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Hidetoshi Shinohara
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Realities of U.S. Military Doctrine Development
During the Iraq War
-FM 3-24 COIN (2006)・AFDD 2-3 IW (2007)-
Hidetoshi Shinohara
Introduction
The U.S. forces that intervened in Iraq in 2003 were struggling
to stabilize the
country after bringing down the regime of President Saddam
Hussein. Under
these circumstances, the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps decided
to revise an
operational doctrine. That doctrine was the Field Manual 3-24 /
Marine Corps
Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency‖ (herein after
referred to as
―FM 3-24 (2006)‖), issued in December 2006. Counterinsurgency is
defined as
―military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and
civic actions taken
by a government to defeat insurgency…aimed at the overthrow of a
constituted
government through the use of subversion,‖ and is sometimes
called ―COIN‖ for
short.1 In the United States where calls were growing for a
change in strategy
amid the rough going in Iraq, the issuance of FM 3-24 (2006)
grabbed much
attention with wide coverage in media. A month later, President
George W. Bush
announced the dispatching of an additional 20,000 American
troops to Iraq and a
shift to the strategy that focused on counterinsurgency.
Meanwhile, in August 2008, eight months after the issuance of FM
3-24
(2006), the U.S. Air Force issued the Air Force Doctrine
Document 2-3 Irregular
Warfare (hereinafter referred to as ―AFDD 2-3 (2007).‖ Irregular
warfare is
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
111
defined as ―a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors
for legitimacy and
influence over the relevant populations,‖ and is sometimes
called ―IW‖ for short2.
Counterinsurgency is regarded as one of operations in irregular
warfare. FM 3-24
(2006) lied behind the development of AFDD 2-3 (2007). The U.S.
Air Force set
out to formulate its own doctrine as it thought that the
description of the use of air
power in counterinsurgency in FM 3-24 (2006) is not sufficient.
The U.S. Air
Force developed and issued AFDD 2-3 (2007) only half a year
after it
commenced the work on the doctrine.
Why did the U.S. Air Force choose to develop a doctrine for
irregular
warfare rather than for counterinsurgency as did the U.S. Army
and the Marine
Corps? This paper attempts to find the answer to this question
by making a
comparative analysis of the backgrounds, the processes, the
details of the
discussions that took place, and the doctrines as the ultimate
products. And this
paper then sheds light on the actual conditions of how the armed
forces of the
United States, an advance nation in terms of military doctrines,
are developing
and making use of them. By examining these things, this paper
can hopefully
provide a catalyst to ponder on how the military doctrine should
be formulated.
1. The Iraq War for the United States
The U.S. administration of President George W. Bush, suspecting
that Iraq has
weapons of mass destruction, formed the Coalition of the Willing
with countries
going along with the United States, and launched a military
intervention in Iraq,
the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), on March 19, 2003. Its
objectives were to
drive the Saddam Hussein regime out of Iraq and establish a
stable democratic
state under a new elected government. The multinational forces
with the
overwhelming military power made inroads into the central part
of the Iraqi
capital of Baghdad on April 9, 21 days after the opening of
hostilities, and on
May 1, aboard the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln,
which had been
deployed to the Persian Gulf, President Bush declared the end of
major combat
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
112
operations in Iraq in his ―Mission Accomplished‖ speech.
However, the United
States was forced to struggle in its subsequent endeavor to
rebuild Iraq.
In proceeding with the work to reconstruct and stabilize Iraq
following the
declaration of the end of combat operations, then Secretary of
Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld had in mind the intervention by the U.S. forces under
the Afghanistan
formula. His intention was to withdraw the U.S. troops sent to
Iraq within a short
period of time by deploying the special operations forces on the
minimum
required scale in Iraq under cover of air power, promptly
fostering the Iraqi
government and the Iraqi security forces and turning over the
power to them.
Actually, however, things did not work out that way. Over time,
the number of
casualties increased not only among Iraqi people but also
American soldiers sent
to Iraq. Casualties increased year after year among both Iraqis
and American
soldiers dispatch and in 2006, the number of casualties more
than doubled from
the level in the initial phase of the U.S. intervention in
Iraq3. With the sectarian
conflict between Shiites and Sunnis also beginning to become
conspicuous,
concerns mounted that Iraq might slip into a civil war if the
situation was
allowed to go on.
The deterioration of the situation reinforced public opinion in
the United
States calling for a review of the intervention strategy,
including an early
withdrawal of American soldiers, compelling the Bush
administration to review
its strategy. Under these circumstances, the change in the
administration‘s
strategy by President Bush is said to have been influenced by
then Lt. Gen.
David H. Petraeus who played a predominant role in the
formulation of FM 3-24
(2006) and retired Army Gen. Jack M. Keane who personally
recommended
Petraeus to President Bush. Attributing the deterioration in the
Iraqi situation to
the insurgency against the new Iraqi government and the
Coalition of the Willing
in Iraq supporting it (hereinafter referred to as the
―Multinational Force-Iraq‖),
the Bush administration announced the shift in its strategy to
COIN to quell it.
2. Revision of the Field Manual
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
113
The Combined Arms Center (CAC) commanded by Petraeus, who is
said to
have influenced President Bush‘s strategy review, is the unit
that draws up the
Army‘s doctrines, and issued FM 3-24 (2006) in December 2006, a
month
before President Bush indicated the change in the strategy. The
announcement of
FM 3-24 (2006) drew keen interest in the United States where
voices calling
for the change in the strategy were growing strong and was
widely covered by
media. The background leading to the issuance of the doctrine,
the characters of
team members involved in the doctrine‘s revision and details of
the revision are
described below.
(1) The Background to the Revision
The doctrine concerning counterinsurgency was revised as FM 3-24
(2006) for
the first time in 20 years by the Army, and in 25 years by the
Marine Corps.
Under the John F. Kennedy administration just before the
intensification of the
Vietnam War, there was the period when interest in
counterinsurgency
heightened and the doctrine for it was developed, but it was
repealed in the
mid-1970s. Counterinsurgency came under the spotlight again in
the 1980s due
to the spread of conflict in Nicaragua, El Salvador and other
countries Central
and South America. After the Special Operations Command was
created in 1987,
however, interest in counterinsurgency waned again in regular
operating forces.
In 2003, when the United States launched the OIF, the reference
to
counterinsurgency was made only in just one page in the
operations doctrine,
FM 3-0 Operations, saying that the bare minimum support should
be provided to
allow a recipient country to solve its problems on its own4.
Amid the deterioration of the domestic situation in Iraq with
insurgency
increasingly taking on serious proportions, moves began to
emerge to proceed
with the review of the strategy within the Department of
Defense. In November
2005, the Defense Department Directive 3000.055 was issued to
seek efforts
toward the review, including the doctrine, organization and
training, for the
stabilization operations. Then in February 2006, the Quadrennial
Defense
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
114
Review (QDR)6 that emphasized irregular warfare was announced.
Petraeus,
who became commandant of the CAC in October 2005 after
completing his
duties in Iraq twice, proactively followed up on these move.
Petraeus regarded
the assumption of the post of CAC commandant as an opportunity,
because at
the time, Petraeus was already told to take the post of
commander of the
Multinational Force-Iraq as successor to Gen. George W. Casey
and before
assuming that post, he wanted to reform the U.S. Army into a
military force that
could handle irregular warfare and counterinsurgency. The CAC
commandant
doubles as vice commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command,
which controls all combat schools, the National Training Center
and the Joint
Readiness Training Center that provide simulation and
live-ammunition training
to soldiers before they are sent overseas, the Battle Command
Training Program
where troops make final preparations just before their dispatch
overseas, and the
Center for Army Lessons Learned where history researchers in the
military
analyze all combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan7. The CAC
and all these
organizations constitute the organizational framework that can
form the feedback
loop capable of educating and training soldiers on the doctrines
developed by the
CAC and evaluating the results in actual combats for
improvements, and was
called ―An Engine of Change‖ in the U.S. Army8 Petraeus thought
that the
formulation of the new counterinsurgency doctrine by the CAC was
the best way
to reform the U.S. Army as an organization that can respond to
irregular warfare
and counterinsurgency. And after the revision of the
counterinsurgency doctrine,
Petraeus actually became commander of the Multinational
Force-Iraq to replace
Gen. Casey and assumed command of the counterinsurgency
operations in Iraq
by leading the troops that learned the new doctrine and received
training in
accordance with it.
Meanwhile, the work to develop the counterinsurgency doctrine by
Petraeus
got under way in February 2014. CAC commandant Lt. Gen. William
Scott,
Petraeus‘s predecessor, saw differences between training
undertaken at the Battle
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
115
Command Training Program and operations actually conducted in
Iraq as
problematic and ordered the doctrine division to develop a
new
counterinsurgency doctrine within six months9. The development
work was led
by a lieutenant colonel in the doctrine division, but he had
never been sent to Iraq
or learned about counterinsurgency10
. This doctrine was developed before the
deadline and issued as an interim doctrine (FMI 3-07.2211
) in October 2004, but
its contents were far from satisfactory. New CAC commandant
Petraeus,
recognizing the need to call together extensively experienced
and
highly-educated officers for the work to revise the new
doctrine, leveraged his
network of contracts to organize the counterinsurgency doctrine
revision team.
(2) The Counterinsurgency Doctrine Revision Team
The counterinsurgency doctrine revision team comprised over 10
principal
authors and support authors. The principal authors included
researchers in the
U.S. Army as well as the Marine Corps and U.S. universities.
Among them were
several officers with doctoral degrees called ―Warrior
Scholar‖12
, including
Petraeus. The participation of the Marine Corps in the revision
team was realized
with approval of Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis13
, who commanded the First Marine
Division in Iraq during the same period as Petraeus and later
assumed the post of
commandant of the USMC Combat Development Command that
develops
doctrines for the Marine Corps. As commander of the First Marine
Division,
Mattis carried out operations fitted for counterinsurgency and
succeeded in
separating residents from insurgents. This case example was
introduced in FM
3-24 (2006) as a case of success14
. Going along with Petraeus, Mattis sent the
best people in the Marine Corps to the revision team and he also
proactively
provided advance to contribute to the formulation of FM 3-24
(2006).
In order to assemble broad-based knowledge, the revision team
created a
multitude of opportunities to hear opinions of people from a
wide range of fields.
The team heard opinions of not only Army soldiers who
experienced fighting in
Iraq and/or Afghanistan and senior officers but also doctrine
authors in the
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
116
British Army as well as officials of government agencies, such
as the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the U.S. Agency for International
Development
(USAID) and the Department of State, and prominent think tanks,
media and
human rights groups and other non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).
There were several key persons in the revision team who led and
guided the
work. The first of them was CAC commandant Petraeus who
exercised control
over the revision team. He reflected his knowledge and thoughts
about
counterinsurgency in the major points of the revision work.
Petraeus who
graduated from the Military Academy at West Point immediately
after the
withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the Vietnam War took strong
interest in
counterinsurgency from around this time, which eventually became
his lifework.
In his doctoral dissertation at Princeton University in 1987,
Petraeus studied
lessons for the U.S. forces learned from the Vietnam War and
discussed the need
for the U.S. forces in the post-Vietnam War to prepare for
counterinsurgency15
.
In the Iraq War, he occupied Mosul in northern Iraq as commander
of the 101st
Airborne Division, drawing attention as a case of success of
governance based
on the counterinsurgency principles. Petraeus advocated the need
to introduce the
counterinsurgency principles since before the intervention in
Iraq and he
practiced them per se as commander. Soon after assuming the post
of CAC
commandant, Petraeus wrote ―Learning Counterinsurgency:
Observations from
Soldiering in Iraq16
‖ on the basis of his commanding experience in Mosul, and
this became the guideline for the revision team. This guideline
was ultimately
incorporated in Chapter 1 of FM 3-24 (2006).
Another key person who provided leadership to the revision team
was
Conrad C. Crane, who played a coordinating role in the revision
team. Crane was
seminar historian at the Army War College, and was involved in
the
reconstruction plan for Iraq after the collapse of the Hussein
regime17
. Crane,
a retired veteran, knew Petraeus very well as they were in the
same class at
the Amy War College, and was highly trusted by Prof. Eliot
Cohen, who had
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
117
a significant influence over the revision of the
counterinsurgency doctrine.
Cohen was with the strategic studies program at the Paul H.
Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins
University. During
this period, Cohen quite frequently sponsored study meetings
on
counterinsurgency and made proactive presentations at symposiums
on the
theme of counterinsurgency18
. After hearing Crane‘s presentation at one of these
symposiums, Cohen felt that Crane should lead the revision team
and
recommended him to Petraeus19
. While acting as the coordinator of the overall
work, Crane also served as a liaison to tactfully reflect the
intentions of Petraeus
in the revision work. The most difficult task in the hearings of
opinions about the
rough draft of the counterinsurgency doctrine was how to handle
opinions of
senior officers in the ranks of generals. While consulting with
Petraeus, Crane
proficiently disposed of them and contributed to the formulation
of the doctrine
in a short period of time20
.
The individual who wielded a significant influence over what was
written in
the doctrine in the revision team was Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, who
joined the team
when he was special military adviser to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense. Even
before joining the revision team, Nagl was known as one of those
who advocated
the introduction of the counterinsurgency strategy within the
U.S. Army along
with Petraeus. He became known after his book, ―Learning to Eat
Soup with a
Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam21
,‖ came under the
spotlight. In this book, Nagl made research into
counterinsurgency and military
organizations that would execute it through the comparison
between the Malaya
crisis for Britain and the Vietnam War for the United States by
relying on five
―Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency‖22
of Robert Thompson, famous for his
organizational theory and classic counterinsurgency principles.
While noting the
success of Britain that made use of lessons learned in
stabilizing post-crisis
Malaya (currently Malaysia), Nagl pointed to problems in the
organization of the
U.S. forces that failed to make good use of the lessons. Gen.
Peter J. Schoomaker,
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
118
then chief of staff of the U.S. Army, recommended Nagl‘s book as
a must-read
book, presenting the book to every senior officer who came to
visit his room23
.
The book drew keen attention of the U.S. forces as they had a
hard time fighting
in Iraq. Nagl advised members of the revision team to read
―Counterinsurgency
Warfare: Theory and Practice24
‖ by David Galula, and its contents were reflected
in FM 3-24 (2006). Nagl also wrote the introduction of FM 3-24
(2006), in
which he emphasized the importance of ―learning‖ and
―adaptation‖ to win in
counterinsurgency operations.
Other than the above, knowledge of a wide variety of individuals
was
reflected in FM 3-24(2006). They included David Kilcullen25
, an Australian
serviceman on temporary assignment to the U.S. Department of
State, who, like
Nagl, strongly recommended the introduction of counterinsurgency
in Iraq and
advised the U.S. administration and the military, and Sarah
Sewall, director of
the Kennedy School of Government‘s Carr Center for Human Rights
Policy,
Harvard University, who studied incidental damage among ordinary
citizens and
frequently held study meetings and consultative meetings
concerning
counterinsurgency from the perspective of human rights.
Literature on
counterinsurgency Kilcullen published in the Military Review was
quoted as ―A
Guide for Action‖ as an appendix at the end of FM 3-24
(2006)26
. Cohen,
Petraeus and Nagl participated in consultative meetings
sponsored by Sewall
even before the formation of the revision team, and many of
members of human
rights groups and NGOs came to have support relationships with
the revision
team through these consultative meetings.
(3) Characteristics FM 3-24(2006)
The counterinsurgency doctrine developed on the basis of a wide
range of
knowledge of the military, other governmental agencies, NGOs and
media as
well as the revision team was organized into eight chapters and
five appendixes
at the end, resulting in a great piece of writing with 282 pages
in total27
.
The introduction emphasized that the U.S. military failed to
learn about
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
119
insurgency and counterinsurgency. Recognizing that there was the
perceived
notion within the military that large-scale armed forces trained
for conventional
wars would not lose in small-scale, irregular warfare, the
revised
counterinsurgency doctrine advised, ―In COIN, the side that
learns faster and
adapts more rapidly—the better learning organization—usually
wins28
.‖ Then, in
Chapter 1, reflecting the principles derived by Thompson and
Galula from the
past experiences in counterinsurgency as the classical
counterinsurgency
principles and recognizing that wars today are the ―wars among
the people,‖ the
doctrine sets the primary objective as fostering the development
of effective
governance by a legitimate government and focuses on residents
instead of
enemies29
. As the noteworthy content, this chapter states the rough
required ratio
of troops to execute counterinsurgency (the number of
counterinsurgents for
every 1,000 residents in an area of operation). This was written
into the doctrine
partly because Petraeus anticipated questions about the number
of troops
required for a surge as it was necessary for him to personally
appear before the
Senate Defense Committee to be confirmed as the commander of
the
Multinational Force-Iraq30
. At the end of this chapter, ―Paradoxes of
Counterinsurgency Operations‖ are stated to show the difficulty
of
counterinsurgency operations. They are the nine paradoxes in
conducting
counterinsurgency operations, including ―Sometimes, the More You
Protect Your
Force, the Less Secure You May Be,‖ ―Sometimes, the More Force
Used, the
Less Effective It Is,‖ and ―Some of the Best Weapons for
Counterinsurgents Do
Not Shoot‖31
. The description of these paradoxes drew many objections
from
senior officers of the Army and the Air Force, which in part
drove the subsequent
development of AFDD 2-3 (2007).
Chapter 2 emphasizes the ―Unity of Effort‖ to highlight the
integration of
civilian and military activities as essential for a victory in
counterinsurgency
operations. The unity of efforts is the matter that is
particularly emphasized in the
classical counterinsurgency principles. As its importance was
well recognized
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
120
from the initial phase of authoring the doctrine, it apparently
was stated in an
earlier chapter.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are the particularly important chapters that
pertain to the
planning and execution of counterinsurgency operations, covering
in detail such
conception matters as information activities and the designing
of
counterinsurgency campaigns as well as assessment of operations
and how to
determine targets of attacks. In particular, Chapter 4
―Designing
Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations‖ incorporated the
recommendations by Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Mattis, and Crane noted
that this
section reflected the thinking the U.S. Army did not have
before32
. In Chapter 6
and later chapters, the doctrine discussed the development and
supervision of
host-nation security forces, ethics33
and logistic considerations.
Matters that are not worth describing in separate chapters but
still need to be
recognized were included in appendixes at the end of the main
text of the
doctrine. Including a Guide for Action, these five appendixes
cover the methods
to evaluate operations and threats, linguist support for
interpretation in areas of
operations, legal considerations, and the use of airpower in
counterinsurgency. Of
these appendixes, the most controversial was what was stated
about airpower.
The use of airpower in counterinsurgency was discussed in six
pages of
Appendix 6. The author of this appendix was Prof. James S.
Corum, who taught
military history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College. He also
authored the doctrine‘s Chapter 6 ―Developing Host-Nation
Security Forces.‖
Corum co-authored Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgent and
Terrorists34
‖
in 2003. In writing the appendix, Corum solicited comments from
senior contact
instructors of the Air Force and the Navy who were with the CAC
and also used
written opinions of the Air Force as reference.
The appendix on airpower discussed the importance of airpower as
the
means of support for land power. Main matters discussed included
air strikes,
intelligence collection, the roles played by high-technology and
low-technology
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
121
assets, airlift, airpower command structure and building of
host-nation airpower
capability. Regarding airpower in the strike role, the appendix
noted that while
air attacks can be of enormous value in counterinsurgency,
commanders exercise
exceptional care when using airpower in the strike role because
bombing, even
with the most precise weapons, can cause unintended civilian
casualties. This
had to do with the concern, taken up in ―Paradoxes of
Counterinsurgency
Operations‖ in Chapter 1, that an air strike can cause
collateral damage that turns
people against the host-nation government and provides
insurgents with a major
propaganda victory. The appendix notes that even when justified
under the law
of war, video images of collateral damage of bombings to
residents spread via
media could bring the immeasurable benefit to insurgents35
.
Concerning the descriptions of airpower in the doctrine, the
Marine Corps
thought that they are ―not necessary because everyone knows the
role of
airpower plays in counterinsurgency as an integrated operation.‖
However, the
Army side wanted them included in the doctrine because it ―wants
to emphasize
the characteristics of airpower in operations other than air
strikes in
counterinsurgency operations.‖ Behind the Army‘s assertion were
the wishes of
Petraeus and Crane to help enhance the interest in
counterinsurgency within the
Air Force and facilitate discussions by including them in the
doctrine. At the
stage of the rough draft of the doctrine, the Air Force, as an
organization, showed
no interest in appendixes36
. Regarding the use of airpower, Petraeus and Crane
were concerned about examples in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan,
efforts to cover
ground forces with airpower capabilities caused collateral
damage of air strikes
to civilians, giving rise to vocal criticisms by Afghan people
in the country and
also deteriorating the public image of campaigns by the North
Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) forces in the international community37
, while the Air
Force was of the strong view that the use of airpower like that
in Afghanistan is
suitable in counterinsurgency operations.
The issuance of FM 3-24 (2006) subsequently led to the
development of not
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
122
only AFDD 2-3 (2007) but also the Joint Publication 3-24
Counterinsurgency
(2009) and the Allied Joint Publication3.4.4 Allied Joint
Doctrine for
Counterinsurgency (2011), NATO‘s counterinsurgency
doctrine38
. The British
Army also revised the counterinsurgency doctrine originally
issued in 1995 for
the first time in 14 years.
3. Establishment of the Doctrine by the U.S. Air Force
In August 2007, eight months after the issuance of FM 3-24
(2006), the U.S. Air
Force issued AFDD 2-3 (2007). But the title of the document was
not
―Counterinsurgency‖ but ―Irregular Warfare‖ with wider meanings,
including
counterinsurgency. The formulation of the new doctrine within a
short period of
time, in a sense, indicated that the rising interest in
counterinsurgency and
animated discussions within the Air Force, just as Petraeus and
Crane had hoped
for. The background to the issuance of the new doctrine,
discussions at an Air
Force symposium on counterinsurgency, which had a significant
influence on
AFDD 2-3 (2007), and the characteristics of the doctrine
developed for irregular
warfare are discussed below.
(1) The Background to the Development
The issuance of AFDD 2-3 (2007) represented the establishment of
the new
doctrine, instead of a revision to the existing one. The U.S.
Air Force has never
before had an independent doctrine carrying the title of
irregular warfare or
counterinsurgency. The Air Force doctrines were commonly called
―Military
Operations Other Than War: MOOTW.‖ But this does not mean that
the term
―counterinsurgency‖ has never been used in the Air Force
doctrines. Examining
the Air Force Basic Doctrine in the past, the Basic Doctrine
issued in March
1964 had ―Chapter 5 Use of Air Power in
Counterinsurgency.‖39
The year of
1964 was close to the period when the Kennedy administration was
considering
counterinsurgency amid the deteriorating situation of the
Vietnam War40
.
However, the term of ―counterinsurgency‖ disappeared from the
Basic Doctrine
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
123
thereafter, replaced by such items as special operations in
low-intensity conflict41
and MOOTW.
Irregular warfare came under the spotlight within the U.S. armed
forces after
the February 2006 announcement of the QDR in which the term
irregular
warfare was used. This overlapped the timing when the Air Force
began the
development of the doctrine for irregular warfare.
However, unlike a sense of stagnation in ground operations,
operations by the
Air Force have never fell into a serious predicament where the
casualties of the
U.S. forces would increase. While media occasionally took up
collateral damage
of air raids to the civilian population, the number of
casualties of air strikes
among civilians was on the continuous decline in 2005 and
200642
. During this
period, cases where military airplanes on airborne alert for
close air support
(CAS) actually dropped bombs after being told of attack targets
declined
significantly and air operations remained stable as a whole.
Given such
circumstances, the Air Force had no urgent necessity to quickly
develop its
doctrine for irregular warfare like the Army or the Marine Corps
from the
perspective of its operational situation.
Judging from discussions at a symposium on counterinsurgency
held by the
Air Force in the course of developing AFDD 2-3 (2007) and
statements by Air
Force generals, the Air Force embarked on the development of the
doctrine for
irregular warfare apparently because it was unhappy with what
was written in the
appendix of FM 3-24 (2006). The Air Force‘s commander of the Air
Combat
Command voiced, before Crane and Nagl at the symposium on
counterinsurgency, his dissatisfaction that the role of airpower
was taken up only
in the appendix of FM 3-24 (2006)43
. The Air Force also complained that FM
3-24 (2006) paid no regard to opinions of the Air Force in the
course of its
development and its contents were not satisfactory. Such views
of the Air Force
reflected its concern that the insufficient doctrine formulated
by a particular
branch of the military spread like wildfire with little
understanding about the
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
124
inherent capabilities of airpower in counterinsurgency44
. There were some senior
officers of the Air Force with the views that the capabilities
of airpower can and
should be used more widely and more effectively, without being
limited only to
support ground forces in counterinsurgency operations45
.
The Air Force inaugurated a group of authors for the doctrine in
February
2007 and issued AFDD2-3 (2007) in August of the same year. The
Air Force
completed the work to develop the doctrine, which usually takes
about one year,
only in six months46
. Unlike the revision team of FM 3-24 (2006), no documents
and materials such as memoirs that specifically explained the
background to the
doctrine development and the development work are readily
available, but we
can still check what was discussed at the symposium on
counterinsurgency
sponsored by the Air Force in April 2007 from relevant
documents.
(2) The Air Force’ s Counterinsurgency Symposium
The Air Force held the symposium on the theme of
―counterinsurgency‖ at the
Air University for three days from April 24, 2007. The symposium
was jointly
sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Headquarters, the Air Combat
Command
(ACC) and the Air Force Special Operation Command (AFSOC), with
over 170
participants from other branches of the U.S. military,
government organizations
and international institutions as well as civilians, scholars
and other experts. The
symposium was held with the purpose of collecting and reflecting
knowledge
about counterinsurgency and airpower from a wide variety of
experts in AFDD
2-3 (2007) under development.
The symposium discussed how the Air Force should interpret
irregular
warfare and counterinsurgency operations and how the Air Force
should
contribute to them. Nagl and Crane, who participated in it to
represent the Army,
explained what had been discussed for the development of FM 3-24
(2006) and
voiced the view that what is important in counterinsurgency
operations are not
military actions per se but the establishment of a government
with legitimacy47
.
The symposium‘s discussions covered four areas of
policy/strategy/necessity
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
125
of cooperation in doctrine, the building of troops, strategic
communication and
the building of host-nation capabilities. Opinions voiced in the
course of
discussions included that the execution of counterinsurgency per
se and
instructions on counterinsurgency require different strategies
and doctrines and
that the U.S. armed forces cannot always intervene proactively
in irregular
warfare that could happen in every corner of the world. Among
other views and
questions expressed at the symposium were about the requirement
of political
decisions on how to get involved in irregular warfare, how to
structure the chain
of command, how to go about public relations activities and
information
activities in counterinsurgency operations that would be a
long-drawn-out affair,
how to handle psychological warfare, and what would be required
of the U.S.
armed forces to implement the capacity building of host
nations.
Furthermore, through these discussions, the merits and demerits
of the use of
existing airpower in counterinsurgency operations became
apparent. As the
advantages, some participants argued that the use of precision
guided munitions
through the integration operation under the centralized command
and under the
assessment of the situation based on accurate information can be
expected to
produce the effects of limiting collateral damage to civilians
and damage to
ground forces dispatched, while others said the superiority of
the overwhelming
airpower already commanded by the Air Force can threat
insurgents from air on
continually. On the other hand, participants who anticipated the
demerits argued
the main mission of the Air Force is to acquire air superiority
over an adversary
and achieve a crushing victory in interstate war and has hence
developed the
effective and efficient airpower to serve that purpose, but the
proactive execution
of counterinsurgency operations would require the procurement of
equipment
and training suitable to that and could undermine the Air
Force‘s ability to
achieve a victory in interstate war, its principal mission.
The results of the discussions were broadly summarized into the
two
problems. One was that while the Air Force can function smoothly
in the initial
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
126
counterinsurgency environment but fails to function well in a
subsequent
transition period or withdrawal period. Another was that the Air
Force idea of
executing counterinsurgency operations per se needs to be
transformed into an
idea of enabling a host-nation to conduct counterinsurgency
operations on its
own. These problems stemmed from the recognition that in order
to achieve a
victory under the U.S. defense strategy requiring global
engagement, cooperation
of a host nation is essential as it is impossible for the U.S.
armed forces to do
everything and that there is no case example in global history
that a country that
intervened in a civil war in another country came out a winner
singlehandedly48
.
The ultimate conclusions coming out of the symposium included
the need to
determine what irregular warfare and counterinsurgency mean for
the U.S. forces
and the need to present strategies in a hierarchical manner. On
this basis, irregular
warfare and counterinsurgency were judged to be not something
the Air Force
should handle comprehensively with all its might but fall within
the range of
missions of special operations forces. Another conclusion was
that if irregular
warfare or counterinsurgency is to be considered in the context
of the capacity
building of a host nation, the Air Force does not need to
develop its own doctrine
for counterinsurgency operations or to procure equipment
specifically for
counterinsurgency operations49
. The symposium received the presentations of as
many as 220 proposals and recommendations like them, which the
Air Force
pledged to reflect in the final version of AFDD 2-3 (2007)50
.
The criticisms of FM 3-24 (2006) voiced at the Air Force
symposium
remained vocal even after the issuance of AFDD 2-3 (2007). To
cite typical ones,
Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap and Philip S. Meilinger,
known as Air
Force strategist, asserted that the Army or the Marine Corps
fail to accurately
understand the technological excellence of airpower that can
replace ―boots on
the ground‖51
. These criticisms remain unabated even after 2009, when JP
3-24
Counterinsurgency was issued52
.
(3) Characteristics of AFDD 2-3 (2007)
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
127
In AFDD 2-3 (2007), the U.S. Air Force explained that the reason
for the
development of its doctrine for irregular warfare is to
―establishes
operational-level doctrinal guidance for irregular warfare…where
the nature and
characteristics are significantly different from traditional
war53
‖. Like FM 3-24
(2006), the doctrine was not developed by bearing the fighting
in Iraq and
Afghanistan in mind and it was formulated for the purpose of
demonstrating the
concept that is applicable from the broad perspective and for
many years to
come.
AFDD 2-3 (2007) has a total of 103 pages and consist of five
chapters and
appendixes. Chapter One covers the definitions related to
irregular warfare and
counterinsurgency and also describes major activities in
irregular warfare and
capabilities required for them54
. Chapter Two explains the value of Air Force
capabilities in irregular warfare and how to use them, while
Chapter Three
indicates specific missions of airpower. Chapter Four describes
the strategy for
irregular warfare and how to develop its operational plans, and
Chapter Five sets
forth the command and control and the environment for executing
it as well as
considerations in the execution of the strategy. Appendixes
cover insurgent
motivations, organization and strategies used by insurgents in
order to deepen the
understanding about insurgency.
The contents of the doctrine did not level criticisms against FM
3-24 (2006),
like those heard at the Air Force symposium. The main text
starts with the
remarks of Gen. Curtis E. Lemay on the lessons from the Vietnam
War55
. As a
whole, the doctrine emphasizes that unlike traditional war, a
victory in irregular
warfare cannot be achieved with military power alone. It also
emphasizes that
irregular warfare is a struggle for legitimacy and influence
over the relevant
populations and the center of gravity is often the population.
For this reason, the
doctrine advises that it is necessary to recognize that the
achievements required at
the operational and strategical levels in irregular warfare,
even when using the
same air equipment as in regular warfare, are entirely different
from those in
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
128
regular warfare. The most distinctive feature of AFDD 2-3 (2007)
is that matters
related to building partnership capacity, the main agenda at the
symposium on
counterinsurgency, are stated at the outset of ―Chapter Three
Air Force
Capabilities in IW.‖ Building partnership capacity comes ahead
of explanations
about combat support and precision engagement, indicating the
doctrine‘s focus
on the support for the capacity development to host nations as
at the symposium.
In addition, such matters as information and strategic
communication, the main
themes for discussions at the symposium, were addressed as top
items after the
building of partnership capacity in Chapter Three. Furthermore,
the explanations
provided include the description of support for insurgents. This
is because
support for anti-government forces engaged in insurgency, as
well as
counterinsurgency, can be assumed56
. This is one of the reasons behind the
development of the Air Force doctrine with the wider definition
of ―irregular
warfare‖ than counterinsurgency. This indicates that the Air
Force wanted to
develop the doctrine that can flexibly respond to policy
decisions by the U.S.
administration. As the applications of airpower in irregular
warfare, AFDD 2-3
(2007) emphasizes small-scale interventions and rapid response
by making use
of the characteristics of airpower (speed, range, flexibility,
versatility and
destructive power) and situational awareness supported by the
continuous
collection of information at the strategic, operational and
tactical levels57
. They
make it possible for American aircraft to fly from outside the
host nation to fulfill
its missions and may reduce the total number of forces visible
to local
populations, thereby reducing their potential resentment.
AFDD 2-3 (2007) does not deny the use of lethal airpower, and
says that it
may be possible to use armed attacks if strategically necessary
to destroy an
adversary‘s will to fight and capabilities. However, repeatedly
emphasizing that
the purpose of irregular warfare is the securing of a legitimate
government‘s
influence over residents, it says that military actions should
be taken only within
the scope consistent with this purpose. In addition, as does FM
3-24 (2006), the
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
129
doctrine emphasizes that not attacking the enemy rather than
attacking the enemy
may lead to the attainment of strategic purposes58
.
4. Realities of U.S. Military Doctrine Development
Comparison of the backgrounds to the development of the two
doctrines, details
of discussions about them and the ultimate products helps shed
light on the three
realities of the doctrine development by the U.S. armed
forces.
(1) System for Gathering Wisdom
The development of the two doctrines was undertaken by
respective divisions
specializing the doctrine development of the Army, the Marine
Corps and the Air
Force. But the development work was not accomplished by the
specialized
divisions alone. At the U.S. Army, just one self-educated
lieutenant colonel was
assigned to develop the counterinsurgency doctrine and the
document was issued
on a provisional basis. But his doctrine was never accepted by
people who know
the real conditions of counterinsurgency operations. Then, FM
3-24 (2006),
which came to be known throughout the world, was developed by
the special
team that comprised several ―Warrior Scholars‖ and university
professionals
with an input from a wide variety of intellectuals in and out of
the military. The
Air Force also inaugurated its group of doctrine authors and
developed its
doctrine for irregular warfare by soliciting advice from a wide
variety of
intellectuals through the symposium.
The latest doctrines of the U.S. armed forces were not a mere
collection of
theories, principles and lessons. They are the ripe fruit of a
serious of discussions
by diverse range of intellectuals, born from a draft doctrine
comprising theories,
principles and lessons. Despite the differences in the points of
view between the
Army and the Marine Corps on one hand and the Air Force on the
other, there
was a system where gathering wisdom was possible, by
transforming conflict
into debate, so that the doctrines were further evolved.
(2) The Perfect Doctrine Does Not Exist
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
130
When the respective discussions of the Army/Marine Corps and the
Air Force
were closely examined, the description of airpower in FM 3-24
(2006) cannot be
necessarily termed as insufficient. As the forms of warfare are
classified into
traditional warfare and irregular warfare, what was required of
the Air Force was
the doctrine about how it should get engaged with war that is
different from
traditional war. The doctrine dedicated to counterinsurgency was
not required of
the Air Force.
On the other hand, the Army and the Marine Corps that were
actually
involved in counterinsurgency in Iraq needed the doctrine that
let them learn how
to execute counterinsurgency operations on the ground. FM 3-24
(2006) was
indeed the doctrine that made them aware of it. The description
in the appendix
represented the role of airpower that should be known by
soldiers of operational
units on the ground who are most likely to make use of FM 3-24
(2006), while
the role of airpower the Air Force should know was found in AFDD
2-3 (2007).
Thus, it can be said that both the Army/Marine Corps and the Air
Force have
developed the doctrines required by their respective
organizations at the time.
The confrontation between the Army/Marine Corps and the Air
Force may be
described as the confrontation ascribable to the absence of the
integrated doctrine
for counterinsurgency operations for which the joint operation
is essential.
The two doctrines do not necessarily show the doctrines designed
for
particular irregular warfare or counterinsurgency operations
(Iraq and
Afghanistan, for example, in this case), but have been developed
to show the
doctrines that are universal and may be widely applicable to
all
counterinsurgency operations. However, even for the doctrines
formulated only
after amassing wisdoms and holding so many sessions of
discussions, objections
to and advice on the doctrine issued have never halted, coming
from within the
same military service and also more from the different branches
of the military as
well as from outsiders.
The doctrines required may change due to various factors,
including the
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
131
stance of a particular division of the military, times,
surrounding conditions and
technological advances. Even for a moment, or by amassing
wisdoms of all sorts,
it is practically impossible to produce a doctrine that can
satisfy everyone. The
important thing is not to try to develop a perfect doctrine that
can satisfy
everyone but to come up with the best doctrine for people in
that position at the
time and seek further progress through the next lessons and
discussions. It means
the establishment of the feedback loop as ―An Engine of Change‖
in the words
of Petraeus59
.
(3) The Layered Structure of Doctrines
The common flow of military actions calls for the development of
a national
defense policy based on a national strategy and then the
objective and goal of
each operation and the operation itself are presented upon the
presentation of a
military strategy based on the national defense policy. From
this perspective,
given that the integrated operation is the order of the day, the
development of a
doctrine for each service of the military upon the presentation
of the joint
doctrine may be the best course of action. The latest
confrontation between the
Army/Marine Corps and the Air Force over the description in
the
counterinsurgency doctrine may be called the confrontation that
emerged due to
the absence of the presentation of any joint doctrine.
However, it is difficult to create a doctrine for each layer
from the beginning.
What is important is to shape the doctrine, not to discuss ―the
chicken or the egg.‖
As was the case with the doctrines for counterinsurgency and
irregular warfare, a
branch of the military develops a doctrine required for its
organization out of
necessity and this triggers discussions as it spreads to other
military services and
the joint doctrine, ultimately creating the feedback loop for
discussions that help
develop the layered doctrines.
Within the U.S. armed forces, the issuance of FM 3-24 (2006) and
AFDD
2-3 (2007) was followed by the issuance of the joint doctrine
for
counterinsurgency (JP 3-24 COIN) in 2009, and in 2013, this
joint doctrine and
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
132
the Air Force doctrine for irregular warfare were revised. In
the following year,
FM 3-24 for the Army and the Marine Corps was revised.
Furthermore, with the
progress in computerization of doctrines, doctrines of each
military service have
been linked on the Internet and a click on a term used in the
doctrine of the Air
Force takes you to the joint doctrine. The doctrine system of
the U.S. forces is
moving toward strengthening the layered structure along with the
evolution of
doctrines for each military service.
Conclusion
Why did the U.S. Air Force choose to develop the doctrine for
irregular warfare
instead of the doctrine for counterinsurgency as did the U.S.
Army and the
Marine Corps? In order to find an answer to that question, this
article made an
analysis of the doctrine development processes of the
Army/Marine Corps and
the Air Force, the discussions they held in the course of
doctrine development
and their ultimate products. The result of this analysis showed
that what the
Army and the Marine Corps needed was the doctrine that presents
the principles
for counterinsurgency their ground forces actually engaged in
counterinsurgency
operations should urgently know. Meanwhile, the Air Force, after
considering the
characteristics of airpower, reached the conclusion that the
development of a
doctrine for irregular warfare that has a broader meaning
instead of the particular
category of counterinsurgency allows it to more flexibly respond
to operational
requirements. While the discussions within the Air Force
commenced with the
notion that the descriptions of FM 3-24 (2006) were
insufficient, it is apparent
that the important thing is whether the doctrine required for
each military service
is developed as a doctrine that takes into account the
characteristics of the means
that service has rather than whether the descriptions of a
doctrine of another
military service are sufficient or not.
Considering the layered structure of doctrines, it may be ideal
if the joint
doctrine is established first, and then each military service
develops its own, so
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
133
that there is a consistency among the doctrines of each service.
However, even
within the U.S. armed forces, which are an advanced organization
in terms of the
utilization of doctrines, the realities are that each service
develops its doctrine
separately to suits its particular demand, not a layered
doctrine with consistency.
A perfect doctrine that satisfies everyone has never
materialized, in spite of
continuous discussions. However, the end result is not
necessarily so bad.
Doctrines have continued to evolve and be revised through
discussions that
transcended the organizational barriers. The important thing is
to make sure not
to break up the feedback loop, in order to ensure the ceaseless
evolution of
doctrines using the wisdom that has accumulated, rather than to
make a perfect
doctrine.
As the duties and mission of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are
becoming
increasingly complex and diversified, to develop our own
doctrines comes to be
considered vital, because doctrines are the kind of
authoritative documents that
commanders rely on as a solid basis for making a decision. It
seems that in Japan,
possibly because of what is known as the Japanese mentality,
people consider
doctrines to be something everyone can agree on. And this may be
the reason
discussions often go around in circles, thus preventing any
further progress.
Therefore, the doctrine discussions with the U.S. armed forces
triggered by the
Iraq War and the process of developing their doctrines may
become a useful
source, in order to develop the SDF‘s own doctrine development
cycle. This
author hopes that this paper somehow stirs up a discussion about
how to
establish the feedback loop within the Air Self-Defense Force as
―the Engine of
Change.‖
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
134
1 United States Army,
FM3-24/MCWP3-33.5:Counterinsurgency.December 2006,p.1-1. 2 United
States Air Force, AFDD 2-3: Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007, p. 5.
3 The number of casualties among Iraqi people rose to 29,517 by
2006 from 12,133 in 2003, according to the database of Iraq Body
Counts (IBC). www.iraqbodycount.org/, accessed December 11, 2017;
Meanwhile, the
number of casualties among American soldiers increased from 486
in 2003 to 823 in 2006, according to the
database of the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count.
icasualties.org/iraq/index.aspx, accessed December 11. 2017. 4
Conrad Carne, ―United States,‖ Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney ed.,
Understanding Counterinsurgency:
Doctrine, operations, and challenges, Routledge, 2010, p. 59. 5
Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05,
November 28, 2005. 6 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense
Review Report, February 6, 2006. 7 Fred Kaplan, The Insurgency:
David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War,
Simon &
Schuster Paperbacks, 2013, pp. 130-131. 8 Lt. Gen. Petraeus was
reportedly surprised by the appointment of himself as the CAC
commandant, saying
that “the U.S. Army posted the insurgent to the position that
controls the engine of change.” Ibid., p. 131. 9 Ibid., p. 133. 10
Lt. Col. Horvath exerted himself in writing the new doctrine as a
member of the revision team until around
mid-2006 when he was sent to the Counter-Insurgency Academy in
Iraq. Crane, ―United States,‖, p. 61. 11 ―I‖ in FMI means
―Interim.‖ 12 A group of excellent teachers at the Department of
Social Sciences of the Military Academy at West Point
was called ―Sosh.‖ This ―Sosh‖ group, called the most
outstanding think tank of the U.S. Army, turned out many officers
and specialist researchers, including Petraeus, John A. Nagl, and
Brig. Gen. Peter Cherry,
deputy commander of the U.S. forces in Iraq. 13 Mattis served as
the Secretary of Defense in the Trump administration, but resigned
in December 2018. 14 US Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006, pp. 4-7.
15 David H. Petraeus, The American Military and the Lesson of
Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and
the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era, Ph. D Dissertation,
Princeton University, 1987. 16 Kaplan, The Insurgency: David
Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, 2013,
p.137. These observations became widely known after being published
in the Military Review later under the title of
―Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in
Iraq.‖ Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army, ―Learning
Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,‖ Military
Review,
January-February 2006. 17 Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill,
Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for
Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, U.S. Army War College:
Strategic Studies Institute, February
2003. 18 After the Operation Desert Storm of 1991, Cohen
conducted research on air power in the Gulf War at the request of
the Secretary of the Air Force. Concerned about how the U.S. forces
responded in the intervention
in Iraq since 2003, he frequently sponsored study meetings and
provided advice to the Bush administration as
well as political leaders and top echelons of the military. He
was one of those who recommended Petraeus to President Bush.
Kaplan, The Insurgency, pp. 108-110. 19 At the time, Cohen did not
know that Petraeus and Crane were in the same class at the Army War
College. 20 Crane pointed out that the number of people who got
involved in the doctrine revision work reached as many as 600,000,
noting that all soldiers of the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps were
given opportunities to
voice their opinions about a rough draft of the doctrine. Many
senior officers also read this rough draft, and the
revision team had difficulty in responding to some of their
opinions. Crane, ―United States,‖ p. 68. 21 John A. Nagl, Learning
to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and
Vietnam.
University of Chicago Press, 2005.; Nagl conceived this title
for the book from the expression that ―to make
war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a
knife,‖ found in ―Seven Pillars of Wisdom‖ written by T.E.
Lawrence, known as the Lawrence of Arabia. Kaplan, The Insurgency:
David Petraeus and
the Plot to Change the American Way of War, p. 43. 22 Robert.
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya
and Vietnam, Chatto &
-
Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
135
Windus, 1966. 23 Schoomaker handed the book written by Nagl to
Gen. George W. Casey when he became a candidate for
the commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq. David Cloud and
Greg Jaffe, The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle
for the Future of the United States Army. Three Rivers Press, 2009,
p. 168. 24 Galula derived the counterinsurgency principles by
studying the struggle for independence in Algeria from
1954 through 1952 to seek independence from France as a
counterinsurgency war. David Galula, Foreword by Robert R. Bowie,
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Frederick A.
Praeger, 1964. ;
Regarding the struggle for independence in Algeria, Italian
movie director Gillo Pontecorvo‘s ―The Battle of
Algiers (La battaglia di Algeri),‖ which won the Gold Lion Award
at the Venice International Film Festival in 1966, is quite famous.
25 Kilcullen, who later published his book, ―Accidental Guerrilla:
Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big
One,‖ wrote in the book that local residents who suffered
incidental damage harbor ―adverse reactions‖ to foreign forces
(countries intervening with counterinsurgency operations like the
United States), get acquainted
with militarist groups and ultimately come to have a spirit of
revolt against foreign forces as insurgents. He
defines these developments as ―accidental guerrilla.‖ David
Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst
of a Big One, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 35-38. 26 David
Kilcullen, ―Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level
Counterinsurgency,‖ Military
Review, Vol. 86, May/June 2006, pp. 103-108. 27 Concern over an
excessive number of pages was discussed within the revision team.
But the team
eventually reached a conclusion that they cannot cut the
doctrine short as their original intent was to eliminate
the previous gaps that resulted from important matters being
made light of in the past. Crane, ―United States,‖ 2010, p. 67. 28
US Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006, p. ix. 29 Ibid., p. 1-21.
Counterinsurgency is a mixture of diverse operations, such as
offensive operations focusing on eliminating the insurgent cadre,
defensive operations focusing on protecting the populace and
infrastructure from direct attacks, and stability operations,
while the killing and detention of insurgent enemies
are also necessary. But the doctrine says that victory is
achieved only when counterinsurgency builds up and
maintains the support of residents. Ibid., pp. x, 1-3, 1-19. 30
Crane, ―United States,‖ 2010, p. 66. The ratio of the number of
forces required for counterinsurgency is
stated in 1-67, Chapter 1, of US Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5,
2006. 31 US Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006, pp. 1-26-1-27. 32
Crane, ―United States,‖ 2010, p. 64. 33 Fierce debate arose over
ethics issues following an incident at the Abu Ghraib prison. Ibid,
p. 66. 34 Through this historical research, Corum came up with 11
lessons concerning airpower in small-scale wars.
It is assumed that he used these lessons as a reference in
authoring his portion in US Army, FM 3-24/MCWP
3-33.5, 2006. James S. Corum and Wary R. Johnson, Airpower in
Small Wars: Fighting Insurgent and Terrorists, University Press of
Kansas, 2003, pp. 425-439. 35 US Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006 p.
E-1. 36 At a session to exchange views between the Army and the Air
Force, a professor of the Air University who participated in the
session personally aired the view that the descriptions of the use
of airpower should be
included in the doctrine, but the Air Force as an organization
was negative toward the idea. Conrad Crane,
Cassandra in OZ: Counterinsurgency and Future War, Naval
Institute Press, 2016, pp. 82, 97. 37 Crane, ―United States,‖ 2010,
pp. 67-68. 38 The consultation held in Paris at the end of 2007
marked the commencement of the development of the NATO version of
the counterinsurgency doctrine. Crane Cassandra in OZ, 2016, p.
127. 39 Lt Col Johnny R. Jones, USAF, Development of Air Force
Basic Doctrine 1947-1992, Air University Press,
1997, p.51. 40 Austin Long, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The
U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine,
1960-1970 and 2003-2006, RAND, 2008, p. vii. 41 The item of
counterinsurgency was deleted as the core matters for descriptions
in the Basic Doctrines
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Hidetoshi Shinohara
136
shifted to nuclear strategies and conventional wars amid the
rising threat from the Soviet Union during the
Cold War period. But the item of special operations did exist in
order to respond to interventions in civil wars
of other countries, which were often referred to as proxy wars.
The item of special operations mainly referred to education and
support for training to help build the airpower capabilities of
host nations. 42 The number of casualties among Iraqi citizens in
air raids by the Multinational Force-Iraq decreased from
1,405 in 2004 to 341 in 200t and further to 255 in 2006. Iraq
Body Count, www.iraqbodycount.org/, accessed December 11, 2017. 43
Crane Cassandra in OZ, 2016, p. 133.; Remarks of General Ronald E.
Keys, Commander, Air Combat
Command, dinner presentation at Air Force Symposium 2007:
Counterinsurgency, April 24, 2007, Maxwell AFB, AL. Crane, ―United
States,‖ 2010, p. 71. 44 Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, Chief,
Professional Journals, ―Airpower and Irregular Warfare,‖ Air
and
Space Power Journal, Winter 2007, Vol. 41 No. 4 AFRP 10-2, p.
21. 45 Based on remarks of Maj. Gen. Allen Peck, commandant of the
Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC).
Christine Harrison, ―Doctrine Center ‗Jump Starts‘ Irregular
Warfare Doctrine,‖ Air University Public Affairs.
March1,2007,
www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/127789/doctrine-center-jump-starts-irregular-warfare-doctrine/,
accessed October 19, 2014. 46 Commenting on this doctrine
developed by the U.S. Air force, Crane said that ―it is hardly
surprising, but frankly speaking, this publication is not a good
one. It emphasizes targeting and air strikes.‖ Crane Cassandra
in OZ: Counterinsurgency and Future War, 2016, p. 133. 47 By the
time when the symposium was held in April 2007, the difference
between conventional warfare and counterinsurgency or irregular
warfare was widely understood to a certain extent. Maj. Gen.
Richard Y.
Newton III, assistant deputy chief of staff for operations,
plans and requirements, Headquarters U.S. Air Force,
also stated at the symposium that counterinsurgency and
irregular warfare involve problems of people, not
fighting and ―It‘s about control of a population, not
necessarily control of an adversary’s force or territory.” Carl
Bergquist, ―Air University Hosts Counterinsurgency Symposium,‖ Air
University Public Affairs, April 30,2007,
www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/127038/air-university-hosts-counterinsurgency-symposium/,
accessed March 2, 2018. 48 Col Robyn Read, USAF, Retired,
―Irregular Warfare and the US Air Force: The Way Ahead,‖ Air
and
Space Power Journal, Winter 2007, Vol. XXI, No. 4 AFRP 10-1, pp.
41-42. 49 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 50 Ibid., p. 42. 51 John T. Farquhar,
―Air power and Irregular Warfare: A Battle of Ideas,‖ Byan Burke,
Michael Fowler,
Kevin McCaskey, ed., Military Strategy, Joint Operations, and
Airpower: An Introduction, Georgetown University Press, pp.
144-145. 52 For Dunlap‘s arguments and details of the discussions
about the counterinsurgency doctrine in the United
States, see Tetsuya Yano, Issues and Future Outlook for
Counterinsurgency Operations, NIDS Kiyo, Vol. 14, No.1, December
2011, pp. 39-63. 53 USAF, AFDD 2-3, 2007, p. vi. 54 While USAF,
AFDD 2-3, 2007, mainly covers counterinsurgency and building
partnership capacity of irregular warfare, the revised version of
the Air Force doctrine for irregular warfare issued in 2013 sets
forth
the five activities of Counterinsurgency (COIN),
Counterterrorism (CT), Foreign Internal Defence (FID),
Stability Operations (SO), Unconventional warfare (UW) as
activities included in irregular warfare, along with their
definitions. USAF, AFDD 2-3, 2013, pp. 5-8. 55 At the outset, USAF,
AFDD 2-3, 2007, introduces the remarks of Gen. Lemay that ―In this
type of war you
cannot – you must not – measure the effectiveness of the effort
by the number of bridges destroyed, buildings damaged, vehicles
burned, or any of the other standards that have been used for
regular warfare. The task is to
destroy the effectiveness of the insurgent‘s efforts and his
ability to use the population for his own ends.‖ Ibid.,
p. vi.
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Realities of U.S. Doctrine Development during the Iraq War
137
56 U.S. support currently provided to anti-government forces in
Syria falls under this category. 57 They include surveillance in
outer space and cyberspace. 58 USAF, AFDD 2-3, 2007, p. 10. 59 In
the following year of the issuance of the counterinsurgency
doctrine, Crane paid a visit to the U.S. forces
stationed in Iraq at the invitation of Petraeus, then commander
of the Multinational Force-Iraq, to evaluate the
new doctrine on the scenes of actual operations. Crane Cassandra
in OZ, 2016, p. 142.