oprena shvatanja o statusu optih
pojmova i danas postoje, kako u filozofiji, tako i van nje, u
politikim i drugim raspravama o pojedinim pitanjima, gdje se
pojavljuju "realistika" i "nominalistika" shvatanja o pojedinim
problematinim pojmovima.Npr. da linacija(i drugi slini pojmovi)
postoji realno, van predstave koju o tome imaju pojedinci? U
diskusijama o pojmovima "hrvatstvo", "srpstvo", "jugoslovenstvo",
"Evropa", "Balkan" i tsl. lako moemo uoiti "realistiki" i
"nominalistiki" stav, ili barem nain govora (a takve diskusije
naravno vode i svi drugi narodi u svijetu).Drugi primjer su
diskusije o pojmu pola i roda, koje je podstakaofeminizam. Postoje
naravno bioloke razlike izmeu mukaraca i ena, ali do koje mjere
moemo govoriti o postojanju "mukosti" i "enskosti" kao posebnih
entiteta? Postoji radikalno nominalistiki stav koji sve razlike u
osjeajima, ponaanju i dr. pripisuje samo odgoju, i tvrdokorno
tradicionalistiki koji smatra da su razlike uroene i nepremostive;
a postoje naravno i umjereni stavovi izmeu ta dva ekstrema, esto u
smislu "naunog realizma" (vidi slijedei odjeljak).Druga znaenja
pojma "realizam" u filozofiji[]Van spomenutog konteksta rasprave o
univerzalijama, pojam "realizam" u filozofiji se koristi u
razliitim znaenjima. Tako se ponekad "realistima" nazivaju svi oni
filozofi koji idejama pripisuju objektivno postojanje, odnosno, svi
"objektivni idealisti". Kantovose uenje naziva paktranscendentalni
realizam, a uenje nekih njegovih nastavljaakritiki realizam, koji
se pak po smislu pribliava "naunom realizmu" (vidi dolje). Potpuno
drugaije je znaenje kada se "realizam" suprotstavljasubjektivnom
idealizmu, kao uenje da vanjski svijet postoji nezavisno o
svijesti, odnosno nezavisno o subjektu, koji ga spoznaje. U tom
sluaju pojam "realizam" moe se koristiti kao sinonim
zamaterijalizamili kao iri pojam, koji ukljuuje i neke
tzv.idealistikekoncepcije. Savremeninauni realizam, kao "prirodna
filozofija" koju naunici obino u svojem radu slijede, kompromisni
je (eklektiki) stav po kojem neke osobine predmeta pripadaju njima
samima, ali druge zavise o odnosu prema spoznajnom subjektu; koje
su prvog, a koje drugog tipa treba u svakom pojedinom sluaju
istraivanjima utvrditi. Dokle pak ta relativnost spoznaje see i
koji su joj sve oblici, odnosno koliko nauka moe pretendirati na
univerzalnost svojih spoznaja, predmet je znaajnih diskusija
ufilozofiji naukeisociologiji spoznaje20. stoljea. Takoe se u
filozofskim djelima, osobito u savremenojanalitikoj filozofijimoe
nai pojamrealizamu njegovom svakodnevnom smislu.Zbog te
viestrukosti, ako se termin "realizam" koristi, treba biti tano
naznaeno na koje se znaenje misli. Ako je mogue, treba ga
zamijeniti nekim preciznijim terminom. Treba biti vrlo oprezan u
tome da se raznolike koncepcije svode pod neki opti pojam, da se
"etiketiraju" (da se dakle postupa u smislu "realizma", svodei vrlo
razliita razmatranja i uenja filozofa na neku optu "sutinu").
RoscelinIzvor: WikipediaJean Roscelin iz Compiegnea (Johannis
Roscellinus Compediensis, oko 1050. - oko 1122/24) je bio francuski
redovnik, teolog, filozof, pripada medu prve vane predstavnike
zrele skolastike.
No, njegov nauk poznajemo tek iz jednoga pisma njegovu uceniku
Abelardu, to ga prenosi J. - P. Mign (Patrologi Cursus Completus.
To pismo, nastalo oko 1120, dio je Roscelinove polemike s
Abelardom, a uz minuciozne teoloke argumente donosi i, za poboni
Srednji Vijek, zacudnu kolicinu osobnih napadaja, sve do
nesmiljenog izrugivanja Abelardovoj kastraciji, to je ovoga snala
zbog njegove ljubavi spram Heloize. Inace nam je Roscelinovo
naucavanje dostupno istom neizravno, iz spisa njegovih protivnika,
realista: samoga Abelarda (umjerenog realista -konceptualista),
Anselma od Canterburuyja (koji Roscelina napada kao jednoga medu
"dijalekticarima naega doba"), te Johna od Salisburuyja, kao i
jednog anonimnog epigrama.
Roscelin ulazi u povijest miljenja svojim radikalnim
nominalizmom, kojim nastoji rijeiti veliki srednjovjekovni
mudroslovni problem, problem univerzalija: one, dri Roscelin, ne
postoje ni u Bojem umu (niti na nekom inteligibilnom nebu poput
svijeta Platonovih ideja), niti u stvarima, ali nisu ni opci
pojmovi (kako je tvrdio Abelard), premda postoji evidencija da
Roscelin nije nijekao njihovu mogucnost. Ono opce naprosto nije
drugo doli puka rijec, djeljiva na slogove, suglasnike i
samoglasnike; pace, dah rijeci, daak glasa, kako on veli (flatus
vocis). To je sententia vocum, njegov nauk o rijecima (glasovima):
zbiljski opstoji samo ono pojedinacno, konkretni obojeni predmet,
naprimjer konj, docim vec "boja" nema vlastite stvarnosti, kao
niti, recimo, mudrost, izvan due koja je mudra. Svaka je
substancija, dakle, individualna.
Roscelina je njegov dosljedni nominalizam doveo i osjetljivim
teolokim konzekvencama. Tvrdeci, naime, kako Boje Trojstvo (kao
opcost) nema realnosti, nego su realne samo tri Boje osobe, tri
samostalna boanstva (Otac, Sin i Duh Sveti), jednaka tek voljom i
mocju (una sit voluntas et potestas - prema Anselmovu prikazu
Roscelina), ali ne jedinstvena, nego odvojena, poput tri andela ili
tri due - inace bi se i Otac i Duh utjelovili, a ne samo Sin -
Roscelin je zapao u krivovjerje triteizma, troboja, koje je osudeno
na crkvenom saboru u Soissonsu 1092. Roscelin je tu opozvao svoja,
u ocima Crkve kriva naucavanja, te izbjegao u Englesku, da ga ne
snade kazna kamenovanja. Iz Engleske je, kao protivnik
canterburyjskoga nadbiskupa Anselma, morao prebjeci u Rim, a
poslije se vratio u Francusku. Kada je nestalo pogibli
ekskomunikacije, navodno se ponovno priklonio svojemu izvornom
uvjerenju.
Roscelin se "spotaknuo" na pitanju Trojstva, shvativi ga odvec
racionalno, formalno-logicki. Drugi su skolastici oprezno
priznavali da taj problem nije dostupan razumu (koji se tu mora
zaplesti u aporije odnoaja opceg i pojedinacnog), pa su njegovo
rjeavanje preputali cistoj vjeri i Objavi.
Radikalni Roscelinov nominalizam preuzeo je Vilim Okamski, no on
ivi i u nadolazecim stoljecima filozofije, ako toga filozofi i nisu
uvijek svjesni. Nominalisticki se nauk provlaci kroz teoriju
spoznaje, antropologiju, etiku, filozofiju politike. Prepoznajemo
ga u raznim oblicima pozitivizma i uopce antimetafizike, te
empirizma - senzualizma, u individualistickom egoizmu jednoga Maxa
Stirnera, u filozofiji egzistencije Srena Kierkegaarda ili Jeana -
Paula Sartrea, u anarhizmu i liberalizmu (pa, nacelno, i u
komunizmu), koji uime pojedinca manje ili vie nijecu dravu kao
zajednicu opcosti; napokon, u otporu protiv univerzalistickih
ideologija to ga prua filozofsko-politicka teorija Nove Desnice
(Neue Rechte, Nouvelle Droite) na celu s Arminom Mohlerom i Alainom
de Benoistom.
Od Roscelinovih izravnih sljedbenika valja navesti Raimberta iz
Lillea te redovnika Herimana. .()
() (.Pierre Abelard,.Petrus Abelardus) (10791142), , . , , .
Theologia christiana( )., . , , . , . . , (Sic et Non). , , 158 . ,
. , , ( ) . , , - . . , . , , . (). , ( ) . .[1] . : , (). : , . ,
. , . , . () , . , .Problem of universalsFrom Wikipedia, the free
encyclopediaInmetaphysics, theproblem of universalsrefers to the
question of whether properties exist, and if so, what they
are.[1]Propertiesare qualities or relations that two or more
entities have in common. The various kinds of properties, such as
qualities andrelationsare referred to asuniversals. For instance,
one can imagine three cup holders on a table that have in common
the quality ofbeing circularorexemplifying circularity,[2]or two
daughters that have in commonbeing the daughter of Frank.There are
many such properties, such as being human, red, male or female,
liquid, big or small, taller than, father of, etc.[3]While
philosophers agree that human beings talk and think about
properties, they disagree on whether these universals exist in
reality or merely in thought and speech.Contents[hide] 1Positions
1.1Realism 1.2Nominalism 1.3Idealism 2Ancient thought 2.1Plato
2.2Aristotle 3Medieval thought 3.1Boethius 3.2Duns Scotus 3.3Ockham
3.4Medieval realism 3.5Medieval nominalism 4Modern and contemporary
views 4.1Berkeley 4.2Kant 4.3Mill 4.4Peirce 4.5James 4.6Armstrong
5See also 6Notes 7References and further reading 8External
linksPositions[edit]The main positions on the issue are generally
considered to be:realism,nominalism, andidealism(sometimes simply
called "anti-realism" with regard to
universals).[4]Realism[edit]Main article:Philosophical realismThe
realist school claims that universals are real they exist and are
distinct from the particulars that instantiate them. There are
various forms of realism. Two major forms arePlatonic
realism(universalia ante res) andAristotelian realism(universalia
in rebus).[5]Platonic realismis the view that universals are real
entities and they exist independent of particulars.Aristotelian
realism, on the other hand, is the view that universals are real
entities, but their existence is dependent on the particulars that
exemplify them.Realists tend to argue that universals must be
posited as distinct entities in order to account for various
phenomena. For example, a common realist argument, arguably found
in Plato, is that universals are required for certain general words
to have meaning and for the sentences in which they occur to be
true or false. Take the sentence "Djivan Gasparyanis a musician".
The realist may claim that this sentence is only meaningful and
expresses a truth because there is an individual, Djivan Gasparyan,
who possesses a certain quality, musicianship. Thus it is assumed
that the property is a universal which is distinct from the
particular individual who has the property.[6]Nominalism[edit]Main
article:NominalismNominalists assert that only individuals or
particulars exist and deny that universals are real (i.e. that they
exist as entities or beings). The term "nominalism" comes from the
Latinnomen("name"), since the nominalist philosopher agrees that we
predicate the same property of multiple entities but argues that
the entities only share a name, not a real quality, in common.
There are various forms of nominalism (which is sometimes also
referred to as "terminism"), three major forms areresemblance
nominalism,conceptualism, andtrope nominalism. Nominalism has been
endorsed or defended by many, includingWilliam of Ockham,Peter
Abelard,D. C. Williams(1953),David Lewis(1983), and arguablyH. H.
Price(1953) andW. V. O. Quine(1961).Nominalists often argue for
their view by claiming that nominalism can account for all the
relevant phenomena, and thereforebyOckham's razoror some sort of
principle of simplicitynominalism is preferable, since it posits
fewer entities. Whether nominalism can truly account for all of the
relevant phenomena is debated.Idealism[edit]Main
article:IdealismSee also:German Idealism,Immanuel Kant,Johann
Gottlieb Fichte,Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling,Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich HegelandBritish IdealismIdealists, such as Kant and
Hegel, posit that universals are not real, but are ideas in the
mind of rational beings. Idealists do not reject universals as
arbitrary names; rather, they treat universals as fundamental
categories of pure reason (or as secondary concepts derived from
those fundamental categories). Universals, in idealism, are
intrinsically tied to the rationality of the subject making the
judgment.For instance, when someone judges that two cup holders are
both circular they are not noticing a mind-independent thing
("circularity") that is in both objects, nor are they simply
applying a name ("circular") to both. Rather, they partially
constitute the very concept of cup holder by supplying it with the
concept of circularity, which already exists as an idea in their
rational mind.Thus, for idealists, the problem of universals is
only tangentially a metaphysical problem; it is more of a problem
ofpsychologyandepistemology.Ancient
thought[edit]Plato[edit]Platobelieved there to be a sharp
distinction between the world of perceivable objects and the world
of universals orforms: one can only have mere opinions about the
former, but one can haveknowledgeabout the latter. For Plato it was
not possible to have knowledge of anything that could change or was
particular, since knowledge had to be forever unfailing and
general.[7]For that reason, the world of the forms is the real
world, likesunlight, the sensible world is only imperfectly or
partially real, likeshadows. ThisPlatonic realism, however, in
denying that theeternal Formsare mental artifacts, differs sharply
with modern forms of idealism.One of the first nominalist critiques
of Plato's realism was that ofDiogenes of Sinope, who said "I've
seen Plato's cups and table, but not his cupness and
tableness."[8]Aristotle[edit]Plato's studentAristotledisagreed with
his tutor. Aristotle transformed Plato's forms into "formal
causes", the blueprints oressencesof individual things. Whereas
Plato idealizedgeometry, Aristotle emphasizednatureand related
disciplines and therefore much of his thinking concerns living
beings and their properties. The nature of universals in
Aristotle's philosophy therefore hinges on his view ofnatural
kinds.Consider for example a particularoaktree. This is a member of
a species and it has much in common with other oak trees, past,
present and future. Its universal, its oakness, is a part of it. A
biologist can study oak trees and learn about oakness and more
generally the intelligible order within the sensible world.
Accordingly, Aristotle was more confident than Plato about coming
to know the sensible world; he was a prototypicalempiricistand a
founder ofinduction. Aristotle was a new,moderatesort of realist
about universals.Medieval thought[edit]Boethius[edit]The problem
was introduced to the medieval world byBoethius, by his translation
ofPorphyry'sIsagoge. It begins:"I shall omit to speak about genera
and species, as to whether they subsist (in the nature of things)
or in mere conceptions only; whether also if subsistent, they are
bodies or incorporeal, and whether they are separate from, or in,
sensibles, and subsist about these, for such a treatise is most
profound, and requires another more extensive
investigation".[9]Duns Scotus[edit]Duns Scotusargued strongly
against both nominalism and conceptualism, arguing instead
forScotist realism, a medieval response to the conceptualism of
Abelard.Ockham[edit]William of Ockhamargued strongly that
universals are a product of abstract human thought. According to
Ockham, universals are just words/names that only exist in the mind
and have no real place in the external world.Medieval
realism[edit]Realism was argued for by bothThomas AquinasandJohn
Duns Scotus. Aquinas argued that both the essence of a thing and
its existence were clearly distinct,[10]in this regard he is close
to the teaching of Aristotle.Scotist realismargues that in a thing
there is no real distinction between the essence and the existence,
instead there is only aFormal distinction.[11]Both these opinions
were denied by Scotus' pupil William of Ockham.Medieval
nominalism[edit]Nominalism was first formulated as a philosophical
theory in the Middle Ages. The French philosopher
andtheologianRoscellinus(c. 1050-c. 1125) was an early, prominent
proponent of this view. It can be found in the work ofPeter
Abelardand reached its flowering inWilliam of Ockham, who was the
most influential and thorough nominalist. Abelard's and Ockham's
version of nominalism is sometimes calledconceptualism, which
presents itself as a middle way between nominalism and realism,
asserting that thereissomething in common among like individuals,
but that it is a concept in the mind, rather than a real entity
existing independently of the mind. Ockham argued that only
individuals existed and that universals were only mental ways of
referring to sets of individuals. "I maintain", he wrote, "that a
universal is not something real that exists in a subject... but
that it has a being only as a thought-object in the mind
[objectivum in anima]". As a general rule, Ockham argued against
assuming any entities that were not necessary for explanations.
Accordingly, he wrote, there is no reason to believe that there is
an entity called "humanity" that resides inside, say, Socrates, and
nothing further is explained by making this claim. This is in
accord with the analytical method which has since come to be
calledOckham's razor, the principle that the explanation of any
phenomenon should make as few assumptions as possible.Critics argue
that conceptualist approaches only answer the psychological
question of universals. If the same concept iscorrectlyand
non-arbitrarily applied to two individuals, there must be some
resemblance or shared property between the two individuals that
justifies their falling under the same concept and that is just the
metaphysical problem that universals were brought in to address,
the starting-point of the whole problem (MacLeod & Rubenstein,
2006, 3d). If resemblances between individuals are asserted,
conceptualism becomes moderate realism; if they are denied, it
collapses into nominalism.[12]Modern and contemporary
views[edit]Berkeley[edit]George Berkeley, best known for his
empiricism, was also an advocate of an extreme nominalism. Indeed,
he disbelieved even in the possibility of a general thought as a
psychological fact. It is impossible to imagine a man, the argument
goes, unless one has in mind a very specific picture of one who is
either tall or short, European, African or Asian, blue-eyed or
brown-eyed, et cetera. When one thinks of atriangle, likewise, it
is always obtuse, right-angled or acute. There is no mental image
of a triangle in general. Not only then do general terms fail to
correspond to extra-mental realities, they don't correspond to
thoughts either.Berkeleyan nominalism contributed to the same
thinker's critique of the possibility of matter. In the climate of
English thought in the period followingIsaac Newton's major
contributions tophysics, there was much discussion of a distinction
betweenprimary qualities and secondary qualities. The primary
qualities were supposed to be true of material objects in
themselves (size, position,momentum) whereas the secondary
qualities were supposed to be more subjective (colorandsound). But
on Berkeley's view, just as it is meaningless to speak of
triangularity in general aside from specific figures, so it is
meaningless to speak of mass in motion without knowing the color.
If the color is in the eye of the beholder, so is the mass.
Contributions to philosophy[edit]Main article:Subjective
idealismAccording to Berkeley there are only two kinds of things:
spirits and ideas. Spirits are simple, active beings which produce
and perceive ideas; ideas are passive beings which are produced and
perceived.[12]The use of the concepts of "spirit" and "idea" is
central in Berkeley's philosophy. As used by him, these concepts
are difficult to translate into modern terminology. His concept of
"spirit" is close to the concept of "conscious subject" or of
"mind", and the concept of "idea" is close to the concept of
"sensation" or "state of mind" or "conscious experience".Thus
Berkeley denied the existence of matter as ametaphysicalsubstance,
but did not deny the existence of physical objects such as apples
or mountains. ("I do not argue against the existence of any one
thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That
the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist,
really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose
existence we deny, is that which philosophers call matter or
corporeal substance. And in doing of this, there is no damage done
to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss
it.",Principles#35) This basic claim of Berkeley's thought, his
"idealism", is sometimes and somewhat derisively called
"immaterialism" or, occasionally,subjective idealism. InPrinciples
#3,he wrote, using a combination of Latin and English,esse is
percipi,(to be is to be perceived), most often if slightly
inaccurately attributed to Berkeley as the pure Latin phraseesse
est percipi.[13]The phrase appears associated with him in
authoritative philosophical sources, e.g. "Berkeley holds that
there are no such mind-independent things, that, in the famous
phrase, esse est percipi (aut percipere) to be is to be perceived
(or to perceive)."[14]Hence, human knowledge is reduced to two
elements: that of spirits and of ideas (Principles#86). In contrast
to ideas, a spirit cannot be perceived. A person's spirit, which
perceives ideas, is to be comprehended intuitively by inward
feeling or reflection (Principles#89). For Berkeley, we have no
direct 'idea' of spirits, albeit we have good reason to believe in
the existence of other spirits, for their existence explains the
purposeful regularities we find in experience.[15]("It is plain
that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than
by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us", Dialogues
#145). This is the solution that Berkeley offers to theproblem of
other minds. Finally, the order and purposefulness of the whole of
our experience of the world and especially of nature overwhelms us
into believing in the existence of an extremely powerful and
intelligent spirit that causes that order. According to Berkeley,
reflection on the attributes of that external spirit leads us to
identify it with God. Thus a material thing such as an apple
consists of a collection of ideas (shape, color, taste, physical
properties, etc.) which are caused in the spirits of humans by the
spirit of God.Theology[edit]A convinced adherent of Christianity,
Berkeley believed God to be present as an immediatecauseof all our
experiences.He did not evade the question of the external source of
the diversity of thesense dataat the disposal of the human
individual. He strove simply to show that the causes of sensations
could not be things, because what we called things, and considered
without grounds to be something different from our sensations, were
built up wholly from sensations. There must consequently be some
other external source of the inexhaustible diversity of sensations.
The source of our sensations, Berkeley concluded, could only be
God; He gave them to man, who had to see in them signs and symbols
that carried God's word.[16]Here is Berkeley's proof of the
existence of God:Whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I
find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like
dependence on mywill. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is
not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to
determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my
view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas
imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore
some other Will or Spirit that produces them.
(Berkeley.Principles#29)As T.I. Oizerman explained:Berkeley'smystic
idealism(asKantaptly christened it) claimed that nothing separated
man and God (exceptmaterialistmisconceptions, of course), since
nature or matter did not exist as a reality independent of
consciousness. The revelation of God was directly accessible to
man, according to this doctrine; it was the sense-perceived world,
the world of man's sensations, which came to him from on high for
him to decipher and so grasp the divine purpose.[16]Berkeley
believed that God is not the distant engineer ofNewtonianmachinery
that in the fullness of time led to the growth of a tree in the
university quadrangle. Rather, the perception of the tree is an
idea that God's mind has produced in the mind, and the tree
continues to exist in the quadrangle when "nobody" is there, simply
because God is an infinitemindthat perceives all.The philosophy
ofDavid Humeconcerning causality and objectivity is an elaboration
of another aspect of Berkeley's philosophy.A.A. Luce, the most
eminent Berkeley scholar of the 20th century, constantly stressed
the continuity of Berkeley's philosophy. The fact that Berkeley
returned to his major works throughout his life, issuing revised
editions with only minor changes, also counts against any theory
that attributes to him a significantvolte-face.[citation
needed]Relativity arguments[edit]See also:Three Dialogues between
Hylas and PhilonousJohn Locke (Berkeley's predecessor) states that
we define an object by itsprimary and secondary qualities. He takes
heat as an example of a secondary quality. If you put one hand in a
bucket of cold water, and the other hand in a bucket of warm water,
then put both hands in a bucket of lukewarm water, one of your
hands is going to tell you that the water is cold and the other
that the water is hot. Locke says that since two different objects
(both your hands) perceive the water to be hotandcold, then the
heat is not a quality of the water.While Locke used this argument
to distinguish primary from secondary qualities, Berkeley extends
it to cover primary qualities in the same way. For example, he says
that size is not a quality of an object because the size of the
object depends on the distance between the observer and the object,
or the size of the observer. Since an object is a different size to
different observers, then size is not a quality of the object.
Berkeley rejects shape with a similar argument and then asks: if
neither primary qualities nor secondary qualities are of the
object, then how can we say that there is anything more than the
qualities we observe?
Berkeley's great contribution (picked up on later by Kant) was
to suggest the preposterousness of referencing absolute knowledge,
given that all knowledge is gained through contingent sensory
experience. In fact, the very notion of finding coherence and
permanence within sensory experience was so preposterous to him,
that he had to postulate the notion of a God who holds all reality
in HIS mind, in order to explain why the world doesn't just vanish
when we stop perceiving it. He was forced, by his extreme
empiricism, to posit the existence of God in order to explain our
experience of coherence, even though on an empirical understanding
of raw sense data, such a conclusion did not follow. In this, he
demonstrates the importance and brilliance of Kant's "Copernican
revolution" in epistemology that was to follow. For without Kant,
Berkeley was not able to give an account of the coherence of our
experience that squared with his empiricism. David Hume tried to
give such an account when he proposed that concepts are merely the
faded memories of sensory experiences had over and over again, like
writing on a page which eventually sinks through to the underlying
pages. But this account seemed to threaten the very possibility of
science as an objective endeavor and made Kant, himself a
scientist, very uneasy. It forced Kant to come up with his theory
of noumenal objects as unverifiable but understandable extensions
of our immediate sensory experience constructed according to the
inherent schemae of our understanding. Thus, in place of God's role
as guarantor of the coherence of the world, Kant posits a faculty
of reason structured by the forms of our intuition (our sense of
time and space) and the categories of our understanding (like the
notion of cause and effect).Kant[edit]Idealism is a broad category
that includes several diverse themes, fromKant's radical doubt
about what can truly be perceived externally toHegel's Absolute
Ideal as the verification of the sum of potential manifestations of
matter and concepts. This position argues that the nature of
reality is based only in our minds or ideas, and represents one of
several divergent interpretations of Kants legacy. On Hegels view,
the external world is inseparable from the mind, consciousness or
perceptions. Universals are real and exist independently of that on
which they might be predicated.But to conflate Kant's and Hegel's
versions of idealism is to seriously miss the point of Kants
radical doubt, which was stimulated in turn by David Hume's. Kant
claimed it was Humes skepticism about the nature of inductive
reasoning and the conclusions of rationalist metaphysicians
(Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz) that "roused him from his dogmatic
(i.e. rationalist) slumbers" and spurred him on to one of the most
far reaching re-evaluations of human reason since Aristotle.
Following Aristotles lead, Kant considered that knowledge can only
be had through experience of particulars. Given that premise, the
notion of absolute knowledge (as described by Plato and the
rationalists) is seen as mere illusion, and this is what he set out
to demonstrate in the first part of his magnum opus "The Critique
of Pure Reason" (1781). He claims to demonstrate that because
knowledge can only be had through contingent (imperfect)
experience, the notion of absolute, uncontingent knowledge must not
actually be obtainable, but must function merely as a regulative
principle or heuristic device for problem solving. Thus we can
conceive of a noumenal world (noumenal meaning "object of thought")
which exists only as a heuristic for our cognitive capacities and
not as something directly accessible to experience. The noumenal
world for Kant is the way things in themselves might appear to a
being of uncontingent reason (i.e. God).The phenomenal world, on
the other hand is the world of experience, in which we live and in
which objects are given to reason in experience. Our understanding
of the phenomenal world is inevitably colored by the imperfections,
or restrictions, of the knowing apparatus, and this is what he set
out to describe in the first part of the 1st Critique. Following
Aristotles lead, he describes categories of the understanding, such
as the notion of cause and effect, which inevitably mediate our
experience of the world and give us the objects of our experience.
The objects in themselves as they might appear in their universal
or absolute nature are forever hidden from us, and thus Kant
effectively rules out the type of access to the world of the forms
that had been formulated by Plato. The notion of the noumenal can
only function as a heuristic of reason, not as an actual something
to be experienced by contingent beings. Thus Kant effects his
Copernican revolution of knowledge by changing our perspective on
knowledge from a question of what can truly be known (i.e. how can
we actually come to know universals), to a question of how does the
knowing mind operate. As with Copernicus, the data remains the same
but the model used to encounter the data shifts tremendously.After
Kant, the problem of universals becomes a problem of human
psychology and questions about conceptual models we use to
understand universals, rather than the same old metaphysical
arguments about what universals really are. The second part of the
1st Critique is Kants examination of the rationalist claims to
absolute knowledge, taking on the most famous of these,
theontological proofof Gods existence, and showing that he can,
through pure, non-experiential logic, both prove the affirmative
and the negative of a proposition about a noumenal object (i.e. an
object like God which can never be an object of direct experience
for a contingent being). Given that both A and not-A are seen to be
true, Kant concludes that its not that God doesnt exist but that
there is something wrong with how we are asking questions about God
and how we have been using our rational faculties to talk about
universals ever since Plato got us started on this track! He goes
on, in subsequent Critiques and other works, to demonstrate his
model for the proper use of concepts like God the Good, and the
beautiful, effecting the most radical re-evaluation of these ideas
since Plato, and changing forever the course of western philosophy.
It is perhaps no small exaggeration to claim that most western
philosophers since Kant, even if they disagree with him, have had
to find some way to respond to his revolutionary
ideas.Mill[edit]John Stuart Milldiscussed the problem of universals
in the course of a book that eviscerated the philosophy of
SirWilliam Hamilton. Mill wrote, "The formation of a concept does
not consist in separating the attributes which are said to compose
it from all other attributes of the same object and enabling us to
conceive those attributes, disjoined from any others. We neither
conceive them, nor think them, nor cognize them in any way, as a
thing apart, but solely as forming, in combination with numerous
other attributes, the idea of an individual object".However, he
then proceeds to state that Berkeley's position is factually wrong
by stating the following:But, though meaning them only as part of a
larger agglomeration, we have the power of fixing our attention on
them, to the neglect of the other attributes with which we think
them combined. While the concentration of attention lasts, if it is
sufficiently intense, we may be temporarily unconscious of any of
the other attributes and may really, for a brief interval, have
nothing present to our mind but the attributes constituent of the
concept.[citation needed]In other words, we may be "temporarily
unconscious" of whether an image is white, black or yellow and
concentrate our attention on the fact that it is a man and on just
those attributes necessary to identify it as a man (but not as any
particular one). It may then have the significance of a universal
of manhood.Peirce[edit]The 19th-century American logicianCharles
Sanders Peirce, known as the father ofpragmatism, developed his own
views on the problem of universals in the course of a review of an
edition of the writings of George Berkeley. Peirce begins with the
observation that "Berkeley'smetaphysicaltheories have at first
sight an air of paradox and levity very unbecoming to a
bishop".[13]He includes among these paradoxical doctrines
Berkeley's denial of "the possibility of forming the simplest
general conception". He wrote that if there is some mental fact
that worksin practicethe way that a universal would, that fact is a
universal. "If I have learned a formula in gibberish which in any
way jogs my memory so as to enable me in each single case to act as
though I had a general idea, what possible utility is there in
distinguishing between such a gibberish... and an idea?" Peirce
also held as a matter ofontologythat what he called "thirdness",
the more general facts about the world, are extra-mental
realities.James[edit]William Jameslearned pragmatism, this way of
understanding an idea by its practical effects, from his friend
Peirce, but he gave it new significance. (Which was not to Peirce's
taste - he came to complain that James had "kidnapped" the term and
eventually to call himself a "pragmaticist" instead). Although
James certainly agreed with Peirce and against Berkeley that
general ideas exist as a psychological fact, he was a nominalist in
his ontology:From every point of view, the overwhelming and
portentous character ascribed to universal conceptions is
surprising. Why, from Plato and Aristotle, philosophers should have
vied with each other in scorn of the knowledge of the particular
and in adoration of that of the general, is hard to understand,
seeing that the more adorable knowledge ought to be that of the
more adorable things and that the things of worth are all concretes
and singulars. The only value of universal characters is that they
help us, by reasoning, to know newtruthsabout individual things.
William James,The Principles of PsychologyThere are at least three
ways in which a realist might try to answer James' challenge of
explaining the reason why universal conceptions are more lofty than
those of particulars - there is the moral/political answer, the
mathematical/scientific answer and the anti-paradoxical answer.
Each has contemporary or near contemporary advocates.The moral or
political response is given by the conservative philosopherRichard
M. WeaverinIdeas Have Consequences, where he describes how the
acceptance of "the fateful doctrine of nominalism" was "the crucial
event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those
acts which issue now in modern decadence".[14][15]Roger
Penrosecontends that thefoundations of mathematicscan't be
understood absent the Platonic view that "mathematical truth is
absolute, external and eternal, and not based on man-made criteria
... mathematical objects have a timeless existence of their
own..."Nino Cocchiarella(1975), professor emeritus of philosophy
atIndiana University, has maintained that conceptual realism is the
best response to certain logical paradoxes to which nominalism
leads. It is noted that in a sense Cocchiarella has adopted
Platonism for anti-Platonic reasons. Plato, as seen in the
dialogueParmenides, was willing to accept a certain amount of
paradox with his forms. Cocchiarella adopts the forms to avoid
paradox.Armstrong[edit]The Australian philosopherDavid Malet
Armstronghas been one of the leading realists in the twentieth
century, and has used a concept of universals to build a
naturalistic and scientifically realist ontology upon. In
bothUniversals and Scientific RealismandUniversals: An Opinionated
Introduction, Armstrong describes the relative merits of a number
of nominalist theories which appeal either to "natural classes" (a
view he ascribes toAnthony Quinton), concepts, resemblance
relations or predicates, and also discusses non-realist "trope"
accounts (which he describes in theUniversals and Scientific
Realismvolumes as "particularism"). He gives a number of reasons to
reject all of these, but also dismisses a number of realist
accounts.See also[edit]Philosophy portal
Abstract object Bundle theory Conceptualism Nominalism Object
(philosophy) Philosophy of mathematics Platonic form Qualia[16]
Realism (philosophy) Universal (metaphysics) Universality
(philosophy)