Reactive Forces & Resurgent Challenges to Plural Societies

Reactive Forces &

Resurgent Challenges to Plural Societies

Costantinos Berhuetesfa Costantinos, PhD, School of Graduate Studies, Addis Ababa University,

[email protected]

Foreign Policy Discussion, AU Hall, Addis Ababa Public Lecture Series XXXIV

Summary

This lecture (a chapter in my upcoming book - Plural Politics in Africa: Socio-Cultural Trajectories of Political Culture Development & Legal Empowerment of the Poor - raises the tangential issues of the trajec-tories on the stewardship of African democratization that are marked by uniquely austere organiza-tional-strategic issues. From Algeria and Egypt to Benin and Burkina Faso to Lesotho and Maurita-nia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, To-go, Tunisia, Uganda and Zanzibar have experienced multiple coups and counter coups for various economic, political and social reasons. The looting of mineral, flora and fauna resources is also a source of grave concern for Africa (Costantinos, 1996).

During the transition in the 90s, some countries though small in number had already made a successful transition from military-affiliated single party dictatorships to pluriform institutions and practices. Nonetheless, of the 354 presidential elections since then, the incumbent won 207 of them without contes-tation. On the other polar opposite, in 52 cases, the incumbent lost and conceded defeat. In 95 cases, the election results were contested by the loser. The incumbents lost, rejected the results and formed a coalition in 48 cases. The challengers lost, contested the results and formed a coalition with the incumbent in 40 cases (Ncube, 2013). An array of power-ful, illiberal forces has built momentum in recent years that is increasingly challenging democratic norms and the inter-national order. This illiberal surge seemingly has caught established democracies around the world by surprise (Walk-er, 2015). Significantly, political pluralism depends upon the emergence of supportive set of political institutions that are recurrent and valued patterns of political behaviour give shape and regularity to politics and manifest as political rules and organizations and customary political norms and practices.

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1. From colonial rule to independence

1.1. The Scramble for Africa: Stewardship of African ‘democratization’

This lecture (a chapter in my new book - Plural Politics in Africa: Socio-Cultural Trajectories of Political Culture Development & Legal Empowerment of the Poor - raises the tangential issues of the trajectories on the stewardship of African democratization that are marked by uniquely austere organizational-strategic issues. Even under democratically favourable contemporary global conditions, historical, ideological and strategic characteristics internal and external to the unification process still would exist that would make it a costly exercise. African Unification, without any doubt, is in crisis. It heav-ily depends on the legitimacy of national democratic process that is honest, predictable, transparent and accountable in the execution of the African states’ broader unification responsibility. It is appar-ent that as the continent enters this new era of political pluralism there is a need to overhaul the ad-ministrative machinery and develop institutional alternatives to the centralized, bureaucratic and hi-erarchical organizational structure of the state.

There was general agreement among the new leaders of Africa to stick with these borders. One of the major tasks facing these leaders was to generate a sense of national unity, which went beyond the unity created, by being in opposition to colonial rule. This meant creating an effective administrative machinery and good communications. It also meant having a shared vision and sense of identity. The obvious person to generate this vision was the head of state. Originally, the cult of personality grew in response to a need to bring people together. Through oratory and image, the African leader himself became more than a leader; he became symbolic of something bigger, which brought all people together. So Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast was known as The Ram who defends his people; Kenyatta of Kenya was The Flaming Spear of Kenya; Nyerere of Tanzania was Mwalimu or teacher. Banda of Malawi combined a severe European look of trilby, and three-piece suit, with an extraordinary capacity to play the crowd.

‗In terms of philosophical outlook, socialism was attractive to new leaders. It rejected the premise of profit and accumulation of capital, which Europeans had so ruthlessly put to work in Africa. The Soviet Union was ideolog-ically committed to helping newly independent countries, as well as increasing its sphere of influence in a world in-creasingly defined by the Cold War and antagonistic relations between America and the Soviet Union. When Eu-ropeans turned their backs on the efforts and needs of new leaders, or else proposed economic and political relation-ships with African countries, which were one-sidedly in favor of the West, the Soviet Union offered help, mainly military. In the hysterical climate generated by the Cold War, any African leader visiting Moscow or accepting material support was branded a communist. Despite contact and support from the Soviet Union, there was not a single Marxist Leninist among the first generation of African leaders in the 1960‘s. Rather, people like Nkru-mah were searching to define different brands of African socialism. However, many western observers were obsessed with trying to spot ideological converts, and so assign the status of Soviet puppet to leaders with policies they did not like (BBC, 2014:1).

The borders of the countries, which African leaders inherited at independence, were created by Europeans in the 19th century, a map drawn up with no regard to the boundaries between different ethnic groups, linguistic variations and regional power bases. Somalia stood alone as a unit, which was uniform both ethnically and linguistically (Ibid). According to BBC, the Scramble for Africa, also known as the Race for Africa was a process of invasion, occupation, colonization and annexa-tion of African territory by European powers during the New Imperialism period, between 1881 and World War I in 1914. Because of the heightened tension between European states in the last quarter of the 19th century, the partitioning of Africa may be seen as a way for the Europeans to eliminate the threat of a Europe-wide war over Africa. The last 59 years of the 19th century saw transition from ‘informal imperialism’ of control through military influence and economic dominance to that of direct rule.

The Portuguese had been the first post-Middle Ages Europeans to establish firmly settlements, trade posts, permanent fortifications and ports of call along the coast of the African continent, from the beginning of the Age of Discovery, in the 15th century. There was little interest in, and less

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knowledge of, the interior for some two centuries thereafter. By 1914, only Ethiopia, Liberia and the Dervish State were independent of European control. Technological advancement facilitated over-seas expansionism. Industrialization brought about rapid advancements in transportation and com-munication, especially in the forms of steam navigation, railways, and telegraphs. Medical advances also were important, especially medicines for tropical diseases. The development of quinine, an ef-fective treatment for malaria, enabled vast expanses of the tropics to be accessed by Europeans.

However, exclusive of the area, which became the Union of South Africa in 1910 – the amount of capital investment by Europeans was relatively small, compared to other continents. Consequent-ly, the companies involved in tropical African commerce were relatively small, apart from Cecil Rhodes’s De Beers Mining Company. Rhodes had carved out Rhodesia for himself; Leopold II of Belgium later, and with considerably greater brutality, exploited the Congo Free State. These events might detract from the pro-imperialist arguments of colonial lobbies such as the Alldeutscher Verband, Francesco Crispi and Jules Ferry, who argued that sheltered overseas markets in Africa would solve the problems of low prices and over-production caused by shrinking continental markets.

2. Military coup d’états

2.1. Successful coups

From Algeria and Egypt to Benin and Burkina Faso to Lesotho and Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and Zanzibar have experienced multiple coups and counter coups for various economic, political and social reasons. The looting of mineral, flora and fauna resources is also a source of grave con-cern for Africa. Profound commitment is needed to promote regional policies and strategies for the diversification and enhancement of sources of income, competitiveness of productive sectors, ra-tional management of land resources, sustained and sound management of vital regional natural and environmental resources such as aquatic ecosystems, mineral deposits and forests of the Congo Ba-sin, as well as sustainable human settlements. Given the manifold impact of these, it is important to dwell on the lessons learnt and recommendations for best practice development.

Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) and rising ethnic tensions characterized the eighties in much of Africa. These tendencies interact causally. Africa’s growing debt burden and the nature of the SAPs have generated authoritarian responses to popular anger. The linkage between SAP and rising ethnic tensions is manifested in the distribution of power, wealth and ethnicity, especially un-der conditions of increasing scarcity, needs to be reconsidered. A number of reasons exacerbated ethnic and regional tensions. These are debts, economic crisis and SAPs. A core contention is that political tensions are arising as part of the general resistance against both SAPs, because of its pau-perizing impact, and against the state, which is seen as increasingly coercive and as negligent of its basic welfare responsibilities towards its citizens (Costantinos, 2014).

2.2. Political transition in the Nineties

During the transition in the 90s, unlike the pessimism portrayed by the African elite, some coun-tries though small in number, notably Zambia and Mozambique had already made a successful tran-sition from military-affiliated single party dictatorships to pluriform institutions and practices. Armed peace, while contested heavily as to its democratic credentials by opposition forces has re-sulted in regime change and relative peace for economic development. Ruling parties had used the moment of elections to rally the populace behind votes designed to intimidate the populace and a one party choice. Nigeria, Algeria and Burundi had of course slipped into political oblivion by the restitution of military rule.

Seen from the outside, Africa is often characterized as a continent of civil conflict, refugees and displaced populations and economic crisis. Yes, some of the bloodiest conflicts since the end of WWII have been among Africans. Millions of refugees and IDPs, proportionately the largest num-ber in developing countries, are in Sub-Saharan Africa. The forces of lawlessness, mercenaries, petty arms traders, narco-traffickers and smugglers have descended on African countries in conflict, fan-

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ning the flames of war, and profiteering from the destruction of the lives of our children. One may indeed ask whether the state-sponsored plunder of colonialism has not been replaced by private profiteering: the privatization of plunder and exploitation! On the arrearage side, within a life span of something like two millennia, the African state has exhibited an enhanced degree of coercive power, resulting in a pervasive military ethos leading to the emergence of self-labeled ‘Socialist’ mili-tary oligarchies through a long and painful process of ideological schooling. A major obstacle to ef-forts to install and consolidate democratic system in Africa is the all-powerful, highly centralized and hier-archical bureaucratic structure; further exacerbated by economic adjustment program, coups, and counter coups, which antedated the democratization process by almost a decade. The organizational imperative of the massive bureaucratic machine is to command and control and is preoccupied with its own survival and enrichment. It is unlikely that the powerful bureaucracy will abandon its control of the state ap-paratus to elected leaders or respect the institutional restraints of democratic rule without struggle.

The lack of political culture also imposes serious threats to democratic development in the con-tinent. Practices such as free elections, the formatting of political parties, free and open discourse on public issues are all foreign concepts that need to be installed in the minds of the majority of the populace. While a host of other African countries set themselves to attain the institutions and prac-tices that have been the basic ingredients of the Western liberal democratic model, ethnicity and the right to self-determination have come to be espoused as principal sources of political partisanship often leading to deadly internal strife. Nevertheless, how much of this has deep historical roots in Africa or is it an elite ideology? One major obstacle to efforts to install and consolidate democratic system in Africa is the all-powerful, highly centralized and hierarchical bureaucratic structure. Built over the last fifty years, the organizational imperative of the massive bureaucratic machine is to command and control and is preoccupied with its own survival and enrichment. It is unlikely that the powerful bureaucracy will abandon its privileged position and control of the state apparatus to democratically elected political leaders or respect the institutional restraints of democratic rule without struggle (Ibid).

3. Elections, Ethnicity and Ideology

3.1. Elections and their outcomes

It is possible to draw a conceptual distinction between two levels of articulation of election of outcomes and to note the implications of their relations for process openness. There are representa-tions of specific interests, identities, needs, wishes, goals, claims, demands different in different indi-viduals, groups and communities and a second level of production and circulation of ideology where broad-based concepts, principles and rules take shape and come into play.

In Africa, all institutional weaknesses and strength flow from the top. This brief analysis of the strategic choices of 653 African Presidential and Legislative elections from 1960-2010 shows that the incumbent wins with no contestation 64%, forms a coalition 6%, and result in a standoff 2%. The incumbent loses and accepts defeat 16%, coalition 12%, and standoff 0%. Africa stands out as one region that has been slowest in establish-ing democratic institutions. Sub-Saharan African countries have been holding various elections that have estab-lished democracy in some countries but have caused reversals in others. The post 2011 fall or transformation of autocracies in North Africa and Middle East and the unsteady transition illustrates the challenges of democracy lying ahead in this region. Election outcomes can be represented by a tree structure for a two period representation (a game theory model is used here) with six outcomes (i) If the incumbent wins the election after period 1, it re-mains in power (WP) if the challenger accepts defeat (ii) A standoff (WS) or (iii) coalition (WC) ensues if the challenger does not accept defeat (iv) If the incumbent loses the election after period 1, the challenger becomes the new incumbent (LP) if the incumbent accepts defeat, or (v) a standoff (LS) or (vi) coalition (LC) ensues if the in-cumbent does not accept defeat. In Mapping of Actual African Election Outcomes: Mapping Actual Election Outcomes 2006-2011+Eritrea 1993 ‘

Countries where the incumbent wins and remains in power are

Algeria 2009 Angola 2008 Benin 2011 Botswana 2009 Burkina Faso 2010 Burundi 2010

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Cameroon 2007 Cape Verde 2006 DRC 2007 Egypt 2010 Ethiopia 2010 Namibia 2009 Rwanda 2010 Seychelles 2011 South Africa 2009 Tanzania 2010 Togo 2010 Tunisia 2009 Uganda 2011 Zambia 2008 In a series of articles by Foreign Policy (2015), several authors have discussed Resurgent Dicta-

torship: The Global Assault on Democracy (FP, 2015).

Authoritarian regimes are innovating and developing their own counter norms to thwart established and cred-ible international election monitoring efforts by building on tried and true methods of electoral manipulation, auto-crats are devising increasingly sophisticated techniques to influence international and national election monitoring efforts. Among the tactics authoritarian regimes utilize to cloud election observation are the following: denying cred-ible monitoring organizations access to election-day activities by withholding invitations or accreditation (or issuing them too late to allow for meaningful participation). They ―stack the mission‖ of credible, regional intra-governmental organizations with pro-government representatives. They deploy ―zombie‖ or fake monitors that praise flawed elections to weaken the impact of more critical assessments. They present phony election monitors as representatives of established organizations. They fund political parties in other countries to ensure a steady stream of sympathetic election monitors in foreign government election observation delegations. They hire public relations firms in Europe and the United States to spread misinformation and other diversions to obscure faulty elections and bolster their image at home and abroad.

―While internationally agreed upon standards governing election monitoring organizations began to develop in earnest during the democratic transitions after the fall of communism in the former Soviet Union, they are a natu-ral extension of the International Declaration of Human Rights' Article 21, which guarantees citizens the right to take part in the government of their country, directly or through freely chosen representations. These standards were codified by the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for In-ternational Election Observers. At its 2005 signing, the declaration was endorsed by 23 regional and interna-tional organizations from all over the world. The United Nations celebrated their codification with an Endorse-ment Ceremony and has since recognized the document with appreciation in three UN General Assembly resolu-tions. Authoritarian governments are increasingly bypassing the standards of credible election monitoring despite widespread support for these principles as part of their drive to reshape global democratic norms and control their national narratives. Well aware that there are international consequences for rigged elections and other non-democratic political processes—such as sanctions or a loss of international aid and support—authoritarian re-gimes are walking a tightrope of appearing democratic to international audiences while maintaining control over domestic constituents. The result of this context where exposed election fraud poses heightened risks to autocrats is that illiberal regimes are resorting to more deceptive methods of election rigging (Aten, 2015).

‘African countries where there were electoral standoffs have been the overriding phenomena are

CAR 2011 Chad 2011 Djibouti 2010 Equatorial Guinea 2009 Gambia 2006 Mali 2007 Republic of Congo 2009 Senegal 2007 Somalia 2009 Sudan 2010

‗Guinea-Bissau (2009, Kenya (2007, Lesotho (2007, Madagascar (2007, Malawi (2009, Zimbabwe (2008 have resulted in a coalition government. Gabon (2009) and Mozambique (2009) have resulted in a coali-tion. Countries where the incumbent lost and challengers became the new incumbents are

Sierra Leone 2007 Niger 2011 Sao Tome 2011 Morocco 2007 Mauritania 2009 Mauritius 2010 Ghana 2008 Guinea 2010 Comoros 2010 Liberia 2005 Cote d‘Ivoire 2010 Nigeria 2015

‗Of the 354 presidential elections, the incumbent president won 207 without contestation. On the other polar opposite, in 52 cases, the incumbent lost and conceded defeat. In 95 cases, the election results were contested by the loser. The incumbent lost, rejected the results and formed a coalition in 48 cases. The challenger lost, contested the results and formed a coalition with the incumbent in 40 cases. Seven elections resulted in a standoff. In Benin (1991 and 2001), Togo (2005), Zimbabwe (2008) and Malawi (2009), the challenger‘s contestation of the in-

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cumbent‘s victory resulted in a standoff. In the cases of Somalia (2009) and Mauritania (2009), the incumbent contestation also resulted in a standoff. Some coalition is formed after a certain period of standoff. Standoff may result from a broken coalition. It may also be imposed by the international community‘ (Ncube, 2013).

Again, in a series of articles by Foreign Policy (2015), several authors have discussed Resurgent Dictatorship: The Global Assault on Democracy (FP, 2015).

An array of powerful, illiberal forces has built momentum in recent years that is increasingly challenging dem-ocratic norms and the international order. This illiberal surge seemingly has caught established democracies around the world by surprise. The end of the Cold War, the implosion of communism, and the advance of new democracies in the 1990s suggested that the spread of democracy would continue beyond the last decade of the 20th century. While the assumption of democracy‘s continuing rise was entirely reasonable, it did not foresee the emergence of a new set of influential illiberal powers, first among which are leading authoritarian states such as China, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. These countries may disagree on many things, but they share the goal of containing the spread of democracy and limiting the influence of democratic standards in the world. The illiberal surge is not limited to state actors; ISIS, one of a number of illiberal non-state forces, is demonstrating a troubling degree of resilience that is altering the landscape in the Middle East in disturbing ways that were largely unantici-pated not all that long ago. The NED‘s International Forum for Democratic Studies has been engaged in a study of what we have described as the ―world movement against democracy,‖ which has devoted attention to the leading states that have been at the forefront of the illiberal resurgence, as well as the crucial ―soft-power‖ spheres in which they have been seeking to weaken democracy. The momentum behind the potent forces that have emerged does not look to be slowing, at least for now. It is our hope that this website and the blog that is part of it will serve as a reference point for interested audiences and help to improve understanding of the multifaceted ways in which illiber-al authoritarian regimes are seeking to reshape the international order and its norms (Walker, 2005).

Whether through legitimate, free and fair elections or ‘democratic machinations’ examples of one-party dominated states in Africa until recently are

African National Congress, South Africa Botswana Democratic Party Angola: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola Cameroon: People‘s Democratic Movement Chad: Patriotic Salvation Movement in power Congo (Brazzaville) Congolese Labor Party Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea Djibouti: People‘s Rally for Progress Egypt: the National Democratic Party Eritrea: People‘s Front for Democracy & Justice Ethiopian People‘s Democratic Revolutionary Front Gabonese Democratic Party Namibia South-West Africa People‘s Organization Lesotho Congress for Democracy Rwandan Patriotic Front Sudan National Congress; Gambia: Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation & Construction Tanzania: Chama Cha Mapinduzi; Tunisia: Constitutional Democratic Rally Cameroon Togo Rally of the Togolese People Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front Uganda: National Resistance Movement

3.2. Ideological basis for state formation (Costantinos, 1996)

3.2.1. political institutions

Significantly, political pluralism depends upon the emergence of supportive set of political insti-tutions that are recurrent and valued patterns of political behavior that give shape and regularity to politics. They may be manifest as political rules or as political organizations including customary po-litical norms and practices. The prospects for sustainable livelihoods partly depend on habitual atti-tudes and behavior among the population at large. From theoretical perspectives, political culture best predicts the prospects for political pluralism.

These explanatory factors operate at different level of analysis and each has its own data re-quirements. The power of a given set of factors to explain possibilities for political pluralism, the susceptibility of concepts to empirical investigation, and the potential of the approach to generate policy recommendations, however, will no wonder lead to an imperative to adopt ‘an institutional approach’. Hence, the hypothesis is that (GCA/ALF, 1993). The upshot of the development of po-litical culture for African total political pluralism depends on the configuration of political institu-

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tions in state and civil society. The key research question becomes, ‘Is the endowment of institutions in society and state conducive to African political pluralism?’

Here one is tempted to underwrite the hypothesis on the formation and sustainability of the real unity as opposed to the formal, vacuous institutional evolution that has been creeping since the fif-ties. The development of political culture for African total political pluralism depends on the config-uration of political institutions in state and civil society. Hence, the endowment of institutions in society and state conducive to political pluralism is sine qua non for ultimate political integration. The goals may be amenable to description not only at the level of what he broadly and formally acknowledges as the aims, but also in terms of implicative objectives and purposes and specific tac-tics and processes that inform a variety of activities leading to one politically, socially and economi-cally integrated Africa. True there exist insurmountable obstacles to political pluralism; nevertheless a skilled and committed citizenry and state leadership can prevail over this.

3.2.2. Agency:

Participants in and around projects of political pluralism generally constitute a network or inter-section of institutions and groups. These may include the following: indigenous governments that preside over formal transition to political pluralism processes, political organizations not affiliated with ruling coalition, opposition groups and intellectual that operate outside official government channels and struggle for a share of power or influence. In some cases, a free, though constitutional-ly and legally not very well protected, press; local non-governmental organizations involved in pro-moting political pluralism at the grassroots as well as in civic, humanitarian and relief work; profes-sional associations; and multilateral maybe included. In some other cases, bilateral agencies and pri-vate international aid groups which collectively exert far-reaching external influence over political reform may hold sway.

Generally, the larger the number and degree of diversity of participants actively involved, the greater the variation. Uncertainty and complexity of forms of agency and activity possible, and the more open and free the transition to political pluralism process is likely to be in its formal as well as informal aspects. Admittedly, the interesting actors typically have their own primary ‘functions’ quite apart from their role in promoting globalization. Every one of the players is geared toward specific interests, concerns and activities beyond or outside the ends of pluralism. Even if they are expressly committed to promoting reform, it is always possible for participants to lose themselves in the spe-cifics and ‘forget’ the process as a whole. To restate the basic point, the extent and nature of open-ness of political pluralism are conditioned by the breadth of the range of available participants and the degree of uncertainty and complexity that characterized their agency and functional relations.

Structural constraints on possibilities of political pluralism are reinforced by specific, more or less conscious, uncertainty and complexity reducing activities of key participants, particularly the governments and foreign backers. As an interval between one regime or system of rule add another during which competing actors claim and contest over state power, transition to globalizations may be characterized by rules and forms of political engagement that are ‘in constant flux’ and may lead to ‘any number of unpredictable alternative outcomes’. At the same times, however, the interval is marked by aspiring or incumbent governments that seek to get quickly their hands on the flux of transition to political pluralism events and circumstances, often succeeding in immediately securing themselves in and projecting power. Also, the proliferation of varied aid conditionalities tied to spe-cific policies and sectors - SAPs to be implemented, good governance reform measures to be taken, administrative codes to be followed, human rights to be protected, environmental regulations to be adhered to and so on - often outpace the development of coherent transition to political pluralism standards, rules and concepts by and within nation-states.

3.2.3. Ideology:

Beyond the sphere of political agency, possibilities and problems of political pluralism openness can be grasped in terms of the related domain of ideology. Ideological elements and constructs

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might be seen as the very constitutive structure of process openness and closure. Transition to polit-ical pluralism will commonly be characterized by a number of distinctive and shared additional ele-ments, including concepts and rules of government, national and cultural values, traditions of politi-cal discourse and arguments, and modes of representation of specific interests, needs and issues. These elements, or complexes of elements, will tend to assume varying forms and to enter into shift-ing relations of competition, cooperation and hegemony during political reform. Generally, the broader the range of ideological elements at plays in a transition to political pluralism to globaliza-tion, and the more varied and uncertain their relations, the greater the possibilities of process open-ness and transparency that exist.

Like the transition to political pluralism of politics and political organizations and activities to which they are often tied more or less closely, transition to globalized ideological constructs tend to be unsettled and, at times, unsettling. Particularly at these initial stages of transition to globalization, they are more likely to be uncertain rather than stable structures of ideas and values. This has the effect of opening up the entire political pluralism process, of freeing the process from simple domi-nation by any one organized actor or coalition of actors. Yet, global ideological elements and rela-tions take shape and come into play within a hierarchy of global and local agencies and groups. A determinate order of institutions, powers, interests and activates operates through complexes of transition to political pluralism ideas and values, filling out, specifying, anchoring and, often shortcutting their formal content or meaning. Moreover, this may impose ideological as well as prac-tical limits on the extent to which and how pluralism processes can be opened up or broadened.

Thus, the fact that promoters or supporters of political pluralism often do not efficiently realize in practice the potential of the ideas and goals they promote, that the volume of their interventions is not nearly proportional to their impact raises the issue of whether the ideas in question may be fundamentally constrained at the moment of their conception and implementation by the very insti-tutions and technocratic structures that ground their articulation. Within countries, the supply of ideas of political pluralism may be artificially deflated by particular strategies and mechanisms used by incumbent governments to manage entire reform processes.

Conceptual possibilities may be left unrealized, or sub-optimally realized, insofar as governing elite are preoccupied with filling out those spaces of uncertainty in transition to political pluralism political thought, discourse and action that alternative or opposition parties would occupy in the course of their own engagement. In the sphere of ideology, openness of political pluralism process is concerned in part with allowing free expression of diverse ideas and beliefs and permitting unre-stricted taking of positions by citizens on specific issues. It has to do with creating conditions for the existence of the broadest possible range of opinions and sentiments. Are all ideas and values allowed to contend? Are there laws or unwritten ‘codes’ which prevent or hinder intellectual and cultural freedom? Do the views and perspectives of various groups have a significant and legitimate place in pluralism projects and processes? Is good faith criticism of a particular political pluralism strategy of a particular governing stratum construed by the ruling stratum in question as negation of political pluralism as such?

Questions such as these are important in examining and assessing the ideological basis for plu-ralism. However, as important as it is, this is only one context, level, or analysis of the breadth and depth of the political pluralism process on the terrain of ideology. There is another level of analysis, concerned with the extent and nature of openness of distinct ideological constructs to one another, with modes of articulation of given sets of ideas and values and of representations of specific issues relative to others. The concern here is not so much the number and diversity of ideas, values and opinions allowed to gain currency during transition to political pluralism as modes of their competi-tive and co-operative articulation. For example,

Does political pluralism enter national transition processes as an external ideology, constructing and deploying its concepts in sterile abstraction from national beliefs and values?

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Does political pluralism come into play in total opposition to, or in tandem with historic values?

In the struggle over the establishment of global rules of economic and political engagement, do they equate the articulation of their agenda with the production of broad-based concepts, norms and goals?

Does transition to political pluralism processes signify change in terms of the transformation of the immediate stuff of national politics into an activity mediated and guided by objective and critical pluralism standards, rules and principles?

It is possible to draw a conceptual distinction between two levels of articulation of ideology in political pluralism process and to note the implications of their relations for process openness. There are first, representations of specific interests, identities, needs, wishes, goals, claims, demands and so on, different in different individuals, groups and communities. These are to be distinguished from a second level of production of plural ideology where broad-based concepts, principles and rules take shape and come into play. For convenience, we can designate ideological elements at the former lev-el of particular representations or contents, and those at the latter level of explicit general forms. Particular representations have to do with ideologically loaded articulations of interests, needs and activities, which may appear or become so immediate as to be taken for spontaneous realities.

4. Discussion

4.1. Analytical challenges

In engaging in uncertainty reducing activities which short-cut the full emergence of open and transparent democratic process, regimes often enlist the support of outside participants in political reform, notably Western governments and international agencies. Donors may support political plu-ralism through a variety of mechanisms, including the use of the instrument of aid conditionality. The range of supportive measures they take may even be expanding beyond efforts aimed at gov-ernment renovation into broader areas of political reform, including ‘the support of press freedom and independence’. Nevertheless, Western governments and international agencies also worry about political instability, civil strife and economic disorder to which this might lead. In addition, the pro-liferation of varied aid conditionality tied to specific policies and sectors often outpace the develop-ment of coherent political pluralism standards, rules and concepts by and within nation-states. Local political pluralism process has generally not matched global action. With all the multiplicity of differ-ent, not very well coordinated, international development and political pluralism programs, projects, mechanisms and activities, it has been a bit difficult to maintain a sense of direction, in both a stra-tegic and process sense.

As stated earlier, beyond the sphere of political agency, possibilities and problems of political pluralism openness can be grasped in terms of the related domain of ideology. Ideological elements and constructs might be seen as the very constitutive structure of process openness and closure. Po-litical pluralism will commonly be characterized by a number of distinctive and shared additional elements, including concepts and rules of government, national and cultural values, traditions of po-litical discourse and arguments, and modes of representation of specific interests, needs and issues. These elements, or complexes of elements, will tend to assume varying forms and to enter into shift-ing relations of competition, cooperation and hegemony during political reform.

Like the politics and political organizations and activities to which they are often tied more or less closely, ideological constructs tend to be unsettled and, at times, unsettling, particularly at the initial stages of democratic transition. They are more likely to be uncertain rather than stable struc-tures of ideas and values. This has the effect of opening up the entire political pluralism process, of freeing the process from simple domination by any one organized actor or coalition of actors. Yet global ideological elements and relations take shape and come into play within a hierarchy of global and local agencies and groups. A determinate order of institutions, powers, interests and activates operates through complexes of political pluralism ideas and values, filling out, specifying, anchoring and, often shortcutting their formal content or meaning. Moreover, this may impose ideological as well as practical limits on the extent to which and how democratic processes can be broadened.

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4.2. Democratic rules and institutions

Democratic Development is a process of rulemaking in which citizens obtain opportunities for political contestation and political participation. Political contestation refers to open rivalry and competition among diverse political interests. Political participation refers to the entitlement of citi-zens, considered as political equals, to be involved in choosing governmental leaders and policies. Democracy is a regime in which the authority to exercise power derives from the will of the people.

Current perspectives on political reform in Africa neglect to pose the problem of articulation of democracy as a relatively autonomous mode of analysis. These viewpoints augur on the idea in which democracy projects impose ideology upon our societies, governments and societies from the outside. Here, democratization would consist of a set of activities in which universal, mainly West-ern, concepts and standards of governance are neatly ‘applied to’, as distinct from produced or re-produced in African contexts and conditions. Even at the level of application alone, it is largely overlooked that international models may enter Government and societies in Africa through a pro-liferation of programs and mechanisms that hinder the growth of open and effective transition pro-cess thus retarding the development of indigenous democratic-system experience and capacity.

Whether democracy in Africa is defined in terms of individual freedom or collective rights, gov-ernment policy or citizen action, private value or public norm, the upshot of the relative inattention to problems of articulation of open democratic systems and processes in itself makes democracy at once the most concrete of idea systems. Within current projects of political reform, democracy is either conventionalized or sterilized on terrain of theory and often vacuously formalized on the ground of practice. It enters African politics and society in relatively abstract and plain form, yet is expected to land itself to immediate and vital African polity’s socio-political experience. It suggests itself, seems within reach only to elude, and appears readily practicable only to resist realization.

References & Endnotes Aten, Melissa. Muddying the Waters: How Authoritarians Erode Election Observation Standards, (April 30,

2015, FP, The Democracy Lab Weekly Brief, http://www.resurgentdictatorship.org/muddying-the-waters-how-authoritarians-erode-election-observation-standards/)

Costantinos, Berhutesfa. Political Transition in Africa, (ALF/GCA, Washington Dc., 1996) Costantinos, Berhutesfa. Unleashing Africa‘s Resilience: (Lulu Publishing, California, 2014,

http://www.amazon.com/Unleashing-Africas-Resilience-Pan-Africanist-Renaissance/dp/1483410129/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1404449239&sr=1-1&keywords=Unleashing+Africa%27s+Resilience

Dictionary.com, A definition of Pan-Africanism, (2012, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pan-africanism, . [Last accessed:]

GCA/ALF. Study on the transition to democracy in Africa, (Africa Leadership forum and Global Coali-tion for Africa, 1993).

Ncube, Mthuli. Elections and Political Fragility in. Africa. (African Development Bank Group, 2013) Sibrian, Hainer, The Shared Interets of Saudi Arabia and Iran, (April 30, 2015, FP, The Democracy Lab

Weekly Brief, http://www.resurgentdictatorship.org/the-shared-interest-of-saudi-arabia-and-iran/)

Walker Christopher, The Illiberal Surge and the Changing World Order, (April 30, 2015, FP, The Democracy Lab Weekly Brief, http://www.resurgentdictatorship.org/the-illiberal-surge-and-the-changing-world-order/