Reactive Imperialism: Britain, the Hashemites, and the Creation of Modern Iraq

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Reactive imperialism: Britain, the Hashemites, and thecreation of modern IraqEfraim Karsh aa King's College London ,Published online: 01 Jul 2008.

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Reactive Imperialism:Britain, the Hashemites, and the

Creation of Modern Iraq

EFRAIM KARSH

The creation of the Middle Eastern state system in the wake of the FirstWorld War is often regarded as being of the exclusive making of theEuropean great powers, Britain in particular, which carved the defunctOttoman Empire into artificial entities in accordance with their imperialistinterests and in complete disregard of local wishes. 'It was an era in whichMiddle Eastern countries and frontiers were fabricated in Europe', arguedthe American historian, David Fromkin, in the most recent articulation ofthis received wisdom. 'Iraq and what we now call Jordan, for example, wereBritish inventions, lines drawn on an empty map by British politicians afterthe First World War." Reality, however, was quite different. The post-Ottoman design for the region was no less of the making of the local actorsthan of the great powers. Not only were they seated around the table whensome of the key decisions were made (notably the Lausanne Conference inwhich Mustafa Kemal's Turkey undid the draconian peace imposed on it bythe great powers), but they had their voices heard through influentialchampions when they were not directly represented. No less importantly,they often predetermined the official decision-making process throughdevelopments on the ground in which they played the pivotal role.

The formation of the Kingdom of Iraq from the Ottoman velayets ofBasra, Baghdad, and Mosul offers a striking illustration of this pattern - onthe face of it, a purely British decision taken by the Cabinet in March 1921on the basis of the recommendations of a special conference, held earlierthat month in Cairo with the participation of Colonial Secretary WinstonChurchill and his advisers. In actual fact, it was the culmination of asustained effort by King Faisal Ibn Hussein, the celebrated hero of the'Great Arab Revolt' against the Ottoman Empire, to substitute Iraq for theSyrian kingdom from which he had been expelled by French forces in thesummer of 1920. What makes this development all the more extraordinaryis that Faisal's gains were matched only by his poor resources. In July 1920Faisal was a spent ruler, desperately seeking his place in the sun, spurned

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.30, No.3, September 2002, pp.55-70PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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56 THE JOURNAL OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY

both by his former British allies and by his father, King Hussein of theHijaz. Eight months later he and his British champions had talked the largestempire on Earth into endorsing his candidature for the Iraqi throne, thusmaking him a pre-eminent figure in the post-war Middle Easternarchitecture.

Hardly had Faisal been forced out of Damascus when he reluctantly beganto cast his glance eastward. Mesopotamia, that vast stretch of land fromRussia to the Persian Gulf, had never figured prominently in his plans. Tornby ethnic, social, and religious schisms, with the dominant Arab populationhopelessly polarised between the Shi'ite and Sunni communities, eachfurther split into rival clans - and with the Kurdish population of the northimplacably opposed to Arab domination yet deeply fragmented along triballines - Mesopotamia held little appeal for foreign occupiers. As early as the1830s, Ibrahim Pasha, the debonair warlord who had brought the OttomanEmpire to its knees, advised his father, Muhammad Ali, the illustriousgovernor of Egypt, to shun control of Mesopotamia altogether: 'Upon myword, Baghdad is as unimportant as the district of Sennar. It is not worth theexpenses involved in retaining it.' Faisal himself, in a memorandum writtenin March 1932, a year before his untimely death, candidly admitted that asyet there was no such thing as an Iraqi people.2

Yet in the eventful summer of 1920, with Faisal's Syrian kingdom intatters, all these problems suddenly seemed marginal compared with thedesire for a consolation prize, however unsatisfactory it might be. Comewhat may, a kingdom had to be found - or rather founded - for the deposedmonarch. This was easier said than done. While Faisal's foremostchampion, the famous 'Lawrence of Arabia', was rallying British publicopinion behind his cause, and his London partisans were lobbying thegovernment on his behalf, the deposed king had no illusions regarding theobstacles that lay ahead. In the first place, he had to override his elderbrother, Abdallah, who, during Faisal's short-lived reign in Damascus, hadestablished himself as the frontline contender to the Mesopotamian throne.In this endeavour Faisal could expect little support from his father, who hadalways favoured Abdallah over him and who considered Faisal's past questfor a Syrian kingdom anathema to his own dream of a pan-Arab empire.3 'Ifyou had remained simply a representative of Your Father and had notinaugurated a separate kingdom, the French would not have been able totake against you the action they did, as King Hussein is one of the TreatyAllies recognised by the important powers and they would therefore havebeen afraid to attack him', Abd al-Malik al-Khatib, King Hussein's Agent

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BRITAIN AND THE CREATION OF MODERN IRAQ 57

in Egypt, reprimanded Faisal, before telling Major H. Garland, ActingDirector of the Cairo Arab Bureau, that 'Abdallah would be the moresuitable person'. 'If Faisal were to go he would be surrounded by the sameavaricious, place-seeking clique of officers and officials who lived on himat Damascus', al-Khatib claimed. 'Abdallah had no such clique. He oncehad, but fortunately Providence gathered them all in at Tarabah [i.e.Abdullah's defeat by Ibn Saud in 1919].'4

An even higher hurdle on Faisal's road to Baghdad was France'svehement opposition to such an eventuality. Hardly had Faisal beenexpelled from Syria when he became the target of a smear campaign by theFrench press and political circles; and while British officialdom did not takethis propaganda at face value, it was sufficiently attuned to Frenchsensitivities to give Faisal a cold shoulder. When it transpired, within daysof his ignominious eviction from Damascus, that the French would notallow Faisal to stay in the Syrian desert town of Deraa, where he had soughtrefuge, the general view in London was that the deposed king should joinhis father in the Hijaz, where he would be in no position to complicatefurther Anglo-French relations. Particularly chilling winds blew fromEgypt. When Sir Herbert Samuel, High Commissioner for Palestine,suggested that Faisal 'should be invited to go at once to Egypt to see [HighCommissioner Sir Edmund] Allenby before he leaves and thence Mecca',5

the Field-Marshal, whose sympathetic patronage had deluded Faisal and hisnationalist officers into challenging France's position in the Levant, andwho had advocated as late as mid-March 1920 that the Allies recogniseFaisal's sovereignty 'over an Arab nation or Confederation embracingSyria, Palestine and Mesopotamia',6 now blatantly refused to meet thedeposed king, or indeed, to let him set foot in Egypt. "There would begreater facilities for conducting anti-French propaganda at Suez and no shipleaves [for Jeddah] before August 11th'. He declined Samuel's request,instead suggesting that Faisal 'should be conveyed to some station onHedjaz Railway such as Amman and from there proceed to Medina'.7

Faisal, however, would not follow the script written for him by Britain.Keenly aware that his return to the Hijaz would almost certainly mean thedemise of his political ambitions, he informed Samuel of his wish to gofrom Haifa, where he had arrived after his Syrian defeat, either toSwitzerland or to Italy 'as he is "ill" and wants rest'. He assured the HighCommissioner that 'he does not wish to complicate matters between Britishand French, nor does he wish to take any further steps against French'.Though taken by surprise, officials at the Foreign Office did not demur.'You should inform Faisal that His Majesty's Government appreciate hisdesire to create no complications between England and France', theyinstructed Samuel. "They are fully aware that he has made every effort to

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sustain a difficult position with due regard to the interests of the AlliedPowers, and they trust that they may in the future have an opportunity ofshowing to him that his loyal attitude to the British Government has notbeen forgotten.'8

Encouraged by this response, Faisal pitched higher. Italy andSwitzerland were no longer seen as the coveted safe haven for the deposedking, but rather as transit stops en route to London. 'Sir, I beg to submit theenclosed note on the Arab question', Faisal wrote to Prime Minister LloydGeorge on 11 September from the scenic Lake Como in northern Italy,where he had settled for a comfortable stay. 'May I add that my father, theKing of the Hedjaz, has again entrusted me with the mission of representinghim in the Arab question in general, including that of presiding over thedelegation appointed by him to offer his thanks to King George for thepresents graciously sent by His Majesty', he stated, getting down to the realpurpose of his letter: 'I am forwarding my note through General HaddadPasha, in whom my father and myself have implicit trust. I hope that youwill soon inform him of your desire to see me personally in England, as Ihave verbal communications to make you, especially in view of the presentsituation.'

Just what Faisal meant by these 'verbal communications' was clarifiedin an accompanying letter. 'In spite of the distress and preoccupation eventsin Syria for several months past have caused me, I have been followingaffairs in Mesopotamia carefully and, believe me, have felt much grief at thechange in the former cordial relations between the Arabs and the British.'Thus Faisal laid the groundwork for his proposed quid pro quo:

I believe the present evils are not incurable, resulting as they do frommisunderstandings between the two peoples. Both have the sameobjects. Those of Great Britain were declared to my father, KingHussein, and my father's were stated to you. Both approved theother's. How then can their policies not agree? If the pledges given tothe Arabs through King Hussein are fulfilled, I am confident thingswill settle down. My great hope, and that of every Arab, is that thiswill soon be done.9

This was a proposition the Prime Minister could hardly ignore. Like thelegendary phoenix rising from its ashes, in one fell swoop Faisal hadengineered a remarkable political comeback less than two months after thecollapse of his Syrian kingdom. He was no longer a stateless fugitivebegging for a handout, but rather the foremost official representative of theArab cause - an ally, however junior, among allies. It would be infinitelymore difficult for the British government to prevent Faisal's coming to

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London, now that he was yet again his father's representative to the peacetalks, than it had been prior to this development.

Why Hussein agreed to reinstate his son in the driver's seat, given hisgreater affinity for Abdallah and his distrust of Faisal's intentions, is notentirely clear. Perhaps he believed that due to his intimate contacts in LondonFaisal was better suited for the job; or perhaps he reckoned that a bird in thehand was worth two in the bush, namely that it was better to have a satisfiedFaisal in his service instead of a disgruntled former king conniving againsthim in the European chancelleries. Indeed, Faisal was not deterred from usinghis potential obstructionist capacity to goad the British into acquiescing in hisdemands, letting it be known that he 'is now desperate and that if he cannotobtain any satisfaction he will be compelled to return to Arabia and assemblea Moslem conference at Mecca before which he and his father will lay theircase in justification of their revolt against the Caliph'.

This warning fell on receptive ears. 'It is not easy to see what result such •action might have', read a Foreign Office memorandum,

but there have been indications of communication between Faisal (orat any rate some of his entourage) and Mustapha Kemal, and thereseems little doubt that this organization which is the mainspring ofthis gentleman's activities would not be slow to turn it to theiradvantage. There must also be considered the effect in India of anypublic announcement in Mecca to the effect that King Hussein andFaisal - the allies and proteges of Great Britain - had been left in thelurch.10

Meanwhile, Faisal was stepping up the pressure. 'I have received twelvetelegrams from my father, in which he insists on my going to England', heargued on 6 October.

I have been trying to calm him down by saying that the reasons for mynot proceeding at once is that the date for the reception of thedelegation of which I am the head by His Majesty the King has not yetbeen fixed, besides giving other trifling reasons. I am afraid if I tellhim the British Government is hesitating to receive me he will beoffended. I am now between two fires. On one side I have to urge mycase, and on the other I have to quiet my father.

And by way of impressing upon the British the urgency of the matter, Faisalenclosed the latest message he had received from his father. 'I have wiredMr. Lloyd George ... saying you are my representative', Hussein wrote,

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I want you to proceed to London to head the delegation. Yourinterview with our allies in war will be basis of our action. If you thinkthere is anything derogatory to your dignity, please return at once toyour country, because my only object is to prove my loyalty andcontinue my friendship to Great Britain. At the same time I want toshow we are a nation that adheres to its rights, as do Western nations."

By now the Foreign Office was sufficiently alarmed to grant Faisal'srequest. 'We had deferred the visit as long as possible, out of regard for theFrench, and because we did not wish in the smallest degree to offend theirsusceptibilities', the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, told the Frenchambassador on 11 November,

but his father, King Hussein, had some time ago definitely appointedFeisal as head of a mission to make certain return presents to ourKing, and was exceedingly vexed at our apparent reluctance to receivehim in this honorific capacity. We could find no excuse for furtherpostponement, and the King had agreed to receive the Emir early inDecember.12

On 4 December 1920, Faisal had an audience with King George V.

nFaisal's arrival in London brought to a head the Mesopotamian question,with which the government had been grappling for the past two years. Bynow the rebellion, which erupted in the middle Euphrates in the summer of1920, had been largely suppressed and Sir Percy Cox, formerly chiefpolitical officer of the British expeditionary force in Iraq, had returned asHigh Commissioner to Baghdad where he quickly established a Council ofState, or a provisional government, headed by Abd al-Rahman al-Qailani,the Naqib of Baghdad. But the identity of the country's future rulerremained as obscure as ever; and while Faisal's arrival in London got thependulum swinging in his direction yet again, it did not end Britishvacillation altogether. Quite the contrary, none of Faisal's three officialmeetings at the Foreign Office, including a conversation with Curzon on 13January 1921, addressed the future status of Mesopotamia (or for that matterthe future of Syria or Transjordan), for his hosts avoided these thorny issues,focusing instead on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by KingHussein.13 The French were breathing down their necks, and Britishdecision-makers were loathe to strain Anglo-French relations any further.On 4 January Curzon informed the Cabinet of a recent conversation

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between Lord Hardinge of the Foreign Office and Georges Leygues, theFrench Prime Minister, in the course of which the latter 'had raised strongobjections to the candidature of Shereef Feisal which, in his view, wouldarouse a storm of indignation in France'. After some discussion the Cabinetagreed 'to postpone any decision on the question pending the making offurther enquiries by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs into variousaspects of the matter'.14

Three days later Curzon made his move. Colonel Kinahan Cornwallis,former head of the Cairo Arab Bureau now attached to the Foreign Office,was instructed to approach Faisal, 'speaking to him not officially but as apersonal friend', and to indicate to him that Britain would view with favourhis ascendance of the Mesopotamian throne, provided that he induced hisfather to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Faisal was to be reassured thatFrench opposition to his candidacy could be overcome if theMesopotamians were to elect him as their ruler. At the same time, he was tobe told that Britain could not endorse any candidate who was not 'preparedloyally to accept and to act up to the terms of the Mandate as agreed uponby the Great Powers and laid before the Council of the League of Nations',and 'who is likely to give us trouble with the French'. Moreover, since theBritish government could neither impose a ruler on Mesopotamia nor evensuggest who should rule - it could only 'consider carefully the merits andthe claims of any candidates whom the Mesopotamian Congress may bedisposed to recommend' - it was up to Faisal to seize the initiative: tosecure his father's support for his candidacy and then put himself forward,'not with the knowledge or approval of the British government', because thewhole point was that he should be acting on his own.15

This was not good enough for Faisal. He had not taken all the trouble ofcoming to London only to return empty-handed to the Hijaz. Had heremotely believed that his father preferred him to Abdallah with regard toMesopotamia, he would have not travelled to London in the first place.Putting himself forward as yet another candidate was absolutely out of thequestion; either the British were prepared to endorse him officially, and toinform his father and the French to that effect, or they had to look elsewherefor candidates. Besides, in his conversation with Abd al-Malik al-Khatib,shortly before going to Europe, Faisal had been warned that 'if he were togo to Mesopotamia people would say that he was "crown hunting'", and theemir took full notice of this warning.

When he met Cornwallis on 8 January 1921, Faisal played hard to get.'As regards your proposal about myself, I am deeply grateful but I mustreject it definitely', he said, feigning self-effacement before reiterating al-Khatib's advice almost verbatim. 'My father, who really wants Abdallah togo to Mesopotamia would never approve, and he and all the people would

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believe that I am working for myself and not for my nation, in agreementwith the British. I will never put myself forward as a candidate. My honouris my dearest possession and I will never be allowed myself to be accusedof self-interest.' There was, however, a way out. Were Abdallah to bemoved out of the way and Mesopotamian public opinion swayed in Faisal'sdirection, he would be willing to step into the fold. As he put it: 'I wouldonly go to Mesopotamia if H.M.G. rejected Abdullah and asked me toundertake the task and if the people said they wanted me. In such a case bothmy father and Abdullah would agree for they could not go against thewishes of the people."6

Curzon failed to see through Faisal's strategy. He preferred Faisal toascend the Mesopotamian throne and even favoured him over Abdallah -a sea change from his earlier position that 'we do not know what Feisalhas to do with Mesopotamia'.17 Yet he refused to recognise Faisal'stransparent plea to get his elder brother out of the way for what it was,instead interpreting his feigned deference to Abdallah as an honourableact of selflessness. 'His Majesty's Government are not opposed inprinciple to Feisal's candidature, provided it is acceptable locally, but theysee serious objection to any procedure involving intervention or what maybe regarded as intervention by British Government pending spontaneousexpression of wishes of Mesopotamian State', Curzon wrote to Cox on 9January, rejecting his suggestion that the British manipulateMesopotamian public opinion on Faisal's behalf and proposing thealternative course of action offered by Cornwallis to Faisal. The HighCommissioner concurred.18

Though failing to win the immediate endorsement of the Britishgovernment, Faisal's meeting with Cornwallis helped to establish him as theclear front-runner in the race for the Mesopotamian throne. 'Faisal behavedlike a gentleman & with a fine sense of honour & loyalty', Curzon on 9January informed Churchill, who was about to replace Lord Milner asSecretary of State for the Colonies. Two days earlier Lloyd George hadaccepted Churchill's demand that Mesopotamia and Palestine beadministered by a new department, to be established at the Colonial Office,and the energetic minister was eager to put his policy in place before takinghis new post. He had no strong views about Mesopotamia apart from hislong-held belief in the imperative need to reduce Britain's expenses there;and the best way to achieve this goal, in his opinion, was 'to set up an ArabGovernment, through whose agency the peaceful development of thecountry may be assured without undue demands upon Great Britain. It is tothis policy that we must devote our efforts."9

This concern inevitably raised the question of the country's future ruler.On 8 January Churchill discussed the issue with T.E. Lawrence, who also

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agreed to join the Colonial Office as an adviser on Arabian affairs, beforewriting to Lloyd George: 'A little more time & consideration are neededbefore definitely launching Feisal. I must feel my way & feel sure of myway.' Four days later he telegraphed to Cox:

Do you think that Feisal is the right man and the best man? Failinghim, do you prefer Abdallah to any local man? Have you put forwardFeisal because you consider taking a long view he is the best man oras a desperate expedient in the hopes of reducing the garrisonsquickly? If you are really convinced that Feisal is necessary, can youmake sure he is chosen locally? Once I know your true mind on thesepoints decision can be taken here immediately.

Yet Churchill did not wait for Cox's reply. 'I have a strong feeling thatFaisal is the best man, and I do not think there is much to be gained byputting forward an inferior man in the hopes that he will be rejected andsmooth away certain difficulties in the selection of the best candidate', hewrote to Curzon on 12 January, rejecting the latter's suggestion toencourage Abdallah to run for the headship of Mesopotamia before Faisal.'I observe that Mr. Cornwallis has no doubts that Faisal is the right man andthat he would like to undertake the task. All that you say about hishonourable scruples impress me the more with his qualifications. We mustcertainly see that we get "turtle" and not "mock turtle".'

Lawrence was accordingly instructed to ascertain Faisal's views, and on17 January he reported back to Edward Marsh, Churchill's PrivateSecretary. The former king was well disposed to British sensibilities, hestated, and would agree to make no reference to the French-occupied areaof Syria in his talks with the British government and to abandon his father'sclaims to Palestine. 'This leaves four questions', Lawrence said:

(a) Mesopotamia: for which he claims a watching brief in respect ofthe McMahon papers.

(b) Trans-Jordan: where he hopes to have a recognized Arab State withBritish advice.

(c) Nejd: where he wants the Hussein-Ibn Saud question regulated.(d) Yemen: on which he has a suggestion to make.

Lawrence continued:

The advantage of his taking this new ground of discussion is that allquestion of pledges & promises, fulfilled or broken, are set aside. Youbegin a new discussion on the actual positions today & the best way

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of doing something constructive with them. It's so much more usefulthan splitting hairs. Feisal can help very much towards a rapidsettlement of these countries, if he wants to: and if we can only getthem working like a team they will be a surprising big thing in two orthree years.

'I think all he asks in a.b.c.d. can be made useful to ourselves', Lawrenceconcluded, stressing Churchill's deepest sentiment, 'They tend towardscheapness & speed of settlement.' Churchill was duly impressed.20

By the time Churchill had assumed his new post on 15 February 1921,then, the die had been cast. The previous day the Cabinet had authorised theincoming Secretary of State for the Colonies 'to visit Egypt in the early partof March next for the purpose of consulting with the British authorities inPalestine and Arabia',21 and Churchill, who planned to leave for Cairo on 3March, began preparations in earnest. At Churchill's instructions Lawrenceheld yet another conversation with Faisal on 16 February. He informed himof the impending conference, expressing the upbeat assessment that 'presentsigns justified his being reasonably hopeful of a settlement satisfactory toall parties', especially with regard to 'the Mesopotamia^ and Trans-Jordanquestions'. He also told Faisal that he had just accepted an appointment atthe Colonial Office, which would necessarily change the nature of theirrelationship. But he reassured former king that 'the appointment had notchanged my opinions and I hoped he would take it as an indication thatH.M. Government were not wholly adverse to our past policy'. Faisalremained conspicuously unperturbed: 'He would like to lose all his friendsin the same way.'22

Faisal knew what he was talking about. With Lawrence acting asChurchill's Adviser on Arabian Affairs and Hubert Young, another veteranof the 'Great Arab Revolt', as Head of the Political and Administrativebranch of the newly-established Middle Eastern Department at the ColonialOffice, charged with the administration of Mesopotamia, Palestine, andAden, the formulation of Britain's Middle East policy effectively cameunder the sway of Faisal's partisans. Indeed, when on 18 February Churchilldrafted an outline of his proposed agenda for the Cairo Conference, it wasLawrence and Young who were to beef up this skeletal proposal and frameit in such a way that would ipso facto ensure Faisal's appointment to theMesopotamian throne. On the first item on the agenda - the election of rulerand his relationship with H.M.G. under the mandate - they engineered thefollowing collective departmental view: 'We consider that Feisal should bethe ruler, and the first step is to ascertain from Sir P. Cox that he can ensurethe Council of State selecting him. As soon as the Council had notified theirchoice Feisal should be invited to proceed forthwith to Mesopotamia.'

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Lawrence and Young also orchestrated a departmental consensus favourableto Faisal's request for a qualified acceptance of the mandate: 'Before puttingFaisal's name before the Council of State we should obtain his provisionalacceptance of the draft mandate, on the understanding that as soon as theOrganic Law has been brought into operation, we shall be prepared toconsider any proposals the Mesopotamian Government may wish to makefor re-adjusting their relations with H.M.G.'23

These and other recommendations contained in the draft agenda, all ofwhich received Churchill's warm endorsement, were discussed at aninterdepartmental conference on 26 February. In addition to Lawrence andYoung, Colonels Cornwallis and Joyce, two staunch Hashemite partisans,the meeting was attended by Sir Arnold Wilson, a former acting chiefpolitical adviser to the expeditionary force in Iraq, and a more recentconvert to Faisal's cause. Hence, not only was there no objection to Faisal'sascendancy of the Mesopotamian throne, but the Foreign Officerepresentative reassured his counterparts 'that the difficulty of getting theFrench to agree was not insuperable and that if they were faced with a faitaccompli no trouble was likely to ensue'.24

I l l

When it opened on the glorious Saturday morning of 12 March, the CairoConference had little difficulty to reaffirm the collective recommendationsof the Middle Eastern Department. In his review of the candidates for theMesopotamian throne, Cox identified Faisal as by far the leading contender.Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud seemed to him out of the question, if only forreligious reasons, Sheikh Khaz'al of Muhammarah (a Persian subject), forthe lack of an adequate following, and Prince Burhan al-Din (a son of theOttoman Sultan Abdul Hamid), for the fact that a Turkish ruler was nolonger deemed desirable. As for the Naqib of Baghdad and Sayyid Talib, theBasra strongman turned Minister of Interior in the Provisional Government,Cox believed that neither had a chance, since 'local opinion would neveragree on a local candidate'. This in turn left a Hashemite ruler as the onlyviable option, and 'this solution [Cox] thought, [would] be welcomed by themajority of Mesopotamians, provided that it was not too obvious that hewas being nominated by His Majesty's Government'. Lawrence followedsuit. He supported Faisal's candidature, not only from his personalknowledge of and friendship for the individual, but also on the ground thatin order to counteract the claims of rival candidates and to pull together thescattered elements of a backward and half-civilised country, it was essentialthat the first ruler should be an active and inspiring personality. AmirAbdallah was lazy, and by no means dominating.

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Churchill pointed to another advantage of the Sharifian solution, namelythat it gave Britain an important lever in its relations with the Arabcountries: 'If Faisal knew that not only his father's subsidy and theprotection of the Holy Places from Wahhabi attack, but also the position ofhis brother in Trans-Jordan was dependent upon his own good behaviour, hewould be much easier to deal with. The same argument applied mutatismutandis to King Hussein and Amir Abdallah.' There was however apotential fly in the ointment, on which Churchill wished to hear the viewsof his experts: 'The French Government had tried to convince him that byadopting a Sherifian policy he would risk being destroyed, likeFrankenstein, by a monster of his own creation.' Lawrence demurred. Hethought that '[p]erhaps the French point of view was unduly coloured bytheir own experiences in Syria. He did not himself anticipate that a Sherifianpolicy would have this effect on British interests.' Gertrude Bell, theOriental Secretary in Baghdad, agreed, claiming that 'the only pan-Arabpropaganda which was at all likely to make headway was the Sherifianpropaganda. It was much better to turn this to our own use than to leave itas a potential enemy.'25

Churchill needed no more encouragement. 'I think we shall reachunanimous conclusion among all authorities that Feisal offers hope of bestand cheapest solutions', he cabled Lloyd George on 14 March. 'I have nodoubt personally Feisal offers far away best chance of saving our money.Please therefore endeavour to telegraph to me as soon as you possibly canthat I am free to make plans on basis of formula.'26

A week later, after an angry exchange with Lloyd George, who seemedlukewarm to the Cairo recommendations, Churchill received the desiredgreen light. 'Cabinet devoted exhaustive consideration to your proposalsthis morning', Lloyd George informed Churchill on 22 March. "They weremuch impressed by collective force of your recommendations ... and it wasthought that order of events should be as follows:

Sir P. Cox should return with as little delay as possible to Mesopotamia,and should get going the machinery which may result in acceptance ofFaisal's candidature and invitation to him to accept position of ruler ofIrak. In the meantime, no announcement or communication to theFrench should be made. Faisal, however, will be told privately that thereis no longer any need for him to remain in England, and that he shouldreturn without delay to Mecca to consult his father, who appears fromour latest reports to be in a more than usually unamiable frame of mind.Faisal also will be told that if, with his father's and brother's consent, hebecomes a candidate for Mesopotamia and is accepted by people of thatcountry, we shall welcome their choice, subject, of course, to the double

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condition that he is prepared to accept terms of mandate as laid beforeLeague of Nations, and that he will not utilise his position to intrigueagainst or attack the French ...

If above conditions are fulfilled, Feisal would then from Meccamake known at the right moment his desire to offer himself ascandidate, and should make his appeal to the Mesopotamian people.At this stage we could, if necessary, communicate with the French,who, whatever their suspicions or annoyance, would have no groundfor protest against a course of action in strict accordance with ourprevious declarations.27

This was music to Faisal's ears. Six months earlier he had been a spent rulerwho would not be seen even by his British partisans in Egypt. Now he notonly became His Majesty's Government's official candidate for theMesopotamian throne, but had done so very much on his own terms. Hetherefore had little difficulty accepting the Cairo programme, but not beforeextracting a promise from Lawrence that within a year from his arrival inMesopotamia the League of Nations mandate would be replaced by amutually negotiated treaty. 'Faisal expressed his appreciation of generalpolicy outlined, and promised to do all he could to make his part of it work',Lawrence telegraphed to Churchill on 15 April after meeting with the emir.28

What remained to be done for Faisal was to convince his father to acceptthe Cairo programme; he then had to bide his time while his supporters inMesopotamia and Sir Percy Cox prepared the way to the throne for him.The first task proved easy enough, as Faisal found his father in asurprisingly friendly mood. The second task, however, turned out to bemore complicated, for the local candidates would not bow out of the racewith the ease predicted by Cox. While a 'friendly advice' from the HighCommissioner sufficed to get the Sheikh of Muhammarah out of the way,and recognition of his title as Sultan of Najd accompanied by a lavish giftof £20,000 achieved the same result with Ibn Saud, the Naqib, though'tottering on the brink of [the] grave',29 and Sayyid Talib proved moreresilient.

Having returned in February 1920 after a four-year exile, Talib wasdetermined to secure for himself the top Mesopotamian spot, even if thismeant partitioning the country into two separate states, the first comprisingthe velayets of Mosul and Baghdad, and the second that of Basra.30 Hemanaged to gain ground in Baghdad by pretending to champion the causeof the Naqib, with whom he had come to a secret agreement; and heassiduously courted key British officials, notably H. St. John Philby, hisadviser at the Interior Ministry, and Gertrude Bell, who exerted immenseinfluence on Cox. 'What's needed in this administration is experience',

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Talib told a British acquaintance of his. 'I've got it. A doctor before helearns his trade will kill at least two hundred people. I've killed my twohundred - no one knows it better than yourself.'31

For a brief while Talib managed to secure Wilson's support for his claimto the leadership of Mesopotamia, and at the height of the uprising the IndiaSecretary, Edwin Montagu, even suggested that he be appointed asGovernor of Basra in tandem with the appointment of Faisal as 'King' atBaghdad. However, given Bell's relentless opposition to his appointmentand Cox's mistrust and dislike of him, Talib never stood a real chance. Atthe Cairo Conference he was derided as 'a man of bad character anduntrustworthy'; and when Cox returned to Mesopotamia with theinstruction to engineer Faisal's election, he seemed bent on elbowing Talibout of the way at the first available opportunity.

He did not have to wait long. Driven by a mixture of overconfidencewith the perceived grassroots support for his candidacy and anxiety over thegrowing British partisanship of the Hashemite cause, Talib overplayed hishand. At a dinner party in his home on 14 April, attended inter alia by theFrench and Persian consuls, he complained of undue influence 'in favour ofone of the candidates to the throne of Iraq', and threatened an armeduprising 'should there be indications that the declared policy of the BritishGovernment was not being carried out'. This was precisely the kind of'incriminating evidence' for which Cox had been waiting. On 16 April Talibwas arrested and sent by boat to the southern port town of Fao. A few dayslater he was on his way to exile on the island of Ceylon, never to return tothe country which he dreamed of ruling.32

With Talib's departure from the political scene the scales wereirrevocably tilted in Faisal's favour. There were still some murmuring thathe was too 'English', and a growing opposition in the velayet of Basra toinclusion in an Iraqi State for fear of being drawn 'into the vortex ofBaghdad politics and religious troubles', but in Baghdad and Kadhimain itwas generally believed that the Hashemites would sweep the board.Nationwide, the dominant sentiment was one of keen anticipation for aBritish-backed candidate. Even the Naqib, while not withdrawing his owncandidacy, relented in his opposition to a Hashemite solution 'to the extentof saying that the country will be best to follow the wishes of H.M.G.whatever they may be'.33

In the circumstances, Faisal decided to make his move. Notwithstandingthe unexpected cordiality meted out to him by his father, he was anxious toproceed to his destination before the political mood changed either in theHijaz or in Mesopotamia, and he did not shirk from making his displeasurewith the slow pace of events known in London. 'I anticipated that thingshere would happen much more quickly', Bell wrote to her father on 22 May.

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'But they haven't happened. They are, I may say, just beginning now, for thetelegrams from Mecca ... are making an appreciable effect.' Two days laterLawrence sent an urgent telegram to Faisal. 'I am very sorry for the delaywhich has been due to the time it takes to get telegraphic replies fromMesopotamia', he sought to appease his friend. 'In two days time we hopeto be able to give you definite dates for yourself.'34 This they did, and on 12June Faisal and his retinue sailed for Basra on board H.M.G. vessel, theNorthbrook, arriving at their destination 12 days later.

The following month, on 11 July, the Council of State passed aunanimous resolution declaring Faisal the King of Iraq 'provided that HisHighness' Government shall be a constitutional representative anddemocratic Government limited by law'. Five days later, at the instructionof Cox, who deemed the resolution insufficient for giving Faisal thenecessary public clout, the Council authorised a plebiscite, which Faisalwon by a landslide 96 per cent. On 23 August 1921, Faisal was crowned thefirst monarch of the newly created kingdom of Iraq.35

King's College London

NOTES

1. David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and theCreation of the Modem Middle East (New York, 1990), 17.

2. Ibrahim to Muhammad Ali, Abd. 13 Ramadan 1248 (10 Aug. 1832), case 243, doc.85, inAsad J. Rustum, The Royal Archives of Egypt and the Origins of the Egyptian Expedition toSyria (Beirut, 1936), 59; Abd al-Razaq al-Hasani, Ta'rikh al-Wizarat al-Iraqiyya (Sidon,1939), 189-95.

3. For Hussein's preference of Abdallah see, for example, Nuri al-Said's conversation withGertrude Bell in Sept. 1921, in Elizabeth Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell from Her PersonalPapers 1914-1926 (London, 1961), 245.

4. H. Garland (Acting director, Arab Bureau), 'Conversation with Sheikh Abdul Melik ElKhatib, Hejaz Agent in Egypt', 25 Aug. 1920, dispatched by Ernest Scott (Acting HighCommissioner, Egypt), to Lord Curzon, 25 Aug. 1920, Foreign Office (FO) records. PublicRecord Office, Kew (PRO), FO 371/5040/E10953, 7-9.

5. Samuel to Foreign Office, telegrams 161 and 164 of 31 July 1920, FO 371/5038/E9175 andE9176, 29-32.

6. Allenby (Cairo) to Curzon, 18 March 1920, in E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds.),Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP) (London, 1960), XIII, 231.

7. Allenby to Foreign Office, telegrams 787, 788, 792, 794, 795, 796 of 1-2 Aug. 1920, FO371/5038.

8. Samuel to Foreign Office, tel.175, 3 Aug. 1920, and Foreign Office to Samuel, tel.69, 5Aug. 1920, FO 371/5038/E9355, 106-07.

9. Faisal to Lloyd George, 11 Sept. 1920 and 'Note to H.B.M.'s Government on the Arabquestion: Memo. On Events in Syria, November 1919 to July, 1920', FO 371/5040.

10. 'The Arab Question', FO 371/5040/E1150, 78.11. Haddad to Cornwallis, 8 Oct. 1920, FO 371/5065, 17.12. Curzon to Derby (Paris), 16 Nov. 1920, FO 371/6350, 163.13. On Faisal's London meetings, see 'Minute by Secretary of State on the Negotiations with

Feisal', 13 Jan. 1921, PRO CO 732/3, 360; 'Record of Conversation between Earl Curzonand the Emir Feisal', ibid., 368-69; 'Report of Conversation between Sir J. Tilley,

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7 0 THE JOURNAL OF IMPERIAL AND COMMONWEALTH HISTORY

K.C.M.G., C.B., representing the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and His Highnessthe Emir Feisal, representing the King of the Hedjaz (Held at the Foreign Office onThursday, 23 December 1920)', ibid., 369-70; 'Report of Conversation between Mr. R.C.Lindsay, C.V.O., representing the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and His Highnessthe Emir Feisal, representing the King of the Hedjaz (Held at the Foreign Office onThursday, 20 January 1921)', ibid., 366-67.

14. 'Conclusions of a meeting held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. on Tuesday, 4th Jan. 1921, at5.30 p.m.', PRO, CAB 23/24, Cabinet 1 (21), 4-5. For French pressures see also theconversation between de Fleuriau and Sir Eyre Crowe on 7 Jan. 1921, FO 371/6349/E469,77-78; Curzon to Hardinge (Paris), 24 Jan. 1921, FO 371/6350/E1090/4/91, 165.

15. Lord Curzon, 'Instructions to Mr. Cornwallis regarding his interview with Emir Feisal', 7Jan. 1921, FO 371/6349/E583, 91-93.

16. Cornwallis, 'Note of an interview with Emir Feisal on 8.1.21', ibid., 96.17. 'Minute by Secretary of State on the Negotiations with Feisal', 362; Curzon to Allenby, 22

March 1920, DBFP, XIII, 235. See also his telegram to Allenby of 19 March 1920, ibid.,232.

18. Curzon to Cox (via India Office), 9 Jan. 1921, and Cox to Curzon, 11 Jan. 1921, FO371/6349/E557, 81-83.

19. Curzon to Churchill, 9 Jan. 1921, Churchill to Cox, 8 Jan. 1921, in Martin Gilbert, WinstonS. Churchill (London, 1977), Companion Volume IV/2, 1297-98.

20. Ibid., 1295, 1300, 1301, 1314.21. 'Conclusions of a Meeting held at 10, Downing Street, S.W. on Monday, 14th Feb., 1921,

at 12 Noon', CAB 23/24, 80.22. T.E. Lawrence, undated note on a conversation with Faisal, PRO, CO 732/3/9836, 402.23. For the original draft in Lawrence's and Young's handwriting, see 'Conference at Cairo -

Agenda & minutes thereon', CO 732/4/17262, 133-62 (Churchill's draft agenda of 18 Feb.1921, 134-36; Departmental view on Mesopotamia, 145-54). For the final, slightly reviseddraft, see 'Report on Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem, March 12th to30th, 1921', FO 371/6343, Appendix 2, 27-33.

24. For the proceedings of the meeting see CO 732/3, 409-12. See also 'Sherifian Policy inMesopotamia & Trans-Jordania', an undated internal memorandum for Churchill (c.25 Feb.1921), reporting the views of Lawrence and Young, CO 732/3/10127, 418-22.

25. 'Report on the Middle East Conference', FO 371/6343, 66-67.26. Churchill to Lloyd George, received at the Colonial Office on 8.30 P.M., 14 March 1921,

CO 732/4/17976, 167.27. Ibid., 171. For the full proceedings of the Cabinet meeting see 'Conclusions of a Meeting

of the Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Tuesday, 22nd March 1921 at 11.30a.m.', Cabinet 14 (21), CAB 23/24, 160-68.

28. Lawrence to Churchill, 15 April 1921, FO 371/6350, fol.154; Cox to Churchill, 17 Aug.1921, FO 371/6352, 125.

29. Churchill to Lloyd George, 18 March 1921, CO 732/4, 169.30. Viceroy of India, 'Future of Mesopotamia', 11 Oct. 1920, FO 371/5231/E12756, 10-11.31. Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 157. See also Office of the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia,

•Intelligence Report', 4 April 1921, FO 371/6351, 32-33.32. Montagu, 'Note on the Causes of the Outbreak in Mesopotamia', FO 371/5229/E10440, 84;

Burgoyne, Gertrude Bell, 157, 170-71, 212-16; Lady Bell, The Letters of Gertrude Bell(New York, nd), 590; Churchill to Lloyd George, 18 March 1921, CO 732/4/17976, 169;Cox to Churchill, 17, 18 April 1921, Churchill to Cox, 20 April, FO 371/6350/E4835,185-90, 194.

33. Office of the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, 'Intelligence Report', 15 May 1921, FO371/6351, 163-64; 'Mesopotamian Intelligence Report No.12', 15 June 1921, ibid., 114-19.

34. Lady Bell, Letters of Gertrude Bell, II, 596; Foreign Office to Marshall, 24 May 1921, FO371/6351, 21.

35. See, for example, Cox to Churchill, 9, 11, 12, 31 July, 18, 19, 23 Aug. 1921, FO 371/6352,11-14, 24-27, 87-88, 145-49, 152, 166.

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