Realism and the Bush Doctrine: Power, Polarisation and Prudence

REALISM AND THE BUSH DOCTRINE:

POWER, POLARISATION AND PRUDENCE

BY

VINCE A.M. KLÖSTERS

BACHELOR THESIS

AMERICAN STUDIES

RADBOUD UNIVERSITY, NIJMEGEN

DR. T.W. GIJSWIJT

JUNE 2011

1

Table of Contents

1. Introduction 2

2. Unipolarity and the Bush Doctrine: The Debate 4

2.1 Unipolarity and Its Critics 4

2.2 The Bush Doctrine 7

3 Classical Realism and the Bush Doctrine 10

3.1 A Brief (Pre-)History of Political Realism 10

3.2 Morgenthau's Six Principles of Political Realism 12

3.3 Morgenthau and the Balance of Power 14

3.4 Conclusion: hubris in foreign policy 15

4 Structural Realism and the Bush Doctrine 16

4.1 Structural Realist Theory 17

4.2 Waltz and the Constraints of Structure 18

4.3 The Unipole and Rational Foreign Policy 19

4.4 Conclusion: shaping the inevitable 21

5 Offensive Realism and the Bush Doctrine 22

5.1 Between Defence and Offence 23

5.2 The Offensive Turn 24

5.3 The Unipole and Power Projection 25

5.4 Conclusion: helping others help yourself 27

6 Conclusion 28

6.1 The Inadequacy of Political Realism 28

6.2 The Irrationality of the Bush Doctrine 30

Bibliography 32

2

1. Introduction

The strength of a structure is highly dependent upon the quality of the blueprint and

whether the blueprint was accurately followed during construction. As with buildings, states'

strength is also based on the materials they are made of and how these materials are used.1 At

the end of the Cold War, a window of opportunity opened for the United States to enjoy its

unipolar moment to the fullest and reinvent its foreign policy blueprint at will. A bipolar

world order, wherein the US and USSR were locked in an ideologically laced power struggle,

gave way to a world where the US was bound to be the sole superpower. No single country

had a realistic chance of catching up anytime soon, nor was forming a coalition of states to

curb US primacy a realistic endeavour, though this conclusion is more easily reached in

hindsight. Only the United States was capable of projecting its power across all oceans in

places of its own choosing, thereby influencing millions across the globe. The blueprints for

the usage of power varied over time as more options in foreign policy became available to US

policymakers. Optimism also arose about liberal democracy's supposed victory over its

competitors, as prominent philosopher Francis Fukuyama deemed Western democracy to be

the final stage of mankind's ideological evolution. And while it is easily argued that liberal

democracy is a flawed system, its competitors deserve even less merit.2

This window of opportunity, or unipolar moment, gave the US the chance to exert its

power in order to reshape and reconstruct the world to its own preferences. In other words,

ideological elements often merely used as window-dressing could now have a more

prominent role in deciding what kind of foreign policy to construct. The Bush Doctrine is one

of these ideologically loaded influences in recent American foreign policy conduct. Many

arguments can readily be found in favour of such sculpturing and even more cases can be

made against it. Organising this debate along theoretical lines will contribute to placing the

widely-felt effects of the Bush Doctrine in perspective. Also, a theoretical analysis is needed

in order to effectively categorise and analyse these arguments without arbitrary

presuppositions. By way of several political realist analyses, this paper will attempt to gauge

the effect of the Bush Doctrine on the status of the United States as the tallest and strongest

1 The term "state" is a neutral term to avoid oversimplifying every state as being a nation, as some are divided

between different nations. It does not refer to the constituents of a federal union. 2 See Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, “The Myth of the Authoritarian Model,” Foreign Affairs 87,

no. 1 (2008): 68-84.

3

building on the block. 3

As the sun rose over what some would have termed a second

American century, many other buildings were overshadowed by the Bush administration's

ideological supplements to its towering construct. Some of these, like fighting the Al Qaeda

threat, carried over from the Clinton administration, while others were specifically prioritised

by the Bush administration. These goals might have had their merits in different moral frames

of reference, but a political realist perspective will shed light on how they affected, and still

affect, the rational interests of the US as a state among others.

This thesis will attempt to structurally elucidate the Bush Doctrine's effect on the US'

position of primacy by way of classical realist, structural realist, and offensive realist

analyses, respectively. These various political realist theories have different nuances and will

focus on different aspects of the Bush Doctrine's effects. Classical realism has its roots in

ancient Greece, and was developed by Hans J. Morgenthau to facilitate the formulation of

correct behaviour for states in the international system. Structural realism, pioneered by

Kenneth N. Waltz, analyses the state from a systemic perspective, as it is a mere agent in the

structure of the international system. Other forms of realism, culminating in John J.

Mearsheimer's offensive realist theories, shed light on various geopolitical aspects and the

role of perception in relations of power. The prescriptive nature of these theories is present

throughout the three consecutive chapters, and the level of description is limited. Most forms

of realism cannot adequately explain the Bush Doctrine, as the Doctrine often seems to fall

outside the bounds of rational foreign policy. Theories of international relations, such as

realism, might not explain the actual construction of foreign policy, but they can indicate

what the blueprints for this construction should be. Deviating from this blueprint will lead to

a faulty structure, with the inevitable consequence of a devastating collapse, possibly

crushing the neighbourhood along with it. Ad hoc corrections of deviations might still be

possible, but they will merely extend the structure's life. The chapters with political realist

analyses and their foundational blueprints form the bulk of this paper, whilst the concluding

chapter will take a brief look inside the black box of US foreign policy construction, after

which the key points of the political realist analyses shall be reviewed to answer what the

effect of the Bush Doctrine was, and will be, on the US' position of power among its fellow

states in the past, and in the future. Firstly, however, the two main concepts of unipolarity and

the Bush Doctrine will be discussed in order to lay the groundwork for the realist analyses.

3 "Bush" refers to George W. Bush, unless mentioned otherwise.

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2. Unipolarity and the Bush Doctrine: The Debate

The theoretical concepts used to analyse real-world events and policies need to be

defined first in order to pave the way for a clear, unambiguous frame of reference. The

separate political realist theories which will be applied will be expanded upon in their

separate chapters, but the basic concepts used in this paper and the discussions surrounding

them will be elaborated upon in this chapter. These concepts will be problematised in order to

do justice to the discord between real world and the models or ideals they represent.

2.1 Unipolarity and Its Critics

The perception of a victory of liberal democracy empowered US values and shifted

the definition of globalisation towards Americanisation. No other ideology could credibly

claim the universalism that liberal democracy could after the Cold War, and Fukuyama

befittingly states that even the non-democracies will adopt the language of democracy to

legitimise their deviation from this dominant standard.4 Charles Krauthammer, the political

commentator who first coined the above-mentioned unipolar moment, stated that Fukuyama's

work was "bold, lucid, [and] scandalously brilliant."5 Unsurprisingly, after the end of the

Cold War, many predicted that the US would reign supreme.

These ideological elements are often closely entangled with the relations of power

between various states. Not only would American ideology reign supreme, but America's

power would eclipse that of all its competitors, as Krauthammer distanced himself from the

idea that the immediate post-Cold War world would be multipolar in his article on the

unipolar moment. No single country or coalition would be able to challenge US primacy, thus

giving rise to a moment wherein only a single state has the amount of power to form a

significant pole along which power flows. He considers the US the sole first-rank power,

capable of being "a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to

involve itself."6 Such involvement should then serve to reshape the world for the sake of

stability.7 This evangelical idealism would later be part of the Bush administration's foreign

4 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 2006): 45.

5 "End of History and the Last Man," accessed 29 Mar 2011,

http://books.simonandschuster.com/9780743284554. 6 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1991): 24.

7 Ibid., 29; Robert Jervis, “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 205;

Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion,” International Security 17, no. 4 (1993): 33.

5

policy, albeit in a more ideologically charged form.8 With Krauthammer as with Bush, one of

the major threats to this unipolarity is the proliferation of WMD.9 Parallel to this,

Krauthammer already foresaw the Bush administration's employment of coalitions of the

willing by stating that only the United States, backed by any volunteers, can tackle threats of

such magnitude.10

Thus, he gives the unipole an almost paragon-like status above other states,

shaping the world for the sake of stability as long as its moment of glory lasts. He only

briefly touches upon the idea that other states might not like being actively eclipsed by a

towering United States.

As such, many have developed a critique of this idea and definition of unipolarity,

which is riddled with normative judgements. Some of Krauthammer's critics argue that a

clearer definition is needed to make it workable. To this end, Samuel P. Huntington modifies

Krauthammer's definition by reformulating it as the uni-multipolar system. It comes down to

the same thing, but with more responsibilities and capabilities attributed to other major

powers. He also implicitly makes the distinction between the actual existence of unipolarity

and the perception of its existence.11

This seems to be an indirect outgrowth of the Thomas

theorem; if the US perceives itself to be the sole superpower, it will act as such. Nevertheless,

Huntington concludes that although the US indeed resembles Albright's indispensable nation,

other nations are certainly not dispensable. Many other actors in the international system

consider the US to be something quite different than the indispensable nation it often purports

itself to be.12

This may stir, in the uni-multipolar world, a coalition of states which will

attempt to balance against the US. As there is a significant debate on whether balancing is

actually occurring,13

it is sufficient to observe that not all major states are satisfied with the

US' foreign policy conduct and that certain US actions may fuel this dissatisfaction. Different

interpretations of the so-called polarity of the system will lead to different predictions for

states' behaviour. A truly unipolar system would favour everyone following the unipole's

8 United States Government, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (White House Office,

September 2002): 3, 13-16. See the next section on the Bush Doctrine. 9 Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," 30; "National Security Strategy," 6.

10 Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," 32.

11 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (1999): 37.

12 Ibid., 42; Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," 46; Kenneth N. Waltz, “America as Model for the World? A Foreign

Policy Perspective,” PS: Political Science and Politics 24, no. 4 (1991): 669. 13

See, for example, Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing,” International Security 30,

no. 1 (2005); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International

Security 30, no. 1 (2005); Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30,

no. 1 (2005); T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 1 (2005).

6

lead, whilst a multipolar system would feature widespread competition and balancing

behaviour. The main issue here is which definition of unipolarity will be used as a backdrop

to the political realist analyses.

With Huntington's added insights, unipolarity will merely be defined as the situation

in which there is a single superpower, with no other state having the power and concurrent

realistic interests to directly challenge this primacy. Aside from this, there is a significant

collective action problem which prevents states from forming a balancing coalition against

the US.14

Such a definition purposely does not include the broader ideological aspects as

included in some definitions of hegemony and the various judgements on what goals the

unipole should have, as it merely describes the degree of US primacy.15

True unipolarity

would require the absence of other states with any capacity to act in the international system.

The rising great powers still have the capacity to successfully deter the unipole in their own

region, thus giving them some sort of minor pole along which power flows. As long as power

flows along various other actors in the international system, it is not fully unipolar.

Unipolarity will simply be used throughout this paper, because achieving true unipolarity is

practically impossible and adding various prefixes and disclaimers would be redundant. Also,

this definition by itself does not say anything about the durability of unipolarity, as various

political scientists predict different futures, but most agree that significant global competitors

will come in time or are already present.16

Based on these observations, it is beyond doubt

that the United States enjoys a position of superior power compared to its peers, even today.

In addition, states often pretend to be or aspire to become liberal democracies, even as talk of

Asian values arose. These norms have a prominent position in the political discourse, even as

they are proclaimed by the unipole, which empowers them to the point that they can constrain

the unipole itself.17

These strongly backed norms also inspire peoples around the world to

actually pursue the goal of implementing them, as we have seen in the Maghreb and Middle

14

Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World out of Balance (Princeton: University Press, 2008): 36-

37; Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” The National Interest, no. 70 (2002): 8-9;

William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 25. 15

This definition is in line with Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth's definition as put forth in G. John

Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic

Consequences,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 3. 16

Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," 23; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion," 45; Christopher

Layne, “US Hegemony in a Unipolar World: Here to Stay or Sic Transit Gloria?,” International Studies Review

11, no. 4 (2009): 784-787. 17

Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).

7

East, though not everyone supports these norms.18

Still, the only relatively plausible

assumption used is that the US is currently the most powerful state in the world with no

single realistic challenger or challenging coalition.

2.2 The Bush Doctrine

Our world as it is conceptualised here thus consists of various great powers with

influence in their own region and interdependence with various other states in the

international system, with most of the power flowing along the unipole. This implies that the

unipole is not invincible, and that the degree of unipolarity can, and often will, slowly shift

towards a system wherein another pole gains sufficient power to tilt the system towards bi- or

multipolarity. Various great powers (especially the PRC) are balancing internally and are

exerting themselves beyond their respective regions, which indicates that such a shift is

presently occurring and that the relative amount of power flowing along the unipole is

decreasing.19

The basic definition of the Bush Doctrine entails pursuing global dominance,

preventing the rise of threats in the form of rogue states and terrorists, and spreading

democracy to prolong US supremacy. These goals seem both rational and idealistic, but the

pursuit of these goals is not without its side-effects. The following definition and

contextualisation of the Bush Doctrine will lay the groundwork for further political realist

analyses of the Doctrine's effects on (the acceleration) of the shifts in power surrounding US

preponderance.

Historically, the US has never wished to entangle itself in regions far from its shores,

but this sentiment often clashed with idealistic outgrowths of a manifest destiny for the

United States as its power, and concurrent interests, grew.20

As Bush has reportedly stated,

"[w]e have an opportunity to restructure the world toward freedom, and we have to get it

right."21

However, if restructuring the world means burning the fuel for power while polluting

everyone's perception of oneself, it is better to save such fuel for strengthening the foundation

of one's place in the international system as the dominant power. Nonetheless, such

restructuring is inherently part of the Bush Doctrine.

18

Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 202. 19

Also, most other (potential) great powers are located near their rivals, making their potential rise to

superpower status a case of delicate strategy infused with miscalculations. See the debate on balance of threat in

Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited,” International Security 31, no. 2 (2006): 15, 20-22. 20

As George Washington so succinctly stated in his 1796 Farewell Address: "It is our true policy to steer clear

of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." 21

Quoted in Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 206.

8

In order to narrow the scope sufficiently, the Bush Doctrine's definition will be further

distilled from the rhetoric employed by the Bush administration. This rhetoric is embedded

into the 2002 National Security Strategy, as well as George W. Bush' speeches. The two

tenets of democratisation and (unilateral) pre-emption must be closely scrutinised to make a

correct political realist analysis possible. George W. Bush already laid down a key

component of his doctrine prior to the tragic events of 9/11. As with the aforementioned

coalitions of the willing, Krauthammer correctly predicted that an important element of the

Bush Doctrine would be unilateralism in US foreign policy.22

Concurrently, Bush' perception

of America's position in the world is in line with Krauthammer's idea of unipolarity. This

unilateralism might be used to support movements for freedom abroad and the US expects

everyone to fulfil their obligations in fighting terrorists, which are other key aspects of pre-

emption.23

Projecting liberal democratic norms upon the world, Bush also states that

"freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation," implying a willingness

to participate in regime change for the sake of freedom.24

The position of superior power

which the US enjoys also makes it easier for it to decide on "tackling" countries harbouring

terrorists, prioritising those on the verge of acquiring WMD.25

Of course, such a normatively loaded quasi-Manichean worldview is not susceptible

to nuance. These means all serve to attain the goal of preventing new threats from arising, for

such threats could not only endanger human lives, but also encroach upon American national

interests. 26

Minimising threats to human lives is, by most definitions, a good thing, but

employing preventive strikes against potential threats begs the question on where the line

must be drawn between an actual and a potential threat.

On the geopolitical level, as manifested in the third tenet of preserving dominance, the

Bush Doctrine promotes the forward deployment of US forces to show commitment to

22

Charles Krauthammer, "In American foreign policy: a new motto: Don't ask. Tell.," CNN insidepolitics, 28

February 2001, accessed 27 March 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2001/03/05/doctrine.html. 23

"National Security Strategy," 3-4, 7. 24

George W. Bush, "The State of the Union" (speech delivered before Congress on 28 January 2003,

Washington, D.C.), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030128-

19.html. 25

"National Security Strategy," 5-6; George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the

American People (speech delivered before Congress on 20 September 2001, Washington, D.C.),

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html 26

"National Security Strategy," 14; George W. Bush, "West Point Graduation Speech," (speech delivered at the

US Military Academy on 1 June, 2002, West Point, NY), http://georgewbush-

whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html.

9

friends and determination to foes.27

Together with unilateralism, this forward deployment is

one of the enabling conditions for attaining the ideological goals (i.e. democratisation) of the

Bush Doctrine. Promoting the fundamental right of freedom, combating terrorists and

ensuring the non-proliferation of WMD are thus key ideological elements of the foreign

policy rhetoric under George W. Bush. To be fair, many of the Doctrine's ideological goals

are praiseworthy, as many would like to enjoy the rights laid down in the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. Aside from this, the primary strategic goal seems to be in line

with most political realist expectations of a rational egoist great power, as US forces must be

strong enough to dissuade others' "hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United

States."28

Most elements of the Bush Doctrine were lauded by supporters of the Project for

the New American Century, including Krauthammer and Fukuyama, who saw the three tenets

as being a significant contribution in maintaining American dominance.29

The US being the

sole first-rank power, however, means that such elements in foreign policy are not always

fruitful in a situation of unipolarity.

Whether the means employed succeeded in dissuading others from challenging the US

will be the key subject of analysis in this paper, as the main question is whether the Bush

Doctrine was counterproductive in maintaining unipolarity. To facilitate a focused analysis,

the political realist critique on the above-stated definition of the Bush Doctrine will be

supplemented by examples drawn from the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The US legitimised this

intervention by appealing to one of the Bush Doctrine's key tenets, halting the spread of

WMD, combined with an appeal to UN Security Council resolution 1441 in a speech that

Colin Powell considers to be a "blot on his record."30

A coalition of the willing joined under

these auspices to secure Iraq, even while the weapons inspection commission failed to find

evidence of WMD present.31

No WMD were found after the occupation by this coalition.

Neither was there any evidence of Iraq supporting members of the terrorist network Al

Qaeda, and it is questionable whether the Iraqi human rights situation improved after the

27

"National Security Strategy," 29. 28

Layne, "Unipolar Illusion Revisited," 13; Quote is from "National Security Strategy," 30. 29

William Kristol, et al., "Letter to President Bush on the War on Terrorism," Project for the New American

Century, 20 September 2001, accessed 18 June 2011, http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm. 30

Quoted in "Powell calls pre-Iraq U.N. speech a 'blot' on his record," USA Today, 8 September 2005, accessed

15 March 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-09-08-powell-iraq_x.htm. 31

Hans Blix, "Presentation on the inspection effort in Iraq" (speech delivered before the UN Security Council on

7 March 2003), http://articles.cnn.com/2003-03-07/us/sprj.irq.un.transcript.blix_1_inspection-effort-unmovic-

unscom?_s=PM:US.

10

invasion, as millions of people were displaced from their homes.32

Regime change has been

achieved and democracy has been brought to Iraq, but the durability of stable democracy in

Iraq is widely contested.33

The efforts under the War on Terror had a mixed success at best,

and cost the US nearly one and a half trillion dollars, which could also have been invested in

strengthening its lagging education system or cutting its deficit spending, arguably leading to

a more solid position among its competitors.34

A political realist scrutiny will contribute to

determining where it all went wrong, what should have been and what can be done about it.

3. Classical Realism and the Bush Doctrine

Political realism has a rich and diverse history, even though it has only been

developed as a distinct theory in the twentieth century. It is often associated with an

inherently negative worldview, assuming that conflict is inevitable as interests collide.

Though it is relatively easy to formulate the independent core of this school, there have been

several influential authors who have (re-)shaped perceptions of international and domestic

politics by contributing to the political realist canon. This chapter will mainly focus on

applying contemporary classical realist theory to the Bush Doctrine and gauging whether a

state following classical realist guidelines would have done the same. However, in order to

understand the nature of contemporary classical realism, a brief history will be presented first

to provide an overview of various realist insights.

3.1 A Brief (Pre-)History of Political Realism

A key premise of political realism is that power matters. Everything, from ideology to

diplomacy, revolves around the implicit or explicit use of power. Without a significant

measure of power, an actor in the international system will have less freedom of action, as

32

Kevin M. Woods, et al., "Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents,"

Federation of American Scientists Iraqi Perspectives Project, November 2007, accessed 15 March 2011,

http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/iraqi/index.html; "Iraq: No Let-up In the Humanitarian Crisis," International

Committee of the Red Cross, March 2008, accessed 15 March 2011. http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/

icrc-iraq-report-0308-eng.pdf. 33

Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied (Columbia: University

Press, 2003): 167-170; Bruce E. Moon, “Long Time Coming: Prospects for Democracy in Iraq,” International

Security 33, no. 4 (2009): 137-143; Julia Schofield and Micah Zenko, “Designing a Secure Iraq: A US Policy

Prescription,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2004):681-683; Moon 137-143; 34

Roger C. Altman and Richard N. Haass, “American Profligacy and American Power,” Foreign Affairs 89, no.

6 (2010); Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since

9/11” (Congressional Research Service, 29 March, 2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf.

11

the ancient Greek historian Thucydides so saliently stated in the oft-cited Melian Dialogue:

"[Q]uestions of justice only arise when there is equal power to compel: in terms of

practicality the dominant exact what they can and the weak concede what they must."35

This

phrase has often been (re-)formulated as "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer

what they must." In contrast to normative international relations theories, realism deals with

the world as it would rationally operate, and does not say anything about the moral

desirability of such actions. According to Hobbes and Machiavelli, the strong simply have

more to say about what justice exactly is, and therefore, the definitions of 'good' and 'evil' are

relative, as good arms precede the capacity to formulate good laws.36

The nature of power is also inherently zero-sum in most political realist theories,

which gives rise to major uncertainties about others' motivations. Because the power calculus

is zero-sum, "he who is the cause of another man's greatness, is himself undone."37

In

international politics (or: inter-citystate politics in Machiavelli's time), there is so much at

stake that it is crucial to depend on worst-case scenarios of others' motivations, hence: trust is

scarce and fleeting. Such distrust inhibits free cooperation, even if both parties would gain

from a transaction. This element of international relations stems from the realist perception of

the world as lacking a hierarchic structure. In a situation of anarchy, Thomas Hobbes'

statement that "every man is Enemy to every man" can be safely extrapolated to the global

level. As Hobbes proclaims, the fruits of (mutually) divided labour are uncertain,38

and

cooperation will only form out of self-interest, with the agreement being regulated by the

parties' relative power. These developments lead to the key terms of political realism: that

everything is dependent upon power and the world is rife with uncertainty, and that man is

wont to pursue his self-interest driven by power. Whether such a situation is desirable is

irrelevant, this is the world as it is, and realism tries to provide a framework for dealing with

it. The first political realist perspective combines the brief history of thoughts into guiding

principles for political conduct, and still leaves some room for a broad definition of power.

35

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Martin Hammond (Oxford: University Press, 2009): 302. 36

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Dover, 2006): 29; Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. N.H.

Thompson (New York: Dover, 1992): 35. 37

Machiavelli, The Prince, 8. 38

Hobbes, Leviathan, 70.

12

3.2 Morgenthau's Six Principles of Political Realism

Hans J. Morgenthau's classical realist work Politics Among Nations is a seminal work

in the evolution of political realism. Written after a devastating Second World War, it lays

down the basic principles on which future realists have mostly based their prescriptions on

what a rational state's behaviour would be in order to avoid total war. Of course, Morgenthau

is well known for his criticism regarding the Vietnam War, and the fact that many compare

the war in Iraq to the war in Vietnam might make the general outcome of this analysis

predictable, because the arguments used against the Vietnam War can be similarly employed

against the Iraq War. However, his work provides a framework through which key errors in

statesmanship can be identified. This makes the analysis more than simply concluding that

the Bush Doctrine is "wrong." And while Morgenthau had not yet developed the modern

structural idea of the international system, his principles of political realism can still be

applied to measure the effect of the Bush Doctrine on the power base of the US, thus

generating a conclusion on how its position of unipolarity was affected. Putting this in

distinctly relative terms is left to structural realism.

Morgenthau's "Six Principles of Political Realism" form the backbone of Politics

Among Nations. These principles are present throughout his work, and can be summarised as

follows. The first principle assumes the existence of objective, rational laws of politics which

are grounded in human nature. Politics is an "autonomous sphere of action" in which interests

collide and interact to shape the balance of power, according to the second principle (also

embedded in the sixth principle). He purposely avoids focusing on motives: George W. Bush'

motives in changing the Iraqi regime might well have been good, but good motives do not

necessarily result in good policies, however these may be defined. The third principle defines

power and interest as inherently dynamic. The content of these concepts can change over

time, and the concurrent manifestations of power politics are dependent upon the entities

exercising power in the international system.39

Thus, for Morgenthau, rational policies are

better policies than those influenced by the ideological whims of man, because they most

successfully pursue the state's interests.40

The first and third principles mainly lay down the assumptions of classical realism.

The second principle can readily be applied to contemporary politics. However, as

Morgenthau states, focusing on the motives and ideological aspects of the statesmen will lead

39

Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006): 10-11. 40

Ibid., 5-7.

13

us astray. Nevertheless, he also states that "statesmen [...] may well make a habit of

presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic and political sympathies in

order to gain popular support for them," which is not in line with rational approaches.41

Later

in his work, he also states that the statesman's mind is different from the popular mind, and

must be concerned primarily with longer-term rational goals. In the US, as he admits, this is

far from easy due to the frequent elections which require a degree of (promises of) short-term

satisfaction. Nevertheless, a statesman must distance himself from the whims of his own

morality and those induced by PACs and lobby groups, as will be touched upon in the

concluding chapter. Morgenthau prescribes a not wholly unexpected compromise as a

solution: good foreign policy must not be sacrificed for the sake of pampering public opinion,

but foreign policy can never be good if it is too far removed from popular opinion.42

Arguably, the Bush Doctrine was not entirely steered by public opinion, but it was

substantially supported by it. The execution of the Doctrine used the incredible wave of

sympathy in global public opinions and domestic popular voices after 9/11 to invade

Afghanistan. The invasion of Iraq, however, was a bridge too far. After some time, the

aforementioned lack of international legitimacy and domestic support had given rise to the

Bush Doctrine's violation of the second part of the above-proposed compromise. Classical

realism is not a consequential theory. As such, irrational foreign policy with positive

consequences would still be unwise foreign policy. Thus, neither did the Doctrine entail

following rational, long-term goals, as such it did not comprise "good" foreign policy, nor did

it enjoy broad public support after the veil of sympathy disappeared.

In classical realist terms this invariably leads to the conclusion that the Bush Doctrine

and the Iraq War are inferior to a rational foreign policy. These conclusions are not shocking,

nor are they unexpected. However, Morgenthau also gives further clues on what constitutes

good foreign policy. As implied above, such foreign policy must not include morality, for a

statesman does not have the right to jeopardise his country for morals which are not fully

accepted, according to the fourth principle.43

Therefore, only a simple mind would view the

world in terms of absolute good and evil.44

Again, this is a major critique of the Bush

Doctrine and its neoconservative benefactors. Bush not only stated that "either you are with

us, or you are with the terrorists," but such thinking was also embedded in the national

41

Ibid., 6. 42

Ibid., 159-161. 43

Ibid., 12. 44

Ibid., 159.

14

security strategy.45

This policy also contrasts with the fifth principle, which dictates that no

nation can credibly lay claim to the morality that governs the universe. By declaring those not

on the side of the US to be enemies of freedom, Bush also violated this principle. If we were

to focus on motives, we could approve of Bush' policies because of their potentially good

intentions, but the policy effects were entirely different. The major error here is that US

actions with political effects were imbued with moral judgements and became part of the

National Security Strategy, inevitably affecting others who might not subscribe to this

specific morality.

3.3 Morgenthau and the Balance of Power

A more abstract level of political action, which will be discussed in detail in the next

chapter, is also described by Morgenthau. He elaborates upon the existence of a balance of

power, which all states seek to preserve in order to maintain stability and prevent the

destruction of a multitude of states.46

The only relevant dyads of conflict are those between

states, for they are the constituents of this balance of power. The Bush Doctrine contains

elements of policy focused on incoherent non-state actors. Such terminology leads to

incredibly complex problems of interpretation. As stated in the National Security Strategy,

there would be no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbour them.

Stability in the balance of power is thus subordinated to the fight against an incoherent foe,

and no state could be certain that it was not (perhaps accidentally) "knowingly harbouring

terrorists." Iraq was initially one of these states, but other states could not be certain as to

whether they would eventually be labelled a rogue state. Such preventive war is not

condemned by classical realism if it inhibits another great power from becoming a threat, but

preventive war against incoherent non-state actors will only raise uncertainty about one's

intentions amongst friends and foes alike,47

which is a key factor conducive to conflict. And,

as implied before, the worldview as expressed in the 2002 National Security Strategy is an

example of generalisation and polarisation, because it is easier to label the enemy as simply

being evil, even while this does an incredible injustice to reality. As with the Viet Cong in the

Vietnam War, these forms of terrorism are also expressions of a multitude of other sentiments

45

George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session"; "National Security Strategy," 3-4, 7. 46

Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 179-181. 47

Ibid., 216, 220.

15

such as nationalism and discontent.48

A balance of power "that favors freedom" is therefore a

contradictio in terminis,49

and the Bush Doctrine is again irrational in failing to take into

account the United States´ relative position among states instead of terrorist groups. Thus,

invading Iraq not only caused unnecessary instability in the region and the international

system as a whole, it also gave other groups and states further ammunition to discredit the

United States. In fact, the Bush Doctrine has even enabled other states to forcibly remove

thorns in their sides under the guise of combating "terrorism," thereby further incurring

damage to its credibility and power base.50

In the end, as the structural realist analysis will

show, the War on Terror might even have shifted the balance of power in favour of

provoking conflicts, as the intentions of the lone superpower have become even harder to

discern and other great powers have an increased incentive to revise the balance of power in

the international system.

3.4 Conclusion: hubris in foreign policy

The strategic errors in the Bush Doctrine, the primacy of morality in substituting

rationality, and the disregard of international legitimacy by forming coalitions of the willing

lead to a simple classical realist advice for future conduct: to act with prudence. An extension

of the fourth principle states that alternative courses of action in international politics must be

duly considered. As will be touched upon in the concluding chapter, this was not entirely the

case. A state should protect its interests, and these interests are determined by the position of

the state relative to others. It should therefore never forget the power-related consequences of

moral actions. By following policies inspired by a self-proclaimed role as the paragon of

freedom, the Bush administration violated the principles of classical realism and

unnecessarily disturbed an already favourable balance of power.51

It induced further

uncertainty towards allies and competitors alike, and its intervention in Iraq merely served to

48

Hans J. Morgenthau, "We Are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam," New York Times Magazine, 18 April 1965,

accessed 25 March 2011, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam/hans'.htm. 49

Cf. "National Security Strategy," 1; the balance of power is between states and can only favour stability or

war 50

Matthew Forney, "China's New Terrorists," Time, 16 September 2002, accessed 25 March 2011,

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,351276,00.html; "China 'crushing Muslim Uighurs'," BBC

News, 12 April 2005, accessed 25 March 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4435135.stm; W.

Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong, "The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense," The

American Journal of International Law 100, no. 3 (2006): 546. 51

Note that the "balance of power" has no fixed definition. Some structural realists define it as a fixed situation

which is impossible under unipolarity, while Morgenthau sees it as permanently and dynamically extant.

16

cause further ambiguity about US regional intentions instead of securing a favourable balance

of power. Classical realism does not look inside the black box which represents the state in

realist theories, but even if it did, it would find grave tactical mistakes and the way in which

post-war stable states (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan) were to be formed.52

And while realism

traditionally does not consider international institutions, the unilateralism practiced under the

guise of the Bush Doctrine towards Iraq has severely damaged the US' national character. As

a final judgement, Morgenthau considers this national character and parallel quality of

government to be the most important and most elusive components of power.53

Good

statesmanship is essential in preserving such character and quality of government. Thus,

under the definition of unipolarity proposed above, the Bush administration has undermined

its own relative power position and given others an incentive to step up balancing efforts as

US intentions are clouded in rhetoric. Other states' intentions might also have been unclear,

but American global efforts simply have more significant effects because of the sheer power

backing them. At its moment of unipolarity, the United States succumbed to hubris, which,

according to classical realism, will negatively affect its power base due to the corrosion of

national character caused by a lack of rational policies.

4. Structural Realism and the Bush Doctrine

Until the advent of structural realism, most realists extrapolated the rules of domestic

politics to international politics. While Morgenthau defined international politics as an

"autonomous sphere of action," he based his principles of realism on human nature. This

indirectly led to the assumption that the dominant actors in international politics are states, as

they are the most powerful entities in this autonomous sphere of action. While no realist

would deny that states are the principal actors in the international system, there are those who

attribute a lot of the enabling conditions to the structure of the international system. To

represent this theoretical perspective, these realists are labelled structural realists. This

chapter will scrutinise the way in which the US and its Bush Doctrine interacted with the

52

Critical errors were the small number of troops deployed and the way in which the Iraqi army was disbanded

and allowed to keep its armaments. See Michael Gordon and Bernard Traior, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the

Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2004); Larry Diamond, "What Went Wrong in Iraq?,"

Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (2004); D.L. Philips, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (Boulder:

Westview, 2005): 198-199. 53

Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 215.

17

structure of the international system, and vice versa. Relevant aspects of one of the major

contributors to structural realism will first be discussed to lay down the theoretical framework

to focus this scrutiny. Towards the end of the chapter, the role of the US according to

structural realism will be discussed in order to contrast the actual situation with the actions

prescribed by structural realism.

4.1 Structural Realist Theory

Many intricate mechanisms are at work in most structural realist theories. Kenneth N.

Waltz first published Man, the State and War in 1959, which proposed three different levels

of analysis in politics. The first and second level describe the realm of individual and

domestic forces on international politics, respectively. They determine policy, but the effects

of this policy on the state's international position cannot be understood without the third

image. This is where Waltz departs from Morgenthau's insights. The third image, or the

structure of international politics, contextualises and gives meaning to the forces of policy.

Kenneth N. Waltz' Theory of International Politics is a groundbreaking work in the legacy of

political realism, which expands upon this third, structural level. Published in 1979, it posited

that the lack of an international government gives rise to the anarchic, amoral nature of this

structure. Morgenthau would attribute the actions of states to human nature, while Waltz

attributes these to the rational response of pressure from the international system.54

In Waltz' theory of international politics, the structure determines the outcomes which

could rationally be expected if states would respond to systemic pressure. Usually, these

incentives are so great that ignoring them would lead to thoroughly bad outcomes for the

states themselves. The relationships between the actors constituting a structure also determine

the structure's nature, and the structure simultaneously narrows down the range of favourable

outcomes available to its constituents. There is also a kind of evolutionary logic to this

system, as successful practices will be copied and states will be forced to act alike in order to

survive. Not only are grand strategies copied, but institutional arrangements (such as liberal

democracy) are imitated or feigned in order to follow in the footsteps of these best

practices.55

As for a state's role in the international system, it would be unwise to specialise in

a certain area, as it may be overrun by competitors in other areas. For Waltz, the only factor

54

Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959): 235-238; Kenneth

N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland, 2010): 72. 55

Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," 17.

18

differentiating states from one another is the amount of power they possess.56

Consequently,

change in the international system is caused by a change of arrangement, which is caused by

changes in relative power positions. The structural idea that the international system first

entered a bipolar arrangement after the demise of the European powers in the post-WWII

period and that it entered a unipolar phase after the collapse of the USSR is a descendant of

Waltzian structural realism. This leads to the following implications of power in Waltz'

theory: absolute power is determined by a state's domestic characteristics, whilst relative

power is determined by its position in the international system. The former means that a

state's demographic, economic and military characteristics and capacities determine the

amount of power a state has. Such power is only meaningful when compared to the power of

other states, which is where relative power comes in.57

States seek to preserve their position

in the system in order to guarantee their security.58

In contrast to Morgenthau's classical

realism, states do not strive to prevent the destruction of a multitude of units, instead they

seek their own survival, and the structure of the system is maintained by these actions. Thus,

the basic premise of Waltzian structural realism is that states seek to emulate each other's best

practices in order to preserve their own relative position, while the polarity of the system is

determined by the number of great powers.

4.2 Waltz and the Constraints of Structure

Such a theoretical framework remains quite abstract and is not accurate in predicting

specific foreign policy outcomes. Theories of foreign policy are needed to pin down the

processes which determine the behaviour of states within the constraints set for them by the

structure of the international system. Having determined earlier that the international system

is currently unipolar, a safe conclusion can be made on the point of structural constraints

acting on the US and its construction of foreign policy. Whereas dangers in a multipolar

system entail an escalation of miscalculations in international affairs due to the many

variables, and those in a bipolar system come down to a rigidified stalemate, the dangers of a

unipolar system are caused by a lack of constraints on the unipole.59

As Waltz himself

proclaims, "one cannot assume that the leaders of a nation superior in power will always

56

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 74-76, 92. 57

Ibid., 98. 58

Ibid., 126. 59

Ibid., 202-207; Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International Security 25, no. 1

(2000): 24.

19

define policies with wisdom."60

Waltz is in agreement with Morgenthau that the possession

of great power is not always supported by the possession of great wisdom. This lack of

wisdom means that the more powerful a state gets relative to its competitors, the more

freedom of action it has in pursuing irrational and counterproductive foreign policy.

The nature of power in structural realist theory resembles a game of Risk. States may

have a huge stockpile of arms and effective means of deploying them. They may even be able

to use these to conquer the world. The inherent goal of power is to deter or to destroy, if

necessary. Moreover, too much power might even fail to deter and instead promote

opposition. A state may use power to establish control over a territory, but establishing

control within it is near-impossible.61

The US misconception that it could pacify Iraq and

establish effective control was not only doomed by misconduct,62

but it was bound to fail

beforehand because being able to project power across the globe does not mean that it can be

used constructively. The US could afford to act upon such perceptions, however, because of

its immense superiority over its competitors.

4.3 The Unipole and Rational Foreign Policy

These theoretical propositions lead to a simple conclusion on the Bush Doctrine and

the Iraq War. The implications are effectively formulated by Kenneth Waltz himself, as

"states that enjoy a margin of power over their closest competitors are led to pay

undue attention to minor dangers and to pursue fancies abroad that reach beyond the

fulfilment of interests narrowly defined in terms of security."63

He applied this to the war in Vietnam, and it is equally applicable to the war in Iraq. A lack of

constraints leads to room for reckless idealism in foreign policy.64

Whereas such endeavours

would not have any significant domestic effects, other states might feel that these actions

threaten their interests. Such a conclusion mirrors Morgenthau's insights, but the pressure on

the US' competitors mainly arises from the structure in Waltzian realism. States feel that the

unipole is exerting too much of its power and see a realistic chance of catching up. On a more

regional level, even local powers might feel the need to counter the unipole as the regional

power feels threatened by the unipole's caprices, evidenced by the persistent (nuclear)

60

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 201. 61

Ibid., 187-188. 62

See fn. 52. 63

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 205. 64

Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism," 24.

20

assertiveness of Iran.65

The unipole is the single most powerful state, but it is not omniscient,

nor is it omnipotent. In addition to Waltzian insights, one could posit the notion that states

join the American bandwagon, riding along freely as long as they have no realistic chance of

catching up (which is the current state of unipolarity), but they will slowly shift to balancing

efforts once they realise that they are gaining in relative power (which is a shift to bi- or

multipolarity, arguably also occurring presently).66

However, in forming balancing coalitions,

one plus one does not equal two, as much is lost in inefficiency and uncertainty. But in the

end, either the sum of a potential coalition minus this inefficiency will surpass the threshold

to start balancing, or a single state will do so. This leads to an added danger for the unipole in

exercising power abroad, since other states' antagonism and mistrust will carry over into the

new multipolar structure of the world.67

The small line in the National Security Strategy

declaring that others should be dissuaded from surpassing US power leads to a paradox in

which acquiring more visible power and attempting to prevent others from attaining it will

lead to extra efforts by those others to balance against the US. For while the US might not

feel pressured by the international system, others will feel this oftentimes overprotective

ceiling pushing down on them, tempting them to push back before the ceiling starts depriving

them of the space to move.

Structural realism thus has an inclination against the unipolar system. Competitors

will eventually arise and unipolarity will slowly shift into bi- or multipolarity. Building on

the insights gained by classical realism, prudence should be exercised in foreign policy in

order prevent unnecessary antagonisation of future peers. Structural realism prescribes a

minimalist foreign policy in order to prolong the moment of unipolarity and to prevent a bias

towards conflict once multipolarity dawns. Not only will exercising massive amounts of

power lead to others free-riding and being antagonised at the same time, it will also accelerate

the decline of unipolarity because the dominant state overpays for its security while others

profit from it.68

Such security is arguably not even real, as it easily threatens others' interests

and sets a precedent for future massive expenditures of power in endeavours across the globe.

Regardless, the fact that the Bush Doctrine is a unilateral affair at times is less problematic

65

Jeremy Pressman, “Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle

East,” International Security 33, no. 4 (2009): 152, 165. 66

This is an extension of the argument put forward by Brooks and Wohlforth that balance-of-power theory does

not apply to the US, see Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance, 23, 35-36. 67

Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," 46. 68

Ibid., 34; Jervis, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," 195.

21

within structural realism than within classical realism. Unilateral interventions are supported

by structural realist theory if they serve to maintain the relative power position of the state in

question, whilst classical realism would abhor such actions if it entailed destabilising the

system and destroying several states in the process. The unilateral part of the Bush Doctrine

does not add anything, however. Unilateral action is only useful when a multilateral solution

cannot be found, and when not acting at all would have negative consequences for the US'

relative position. An intervention in Iraq, chasing figureheads of terrorist organisations while

violating states' national sovereignty, and ramping up forward deployment without another

pole to balance against arguably fall under the category of "fancies abroad" and do not serve

to stabilise the US' position in the world.

So what then? Will not the perils of domestic politics interfere too much in foreign

policy conduct? Is not the demise of the US as the lone superpower a foregone conclusion? In

a sense it is. But this realisation in itself can be a valuable tool in foreign and domestic policy

conduct. Realism does not say anything about domestic specifics, but an inference can be

made from its theoretical notions to suggest a course of action both abroad and at home.

Instead of engaging in pre-emptive strikes against foreign threats which might never have

materialised anyway, the US should engage in pre-emptive internal balancing. As Layne

suggested nearly two decades ago, "redressing the internal causes of relative decline would

be perceived by others as less threatening than a strategy of preponderance."69

This is the best

broad advice that any realist could have given the Bush administration. Shifting resources

from unnecessary foreign engagements has the added advantage that entanglements with

foreign conflicts can be avoided as well. Therefore, maintaining the nation's security while

focusing on internal development to preclude others from gaining a significant advantage is

one of the key tenets of a rational foreign policy for the unipole in general.

4.4 Conclusion: shaping the inevitable

Inevitability of structure does not mean inevitability of content. The nature of future

bi- or multipolar relations will be shaped by the actions of the unipole in its contemporary

circumstances. The Bush Doctrine has unnecessarily entangled the US in conflicts abroad,

reduced investments in the foundation of its position in the international system, and has

given others more cause to step up balancing efforts. These problematic aspects have already

been briefly highlighted by classical realism, but the theoretical framework of structural

69

Layne, "Unipolar Illusion," 46.

22

realism adds a level of analysis which is capable of including systemic pressures and effects.

Instead of spending huge amounts of economic and military resources on futile efforts

abroad, the unipole should strengthen its foundations by investing in education, research, and

a peaceful vision for the future. The latter is not so much a realist advice as it is an advice to

use the bit of hierarchy induced in the international system to further everyone's concrete best

interests. Such visions may encompass a range of issues, from tackling various difficult peace

processes to further development in inspiring endeavours such as space travel and medicine.

These precepts actually fit within the classical realist notion of national character, but fall

outside of structural realism's definition of power. Further discussion on how the unipole

might lead international cooperation falls within the sphere of Keohane's neoliberal

institutionalism, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, advice for a rational

foreign policy would merely contain the two elements of (1) not spending power on un- or

even counterproductive endeavours, and (2) actually spending it on those quests which

strengthen the state's position in the international system. Under classical realism, this would

simply be known as prudence, and the latter point could be supplemented by investing in

one's national character.

5. Offensive Realism and the Bush Doctrine

Between Morgenthau's publication of Politics Among Nations and the present, much

has been added to the realist theoretical canon. Whereas Morgenthau left room for a broad

definition of power, Waltz pinned down the elements of power to specific material aspects.

Later theories have also modified the definition and purpose of power, whilst others have

changed the content of balancing theory and the actors within it. The last political realist

theory to be discussed is John J. Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism. While it is

technically part of the structural realist category, it has some distinct characteristics which

justify the new label of offensive realism. Waltz' structural realism would then be defined as

a form of defensive realism. This chapter will briefly track some major developments in

political realist theory until Mearsheimer's work, applying these to the contemporary situation

where relevant. The documentation of these developments is by no means exhaustive, and

merely serves to place Mearsheimer's perspective in context. The characteristics of

Mearsheimer's offensive realism will be laid down in the sections thereafter, as Mearsheimer

builds upon and reacts against these developments.

23

5.1 Between Defence and Offence

The parsimonious nature of Waltzian structural realism makes for a clear theory, but it

has its disadvantages, as a narrow definition of power automatically causes a narrow

definition of international relations. Different measurements of power yield different

predictions for patterns of behaviour in the balance of power. Under the narrow Waltzian

definition, a balancing state or coalition against the US is highly probable as it is the superior

power. However, a broader definition of power would delay such balancing. While these

issues cannot be discussed in depth, it is imperative to be aware of the fact that definitions of

power and purpose are not fixed. 70

Some theories, such as the balance of threat theory, add

extra elements to its predecessors. Stephen Walt posits that "states will ally with or against

the most threatening power." From this perspective, perceptions of power matter. The

implications for the current geopolitical situation are similar to those generated by Waltzian

structural realism. States might bandwagon with the unipole in order to cope with a regional

threat, but they will balance against it once they perceive it as being the greater threat.71

The

effects are the same, but the extension of structural realism mentioned above stated that states

would bandwagon because a balancing coalition was simply not realistic, while Walt bases

his conclusions on the threat a state poses. Substituting the USSR for the US and Eastern

Europe for the Greater Middle East makes Walt's conclusion eerily applicable to the Bush

Doctrine, as periodic interventions and invasions increase threat to other great powers as they

perceive US intentions to be increasingly threatening to their own.72

Walt's other conclusions

mirror those discussed earlier, as the unipole has more freedom of action in engaging itself

with various structurally irrelevant "distractions" and counterbalancing against it is more

difficult in the face of such a dominant power.73

The balance of threat theory lends itself to predict a varying degree of conflict. It

opens a wider range of options circumscribed by global peace and global war, depending on

how states perceive their peers. Other realist influences attempt to include the offence-

defence balance. They postulate that aggression and war are more likely when offensive

actions are (or seem) more likely to be successful, and the effects of successful conquests are

70

For an overview, see Brooks and Wohlforth, World Out of Balance, 45-51. 71

Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4

(1985): 8-9, 18; Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 89. 72

Walt, "Alliance Formation," 37. 73

Walt, "Alliances," 94-99.

24

increasingly cumulative in gains.74

While this theory lacks empirical evidence at the level of

the international system, it might help explain conflict dyads on a smaller scale, though this

would remove it from the realm of structural realism.75

Nevertheless, the idea of the offence-

defence balance could be embedded into a conception of power in future theories. Geography

also plays a role in determining whether offensive actions are favourable, even though it may

be surmounted if the only goal of an offensive is to deter or destroy.76

Such an offence-

defence balance can be placed in the context of the perceived applicability of power

projection. As stated above, George W. Bush saw an opportunity to restructure the world,

which translated into several costly interventions abroad. Such offensive actions would not

have been initiated if the US still suffered from a severe Vietnam or Somalia syndrome

tipping the perceived balance towards defence, and it could be explained by the salience of

perception of threat balance of threat-theory.77

And, as with earlier realist insights, Stephen

Van Evera provides a valuable contribution from his own offence-defence theory, as the great

powers' "greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and

to respond with counterproductive belligerence." Believing that security is scarce will lead to

a self-fulfilling prophecy as aggressive policies incite further aggression.78

5.2 The Offensive Turn

Mearsheimer took distinctive steps towards a separate theory on what states' goals are

in an anarchic system, such as the international political sphere of action. Whereas

Morgenthau attributes the relentless quest for power to human nature, and Waltz attributes

states' balancing behaviour to the structure of the international system, Mearsheimer claims

that a state's best course of action would be to maximise their relative power in order to be

prepared for the worst. In Mearsheimer's view, more power means more security.79

In

contrast to Waltzian realism, Mearsheimer sees all powers as being revisionist powers,

seeking to revise the structure of the international system in their favour. The balance of

power is always tipped in favour of war, as it is impossible for satisfied status quo powers to

maintain peace and stability, because there are simply no status quo states. Even the unipole

74

Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 6, 8. 75

Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z. Haftel, and Kevin Sweeney, “Offense-Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment,”

The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 84-85. 76

Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," 19. 77

Ibid., 41. 78

Ibid., 43. 79

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2003): 21.

25

will relentlessly strive to gain as much power as possible to prevent others from acquiring

it.80

A key aspect of Mearsheimer's theory is that he does not see the US as being a

hegemon in the global balance of power. In fact, the existence of a global hegemon is nearly

impossible, as it must be the sole power capable of deterring others without any retaliation.

Instead of global hegemony, there is currently only a single regional hegemon, which has

dominance over its own geographical region and is able to focus on global power projection.

The lack of a global hegemon in Mearsheimer's theory might seem problematic when

combined with our definition of unipolarity. However, Mearsheimer confirms that the US is

one-of-a-kind when he asserts that it is the only regional hegemon in the world today.81

This

notion of unbalanced multipolarity comes close to our definition of unipolarity, as there are

multiple regional great powers which cannot effectively balance against the sole regional

hegemon. If they succeeded in attaining the status of regional hegemon, they would tip the

system towards a bipolar or balanced multipolar version. In order to prevent this, the US

would rather pass the buck to other states across the globe to let them balance against the

strongest regional power; it will also act as an offshore balancer to contain the rise of

potential hegemons, if necessary.82

Rational foreign policy in Mearsheimer's view entails

helping others help yourself in order to stop competitors from attaining regional hegemony,

thereby maximising power and security.

5.3 The Unipole and Power Projection

More than any other realist theory, Mearsheimer focuses on the perils of great power

competition. Morgenthau wants to prevent the destruction of a multitude of states, whilst

Waltz seeks to preserve the stability of the system. According to Mearsheimer, the US should

simply focus its attention on preventing regional hegemons from arising, thereby maximising

its power. Combining the various realist insights, Mearsheimer's theory leads to an offensive

foreign policy for the US. We must not forget, however, that there are other states which are

affected by US foreign policy behaviour. Even assuming that the invasion of Iraq was

successful and that it increased US power, it would only make sense in a bandwagoning

world, where other members of the Axis of Evil would succumb to US pressure on order to

80

Ibid., 41-42. 81

Ibid., 140-141. 82

Ibid., 156-162.

26

avert an American invasion. As an extension of balance-of-threat theory and Mearsheimer's

advice to relentlessly strive for more power, however, these other states would have more

incentive to step up their efforts to pursue WMD in order to deter the US from invading them.

There is proof abound, as North Korea tested nuclear weaponry in 2009 and Iran has

continued its nuclear programme. According to offensive realism, invading Iraq was

counterproductive in stimulating other states to pursue policies favourable to the US' unique

position of power.

In reality, as already shown in the classical and structural realist chapters, the invasion

of Iraq did not improve the US position of power amongst its peers. Offensive realism would

only condone such actions if it prevented a regional hegemon from arising. Given the

perilous circumstances in the Middle East, the rise of a regional hegemon is highly unlikely.

Iran would be a primary candidate, but it is encircled by great powers and US allies alike.

Should the US have the wish to invade Iran, it can easily cross the ocean by landing its troops

in nearby allied states.83

The geopolitical priority for US foreign policy is to focus on China's

aspirations and the geographical ring of balancers surrounding it.84

Building upon earlier

classical and structural realist insights, offensive realism emphasises the need to balance

against the unipole even more. With the US entangled in the Iraqi (and Afghani) quagmire,

other states have a window of opportunity to test its capabilities and patience on other

threatening issues, as Mearsheimer implied in a separate article.85

It has fewer resources to

counter other great powers' expansion, such as China's inroads into Siberia and Africa. Not

only has the US decreased its relative power by spending resources on the invasion of Iraq, it

has also decreased its capacity to counter other states from aspiring to become a regional

hegemon.

Following democratic peace logic, it could be wise to attempt the spread of

democracy in order to promote peaceful international cooperation, and keep other states from

attempting to compete with you. Democratic peace theory posits that democratic states

conduct fewer wars with one another, and such a condition would also be favourable for the

US. However, forcibly imposing democracy on states with little or no experience with the

83

Mearsheimer's main point is that great powers surrounded by water are less likely to be invaded. Overcoming

this is a matter of landing troops in a neighbouring allied state to aid them. Effective land armies are the single

most important tool in conquering and controlling other territories. See Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 114-120. 84

Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 397-400. 85

John J. Mearsheimer, “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: realism versus neo-conservatism, ”

openDemocracy.org, 18 May 2005, accessed 5 June 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-

americanpower/morgenthau_2522.jsp.

27

system is rarely successful in practice.86

There are many prerequisites for a stable and true

democracy to form and hold, few of which can be effectively created by external

intervention. These include the cultural background as well as the criterion of economic and

educational development.87

Building upon insights mentioned in the concluding paragraph on

classical realism, it would have been relatively easy to conclude beforehand that creating a

stable democracy would have little chance of success. Even if a functioning democracy had

been formed, there would be no guarantee that it would have benign intentions towards its

(former) benefactor. According to Mearsheimer, offensive realists and other realists alike

would rather have these facts of life changed, but reality is different. 88

An attempt to promote

democracy in order to prevent a hostile state from arising simply has less chance of success in

prolonging US primacy than attempting to curb the rise of other regional hegemons.

5.4 Conclusion: helping others help yourself

Offensive realism, balance-of-threat theory and the offence-defence balance add extra

layers of criticism towards the Bush Doctrine. Balance-of-threat theory centres on structural

realism's confirmation that other states feel increasingly threatened by the unipole's erratic

behaviour. Because they know that an offensive to counter US primacy is doomed to fail,

they have more incentive to step up balancing efforts and acquire WMD in order to deter the

US from invading them. Mearsheimer builds upon these insights in concluding that spreading

liberal democracy is as unrealistic as it is noble. Resources invested in the War on Terror are

only partially useful, at best, in countering the rise of other regional hegemons, as the US is

distracted by its efforts in attempting to eliminate a diffuse threat which can never be wholly

removed from existence. In fact, attempting to remove the terrorist threat and its associated

dictators by forcibly replacing it with liberal democratic institutions might even give rise to

further antagonism amongst the affected populace, as in Vietnam.89

Potential hegemons see a

chance to catch up, not only due to structural power-related constraints, but also because the

US cannot be everywhere at the same time. Still, offensive realism foresees a potentially

brighter future for the US if it uses its power more wisely in the future. Mearsheimer takes

86

See fn. 37 and Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, The Failure of Democratic Nation Building (New York:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 87

Samuel P. Huntington, “Religion and the Third Wave,” The National Interest, no. 24 (1991); Seymour Martin

Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” The

American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69-105. 88

Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau." 89

Ibid.

28

into account geographical factors which are not as prominently featured in other theories. The

US is the sole superpower in its own hemisphere, whilst the Asian continent is filled with

major powers such as India, Japan, Russia and especially China. If the US were to focus its

efforts on offshore balancing and passing the buck to Asia's major powers to curb the rise of a

potential hegemon (most likely China), it could prolong the global condition of unipolarity

for some time to come. In contrast to this, Waltzian structural realism would prefer the sole

rise of China, so that the system becomes more stable as it becomes bipolar. Such

constructive engagement with China to facilitate this is not an option for Mearsheimer, as

every power will become aggressive when it sees the option to maximise its power. In this

respect, the Bush Doctrine has already given the world's major powers and potential

hegemon(s) some leeway in expanding their spheres of influence at the US' expense.

6. Conclusion

6.1 The Inadequacy of Political Realism

Of course, realism is a flawed theory and it cannot fully explain the world as it

actually works. Irrationality is a part of man, man governs the state, and thus rational theories

are irrational in not including mankind's natural irrationality. This makes realism an almost

normative theory, describing an ideal world of rational, egoistic states following their self-

interest wherein patterns of behaviour are more predictable. Realism also cannot adequately

explain why the Iraq War was waged or why the Bush Doctrine was formulated, which

simply means that there are irrational forces at work that fall outside the bounds of political

realist theory. It does not take into account the goings-on in the states themselves, and has

little explanatory value regarding the non-state actors, which also respond to the invasiveness

of the Bush Doctrine. What realism can do, however, is prescribe how to formulate foreign

policy in the rational national interest. It is clear that such rational policies were not

adequately formulated at the advent of the War on Terror.

Various other explanations can be offered for the invasion of Iraq and the overarching

War on Terror. In-depth neoclassical realist theories can help explain the various influences

on foreign policy construction. These theories recognise the idea that the international system

shapes pathways for states to follow, but they attempt to describe the ways in which states

29

find their different paths along these roads.90

In Waltzian terms, they describe the first and

second levels of analysis, which focus on individual and domestic influences, respectively.

We have already touched upon the evangelical idealism that characterises the dominant neo-

conservative government officials' thought in the Bush Administration. Blaming neo-

conservatism is too simple, however. Dina Badie posits that a process of groupthink can help

explain the shift towards an aggressive policy regarding Iraq. She states that hawks in the

administration suppressed dissenting views and intelligence in order to carry through more

aggressive policies towards Iraq.91

This also explains why the administration did not

adequately take into account the scientific insights on how troublesome and costly nation-

building could be and why Morgenthau's fourth principle of considering alternatives was not

adequately followed. Almost ironically, Morgenthau himself observed during the Vietnam

War that often "a new policy has been decided upon, and intelligence must provide the facts

to justify it."92

Unfortunately, such an observation still holds true in the present day.

Stepping outside of his offensive realist paradigm, Mearsheimer concludes, together

with Stephen M. Walt, that the Israel lobby also played a large role in instigating aggression

towards Iraq.93

As Badie stated, there was little support for invading Iraq amongst the Bush

administration's members before 9/11. The neoconservatives, supported by the Israel lobby,

manipulated the intelligence presented to the administration and started a campaign of public

relations to garner support for the invasion of Iraq. The Israeli state saw the invasion of Iraq

as a tool to reshape the Middle East for the sake of Israel's safety.94

Such policies are

inherently irrational in terms of promoting the American national interest, but they are

perfectly rational for an encircled state such as Israel. As Mearsheimer and Walt put it, it

seems as if the "tail is wagging the dog" in the construction of US foreign policy.95

More

generally put, there is more room for foreign and irrational influences to interfere with

policymaking in the US. Avoiding a foreign policy of highly irrational elements is important

in restraining the immense power that could be wielded for goals feigning to fall under the

90

Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 146-

147. 91

Dina Badie, “Groupthink, Iraq and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy Shift toward Iraq,” Foreign

Policy Analysis 6, no. 4 (2010): 293-295. 92

Morgenthau, "We Are Deluding Ourselves." 93

John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israel Lobby,” London Review of Books, 23 March 2006,

accessed 26 November 2010, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/john-mearsheimer/the-israel-lobby: 33. 94

Ibid., 34-35. 95

Ibid., 25.

30

national interest.96

As George Washington stated during his 1796 Farewell Address,

"Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-

citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and

experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican

government."

6.2 The Irrationality of the Bush Doctrine

The fact that realism cannot explain the Bush Doctrine shifts the burden of

irrationality towards the latter. The Bush Doctrine was inspired by influences which

traditional realist theories do not take into account. Nevertheless, it is possible for foreign

policy construction to be based on realist precepts, even though realism is inadequate in

describing the real world, and no statesman could credibly pretend to be a perfectly rational

leader. The different political realist theories emphasise various errors in the Bush Doctrine

and would have inspired different courses of action, for their inadequacy in describing policy

does not mean that it is inadequate in prescribing policy. Classical realism focuses on the

subpar statesmanship that the Bush administration collectively displayed. By including

morality into foreign policy by attempting to promote democracy across the globe and

damaging its 'national character' by expending a massive amount of resources on

unproductive efforts, the Bush Doctrine violated key premises of classical realism. Waltzian

structural realism emphasises the uncertainty caused by the various interventionist policies

amongst the US' competitors and compatriots alike, and criticises the lack of investments in

the foundation of US power. Mearsheimer's offensive realism does not criticise such

expenditures of power, but merely the choice of target of such expenditures. No potential

hegemon was thwarted by the Bush Doctrine, and the resources spent on invading Iraq could

also have been invested in halting the rise of a potential hegemon. Whether such hubris is

inevitable in a situation of unipolarity is not clear, but all forms of political realism discussed

here would have opted for more restraint towards a minimal threat such as Iraq and a diffuse

threat such as terrorism.

All in all, these various critiques indicate that the Bush Doctrine has hastened the

decline of the United States' favourable position in the unipolar system. While the US is still

the sole first-rank power, it has wasted enormous sums of money on unproductive efforts,

thereby giving others the chance to start catching up. It could afford to add various irrational

96

Samuel P. Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997).

31

elements to its towering construct because of the relative advantage to its neighbours, but

these elements have damaged the US' structural integrity and its capacity to keep ahead in the

race to remain the tallest building on the block. These conclusions should by no means be

entirely surprising, but the various political realist perspectives have provided advice on how

to construct a rational foreign policy. The most meaningful international relations are

manifested between the strongest powers on the planet and foreign policy should be tuned to

that observation. Competitors now have more room to deter the US in their own region, and

might one day pass the threshold of becoming a pole in the international system. This need

not necessarily be a bad thing, but the nature of these relations is determined by the actions of

the unipole in its contemporary circumstances, which shape precedents for future behaviour.

The Bush Doctrine has not only caused its homeland's power and security to decline in its

contemporary environment, it has also made future relations more conflict-prone as the

irrational use of power has induced other states to prepare for the worst under an ever-

looming umbrella of contentious politics among nations.

32

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