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Rambouillet Peace Conference; Road to Conference and Results
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8/19/2019 Rambouillet Peace Conference; Road to Conference and Results
Serbs arrived on the Balkan Peninsula in the 7th century C.E. as pagan‘s tribe
from central Asia. The reason for this long voyage was probably protection from
barbarian tribes in Asia and also the warmer Mediterranean climate. Serbs settled this
area from Dalmatia, in today‘s Croatia, to a region that is known today as Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In the middle of this area is today‘s Kosovo (full name
would be Kosovo and Metohija), also known as ‗Old Serbia‘. This entire territory was
under control of Byzantine Empire, and that is the reason why Serbs during the time
became Christians, and later, after the schism between Christians in 1054, Orthodox
Christians.
Albanians were the Serbs‘ southern neighbors, and until the Ottomans conquest
they were allies. Albanians were part of the Serbian army during the King Dushan‘s
leadership. In the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Albanians stood along with Serbs against
Turks.2 Unfortunately, Serbian King Lazar lost this battle, and Turks occupied this part of
Europe for the next 500 years.3 The majority of Albanians saw this as an opportunity to
become Turks‘ ally and finally grows to be stronger than the Serbs. Most of Albanians
accepted Islam4 in an effort to be closer to their new rulers. This tactic began to have
results very fast and Turks started to settle Albanians in territories that were 100%
populated by Serbs. The excuse for this process Albanians, even today, tried to find in a
2 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje:Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 13.3 Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s bloody collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 18.4 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 14.
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Kosovo with parts of southern central Serbia (Pec, Djakovica, Prizren, Novi Pazar,
Mitrovica, Sjenica, Pristina, Gnjilane, Presevo, and Kumanovo). Between 1878 and the
first Balkan war (1912), 400,000 people escaped from Kosovo to central Serbia.7
5 Jean-Arnault Dérens, ―Threat of Enduring Nationalism: Kosovo‘s Rival Histories‖, Le Monde
Diplomatique, July 12, 2005, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/62/446.html6 Bernard J. Fisher, ―A Brief Historical Overview of the Development of Albanian Nationalism,‖ Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 23, 2005,http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/MR313%20Fischer.doc7 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 15-16.
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During WWI, the Serbian army along with thousands of civilians had to retreat
through Albania to Greece. That was the only way since Austrians attacked from the
north and west, while Bulgarians struck from the east in an effort to concur Macedonia
which was southern Serbia at that time. During that retreat through Albania, Albanians
were very aggressive toward Serbs.9
Under the protection of the fascist Italian government in WWII, Albanian
collaborators killed thousands of Serbs and other non-Albanians.10 Before WWII, Serbs
8 Zvonimir Trajkovic, ―Srbi Iznad Sarajeva Postavljaju Divovski Kriz,‖ Srpska Politika,
http://www.srpskapolitika.com/intervjui/2008/latinica/042.html9 The New York Times, ―Serbian Retreat a Heroic Tragedy,‖ January 8, 1916, pg 2,http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9404E7DD103FE233A2575BC0A9679C946796D6CF;another good source for Serbian retreat through Albania is Olive M. Aldridge, Retreat from Serbia through
Montenegro and Albania (London: The Minerva Publishing Company, 1916)http://www.archive.org/texts/flipbook/flippy.php?id=retreatfromserbi00aldriala
10Carl Kosta Savich, ― Albanian Nazi Troops in WW2 Launched a Wide Spread Terror Against KosovoSerbs,‖ Vatopaidi Online, October 27, 2009, http://vatopaidi.wordpress.com/2009/10/27/albanian-nazi-troops-in-ww2-launched-a-wide-spread-terror-against-kosovo-serbs/
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were the majority in Kosovo and Metohija, making up 61% of population. However, after
WWII on 1961 census, Albanians were majority with 67, 1%, this number rose in 1971 to
73, 7% of population in what was called after WWII ―Serbian Autonomous Province
Kosovo and Metohija‖. According to Mr. Simic, in 1981 ethnic Albanians made 77.4%
of population of Kosovo, while Serbs fell from 23.6% in 1961 to 7.3% in 1981. Other
than that, half of Albanian population is younger than 20 years, which means that their
population will most likely double in the next 20 years. Additional data is available in
Tim Judah‘s book , The Serbs, where one can see that 441,740 of Albanians lived in
Yugoslavia in 1918, while that number rises to 1,730,000 in 1981.11
Besides Albanian ethnic cleansing of Serbs during WWII (in just one year of war,
until April 1942, 60,000 Serbs were forced to escape from Kosovo12), there are other
reasons why the demographic structure changed so rapidly. The first reason is that
Communist‘s regime in Yugoslavia did not allow Serbs to return to Kosovo and Metohija
after the war (the decision maker of that time was Josip Broz Tito, and many Albanians
were known as ‗Titoists‘ because he gave them autonomy). ―The ‗Titoist‘ phenomenon
among Albanians was not simply, as it is often described, an expression of nostalgia for
Tito‘s ‗gift‘ to Kosova of its position as a Yugoslav autonomous province…‖ 13 At the
same time, Tito allowed Albanians from Albania to move to this part of Serbia with
excuse that they are trying to escape from dictatorship of Enver Hodza. ―…in the creation
of a Communist Yugoslavia under Tito, the Croat-Slovene. He concluded before World
11 Tim Judah, The Serbs: history, myth & the destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1997), 311-13.12 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 19.13 Stephen Schwartz, ―'Enverists' and 'Titoists' - Communism and Islam in Albania and Kosova, 1941-99:From the Partisan Movement of the Second World War to the Kosova Liberation War,‖ Journal of
Communist Studies and Politics 25, no. 1 (2009): 65.
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War II that Yugoslavia could only be re-created on the basis of a weakened and
constricted Serbia‖.14
The second reason is the Albanians birth rate, which at the end of 20th century
was 6.8 children per family while Serbs had 1.5 per family. In addition to this, it is
interesting that even in a relatively peaceful period, from mid 1960‘s till mid 1980‘s,
approximately 200,000 people left Kosovo, creating 700 settlements ethnically
completely free of Serbs.15
Albanian pronazi demonstration during WWII16
Someone may ask why Serbs had tolerated this behavior of Yugoslav
communist‘s regime. The answer is that this regime was ruled by Dictator Josip Broz
14 David Binder, ―Thoughts about Serbs,‖ Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies 14,no. 2 (2000): 167-71, http://www.serbianstudies.org/publications/pdf/Vol14_2_Binder.pdf15 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 44.16 Coordinamento Nazionale per la Yugoslavia, http://www.cnj.it/documentazione/KOSMET/foto.htm
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Tito who was Croat.17 Though it is still unclear why, Croats and Serbs could never live in
a harmony. It is not easy to find evidences of Serbian hostility toward Croats, but the
newest example of animosity between these two ethnic groups was in civil war of 1990‘s,
which ended in 1995 when Croats launched ―O peration Storm‖ in which 200,000
refugees escaped to Serbia and Bosnia, while ―In the days that followed Operation Storm,
property was destroyed and atrocities committed against those Serbs who remained.‖18
But much worst example for this hatred occurred in 1940‘s. Only in WWII,
Croats, which were Nazi allies, killed 700,000 Serbs (most of them in extermination
camp Jasenovac were Croats killed about 600,000 people19
).
Tito‘s regime changed the constitution in 1974, giving to this province all
attributes of republic except the name. Albanians took advantage of this by creating
ethnically clear of Serbs police, making them less important citizens without any possible
protection from Federal or Republic government. On the other side, Albanians took all
important positions in the Province government and courts. They developed a parallel
education system based on the Albanian language which was against the law. All these
things were unthinkable for Serbs in Albania, where they were forced during the time to
change their names so that they won‘t sound as Slovenes in addition to being forbidden to
be educated in their language.20 Besides that, Albanian government took all their houses
17 Rit Nosotro, ―Josip Broz Tito: 1892-1980, Yugoslavian Dictator Who Succeeded with Communism,‖ HyperHistory Online, 2003, http://www.hyperhistory.net/apwh/bios/b2tito-josip-marshall.htm18 Matt Prodger, ―Evicted Serbs Remember Storm,‖ BBC News, August 5, 2005,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4747379.stm19 Yad Vashem Museum Online, http://www1.yadvashem.org/education/entries/English/29.asp20 David J. Kostelancik, ―Minorities and Minority Language Education in Inter -war…‖ East European
Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1996): 81.
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and other belongings.21 However; discussion on this topic would require another research
paper.
Except for 1968, when Albanian separatists organized huge protests in all the
major cities in Kosovo, using an opportunity to cheer to ―Kosovo Republic‖, ―Long live
Albania‖ and Enver Hodza 22(which was minimized very effectively by Tito‘s communist
propaganda, explaining that it was just a group of youths that broke in a couple of stores,
which is common even in the western countries23) until 1980, when Tito died, Albanians
held their activities bellow the radar, knowing that time was working for them. After that
event everything changed. Albanian separatists begin massive demonstrations against
Serbian government with demands to be recognized as a Republic, which was
unacceptable for Serbian authorities because that would lead to separation from Serbia
and Yugoslavia. This period of violence in Kosovo lasts until 1989, when extremely
popular Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic changed the constitution, and brought
Serbian jurisdiction back to Kosovo, that would last until 1999.
21 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 10. 22 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: a short history (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 325.23 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 24-25.
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After Tito‘s death in 1980, Albanian separatists in Kosovo started massive
protests with parole ―Kosovo Republic‖. They believed that Tito‘s death meant death of
Yugoslavia. This was very dangerous for the security of the country, especially because
of the willingness of a huge number of Albanians in Macedonia (they already had
protests back in 1968 when they insisted on unification with Kosovo24) and Montenegro
to join those demonstrations. The state government decided to send army and police to
suppress protestors. This situation ended with declaring martial law25 and the
imprisonment of hundreds of Albanians. Unfortunately, these prisoners did not change in
the prison; oppositely, prison became an ideal place for recruiting new fighters for
Kosovo independence: ―Most [future] Albanian political prisoners were former students
arrested in the 1980s for their participation in the movement demanding a Republic of
Kosovo within Federal Yugoslavia‖.26 It should be mentioned that arrests in communist
Yugoslavia were very common thing for more trivial things, such as a joke about the
president or a communist party. So these arrests would happen to any other group,
regardless of ethnicity.
Albanian separatists concluded that it was still too early for open confrontation
with the government, and they decided to continue with a less transparent war against
Serbs and other non-Albanians. There was a great number of Serbs killed during the
1980‘s, usurpation of their land and live stock, rapes, refusing to help Serbs in hospitals,
24Ibid, 25.25 Stephen Schwartz, ―'Enverists' and 'Titoists' - Communism and Islam in Albania and Kosova, 1941-99:from the Partisan Movement of the Second World War to the Kosova Liberation War,‖ Journal of
Communist Studies and Politics 25, no. 1 (2009): 67.26 Zoran Kusovac, ―The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,‖ Jane’s Online http://www.janes.com/defence/news/kosovo/jir990401_01_n.shtml
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Serbian police in action in Belgrade, Serbian capital30,31
The only institutions that gave some confidence to Serbs were the Church and the
Army. The largest number of Serbian churches and monasteries are on Kosovo. Some of
these sanctuaries are from the 12th and 13th centuries.32 Albanian separatists did not have
to make special effort to suppress Church because the communist party was more than
sufficient at doing that job. After WWII communists usurped thousands of hectares of
churches land and gave it to Albanians. Different than in other post-communist regimes,
Church never received this land back. However, Serbs priests are still in Kosovo as the
last representatives of Serbian continuity in this province/independent country (depends
from which perspective).
30 B92 Online, http://vukajlija.com/attached_images/0003/6960/policija.jpg31 Politika Online, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Hronika/Policija-na-nishanu-gnevnih.lt.html32 UNESCO Online, ―Medieval Monuments in Kosovo,‖ http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/724/
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Interestingly, Pandora‘s Box in Kosovo was not open during civil war in other parts of
Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Mr. Simic said that reasons
for that, one can find in these three theories: 1) Separatists in Kosovo were not satisfied
with the balance of power in Kosovo, and they wanted to wait until Serbia became
exhausted from civil wars; 2) Neighboring Albania was going through post-communist
transition and turmoil; 3) Until the Dayton peace conference in 1995 regard ending of
civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albanians in Kosovo hoped that international
community would put Kosovo‘s question in Dayton‘s negotiations. Since this never
happened, separatists ceased to support peaceful Mr. Rugova, and started to support so-
called KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), which was established at the end of 1993.36
The conflict culminated in 1998, when the USA threatened Serbia for the first
time with intervention due to ―ethnic cleansing of Albanians‖ and police brutality. To
make clear, Serbian security forces would overreact here and there. Those cases were
usually among police members, not in the army, because the police were local and
sometimes its members had relatives who were killed by KLA.37 Besides that, bad people
exist everywhere. Even US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan had an incident in which
soldiers raped a 14-year-old girl and killed her family. Another example are pictures from
Abu Graib prison where US soldiers sexually assaulted Iraq prisoners, somehow they
even used dogs. Fortunately, no one bombed the USA because of these couple lunatics.
Different than what an international audience could read in newspaper, Serbian
36 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 23-25.37 YouTube Online, Aidan Laverty and Tom Giles, ―Moral Combat - NATO at War - Part 3,‖ BBC
Production , 2000, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7J2Uqxh194&feature=related
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authorities punished individuals involved in criminal activities.38 Many of them are still
in prison. The truth is that Serbs (civilians) suffered much more, and there was a new
wave of Serbian refuges, so the Albanian population on Kosovo rose to more than 95%.
However, the International Community led by Clinton‘s administration assumed that
Serbs are guilty for everything since they were already labeled as ‗bad boys‘ in wars in
former Yugoslavia.
Speaking of Serbian police, once again it should be mentioned that they could be
very violent toward any kind of protestors, regardless of their ethnicity or ideology.39
There was not any difference in police approach to Albanian protestors from that to
supporters of opposition in central Serbia. In both cases protests would end with dozens
of injured protestors and police officers, which always had negative effect to Milosevic‘s
dictatorship. Brutality always led to increasing of number of Milosevic‘s opponents.
However, in the case of Kosovo, once the KLA started to kill police officers on a daily
basis40, Serbian police traded batons for rifles and the conflict escalated to a degree of
which no one could stop that spiral of violence.
Albanian terrorists were shocked, and they decided to become more radical. They
started to attack Police, Army, Serbs, and especially loyal Albanians anytime and
everywhere (more about this in the section about the KLA). This was followed by a large
number of performances for an international audience, from hunger strike of miners,
38 Four former police officers were convicted and sent to prison for total of 68 years for war crime against50 Albanian civilians from Suva Reka. B92 Online, ―Presuda za Zlocin u Suvoj Reci,‖ April 23, 2009, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=04&dd=23&nav_id=356909 39 Glas Javnosti Online, ― Ninth March Without Meeting,‖ March 8, 2000, http://arhiva.glas- javnosti.rs/arhiva/2000/03/09/srpski/p00030810.shtm; On March 9th, 1991 in Belgrade, 114 people werehurt and 2 people died in the demonstrations against Slobodan Milosevic‘s regime. 40 Global Security Online, ―Kosovo Li beration Army [KLA].‖ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/kla.htm
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through students declining to attend Serbian Universities, to food poisoning of school
children, but only Albanian children, even if the School was multiethnic. It should be
mentioned that during that time (September 1990) Albanians in Kosovo declared
independence by ―Kacanik Constitution‖; of course they did not have support from the
USA and other powers, so no one cared about it. 41 Nevertheless, during this turmoil
Albanians got a new leader, Ibrahim Rugova. On first elections for so-called ―Republic of
Kosovo‖ in 1992, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Mr. Rugova won by
far, and he became the first President of Albanian parallel state in Kosovo, while Bujar
Bukosi was elected as a first Prime Minister.42
Rugova become very popular as a fighter for Albanian rights. The most important
thing that he has done for Albanians was abandoning of the blood feud. He gained
forgiveness among 150 families.43 This custom, which divided Albanians for centuries,
was the main reason why they were not as dangerous. Rugova was for Albanians what
Arafat was for Palestinians. His objectives developed from real autonomy, through the
Republic of Kosovo, to full independence.44 At the time Rugova and his followers
insisted that they should have the same rights as Serbs in Croatia, but they had to change
that once Croatian army conducted operation ―Oluja‖ (Storm) in August 199545, in which
they completed ethnic cleansing of Serbs that started in WWII.
Milosevic, on the other side, tried to imitate Israelis, but he did not understand
that for that kind of approach he needed the support of the USA. On the contrary, Rugova
41 UNESCO Online, ―Parallel worlds rebuilding the education system in Kosovo ,‖ 43,http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001361/136152e.pdf42 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 30.43 Milan Komnenic, Klopka u Rambujeu (Beograd: Prosveta, 2006), 124.44 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 31.45 Ibid, 36.
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had more support from the USA and other western countries, not to mention the support
from Muslim countries. It was quite normal when some politician visited Serbia, such as
Senator Bob Dole, to talk only with Albanians, avoiding even a courtesy talk with
government representatives. Encouraged by this amount of support, Albanian terrorists
decided to establish the KLA to intensify attacks on Serbs, especially after the collapse of
the Albanian government (in Albania) and stealing of countless number of weapons from
army bases around Albania (according to Mr. Simic it was more than 700,000 of
weapons).46 Albanian separatists were very surprised when the State Department put the
KLA on the list of terrorist organizations, which lasted until 1998, when the KLA ceased
to be considered as a terrorist group47, and, as some politicians in Serbia claim, actually
become NATO infantry in 1999 bombing of Serbia.
Mr. Holbrook (high ranking diplomat of Department of State who even took off his shoes to show respectto his host- I.B.) with KLA leadership48
46 Ibid, 49.47 Scott Park, ―State Department Once Called New Allies ‗Terrorists‘: Cohen: For KLA victory, but not forKLA,‖ Human Events, April 30, 1999,http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_199904/ai_n8836923/48 Forumi Shqiptar Online, http://www.forumishqiptar.com/showthread.php?t=44488
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Left to Right: Hashim Thachi (KLA Leader), Bernard Kouchner (UNMIK Chief), Sir Michael Jackson(NATO Command), Gen. Agim Ceku (Commanding KLA General), Gen. Wesley Clark (Commanding NATO General)49
According to Mr. Mitic, British journalist Tim Marshall in his book stated that
Americans did not came to Kosovo just to observe, but also to instruct the KLA and
provide them with equipment, satellite phones, etc.50
By 1997, the KLA controlled significant parts of Kosovo‘s territory. This was
unacceptable for Serbian authorities, and Milosevic decided to send more troops to this
region. Quite easily the army and police defeated KLA, but international community did
not like this usage of armed forces so they insisted that Serbia accept UN mission which
would control movements of Serbian security forces. The head of this Mission was
William Walker. The problem with this mission was that they did not do what they were
49 Emperors Online, http://emperors-clothes.com/serbo-croatian/articles/s-sinko.htm50 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 62.
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supposed to; instead, according to some military commentators at that time in
Yugoslavia, they were marking targets for the NATO.51
This Mission was supposed to have 2,000 members, but at the end there were
1,600 people. They did not have any weapons, but a large number of them were military
intelligence personnel from western countries. British journalist Tim Marshall said that
British sent members of SAS as well as members of other elite units. In addition to that,
according to this journalist, the CIA was also present and very active in this mission.52
Besides regular Serbian forces, there were some groups of so-called ―volunteers‖.
The most known leader of them was Arkan with his ―tigers‖. Some westerners said that
the number of these ―soldiers‖ was remarkable, but in actuality there were a couple of
dozens of them. While there were a remarkable percentage of volunteers that came to
Kosovo due to patriotic feelings and ideology (Arkan for example was very interested in
politics, he was once even a member of the Parliament), a significant number of them
came with the main goal to steal cars, TVs, money, jewelry, etc. General Lazarevic
mentioned some cases in which regular armed forces discovered misconduct of
volunteers: ―…25 volunteers were returned from the corps and seven were detained
because of renegade behavior, killings, robbery, rapes, et cetera‖.53
Of course, these volunteers created an extremely negative picture of Serbia in the
world, creating more damage then favor for their country. Unfortunately, they liked to
pose for pictures in uniform and journalists from around the globe saw a great
51 Vlada Republike Srbije Online, ―General lazarevic: Neizostavno se vracamo na Kosmet ,‖http://www.arhiva.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/1999-12/26/17141.html52 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 61.53 UN ICTY Online, Transcripts from General Lazarevic Testimony, 17981,http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/trans/en/071109IT.htm
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The KLA's guerrilla campaign was a deliberate attempt to provoke Belgrade intoreprisals that would attract the West's attention. Knowing it could not defeat Yugoslaviawithout NATO's military support, the KLA waged a nasty insurgency that includedassassinations of Serbian political and military officials.56
Answering the question ―What is actually the KLA?‖ back on 25th
February 1998,
the US special envoy for Kosovo, Ambassador Robert Gelbard said: ―I know how to
recognize terrorist when I see him. Trust me, these people are terrorists‖.57Even if it is not
easy to find these attributes about the KLA in western sources, a persistent researcher
will find one on BBC‘s website from June 28th 1998 where Gelbard was quoted saying:
―I know a terrorist when I see one and these men are terrorists,".58 However, according to
Mr. Simic a couple of months later the KLA was no longer considered a terrorist
organization, but fighters for freedom. Not just that, in the same year on April 21st,
Senators Mitch McConnell and Joseph Lieberman requested that the US administration
finance with 25 million dollars weapons for 10,000 members of the KLA. Journalist Tim
Judah noticed that comparing to organizations such as IRA, ETA, Hezbollah or Corsican
56 Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwartz, ―Was It a Mistake?; We Were Suckers for the KLA,‖ The
Washington Post , March 26, 2000,http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/51850611.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Mar+26%2C+2000&author=Christopher+Layne%3BBenjamin+Schwarz&pub=The+Washington+Post&edition=&startpage=B.01&desc=WAS+IT+A+MISTAKE%3F%3B+We+Were+Suckers+For+the+KLA 57 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 53.58 BBC Online, ―The KLA – Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?‖, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/121818.stm
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National Front, the KLA is most successful terrorist organization in modern history
because in just 18 months since they introduced themselves in public, they acquired main
political goals and succeed in gaining of support of the most powerful military
organization in the world to do for them majority of military goals.59
One of the KLA leaders, Jakup Krasnici openly stated that the KLA objective is
unification of all Albanians on Balkan.60 The other KLA leader, Bardil Mahmuti said that
they calculated that ethnic Albanians could lose approximately 300,000 people to gain
independence which is acceptable.61
According to the DEA (Drugs Enforcement Administration) Albanian mafia is the
most important link in monthly shipments of 4-6 tons of Turkish heroin to Western
Europe.62 The Times commented that the KLA "is a terrorist organization that has
financed much of its war effort with profits from the sale of heroin." Additional
documents from intelligence agencies of five different countries obtained by the news
agencies disclosed that "the KLA has aligned itself with an extensive organized crime
network centered in Albania that smuggles heroin and some cocaine tobuyers throughout
Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States." Members of the KLA are
among the individuals that are part of the Albanian drug cartel. Most of the profits from
this drug operation are then channeled into the KLA for arms purchases. 63
59 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 54.60 ICG Europe, Report No 153, ―Pan Albanianism: how big a threat to Balkan stability?‖, February 25,2004, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan014972.pdf61 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 62-63.62 Heather Cottin, ―The Balkan Route and the Contras of Kosovo,‖ CovertAction Online,
http://www.covertaction.org/content/view/77/75/63 UN Wire, ―Newspaper Explores KLA Drug, Terrorism Ties ,‖ May 6, 1999,http://www.unwire.org/unwire/19990506/2453_story.asp
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Besides the KLA activities that are connected to distribution of illegal drugs, their
connection with Al-Qaeda was also topic of some investigations. ―…some members of
the KLA received training in terrorist camps run by international fugitive Osama bin
Laden…64 And this is what Mr. Kirov, acting head of Bulgarian intelligence said about
Al-Qaeda aspirations on Balkan:‖ Ever since the Yugoslav wars began, Al-Qaeda and
other radical organizations have worked to gain and develop footholds in the Balkans and
among the expatriate populations. He war ned that Kosovo would become a ‗direct source
of regional instability and a hub for international terrorism‘ if concerted action was not
taken to address the issue.‖65
According to data from the Yugoslav police, among
members of the KLA it was not unusual to find Mujahedins from Afghanistan, Chechnya,
Egypt, Sudan, and other Islamic countries.66 According to the same sources, the KLA
was financed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the Humanitarian Organization
―Third World Relief Agency (TWRA)‖ led by sheik Omar Rahman and Osama bin
Laden.67 ―… the Bosnian pattern was replicated in Kosovo: Mujahadeen mercenaries
from various Islamic countries are reported to be fighting alongside the KLA in Kosovo.
German, Turkish and Afghan instructors were reported to be training the KLA in guerilla
and diversion tactics‖68 Even according to the London Times, American intelligence
agencies pointed out that there is a possible connection between the KLA and Osama bin
Laden, a Saudi emigrant accused for bombing of USA embassies in Nairobi and Kenya in
64 Ibid.65 The New York Times, ―Carry on Blair,‖ May 10, 2007,http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/carry-on- blair/?scp=15&sq=Kosovo%20Liberation%20Army,%20Al-Qaeda&st=cse66 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 70.67 Ibid, 70.68 Michael Chossudovsky, ―Kosovo ‗Freedom Fighters‘ Financed by Organized Crime,‖http://www.eroj.org/urbiorbi/Yugoslavia/kosovo.htm
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August 1998.69 This statement was obviously released before 9/11. Some experts said
that they are concerned that Albanian organized crime groups from Kosovo, Albania and
Macedonia could make an alliance with other terrorist groups. However, according to US
officials, those links have not been detected.70
Unfortunately, it seems that all these information are not enough for the US and
other western countries to see the KLA as just another terrorist organization, which might
become a threat to American soldiers as well. It will probably happen once NATO came
on the way to the KLA‘s ambitions in Kosovo.
Between January 1st 1998, and June 10th 1999, members of the KLA carried out
2,896 terrorist attacks, to include 1,071 attacks on citizens, 1,642 on members of police,
and 573 on members of Yugoslav Army.71
69 The Times, ―U.S. Alarmed as Mujahidin Join Kosovo Rebels,‖ November 26, 1998.70 US Embassy Online, ―Islamic Terrorism and the Balkan,‖ July 26, 2005,www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL33012.pdf71 Youtube Online, ―Kosovo War – Political Aspects (Part I)‖, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fv-3z_cvJOk&feature=related
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against Fatmir Limaj, one of the KLA commanders.82 Because of that, at the court Rehaj
changed his original testimony. Besides that, Bllaca admitted that he also killed one
witness in Limaj‘s case.83 Anyway, Haradinaj was just another KLA leader that was
proclaimed innocent in front of ICTY because their prosecutors did not have enough
evidence to put him in jail. Also, this KLA leader had very expensive lawyers from the
law firm where one of employees is Cherie Blair (wife of British Prime Minister, at that
time, Tony Blair who was a strong advocate of bombing as well as independence of
Kosovo) for which he paid millions of Euros.84 Once again, different than for many
Serbian generals, money was not the problem. However, at present signals from Hague
are giving some hope that Haradinaj might have a renewed trial, but it is yet to be
confirmed.
Serbian Intelligence Agency (BIA) in her ‗White Book‘ also presented some
valuable information regarding the KLA. According to BIA, between 1996 and 1999 the
KLA have received 900 million of German Marks, and half of that was made by drug
trafficking. Besides that, Albanians from Europe that were in charge of the financing of
the KLA where involved in trafficking persons, and the smuggling of weapons. A
sizeable amount of money was collected through imposed tax to Albanians that work
abroad (3% of their income) which they were forced to pay. The KLA had a special
department in charge of Serbians enclaves. Their task was to make the remaining Serbs to
leave Kosovo and at the same time make sure that Serbs that are IDPs (Internal
82 Limaj was accused along with three other KLA members of torturing and killing civilians, BBC Online,―Prominent Kosovo Suspect Held,‖ February 19, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2778079.stm83 Vuk Z. Cvijic and Nedjeljko Zeljak. ―Zastrasivali Svedoke da ne Optuze Tacija i Limaja,‖ Blic Online, December 12, 2009, http://www.blic.rs/hronika.php?id=12339484 The Centre for Peace in the Balkans Online, ―U.S. Praises Incident Former Kosovo P.M,‖ May 1, 2007,http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=14323
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Dislocated Persons) won‘t come back.85 Even today the KLA is still active in Europe.
This time they are better known as ‗Albanian Mafia‘ which is growing stronger every
day. Just recently some of their members were caught in London in attempt to sell a girl
to another group of Albanians. Albanians already control most of the prostitution in
Greece, Germany, and Italy, where they are preparing to take the jobs of the Italian
mafia, especially in Milan. According to data from Belgian police department specialized
for Albanian organized crime, Albanian mafia is dominant in illegal activities. Experts
think that war in Kosovo played a crucial role in spreading of Albanian mafia in
Europe.86
Even the famous Russian mafia is avoiding confrontations with Albanians due
to their brutality.
85 Vuk Z. Cvijic. ―Taci Bio Sef Obavestajne Sluzbe na Kosovu,‖ Blic Online, December 9, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/hronika.php?id=12455486 Blic Online, ―Prodavali Devojku za Tri Hiljade Funti,‖ December 8, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/svet.php?id=124352
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The beginning of the end started in the spring of 1998. That year separatists in
Kosovo initiated a real guerilla war. Almost every day the KLA would kill couple of
members of the Serbian armed forces from the ambush, in addition to attacks on
‖Albanian traitors‖ and non-Albanians.87 On the other side, Milosevic organized
referendum regarding the involvement of the international community in this conflict in
Kosovo. As expected, a vast majority of the Serbian population voted against
internationalization of the internal issues of Serbia. Arrogant Milosevic was very satisfied
with the result of referendum, which he saw as approval to handle this conflict in the
same manner. He sent more troops to Kosovo to protect the borders and to deal with the
KLA.
Due to an enormous use of armed forces, Clinton‘s administration treated
Yugoslavia with bombing. Even Mr. Cosic found this ironic because USA bombed
countries that just might be connected to attacks on USA embassies in Africa while
Yugoslavia was not allowed to fight against terrorists on her own territory. However, to
make sure that any future intervention has some legitimacy, the UN Security Council
voted for resolution that will allowed NATO to intervene against ―country that
threatening international peace‖, regardless of the fact that NATO was established to
protect only those countries that are members of that organization. In the meantime,
Adem Demaci, ― political leader of the KLA‖ appealed to his ―army‖ to ―fight against
Serbian occupation until entire liberation of Kosovo‖.88
87 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ―Indictment against RamushHaradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj Released to the Public,‖ March 10, 2005,http://www.icty.org/sid/863188 Dobrica Cosic, Kosovo (Beograd: Novosti, 2004), 89.
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the killing of some KLA terrorists.90 According to Serbian authorities, during the night
the KLA brought more bodies on this location, and also changed uniforms from fallen
terrorists so they would look like civilians, and according to a German documentary
movie this is something that also occurred in the village of Rugovo (Serbs were accused
for the massacres of civilians in Rugovo, but in reality there was a combat in which 24
KLA members and one police officer died, and according to OSCE there were not any
massacres but western media was never willing to say that).91 Nevertheless, in the
morning Albanians called Mr. William Walker (head of OSCE mission in Kosovo who
was delegated to this position by Secretary Albright92
which just proves how even this
European organization was just a toy of Clinton‘s administration) who came in company
with the KLA to see what happened in Racak (later on, during the trial against Milosevic,
Walker could not remember that he was there with the KLA, but, pictures from
newspapers reminded him). This was not the first time that Mr. Walker had a problem
with his memory. A great example is his testimony in BBC‘s documentary movie ―Moral
Combat-NATO at War ‖, where he said that he did not call his superiors from Racak
while Mr. Holbrook and General Clark claim that he called them immediately from the
scene.93 Nevertheless, Mr. Walker did obviously inform his mentors as soon as possible
about the killing of 46‘innocent civilians‘, even if some of them did not have holes from
bullets on their clothes due to a changing of uniforms. Finnish forensic experts in a final
90 Ibid, 101.91 YouTube Online, Bettina Kapune, ―It started with a Lie - NATO Aggression against Serbia 1999 Part 3,‖Westdeutschen Rundfunks (WDR), 2001, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kuhfyd6bJs&NR=192 YouTube Online, Aidan Laverty and Tom Giles, ―Moral Combat - NATO at War - Part 3,‖ BBC
Production , 2000, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X7J2Uqxh194&feature=related93 YouTube Online, Aidan Laverty and Tom Giles ―Moral Combat - NATO at War - Part 4,‖ BBC
Production , 2000, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S2G-FHu4P_8&feature=related
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c95 Jim Fish, ―Sarajevo Massacre Remembered,‖ BBC Online,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3459965.stm96 General Sir Michael Rose, ―Fighting for peace: Bosnia 1994 ,‖ Bosnian Institute Online,http://www.bosnia.org.uk/about/bi_books/long_reviews.cfm?book=148
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bombing of Serbs in Bosnia. This is an excerpt from UN‘s report that supports the theory
that this event led to intervention: ―On 5 February 1994, a mortar round exploded in the
Markale marketplace in downtown Sarajevo killing 68 people, mostly Bosniac civilians,
and injuring over 200. Images of the carnage, which were captured by television crews,
were then transmitted around the world, provoking outrage‖.97
Hopefully the history will show what really happened in Sarajevo, but for this
paper it is more important to find out if Racak was just a performance for the western
audience. According to Helena Ranta, forensic dentist from Finland, William Walker
threw the pencil at her in the winter of 1999 because she did not want to use stronger
language about the Serbs. She also said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to
manipulate the content of her reports while she was appointed by EU to investigate the
incident in Racak. She added that pressure regarding incident of Racak was very high,
including the one that came from media. ―In her investigations, Ranta focussed on
forensic medicine; she did not want to take a stand, at that stage, on politically and legally
loaded terminology‖.98
Finish forensics were not the only one that were involved in the investigation of
Racak. Belarus and Serbian forensics revealed that on the hands of 37 killed Albanians
(from examined 40) they found tracks (using the method of paraffin glove) of
gunpowder, which is the evidence that they used weapons before they died, but no one
cared about that.99
97 United Nations, ―Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: thefall of Srebrenica,‖ November 15, 1999, http://www.un.org/news/ossg/srebrenica.pdf98 Helsingin Sanomat. ―Helena Ranta: Foreign Ministry Tried to Influence Kosovo Reports.‖ Kosovo
Compromise. http://www.emperors-clothes.com/analysis/meetmr.htm99 Vecernje Novosti Online, ―U R eziji Vokera,‖ January 15, 2010,http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=4&status=jedna&vest=168147&title_add=U%20re%C5%BEi
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Some politicians were reserved from the very beginning in regard to Mr. Walker
due to rumors that he covered up the massacres of El Salvador‘s government back in
1989. In the investigation of this rumor, the author of this research found out that when
President Clinton wanted to make William Walker the Ambassador to Panama, back in
1993, the Church in Panama and local politicians reacted very fast accusing him for
involvement of the assassination of five priests in El Salvador in November 1989. "'The
Jesuit order at the time denounced the complicity of the U.S. Embassy (headed by
Walker) in the case, for concealing evidence, obstructing the investigation, pressuring
judges to impede the trial process, and terrorizing witnesses,' Valdes said."100
On top of that, Fernando Garcia, Jesuit priest, said that ―Walker was 'a symbol of
the destruction of life' while he was ambassador in El Salvador."101
Even Mr. Petritsch, one of the three co-presides of the Rambouillet Conference,
said that Mr. Walker was always taking terrorists under protection and that way proved
his anti-Serbian position.102
Nevertheless, Racak incident was initial capsule for NATO intervention which
was actually already prepared.103 However, as Serbian politicians claim, to gain
international support for this intervention, ―International Community‖, popularly called
―the Contact Group‖ (consisted of ministries of foreign affairs from USA, UK, France,
Germany, Italy, and Russia) organized peace conference in Rambouillet (just out of
ji%20Vokera&kword_add=bombardovanje%2C%20racak; This is a story from Serbian newspaperVecernje Novosti, which is a very credible agency.100 Inter Press Service, ―Panama: Jesuits Oppose U.S. Ambassador Designate,‖ July 22, 1993,http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00529.html101 Ibid.102 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 64.103 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 383; SecretaryAlbright talked about gaining support for bombing almost a year before the bombing. She said: ―To makethat [threat of force] credible, it was vital for NATO to begin laying plans for a bombing campaign‖.
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Paris) as a last attempt to avoid war against Yugoslavia.
The most important points from the statement of the Contact Group that was
issued on 29th January are that regardless of efforts that were made by international
community violence was still part of daily life in Kosovo. At the same time ‗the massacre
of Kosovo Albanians in Racak ‘ resulted in several thousands of people that had to escape
from their homes. Surprisingly, in second article of this statement one can found that the
Contact Group (CG) blamed both, Yugoslav armed forces and the KLA for escalation of
violence. Therefore, Ministers of the Contact Group urged both sides to accept
negotiations that would lead to political settlement. For that purpose the CG insisted that
all sides accept ‗the basis for a fair settlement must include the principles set out by the
Contact Group‘. Also, it was asked that negotiators include the elements of ‗substantial
autonomy for Kosovo‘ as a framework for the agr eement. (Appendix, page 121)
The CG also demanded that both sides send their delegations to Rambouillet by
the sixth of February, where they would participate in the negotiation process led by co-
chairmen Hubert Vedrine and Robin Cook (French and British Ministers of Foreign
Affairs). This process was originally meant to last seven days, but as it will be explained
in the following chapters of this paper, it lasted longer. Additionally, the CG required that
both sides restrain from military actions, and said that ‗The Contact Group will hold both
sides accountable if they fail to take the opportunity now offered to them‘.104
104 United Nations, Security Council, January 29, 1999, http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/s9996.pdf thisstatement will be also available in the appendix I of this research.
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The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughoutYugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing.105 Rambouillet is not adocument that any Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document thatshould never have been presented in that form. — Henry Kissinger, Daily Telegraph, June 28 1999 106
Section A; Actors
The brief version of the proposed document (available in appendix II) explains
that Rambouillet accords are agreement made for a period of three years. That agreement
would cover the most important aspects of life for citizens of Kosovo: self-government,
peace, and security. Regarding democratic self-government it was said that it was meant
to cover education, health care, and financial development. In addition to that, both sides
were to agree that Kosovo will have a President, an Assembly, independent courts, local
government, and ―national community institutions with the authority needed to protect
each community's identity‖. On the subject of security it was explained that international
troops will take care of that. At the same time local police would provide law
enforcement while Serbian and Yugoslav security forces were supposed to leave Kosovo
(the exception was small number of border patrols). In section that covers ‗mechanism
for final settlement‘ it was said that after three years the international community would
hold the meeting in which they would find the final solution for Kosovo. On that meeting
they would take very seriously in to consideration ‗the will of the people, opinions of
relevant authorities, each party's efforts regarding the implementation of the Accords, and
105 Ian Bancroft, ―Serbia‘s Anniversary Is a Timely Reminder,‖ Guardian Online, March 24, 2009,http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/24/serbia-kosovo106 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 189.
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The entire agreement (Appendix III) which was signed only by Albanians was
eighty two pages long (―…they [Albanians] officially signed the eighty-two-page
agreement in a five-minute ceremony boycotted both the Yugoslav delegation and the
Russian negotiator.‖)108, and the Serbs had a huge number of complaints which most of
the time were not accepted. However, the agreement discussion will follow after
description of the delegations, which had actually never met in Rambouillet, except when
they would see each other by accident in the hallways. The reason for this was host‘s
decision to implement shuttle diplomacy rather than direct negotiations which Yugoslav
delegation favored.109
The negotiators
Serbian delegation
The Serbian delegation in Rambouillet was represented by five high-ranking allies
of Milosevic in addition to representatives of other ethnic groups from Kosovo. The
107 The State Department Online, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html108 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 405.109 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 203.
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individuals in respective delegations was, particularly in Serbian delegation.
Professor Markovic was just officially a head of the delegation. In reality, Mr.
Sainovic was the chief because Milosevic had full confidence in him. As Markovic said
to other members of Serbian delegation: ―In the way that this duck on the lake is the
owner of this castle, I am the head of the delegation! Besides, that is something that I do
not have to explain to you, you saw that yourself!‖111 (Mitic‘s book is in Serbian and this
is one of translations made by the author of this paper, just like in cases of Simic,
Komnenic, Cosic, and some texts from Serbian newspapers). Additionally, Serbian
President Milutinovic joined the Conference to prove that Yugoslavia did take the
Conference seriously. He ignored Markovic‘s suggestions even if he was usually right.
Occasionally, Milutinovic would use attributes such as a traitor to critique Markovic.
Other than Markovic and Sainovic, Kutlesic and Stambuk were also important
members of the delegation, while other members would be informed occasionally about
the talks. Those others were mainly representatives of minorities from Kosovo who were
seeing by westerners just as an ornament to Serbian delegation.112 According to Austrian
Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch (one of three co-presides of the Conference), Kutlesic,
Markovic, and Sainovic were competent and willing to find the solution that was
acceptable for both sides, while other members of Serbian delegation did not have
anything to say.113
111 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 81.112 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 221.113 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 83.
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Speaking of Albanian delegation, it is very important to mention that the head was
not Rugova but Hasim Thaci, the top leader of the KLA (present Prime Minister 114). Most
likely that Albanians would not accept Thaci as the chief of their delegation without an
influence from someone from the side, which was probably Madeleine Albright. Between
the other two KLA fighters, Thaci succeeded to come to Rambouillet with the help of
OSCE mission in Kosovo, regardless of the fact that he did not have a passport or other
legal documents. However, French issued them travel documents.115 Besides Thaci, there
are other important members of the delegation that were not mentioned in media before
the conference. Those are experts in Albanian delegation that were mostly Americans
with their chief, Morton Abramowitz.116
Secretary Albright and Hasim Thaci – nick
name ―Snake‖ (as stated in Latin say; nomen atque omen-name fits the object-I.B.) in Rambouillet117
114 Central Intelligence Agency, ―Kosovo: Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments,‖May 12, 2009, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/world-leaders-k/kosovo.html115 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 200.116 Diana Johnstone, ―Nato‘s Mixed Motives,‖ http://www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/Johnstone69.pdf; Abramowitz may be considered theéminence grise behind the US policy of support to the Albanian secessionists in Kosovo117 Srpska Politika Online, http://www.srpskapolitika.com/Tekstovi/Komentari/2009/latinica/033.html.
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According to David Livingstone, Abramowitz was often associated to CIA‘s
activities abroad.118 Other than that, Abramowitz was the leader of the group of 32
American intellectuals who wrote a letter to President Clinton titled ―Milosevic is the
Problem‖ (22nd September 1998), in which they stated that the Balkan won‘t be peaceful
and stable until Milosevic is in power. And one of the crucial things in regard to
Abramowitz is that he is a close friend of Madeleine Albright, for which Tim Judah said
that is not insignificant.119 Of course that this is very significant because Abramowitz
represented the Albanian delegation, while his close friend represented the international
community to include both, the stick and the carrot. What then Serbian delegation had to
expect? The only chance was to put someone more important in to Serbian delegation,
but Serbs never understood that part of the game. It is not important who is right, it is
about good advocates.
Since the Albanians acted like rich clients that could afford all the best lawyers,
they engaged many other western experts to fight for them: Paul Williams, an expert for
international law from Washington D.C.; Marc Weller, Professor of International Law
from Cambridge; Shinasi Rama from Columbia University who was in charge for the
KLA public affairs in New York.120
When speaking of three co-presides of the Conference, except for the already
mentioned Petritsch, the other two were American Ambassador Christopher Hill, and
Russian Ambassador Boris Majorski. Officially these three individuals were supposed to
be equal, but it was obvious that Mr. Hill was ‗playing the first violin‘, while Petritsch
118 Word Press Online, ―Uighur Nationalism, Turkey and the CIA ,‖
http://eldib.wordpress.com/2009/08/03/uighur-nationalism-turkey-and-the-cia/; Morton Abramowitz wasalso deeply involved with Afghan Mujahedeen and Kosovo rebels.119 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 205.120 Ibid.
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and Majorski were just assistants. While Hill was most sympathetic to the KLA, Majorski
was making sure that he was not in opposition to Americans, but at the same time he was
doing his best not to confront with Yugoslav delegation, even if he (along with his
assistant Bazdnikin) acted sometimes as a ‘bigger Catholic than the Pope‘, criticizing
Serbs for refusing to accept the paper proposed by the Contact Group.121 Regardless of
the fact that Mr. Hill was the most influential co-preside of the Conference, it is
noticeable that Europeans were trying to show that they also had an important role in
these talks. As published in The New York Times:‖…the French Government controlled
the ground rules. The Americans, for example, wanted NATO military officials in
uniform at the conference as a confidence-building measure for the Albanians. The
French Government blocked their presence.‖122
Among other individuals that are important to mention in regard to this
conference are official hosts (co-chairmen) Hubert Vedrine (French Foreign Minister),
and Robert Cook (British Foreign Minister). Of course it would be unacceptable not to
mention the most important figure of the entire conference, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright.
Despite being a very high ranking diplomat, who should refrain from announcing
publicly negative opinions about her counterparts, Albright never tried to hide her
extremely negative opinion about Milosevic. Regardless of the fact that Slovenia declared
independence, violating the constitution of the SFRY (Socialistic Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia), which was followed by an attempt of JNA to secure the borders, as well as
121 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 98.122 Jane Perlez, ―Diplomat vs. Rebels,‖ New York Times, February 25, 1999,http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/25/world/diplomat-vs-rebels.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/People/C/Clinton,%20Bill&scp=9&sq=Rambouillet%20peace%20conference%201999&st=cse
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Albanians rejected the agreement, he was wrong. We could never get NATO support for
that. ‗On the other hand,‘ I said, ‗if you say yes and the Serbs say no, NATO will strike
and go on striking until the Serb forces are out and NATO can go in. You will have
security. And you will be able to govern yourselves‖.130 Or as better explained in The
New York Times; ―…after intense arm-twisting by the U.S., the Albanian Kosovars said
yes. This was a dishonest yes -- it was a yes that was given not because the Kosovars
truly embraced Rambouillet, but because it was whispered in their ears that if they just
said yes and the Serbs said no, NATO would bomb the Serbs…‖131 Are these two
explanations strong enough pieces of evidences to see how the entire process in
Rambouillet was just a performance for the international community that was used to
make an excuse for bombing? Why? That is something that is not easy to find out. One
might assume that the USA wanted to show to the world that they are not always against
Muslims (both, in Bosnia and Kosovo Muslims were supported by the USA). Also, it is
possible that the West wanted to weaken Serbia because of its strong relationship with
Russia. In addition to that, it seemed that the USA was hardly waiting to bomb Serbia as
a punishment for the war in Bosnia. However, most likely the main reason was a strong
Albanian lobby in the USA which will be discussed later in this research.
Obviously Secretary Albright knew what she was talking about because she was
aware that Yugoslav delegation would never accept the agreement so she had to make
sure that Albanians would put their signature on the document. Unfortunately, Secretary
Albright missed an opportunity to explain why Yugoslav authorities could not accept
130 Ibid, 403.131 Thomas L. Friedman , ―Foreign Affairs; Kosovo‘s Three Wars,‖ New York Times, August 6, 1999,http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/06/opinion/foreign-affairs-kosovo-s-three-wars.html?sec=&spon=&&scp=1&sq=Rambouillet%20peace%20conference%201999&st=cse
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Enter into negotiations with the intention of creating an agreement that will allow both parties to achieve their essential goals.
- Tom Hopkins133
The Conference started on February 6th 1999, and lasted until 23rd of February
instead of the originally planned 13th of February. ―Rambouillet, meanwhile, was under
siege from within. Thousands of security police were deployed, while road blocks were
operating throughout the town to prevent any mass demonstration of Albanians or
Serbs‖.134
Talks in Rambouillet (30 miles south of Paris) started and finished without any
procedure that was planned in advance even if these talks were extremely important, as
Tim Judah said, ―…the alternatives were so awful that it just seemed inconceivable that
either side would scupper the talks‖.135 The first draft of the agreement that was presented
to both sides by Contact Group had only three chapters; 1, 3, and 6. According to Mr.
Mitic this was not an accident. This is because chapters 2, 5, and 7 were so unacceptable
for the Yugoslav delegation that hosts did not want to present them until a couple of
hours before the end of the Conference.136 Still, even chapters 1, 3, and 6 were extremely
difficult for the Serbs to accept them. The first chapter cover ed ―The Constitution of
Kosovo‖; the third was dedicated to elections; while the sixth chapter elaborated the
institution of the ombudsman.
133 Bob Phillips, Phillips’ Book of Great Thoughts and Funny Sayings (Carol Stream: Tyndale HousePublishers, Inc., 1993), 226.134 Rupert Cornwell, ―The Peace Talks: Solution – or Simply a Sideshow?‖ The Independent, February 21,1999, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/the-peace-talks-solution--or-simply-a-sideshow-1072343.html135 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 197.136 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 231.
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changed unless the negotiators thought that modification would be better for the
agreement.139
A similar situation was with Article I in which the Serbian delegation had again
couple of objections. For example, in the sentence where it was stated that both sides
would implement all necessary measures to help refugees in their return to Kosovo, the
Serbs requested ―if they are citizens of Yugoslavia‖ to be added. Of course Serbs
requested this in an effort to prevent Albanians from Albania to settle in Kosovo, but
once again in final text Serbs saw that none of their requests was accepted.140
On the other hand, the Albanians submitted comments on the draft on February
9th in which they stated that each annex was acceptable.141 That way it seemed that the
Albanians were more willing to cooperate while the Serbs had complaints regarding each
annex of the agreement (which will be presented in continuation of this chapter). Of
course, it is because of the fact that entire agreement was in favor of the Albanians.
In Annex I, named ―The Constitution of Kosovo‖, the title itself was irritating for
Serbs because the constitution is the highest law of independent countries, not of the
provinces. Instead, the Serbian side proposed the word ―Statute‖ so that the title of Annex
I would be ―The Statute of Kosovo‖. Nevertheless, the Contact Group did not accept this
request as well. Besides that, the Serbs had many other complaints such as in regard to
foreign missions in Kosovo, or Kosovo‘s offices in foreign countries, which Serbia was
not willing to accept except in cases of education, science, culture, or information. In
addition to this Serbs requested for some sentences to be completely deleted, such as:
Consent for state of emergency, or Consent of the President of Kosovo to Federal
139 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 228.140 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 116.141 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 228.
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decisions. Of course the reason for this is that the president of Kosovo (which would be
obviously always Albanian) would never support decisions of the Federal Government
that would blockade the implementation of Federal laws. Once again, the final paper
which was signed by Albanians was not different at all from the original.142
Yet, the Serbian delegation was constructive as much as possible. For example,
the Serbs first said that they won‘t participate in the talks if the KLA members were part
of the Albanian delegation143, but later on they did not insist on that even if the Serbs
consider the KLA as a terrorist organization. After all, even the US never negotiates with
terrorists.
In Article I of The Constitution, which elaborated the characteristics of the
Kosovo Assembly, Serbs had a few ideas. For example they urged that the Assembly
should be bi-cameral with 120 members instead of uni-cameral with 100 members.
Besides that, the Serbs had some objections in regard to the jurisdictions of the Assembly
because it assumed canceling of jurisdictions of the Federal authorities. Nevertheless, the
final paper did not see any changes with exception to the number of delegates in the
Assembly which would be 120 (80 directly elected and 40 from national communities),
but still in uni-cameral assembly.144
Another issue was ―The President of Kosovo‖. For the Serbs this meant that
Kosovo would have one more attribute of sovereign country, which was unacceptable.
Instead, Serbs suggested that the official title of that person should be ―President of the
Presides of Assembly‖. However, the Contact Group denied this suggestion as well.145
142 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 120.143 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 228-29.144 Ibid, 240.145 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 128.
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A very similar problem was with the ―Government of Kosovo‖. According to the
Contact Group‘s draft, this body would implement laws made by the Kosovo‘s
Assembly. Serbs found this problematic because they thought that the Assembly of
Kosovo should not be authorized to make laws. In addition, the Serbs proposed that
instead of the Government, Kosovo should have an ―executive council‖, for which Weller
said that would be ―…a weakened Council of Ministers‖.146 And again none of the Serbs
objections were accepted,147 even if it was obvious that these proposals (The President,
The Government, and The Assembly) were something that represents a sovereign
country, not an autonomous province. These articles gave to Kosovo authorities to
conduct foreign relations, elect Prime Minister, implementing laws, etc.148
The same situation was with the justice system in Kosovo. The Contact Group
had an idea that the justice system in Kosovo should be completely independent and
separated from that of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. Of course, the Serbian
delegation thought that this entire Article (V) was unacceptable. However, the Contact
Group did not change anything in their final version of the agreement149, just like in the
case of Article VI which covers human rights and rights of national groups (Serbs
requested adding of new statements such as ―the preventing of national groups to
jeopardize the rights of other citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia‖).
Article VII covered the role of the municipals in Kosovo. Serbian delegation did
not have any objections to the proposed paper, but had a couple of suggestions; they
thought that it should be added that municipals‘ assemblies would be constitute in the
146 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 235.147 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 129.148 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 242.149 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 131.
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kind of abuses. After all, Serbia has a tradition of presence of international supervisors on
all modern elections and no one has a problem with that because everybody wants to
make sure that their votes won‘t be stolen.
As mentioned earlier in this section, the sixth Chapter was dedicated to the role of
the ombudsman. The ombudsman‘s responsibility would be to supervise the realization of
the practice of rights of members of national groups, as well as human rights and basic
freedoms in Kosovo. The Serbian delegation did not have any major objections regarding
this chapter. However, they suggested additional sentence which would clarify that
ombudsman should be parliamentary envoy who should be Yugoslav citizen, chosen
without intervention of international community. This suggestion was not accepted by the
Contact Group.151
Chapter 4 and 4A were in connection to matters of economy, humanitarian relief,
reconstruction and economical development. The Albanian delegation ―commented upon
in writing very expeditiously‖.152 The Serbs had serious objections regarding the idea that
all property of Federal and Republic Governments would be transferred to institutions of
Kosovo. However, the Contact Group did not accept these objections, and the final
document was same as the initial one.153 Speaking of the international help, with
exception for humanitarian assistance, it should be mentioned that according to the
proposed agreement it would be dependable on full implementation of the Agreement, as
well as other conditions that would be established by potential donators. The Serbian
delegation found this Chapter offensive because it sounded like blackmail. They
suggested cancellation of the entire Chapter, but the Contact Group refused this proposal
151 Ibid, 140.152 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 229.153 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 142.
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course if they were honest about finding the political solution. As some people would
say: ‗If you want, you‘ll find the way; if you don‘t want, you‘ll find the excuse‘.
Last, but not least is Chapter 7 named ―Implementation II‖, but it was actually
written in regard to international military presence. This Chapter included some parts that
are so contradictory that they would be comical if they were not so tragic for the Serbs.
For example it is stated that ―Sides invite NATO to establish and command by mi litary
forces in attempt to help securing and implementation of decrees from this Chapter. They
[NATO troops] also promote sovereignty and integrity of FR Yugoslavia‖158 (it was
unclear how would foreign troops promote sovereignty of an independent country, but it
became clear once they came to Kosovo after the bombing which will be discussed in the
part III of this paper). According to this Chapter the Yugoslav Army would have to
retreat from Kosovo in no more than 80 days, with the exception of border patrols which
could have up to 1,500 members. In addition to that, those soldiers would not be allowed
to have armored vehicles, while weapons on remaining vehicles could not be larger than
12, 7 mm caliber (it seems that they would be a perfect moving targets for the KLA
which by this Chapter was supposed to hand over weapons in the future). Marc Weller
also admits that Chapters 2 and 7 would ―…establish very strict limitations for the
operation of FRY/Serb law enforcement, border police, customs and military personnel,
both in terms of numbers and in terms of competence‖.159 It seems that the international
community just wanted to make sure that Serbia wouldn‘t sign the agreement for sure
because they knew that no one could accept this part of the ultimatum as well. Which
leader of the country would agree to withdraw all troops (with exception of small number
158 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 155.159 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 240.
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side had some major complaints.161 They requested that ―will of people‖ was changed to
―referendum‖. That is the moment when Madeleine Albright jumped in to make sure that
the Albanians would accept the Agreement. She added her interpretation (on 22nd
February) to this chapter summarizing that this meant that people of Kosovo would be
able to hold referendum regarding the future of Kosovo in three years.162 Marc Weller
talked about this as well. He said that the Albanian delegation confirmed that after three
years of the interim period ―…the people of Kosovo will exercise their will through a
referendum, conducted freely and fairly‖.163 How could anyone expect that the Serbs
would accept this document? That way Serbia would agree to the secession of Kosovo in
2002, which is still worse than a unilateral declaration of independence. Interestingly,
even if the US said that this proposal would be available only if the Albanians sign by the
deadline it did not happen.164 However, this did not have any negative effects on the
Albanian position, and they did finally agree to sign this after Jim O‘Brien (the State
Department lawyer) told Jamie Rubin to distract Thaci (the strongest opponent of
acceptance of the proposal) while the Albanian delegation is accepting the proposal.165
Of course, this was just another aspect of the Agreement that was obviously
unacceptable for Serbs (since everybody knows what would be the outcome of that
referendum). Ministries of the Contact Group added that the entire conference (which
was prolonged for a week) should be finished by 1500 on February 23rd of 1999. The
Serbian delegation sent a couple of letters that day to all three co-presides of the
Conference where they urged for a continuation of negotiations, but it was ineffective and
161 Ibid, 211.162 Ibid, 215.163 Marc Weller , ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 235.164 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 215.165 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 404.
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of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ". And the other proposal is also
hidden from the public, notes Chomsky. 168
Additionally, the authors of this Serbian document added many ideas from the
Contact Group‘s proposal avoiding those elements that would lead to the cancelation of
Serbian sovereignty.169 Of course, this was useless, and the sides could start to count
down the time to the NATO bombing of FR Yugoslavia.
168 Vlada Republike Srbije Online, ―Čomski: Postojalo je Drugačije Rešenje za Kosmet,‖http://www.arhiva.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/2000-03/06/18364.html 169 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 245.
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Another Congressman that opposed this intervention is John Richard Kasich from
Ohio. He said that civil war in Kosovo started in 1389, and there is a small possibility
that stepping in that kind of conflict will be successful.178
However, supporters of the intervention (and they might be led by desire to
punish the Serbs for civil war in Bosnia where the Serbs had an advantage in military
power 179) were doing what they were supposed to do to justify the bombing. Therefore
Mrs. Louise Arbour, which was at that time the main prosecutor for ICTY, had a meeting
with Secretary Albright (April 30th) after which (next month) Mrs. Arbour announced
that President Milosevic and his four most important assistants are accused of war crimes.
In reaction to this Albright said that this indictment is a proof that NATO intervention is
valid.180 One journalist asked if that meant that there was not war crimes before the
bombing, but Albright responded that she thinks that many things happened before the
bombing. Same day, Russian Foreign Ministry critiqued Mrs. Arbour‘s decision,
claiming that it had political motivation.181
Other reasons why the Serbs could not accept the Agreement one can find in the
fact that negotiators pressured Serbia to accept conditions regarding autonomy on part of
her territory that does not exist anywhere in the world. As Lord Gilbert, who was a
178 Congressional Record Online, Congressional Record , http://frwebgate6.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=933744387454+4+2+0&WAISaction=retrieve; we found this out when weintervened in Somalia. We furthermore found this out when we intervened in Lebanon, even under RonaldReagan. Being in the middle of civil wars that are not resolvable is a mistake for a major power. The
question is when, then, should we intervene militarily? Well, on three grounds. One, when it is in the directnational interests of the United States. Number two, when there is an absolute achievable goal. And numberthree, when there is a credible exit strategy. None of these criteria can be met in terms of Kosovo. There isno direct national interest, there is not an achievable goal, and finally, there is no credible exit strategy. 179 President Clinton said: ―this is not the first time we‘ve faced this kind of choice [over whether to takemilitary action]. When President Milosevic started the war in Bosnia seven years ago, the world did not actquickly enough to stop him….We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just few years ago.‖ RolandParis, ―Kosovo & the metaphor war,‖ Political Science Quarterly 117, no.3 (2002): 436.180 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 225.181 Ibid, 225.
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Minister of State in the MoD from 1997-1999 under George Robertson and spoke for the
Government in the House of Lords on defence said
I think the terms put to Milosevic at Rambouillet were absolutely
intolerable; how could he possibly accept them; it was quite deliberate…. It had
been decided in advance that Milosevic had to be taught a military lesson and the
only purpose of the Rambouillet process was to provide an excuse for doing so.
Milosevic was to be made an offer he couldn't accept…. it gave NATO
unrestricted access, not just to Kosovo, but to the whole of Yugoslavia (including
Montenegro). Unless defeated in a war no state with the pretence of independence
could accept those terms (and these terms were in fact omitted from the post-war
settlement in June 1999).182
The Following paragraphs will offer a few examples on how real autonomy
should look like. In case of South Tyrol, Italy and Austria made bilateral international
agreement, and this region gained wide autonomy without any international presence. At
the same time, the Italian Government secured sovereignty and integrity from any kind of
abuses.183Why something similar to this was not possible in case of Kosovo? It would be
better if the international community encouraged two sides to make an agreement, which
will guarantee wide autonomy for Albanians, and at the same time sovereignty and
integrity of Serbia.
In Spain, the Article II of the Constitution says that ―The Constitution is based on
the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all
182 David Morrison, ―Rambouillet Terms ‗Absolutely Intolerable‘, Says ex-Minister,‖ Labour & Trade
Union Review (2001), http://web.ukonline.co.uk/pbrooke/p&t/Balkans/dmonkosovo/200102183 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 179-80.
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Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and
regions which make it up and the solidarity among all of them.‖184 Obviously there is a
right to autonomy, but also an explanation that the country cannot be divisible.
Ironically, both Italy and Spain were part of NATO forces that bombed FR
Yugoslavia.
Finland is another case that is interesting to mention in regard to successful
autonomies. This country has a remarkable Swedish minority (approximately 300,000)
who live compactly on territory of Finland, especially on Oland islands where they are
the majority. Still, as a minority they don‘t have any special rights, and the Government
sees them as citizens of Finland which mother tongue is Swedish.185 Nevertheless, Mr.
Marty Ahtisari (special envoy involved in ending of bombing and 2007 negotiations
process, which will be discussed later in this research) who comes from Finland never
thought that Albanians in Serbia should be treated in the same manner, as Serbs who
speak Albanian. Actually, he was one of the strongest allies of the Albanians in their
campaign for independence.
Another example of successful autonomy that is not comparable to that proposed
in Rambouillet is the case of Russian republic of Tatarstan. This region has autonomy
regarding culture, economy and technical cooperation with other countries, but Russia
kept positions in defense, security and international relations.186
Obviously, these examples from other democracies are not even close to the paper
that was discussed in Rambouillet.
Even Henry Kissinger said in Newsweek International (New World Disorder,
184 Spain Constitution Online, August 27, 1992, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sp00000_.html185 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 184-85.186 Respublika Tatarstan Online, http://www.tatar.ru/?DNSID=830f4d0a9e1ddd7c1d6ac98b5eecc70b
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May 31st, 1999), ‖The air war in Kosovo is justified as establishing the principle that the
international community--or at least NATO--will henceforth punish the transgressions of
governments against their own people. But we did not do so in Algeria, Sudan, Sierra
Leone, Croatia, Rwanda, the Caucasus, the Kurdish areas and many other regions‖.187
Why is that so? What was the justification for bombing of Yugoslavia? The next
statement is one of the explanations how the international community justified the
bombing: George Kenny from Department of State said that they intentionally raised the
bar too high to make sure that Serbs would not be able to jump over.188 Eric Suy, former
chief advisor for the law in UN and professor of international law at Catholic University
in Brussels went so far that he compared the Agreement from Rambouillet with Hitler‘s
ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. In both cases he said that excuse was found in protection
of national minority.189
One more reaction came from British journalist Tim Marshall. He quoted Mr.
Robert Hayden from Pittsburgh University who claims that the only purpose of the
Agreement from Rambouillet was to justify military intervention against FR Yugoslavia.
He also said that members of western delegation had sketched the map of possible
division of Kosovo, but Albright prevented them to show that to the Serbian delegation, it
was feared that they might accept that.190
Serbian President Mr. Milutinovic gave an official statement on 23rd February, at
the end of negotiations. For this occasion it will be present most interesting parts from his
reaction.
187 Newsweek Online, ― New World Disorder ,‖ May 31, 1999, http://www.newsweek.com/id/88424/page/5188 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 189.189 International Court of Justice, May 10, 1999, 38-39, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/114/4491.pdf190 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 204.
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Participating in Rambouillet Peace Conference, Serbia and her citizens hadshowed that they had sincere intention to negotiate on ten principles that wasmade by the Contact Group. Unfortunately, today‘s decision to end ‗talks‘without a positive result is a normal consequence of what we used to talk about on previous press conferences (12th, 15th, and 20th February). Serbia especially
insisted on 10 principles of the Contact Group, that there is not going to beindependence of Kosovo and Metohija, that there is not a third republic [besidesSerbia and Montenegro], neither the referendum, while sovereignty and integrityof Serbia and FR Yugoslavia would not be challenged. However, those whoinitiated this meeting did not accept same approach. They offered documents thatwere in favor of the creation of a third republic and destroying Serbia. By doingthat, the international community worked absolutely in favor of the separatistmovement in Kosovo and Metohija. More than that, only 18 hours before the projected end of the conference, delegation got a new document (56 pages long)that was not discussed at all in first 18 days of the conference. Direct talks wererefused during the entire talks. It is a lie that negotiations could be successfully
conducted without negotiations. The conference was extended for three days because there was a significant improvement, which was made by acceptance ofseven crucial questions in regard to real autonomy, which was proposed by theSerbian delegation. Even the Contact Group admitted that. What then happened inthose three additional days of the conference?This was fraud without precedent and open aggression. Serbian delegation wasvery constructive in spite of the facts that: the entire conference was very poorlyorganized; Albanian delegation was always negative toward the idea of face-to-face meetings, even on the level of experts; Albanian delegation refused to putsignature on 10 principles of the Contact Group; the Albanian delegation,supported by sponsors and guardians, insisted on maximalist requests that
included international protectorate and referendum for independence.
At the end of his letter, Mr. Milutinovic added that FR Yugoslavia and Serbia are
willing to continue talks in Belgrade, Pristina or any other place regarding Kosovo‘s
autonomy, but never about the independence of Kosovo or third republic. He even said
that FR Yugoslavia is willing to consider the size and character of international presence
in Kosovo and Metohija in an effort to implement the agreement that would be accepted
in Rambouillet.191 Even Albanian advisor Marc Weller talked about some of things that
were mentioned by President Milutinovic. He admits that the Serbian delegation in final
declaration emphasized the most important developments toward achieving a political
191 Ibid, 167-70.
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solution, as well as Serbian willingness to discuss about the character of international
presence in Kosovo.192 But, it seems that the international community was not willing to
give peace a chance because they made deadline for acceptance of the agreement, even if
―…a significant number of substantive issues had not been negotiated‖.193 Not to mention
that the most important annexes of the agreement were presented day before the deadline.
Yet there was some chance for avoidance of the war because both sides agreed to attend
new conference in Paris on 15th March, but it ended just with Albanian acceptance to sign
the document and Serbian decision to present their version of the Agreement.194 The
author of this paper thinks that there was a hidden agenda by the international community
not to achieve a peace solution because it does not make sense that negotiators did not
want to give more time to the time.
Besides Mr. Milutinovic, exactly one month later (23rd March 1999) the President
of Yugoslavia Mr. Milosevic also made an official statement regarding the conference,
which was written just one day after Mr. Holbrooke‘s last trip to Belgrade where he said
that the bombing is imminent if Yugoslavia does not accept the Rambouillet accords.195
Milosevic‘s statement was sent in form of the letter to Ministers of Foreign Affairs
Hubert Vedrine (France) and Robin Cook (UK), the official co-chairmen of the
conference. Unfortunately, this letter was not published, but is a part of the most knowing
collection of documents regarding Kosovo and Metohija published in Cambridge. These
are some of the most significant points of that letter.
192 Marc Weller, ―The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo,‖ International Affairs 75, no.2 (1999): 233.193 Ibid, 231.194 Ibid, 234.195 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 227.
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…text that you named ―the Agreement from Rambouillet‖ was published inKosovo‘s newspapers even before the conference (Albanian newspaper KohaDitore). Belgrade is tolerant, but not stupid. Thanks to some one else‘s stupidity,the document that was supposed to be a result of negotiations was published even before those negotiations have begun. Therefore, my answer to your sentence ‗the
Agreement is on the table‘ is: just a proposal of the Agreement can be on thetable. But, an empty table can‘t lead to the agreement. Those that are interested into agreement have to seat around that table.Considering your threat with NATO bombing, your nations will be ashamed because of that, since you are preparing to use force against one small Europeannation just because of her willingness to protect its territory from separatism. Yougentlemen, as Ministers of Foreign Affairs of two European countries have theright to negotiate, mediate, etc, but you don‘t have the right to threaten othercountries and other citizens, nor you can arrange lives in other countries.196
The next day, 24th March 1999, NATO commenced the bombing of FR
Yugoslavia.
196 Miodrag Mitic, Kako Nam Se Dogodio Rambuje (Beograd: Filip Visnjic, 2003), 154-76.
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The Serbs would not accept a Nato force; Nato on its 50th anniversary wanted to
show it mattered - and only one outcome was possible
198
It was 24th March 1999 when the first ―smart bombs‖, as some ―experts‖ like to
call them, were felt in the Federal Republic Yugoslavia. These bombs are considered
smart due to their precision, which is unquestionable, but nobody cared about the size of
the blasts that were produced from explosions. NATO would, for example, hit the Army
Headquarters in the Serbian capital Belgrade, which is in downtown, even if that building
was empty days before bombing. However, civilians on the streets were killed even if
197 Info-sluzba Kosova I Metohije Online, http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2007/March_25/2.html198 BBC Online, ―Rambouillet Talks ‗Designed to Fail‘,‖ March 19, 2000,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/682877.stm
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they were mile away. Actually, more people died from the second ‗tomahawk‘, which
was launched a half hour later, because they came to help the injured. Civilians died also
in Radio Television of Serbia, in sanitarium in Surdulica199 , on dozens of bridges200
including the train bridge when the train passing through201, in factories (some of them
created small ecological catastrophes), in schools, etc. NATO bombers also attacked
refugees‘ convoy on Kosovo because they thought that it was a military convoy.202
Unfortunately, so-called journalists from western countries did not have an interest in the
coverage of this side of the story. NATO officials, such as General Wesley Clark, also
did not show concerns for this issue, and they viewed civilian victims as ―collateral
damage‖. Actually, as Rebecca Sumner noticed: ―three to four times more civilians than
soldiers were killed‖. Besides that, based to international law and NATO's documents,
NATO must be subordinate to the UN and meet the terms of the international law. But in
the case of Kosovo, NATO waged war without declaration of war which is illegal, used
cluster bombs (forbidden for exceptional inhumanity), ―and repeatedly refused to
subordinate their actions to the UN‖.203 One of the reasons for NATO’s arrogance can be
found in President Clinton‘s statement from 1993, where he said in regard to NATO
interventions: ―With the United Nations if possible, without it if necessary‖. He also
added: ―NATO is the decision-making criterion for the UN and not the other way
around‖.204
199 General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York:Public Affairs, 2001), 334.200 Ibid, 334.201 Ibid, 254.202 Ibid, 254-55.203 Rebecca Sumner, ―A New World Order,‖ London Daily Online, http://www.london-daily.com/art/ld-rebec.htm204 Youtube Online, Bettina Kapune, ―It started with a Lie - NATO Aggression against Serbia 1999 Part 3,‖Westdeutschen Rundfunks (WDR), 2001, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kuhfyd6bJs&NR=1
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Nevertheless, the rest of the world did not show huge concern about life of
ordinary people in Yugoslavia until NATO bombed the Chinese embassy on the 45th day
of bombing. On that day three Chinese journalists died which raised questions in the
world about the way that NATO chooses targets, especially when considering that it had
very negative effect on relationship with two important powers, Russia and China.205
At the same time in Kosovo, Serbian Security forces saw an opportunity to
destroy the KLA, which was no longer on the State Department list of terrorist‘s
organization, regardless of their connections with Al-Qaeda. It should be mentioned that
some of the members of the KLA were involved in an unsuccessful attack on Fort Dix,
NJ in 2007.206 As usual, the worst situation was for the civilians. Approximately 800,000
Albanians escaped from Kosovo. Some of them were victims of ―friendly fire‖, some
victims of Serbian ―volunteers‖, but some were killed by the KLA because they did not
want to fight against the Serbs. Of course people could read only about bad Serbs and
Albanian refuges. Very often politicians from ―civilized countries‖ would make numbers
bigger. The newest example is the interview in which Italian Foreign Minister Massimo
D‘Alema gave to Indian newspaper. He said, ―When NATO attacked, Kosovo was under
the Serb occupation and three million refugees crossed over to Albania‖.207 What‘s
wrong with this statement? Well, first of all, Serbia could not occupy Kosovo because
that is/was (again depends from point of view) part of Serbia. Secondly, it is quite
205 Michael Mandelbaum, ―A Perfect Failure: NATO‘s War against Yugoslavia‖, Foreign Affairs (1999),http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55396/michael-mandelbaum/a-perfect-failure-natos-war-against-yugoslavia206 Chris Suellentrop, ―Carry on, Blair,‖ The New York Times Online, January 28, 2010,http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/carry-on- blair/?scp=15&sq=Kosovo%20Liberation%20Army,%20Al-Qaeda&st=cse; four of the alleged plotters of aterrorist attack on Fort Dix, N.J., were ―ethnic Albanians from the former Yugoslavia, three from a town onthe Macedonia-Kosovo border and one who had served as a sharpshooter in the Kosovo Liberation Army(K.L.A.) in its clashes with Serbian security forces during the 1990s‖207 B92 Online, archive October 17, 2007, http://www.b92.net/
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impossible to have three million refuges from province that has less than two million
people (it is impossible to know exact number because Albanians refused to participate
on official census since 1981). Unfortunately, nobody cares about these comments
because the Serbs are considered guilty for everything bad that happened in former
Yugoslavia including Kosovo.
Nevertheless, Serbia had to fight against the KLA and the NATO. This NATO
intervention was called ―Merciful Angel‖. During this intervention, the KLA was very
active. According to Serbian General Lazarevic‘s testimony in international court for war
crimes, the KLA had between 20,000 and 25,000 members.208
The KLA had a tactic
called ―two villages‖. This meant that one village would be reserved only for the KLA,
while the next one was home of the civilians/refugee camp. After defeating of the KLA
positions, terrorists would escape to that second village and use civilians as shield. The
other tactic that was used by the KLA since 1998 was ―thousand fires‖.209 In other words,
the KLA would have cells in every village, and their mission was to attack Serbian forces
so often that they would not be able to control the situation. Lazarevic said that by 1998
the KLA controlled between 400 and 600 villages on Kosovo.210 At the same time, there
were more than 500 breakings of the Serbian border from Albania that were made by
Albanian groups seized from 10-800 members. Of course, Serbian forces could not stop
that because they were obligated by the UN to retreat from the border with Albania.
Speaking of battle with NATO aircrafts, Yugoslav army was in huge disadvantage
due to NATO‘s technical, quantitative, and logistical advantages. NATO used hundreds
208 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, p 17729,http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/trans/en/071106IT.htm209 Ibid, p 17754, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/trans/en/071106IT.htm210 Ibid, p 18372-73, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/trans/en/071115IT.htm
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of all kinds of aircrafts and bases in many countries. Those countries were not just
members of NATO, but all other interested in military defeat of Yugoslavia. This is what
General Clark said regarding Albania:
In Albania, the reception was overwhelmingly positive. The young prime
minister, Pandeli Majko, fluent in English, approved every request. May we use
an additional airfield? Of course, use all airfields. May we repair the highway to
Kukes? Please do so. And the road to Skopje? You may have all roads and all
government facilities – take anything you need.211
It was the same situation in FYRM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia),
and obviously in Croatia since General Clark said that NATO officials were in doubt if
they should launch a ground troop invasion (which actually never happened) from
Croatia and Hungary, or from Albania and FYRM.
Of course, NATO and the KLA coordinated their actions in Kosovo as real allies.
One of the KLA leaders, Agim Ceku, said more about that in Tim Judah‘s book, where
he explained how the KLA helped NATO to easier identify Yugoslav soldiers. He said:
One of the reasons Milosevic had to end the war was because we were attacking
from the border and he was obliged to bring in many units who made good
targets. Before, they had been dug in, but our attack made them come out. NATO
enjoyed that bombing! The Serbs were faced with low morale and no one wanted
to go to Pastrik or Kosare. Milosevic was in danger of losing his army. One B-52
killed 224 soldiers.212
211 General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York:Public Affairs, 2001), 257.212 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 284.
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Finally after 78 days of NATO bombing, in which the usage of ammunition
enriched with depleted uranium and cluster bombs (violation of a couple of UN
agreements regarding conducting the wars) was a common thing (even Gen. Clark
mentioned usage of cluster bombs in his book 213), Milosevic understood that a fight with
19 countries could not last forever, regardless of the fact that Yugoslav Anti Air Defense
was much more successful then one would expect, even Gen. Clark admitted a couple of
destroyed aircrafts including Stealth fighter bomber F-117.214 Milosevic decided to sign
the Kumanovo (city in Macedonia) treaty, which was actually a capitulation (of course
Milosevic used his powerful propaganda to convince citizens that it was a victory).
Serbian forces had to retreat from Kosovo, while the KFOR came in to protect non-
Albanians. During this ―protection‖ more than 250,000 Serbs escaped to central Serbia,
while approximately 100,000 left in Kosovo, either on the north of the province or in
enclaves on the south. Unfortunately, the international community did not show an
interest to bring these refugees home. It is not very often that people are refugees in their
own country (precise name is actually Internal Dislocated Persons-IDP), but as head of
the European parliament for Southeast Europe Doris Pack said, Kosovo is the right
punishment for Serbian behavior.215 Interestingly Doris Pack is German politician and it
is questionable if she has the moral right to talk about punishing an entire nation because
of one leader. If she is right, Germany should not exist today.
Noam Chomsky discussed about legitimacy of NATO bombing. He said:
213 Ibid, 296.214 Ibid, 215.215 Glas Javnosti Online, ― Nezavisnost Kosmeta, Zatim Potpis Srbiji ,‖ December 14, 2007,http://www.glas-javnosti.rs/clanak/glas-javnosti-14-12-2007/nezavisnost-kosmeta-zatim-potpis-srbiji
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Hungarians; and over 300 of members of other ethnic groups221
(unfortunately, number
of killed Serbs is not final because they are still targets of Albanian terrorists, including
the attack in March of 2004, the largest one since KFOR came to Kosovo).222 Evidently,
Albanians had almost five times more victims than Serbs, but in percentages Serbs
suffered more since there were 6-7 times more Albanians than Serbs in Kosovo (now that
ratio is 1 to 10). It is interesting that among killed Serbs are 577 soldiers and 354 police
officers (13 of those police officers were actually Albanians that were loyal to Serbia).
Unfortunately, it is still unknown what happened to 1,886 people that are missing (over
500 of them are Serbs, Gypsies and other non-Albanians).
Since one picture is worth a 1,000 words here are a couple of pictures that were
used to blame the Serbs and portray the Albanians as innocent victims that seek
democracy and freedom.
220 John Pilger, ―How Silent Are the Humanitarian Invaders of Kosovo?‖ Global Policy Forum Online,December 8, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/36491.html 221 Blic Online, ―FHP: 13,421 Zrtva Sukoba na Kosovu,‖ October 6, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/hronika.php?id=114227222 Human Rights Watch, ―Kosovo: Failure of NATO, U.N. to Protect Minorities,‖ July 26, 2004,http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/07/26/kosovo-failure-nato-un-protect-minorities
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225 It is always good to show innocent unprotected
babies at the cover page and ask tendentiousquestions (I.B.)
226
223 Ovsiste Online, http://www.freewebs.com/ovsiste/#+224 BBC Online, September 27, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_pictures/7016174.stm225 Time Online, archive April 5, 1999,http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://img.timeinc.net/time/magazine/archive/covers/1999/11019
Time Online, archive April 12, 1999,http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://img.timeinc.net/time/magazine/archive/covers/1999/1101990412_400.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19990412,00.html&usg=__kTkiJdHBxskKu3OzUj4njz4Si2s=&h=527&w=400&sz=46&hl=en&start=3&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=qcjmC1IbvlOiiM:&tbnh=132&tbnw=100&prev=/images%3Fq%3DTime%2BCover,%2BKosovo%26hl%3Den%26rlz%3D1T4GGIH_enUS310US310%26sa%3DN%26um%3D1
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persons can return home in safety…‖232 is also something that was conduct only in the
manner to satisfy Albanian refugees. While they returned home immediately after the end
of the bombing, Serbs that were internally displaced persons (IDP) are still IDP and the
number of them is growing every day.
The following statement is one of those that are in favor of the Albanians because
it has ties with Rambouillet peace accords: ―Facilitating a political process designed to
determine Kosovo‘s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords
(S/1999/648)‖.233 What is noticeable for anyone that knows something about the
negotiation process over Kosovo is that it is very strange that this sentence which
supports Rambouillet accords is written in the same document where member states are
called to protect Yugoslav‘s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Yugoslav
authorities led by President Milosevic had to accept this resolution to stop the bombing.
Another thing that was stated in resolution 1244 is ―Protecting and promoting
human rights”. Unfortunately, this was never implemented toward the Serbs who are
still targets of Albanian terrorists, especially in enclaves located in southern Kosovo.234
The truth is that the Resolution 1244 ―created an international protectorate‖235,
regardless of Milosevic‘s attempt to fool his citizens that he made a fair agreement.
232 Ibid, 3.233 Ibid, 4.234 Zejak N, ―Mortar Attack on Gorazdevac,‖ Blic Online, March 11, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/blic/blic17.html235 Ray Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia, and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 157.
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KFOR divided Kosovo into five zones of responsibilities. The French contingent
is in the northern part of Kosovo, in an area where the Serbs are the majority. The British
are in the central region, including the capital of Pristina, probably because the UK is one
of the strongest supporters of Kosovo independence. The US troops are on the border
with FYR Macedonia because they do not want to be involved too much in possible
conflicts. Germans are on the south where Albanians represent vast majority, which is
good because Serbs still have bad memories from WWII regarding German soldiers. In
the west zone are Italian soldiers. This is a very dangerous zone because of the great
number of locations that are contaminated by depleted uranium that was used by NATO
bombers. One study shows that several Italian soldiers died because of that, while dozens
of them suffer from different types of cancer.
237
How poorly KFOR protects citizens of Kosovo, especially the Serbs is noticeable
through the number of damaged and destroyed churches and other evidences that Serbs
236 Planken Online, http://planken.org/images/balkans/map_kfor_sect.gif237 Blic Online, ―Uranijumski Danak na Jugu Srbije,‖ November 4, 2007,http://www.blic.rs/drustvo.php?id=18489
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were in Kosovo for centuries. According to British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since
1999 in Kosovo was damaged or destroyed total of 155 Serbian churches and
monasteries, 250 cemeteries, and approximately 6,750 of graves.238
There are soldiers from other countries inside these five zones, but their number is
not significant, and their purpose is to make picture of international presence in Kosovo,
not only NATO. KFOR came as a result of the UN resolution 1244. This resolution
should guarantee Serbia sovereignty and protection for all people, but the reality is
different. Peacekeepers are more concerned about their own safety, and there are not
enough of them.239
That is the reason why they created the KPC (Kosovo Protection
Corpus), with a mission to protect people. As already mentioned, the problem is that the
majority of the KPC are former KLA members, just this time on the UNMIK paycheck.
So it is not very difficult to imagine how concerned they are about the rights of Serbs.
The other part of the Resolution 1244 that no one cares about is allowing the Serbian
Police and Army to return in areas with Serbs majority. On the contrary, the UNMIK said
that any attempt in this direction from the Serbian government would be considered as an
attack on Kosovo and the UN.
238 Tereza Bojkovic, ―Britanci Prebrojali Unisteno Srpsko Nasledje na Kosmetu,‖ Politika Online, November 16, 2009, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Britanci-prebrojali-unishteno-srpsko-nasledje-na-Kosmetu.sr.html239 Melanie McDonagh, ―Now the Serbs Need Our Help,‖ New Statesman 128, no. 4442, 12,http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.hpu.edu:5000/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=104&sid=9dbdebf0-0704-4835-9a72-420fbf2333f2%40sessionmgr112&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=hlh&AN=2025037
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Serbian population in Kosovo 1999 (since KFOR‘s watch) and 2005240
In the meantime, Kosovo became a paradise for drug dealers and sex
trafficking.241, 242 The KLA is in charge of the majority of heroin supplies that comes
from Afghanistan through the Balkan to the EU. Even during the strongest presence of
Serbian Armed Forces in Kosovo it was impossible to stop these activities. Today the
situation is even worse, but the UNMIK did not show an interest to end these criminal
activities; probably even if they wanted it would not be doable. Prostitution is probably
the second biggest source of income for citizens of Kosovo.243 Unfortunately, even some
KFOR soldiers, with their high incomes and huge distance from loved ones are
occasionally clients. Other than this, Kosovo‘s economy almost does not exist, and
besides illegal privatization of some Serbian companies, there is no other way for citizens
to make money. According to the UNDP, 14 % of Kosovo citizens live with less than 70
eurocents per day.244
240 Novosti Online, February 21, 2008,http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=4&status=jedna&vest=116577&datum=2008-02-22241 Imer Mushkolaj, ―Drug Dealers Flourish in Post-War Kosovo,‖ New York University, June 22, 2000,http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/Imer062200.html242 BBC Online, ―Kosovo UN Troops ‗Fuel Sex Trade‘ ,‖ May 6, 2004,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3686173.stm243 Ronald G McNeil Jr., ―U.N. and NATO Move to Curb Kosovo Crime,‖ The New York Times,http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/15/world/un-and-nato-move-to-curb-kosovo-crime.html?pagewanted=1244 B92 Online, archive October 17, 2007, http://www.b92.net/
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Serbian parliament, ethnic Albanians would cynically respond that they do not want to
interfere in domestic affairs of neighboring country.247
248 Republican presidential candidate Sen. John
McCain, R-Ariz., speaks to a pro Kosovo, proMcCain, rally across the street from his New York City hotel Friday morning,Feb. 11, 2000. McCain is in New York for the dayto attend fundraisers and to talk to the press before returning to South Carolina Friday night.(AP Photo/Stephan Savoia). 249
Money that the KLA made from dealing drugs, as well as from tax collection
abroad250, is no longer used for buying the weapons. Now that‘s the most important way
for buying the support for independence around the world. That is the reason why the
247 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 35.248 ―John McCain aimed Kosovo Islamic terrorists.‖ Svet , February 13, 2008,
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_PsML9GxjaK0/R7dtJ7LSzJI/AAAAAAAAAXg/PChvWGtk-2k/s320/McCainKLA.JPG249 Justin Raimondo, ―McCain and the KLA connection,‖ Antiwar Online, February 25, 2000,www.antiwar.com/justin/j022500.html250 Zoran Kusovac, ―The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control,‖ Jane’s Online http://www.janes.com/defence/news/kosovo/jir990401_01_n.shtml; ―The self-proclaimed government ofthe 'Republic of Kosovo' collected a 3 per cent income tax on all exiles working in Germany, Switzerlandand Austria, but much more important for the financing of the KLA were the funds sent by family memberswho worked abroad‖.
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Albanians have such a strong caucus in the USA Senate and in EU parliament. One of the
main supporters of Albanian interests in USA is Congressman Joseph DioGuardi. He
founded the Albanian caucus (back in 1990‘s) in the Congress in which he brought
Senators Robert Dole, Alfonse D‘Amato, Dennis DeConcini, and Congressmen Tom
Lantos.251, 252 Besides that, it is very important to have private journalists in influential
magazines and newspaper. Due to a huge pressure from these Albanian‘s allies, the UN
decided to end this status quo. The UN sent Marti Ahtisary to solve this problem. Very
soon he came to the conclusion that Kosovo should be independent. There were some
rumors in Serbia that he received 40 million euros for this decision and that this
information came from the BND (German Intelligence Service)253, but this story never
reached cover pages. Naturally Serbian government strongly opposed this idea and the
UN decided to send ―Troika‖ (from number three, representing negotiators from USA,
EU, and Russia) to start new negotiations. Albanians never took these negotiations
seriously because the international community said that if ‗Troika‘ does not manage a
better solution in 120 days than Ahtisary‘s proposal will be implemented254 So Albanians
had a simple task, just to travel around the world with ‗Troika‘ and pretend that they care
about these talks.
Serbs, Albanians, and ‗Troika‖ had a due date of December 10th 2007. Even
before this date their negotiations were finished because a compromise was impossible.
Albanians wanted only independence while the Serbs could offer anything but the
251 Predrag Simic, Put u Rambuje: Kosovska Kriza 1995-2000 (Beograd: Nea, 2000), 22.252 Joseph J DioGuardi and Shirley Cloyes, ―The Albanian American Civic League: On a Collision Coursewith Slobodan Milosevic ,‖ http://blog.aacl.com/the-aacl-on-a-collision-course-with-slobodon-milsovic/253 Axis Information and Analysis Online, ―Eurasian Secret Services Daily Review ,‖ June 25, 2007,http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1334254 Ahtisary received Nobel Peace Prize in 2008 for efforts to resolve international conflicts including thatone in Kosovo. Obviously it was less important how successful he was.
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independence. It is understandable that Serbia strongly disagreed with dismemberment of
15% of its territory. It would be interesting to see how people in UK for example would
feel if the international community insisted on the independence of Wales.
Potential Independent States in Europe255
However, the reality is that 1.8 million Albanians in Kosovo do not want to live
under Serbian authority. For this reason Serbs suggested a couple of solutions during
talks with ‗Troika‘. The Serbs offered a system that exists in China regarding Hong
Kong, which is the part of China but still parallel system. Albanians rejected this because
―Hong Kong and Kosovo have completely different positions‖.256 After this idea, Serbia
came up with another solution; Oland‘s islands in Finland with Swedish majority.257
Again, the Albanians said no. All that the Albanians wanted to talk about was the future
relations between Serbia and Kosovo as two neighboring countries.
255 Caenada Blogspot Online, http://caenada.blogspot.com/2008/02/potential-independent-states-in-europe.html256 B92 Online, ―Beograd: Kosovo kao Hong Kong ,‖ November 5, 2007,http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=11&dd=05&nav_id=270794.257 United Nations, ―Serbia‘s President Calls on Secur ity Council to Prevent Encouragement, Adoption ofAny Unilateral Act on Independence of Kosovo ,‖ January 16, 2008,http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9227.doc.htm
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In reaction to declaration of independence many Serbs spontaneously started
demonstrations in major cities in Serbia and rest of the world. Unfortunately, some of
those protestors missed an opportunity to peacefully show their concern and
disagreement with this decision (there is an old saying in Serbia that Serbs never miss an
opportunity to miss the opportunity). Instead, they broke in to the US embassy and set
fire in which one protestor (internally displaced person from Kosovo) has died. Sadly,
because of a couple dozen of violent protestors that attacked the US and Croatian
embassy the rest of the world (thanks to the CNN and other news agencies) did not see
almost a million of worried protestors but footage from the US embassy in fire instead.258
Even the writer of this paper had friends at work that asked him what‘s wrong with the
Serbs again.
Nevertheless, Serbian authorities commenced a huge diplomatic offensive to
make sure that number of countries that are recognizing Kosovo is not growing, lobbying
at the same time in the UN to open discussion in front of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in Hague which would have to hear pros and cons about declaration of
independence and announce the official opinion.259
This trial started on December 1st 2009, and the Serbs are hoping that this
decision will be in their favor, but some people are very concerned, especially after
Hisashi Owada‘s (Japanese Judge who is the President of ICJ)260 announcement that most
258 CNN Online, ―U.S. Warns Serbia It‘s Responsible for Safety of Embassy ,‖ February 22, 2008,http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/02/22/us.serbia/index.html?iref=storysearch; yet, some Westernsources were lees bias, such as Times, http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1715332,00.html259 BBC Online, ―UN Seeks World Court Kosovo View ,‖ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7658103.stm;74 countries in the UN voted in favor of asking ICJ for advice, 6 were against, while 74 abstained fromvoting.260 Miroslav Lazanski, ―Od Japanca, Iskreno,‖ Politika Online, November 22, 2009,http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Svet/Od-Japanca-iskreno.sr.html
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likely the ICJ statement won‘t be right or wrong, but rather several pages of interpretation
which will make room for both sides to interpret it in the way they like.
So far several countries have had a chance to speak in front of the ICJ regarding
Kosovo independence. Approximately 15 countries will support the Serbs, while the
same number of countries will support the Albanians. Here are a couple of statements
from the ICJ sessions so far, starting with those that support Serbian positions:
The ambassador of Bolivia said that Serbia could not unilaterally forbid the
staying of international organization in Kosovo, and in the same manner authorities in
Pristina cannot unilaterally cancel the sovereignty of Serbia over Kosovo. He said that the
right for independence is guaranteed to nations that are under colonial rule or occupation.
Since Kosovo have never been a colony nor under the occupation of foreign country it
can not have right for independence.261
China said that there is not question that Kosovo was part of FR Yugoslavia and
Serbia after the collapse of SFRY. The integral parts of sovereign countries, based on
international law, do not have the right to unilaterally declare independence, while
protection of territorial integrity is a blueprint for international order of law.262
Cyprus called the ICJ to implement international law, and stated that Kosovo‘s
declaration of independence is illegal. Cyprus‘ Ambassador denied accepting Kosovo as
a ‘unique case‘, warning that if the ICJ found Kosovo‘s independence legal it would be
very difficult to limit that statement just to Kosovo.263
261 Blic Online, ―Brazil i Bolivija Protiv, Bugarska za Nezavisnost Kosova,‖ April 12, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123905262 B92 Online, ―Nastavak Rasprave o Kosovu u Hagu,‖ December 7, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123905263 Ibid
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Russia said (Tuesday, December 8th 2009) that unilateral declaration of
independence is illegal, underlining that the Resolution 1244, which confirms the Serbian
territorial integrity is still active. The Russian delegation said that it is very often heard
that the international law is not the real law, but that the real law is that one of the
stronger. They added that this is time to show that international law is the real one.264
Spain also said that Kosovo violated international law. Spain envoy stated that
unilateral declaration of independence can not be in line with international law because it
violates principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia, which are protected by
the Resolution 1244 of Security Council of UN.265
On the other side, countries that are traditionally opposed to Serbia gave their
views:
The Bulgarian envoy said that Kosovo did not violate international law or the
Resolution 1244. He said that declaration of independence is not covered by international
law, but under domestic constitutional law. According to him, the Resolution 1244 did
not require agreement regarding the status of Kosovo.266
Croatian envoy, Andreja Metelko Zgombic said that Kosovo was part of the
SFRY, and that because of that it had right to declare independence. She added that
Albanians in Kosovo were victims of repression of Serbian authorities, and that will of
the people of Kosovo should be the bottom line in making the final decision regarding
264 Novosti Online, ―Pravo je Iznad Moci,‖ December 8, 2009,http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=1&status=jedna&vest=164837&title_add=Pravo%20je%20iznad%20mo%C4%87i&kword_add=nezavisnost%20kosova%2C%20medjunarodni%20sud%20pravde265 Ibid266 Blic Online, ―Brazil i Bolivija Protiv, Bugarska za Nezavisnost Kosova,‖ April 12, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123905
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Kosovo.267 Unfortunately, she missed an opportunity to explain why Serbs in Krajina
(part of Croatia where Serbs were in majority until ethnic cleansing of 1995) did not have
the same right as the one that she is giving to Albanians. However, this is something that
was expected from Croatia, especially when one knows that by giving right to southern
Serbian province to separate they are giving the same right to Serbian northern province
(Vojvodina), which was already occupied by Croatia (WWII when Vojvodina along with
Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of German made independent Croatia).
The USA asked ICJ to leave Kosovo‘s declaration of independence intact either
by refusal to make a statement about that, or by finding that the international law does not
forbid declaration of independence. The USA envoy also asked the ICJ not to look at
Kosovo‘s case as a part of bigger story, but rather as a unique case. He added that there is
not any kind of contradiction between peacefully declared independence and international
law, including the Resolution 1244. Envoy also explained that by doing this Kosovo did
not break principle of territorial integrity because that is obligatory only for states, but not
for inner entities. He also said that declaration of independence of Kosovo is final stage
of death of the SFRY, with note that initially Serbia did not recognize Slovenia and
Croatia, but later on that happened.268 Again, it is not hard to find biases in the statement
of country that supports independence of Kosovo. First, who is going to explain to other
regions in the world that seeks independence why they can not be a ‗unique case‘ as
well? Also, the US envoy compared Slovenia and Croatia, which were republics that
267 B92 Online, ―Nastavak Rasprave o Kosovu u Hagu,‖ December 7, 2009,http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=123905
268 Novosti Online, ―Pravo je Iznad Moci,‖ December 8, 2009,http://www.novosti.rs/code/navigate.php?Id=1&status=jedna&vest=164837&title_add=Pravo%20je%20iznad%20mo%C4%87i&kword_add=nezavisnost%20kosova%2C%20medjunarodni%20sud%20pravde
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were part of the SFRY with Kosovo which is/was a Province of Serbia (as people would
say apples and oranges). Lastly, is not this a great excuse for the Serbs in Bosnia
(Republic of Srpska covers 49% of Bosnia) to request independence as the last stage of
collapse of the SFRY?
Still, there are some important individuals in the US who also think that
independence of Kosovo is not good idea. One of them is James Lyons (U.S. Navy
retired Admiral) who use to serve as commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, senior
U.S. military representative to the United Nations, and deputy chief of naval operations,
where he was principal adviser on all Joint Chiefs of Staff matters. He said that ―…more
than 300 mosques have been built in Kosovo, funded mainly by Saudi Arabia where the
radical teachings of the Wahhabi sect are promoted‖. Admiral Lyons also explained that
leaders of the KLA have connections with the global jihad movement, as well as with
organized crimes, and still they represent ―…the dominant element in the local Albanian
administration…”. More importantly he noticed that the US is endorsing formation of
‗Taliban-like‘ state in the heart of Europe. That is something that will be dangerous for
stability of the region. At the same time it will complicate US relations with Russia and
China which are already bad due to issues over Iran, Taiwan, North Korea and Middle
East.269
If the writer of this paper could give some advice to the Serbian and Albanian
authorities it would be to come back to the table and find the solution that would satisfy
both sides. Of course, that would mean that neither side would get 100%, but more
importantly neither side would lose 100%, which is the case at this moment. Actually, the
269 The Washington Times, ―Kosovo Train Wreck-Warnings,‖ January 2, 2008,http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/jan/02/kosovo-32train-wreck-warnings/
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suppress terrorists/rebellions without approval of the USA, EU, and NATO. The best
examples are Turkey270 which has to fight against Kurds, and Israel fighting against
sever al terrorist‘s groups. Thanks to the support of the western world they can fight
against terrorists even in neighboring countries such as Iraq and Lebanon, respectively.
One can‘t imagine what would have happened if Serbia tried to fight against the KLA in
Albania.
In the future on the Balkan Peninsula, the world can expect more turmoil in FYR
Macedonia, the southern part of central Serbia, Montenegro, and perhaps Greece (some
of incidents in these areas were already mentioned in news and articles such as Pan-
Albanianism: How big a threat to Balkan stability?).271
The reason for this is the Albanian aspiration to create ―Great Albania‖ as
mentioned earlier in this research. For this purpose terrorists established ANA (Albanian
National Army) which already had conflicts with security forces in FYR Macedonia and
central Serbia. Just a couple years ago Macedonian police conducted action on Sar
Mountain in which they killed several terrorists and recovered weapons for 650 men.272
Many questions rose during this research; why does it seem that the international
community uses double standards in solving the problems around the world? Is it
possible that Croatia has right to separate from Yugoslavia while Serbs can not separate
from Croatia (or just stay in Yugoslavia)? Why was Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH)
270 Peter Brooke, ―Kosovo: What We Weren‘t Told ,‖
http://web.ukonline.co.uk/pbrooke/p&t/Balkans/dmonkosovo/Kosovo; ―The Yugoslav response was notgentle but it was certainly no more heavy-handed than Turkey's response to the Kurdish PKK guerrillas, ina war which 30,000 lives were lost, 4,000 villages were razed to the ground and 3 million Kurds weredriven from their homes. And Turkey is a member of NATO, which participated enthusiastically in
NATO's "humanitarian war" on Yugoslavia.” 271 ICG Europe. Report No 153, ―Pan Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?‖ February 25,2004, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan014972.pdf.272 B92 Online, archive November 9, 2007, http://www.b92.net/
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http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.hpu.edu:5000/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=104&sid=a4ecd0df-105c-4b4d- b4fb-7239e7c36e7d%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=17580396274 UNMIK Online, ―Division of Public Monitoring ,‖ April 8, 2004, 2,http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2004/mon/apr/lmm080404.pdf 275 Efraim Zuroff the director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center office in Jerusalem talked about Austria as asafe heaven for Nazis in his interview with Politika. Zorana Suvakovic, ―Nacisti jos Setaju Balkanom,‖ Politika Online, December 4, 2009, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Nacisti-josh-shetaju-Balkanom.sr.html
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thousands of troops to reinforce the small contingent at the Pristina airport. The flights
never took off because the Russians were denied to cross the airspace of Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria….the NATO-led force deployed and ended up feeding the lightly
supplied Russians at the airport…‖.276 Naturally, a couple of years later Romania and
Bulgaria were invited to become members of NATO (Hungary accede to NATO in April
1999, during the bombing). Nevertheless, it might be wise to determine where the limit of
NATO‘s increase is. Is it realistic to expect that France, for example, will fight with
Russians over Estonia? Besides that it seems better to build partnership with Russia than
to provoke them by putting under NATO‘s umbrella countries that are in their backyard.
After all, Russians proved in the 2008 war with Georgia that they still do not need
approval to invade another sovereign country.
Another explanation is that the west did not want a strong Yugoslavia but rather
several weak states under protectorate of EU, IMF, and NATO. "In post-cold war Europe
no place remained for a large, independent-minded socialist state that resisted
globalisation," said George Kenney, former Yugoslavia desk officer of the US state
department. ―The Serbs' great ‗crime‘ was not reading the script‖.277
Additionally, it is just important to think far and wide because by allowing the
independence of Kosovo western world made a precedent that could be crucial in future
geopolitical games with some major powers. Examples are China with several regions
that seek independence or India which has many states that would like to be independent.
Even Russia showed that it is not immune to terrorism and separatism. Nevertheless,
western powers should be extremely careful when they make those moves because it
276 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 423-24.277 Neil Clark, ―It‘s Time to End Serb-Bashing,‖ Guardian Online, January 14, 2008,http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/14/itstimetoendserbbashing
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could make wrong effect such as in the case of Russia and Mr. Putin. One of the reasons
why this ex KGB officer got such a huge support from his people is the bombing of
Yugoslavia which he used to highlight the importance of powerful Russia. Maybe, if
NATO did not bomb Yugoslavia and teased this big country, Russia would be still in
political coma with some weak leader such as Mr. Yeltsin (well known for many scandals
connected to alcohol and violation of law278) who would never seriously opposed
demands from the west.
Another significant issue is NATO credibility. This organization needs to be
extremely cautious when making important decisions. First NATO military actions were
in 1990‘s against Serbs in Bosnia and Serbia (Yugoslavia). Many countries saw that as a
violation of international laws which damaged NATO credibility. More importantly,
during the bombing of Serbia in 1999, NATO bombed China‘s embassy in Belgrade279
which created a major diplomatic incident. Without mistakes such as that one or as
explained with Russia, NATO led by USA might be in better position today regarding
much more serious issues (Iran, Iraq, Al-Qaeda, North Korea, etc). All this issues would
be much easier to solve with the help of Russia and China. Unfortunately, these two
countries are not truly concerned about rogue regimes, but actually have pretty successful
cooperation in various fields (economy, weapons). However, President Obama
demonstrated, by abandoning the idea of the missile shield in Europe, that he is willing to
change western approach to other world powers which might be crucial for the future of
the world and avoidance of unnecessary wars (and interventions) such as that in
278 ―Swiss investigators say that up to $15m worth of bribes were made available to the Russian leader[Yeltsin], his family and senior Kremlin officials by a construction company competing for Kremlincontracts. ―, BBC Online, ―Business: The Economy Yeltsin Linked to Bribe Scandal,‖ September 8, 1999,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/441916.stm279 Madeleine Albright. Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Easton Press, 2003), 417-18.
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The UN is another organization that also lost credibility (which was always
questionable) over Yugoslavia and later on in Serbia because it did not do anything to
prevent Albanians from declaring their independence. Actually, many countries in this
organization were very supportive to independence of Kosovo, and the only reason that
Kosovo is not member of UN is Russia. Nevertheless, it would not be a surprise if some
future president of Russia allows membership of Kosovo in UN in return for some
benefits from the west. Especially when one has in mind that the only super-power is
pressuring countries around the world to recognize independence of Kosovo. The most
recent knowing case is Bangladesh. According to the RTS (Radio Television of Serbia),
the USA demanded for the fifth time this year (2009) from Bangladesh to recognize
independence of Kosovo. Even US Ambassador to Bangladesh, James Moriarty, admitted
that he talked about that with secretary and ministry of foreign affairs of Bangladesh.280
However, this poor country still refuses to obey requests of the USA. A journalist of RTS
indicates that the main reason for this refusal is Bangladesh‘s close relations with Russia.
Besides that, it would not be surprise if the reason were fear from separatist movements
in Bangladesh who would see this as their chance to gain independence.
Another problem with the loss of credibility of UN and other international
organizations is the fact that worlds ‗rogue regimes‘ will also learn a lesson and become
more reluctant to peace talks and acceptance of UN resolutions, especially when they see
280 RTS Online, ―Pritisak na Banglades da Prizna Kosovo,‖ November 16, 2009,http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ci/story/1/%D0%A1%D1%80%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0/302081/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BA+%D0%BD%D0%B0+%D0%91%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%88+%D0%B4%D0%B0+%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0+%D0%9A%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE.html
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country that was supplying them with weapons, just like in case of Iraq (while at war
with Iran) and Afghanistan (while at war with Soviets) which were supplied with
weapons by US, and today they use some of those weapons to attack US troops;
obviously someone did not think far and wide.
Clinton in Pristina (Kosovo capital) next to his 11 foot tall statue in 2009 for purpose of ceremonymade in his honor 281
281 Telegraph Online, ―Bill Clinton unveils statue of himself in Kosovo‖, November 1, 2009,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/kosovo/6481057/Bill-Clinton-unveils-statue-of-himself-in-Kosovo.html
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(d) Cooperate fully with OSCE and permit the Kosovo Verification
Mission and its Chief of Mission to continue to carry out their
responsibilities unhindered;
(e) Cooperate fully with the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia as required by relevant Security Council resolutions;
(f) Conduct a full investigation of Racak with the participation of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, allowing the ChiefProsecutor and Tribunal investigators to enter and work in Kosovo to
participate in the investigation of the massacre;
(g) Identify and suspend the Yugoslav Army/Serbian Special Police
officers operating in Racak at the time of the massacre until the
results of the investigation become available;
(h) Mitigate the sentences of those imprisoned in connection with the
conflict and provide due process to all detainees.
6. The Contact Group emphasized that compliance with Security Council
resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) applied equally to
the Kosovo Albanians. It condemned all provocations by the KLA, which
could only fuel the cycle of violence, and insisted that all hostages
should be released. The Contact Group believes that the framework it
has set out meets the legitimate aspirations of the Kosovo Albanians
and demands that their leaders rally behind negotiations to reach a
settlement and end provocative actions which would impede the political
process.
7. The Contact Group asked Robin Cook to travel to Belgrade and
Pristina to transmit these messages to the parties.
S/1999/96
English
Page 4
8. The future of the people of Kosovo is in the hands of leaders in
Belgrade and Kosovo. They must commit themselves now to complete thenegotiations on a political settlement within 21 days to bring peace to
Kosovo. The Contact Group will hold both sides accountable if they fail
to take the opportunity now offered to them, just as the Group stands
ready to work with both sides to realize the benefits for them of a
peaceful solution.282
-----
282 United Nations, Security Council, January 29, 1999, http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/s9996.pdf thisstatement will be also available in the appendix I of this research
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This is a document that could be found on the Department of State Website regarding an
agreement that was proposed to sides in Rambouillet;
The Rambouillet Accords are a 3-year interim agreement that will provide democraticself-government, peace, and security for everyone living in Kosovo.
Democratic self-government will include all matters of daily importance to people inKosovo, including education, health care, and economic development. Kosovo will havea President, an Assembly, its own courts, strong local government, and nationalcommunity institutions with the authority needed to protect each community's identity.
Security will be guaranteed by international troops deployed on the ground throughoutKosovo. Local police, representative of all national communities in Kosovo, will provide
routine law enforcement. Federal and Republic security forces will leave Kosovo, exceptfor a limited border protection presence.
Mechanism for final settlement. An international meeting will be convened after 3years to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo. The will of the peoplewill be an important factor at the international meeting.
DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNMENT
During the interim period, citizens in Kosovo will govern themselves democraticallythrough Kosovo institutions.
Kosovo will have a Constitution. The Constitution calls for the democraticselection of a President, a Prime Minister and Government, an Assembly, andstrong communal authorities. Kosovo will have its own Supreme Court,Constitutional Court, other courts, and prosecutors.Free and fair elections will be held within 9 months of entry into force, under thesupervision of the OSCE.Kosovo will have the authority to make laws not subject to revision by Serbia orthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including levying taxes, instituting programsof economic, scientific, technological, regional, and social development,conducting foreign relations within its areas of responsibility in the same manner
as a Republic, and all matters of local government.Kosovo and its national communities will perform most functions presentlyhandled by the Republic of Serbia. However, citizens in Kosovo will be able tocall upon Republic institutions for assistance, if they wish. The Federal Republicwill not be permitted to act in ways injurious to Kosovo. National communities in Kosovo will be able to control their own identities,including preserving their languages and operating schools and hospitals. Allother authorities are forbidden from interfering.
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Human rights and the rights of the members of all national communities will beguaranteed.The international community will play a role in ensuring that these provisions arecarried out, through a civilian Implementation Mission, an ombudsman andconstitutional court judges selected under international auspices, OSCE
supervision of elections, and an international military presence.
SECURITY
The Parties invite NATO to deploy a military force (KFOR), which will be authorized touse necessary force to ensure compliance with the Accords, protect international agenciesinvolved with implementation, and provide a secure environment for everyone inKosovo.
Security in Kosovo will be handled by KFOR. All other security forces will withdraw or be phased out under the supervision of KFOR, according to a balanced schedule of
reciprocal steps by all sides specified in the Accords.
Yugoslav army forces will withdraw completely from Kosovo, except for alimited border guard force (active only within 5 km. border zone) and associated personnel.Serb security forces will withdraw completely except for limited number of border police and, for a transitional period, a limited number of civil policeofficers who will serve at the direction of the international ImplementationMission until local police are trained to replace them.The Kosovo Liberation Army will hand over security in Kosovo to NATO troopsand will be demilitarized.
Local police will take over all policing duties in Kosovo within 1 year, extendablefor a limited period only by the Chief of the Implementation Mission.
A MECHANISM FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT
Three years after entry into force of the Accords, an international meeting will beconvened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of thewill of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each party's efforts regarding theimplementation of the Accords, and the Helsinki Final Act.283
283 The State Department Online, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html.
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III Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo
The Parties to the present Agreement,
Convinced of the need for a peaceful and political solution in Kosovo as a prerequisite
for stability and democracy,
Determined to establish a peaceful environment in Kosovo,
Reaffirming their commitment to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, aswell as to OSCE principles, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris fora new Europe,
Recalling the commitment of the international community to the sovereignty andterritorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Recalling the basic elements/principles adopted by the Contact Group at its ministerialmeeting in London on January 29, 1999,
Recognizing the need for democratic self-government in Kosovo, including full participation of the members of all national communities in political decision-making,
Desiring to ensure the protection of the human rights of all persons in Kosovo, as well asthe rights of the members of all national communities, Recognizing the ongoingcontribution of the OSCE to peace and stability in Kosovo,
Noting that the present Agreement has been concluded under the auspices of the
members of the Contact Group and the European Union and undertaking with respect tothese members and the European Union to abide by this Agreement,
Aware that full respect for the present Agreement will be central for the development ofrelations with European institutions,
Have agreed as follows:
Framework
Article I: Principles
1. All citizens in Kosovo shall enjoy, without discrimination, the equal rights andfreedoms set forth in this Agreement.
2. National communities and their members shall have additional rights specified inChapter 1. Kosovo, Federal, and Republic authorities shall not interfere with the exerciseof these additional rights. The national communities shall be legally equal as specifiedherein, and shall not use their additional rights to endanger the rights of other national
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communities or the rights of citizens, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, or the functioning of representative democraticgovernment in Kosovo.
3. All authorities in Kosovo shall fully respect human rights, democracy, and the equality
of citizens and national communities.
4. Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to democratic self-government throughlegislative, executive, judicial, and other institutions established in accordance with thisAgreement. They shall have the opportunity to be represented in all institutions inKosovo. The right to democratic self-government shall include the right to participate infree and fair elections.
5. Every person in Kosovo may have access to international institutions for the protectionof their rights in accordance with the procedures of such institutions.
6. The Parties accept that they will act only within their powers and responsibilities inKosovo as specified by this Agreement. Acts outside those powers and responsibilitiesshall be null and void. Kosovo shall have all rights and powers set forth herein, includingin particular as specified in the Constitution at Chapter 1. This Agreement shall prevailover any other legal provisions of the Parties and shall be directly applicable. The Partiesshall harmonize their governing practices and documents with this Agreement.
7. The Parties agree to cooperate fully with all international organizations working inKosovo on the implementation of this Agreement.
Article II: Confidence-Building Measures
End of Use of Force
1. Use of force in Kosovo shall cease immediately. In accordance with this Agreement,alleged violations of the cease-fire shall be reported to international observers and shallnot be used to justify use of force in response.
2. The status of police and security forces in Kosovo, including withdrawal of forces,shall be governed by the terms of this Agreement. Paramilitary and irregular forces inKosovo are incompatible with the terms of this Agreement.
Return
3. The Parties recognize that all persons have the right to return to their homes.Appropriate authorities shall take all measures necessary to facilitate the safe return of persons, including issuing necessary documents. All persons shall have the right toreoccupy their real property, assert their occupancy rights in state-owned property, andrecover their other property and personal possessions. The Parties shall take all measuresnecessary to readmit returning persons to Kosovo.
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4. The Parties shall cooperate fully with all efforts by the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international and non-governmentalorganizations concerning the repatriation and return of persons, including thoseorganizations monitoring of the treatment of persons following their return.
Access for International Assistance
5. There shall be no impediments to the normal flow of goods into Kosovo, includingmaterials for the reconstruction of homes and structures. The Federal Republic ofYugoslavia shall not require visas, customs, or licensing for persons or things for theImplementation Mission (IM), the UNHCR, and other international organizations, as wellas for non- governmental organizations working in Kosovo as determined by the Chief ofthe Implementation Mission (CIM).
6. All staff, whether national or international, working with international or non-governmental organizations including with the Yugoslav Red Cross, shall be allowed
unrestricted access to the Kosovo population for purposes of international assistance. All persons in Kosovo shall similarly have safe, unhindered, and direct access to the staff ofsuch organizations.
Other Issues
7. Federal organs shall not take any decisions that have a differential, disproportionate,injurious, or discriminatory effect on Kosovo. Such decisions, if any, shall be void withregard to Kosovo.
8. Martial law shall not be declared in Kosovo.
9. The Parties shall immediately comply with all requests for support from theImplementation Mission (IM). The IM shall have its own broadcast frequencies for radioand television programming in Kosovo. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall provide all necessary facilities, including frequencies for radio communications, to allhumanitarian organizations responsible for delivering aid in Kosovo.
Detention of Combatants and Justice Issues
10. All abducted persons or other persons held without charge shall be released. TheParties shall also release and transfer in accordance with this Agreement all persons held
in connection with the conflict. The Parties shall cooperate fully with the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to facilitate its work in accordance with its mandate,including ensuring full access to all such persons, irrespective of their status, whereverthey might be held, for visits in accordance with the ICRC's standard operating procedures.
11. The Parties shall provide information, through tracing mechanisms of the ICRC, tofamilies of all persons who are unaccounted for. The Parties shall cooperate fully with the
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ICRC and the International Commission on Missing Persons in their efforts to determinethe identity, whereabouts, and fate of those unaccounted for.
12. Each Party:
(a) shall not prosecute anyone for crimes related to the conflict in Kosovo, except for persons accused of having committed serious violations of international humanitarianlaw. In order to facilitate transparency, the Parties shall grant access to foreign experts(including forensics experts) along with state investigators;
(b) shall grant a general amnesty for all persons already convicted of committing politically motivated crimes related to the conflict in Kosovo. This amnesty shall notapply to those properly convicted of committing serious violations of internationalhumanitarian law at a fair and open trial conducted pursuant to international standards.
13. All Parties shall comply with their obligation to cooperate in the investigation and
prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
(a) As required by United Nations Security Council resolution 827 (1993) and subsequentresolutions, the Parties shall fully cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal forthe Former Yugoslavia in its investigations and prosecutions, including complying withits requests for assistance and its orders.
(b) The Parties shall also allow complete, unimpeded, and unfettered access tointernational experts- including forensics experts and investigators to investigateallegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Independent Media
14. Recognizing the importance of free and independent media for the development of ademocratic political climate necessary for the reconstruction and development of Kosovo,the Parties shall ensure the widest possible press freedoms in Kosovo in all media, publicand private, including print, television, radio, and Internet.
Chapter 1
Constitution
Affirming their belief in a peaceful society, justice, tolerance, and reconciliation,
Resolved to ensure respect for human rights and the equality of all citizens and nationalcommunities,
Recognizing that the preservation and promotion of the national, cultural, and linguisticidentity of each national community in Kosovo are necessary for the harmoniousdevelopment of a peaceful society,
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Desiring through this interim Constitution to establish institutions of democratic self-government in Kosovo grounded in respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty ofthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and from this Agreement, from which the authoritiesof governance set forth herein originate,
Recognizing that the institutions of Kosovo should fairly represent the nationalcommunities in Kosovo and foster the exercise of their rights and those of their members,
Recalling and endorsing the principles/basic elements adopted by the Contact Group at itsministerial meeting in London on January 29, 1999,
Article I: Principles of Democratic Self-Government in Kosovo
1. Kosovo shall govern itself democratically through the legislative, executive, judicial,and other organs and institutions specified herein. Organs and institutions of Kosovoshall exercise their authorities consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
2. All authorities in Kosovo shall fully respect human rights, democracy, and the equalityof citizens and national communities.
3. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has competence in Kosovo over the followingareas, except as specified elsewhere in this Agreement: (a) territorial integrity, (b)maintaining a common market within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which powershall be exercised in a manner that does not discriminate against Kosovo, (c) monetary policy, (d) defense, (e) foreign policy, (f) customs services, (g) federal taxation, (h)federal elections, and (i) other areas specified in this Agreement.
4. The Republic of Serbia shall have competence in Kosovo as specified in thisAgreement, including in relation to Republic elections.
5. Citizens in Kosovo may continue to participate in areas in which the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia have competence through their representationin relevant institutions, without prejudice to the exercise of competence by Kosovoauthorities set forth in this Agreement.
6. With respect to Kosovo:
(a) There shall be no changes to the borders of Kosovo;
(b) Deployment and use of police and security forces shall be governed by Chapters 2and 7 of this Agreement; and
(c) Kosovo shall have authority to conduct foreign relations within its areas ofresponsibility equivalent to the power provided to Republics under Article 7 of theConstitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
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7. There shall be no interference with the right of citizens and national communities inKosovo to call upon appropriate institutions of the Republic of Serbia for the following purposes:
(a) assistance in designing school curricula and standards;
(b) participation in social benefits programs, such as care for war veterans, pensioners,and disabled persons; and
(c) other voluntarily received services, provided that these services are not related to police and security matters governed by Chapters 2 and 7 of this Agreement, and that anyRepublic personnel serving in Kosovo pursuant to this paragraph shall be unarmedservice providers acting at the invitation of a national community in Kosovo.
The Republic shall have the authority to levy taxes or charges on those citizensrequesting services pursuant to this paragraph, as necessary to support the provision of
such services.
8. The basic territorial unit of local self-government in Kosovo shall be the commune. Allresponsibilities in Kosovo not expressly assigned elsewhere shall be the responsibility ofthe communes.
9. To preserve and promote democratic self-government in Kosovo, all candidates forappointed, elective, or other public office, and all office holders, shall meet the followingcriteria:
(a) No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal andwho has failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal, may stand as acandidate or hold any office; and
(b) All candidates and office holders shall renounce violence as a mechanism forachieving political goals; past political or resistance activities shall not be a bar to holdingoffice in Kosovo.
Article II: The Assembly
General
1. Kosovo shall have an Assembly, which shall be comprised of 120 Members.
(a) Eighty Members shall be directly elected.
(b) A further 40 Members shall be elected by the members of qualifying nationalcommunities.
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(i) Communities whose members constitute more than 0.5 per cent of the Kosovo population but less than 5 per cent shall have ten of these seats, to be divided among themin accordance with their proportion of the overall population.
(ii) Communities whose members constitute more than 5 per cent of the Kosovo
population shall divide the remaining thirty seats equally. The Serb and Albanian nationalcommunities shall be presumed to meet the 5 per cent population threshold.
Other Provisions
2. Elections for all Members shall be conducted democratically, consistent with the provisions of Chapter 3 of this Agreement. Members shall be elected for a term of threeyears.
3. Allocation of seats in the Assembly shall be based on data gathered in the censusreferred to in Chapter 5 of this Agreement. Prior to the completion of the census, for
purposes of this Article declarations of national community membership made duringvoter registration shall be used to determine the percentage of the Kosovo population thateach national community represents.
4. Members of the Assembly shall be immune from all civil or criminal proceedings onthe basis of words expressed or other acts performed in their capacity as Members of theAssembly.
Powers of the Assembly
5. The Assembly shall be responsible for enacting laws of Kosovo, including in political,
security, economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural areas as set out below andelsewhere in this Agreement. This Constitution and the laws of the Kosovo Assemblyshall not be subject to change or modification by authorities of the Republics or theFederation.
(a) The Assembly shall be responsible for:
(i) Financing activities of Kosovo institutions, including by levying taxes and duties onsources within Kosovo;
(ii) Adopting budgets of the Administrative organs and other institutions of Kosovo, with
the exception of communal and national community institutions unless otherwisespecified herein;
(iii) Adopting regulations concerning the organization and procedures of theAdministrative Organs of Kosovo;
(iv) Approving the list of Ministers of the Government, including the Prime Minister;
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(v) Coordinating educational arrangements in Kosovo, with respect for the authorities ofnational communities and Communes;
(vi) Electing candidates for judicial office put forward by the President of Kosovo;
(vii) Enacting laws ensuring free movement of goods, services, and persons in Kosovoconsistent with this Agreement;
(viii) Approving agreements concluded by the President within the areas of responsibilityof Kosovo;
(ix) Cooperating with the Federal Assembly, and with the Assemblies of the Republics,and conducting relations with foreign legislative bodies;
(x) Establishing a framework for local self- government;
(xi) Enacting laws concerning inter-communal issues and relations between nationalcommunities, when necessary;
(xii) Enacting laws regulating the work of medical institutions and hospitals;
(xiii) Protecting the environment, where inter- communal issues are involved;
(xiv) Adopting programs of economic, scientific, technological, demographic, regional,and social development, as well as urban planning;
(xv) Adopting programs for the development of agriculture and of rural areas;
(xvi) Regulating elections consistent with Chapters 3 and 5;
(xvii) Regulating Kosovo-owned property; and
(xviii) Regulating land registries.
(b) The Assembly shall also have authority to enact laws in areas within the responsibilityof the Communes if the matter cannot be effectively regulated by the Communes or ifregulation by individual Communes might prejudice the rights of other Communes. In theabsence of a law enacted by the Assembly under this subparagraph that preempts
communal action, the Communes shall retain their authority.
Procedure
6. Laws and other decisions of the Assembly shall be adopted by majority of Members present and voting.
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7. A majority of the Members of a single national community elected to the Assembly pursuant to paragraph 1(b) may adopt a motion that a law or other decision adverselyaffects the vital interests of their national community. The challenged law or decisionshall be suspended with regard to that national community until the dispute settlement procedure in paragraph 8 is completed.
8. The following procedure shall be used in the event of a motion under paragraph 7:
(a) The Members making the vital interest motion shall give reasons for their motion. The proposers of the legislation shall be given an opportunity to respond.
(b) The Members making the motion shall appoint within one day a mediator of theirchoice to assist in reaching an agreement with those proposing the legislation.
(c) If mediation does not produce an agreement within seven days, the matter may besubmitted for a binding ruling. The decision shall be rendered by a panel comprising
three Members of the Assembly: one Albanian and one Serb, each appointed by his or hernational community delegation; and a third Member, who will be of a third nationalityand will be selected within two days by consensus of the Presidency of the Assembly.
(i) A vital interest motion shall be upheld if the legislation challenged adversely affectsthe community's fundamental constitutional rights, additional rights as set forth in ArticleVII, or the principle of fair treatment.
(ii) If the motion is not upheld, the challenged legislation shall enter into force for thatcommunity.
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply to the selection of Assembly officials.
(e) The Assembly may exclude other decisions from this procedure by means of a lawenacted by a majority that includes a majority of each national community elected pursuant to paragraph 1(b).
9. A majority of the Members shall constitute a quorum. The Assembly shall otherwisedecide its own rules of procedure.
Leadership
10. The Assembly shall elect from among its Members a Presidency, which shall consistof a President, two Vice-Presidents, and other leaders in accordance with the Assembly'srules of procedure. Each national community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph 1(b)(ii) shall be represented in the leadership. The President of the Assemblyshall not be from the same national community as the President of Kosovo.
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11. The President of the Assembly shall represent it, call its sessions to order, chair itsmeetings, coordinate the work of any committees it may establish, and perform othertasks prescribed by the rules of procedure of the Assembly.
Article III: President of Kosovo
1. There shall be a President of Kosovo, who shall be elected by the Assembly by vote ofa majority of its Members. The President of Kosovo shall serve for a three-year term. No person may serve more than two terms as President of Kosovo.
2. The President of Kosovo shall be responsible for:
(i) Representing Kosovo, including before any international or Federal body or any bodyof the Republics;
(ii) Proposing to the Assembly candidates for Prime Minister, the Constitutional Court,
the Supreme Court, and other Kosovo judicial offices;
(iii) Meeting regularly with the democratically elected representatives of the nationalcommunities;
(iv) Conducting foreign relations and concluding agreements within this power consistentwith the authorities of Kosovo institutions under this Agreement. Such agreements shallonly enter into force upon approval by the Assembly;
(v) Designating a representative to serve on the Joint Commission established by ArticleI.2 of Chapter 5 of this Agreement;
(vi) Meeting regularly with the Federal and Republic Presidents; and
(vii) Other functions specified herein or by law.
Article IV: Government and Administrative Organs
1. Executive power shall be exercised by the Government. The Government shall beresponsible for implementing the laws of Kosovo, and of other government authoritieswhen such responsibilities are devolved by those authorities. The Government shall alsohave competence to propose laws to the Assembly.
(a) The Government shall consist of a Prime Minister and Ministers, including at leastone person from each national community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph1(b)(ii) of Article II. Ministers shall head the Administrative Organs of Kosovo.
(b) The candidate for Prime Minister proposed by the President shall put forward a list ofMinisters to the Assembly. The Prime Minister, together with the list of Ministers, shall be approved by a majority of those present and voting in the Assembly. In the event that
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the Prime Minister is not able to obtain a majority for the Government, the President shall propose a new candidate for Prime Minister within ten days.
(c) The Government shall resign if a no confidence motion is adopted by a vote of amajority of the members of the Assembly. If the Prime Minister or the Government
resigns, the President shall select a new candidate for Prime Minister who shall seek toform a Government.
(d) The Prime Minister shall call meetings of the Government, represent it as appropriate,and coordinate its work. Decisions of the Government shall require a majority ofMinisters present and voting. The Prime Minister shall cast the deciding vote in the eventMinisters are equally divided. The Government shall otherwise decide its own rules of procedure.
2. Administrative Organs shall be responsible for assisting the Government in carryingout its duties.
(a) National communities shall be fairly represented at all levels in the AdministrativeOrgans.
(b) Any citizen in Kosovo claiming to have been directly and adversely affected by thedecision of an executive or administrative body shall have the right to judicial review ofthe legality of that decision after exhausting all avenues for administrative review. TheAssembly shall enact a law to regulate this review.
3. There shall be a Chief Prosecutor who shall be responsible for prosecuting individualswho violate the criminal laws of Kosovo. He shall head an Office of the Prosecutor,
which shall at all levels have staff representative of the population of Kosovo.
Article V: Judiciary
General
1. Kosovo shall have a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court, District Courts, andCommunal Courts.
2. The Kosovo courts shall have jurisdiction over all matters arising under thisConstitution or the laws of Kosovo except as specified in paragraph 3. The Kosovo courts
shall also have jurisdiction over questions of federal law, subject to appeal to the Federalcourts on these questions after all appeals available under the Kosovo system have beenexhausted.
3. Citizens in Kosovo may opt to have civil disputes to which they are party adjudicated by other courts in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which shall apply the lawapplicable in Kosovo.
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4. The following rules will apply to criminal cases:
(a) At the start of criminal proceedings, the defendant is entitled to have his or her trialtransferred to another Kosovo court that he or she designates.
(b) In criminal cases in which all defendants and victims are members of the samenational community, all members of the judicial council will be from a nationalcommunity of their choice if any party so requests.
(c) A defendant in a criminal case tried in Kosovo courts is entitled to have at least onemember of the judicial council hearing the case to be from his or her national community.Kosovo authorities will consider and allow judges of other courts in the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia to serve as Kosovo judges for these purposes.
Constitutional Court
5. The Constitutional Court shall consist of nine judges. There shall be at least oneConstitutional Court judge from each national community meeting the threshold specifiedin paragraph 1(b)(ii) of Article II. Until such time as the Parties agree to discontinue thisarrangement, 5 judges of the Constitutional Court shall be selected from a list drawn up by the President of the European Court of Human Rights.
6. The Constitutional Court shall have authority to resolve disputes relating to themeaning of this Constitution. That authority shall include, but is not limited to,determining whether laws applicable in Kosovo, decisions or acts of the President, theAssembly, the Government, the Communes, and the national communities are compatiblewith this Constitution.
(a) Matters may be referred to the Constitutional Court by the President of Kosovo, thePresident or Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, the Ombudsman, the communalassemblies and councils, and any national community acting according to its democratic procedures.
(b) Any court which finds in the course of adjudicating a matter that the dispute dependson the answer to a question within the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction shall refer theissue to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary decision.
7. Following the exhaustion of other legal remedies, the Constitutional Court shall at the
request of any person claiming to be a victim have jurisdiction over complaints thathuman rights and fundamental freedoms and the rights of members of nationalcommunities set forth in this Constitution have been violated by a public authority.
8. The Constitutional Court shall have such other jurisdiction as may be specifiedelsewhere in this Agreement or by law.
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9. The Supreme Court shall consist of nine judges. There shall be at least one SupremeCourt judge from each national community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph1(b)(ii) of Article II.
10. The Supreme Court shall hear appeals from the District Courts and the CommunalCourts. Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall be thecourt of final appeal for all cases arising under law applicable in Kosovo. Its decisionsshall be recognized and executed by all authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Functioning of the Courts
11. The Assembly shall determine the number of District and Communal Court judgesnecessary to meet current needs.
12. Judges of all courts in Kosovo shall be distinguished jurists of the highest moralcharacter. They shall be broadly representative of the national communities of Kosovo.
13. Removal of a Kosovo judge shall require the consensus of the judges of theConstitutional Court. A Constitutional Court judge whose removal is in question shall not participate in the decision on his case.
14. The Constitutional Court shall adopt rules for itself and for other courts in Kosovo.The Constitutional and Supreme Courts shall each adopt decisions by majority vote oftheir members.
15. Except as otherwise specified in their rules, all Kosovo courts shall hold public proceedings. They shall issue published opinions setting forth the reasons for theirdecisions.
Article VI: Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
1. All authorities in Kosovo shall ensure internationally recognized human rights andfundamental freedoms.
2. The rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in
Kosovo. Other internationally recognized human rights instruments enacted into law bythe Kosovo Assembly shall also apply. These rights and freedoms shall have priority overall other law.
3. All courts, agencies, governmental institutions, and other public institutions of Kosovoor operating in relation to Kosovo shall conform to these human rights and fundamentalfreedoms.
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1. National communities and their members shall have additional rights as set forth belowin order to preserve and express their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic identitiesin accordance with international standards and the Helsinki Final Act. Such rights shall
be exercised in conformity with human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. Each national community may elect, through democratic means and in a mannerconsistent with the principles of Chapter 3 of this Agreement, institutions to administerits affairs in Kosovo.
3. The national communities shall be subject to the laws applicable in Kosovo, providedthat any act or decision concerning national communities must be non- discriminatory.The Assembly shall decide upon a procedure for resolving disputes between nationalcommunities.
4. The additional rights of the national communities, acting through their democraticallyelected institutions, are to:
(a) preserve and protect their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities,including by:
(i) inscribing local names of towns and villages, of squares and streets, and of othertopographic names in the language and alphabet of the national community in addition tosigns in Albanian and Serbian, consistent with decisions about style made by thecommunal institutions;
(ii) providing information in the language and alphabet of the national community;
(iii) providing for education and establishing educational institutions, in particular forschooling in their own language and alphabet and in national culture and history, forwhich relevant authorities will provide financial assistance; curricula shall reflect a spiritof tolerance between national communities and respect for the rights of members of allnational communities in accordance with international standards;
(iv) enjoying unhindered contacts with representatives of their respective nationalcommunities, within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and abroad;
(v) using and displaying national symbols, including symbols of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia;
(vi) protecting national traditions on family law by, if the community decides, arrangingrules in the field of inheritance; family and matrimonial relations; tutorship; andadoption;
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(vii) the preservation of sites of religious, historical, or cultural importance to the nationalcommunity in cooperation with other authorities;
(viii) implementing public health and social services on a non-discriminatory basis as tocitizens and national communities;
(ix) operating religious institutions in cooperation with religious authorities; and
(x) participating in regional and international non-governmental organizations inaccordance with procedures of these organizations;
(b) be guaranteed access to, and representation in, public broadcast media, including provisions for separate programming in relevant languages under the direction of thosenominated by the respective national community on a fair and equitable basis; and
(c) finance their activities by collecting contributions the national communities may
decide to levy on members of their own communities.
5. Members of national communities shall also be individually guaranteed:
(a) the right to enjoy unhindered contacts with members of their respective nationalcommunities elsewhere in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and abroad;
(b) equal access to employment in public services at all levels;
(c) the right to use their languages and alphabets;
(d) the right to use and display national community symbols;
(e) the right to participate in democratic institutions that will determine the nationalcommunity's exercise of the collective rights set forth in this Article; and
(f) the right to establish cultural and religious associations, for which relevant authoritieswill provide financial assistance.
6. Each national community and, where appropriate, their members acting individuallymay exercise these additional rights through Federal institutions and institutions of theRepublics, in accordance with the procedures of those institutions and without prejudice
to the ability of Kosovo institutions to carry out their responsibilities.
7. Every person shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as belonging to a national community, and no disadvantage shall result from that choice orfrom the exercise of the rights connected to that choice.
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1. Kosovo shall have the existing communes. Changes may be made to communal boundaries by act of the Kosovo Assembly after consultation with the authorities of thecommunes concerned.
2. Communes may develop relationships among themselves for their mutual benefit.
3. Each commune shall have an Assembly, an Executive Council, and suchadministrative bodies as the commune may establish.
(a) Each national community whose membership constitutes at least three percent of the population of the commune shall be represented on the Council in proportion to its shareof the communal population or by one member, whichever is greater.
(b) Prior to the completion of a census, disputes over communal population percentages
for purposes of this paragraph shall be resolved by reference to declarations of nationalcommunity membership in the voter registry.
4. The communes shall have responsibility for:
(a) law enforcement, as specified in Chapter 2 of this Agreement;
(b) regulating and, when appropriate, providing child care;
(c) providing education, consistent with the rights and duties of national communities,and in a spirit of tolerance between national communities and respect for the rights of the
members of all national communities in accordance with international standards;
(d) protecting the communal environment;
(e) regulating commerce and privately-owned stores;
(f) regulating hunting and fishing;
(g) planning and carrying out public works of communal importance, including roads andwater supplies, and participating in the planning and carrying out of Kosovo-wide publicworks projects in coordination with other communes and Kosovo authorities;
(h) regulating land use, town planning, building regulations, and housing construction;
(i) developing programs for tourism, the hotel industry, catering, and sport;
(j) organizing fairs and local markets;
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(k) organizing public services of communal importance, including fire, emergencyresponse, and police consistent with Chapter 2 of this Agreement; and
(l) financing the work of communal institutions, including raising revenues, taxes, and preparing budgets.
5. The communes shall also have responsibility for all other areas within Kosovo'sauthority not expressly assigned elsewhere herein, subject to the provisions of ArticleII.5(b) of this Constitution.
6. Each commune shall conduct its business in public and shall maintain publiclyavailable records of its deliberations and decisions.
Article IX: Representation
1. Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to participate in the election of:
(a) At least 10 deputies in the House of Citizens of the Federal Assembly; and
(b) At least 20 deputies in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.
2. The modalities of elections for the deputies specified in paragraph 1 shall bedetermined by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbiarespectively, under procedures to be agreed with the Chief of the ImplementationMission.
3. The Assembly shall have the opportunity to present to the appropriate authorities a list
of candidates from which shall be drawn:
(a) At least one citizen in Kosovo to serve in the Federal Government, and at least onecitizen in Kosovo to serve in the Government of the Republic of Serbia; and
(b) At least one judge on the Federal Constitutional Court, one judge on the FederalCourt, and three judges on the Supreme Court of Serbia.
Article X: Amendment
1. The Assembly may by a majority of two-thirds of its Members, which majority must
include a majority of the Members elected from each national community pursuant toArticle II.1(b)(ii), adopt amendments to this Constitution.
2. There shall, however, be no amendments to Article I.3-8 or to this Article, nor shallany amendment diminish the rights granted by Articles VI and VII.
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This Constitution shall enter into force upon signature of this Agreement.
Chapter 2
Police and Civil Public Security Article I: General Principles
1. All law enforcement agencies, organizations and personnel of the Parties, which for purposes of this Chapter will include customs and border police operating in Kosovo,shall act in compliance with this Agreement and shall observe internationally recognizedstandards of human rights and due process. In exercising their functions, law enforcement personnel shall not discriminate on any ground, such as sex, race, color, language,religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a nationalcommunity, property, birth or other status.
2. The Parties invite the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)through its Implementation Mission (IM) to monitor and supervise implementation of thisChapter and related provisions of this Agreement. The Chief of the ImplementationMission (CIM) or his designee shall have the authority to issue binding directives to theParties and subsidiary bodies on police and civil public security matters to obtaincompliance by the Parties with the terms of this Chapter. The Parties agree to cooperatefully with the IM and to comply with its directives. Personnel assigned to police-relatedduties within the IM shall be permitted to wear a uniform while serving in this part of themission.
3. In carrying out his responsibilities, the CIM will inform and consult KFOR asappropriate.
4. The IM shall have the authority to:
(a) Monitor, observe, and inspect law enforcement activities, personnel, and facilities,including border police and customs units, as well as associated judicial organizations,structures, and proceedings;
(b) Advise law enforcement personnel and forces, including border police and customsunits, and, when necessary to bring them into compliance with this Agreement, including
this Chapter, issue appropriate binding directions in coordination with KFOR;
(c) Participate in and guide the training of law enforcement personnel;
(d) In coordination with KFOR, assess threats to public order;
(e) Advise and provide guidance to governmental authorities on how to deal with threatsto public order and on the organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies;
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(f) Accompany the Parties' law enforcement personnel as they carry out theirresponsibilities, as the IM deems appropriate;
(g) Dismiss or discipline public security personnel of the Parties for cause; and
(h) Request appropriate law enforcement support from the international community toenable IM to carry out the duties assigned in this Chapter.
5. All Kosovo, Republic and Federal law enforcement and Federal military authoritiesshall be obligated, in their respective areas of authority, to ensure freedom of movementand safe passage for all persons, vehicles and goods. This obligation includes a duty to permit the unobstructed passage into Kosovo of police equipment which has beenapproved by the CIM and COMKFOR for use by Kosovo police, and of any othersupport provided under subparagraph 4(h) above.
6. The Parties undertake to provide one another mutual assistance, when requested, in the
surrender of those accused of committing criminal acts within a Party's jurisdiction, andin the investigation and prosecution of offenses across the boundary of Kosovo with other parts of the FRY. The Parties shall develop agreed procedures and mechanisms forresponding to these requests. The CIM or his designee shall resolve disputes on thesematters.
7. The IM shall aim to transfer law enforcement responsibilities described in Article II below to the law enforcement officials and organizations described in Article II at theearliest practical time consistent with civil public security.
Article II: Communal Police
1. As they build up, communal police units, organized and stationed at the communal andmunicipal levels, shall assume primary responsibility for law enforcement in Kosovo.The specific responsibilities of the communal police will include police patrols and crime prevention, criminal investigations, arrest and detention of criminal suspects, crowdcontrol, and traffic control.
2. Number and Composition. The total number of communal police established by thisAgreement operating within Kosovo shall not exceed 3,000 active duty law enforcementofficers. However, the CIM shall have the authority to increase or decrease this personnelceiling if he determines such action is necessary to meet operational needs. Prior to
taking any such action, the CIM shall consult with the Criminal Justice Administrationand other officials as appropriate. The national communities in each commune shall befairly represented in the communal police unit.
3. Criminal Justice Administration.
a. A Criminal Justice Administration (CJA) shall be established. It shall be anAdministrative Organ of Kosovo, reporting to an appropriate member of the Government
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of Kosovo as determined by the Government. The CJA shall provide generalcoordination of law enforcement operations in Kosovo. Specific functions of the CJAshall include general supervision over, and providing guidance to, communal policeforces through their commanders, assisting in the coordination between separatecommunal police forces, and oversight of the operations of the police academy. In
carrying out these responsibilities, the CJA may issue directives, which shall be bindingon communal police commanders and personnel. In the exercise of its functions, the CJAshall be subject to any directions given by CIM.
b. Within twelve months of the establishment of the CJA, the CJA shall submit forreview by the CIM a plan for the coordination and development of law enforcement bodies and personnel in Kosovo within its jurisdiction. This plan shall serve as theframework for law enforcement coordination and development in Kosovo and be subjectto modification by the CIM.
c. The IM will endeavor to develop the capacities of the CJA as quickly as possible. Prior
to the point when the CJA is able to properly carry out the functions described in the preceding paragraph, as determined by the CIM, the IM shall carry out these functions.
4. Communal Commanders. Subject to review by the CIM, each commune will appoint,and may remove for cause, by majority vote of the communal council, a communal policecommander with responsibility for police operations within the commune.
5. Service in Police.
(a) Recruitment for public security personnel will be conducted primarily at the locallevel. Local and communal governments, upon consultation with communal Criminal
Justice Commissions, will nominate officer candidates to attend the Kosovo PoliceAcademy. Offers of employment will be made by communal police commanders, withthe concurrence of the academy director, only after the candidate has successfullycompleted the academy basic recruit course.
(b) Recruitment, selection and training of communal police officers shall be conductedunder the direction of the IM during the period of its operation.
(c) There shall be no bar to service in the communal police based on prior politicalactivities. Members of the police shall not, however, be permitted while they hold this public office to participate in party political activities other than membership in such a
party.
(d) Continued service in the police is dependent upon behavior consistent with the termsof this Agreement, including this Chapter. The IM shall supervise regular reviews ofofficer performance, which shall be conducted in accordance with international due process norms.
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(a) All communal police officers, with the exception of officers participating in crowdcontrol functions, shall wear a standard uniform. Uniforms shall include a badge, pictureidentification, and name tag.
(b) Communal police officers may be equipped with a sidearm, handcuffs, a baton, and aradio.
(c) Subject to authorization or modification by the CIM, each commune may maintain,either at the communal headquarters or at municipal stations, no more than one long- barreled weapon not to exceed 7.62 mm for every fifteen police officers assigned to thecommune. Each such weapon must be approved by and registered with the IM and KFOR pursuant to procedures established by the CIM and COMKFOR. When not in use, allsuch weapons will be securely stored and each commune will keep a registry of theseweapons.
(i) In the event of a serious law enforcement threat that would justify the use of theseweapons, the communal police commander shall obtain IM approval before employingthese weapons.
(ii) The communal police commander may authorize the use of these weapons without prior approval of the IM for the sole purpose of self-defense. In such cases, he mustreport the incident no later than one hour after it occurs to the IM and KFOR.
(iii) If the CIM determines that a weapon has been used by a member of a communal police force in a manner contrary to this Chapter, he may take appropriate corrective
measures; such measures may include reducing the number of such weapons that thecommunal police force is allowed to possess or dismissing or disciplining the lawenforcement personnel involved.
(d) Communal police officers engaged in crowd control functions will receive equipmentappropriate to their task, including batons, helmets and shields, subject to IM approval.
Article III: Interim Police Academy
1. Under the supervision of the IM, the CJA shall establish an interim Police Academythat will offer mandatory and professional development training for all public security
personnel, including border police. Until the interim police academy is established, IMwill oversee a temporary training program for public security personnel including border police.
2. All public security personnel shall be required to complete a course of police studiessuccessfully before serving as communal police officers.
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3. The Academy shall be headed by a Director appointed and removed by the CJA inconsultation with the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission and the IM. The Directorshall consult closely with the IM and comply fully with its recommendations andguidance.
4. All Republic and Federal police training facilities in Kosovo, including the academy atVucitrn, will cease operations within 6 months of the entry into force of this Agreement.
Article IV: Criminal Justice Commissions
1. The parties shall establish a Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission and CommunalCriminal Justice Commissions. The CIM or his designee shall chair meetings of theseCommissions. They shall be forums for cooperation, coordination and the resolution ofdisputes concerning law enforcement and civil public security in Kosovo.
2. The functions of the Commissions shall include the following:
(a) Monitor, review, and make recommendations regarding the operation of lawenforcement personnel and policies in Kosovo, including communal police units;
(b) Review, and make recommendations regarding the recruitment, selection and trainingof communal police officers and commanders;
(c) Consider complaints regarding police practices filed by individuals or nationalcommunities, and provide information and recommendations to communal policecommanders and the CIM for consideration in their reviews of officer performance; and
(d) In the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission only: In consultation with designatedlocal, Republic and Federal police liaisons, monitor jurisdiction sharing in cases ofoverlapping criminal jurisdiction between Kosovo, Republic and Federal authorities.
3. The membership of the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission and each CommunalCriminal Justice Commission shall be representative of the population and shall include:
(a) In the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission:
(i) a representative of each commune;
(ii) the head of the Kosovo CJA;
(iii) a representative of each Republic and Federal law enforcement component operatingin Kosovo (for example, Customs police and Border police);
(iv) a representative of each national community;
(v) a representative of the IM, during its period of operation in Kosovo;
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(vi) a representative of the VJ border guard, as appropriate;
(vii) a representative of the MUP, as appropriate, while present in Kosovo; and
(viii) A representative of KFOR, as appropriate. (b) In the Communal Criminal Justice
Commissions:
(i) the communal police commander;
(ii) a representative of any Republic and Federal law enforcement component operatingin the commune;
(iii) a representative of each national community;
(iv) a civilian representative of the communal government;
(v) a representative of the IM, during its period of operation in Kosovo;
(vi) a representative of the VJ border guard, who shall have observer status, asappropriate; and
(vii) A representative of KFOR, as appropriate.
4. Each Criminal Justice Commission shall meet at least monthly, or at the request of anyCommission member.
Article V: Police Operations in Kosovo
1. The communal police established by this Agreement shall have exclusive lawenforcement authority and jurisdiction and shall be the only police presence in Kosovofollowing the reduction and eventual withdrawal from Kosovo by the MUP, with theexception of border police as specified in Article VI and any support provided pursuant toArticle I(3)(h).
(a) During the transition to communal police, the remaining MUP shall carry out onlynormal policing duties, and shall draw down, pursuant to the schedule described inChapter 7.
(b) During the period of the phased drawdown of the MUP, the MUP in Kosovo shallhave authority to conduct only civil police functions and shall be under the supervisionand control of the CIM. The IM may dismiss from service, or take other appropriatedisciplinary action against, MUP personnel who obstruct implementation of thisAgreement.
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(a) Except as provided in Article V.1 and Article VI, Federal and Republic lawenforcement officials may only act within Kosovo in cases of hot pursuit of a personsuspected of committing a serious criminal offense.
(i) Federal and Republic authorities shall as soon as practicable, but in no event later thanone hour after their entry into Kosovo while engaged in a hot pursuit, notify the nearestKosovo law enforcement officials that the pursuit has crossed into Kosovo. Oncenotification has been made, further pursuit and apprehension shall be coordinated withKosovo law enforcement. Following apprehension, suspects shall be placed into thecustody of the authorities originating the pursuit. If the suspect has not been apprehendedwithin four hours, the original pursuing authorities shall cease their pursuit andimmediately depart Kosovo unless invited to continue their pursuit by the CJA or theCIM.
(ii) In the event the pursuit is of such short duration as to preclude notification, Kosovolaw enforcement officials shall be notified that an apprehension has been made and shall be given access to the detainee prior to his removal from Kosovo.
(iii) Personnel engaged in hot pursuit under the provisions of this Article may only becivilian police, may only carry weapons appropriate for normal civilian police duties(sidearms, and long-barreled weapons not to exceed 7.62mm), may only travel inofficially marked police vehicles, and may not exceed a total of eight personnel at anyone time. Travel in armored personnel carriers by police engaged in hot pursuit is strictly prohibited.
(iv) The same rules shall apply to hot pursuit of suspects by Kosovo law enforcementauthorities to Federal territory outside of Kosovo.
(b) All Parties shall provide the highest degree of mutual assistance in law enforcementmatters in response to reasonable requests.
Article VI: Security on International Borders
1. The Government of the FRY will maintain official border crossings on its international borders (Albania and FYROM).
2. Personnel from the organizations listed below may be present along Kosovo'sinternational borders and at international border crossings, and may not act outside thescope of the authorities specified in this Chapter.
(a) Republic of Serbia Border Police
(i) The Border Police shall continue to exercise authority at Kosovo's international bordercrossings and in connection with the enforcement of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
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immigration laws. The total number of border police shall be drawn down to 75 within 14days of entry into force of this Agreement.
(ii) While maintaining the personnel threshold specified in subparagraph (i), the ranks ofthe existing Border Police units operating in Kosovo shall be supplemented by new
recruits so that they are representative of the Kosovo population.
(iii) All Border Police stationed in Kosovo must attend police training at the Kosovo police academy within 18 months of the entry into force of this Agreement.
(b) Customs Officers
(i) The FRY Customs Service will continue to exercise customs jurisdiction at Kosovo'sofficial international border crossings and in such customs warehouses as may benecessary within Kosovo. The total number of customs personnel shall be drawn down to50 within 14 days of the entry into force of this Agreement.
(ii) Kosovar Albanian officers of the Customs Service shall be trained and compensated by the FRY.
(c) The CIM shall conduct a periodic review of customs and border police requirementsand shall have the authority to increase or decrease the personnel ceilings described in paragraphs (a)(i) and (b)(i) above to reflect operational needs and to adjust thecomposition of individual customs units.
Article VII: Arrest and Detention
1. Except pursuant to Article V, Article I(3)(h), and sections (a)-(b) of this paragraph,only officers of the communal police shall have authority to arrest and detain individualsin Kosovo. (a) Border Police officers shall have authority within Kosovo to arrest anddetain individuals who have violated criminal provisions of the immigration laws.
(b) Officers of the Customs Service shall have authority within Kosovo to arrest anddetain individuals for criminal violations of the customs laws.
2. Immediately upon making an arrest, the arresting officer shall notify the nearestCommunal Criminal Justice Commission of the detention and the location of thedetainee. He subsequently shall transfer the detainee to the nearest appropriate jail in
Kosovo at the earliest opportunity.
3. Officers may use reasonable and necessary force proportionate to the circumstances toeffect arrests and keep suspects in custody.
4. Kosovo and its constituent communes shall establish jails and prisons to accommodatethe detention of criminal suspects and the imprisonment of individuals convicted ofviolating the laws applicable in Kosovo. Prisons shall be operated consistent with
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international standards. Access shall be provided to international personnel, includingrepresentatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Article VIII: Administration of Justice
1. Criminal Jurisdiction over Persons Arrested within Kosovo.
(a) Except in accordance with Article V and subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, any person arrested within Kosovo shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Kosovo courts.
(b) Any person arrested within Kosovo, in accordance with the law and with thisAgreement, by the Border Police or Customs Police shall be subject to the jurisdiction ofthe FRY courts. If there is no applicable court of the FRY to hear the case, the Kosovocourts shall have jurisdiction.
2. Prosecution of Crimes.
(a) The CJA shall, in consultation with the CIM, appoint and have the authority toremove the Chief Prosecutor.
(b) The IM shall have the authority to monitor, observe, inspect, and when necessary,direct the operations of the Office of the Prosecutor and any and all related staff.
Article IX: Final Authority to Interpret
The CIM is the final authority regarding interpretation of this Chapter and hisdeterminations are binding on all Parties and persons.
Chapter 3
Conduct and Supervision of Elections Article I: Conditions for Elections
1. The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the organization of free and fairelections, which include but are not limited to:
a) freedom of movement for all citizens;
b) an open and free political environment;
c) an environment conducive to the return of displaced persons;
d) a safe and secure environment that ensures freedom of assembly, association, andexpression;
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e) an electoral legal framework of rules and regulations complying with OSCEcommitments, which will be implemented by a Central Election Commission, as set forthin Article III, which is representative of the population of Kosovo in terms of nationalcommunities and political parties; and
f) free media, effectively accessible to registered political parties and candidates, andavailable to voters throughout Kosovo.
2. The Parties request the OSCE to certify when elections will be effective under currentconditions in Kosovo, and to provide assistance to the Parties to create conditions for freeand fair elections.
3. The Parties shall comply fully with Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the OSCE CopenhagenDocument, which are attached to this Chapter.
Article II: Role of the OSCE
1. The Parties request the OSCE to adopt and put in place an elections program forKosovo and supervise elections as set forth in this Agreement.
2. The Parties request the OSCE to supervise, in a manner to be determined by the OSCEand in cooperation with other international organizations the OSCE deems necessary, the preparation and conduct of elections for:
a) Members of the Kosovo Assembly;
b) Members of Communal Assemblies;
c) other officials popularly elected in Kosovo under this Agreement and the laws andConstitution of Kosovo at the discretion of the OSCE.
3. The Parties request the OSCE to establish a Central Election Commission in Kosovo("the Commission").
4. Consistent with Article IV of Chapter 5, the first elections shall be held within ninemonths of the entry into force of this Agreement. The President of the Commission shalldecide, in consultation with the Parties, the exact timing and order of elections forKosovo political offices.
Article III: Central Election Commission
1. The Commission shall adopt electoral Rules and Regulations on all matters necessaryfor the conduct of free and fair elections in Kosovo, including rules relating to: theeligibility and registration of candidates, parties, and voters, including displaced personsand refugees; ensuring a free and fair elections campaign; administrative and technical
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preparation for elections including the establishment, publication, and certification ofelection results; and the role of international and domestic election observers.
2. The responsibilities of the Commission, as provided in the electoral Rules andRegulations, shall include:
a) the preparation, conduct, and supervision of all aspects of the electoral process,including development and supervision of political party and voter registration, andcreation of secure and transparent procedures for production and dissemination of ballotsand sensitive election materials, vote counts, tabulations, and publication of electionsresults;
b) ensuring compliance with the electoral Rules and Regulations established pursuant tothis Agreement, including establishing auxiliary bodies for this purpose as necessary;
c) ensuring that action is taken to remedy any violation of any provision of this
Agreement, including imposing penalties such as removal from candidate or party lists,against any person, candidate, political party, or body that violates such provisions; and
d) accrediting observers, including personnel from international organizations and foreignand domestic non-governmental organizations, and ensuring that the Parties grant theaccredited observers unimpeded access and movement.
3. The Commission shall consist of a person appointed by the Chairman-in-Office (CIO)of the OSCE, representatives of all national communities, and representatives of political parties in Kosovo selected by criteria to be determined by the Commission. The personappointed by the CIO shall act as the President of the Commission. The rules of
procedure of the Commission shall provide that in the exceptional circumstance of anunresolved dispute within the Commission, the decision of the President shall be finaland binding.
4. The Commission shall enjoy the right to establish communication facilities, and toengage local and administrative staff.
Chapter 4
Economic Issues Article I
1. The economy of Kosovo shall function in accordance with free market principles.
2. The authorities established to levy and collect taxes and other charges are set forth inthis Agreement. Except as otherwise expressly provided, all authorities have the right tokeep all revenues from their own taxes or other charges consistent with this Agreement.
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3. Certain revenue from Kosovo taxes and duties shall accrue to the Communes, takinginto account the need for an equalization of revenues between the Communes based onobjective criteria. The Assembly of Kosovo shall enact appropriate non-discriminatorylegislation for this purpose. The Communes may also levy local taxes in accordance withthis Agreement.
4. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be responsible for the collection of allcustoms duties at international borders in Kosovo. There shall be no impediments to thefree movement of persons, goods, services, and capital to and from Kosovo.
5. Federal authorities shall ensure that Kosovo receives a proportionate and equitableshare of benefits that may be derived from international agreements concluded by theFederal Republic and of Federal resources.
6. Federal and other authorities shall within their respective powers and responsibilitiesensure the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital to Kosovo, including
from international sources. They shall in particular allow access to Kosovo withoutdiscrimination for persons delivering such goods and services.
7. If expressly required by an international donor or lender, international contracts forreconstruction projects shall be concluded by the authorities of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, which shall establish appropriate mechanisms to make such funds availableto Kosovo authorities. Unless precluded by the terms of contracts, all reconstruction projects that exclusively concern Kosovo shall be managed and implemented by theappropriate Kosovo authority.
Article II
1. The Parties agree to reallocate ownership and resources in accordance insofar as possible with the distribution of powers and responsibilities set forth in this Agreement,in the following areas:
(a) government-owned assets (including educational institutions, hospitals, naturalresources, and production facilities);
(b) pension and social insurance contributions;
(c) revenues to be distributed under Article I.5; and
(d) any other matters relating to economic relations between the Parties not covered bythis Agreement.
2. The Parties agree to the creation of a Claim Settlement Commission (CSC) to resolveall disputes between them on matters referred to in paragraph 1.
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(a) The CSC shall consist of three experts designated by Kosovo, three experts designated jointly by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, and threeindependent experts designated by the CIM.
(b) The decisions of the CSC, which shall be taken by majority vote, shall be final and
binding. The Parties shall implement them without delay.
3. Authorities receiving ownership of public facilities shall have the power to operatesuch facilities.
Chapter 4 A
Humanitarian Assistance, Reconstruction and Economic Development
1. In parallel with the continuing full implementation of this Agreement, urgent attentionmust be focused on meeting the real humanitarian and economic needs of Kosovo in
order to help create the conditions for reconstruction and lasting economic recovery.International assistance will be provided without discrimination between nationalcommunities.
2. The Parties welcome the willingness of the European Commission working with theinternational community to co-ordinate international support for the parties' efforts.Specifically, the European Commission will organize an international donors' conferencewithin one month of entry into force of this Agreement.
3. The international community will provide immediate and unconditional humanitarianassistance, focusing primarily on refugees and internally displaced persons returning to
their former homes. The Parties welcome and endorse the UNHCR's lead role in co-ordination of this effort, and endorse its intention, in close co-operation with theImplementation Mission, to plan an early, peaceful, orderly and phased return of refugeesand displaced persons in conditions of safety and dignity.
4. The international community will provide the means for the rapid improvement ofliving conditions for the population of Kosovo through the reconstruction andrehabilitation of housing and local infrastructure (including water, energy, health andlocal education infrastructure) based on damage assessment surveys.
5. Assistance will also be provided to support the establishment and development of the
institutional and legislative framework laid down in this Agreement, including localgovernance and tax settlement, and to reinforce civil society, culture and education.Social welfare will also be addressed, with priority given to the protection of vulnerablesocial groups.
6. It will also be vital to lay the foundations for sustained development, based on a revivalof the local economy. This must take account of the need to address unemployment, and
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to stimulate the economy by a range of mechanisms. The European Commission will begiving urgent attention to this.
7. International assistance, with the exception of humanitarian aid, will be subject to fullcompliance with this Agreement as well as other conditionalities defined in advance by
the donors and the absorptive capacity of Kosovo.
Chapter 5
Implementation I Article I: Institutions
Implementation Mission
1. The Parties invite the OSCE, in cooperation with the European Union, to constitute anImplementation Mission in Kosovo. All responsibilities and powers previously vested in
the Kosovo Verification Mission and its Head by prior agreements shall be continued inthe Implementation Mission and its Chief.
Joint Commission
2. A Joint Commission shall serve as the central mechanism for monitoring andcoordinating the civilian implementation of this Agreement. It shall consist of the Chiefof the Implementation Mission (CIM), one Federal and one Republic representative, onerepresentative of each national community in Kosovo, the President of the Assembly, anda representative of the President of Kosovo. Meetings of the Joint Commission may beattended by other representatives of organizations specified in this Agreement or needed
for its implementation.
3. The CIM shall serve as the Chair of the Joint Commission. The Chair shall coordinateand organize the work of the Joint Commission and decide the time and place of itsmeetings. The Parties shall abide by and fully implement the decisions of the JointCommission. The Joint Commission shall operate on the basis of consensus, but in theevent consensus cannot be reached, the Chair's decision shall be final.
4. The Chair shall have full and unimpeded access to all places, persons, and information(including documents and other records) within Kosovo that in his judgment arenecessary to his responsibilities with regard to the civilian aspects of this Agreement.
Joint Council and Local Councils
5. The CIM may, as necessary, establish a Kosovo Joint Council and Local Councils, forinformal dispute resolution and cooperation. The Kosovo Joint Council would consist ofone member from each of the national communities in Kosovo. Local Councils wouldconsist of representatives of each national community living in the locality where theLocal Council is established.
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(a) supervise and direct the implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement
pursuant to a schedule that he shall specify;
(b) maintain close contact with the Parties to promote full compliance with those aspectsof this Agreement;
(c) facilitate, as he deems necessary, the resolution of difficulties arising in connectionwith such implementation;
(d) participate in meetings of donor organizations, including on issues of rehabilitationand reconstruction, in particular by putting forward proposals and identifying prioritiesfor their consideration as appropriate;
(e) coordinate the activities of civilian organizations and agencies in Kosovo assisting inthe implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement, respecting fully theirspecific organizational procedures;
(f) report periodically to the bodies responsible for constituting the Mission on progressin the implementation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement; and
(g) carry out the functions specified in this Agreement pertaining to police and securityforces.
2. The CIM shall also carry out other responsibilities set forth in this Agreement or asmay be later agreed.
Article III: Status of Implementation Mission
1. Implementation Mission personnel shall be allowed unrestricted movement and accessinto and throughout Kosovo at any time.
2. The Parties shall facilitate the operations of the Implementation Mission, including bythe provision of assistance as requested with regard to transportation, subsistence,accommodation, communication, and other facilities.
3. The Implementation Mission shall enjoy such legal capacity as may be necessary forthe exercise of its functions under the laws and regulations of Kosovo, the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Serbia. Such legal capacity shall include thecapacity to contract, and to acquire and dispose of real and personal property.
4. Privileges and immunities are hereby accorded as follows to the ImplementationMission and associated personnel:
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(a) the Implementation Mission and its premises, archives, and other property shall enjoythe same privileges and immunities as a diplomatic mission under the Vienna Conventionon Diplomatic Relations;
(b) the CIM and professional members of his staff and their families shall enjoy the same
privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents and their families underthe Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and
(c) other members of the Implementation Mission staff and their families shall enjoy thesame privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by members of the administrative andtechnical staff and their families under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
Article IV: Process of Implementation
General
1. The Parties acknowledge that complete implementation will require political acts andmeasures, and the election and establishment of institutions and bodies set forth in thisAgreement. The Parties agree to proceed expeditiously with these tasks on a schedule set by the Joint Commission. The Parties shall provide active support, cooperation, and participation for the successful implementation of this Agreement.
Elections and Census
2. Within nine months of the entry into force of this Agreement, there shall be electionsin accordance with and pursuant to procedures specified in Chapter 3 of this Agreementfor authorities established herein, according to a voter list prepared to international
standards by the Central Election Commission. The Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE) shall supervise those elections to ensure that they are freeand fair.
3. Under the supervision of the OSCE and with the participation of Kosovo authoritiesand experts nominated by and belonging to the national communities of Kosovo, Federalauthorities shall conduct an objective and free census of the population in Kosovo underrules and regulations agreed with the OSCE in accordance with international standards.The census shall be carried out when the OSCE determines that conditions allow anobjective and accurate enumeration.
(a) The first census shall be limited to name, place of birth, place of usual residence andaddress, gender, age, citizenship, national community, and religion.
(b) The authorities of the Parties shall provide each other and the OSCE with all recordsnecessary to conduct the census, including data about places of residence, citizenship,voters' lists, and other information.
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4. All laws and regulations in effect in Kosovo when this Agreement enters into forceshall remain in effect unless and until replaced by laws or regulations adopted by acompetent body. All laws and regulations applicable in Kosovo that are incompatible
with this Agreement shall be presumed to have been harmonized with this Agreement. In particular, martial law in Kosovo is hereby revoked.
5. Institutions currently in place in Kosovo shall remain until superseded by bodiescreated by or in accordance with this Agreement. The CIM may recommend to theappropriate authorities the removal and appointment of officials and the curtailment ofoperations of existing institutions in Kosovo if he deems it necessary for the effectiveimplementation of this Agreement. If the action recommended is not taken in the timerequested, the Joint Commission may decide to take the recommended action.
6. Prior to the election of Kosovo officials pursuant to this Agreement, the CIM shall take
the measures necessary to ensure the development and functioning of independent mediain keeping with international standards, including allocation of radio and televisionfrequencies.
Article V: Authority to Interpret
The CIM shall be the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of the civilianaspects of this Agreement, and the Parties agree to abide by his determinations as bindingon all Parties and persons.
Chapter 6
The Ombudsman Article I: General
1. There shall be an Ombudsman, who shall monitor the realization of the rights ofmembers of national communities and the protection of human rights and fundamentalfreedoms in Kosovo. The Ombudsman shall have unimpeded access to any person or place and shall have the right to appear and intervene before any domestic, Federal, or(consistent with the rules of such bodies) international authority upon his or her request. No person, institution, or entity of the Parties may interfere with the functions of theOmbudsman.
2. The Ombudsman shall be an eminent person of high moral standing who possesses ademonstrated commitment to human rights and the rights of members of nationalcommunities. He or she shall be nominated by the President of Kosovo and shall beelected by the Assembly from a list of candidates prepared by the President of theEuropean Court of Human Rights for a non-renewable three-year term. The Ombudsmanshall not be a citizen of any State or entity that was a part of the former Yugoslavia, or ofany neighboring State. Pending the election of the President and the Assembly, the CIM
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shall designate a person to serve as Ombudsman on an interim basis who shall besucceeded by a person selected pursuant to the procedure set forth in this paragraph.
3. The Ombudsman shall be independently responsible for choosing his or her own staff.He or she shall have two Deputies. The Deputies shall each be drawn from different
national communities.
(a) The salaries and expenses of the Ombudsman and his or her staff shall be determinedand paid by the Kosovo Assembly. The salaries and expenses shall be fully adequate toimplement the Ombudsman's mandate.
(b) The Ombudsman and members of his or her staff shall not be held criminally orcivilly liable for any acts carried out within the scope of their duties.
Article II: Jurisdiction
1. The Ombudsman shall consider:
(a) alleged or apparent violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo,as provided in the Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republicof Serbia, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms and the Protocols thereto; and
(b) alleged or apparent violations of the rights of members of national communitiesspecified in this Agreement.
2. All persons in Kosovo shall have the right to submit complaints to the Ombudsman.
The Parties agree not to take any measures to punish persons who intend to submit orwho have submitted such allegations, or in any other way to deter the exercise of thisright.
Article III: Powers and Duties
1. The Ombudsman shall investigate alleged violations falling within the jurisdiction setforth in Article II.1. He or she may act either on his or her own initiative or in response toan allegation presented by any Party or person, non-governmental organization, or groupof individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation or acting on behalf of allegedvictims who are deceased or missing. The work of the Ombudsman shall be free of
charge to the person concerned.
2. The Ombudsman shall have complete, unimpeded, and immediate access to any person, place, or information upon his or her request.
(a) The Ombudsman shall have access to and may examine all official documents, and heor she can require any person, including officials of Kosovo, to cooperate by providingrelevant information, documents, and files.
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(b) The Ombudsman may attend administrative hearings and meetings of other Kosovoinstitutions in order to gather information.
(c) The Ombudsman may examine facilities and places where persons deprived of theirliberty are detained, work, or are otherwise located.
(d) The Ombudsman and staff shall maintain the confidentiality of all confidentialinformation obtained by them, unless the Ombudsman determines that such informationis evidence of a violation of rights falling within his or her jurisdiction, in which case thatinformation may be revealed in public reports or appropriate legal proceedings.
(e) The Parties undertake to ensure cooperation with the Ombudsman's investigations.Willful and knowing failure to comply shall be a criminal offense prosecutable in any jurisdiction of the Parties. Where an official impedes an investigation by refusing to provide necessary information, the Ombudsman shall contact that official's superior orthe public prosecutor for appropriate penal action to be taken in accordance with the law.
3. The Ombudsman shall issue findings and conclusions in the form of a published report promptly after concluding an investigation.
(a) A Party, institution, or official identified by the Ombudsman as a violator shall, withina period specified by the Ombudsman, explain in writing how it will comply with any prescriptions the Ombudsman may put forth for remedial measures.
(b) In the event that a person or entity does not comply with the conclusions andrecommendations of the Ombudsman, the report shall be forwarded for further action tothe Joint Commission established by Chapter 5 of this Agreement, to the President of the
appropriate Party, and to any other officials or institutions that the Ombudsman deems proper.
Chapter 7
Implementation II Article I: General Obligations
1. The Parties undertake to recreate, as quickly as possible, normal conditions of life inKosovo and to co- operate fully with each other and with all international organizations,agencies, and non-governmental organizations involved in the implementation of this
Agreement. They welcome the willingness of the international community to send to theregion a force to assist in the implementation of this Agreement.
a. The United Nations Security Council is invited to pass a resolution under Chapter VIIof the Charter endorsing and adopting the arrangements set forth in this Chapter,including the establishment of a multinational military implementation force in Kosovo.The Parties invite NATO to constitute and lead a military force to help ensure compliance
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with the provisions of this Chapter. They also reaffirm the sovereignty and territorialintegrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
b. The Parties agree that NATO will establish and deploy a force (hereinafter "KFOR")which may be composed of ground, air, and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO
nations, operating under the authority and subject to the direction and the political controlof the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of command. The Partiesagree to facilitate the deployment and operations of this force and agree also to complyfully with all the obligations of this Chapter.
c. It is agreed that other States may assist in implementing this Chapter. The Parties agreethat the modalities of those States' participation will be the subject of agreement betweensuch participating States and NATO.
2. The purposes of these obligations are as follows:
a. to establish a durable cessation of hostilities. Other than those Forces provided for inthis Chapter, under no circumstances shall any armed Forces enter, reenter, or remainwithin Kosovo without the prior express consent of the KFOR Commander(COMKFOR). For the purposes of this Chapter, the term "Forces" includes all personneland organizations with military capability, including regular army, armed civilian groups, paramilitary groups, air forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, military police, intelligence services, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local, Special, Riot and Anti-Terrorist Police, and any other groups or individuals so designated by COMKFOR. Theonly exception to the provisions of this paragraph is for civilian police engaged in hot pursuit of a person suspected of committing a serious criminal offense, as provided for inChapter 2;
b. to provide for the support and authorization of the KFOR and in particular to authorizethe KFOR to take such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force, toensure compliance with this Chapter and the protection of the KFOR, ImplementationMission (IM), and other international organizations, agencies, and non- governmentalorganizations involved in the implementation of this Agreement, and to contribute to asecure environment;
c. to provide, at no cost, the use of all facilities and services required for the deployment,operations and support of the KFOR.
3. The Parties understand and agree that the obligations undertaken in this Chapter shallapply equally to each Party. Each Party shall be held individually responsible forcompliance with its obligations, and each agrees that delay or failure to comply by oneParty shall not constitute cause for any other Party to fail to carry out its own obligations.All Parties shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by the KFOR as may benecessary to ensure implementation of this Chapter in Kosovo and the protection of theKFOR, IM, and other international organizations, agencies, and non- governmentalorganizations involved in the implementation of this Agreement.
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1. The Parties shall, immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement (EIF), refrainfrom committing any hostile or provocative acts of any type against each other or againstany person in Kosovo. They shall not encourage or organize hostile or provocative
demonstrations.
2. In carrying out the obligations set forth in paragraph 1, the Parties undertake in particular to cease the firing of all weapons and explosive devices except as authorized byCOMKFOR. They shall not place any mines, barriers, unauthorized checkpoints,observation posts (with the exception of COMKFOR-approved border observation postsand crossing points), or protective obstacles. Except as provided in Chapter 2, the Partiesshall not engage in any military, security, or training-related activities, including ground,air, or air defense operations, in or over Kosovo, without the prior express approval ofCOMKFOR.
3. Except for Border Guard forces (as provided for in Article IV), no Party shall haveForces present within a 5 kilometer zone inward from the international border of the FRYthat is also the border of Kosovo (hereinafter "the Border Zone"). The Border Zone will be marked on the ground by EIF + 14 days by VJ Border Guard personnel in accordancewith direction from IM. COMKFOR may determine small scale reconfigurations foroperational reasons.
4. a. With the exception of civilian police performing normal police duties as determined by the CIM, no Party shall have Forces present within 5 kilometers of the Kosovo side ofthe boundary of Kosovo with other parts of the FRY.
b. The presence of any Forces within 5 kilometers of the other side of that boundary shall be notified to COMKFOR; if, in the judgment of COMKFOR, such presence threatens orwould threaten implementation of this Chapter in Kosovo, he shall contact the authoritiesresponsible for the Forces in question and may require those Forces to withdraw from orremain outside that area.
5. No Party shall conduct any reprisals, counter-attacks, or any unilateral actions inresponse to violations of this Chapter by another Party. The Parties shall respond toalleged violations of this Chapter through the procedures provided in Article XI.
Article III: Redeployment, Withdrawal, and Demilitarization of Forces
In order to disengage their Forces and to avoid any further conflict, the Parties shallimmediately upon EIF begin to re-deploy, withdraw, or demilitarize their Forces inaccordance with Articles IV, V, and VI.
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a. By K-Day + 5 days, all VJ Army units in Kosovo (with the exception of those Forces
specified in paragraph 2 of this Article) shall have completed redeployment to theapproved cantonment sites listed at Appendix A to this Chapter. The senior VJcommander in Kosovo shall confirm in writing to COMKFOR by K-Day + 5 days thatthe VJ is in compliance and provide the information required in Article VII below to takeaccount of withdrawals or other changes made during the redeployment. This informationshall be updated weekly.
b. By K-Day + 30 days, the Chief of the VJ General Staff, through the senior VJcommander in Kosovo, shall provide for approval by COMKFOR a detailed plan for the phased withdrawal of VJ Forces from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia to ensure thefollowing timelines are met:
1) By K-Day + 90 days, VJ authorities must, to the satisfaction of COMKFOR, withdrawfrom Kosovo to other locations in Serbia 50% of men and materiel and all designatedoffensive assets. Such assets are taken to be: main battle tanks; all other armored vehiclesmounting weapons greater than 12.7mm; and, all heavy weapons (vehicle mounted ornot) of over 82mm.
2) By K-Day + 180 days, all VJ Army personnel and equipment (with the exception ofthose Forces specified in paragraph 2 of this Article) shall be withdrawn from Kosovo toother locations in Serbia.
2. VJ Border Guard Forces
a. VJ Border Guard forces shall be permitted but limited to a structure of 1500 membersat pre- February 1998 Border Guard Battalion facilities located in Djakovica, Prizren, andUrosevac and subordinate facilities within the 5 kilometer Border Zone, or at a limitednumber of existing facilities in the immediate proximity of the Border Zone subject to the prior approval of COMKFOR, with that number to be reached by K-Day + 14 days. Anadditional number of VJ personnel -- totaling no more than 1000 C2 and logistics forces -- will be permitted to remain in the approved cantonment sites listed at Appendix A tofulfill brigade-level functions related only to border security. After an initial 90 day period from K- Day, COMKFOR may at any time review the deployments of VJ
personnel and may require further adjustments to force levels, with the objective ofreaching the minimum force structure required for legitimate border security, as thesecurity situation and the conduct of the Parties warrant.
b. VJ elements in Kosovo shall be limited to weapons of 82mm and below. They shall possess neither armored vehicles (other than wheeled vehicles mounting weapons of12.7mm or less) nor air defense weapons.
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c. VJ Border Guard units shall be permitted to patrol in Kosovo only within the BorderZone and solely for the purpose of defending the border against external attack andmaintaining its integrity by preventing illicit border crossings. Geographic terrainconsiderations may require Border Guard maneuver inward of the Border Zone; any suchmaneuver shall be coordinated with and approved by COMKFOR.
d. With the exception of the Border Zone, VJ units may travel through Kosovo only toreach duty stations and garrisons in the Border Zone or approved cantonment sites. Suchtravel may only be along routes and in accordance with procedures that have beendetermined by COMKFOR after consultation with the CIM, VJ unit commanders,communal government authorities, and police commanders. These routes and procedureswill be determined by K-Day + 14 days, subject to re- determination by COMKFOR atany time. VJ forces in Kosovo but outside the Border Zone shall be permitted to act onlyin self-defense in response to a hostile act pursuant to Rules of Engagement (ROE) whichwill be approved by COMKFOR in consultation with the CIM. When deployed in theBorder Zone, they will act in accordance with ROE established under control of
COMKFOR.
e. VJ Border Guard forces may conduct training activities only within the 5 kilometerBorder Zone, and only with the prior express approval of COMKFOR.
3. Yugoslav Air and Air Defense Forces (YAADF)
All aircraft, radars, surface-to-air missiles (including man-portable air defense systems{MANPADS}) and anti-aircraft artillery in Kosovo shall immediately upon EIF beginwithdrawing from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia outside the 25 kilometer MutualSafety Zone as defined in Article X. This withdrawal shall be completed and reported by
the senior VJ commander in Kosovo to the appropriate NATO commander not more than10 days after EIF. The appropriate NATO commander shall control and coordinate use ofairspace over Kosovo commencing at EIF as further specified in Article X. No airdefense systems, target tracking radars, or anti-aircraft artillery shall be positioned oroperated within Kosovo or the 25 kilometer Mutual Safety Zone without the prior expressapproval of the appropriate NATO commander.
Article V: Other Forces
1. The actions of Forces in Kosovo other than KFOR, VJ, MUP, or local police forces provided for in Chapter 2 (hereinafter referred to as "Other Forces") shall be in
accordance with this Article. Upon EIF, all Other Forces in Kosovo must immediatelyobserve the provisions of Article I, paragraph 2, Article II, paragraph 1, and Article IIIand in addition refrain from all hostile intent, military training and formations,organization of demonstrations, and any movement in either direction or smugglingacross international borders or the boundary between Kosovo and other parts of the FRY.Furthermore, upon EIF, all Other Forces in Kosovo must publicly commit themselves todemilitarize on terms to be determined by COMKFOR, renounce violence, guarantee
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security of international personnel, and respect the international borders of the FRY andall terms of this Chapter.
2. Except as approved by COMKFOR, from K-Day, all Other Forces in Kosovo must notcarry weapons:
a. within 1 kilometer of VJ and MUP cantonments listed at Appendix A;
b. within 1 kilometer of the main roads as follows:1) Pec - Lapusnik - Pristina2) border - Djakovica - Klina3) border - Prizren - Suva Rika - Pristina4) Djakovica - Orahovac - Lapusnik - Pristina5) Pec - Djakovica - Prizren - Urosevac - border6) border - Urosevac - Pristina - Podujevo - border7) Pristina - Kosovska Mitrovica - border
8) Kosovka Mitrovica - (Rakos) - Pec9) Pec - Border with Montenegro (through Pozaj)10) Pristina - Lisica - border with Serbia11) Pristina - Gnjilane - Urosevac12) Gnjilane - Veliki Trnovac - border with Serbia;13) Prizren - Doganovic
c. within 1 kilometer of the Border Zone;
d. in any other areas designated by COMKFOR.
3. By K-Day + 5 days, all Other Forces must abandon and close all fighting positions,entrenchments, and checkpoints.
4. By K-Day + 5 days, all Other Forces' commanders designated by COMKFOR shallreport completion of the above requirements in the format at Article VII to COMKFORand continue to provide weekly detailed status reports until demilitarization is complete.
5. COMKFOR will establish procedures for demilitarization and monitoring of OtherForces in Kosovo and for the further regulation of their activities. These procedures will be established to facilitate a phased demilitarization program as follows:
a. By K-Day + 5 days, all Other Forces shall establish secure weapons storage sites,which shall be registered with and verified by the KFOR;
b. By K-Day + 30 days, all Other Forces shall store all prohibited weapons (any weapon12.7mm or larger, any anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons, grenades, mines or explosives)and automatic weapons in the registered weapons storage sites. Other Forcescommanders shall confirm completion of weapons storage to COMKFOR no later thanK-Day + 30 days;
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c. By K-Day + 30 days, all Other Forces shall cease wearing military uniforms andinsignia, and cease carrying prohibited weapons and automatic weapons;
d. By K-Day + 90 days, authority for storage sites shall pass to the KFOR. After this date,it shall be illegal for Other Forces to possess prohibited weapons and automatic weapons,
and such weapons shall be subject to confiscation by the KFOR;
e. By K-Day + 120 days, demilitarization of all Other Forces shall be completed.
6. By EIF + 30 days, subject to arrangements by COMKFOR if necessary, all OtherForces personnel who are not of local origin, whether or not they are legally withinKosovo, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other States, shall be withdrawn from Kosovo.
ARTICLE VI: MUP
1. Ministry of Interior Police (MUP) is defined as all police and public security units and personnel under the control of Federal or Republic authorities except for the border police referred to in Chapter 2 and police academy students and personnel at the trainingschool in Vucitrn referred to in Chapter 2. The CIM, in consultation with COMKFOR,shall have the discretion to exempt any public security units from this definition if hedetermines that it is in the public interest (e.g. firefighters).
a. By K-Day + 5 days, all MUP units in Kosovo (with the exception of the border policereferred to in Chapter 2) shall have completed redeployment to the approved cantonmentsites listed at Appendix A to this Chapter or to garrisons outside Kosovo. The seniorMUP commander in Kosovo or his representative shall confirm in writing by K-Day + 5
days to COMKFOR and the CIM that the MUP is in compliance and update theinformation required in Article VII to take account of withdrawals or other changes madeduring the redeployment. This information shall be updated weekly. Resumption ofnormal communal police patrolling will be permitted under the supervision and control ofthe IM and as specifically approved by the CIM in consultation with COMKFOR, andwill be contingent on compliance with the terms of this Agreement.
b. Immediately upon EIF, the following withdrawals shall begin:
1) By K-Day + 5 days, those MUP units not assigned to Kosovo prior to 1 February 1998shall withdraw all personnel and equipment from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia.
2) By K-Day + 20 days, all Special Police, including PJP, SAJ, and JSO forces, and theirequipment shall be withdrawn from their cantonment sites out of Kosovo to otherlocations in Serbia. Additionally, all MUP offensive assets (designated as armoredvehicles mounting weapons 12.7mm or larger, and all heavy weapons {vehicle mountedor not} of over 82mm) shall be withdrawn.
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c. By K-Day + 30 days, the senior MUP commander shall provide for approval byCOMKFOR, in consultation with the CIM, a detailed plan for the phased drawdown ofthe remainder of MUP forces. In the event that COMKFOR, in consultation with theCIM, does not approve the plan, he has the authority to issue his own binding plan forfurther MUP drawdowns. The CIM will decide at the same time when the remaining
MUP units will wear new insignia. In any case, the following time-table must be met:
1) by K-Day + 60 days, 50% drawdown of the remaining MUP units including reservists.The CIM after consultations with COMKFOR shall have the discretion to extend thisdeadline for up to K-Day + 90 days if he judges there to be a risk of a law enforcementvacuum;
2) by K-Day + 120 days, further drawdown to 2500 MUP. The CIM after consultationswith COMKFOR shall have the discretion to extend this deadline for up to K-Day + 180days to meet operational needs;
3) transition to communal police force shall begin as Kosovar police are trained and ableto assume their duties. The CIM shall organize this transition between MUP andcommunal police;
4) in any event, by EIF + one year, all Ministry of Interior Civil Police shall be drawndown to zero. The CIM shall have the discretion to extend this deadline for up to anadditional 12 months to meet operational needs.
d. The 2500 MUP allowed by this Chapter and referred to in Article V.1(a) of Chapter 2shall have authority only for civil police functions and be under the supervision andcontrol of the CIM.
Article VII: Notifications
1. By K-Day + 5 days, the Parties shall furnish the following specific informationregarding the status of all conventional military; all police, including military police,Department of Public Security Police, special police; paramilitary; and all Other Forcesin Kosovo, and shall update the COMKFOR weekly on changes in this information:
a. location, disposition, and strengths of all military and special police units referred toabove;
b. quantity and type of weaponry of 12.7 mm and above, and ammunition for suchweaponry, including location of cantonments and supply depots and storage sites;
c. positions and descriptions of any surface-to-air missiles/launchers, including mobilesystems, anti-aircraft artillery, supporting radars, and associated command and controlsystems;
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d. positions and descriptions of all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices,demolitions, obstacles, booby traps, wire entanglements, physical or military hazards tothe safe movement of any personnel in Kosovo, weapons systems, vehicles, or any othermilitary equipment; and
e. any further information of a military or security nature requested by the COMKFOR.
Article VIII: Operations and Authority of the KFOR
1. Consistent with the general obligations of Article I, the Parties understand and agreethat the KFOR will deploy and operate without hindrance and with the authority to takeall necessary action to help ensure compliance with this Chapter.
2. The Parties understand and agree that the KFOR shall have the right:
a. to monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties with this Chapter and to respond
promptly to any violations and restore compliance, using military force if required. Thisincludes necessary action to:
1) enforce VJ and MUP reductions; 2) enforce demilitarization of Other Forces; 3)enforce restrictions on all VJ, MUP and Other Forces' activities, movement and trainingin Kosovo;
b. to establish liaison arrangements with IM, and support IM as appropriate;
c. to establish liaison arrangements with local Kosovo authorities, with Other Forces, andwith FRY and Serbian civil and military authorities;
d. to observe, monitor, and inspect any and all facilities or activities in Kosovo, includingwithin the Border Zone, that the COMKFOR believes has or may have militarycapability, or are or may be associated with the employment of military or policecapabilities, or are otherwise relevant to compliance with this Chapter;
e. to require the Parties to mark and clear minefields and obstacles and to monitor their performance;
f. to require the Parties to participate in the Joint Military Commission and its subordinatemilitary commissions as described in Article XI.
3. The Parties understand and agree that the KFOR shall have the right to fulfill itssupporting tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks, its capabilities, andavailable resources, and as directed by the NAC, which include the following:
a. to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated withthis Agreement, including free and fair elections;
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b. to assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarianmissions;
c. to assist international agencies in fulfilling their responsibilities in Kosovo;
d. to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations,refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate threat to lifeand person.
4. The Parties understand and agree that further directives from the NAC may establishadditional duties and responsibilities for the KFOR in implementing this Chapter.
5. KFOR operations shall be governed by the following provisions:
a. KFOR and its personnel shall have the legal status, rights, and obligations specified inAppendix B to this Chapter;
b. The KFOR shall have the right to use all necessary means to ensure its full ability tocommunicate and shall have the right to the unrestricted use of the entire electromagneticspectrum. In implementing this right, the KFOR shall make reasonable efforts tocoordinate with the appropriate authorities of the Parties;
c. The KFOR shall have the right to control and regulate surface traffic throughoutKosovo including the movement of the Forces of the Parties. All military trainingactivities and movements in Kosovo must be authorized in advance by COMKFOR;
d. The KFOR shall have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement by ground, air,
and water into and throughout Kosovo. It shall in Kosovo have the right to bivouac,maneuver, billet, and utilize any areas or facilities to carry out its responsibilities asrequired for its support, training, and operations, with such advance notice as may be practicable. Neither the KFOR nor any of its personnel shall be liable for any damages to public or private property that they may cause in the course of duties related to theimplementation of this Chapter. Roadblocks, checkpoints, or other impediments to KFORfreedom of movement shall constitute a breach of this Chapter and the violating Partyshall be subject to military action by the KFOR, including the use of necessary force toensure compliance with this Chapter.
6. The Parties understand and agree that COMKFOR shall have the authority, without
interference or permission of any Party, to do all that he judges necessary and proper,including the use of military force, to protect the KFOR and the IM, and to carry out theresponsibilities listed in this Chapter. The Parties shall comply in all respects with KFORinstructions and requirements.
7. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, the Parties understand and agreethat COMKFOR has the right and is authorized to compel the removal, withdrawal, orrelocation of specific Forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities
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whenever the COMKFOR determines such Forces, weapons, or activities to constitute athreat or potential threat to either the KFOR or its mission, or to another Party. Forcesfailing to redeploy, withdraw, relocate, or to cease threatening or potentially threateningactivities following such a demand by the KFOR shall be subject to military action by theKFOR, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance, consistent with the
terms set forth in Article I, paragraph 3.
Article IX: Border Control
The Parties understand and agree that, until other arrangements are established, andsubject to provisions of this Chapter and Chapter 2, controls along the international border of the FRY that is also the border of Kosovo will be maintained by the existinginstitutions normally assigned to such tasks, subject to supervision by the KFOR and theIM, which shall have the right to review and approve all personnel and units, to monitortheir performance, and to remove and replace any personnel for behavior inconsistentwith this Chapter.
Article X: Control of Air Movements
The appropriate NATO commander shall have sole authority to establish rules and procedures governing command and control of the airspace over Kosovo as well aswithin a 25 kilometer Mutual Safety Zone (MSZ). This MSZ shall consist of FRYairspace within 25 kilometers outward from the boundary of Kosovo with other parts ofthe FRY. This Chapter supersedes the NATO Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement ofOctober 12, 1998 on any matter or area in which they may contradict each other. Nomilitary air traffic, fixed or rotary wing, of any Party shall be permitted to fly overKosovo or in the MSZ without the prior express approval of the appropriate NATO
commander. Violations of any of the provisions above, including the appropriate NATOcommander's rules and procedures governing the airspace over Kosovo, as well asunauthorized flight or activation of FRY Integrated Air Defense (IADS) within the MSZ,shall be subject to military action by the KFOR, including the use of necessary force. TheKFOR shall have a liaison team at the FRY Air Force HQ and a YAADF liaison shall beestablished with the KFOR. The Parties understand and agree that the appropriate NATOcommander may delegate control of normal civilian air activities to appropriate FRYinstitutions to monitor operations, deconflict KFOR air traffic movements, and ensuresmooth and safe operation of the air traffic system.
Article XI: Establishment of a Joint Military Commission
1. A Joint Military Commission (JMC) shall be established with the deployment of theKFOR to Kosovo.
2. The JMC shall be chaired by COMKFOR or his representative and consist of thefollowing members:
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a. the senior Yugoslav military commander of the Forces of the FRY or hisrepresentative;
b. the Ministers of Interior of the FRY and Republic of Serbia or their representatives;
c. a senior military representative of all Other Forces;
d. a representative of the IM;
e. other persons as COMKFOR shall determine, including one or more representatives ofthe Kosovo civilian leadership.
1. The JMC shall:
a. serve as the central body for all Parties to address any military complaints, questions,or problems that require resolution by the COMKFOR, such as allegations of cease-fire
violations or other allegations of non-compliance with this Chapter;
b. receive reports and make recommendations for specific actions to COMKFOR toensure compliance by the Parties with the provisions of this Chapter;
c. assist COMKFOR in determining and implementing local transparency measures between the Parties.
4. The JMC shall not include any persons publicly indicted by the International CriminalTribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
5. The JMC shall function as a consultative body to advise COMKFOR. However, allfinal decisions shall be made by COMKFOR and shall be binding on the Parties.
6. The JMC shall meet at the call of COMKFOR. Any Party may request COMKFOR toconvene a meeting.
7. The JMC shall establish subordinate military commissions for the purpose of providingassistance in carrying out the functions described above. Such commissions shall be at anappropriate level, as COMKFOR shall direct. Composition of such commissions shall bedetermined by COMKFOR.
Article XII: Prisoner Release
1. By EIF + 21 days, the Parties shall release and transfer, in accordance withinternational humanitarian standards, all persons held in connection with the conflict(hereinafter "prisoners"). In addition, the Parties shall cooperate fully with theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to facilitate its work, in accordancewith its mandate, to implement and monitor a plan for the release and transfer of
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prisoners in accordance with the above deadline. In preparation for compliance with thisrequirement, the Parties shall:
a. grant the ICRC full access to all persons, irrespective of their status, who are beingheld by them in connection with the conflict, for visits in accordance with the ICRC's
standard operating procedures;
b. provide to the ICRC any and all information concerning prisoners, as requested by theICRC, by EIF + 14 days.
2. The Parties shall provide information, through the tracing mechanisms of the ICRC, tothe families of all persons who are unaccounted for. The Parties shall cooperate fully withthe ICRC in its efforts to determine the identity, whereabouts, and fate of thoseunaccounted for.
Article XIII: Cooperation
The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of thissettlement, as described in the Framework Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations Security Council, including the International Criminal Tribunal forthe former Yugoslavia.
Article XIV: Notification to Military Commands
Each Party shall ensure that the terms of this Chapter and written orders requiringcompliance are immediately communicated to all of its Forces.
Article XV: Final Authority to Interpret1. Subject to paragraph 2, the KFOR Commander is the final authority in theaterregarding interpretation of this Chapter and his determinations are binding on all Partiesand persons.
2. The CIM is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of the references inthis Chapter to his functions (directing the VJ Border Guards under Article II, paragraph3; his functions concerning the MUP under Article VI) and his determinations are binding on all Parties and persons.
Article XVI: K-Day
The date of activation of KFOR -- to be known as K-Day -- shall be determined by NATO.
Appendices:A. Approved VJ/MUP Cantonment SitesB. Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force
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1. There are 13 approved cantonment sites in Kosovo for all VJ units, weapons,equipment, and ammunition. Movement to cantonment sites, and subsequent withdrawal
from Kosovo, will occur in accordance with this Chapter. As the phased withdrawal ofVJ units progresses along the timeline as specified in this Chapter, COMKFOR will closeselected cantonment sites.
3. Within each cantonment site, VJ units are required to canton all heavy weapons andvehicles outside of storage facilities.
4. After EIF + 180 days, the remaining 2500 VJ forces dedicated to border security
functions provided for in this Agreement will be garrisoned and cantoned at the followinglocations: Djakovica, Prizren, and Ursoevac; subordinate border posts within the BorderZone; a limited number of existing facilities in the immediate proximity of the BorderZone subject to the prior approval of COMKFOR; and headquarters/C2 and logisticsupport facilities in Pristina.
5. There are 37 approved cantonment sites for all MUP and Special Police force units inKosovo. There are seven (7) approved regional SUPs. Each of the 37 approvedcantonment sites will fall under the administrative control of one of the regional SUPs.Movement to cantonment sites, and subsequent withdrawal of MUP from Kosovo, willoccur in accordance with this Chapter.
6. Approved MUP regional SUPs and cantonment sites:
a) Kosovska Mitrovica SUP 425300N0205200E
1) Kosovska Mitrovica (2 locations)
2) Leposavic
3) Srbica
4) Vucitrn
5) Zubin Potok
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7. Within each cantonment site, MUP units are required to canton all vehicles above 6tons, including APCs and BOVs, and all heavy weapons outside of storage facilities.
8. KFOR will have the exclusive right to inspect any cantonment site or any otherlocation, at any time, without interference from any Party.
Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force
1. For the purposes of this Appendix, the following expressions shall have the meaningshereunder assigned to them:
a. "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its subsidiary bodies,its military Headquarters, the NATO-led KFOR, and any elements/units forming any partof KFOR or supporting KFOR, whether or not they are from a NATO member country
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and whether or not they are under NATO or national command and control, when actingin furtherance of this Agreement.
b. "Authorities in the FRY" means appropriate authorities, whether Federal, Republic,Kosovo or other.
c. "NATO personnel" means the military, civilian, and contractor personnel assigned orattached to or employed by NATO, including the military, civilian, and contractor personnel from non-NATO states participating in the Operation, with the exception of personnel locally hired.
d. "the Operation" means the support, implementation, preparation, and participation by NATO and NATO personnel in furtherance of this Chapter.
e. "Military Headquarters" means any entity, whatever its denomination, consisting of orconstituted in part by NATO military personnel established in order to fulfill the
Operation.
f. "Authorities" means the appropriate responsible individual, agency, or organization ofthe Parties.
g. "Contractor personnel" means the technical experts or functional specialists whoseservices are required by NATO and who are in the territory of the FRY exclusively toserve NATO either in an advisory capacity in technical matters, or for the setting up,operation, or maintenance of equipment, unless they are:
(1) nationals of the FRY; or
(2) persons ordinarily resident in the FRY.
h. "Official use" means any use of goods purchased, or of the services received andintended for the performance of any function as required by the operation of theHeadquarters.
i. "Facilities" means all buildings, structures, premises, and land required for conductingthe operational, training, and administrative activities by NATO for the Operation as wellas for accommodation of NATO personnel.
2. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities under this Appendix, all NATO personnel shall respect the laws applicable in the FRY, whether Federal, Republic,Kosovo, or other, insofar as compliance with those laws is compatible with the entrustedtasks/mandate and shall refrain from activities not compatible with the nature of theOperation.
3. The Parties recognize the need for expeditious departure and entry procedures for NATO personnel. Such personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations and
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the registration requirements applicable to aliens. At all entry and exit points to/from theFRY, NATO personnel shall be permitted to enter/exit the FRY on production of anational identification (ID) card. NATO personnel shall carry identification which theymay be requested to produce for the authorities in the FRY, but operations, training, andmovement shall not be allowed to be impeded or delayed by such requests.
4. NATO military personnel shall normally wear uniforms, and NATO personnel may possess and carry arms if authorized to do so by their orders. The Parties shall accept asvalid, without tax or fee, drivers' licenses and permits issued to NATO personnel by theirrespective national authorities.
5. NATO shall be permitted to display the NATO flag and/or national flags of itsconstituent national elements/units on any NATO uniform, means of transport, or facility.
6. a. NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, orcriminal.
b. NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from theParties' jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administrative, criminal, or disciplinaryoffenses which may be committed by them in the FRY. The Parties shall assist States participating in the Operation in the exercise of their jurisdiction over their own nationals.
c. Notwithstanding the above, and with the NATO Commander's express agreement ineach case, the authorities in the FRY may exceptionally exercise jurisdiction in suchmatters, but only in respect of Contractor personnel who are not subject to the jurisdictionof their nation of citizenship.
7. NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest, investigation, or detention by the authorities in the FRY. NATO personnel erroneously arrested or detained shallimmediately be turned over to NATO authorities.
8. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, andequipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRYincluding associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limitedto, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities asrequired for support, training, and operations.
9. NATO shall be exempt from duties, taxes, and other charges and inspections and
custom regulations including providing inventories or other routine customsdocumentation, for personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, supplies, and provisions entering, exiting, or transiting the territory of the FRY in support of theOperation.
10. The authorities in the FRY shall facilitate, on a priority basis and with all appropriatemeans, all movement of personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, or supplies,through or in the airspace, ports, airports, or roads used. No charges may be assessed
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against NATO for air navigation, landing, or takeoff of aircraft, whether government-owned or chartered. Similarly, no duties, dues, tolls or charges may be assessed against NATO ships, whether government-owned or chartered, for the mere entry and exit of ports. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft used in support of the Operation shall not be subjectto licensing or registration requirements, nor commercial insurance.
11. NATO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and ports without payment of fees,duties, dues, tolls, or charges occasioned by mere use. NATO shall not, however, claimexemption from reasonable charges for specific services requested and received, butoperations/movement and access shall not be allowed to be impeded pending payment forsuch services.
12. NATO personnel shall be exempt from taxation by the Parties on the salaries andemoluments received from NATO and on any income received from outside the FRY.
13. NATO personnel and their tangible moveable property imported into, acquired in, or
exported from the FRY shall be exempt from all duties, taxes, and other charges andinspections and custom regulations.
14. NATO shall be allowed to import and to export, free of duty, taxes and other charges,such equipment, provisions, and supplies as NATO shall require for the Operation, provided such goods are for the official use of NATO or for sale to NATO personnel.Goods sold shall be solely for the use of NATO personnel and not transferable tounauthorized persons.
15. The Parties recognize that the use of communications channels is necessary for theOperation. NATO shall be allowed to operate its own internal mail services. The Parties
shall, upon simple request, grant all telecommunications services, including broadcastservices, needed for the Operation, as determined by NATO. This shall include the rightto utilize such means and services as required to assure full ability to communicate, andthe right to use all of the electro-magnetic spectrum for this purpose, free of cost. Inimplementing this right, NATO shall make every reasonable effort to coordinate with andtake into account the needs and requirements of appropriate authorities in the FRY.
16. The Parties shall provide, free of cost, such public facilities as NATO shall require to prepare for and execute the Operation. The Parties shall assist NATO in obtaining, at thelowest rate, the necessary utilities, such as electricity, water, gas and other resources, as NATO shall require for the Operation.
17. NATO and NATO personnel shall be immune from claims of any sort which arise outof activities in pursuance of the Operation; however, NATO will entertain claims on anex gratia basis.
18. NATO shall be allowed to contract directly for the acquisition of goods, services, andconstruction from any source within and outside the FRY. Such contracts, goods,
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services, and construction shall not be subject to the payment of duties, taxes, or othercharges. NATO may also carry out construction works with their own personnel.
19. Commercial undertakings operating in the FRY only in the service of NATO shall beexempt from local laws and regulations with respect to the terms and conditions of their
employment and licensing and registration of employees, businesses, and corporations.
20. NATO may hire local personnel who on an individual basis shall remain subject tolocal laws and regulations with the exception of labor/employment laws. However, local personnel hired by NATO shall:
a. be immune from legal process in respect of words
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in
their official capacity;
b. be immune from national services and/or national
military service obligations;
c. be subject only to employment terms and
conditions established by NATO; andd. be exempt from taxation on the salaries and
emoluments paid to them by NATO.
21. In carrying out its authorities under this Chapter, NATO is authorized to detainindividuals and, as quickly as possible, turn them over to appropriate officials.
22. NATO may, in the conduct of the Operation, have need to make improvements ormodifications to certain infrastructure in the FRY, such as roads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, and utility systems. Any such improvements or modifications of a non-temporary nature shall become part of and in the same ownership as that infrastructure.Temporary improvements or modifications may be removed at the discretion of the NATO Commander, and the infrastructure returned to as near its original condition as possible, fair wear and tear excepted.
23. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with the regard to the interpretation orapplication of this Appendix shall be settled between NATO and the appropriateauthorities in the FRY.
24. Supplementary arrangements with any of the Parties may be concluded to facilitateany details connected with the Operation.
25. The provisions of this Appendix shall remain in force until completion of theOperation or as the Parties and NATO otherwise agree.
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Amendment, Comprehensive Assessment, and Final Clauses Article I: Amendment and Comprehensive Assessment
1. Amendments to this Agreement shall be adopted by agreement of all the Parties,except as otherwise provided by Article X of Chapter 1.
2. Each Party may propose amendments at any time and will consider and consult withthe other Parties with regard to proposed amendments.
3. Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis ofthe will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding theimplementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake acomprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider
proposals by any Party for additional measures.
Article II: Final Clauses
1. This Agreement is signed in the English language. After signature of this Agreement,translations will be made into Serbian, Albanian, and other languages of the nationalcommunities of Kosovo, and attached to the English text.
2. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.284
BH – Bosnia and HerzegovinaBIA – Security Information Agency (Bezbednosno Informativna Agencija)BND – Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst)CIA – Central Intelligence AgencyCG – Contact GroupDEA – Drugs Enforcement AdministrationETA – Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna)EU – European UnionFHP – Found for Humanitarian RightFRY – Federative Republic of YugoslaviaFYRM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ICJ – International Court of JusticeICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the Former YugoslaviaIDP – Internal Dislocated PersonsIMF – International Monetary FundIRA – Irish Republican ArmyJNA – Yugoslav National Army ( Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija)KFOR – Kosovo ForceKGB – Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti) KLA – Kosovo Liberation ArmyKosmet – Kosovo and MetohijaKPC – Kosovo Protection Corpus
LDK – Democratic League of KosovoMoD – Ministry of Defence NATO – North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationOSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in EuropeRTS – Radio Television of SerbiaSAS – Special Air ServiceSFRY – Socialistic Federative Republic of YugoslaviaSMIP – Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Savezno Ministarstvo Inostranih Poslova)SPS – Socialistic Party of SerbiaTWRA – Third World Relief AgencyUN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development ProgrammeUNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesUNMIK – United Nations Interim Administration MissionWMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
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