-
CLARIFYING THE CNN EFFECT: An Examination of Media
EffectsAccording to Type of MilitaryIntervention
by
Steven Livingston
Research Paper R-18June 1997
PRESS POLITICS
PUBLIC POLICY
The Joan Shorenstein Center
Harvard UniversityJohn F. Kennedy School of Government
-
CLARIFYING THE CNN EFFECT: An Examination of Media
EffectsAccording to Type of MilitaryIntervention
by
Steven Livingston
Research Paper R-18June 1997
Copyright 1997, President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
-
Steven Livingston 1
IntroductionIn recent years, observers of international
affairs have raised the concern that media haveexpanded their
ability to affect the conduct ofU.S. diplomacy and foreign policy.
Dubbed theCNN effect (or CNN curve or CNN fac-tor), the impact of
these new global, real-timemedia is typically regarded as
substantial, if notprofound.
Two key factors have joined to bring thisabout. One is the end
of the Cold War. With itspassing the United States lacks an evident
ratio-nale in fashioning its foreign policy.1 The otherfactor is
technological. Advances in communica-tion technology have created a
capacity to broad-cast live from anywhere on Earth. As a result,
thevacuum left by the end of the Cold War has beenfilled by a
foreign policy of media-specified crisismanagement.
While William Randolph Hearsts New YorkJournal and Joseph
Pulitzers World may havecreated the climate for war with Spain in
1898,the extent, depth, and speed of the new globalmedia have
created a new species of effects. It isthis global, real-time
quality to contemporarymedia that separates the CNN effect from
ear-lier media effects on foreign policy. Yet exactlywhat those
effects are, when they are likely to beseen, and even whether they
exist at all is thesubject of intense debate.
Despite numerous symposia, books, articles,and research
fellowships devoted to unravelingthe CNN effect, success at
clarifying itthispaper will arguehas been minimal. In part, thismay
be due to the imprecise use of the termCNN effect. Writers too
often and too easilyslip back and forth between related but
otherwiseconceptually distinct understandings of the effector
effects in question. The first objective of thispaper is to clarify
exactly what is meant by theCNN effect. The second objective
concerns
policy. Just as we must speak more preciselyregarding the type
of effect we might expect tofind as a result of media coverage, so
too must wespeak more precisely about foreign policy. Ratherthan
treat foreign policy as an undifferentiatedmonolith, we need to
discriminate between dif-ferent foreign policies, each with its own
objec-tives, means, potential and actual costs (mea-sured in
dollars, lives, and political prestige) andsensitivities to media
and public pressures. Wemust develop, in other words, a greater
apprecia-tion for the possibility that different foreign poli-cy
objectives will present different types and lev-els of sensitivity
to different types of media. Atypology of policy-media effects will
be developedin the last half of this paper that demonstratesseveral
different potential consequences for poli-cy, some harmful, some
salubrious, dependingupon the nature of the policy objectives
andmedia content. A matrix of media effects, policytypes, and
objectives is offered last.
Differentiating Several CNN EffectsFor many journalists,
policy-makers, and
scholars, there really is little doubt that mediaprofoundly
affect the foreign policy process.Former Defense Secretary James
Schlesinger, forexample, has argued that in the post-Cold Warera
the United States has come to make foreignpolicy in response to
impulse and image. Inthis age image means television, and
policiesseem increasingly subject, especially in democra-cies, to
the images flickering across the televisionscreen.2 A
commonly-cited example is theClinton administrations response to
the mortarattack on a Sarajevo market in February 1994that killed
sixty-eight people.3
Despite the frequency, volume, and intuitiveappeal of this
argument, a growing number ofscholars and commentators have begun
to ques-tion whether media actually do have the abilityto affect
the foreign policy process as presumed.4The key variable to medias
effect on foreign poli-cy is not the presence or absence of
cameras, butrather the presence or absence of political
leader-ship. James Hoge, Jr., editor of Foreign Affairs,
forexample, argues that while a CNN effect of somesort may have
once existed immediately follow-ing the end of the Cold War, it no
longer does, orat least not to the same extent.
CLARIFYING THE CNN EFFECT: AN EXAMINATION OF MEDIA
EFFECTSACCORDING TO TYPE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
by Steven Livingston
Steven Livingston was a Fellow at the Shorenstein Center inthe
Spring of 1996. He is Associate Professor of PoliticalCommunication
and International Affairs and can bereached at: The School of Media
and Public Affairs,The George Washington University,801 22nd
Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052.Telephone:
(202)[email protected]
-
2 Clarifying the CNN Effect
It seems to me that about two years ago we reachedthe high-water
mark on standing in awe over thepotential CNN effect on things.
Since then, therehave been a lot of conferences and things
writtenthat have essentially gotten us to where we aretoday, which
is that television news has a tacticaleffect from time to time, but
not a strategic one;that it operates more when humanitarian issues
areat hand than when actual security issues are.5
Hoges point is important. Whether his specif-ic assertions are
correct is less important thanthe approach he takes to the
question. He is sug-gesting that effects on policy are conditional
andspecific to policy types and objectives.
A reading of the growing literature suggests atleast three
conceptually distinct and analyticallyuseful understandings of
medias effect on theforeign policy process.
We may speak of the CNN effect as 1) a poli-cy agenda-setting
agent, 2) an impediment tothe achievement of desired policy goals,
and 3)an accelerant to policy decisionmaking. Eachroughly
corresponds to various stages of the use-ful, though slightly
contrived, notion of a linearpolicy process. The initial
formulation of policycorresponds with concerns that media are
policyagenda-setting agents. Secondly, policy imple-mentation
corresponds with concerns thatmedia may serve as accelerants of the
process orimpediments to the achievement of policyobjectives.
(Figure One provides an outline ofthese effects.)
It is important to keep in mind that each ofthese possible
effects may be evident over
timesometimes a very short timeon a singlepolicy issue. It is
possible, for example, thatmedia as policy agenda-setters may raise
theprominence of an issue, placing it before higher-level
policymakers. It may then shorten thetime those policymakers have
to deal with orresolve the issue (accelerant). Finally, it
maythenwith coverage of some traumatic event ordisclosure of
tactically important information,impede the development or
implementation ofpolicy meant to address the problem. U.S. policyin
Somalia, in some measure, fits this mold.These are, nevertheless,
analytically distincteffects, and as I will argue later, each is
likely tobe associated with different types of policy. Eachwill be
taken up in turn.6
Media as AccelerantOne of the potential effects of global,
real-time
media is the shortening of response time for deci-sionmaking.
Decisions are made in haste, some-times dangerously so.
Policymakers decry theabsence of quiet time to deliberate choices,
reachprivate agreements, and mold the publics under-standing.7
Instantaneous reporting of events,remarks State Department
SpokespersonNicholas Burns, often demands instant analysisby
governments . . . In our day, as events unfoldhalf a world away, it
is not unusual for CNNState Department correspondent Steve Hurst
toask me for a reaction before weve had a chanceto receive a more
detailed report from ourembassy and consider carefully our
options.8
Former Secretary of State James A. Baker, IIIhighlights this
understanding of the CNN effect.
Accelerant Media shortens decision-making response
time.Televisiondiplomacy evident. During time of war, live, global
televisionoffer potential security-intelligence risks. But media
may alsobe a force multiplier, method of sending signals. Evident
inmost foreign policy issues to receive media attention.
Impediment Two types: 1. Emotional, grisly coverage may
underminemorale. Government attempts to sanitize war (emphasis
onvideo game war), limit access to the battlefield.2. Global,
real-time media constitute a threat to operationalsecurity.
Agenda Setting Emotional, compelling coverage of atrocities or
humanitarian Agency crises reorder foreign policy priorities.
Somalia, Bosnia and
Haiti said to be examples.
Figure 1. Conceptual Variations of CNN Effect
-
Steven Livingston 3
The one thing it does, he says, is to drivepolicymakers to have
a policy position. I wouldhave to articulate it very quickly. You
are in areal-time mode. You dont have time toreflect.9 His adviser
and former press secretary,Margaret Tutwiler, echoes his
assessment:Time for reaction is compressed. Analysis
andintelligence-gathering is out in the new worldof global
media.10
Richard Haass, former member of theNational Security Council and
one of PresidentBushs closest advisers during the Persian
Gulfconflict, also notes this effect, saying thatCNN has changed
the concept of a daily newscycle. We no longer have the old
rhythms,everything is telescoped. So, if he (SaddamHussein) was
going to get out there at 4:00 or5:00 in the afternoon, we had to
get out by 4:30or 5:00 in order to make sure that the eveningnews
was not a disaster or that people in theMiddle East some seven or
eight hours aheaddidnt go to sleep thinking that somehowSaddam had
made some great new offer, whenin fact he really hadnt.11
Understood as an accelerant to the policyprocess, global,
real-time media have also had aneffect on the operation of the
foreign policybureaucracy, particularly intelligence agenciesand
desk officers in the State Department.Former presidential press
secretary MarlinFitzwater remarked, In most of these kinds
ofinternational crises now, we virtually cut outthe State
Department and the desk officers . . .Their reports are still
important, but they dontget here in time for the basic decisions to
bemade.12 Intelligence agencies now must com-pete with news
organizations, thus speeding uptheir assessments, and be prepared
to defendtheir assessments against the evidence presentedon
television or other real-time media, such asthe Internet and
telephone.
While often treated as a detriment to goodpolicy, Haass has
argued that the availability ofglobal, real-time television can
just as well beconsidered an asset.
People are looking at the medias impact as adowner, . . . a
problem for policymakers to copewith. That is true. But it was also
an opportunity.One of the things about the CNN effect for peo-ple
like me at the time (of the Persian Gulf war)was it gave you some
real opportunities. One waspenetration. CNN gave you tremendous
access tomarkets that normally you couldnt get to.13
Besides the Middle East, it was useful, saidHaass, in sending
signals into Europe. And itgave us a real capacity to reach people
at home.The media which brought information ininstantaneously also
gave us the chance torespond and to get our message out
instanta-neously. This had consequences, in Haasssview, but not of
the sort supposed by thoselamenting the CNN effect. We felt we
couldmanage public opinion in this country and thatwe could manage
the alliance, or the coalitiondimensions of the war, as well as get
to the Iraqipeople and the Arab world. Much of the time,global,
real-time media offered opportunities fora policymaker, rather than
only presenting prob-lems.14 This more inclusive understanding
ofthe CNN effect was evident even at the dawn ofthe global reach of
media over thirty years ago.
During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, theKennedy
administration had several days duringwhich the public knew nothing
of the threatlooming over the horizon. According to
historianMichael Beschloss, Kennedys successors mightwell look back
longingly at the episode, forKennedy had the luxury of operating in
whatthey would probably consider to be the halcyonage before modern
television news coverage.15Kennedy used the first six days of the
crisis toconvene his advisers and rationally consider theoptions in
quiet, without public hysteria.16
What is often overlooked, however, is theconstructive role
played by the real-time, glob-al media, such as they were in 1962,
in endingthe crisis. At the time, government-to-govern-ment
communication between Moscow andWashington was so primitive,
according toBeschloss, it took six to eight hours to send
andtranslate messages. In an attempt to overcomethis barrier, and
to side-step the KGB andSoviet military, Khrushchev began sending
mes-sages to the Americans via Radio Moscow,which he knew was
constantly monitored bythe United States. Robert McNamara
recalledthat on Sunday, October 28, the day the crisiswas finally
defused,
He (Khrushchev) instructed that the public radiotransmitter in
Moscow be held open for his mes-sage. And his message was sent over
that so that itwould avoid the long interval of coding and
decod-ing . . . It was to eliminate that time gap of six oreight
hours that Khrushchev insisted that the finalmessage be transmitted
immediately, because hefeared that we were engaged at that moment
intime in initiating military action.17
-
4 Clarifying the CNN Effect
Meanwhile, CBS News Moscow correspon-dent Marvin Kalb, having
anticipatedKhrushchevs announcement, secured a line toNew York to
coincide with the key RadioMoscow broadcast that morning. As Kalb
simul-taneously translated Radio Moscows announce-ment, President
Kennedy and his advisers lis-tened in the White House.18
Ironically, it seems, the pre-global televisionhalcyon age
included a scramble to find ameans to achieve what is today one of
the chiefcharacteristics of the CNN effect: accelerated,real-time
diplomacy.
Today, the instantaneous transmission ofdiplomatic signals via
global media is routine.Tutwiler points out that other
governmentswatched her briefings with great care, lookingfor
nuanced policy shifts. Consequently, theState Department would use
this to theiradvantage to inform their counterparts overseasof U.S.
reactions or intentions.19 StateDepartment spokesperson Nicholas
Burns doesthe same thing.
I sometimes read carefully calibrated statements tocommunicate
with those governments with whichwe have no diplomatic
relationsIraq, Iran, Libyaand North Korea . . . . Given the
concentration ofjournalists in Washington and our position in
theworld, the U.S. is uniquely situated to use televi-sion to our
best advantage, with our friends as wellas our adversaries.20
While the new environment constitutes a sig-nificant change to
the slower, more deliberateprocesses of yesteryear, it is less
clear whetherthis is necessarily injurious to sound policymak-ing.
Rather than a liability, a resourceful diplo-mat may just as well
find global, real-timemedia an asset.
Media as ImpedimentThere are at least two types of
media-related
policy impediments. One is rooted in theinhibiting effects of
emotional coverage andoperates through the agency of public
opinion,both actual and latent. The other is rooted inthe potential
for global, real-time media to com-promise operational security,
the veil of secrecyespecially needed with some types of
militaryoperations. We will take up each of these typesin order.a)
As an Emotional Inhibitor
Following the decisive American military victory in the Persian
Gulf, President Bushenthusiastically remarked, By God, weve
kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.21At the heart of
the Vietnam syndrome was theconcern that media coverage had the
potentialto undermine public support for an operationand erode
troop morale on the ground. As such,perceived American credibility
and resolve inthe world was undermined.
Yet two years later, in October 1993, picturesof a dead American
soldier being draggedthrough the streets of Mogadishu revived
someof the same fears and concerns evoked byVietnam. The Clinton
administrations decisionto withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia as
soon aspossible was the more immediate result.22 AsThe New York
Times put it, the recent fightingcrystallized American public
opinion on anissue that previously was not particularly press-ing
to the average citizen. And the pictures of adead American soldier
being dragged throughthe streets of Mogadishu seem to have made
itall but impossible for Mr. Clinton to changemany minds. Indeed,
public opinion pollsfound that more than half the respondents
didnot approve of President Clintons handling ofthe situation in
Somalia.23
During the Gulf war, fear of an unsanitizedpresentation of the
carnage of battle was per-haps central to the militarys efforts to
controlthe media through the use of press pools andmilitary
escorts. John J. Fialka, a Wall StreetJournal correspondent,
remarked, We wereescorted away from most of the violencebecause the
bodies of the dead chopped up byartillery, pulverized by B-52
raids, or laceratedby friendly fire dont play well,
politically.24Military planners insisted, on the other hand,that
they were motivated by a legitimate con-cern for operational
security, as well as a con-cern for the well-being of the
journalists. Theyfurther pointed to the logistical
difficultiesencountered in accommodating the large num-ber of
journalists who wanted to cover the war.
But for many the impression remained that atthe heart of the
militarys concern was thecapacity of media to undermine public
andpolitical support for an operation involvingcasualties. Ted
Koppel, speaking of the PersianGulf war, remarked, Im not sure the
publicsinterest is served by seeing what seems to havebeen such a
painless war, when 50,000 to100,000 people may have died on the
other side.Obviously this was done so they could maintainthe
closest possible control over public opinion,to increase support
for the war.25
Control of the reporter was a central compo-nent of the
militarys effort to limit the potential
-
Steven Livingston 5
for public relations damage. Just before theground war there
were 25 to 30 pool reporters tocover six Army and two Marine
divisions nearthe Kuwaiti border. No reporter from The NewYork
Times bureau in Saudi Arabia was givenofficial access to a pool
slot before February 10.26
Use of officially sanctioned pools had a par-ticularly
pronounced effect on the availability ofpictures during combat. One
editor at the timewas quoted as remarking, The pictures comingout
of pool arrangements are quite ordinary.There are no negative
aspects to the war.27
Tomorrow's wars will most likely look morelike the conflicts in
Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti,and less like the Gulf war. In such
circum-stances, journalists will already be in the zoneof conflict,
making their control far more diffi-cult for military planners.
Yet, in the long-run,pictures may not matter as much as context
andleadership. The key variable may be the pres-ence of a clearly
articulated policy and a publicsense that the policy is worth it.
Colin Powellexpressed this point:
Theyre (the American people) prepared to takecasualties. And
even if they see them on live tele-vision it will make them madder.
Even if they seethem on live television, as long as they believe
itsfor a solid purpose and for a cause that is under-standable and
for a cause that has something to dowith an interest of ours. They
will not understandit, if it cant be explained, which is the point
I havemade consistently over the years. If you cantexplain it to
the parents who are sending theirkids, youd better think twice
about it.28
Media scholars suggest that government offi-cials and agencies
are becoming more sophisti-cated in their effort at offering the
sort of credi-ble explanations referred to by Powell andthat in
most circumstances they are assisted intheir efforts by the
American media.29 Forexample, political scientist W. Lance
Bennetthas found that the media closely index theircoverage to the
contours of official debate andcontroversy.30 That is, the levels
of criticismdirected at government policy rises and falls
inaccordance with the intensity of criticisms ema-nating out of
other institutionally-based officialsources. As Bennett and
political scientist JarolManheim put it, As a practical matter,
newsorganizations routinely leave policy framing andissue emphasis
to political elites (generally, gov-ernment officials).31
b) As a Threat to Operational SecurityWhile it may still be an
open question
whether media content, live or otherwise, hasthe ability to
hinder the pursuit of desired policygoals because of their
emotional freight, the factremains that some operations are
extremely sen-sitive to media exposure. Maintaining opera-tional
security during conventional war and tac-tical operations, such as
anti-terrorism opera-tions, is essential. In these circumstances,
mediahave the technological capacity to hinder sometypes of
operations simply by exposing them.
This is true, for example, in conventionalwarfare. As
communication equipment becomesmore mobile and global in its reach,
and real-time reporting of all types becomes more perva-sive, the
danger to operational security willbecome more pronounced. It isnt
like WorldWar II, when George Patton would sit around inhis tent
with six or seven reporters and muse,with the results transcribed
and reviewedbefore being released, remarks Powell. If a com-mander
in Desert Shield sat around in his tentand mused with a few CNN
guys and pool guysand other guys, its in 105 capitals a
minutelater.32 In the process of covering an operation,news
organizations may reveal information thatleads to unnecessary
casualties and even thepossible failure of a mission.
This is not to say that journalists will seek (orhave sought) to
deliberately expose operations.The disclosures are inadvertent.
Retired generalNorman Schwarzkopf has told of such a case.
It was reported (by an American television net-work) that at
this time, right now, we are witness-ing an artillery duel between
the 82nd AirborneDivision and the Iraqis. If they (the Iraqis) had
anykind of halfway decent intelligence, they wouldhave made note of
the time . . . and through theirintelligence network they would
have pinpointedthe location of the 82nd Airborne. Until that
timeeverything they ever saw of the 82nd was on theeast coast. All
of a sudden they would have foundthe 82nd way to the west and it
would certainlyhave telegraphed something to them.33
Shortcomings in Iraqi military intelligencemeant they were not
able to take advantage of akey piece of information that would
haveinformed them the American military wasmassing 200 miles west
of Kuwait City.
In summary, there are two understandings ofmedia
effect-as-policy-impediment. One is psy-chological and concerns the
corrosive effect
-
6 Clarifying the CNN Effect
some types of media content may have on pub-lic opinion,
particularly public support for war.The seriousness of this
potential effect is opento question. As Colin Powell remarked,
picturesof dead American soldiers, as one example, mayjust make the
American public madder. Theother, and potentially far more profound
effectinvolves violations of operational security, as wehave just
reviewed.
Media as Agenda Setting AgentsOf the presumed media effects on
foreign pol-
icy, perhaps the most disturbing is the sugges-tion that the
U.S. foreign policy agenda itself isat times merely a reflection of
news content.This is not to say that issues are necessarily
cre-ated ex nihilo by media content, but rather thatpriorities are
reordered by coverage.34 Whatwould have been handled by mid-level
officialsin a routine fashion instead become the focus ofhigh-level
decisionmaking. Former Secretary ofState James Baker makes the
point this way,
All too often, television is what determines whatis a crisis.
Television concluded the break-up ofthe former Yugoslavia and the
fighting in theBalkans was a crisis, and they began to cover itand
cover it. And so the Clinton administration(was left) to find a way
to do something. (Yet) theydidnt do that in Rwanda where the
excesses wereevery bit as bad, if not worse. And so, you have toask
yourself, does that mean you should do foreignpolicy by television?
Are we going to define crisesaccording to what is covered, by what
the editorsdecide to cover? I dont think we should do that.35
This has been a constant theme of criticismsince the end of the
Cold War. JamesSchlesinger argues this when he remarks,National
policy is determined by the plight ofthe Kurds or starvation in
Somalia, as it appearson the screen. Jessica Mathews makes thesame
point this way, The process by which aparticular human tragedy
becomes a crisisdemanding a response is less the result of
arational weighing of need or of what is remedia-ble than it is of
what gets on nightly newsshows.36
Most of the post-Cold War interventionsSomalia, Haiti, and
Bosniahave been done inthe name of humanitarianism, what
MichaelMandelbaum has referred to as the foreign poli-cy of Mother
Teresa, or foreign policy as abranch of social work.37 In his view,
foreignpolicy as social work, particularly during the
Clinton administration, has tended to be aboutperipheral issues.
It intends
to relieve the suffering caused by ethnic cleansingin Bosnia,
starvation in Somalia, and oppression inHaiti. Historically the
foreign policy of the UnitedStates has centered on American
interests, definedas developments that could affect the lives
ofAmerican citizens. Nothing that occurred in thesethree countries
fit that criterion.38
It is debatable whether this is a fair criticismof the Clinton
administrations foreign policy. Inparticular, Mandelbaums reliance
on a tradition-al values/national interests dichotomy is
prob-lematic, as Stanley Hoffmann pointed out in hisresponse to the
argument.39 National interestsare not self-evident, but are instead
constructsthe choices and preferences made by nationalleaders.
Because the selections are often contro-versial, those who support
them cover themwith the mantle of the national interest, andthose
who do not back them argue, likeMandelbaum, that they deal with
developmentsthat could (not) affect the lives of . . . citizensand
thus are not in the national interest.40
Whatever its shortcomings, Mandelbaumsargument does point us to
the fact that of all thehumanitarian crises found at any given
point intime, the inclination will be to address thosewhich happen
to be featured on television,rather than those which are the more
severe, orthose with the greatest likelihood of successfulredress
by outside intervention. To put it anoth-er way,
media-as-agenda-setting-agent arguesthat the choices and selections
of national inter-ests are too heavily weighted in favor of
whathappens to get covered by CNN or other media.
These are important considerations, for clear-ly the conditions
that have given rise to human-itarian interventions by the United
States in thepast are only likely to grow more severe in thefuture.
According to a 1996 study by the UnitedStates Mission to the United
Nations, regionalconflicts in the mid-1990s have put 42
millionpeople around the world at risk of disease andstarvation.41
If media coverage of crises has hadan effect on U.S. foreign policy
in the past, assome argue, then the potential for similar effectsin
the future are great.
Television, for a variety of commercial andprofessional reasons,
is drawn to the dramaticvisuals found in mostbut not
allhumanitari-an emergencies. The pitched battles
betweengun-totting teenagers in the streets of somehitherto unheard
of place, massive flows of
-
Steven Livingston 7
refugees, the pathos of a starving child, all makefor compelling
television. Once engaged, oncethe U.S. foreign policy priorities
align them-selves with media coverage, the other two
mani-festations of the CNN effect may come intoplay. Decisionmaking
may be accelerated andrash. Events may cascade out of control,
leadingto confrontations for which the public and poli-cymakers
themselves are psychologically unpre-pared. Vivid imagery, in such
a scenario, drivesboth ends of policy, to reiterate an earlier
quote.First there is the politics of humanitarian inter-vention and
then of disillusioned withdrawal.42
While this version of the CNN effect has themost profound
potential consequences, it is alsothe most problematic for several
reasons.
First, what few empirical investigations existhave not borne out
the contention. AndrewNatsios, the Bush administration official
whoheaded-up the relief effort in Somalia, hasargued that if one
examines the record ofAmerican policy involvement in overseas
humanitarian crises, one comes away with theconclusion that the
so-called CNN effect hastaken on more importance than it deserves
as anexplanation for responses emanating from thepolicymaking
process in Washington.43
The majority of humanitarian operations areconducted without
media attention. In 1991, forexample, the United States Agency
forInternational Developments Office of ForeignDisaster Assistance
and Food for Peace Programhad shipped some 12,000 tons of food
toSomalia. This was well before the news mediadiscovered the crisis
there in August of the fol-lowing year.44 Furthermore, the eventual
mediacoverage itself was the consequence of officialactions.
Specifically, it resulted from the effortsof one part of the
foreign policy community(Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and
itsallies in Congress and portions of the StateDepartment) to
pursuade other elements of theforeign policy community (primarily
senior deci-sion makers in the White House) to sign on to
25
20
15
10
5
0
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
12/3012/1011/2012/1010/109/208/308/107/20
A
250
200
150
100
50
0
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
7/20 8/10 8/30 9/20 10/10 10/30 11/20 12/10 12/30
Figure 2.
Aggregated Broadcast
Network News Coverage
of Somalia:
July-December 1992
(a) Daily story count; (b) cumulativestory count. A, U.N.
secretary gener-als report to Security Council; B,U.N. Security
Councils report onSomalia; C, OFDA press confer-ence: Washington,
DC; D, WhiteHouse announces relief effort; E,U.S. airlift
commences; F, first flightsinto Somalia; G, President Bushadvocates
use of security forces; H,Bush approves 28,000 U.S. troops;I,
secretary of state tells U.N. thatUnited States will send troops;
J,U.N. Security Council authorizestroops; K, first U.S. troops go
ashore in Somalia.
2a
2b
-
8 Clarifying the CNN Effect
desired policy goals. The media were used bysome officials to
get the attention of other offi-cials, a tried and true practice of
bureaucraticpolitics that predates CNN by many years.45The great
majority of Somalia coverage followedrather than preceded official
action.
Of the events noted on the timeline presentedin Figures two (a)
and two (b), the White HousesAugust 14 announcement (point
designationD) that it would use U.S. aircraft to sendrelief
supplies precipitated the first wave ofAmerican news media
attention to Somalia,which jumped fivefold almost overnight. As
anexecutive at NBC said at the time, With theinternational relief
effort growing, the Somaliasituation is likely to be examined more
often bythe network news shows in the coming weeks.Were going to
cover it more.46 The announce-ment of the planned deployment of
troops two
months later (point designation H) caused asecond expansion of
coverage. In both instances,media attention followed official
actions.
This trend was even more pronounced withCNN coverage, evident in
Figures three (a) andthree (b).
CNN coverage of Somalia prior to theannouncement of the airlift
of emergency foodand medicine in August (notation E) was spo-radic
to non-existent. By logical necessity, it isdifficult to conceive
how media could have beenthe cause of policy developments in
Somalia in1992.47 Media were doing as they have for gener-ations:
they followed the troops.
While disease and starvation are commonlyseen by American
journalists in Africa and else-where in the developing world,48
they are notcommon news stories. In fact, it may be thatjournalists
tend to dismiss humanitarian crises
Figure 3.
CNN Daily Coverage
of Somalia:
July-December 1992
(a) Daily count by minutes andstory; (b) cumulative count by
min-utes and story. A, U.N. secretarygenerals report to Security
Council;B, U.N. Security Councils report onSomalia; C, OFDA press
confer-ence: Washington, DC; D, WhiteHouse announces relief effort;
E,U.S. airlift commences; F, firstflights into Somalia; G,
PresidentBush advocates use of securityforces; H, Bush approves
28,000U.S. troups; I, secretary of statetells U.N. that United
States willsend troops; J, U.N. SecurityCouncil authorizes troops;
K, firstU.S. troops go ashore in Somalia.
Figures 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b from Steven Livingston and Todd
Eachus, Humanitarian Crises and U.S. Foreign Policy:Somalia and the
CNN Effect Reconsidered, Political Comunication, Volume 12, pp.
413-429.
STORIES MINUTES200
150
100
50
0
AB
C
DE
FG
H
I
J
K
12/3012/1011/2010/3010/109/208/308/107/20
STORIES MINUTES2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
AB
C
DE
FG
H
I
J
K
7/20 8/10 8/30 9/20 10/10 10/30 11/20 12/10 12/30
3a
3b
-
Steven Livingston 9
because they are so much a part of the land-scape in some
regions of the world. In 1993,when approximately 50,000 people were
killedin political fighting between Hutus and Tutsisin Burundi,
American broadcast television net-works ignored the story. When
regional leadersmet in Dar es Salam in April 1994 in an attemptto
reach a regional peace accord, only CNNmentioned the meeting. Yet a
more sophisticat-ed analysis of events in Rwanda that samemonth
required understanding that fear of suc-cessful peace talks
encouraged Hutu extremistsin Rwanda to launch their campaign of
carnageagainst Tutsis and Hutu moderates who
favoredaccommodation.49
Overall, the lack of media coverage of human-itarian emergencies
is most striking.50 Figurefour presents the percentage of mentions
of all13 of the most severe humanitarian emergenciescombined and
total individual mentions in TheNew York Times, Washington Post,
ABC Newsprogramming, CNN news programming, andNPRs All Things
Considered and MorningEdition from January 1995 to mid-May
1996.
This figure, of course, does not capturechanges in news coverage
over time, as FiguresTwo and Three did regarding Somalia, but it
doesclearly indicate the tendency of the Americannews media to give
uneven attention to humani-tarian crises. This is seen in the cases
of Liberiaand Sierra Leone. Next to Tajikistan, they each
received the least attention by the news organi-zations
represented here.51 Afghanistan and theSudan have more people at
risk than Bosnia, buttogether they received only 12 percent of
thetotal media coverage devoted to Bosnia alone.Tajikistan, with
one million people at risk, has alittle over one percent of the
media coveragedevoted to Bosnia alone. Put another way, of allnews
stories between January 1995 and May1996 concerning the thirteen
worst humanitari-an crises in the worldaffecting nearly 30 mil-lion
people, nearly half were devoted to theplight of the 3.7 million
people of Bosnia.52 Thisis not to dismiss their condition, but only
tomake the point that media coverage of humani-tarian crises is not
uniform, and, more impor-tantly is typically triggered by official
actionsand associated with the presence of U.S. troops.
The second reason the CNN effect may havetaken on more
importance than it deserves, touse Natsiosis's characterization, is
that if onelooks more closely at some of the more promi-nent
post-Cold War U.S. humanitarian inter-ventions, one is likely to
find equally com-pelling geostrategic reasons for the
intervention.This was certainly true of the response to theKurdish
refugee crises along the Iraqi borderwith Turkey following the
Persian Gulf war inthe spring of 1991.
President Bushs National Security Adviser,Brent Scowcroft
emphatically makes this point:
Figure Four
Percentage and Frequency of Total at Risk Per Country&
Percentage and Frequency of Total Coverage by News
Organizationof Each Listed Country
Country Percent atRisk(millions)
Percent ofMentionsin Times
Percent ofMentionsin Post
Percent ofMentionsby ABC
Percent ofMentionsby CNN
Percent ofMentionsBy NPR
Afghanistan 14 (4) 4.7 (274) 4.8 (225) 1.5 (19) 1.2 (57) 2.9
(57)Sudan 14 (4) 3.3 (190) 3.5 (166) 0.6 (8) 1.1 (54) 1.5
(31)Bosnia 13 (3.7) 45.8
(2,633)43.7(2,046)
66 (833) 66.7(3,062)
61.3(1,204)
Ethiopia 11 (3 - 4) 0.2 (15) 0.2 (10) 0 (0) 0 (3) 0.3 (6)Angola
9 (2.5) 2.0 (120) 3.0 (144) 0.7 (9) 0.4 (22) 1.7 (34)Rwanda 9 (2.5)
6.9 (401) 5.9 (277) 3.9 (49) 9.8 (150) 6.0 (118)Sierra Leone 6
(1.8) 1.0 (63) 1.6 (78) 0.3 (4) 0.5 (26) 1.0 (20)Liberia 5 (1.5)
2.8 (164) 3.2 (150) 2.5 (32) 1.0 (49) 2.3 (46)Iraq 5 (1.3 -
-
10 Clarifying the CNN Effect
We were actually quite cynical about mediasimpact. Media are too
fickle (to have animpact). Media attention to any given crisiscould
therefore be ridden-out by policy makers.Geopolitical factors, in
Scowcrofts view, weremore important concerning the implementationof
Operation Provide Comfort. Without Turkeyfactored in, with just
television pictures, I dontknow what our response would have been.
Wewere very sensitive to Turkeys anxiety aboutallowing the Kurds to
stay. That was fundamen-tally what motivated us.53 Turkey, a
staunchAmerican ally and a member of NATO, hasbeen in a long and
bloody guerrilla war with ele-ments of its own Kurdish population
in easternTurkey. The idea that thousands of Kurdishrefugees from
Iraq might become permanentlylocated in or near the border was
anathema tothe Turkish government.
James Baker made the same point, Oncethey (the Iraqi Kurdish
refugees) all went intoTurkey, it was important to get them back
toIraq.54 When Saddam Husseins survivingforces ruthlessly crushed
first the Shiite rebel-lion in the south and then the Kurdish
rebellionin the north in March 1991, the policy of theUnited States
was to let the rebellions fail,despite the gruesome pictures coming
out ofnorthern Iraq at the time. When asked if it wasaccurate to
suggest that U.S. policy at the timewas to not get involved,
regardless of what thepictures showed, Baker responded, Thatsright.
I think that is an accurate description. Itwould have been a
mistake to be involved.55For geopolitical reasons, the United
Statesallowed the rebellions to fail and implementeda policy
designed to resettle the Kurdishrefugees back in their towns and
villages innorthern Iraq. This was not done because ofpictures. It
was done because Turkey, a staunchally during the Persian Gulf war
and NATOpartner, needed it done for its stability and forthe
stability of the entire region.
The third reason the CNN effect as agendasetter may be
overstated is the formal policyrequirements put into place
following events inSomalia in 1993. Under the provisions
ofPresidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25),issued in May 1994,
approval of the use of U.S.forces for humanitarian relief missions
becamemore difficult. Before forces may be used, aseries of strict
conditions must be met, includ-ing: a clear statement of American
interests atstake in the operation, the approval of Congress,the
availability of funding for the operation, afixed date of
withdrawal of U.S. forces, and an
agreed upon command and control structure.56The first
application of PDD 25 was in
Rwanda. The U.S. Representative to the UN,Madeleine Albright,
insisted it would havebeen folly for a UN force to venture into
themaelstrom of killing.57 Despite the biblicalproportions of the
bloodshed, the United Statesdid not intervene until later, when
Huturefugees in camps in Zairesome of whomwere the perpetrators of
the massacre in thefirst placebegan dying from the effects
ofdehydration, malnutrition, and disease. Butfeeding and watering,
as it is sometimescalled in the Pentagon, and what we will call
aconsensual humanitarian operation below, isa considerably
different policy objective thanshooting and pacifying, as would
have beennecessary to stop the bloodshed and possiblyavoid the
exodus of refugees. It would haveinvolved far higher risks and
potential costs,measured on several scales.
There are at least three understandings ofthe CNN effect: media
as an accelerant to theprocess, as an inhibitor, and as an agenda
set-ter. The next step is to clarify further the rela-tionship
between these various possible effectsand different policy
types.
Types of Intervention
Eight types of military interventions andtheir possible relation
with one or another ofthe media effects outlined above will
bereviewed next. The objective simply is to illus-trate the thesis,
not to offer a comprehensivereview of potential media effects on
all policytypes. It is intended to stimulate thoughtanchored in a
more refined understanding ofmedia and policy interaction. The
policy typesreviewed are conventional warfare, special oper-ations
and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC),strategic deterrence, tactical
deterrence, peace-making, peacekeeping, imposed
humanitarianoperations, and consensual humanitarian
operations.58
As one moves from top to bottom of FigureFour, one sees reduced
potential costs resulting from failure, measured in money andlives,
andless preciselyin political prestige,international standing, and
confidence felt byalliance partners. Beginning with peace making,as
one moves toward the bottom of the figure,one finds policies
designed to respond to crisesstemming from war or other
human-createdconditions. Failed states or civil wars such as
inSomalia, the Sudan, and Zaire offer examples.
-
Steven Livingston 11
1) Conventional WarfareThe stakes are highest in conventional
war-
fare, which also generates the greatest mediaand public
interest. Reprising the difficultiesfound between the military and
the media inwartime is not necessary here.59 Experience inrecent
wars indicates that when and where pos-sible, the military will
attempt to control themovements of journalists and the content
oftheir reports, behavior rooted in the two con-cerns outlined
above: fear that the wrong pic-tures will undermine public or
congressionalsupport for the effort and, second, that journal-ists
will inadvertently disclose tactical or strate-gic information to
the enemy.
Pool systems, prior clearance of dispatches,and other forms of
censorship will continue tobe a part of military planning for
conventional
warfare. At the same time, high public interestand the
journalists ambition and sense of inde-pendent professionalism will
lead to efforts toavoid and undermine the militarys attempts
tocontrol them. The media will be assisted inthese efforts by the
greater mobility provided tothem by smaller, light-weight equipment
capa-ble of point-to-point transmissions from any-where to anywhere
on Earth.
In conventional warfare, media are most like-ly to serve as
accelerants and impediments inthe policy process. It is highly
unlikely thatmedia content alone might in some fashion leadthe
United States into a conventional war. Thedegree to which media
serve as accelerants todecisionmaking in war, and the degree to
whichthis is necessarily injurious cannot be answeredin the
abstract. The answer depends on the cir-
Figure 5.Intervention Types and Accompanying Media
Considerations
Policy Goals &Objectives
Likely Media Interest Government Policy Likely Media Effects
Public Opinion
Use of Force
Conventional Warfare Destruction of enemyand his
war-fightingcapability.
Extremely high. High degree ofattempted mediacontrol.Indexed
news
Accelerant,impediment (bothtypes).
High public interestand attentiveness to it
Strategic Deterrence Maintain status quo.Ex.: Cold war.Korean
Peninsula.
Moderate to highinterest. Routinizedcoverage.
Routine newsinteraction. WhiteHouse, DoD, Statebriefings,
etc.
During stability, littleeffect. Accelerateduring periods
ofinstability.
Scrutiny only byattentive public.Expansion of baseduring
instability.
Tactical Deterrence Meet challenge tostatus quo.Example:
DesertShield. PRC-Taiwan,March 1996.
Moderate to highinterest but episodic.
Controlled butcooperative. Forcemultiplier.
All three effects, butnot necessarilyinjurious.
Attentive publicscrutiny. Latent publicopinion a concern
topolicy makers
SOLIC Counterterrorism,hostage rescue,specialized
operations.
High interest,particularly hostagesituations, someterrorism.
Secrecy. Barring of allaccess.
Impediment(Operational securityrisk).
Little to no publicawareness in mostcases.
Peace Making Third party impositionof political solution byforce
of arms.Example: LateSomalia, Yugoslavia.
High interest at initialstages of operation.Variation
afterwarddependent on level ofstability.
Volatile conditions.Danger in reporting.Access with
risk.Impediment (bothtypes).
Attentive publicscrutiny. Latent publicopinion a concern
topolicy makers
Peace Keeping Bolster an acceptedpolitical solution bypresence
of third party.
Moderate interestunless accord isdestabilized.
Generally unrestrictedaccess to theater ofoperation.
Impediment(emotional impedimentmost likely).
Attentive publicscrutiny. Latent publicopinion a concern
topolicy makers
Imposed HumanitarianOperations
Forceful, apolitical aidpolicy
Low /moderate interestunless violence ensues.
Volatile conditions.Reporting risky.
Impediment (emotionalimpediment mostlikely). Attentivepublic
scrutiny. Latentpublic opinion aconcern to policymakers
ConsensualHumanitarianOperations
Agreed humanitarianassistance.
Initial operation metby moderate to lowinterest.
Unrestricted, evenencouraged mediacoverage.
Media effect unlikely. Attentive publicscrutiny.
Operations Other Than War
-
12 Clarifying the CNN Effect
cumstances and the resourcefulness of the poli-cymakers. The
same is true of the possibilitythat pictures may undermine public
support forthe war. As Colin Powell remarked, picturesmay just as
well make people madder.
The media effect of greatest concern to themilitary in
conventional warfare is their abilityto provide adversaries
sensitive information. Inan era of highly mobile, decentralized,
global,real-time media, the risks to operational securityare
considerable.
2) Strategic DeterrenceDeterrence may be defined as the
persuasion
of ones opponent that the costs and/or risks of agiven course of
action he might take outweighits benefits.60 Persuasion, of course,
involvescommunication. The idea is to communicate awillingness to
use force with the hope that,ironically, it will negate the
necessity to do so.The movement of force and a projected
willing-ness to use it is an important component ofdeterrence. It
can take the form of a long-termdeployment, such as was the case in
WesternEurope during the Cold War, the continued posi-tioning of
forces on the Korean Peninsula, themore recent stationing of U.S.
troops inMacedonia, and the stationing of mostly AirForce units in
southern Turkey. The objective isto maintain the status quo.61
Typically, media coverage of strategic deterrentoperations
during times of relative stability willbe highly routinized.
Regular correspondentsassigned to institutional settings such as
theState Department, the Defense Department,White House, and
foreign correspondents in theregions of the operation, will monitor
usuallyincremental developments over an extended timeperiod. The
level of media and public interestwill vary according to the
perceived stability ofthe situation, that is, according to the
perceivedeffectiveness of deterrence. Signs of instability,such as
the rash of North Korean incursions intothe demilitarized zone
between the two Koreas in1996, will spark an increase in attention.
Thelikely media effect is subtle. Elite debate and dia-log in
columns and opinion journals regarding thebest way to maintain (or
perhaps dissolve) thestatus quo is most common. Except during
timesof crisis, foreign policy debate of this sort is com-monly
left to the attentive public and policyelite. Television, with a
few exceptions, does notdwell on such matters, again except during
timesof instability, such as when the Eastern Bloc andSoviet Union
collapsed.
3) Tactical DeterrenceDeterrence may also come in the form of
a
rapid response to tactical developments, such asthe deployment
of a Navy carrier group or rapidreaction force to some trouble spot
in the world.In these circumstances media interest is likelyto be
extremely high, as is almost always thecase of troop deployments in
circumstances ofpotential conflict.
With tactical deterrence, global media areoften important and
valuable assets to the mili-tary, particularly when time is short
and condi-tions are critical. Admiral Kendell Pease, Chiefof
Information for the United States Navy, hascalled global media in
such circumstances aforce multiplier. After showing a CNN videoclip
of carrier-based U.S. fighter-bombers takingoff on a practice
bombing run against an impliedIraqi target during Desert Shield,
Peaseexplained that the Navy had arranged for aCNN crew to be
aboard the carrier to film thehardware in use and to send a message
toSaddam Hussein. The Iraqis, the Navy realizedand counted on,
monitored CNN.62 The samething is going on now, said Pease
inTaiwan.63 Prior to Taiwans March 1996 elec-tions, which China
opposed and threatened tostop with military force if necessary,
theClinton administration sent two aircraft carriergroups to the
seas off Taiwan. Television crewsaccompanying the Navy ships sent
pictures ofthe American defenders to the Chinese and therest of the
world.
By using media as a force multiplier in con-junction with
deterrent force, U.S. policy mak-ers are, in effect, attempting to
create a CNNeffect in the policymaking of a potential oractual
adversary. As Richard Haass noted at thebeginning of this paper,
global, real-time mediashould not be regarded solely as an
impedimentor obstacle to policy makers. It may just as wellbe an
asset.
4) SOLICSpecial operations and low-intensity conflict
(SOLIC) is a general term applied to an array ofmilitary
missions employing highly trained andspecialized commando forces.
Navy Seals, ArmyRangers, special operations wings of the AirForce,
and the Delta force offer examples ofunits typically involved in
SOLIC. SOLIC mis-sions include counter-terrorism operations,hostage
rescue, and during conventional war-fare, infiltration into enemy
territory. Duringthe Persian Gulf war, many of the Scud missile
-
Steven Livingston 13
batteries in Iraq were destroyed by special opera-tions units,
rather than by airstrikes.
SOLIC operations take place in hostile envi-ronments, are
usually limited in scope, and areconducted in an envelope of
extreme secrecy. Infact, for years the most elite of the
Americanmilitary units involved in counter-terrorism/hostage rescue
operations, Delta Force, was notpublically acknowledged. The
necessity of secre-cy makes SOLIC operations the most sensitiveto
media coverage. The disclosure of an opera-tion would, in all
likelihood, lead to its termina-tion. It is unlikely other forms of
media effectswould be associated with SOLIC, though it
isconceivable that special operations units may beactivated, for
example, in response to somehighly publicized situation involving
hostages.
5) PeacemakingWith peacemaking operations we begin a dis-
cussion of several non-traditional militarymissions, each
differentiated by subtle butimportant features. Peacemaking, also
some-times referred to as robust peacekeeping andaggravated
peacekeeping, presupposes thatone or more parties to a conflict are
not inter-ested in peace and do not agree to the presenceof
outsider peacekeepers. Ergo, such an outsideforce is a heavily
armed. On the other hand,while there is little or no peace in a
peacemak-ing environment, there is considerable restraintin the use
of force. Peacekeeping is distin-guished from conventional war by
its objectivesin using violence, if necessary. In war, the
objec-tive is to inflict massive destruction on anenemy. In
peacemaking, the goal is to create theconditions necessary for the
implementation ofan accord. In a sense, the goal of peacemaking
isto create the environment required for peace-keeping operations
discussed below.
The hostile, unstable nature of the peacemak-ing environment
means media and public inter-est is likely to be extremely high, at
least ini-tially. As with peacekeeping, if and when asense of
stability is established, media interestwill diminish accordingly.
Also as with peace-keeping, the most likely potential media
effectwith peacemaking is as an emotional impedi-ment. Casualties
may undermine public andelite support for the operation. Knowing
this,opponents of peace may deliberately targetpeacemaking forces.
Due to the hostile nature ofthe environment and the potential for
open con-flict between the peacemakers and one or moreof the
hostile forces in the war, operational
security is also a concern. Descriptions of peace-maker
capabilities may serve as a force multi-plier, but if it is too
detailed it may just as wellsuggest vulnerabilities of the
peacemaking force.Furthermore, it is feasible that in highly
unsta-ble, fluid situations, media content may acceler-ate
decisionmaking. Finally, it seems unlikely,particularly after
implementation of PDD 25,that media content alone will lead to
U.S.involvement in risky peacemaking operations.
6) Peacekeeping In peacekeeping missions, lightly-armed
forces
are deployed in a permissive environment tobolster a fragile
peace. A permissive environ-ment is one in which the outside
military forceis welcome in sufficient measure by all combat-ants
to allow for relative safe operation. Haassdescribes peacekeeping
as the deployment offorce in a largely consensual framework inwhich
there are at most only periodic, relativelyisolated, and
small-scale breakdowns of thepeace.64 Their role is relatively
passive.
As with all U.S. troop deployments, the newsmedia will show
considerable interest in peace-keeping operations, though after a
period ofapparent stability, media interest is likely toflag. U.S.
peacekeeping forces in Macedoniaoffer an example. Coverage, to the
degree thereis any, will be limited to the elite press, such asThe
New York Times. Television, at best, willpay only passing interest.
Media interest willrise in direct proportion to the sense of
potentialinstability. Put another way, the more fragile thepeace
the peacekeepers are there to protect, thegreater will be media and
public interest. If thesituation appears unstable, and political
leadershave not made the case that American nationalinterests are
involved in preserving the peace,media coverage of casualties may
quickly under-mine support for the mission. Here the mediaeffect is
an emotional impediment. Operationalsecurity, though a concern, is
not central.Peacekeeping missions are often transparentin any case,
an openness in operations that ismeant to suggest
evenhandedness.
7) Imposed Humanitarian InterventionsAs the title implies,
imposed humanitarian
interventions differ from peacekeeping opera-tions in that the
scope of their objectives ismore limited. Examples of imposed
humanitari-an interventions are Somalia after December1992 but
before the summer of 1993, Iraq sinceApril 1991, and in and around
Sarajevo in 1994.The objectives are limited to providing food,
-
14 Clarifying the CNN Effect
medicine, clean, safe water, and a secure butlimited
geographical location.65 Whereas themission of a peacekeeping
operation is to main-tain a fragile status quo (peace), and the
missionof a peacemaking operation is to impose a polit-ical
solution, by force of arms if necessary, onone or more sides to a
conflict, the mission ofan imposed humanitarian intervention is to
feedand care for a population in need.
In large measure, in these circumstances themilitary is used for
their technical capabilities,such as water purification, field
medicine, and,most importantly, logistical capabilities.
Withstrategic airlifters, the American military isunmatched in its
ability to move massiveamounts of cargo great distances to almost
anysort of terrain.
Media interest is likely to be quite high, particularly at the
beginning with the introduc-tion of U.S. troops, as discussed
earlier. Thiswill be particularly true if correspondents canoperate
safely in the secure zone established bythe military. One of the
very legitimate andunderstandable reasons so little coverage
wasgiven to the massacres in Rwanda prior to theGoma refugee
coverage was the inability of jour-nalists to move about safely in
Rwanda.66
Though media content alone is not likely tolead to an imposed
humanitarian intervention,it cannot be ruled out. The media effect
of great-est potential in imposed humanitarian missionsis as an
impediment. The argument for continu-ation of a policy with
possibly little or no directAmerican interest would be difficult to
sustainin the face of pictures of the injured and dead.
8) Consensual Humanitarian InterventionsConsensual humanitarian
intervention, as the
name implies, involve the use of the military inaddressing the
urgent needs of a distressed popu-lation. As with imposed
humanitarian interven-tions, consensual humanitarian
interventionsare intended to save lives, not alter political
cir-cumstances on the ground through the use offorce.67 The U.S.
response to a devastatingcyclone that hit Bangladesh on May 3,
1991offers an example. In the midst of OperationProvide Comfort in
northern Iraq, the U.S. mili-tary sent military teams to assist the
survivors.U.S. assistance to refugees in Goma, Zaire in1994 is
another example of a consensualhumanitarian intervention.
Consensual humanitarian interventions arerelatively low-cost,
not only in materialresources but also in terms of the
potentialpolitical capital at stake. Because American sol-diers are
working in a relatively permissiveenvironment, political leaders
face relatively lit-tle risk in deploying them on such a
mission.What risk there is may be found in a generalsense of unease
that pervades such missions, atleast with some, over the
possibility that mis-sion creep will lead to a deeper
involvement,as happened in Somalia. If truly consensual, andif it
remains so, there will probably be little sus-tained media interest
in the story.
Shifts in Media-Policy EffectsEach operation outlined above
tends to offer
different sensitivities to media content. Further,the potential
effects in question are interactive.Shifts in policy will produce
changes in mediacoverage, just as media coverage may changepolicy.
U.S. policy in Somalia offers an exampleof the dynamic interactive
nature of foreign pol-icy making and media coverage.
From late 1991 to about July 1992, the U.S.policy response to
the worsening conditions inSomalia was non-military in nature, with
reliefoperations working through the auspices of non-governmental
organizations, the Office ofForeign Disaster Assistance, the
InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, and UN agencies.As noted
above, during this time there was prac-tically no media attention
to Somalia. In August1992, the Bush administration undertook a
con-sensual humanitarian intervention, transportingrelief supplies
to Somalia using military cargoplanes. A small contingent of
security and othersupport personnel were also involved. With
ToddEachus, I have argued elsewhere that media con-tent had no
effect on this decision, contrary topopular belief. Instead, it
resulted from a numberof bureaucratic and domestic political
(presiden-tial campaign) considerations.68 That is not tosay that
media did not play a role in the unfold-ing policy developments.
With the introductionof American military personnel in August,media
coverage of Somalia skyrocketed, notbecause conditions had
worsened, but becauseAmericans were there.
The continued fighting and banditry inSomalia made the
environment there somethingless than consensual; not all of the
players on
-
Steven Livingston 15
the ground agreed that giving food and otherforms of aid to
those in need was necessarily agood idea. As a result, in December
the Bushadministration sent in Marines to provide secu-rity. At
that point the policy changed, for thethird time, and became an
imposed humanitari-an intervention. Media attention, as Figure
Twoindicates, rose accordingly.
Then, by the summer of 1993, the Clintonadministration and its
counterparts in the UNallowed the mission in Somalia to
becomesomething else again. It drifted into becoming apeacemaking
operation. The problem theadministration created for itself in the
processwas found in the fact that it had not put anappropriate
force structure on the groundthetroops and equipment necessary to
achieve thenew political mission. Whereas humanitarianmissions,
strictly speaking, do not pursue politi-cal objectives, at least
not in theory, peacemak-ing missions do. More importantly, the
Clintonadministration failed to build the political sup-port with
Congress, opinion leaders, and theAmerican public necessary for
sustaining amore demanding political mission in Somalia.As a
result, the policy was derailed in October1993, as is often said,
with the pictures of adead American body on macabre display
inMogadishu. Different policies with differenttypes and levels of
media scrutiny produced dif-ferent results.
ConclusionEach policy outlined above obviously has dif-
ferent objectives, actual and potential costs, andoperational
requirements. As a result, the levelof interest media have and the
potential conse-quence of that interest vary substantially.
Beforewe can make theoretical and empirical progressin
understanding the effects of media on foreignpolicy we must refine
the debate to meaningfulterms. The grand, interesting, and often
heateddebate about the CNN effect will continue tofail us. unless
we distill it into its constituentparts. That means speaking more
precisely aboutthe likely effects relative to specific
policies.
-
16 Clarifying the CNN Effect
1. James Schlesinger, Quest for a Post-Cold WarForeign Policy,
Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992. On-linewithout pagination. See also
Richard N. Haass,Paradigm Lost, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1995.
On-linewithout pagination.
2. James Schlesinger, Quest for a Post-Cold WarForeign Policy.
See also Richard N. Haass, ParadigmLost, Foreign Affairs, Winter
1995, on-line withoutpagination, and James F. Hoge, Jr.,
MediaPervasiveness, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1994, on-linewithout
pagination.
3. Charles Krauthammer, Intervention Lite: ForeignPolicy by CNN,
The Washington Post, February 18,1994, p. 25.
4. Nik Gowing, Real-time Television Coverage ofArmed Conflicts
and Diplomatic Crises: Does itPressure or Distort Foreign Policy
Decision Making?,Working Paper 94-1, The Joan Shorenstein Center
onthe Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. KennedySchool of
Government, Harvard University, p. 9. Seealso Johanna Neuman,
Lights, Camera, War: IsTechnology Driving International Politics?
(St. MartinsPress, 1995) and Warren Strobel, The CNN
Effect,American Journalism Review, May 1996, p. 32;Hearing Before
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.House of Representatives,
103rd Congress, second ses-sion, April 26, 1994, p. 5. See also For
the Record,The Washington Post, April 27, 1994, p. A22.
5. The Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation-George Washington
University conference on Military,Media, and Humanitarian Crises,
held on the campusof The George Washington University, May 5,
1995.
6. This does not exhaust the possibilities, of course.Murray
Edelman pointed out in several importantworks (Constructing the
Political Spectacle, PoliticalLanguage) that the policy process
often acts in reverseof what has just been implied. At times,
particular pol-icy goals are first identified by officials. Second,
a prob-lem of sufficient emotional or symbolic importance isthen
offered as a justification for adopting a set offavored
solutions.
For example, reducing Iraqs ability to conduct hos-tile actions
against its neighbors was a policy goal ofthe Bush administration
in the fall and winter of 1990.The administration needed to find
ways to frameAmerican interests there as something more com-pelling
than protecting oil. Secretary of State James A.Bakers Its jobs,
jobs, jobs just didnt do the trick.Instead, the administration and
its allies at Hill &Knowlton, a Washington public relations
firm, wereable to cast Saddam Hussein as Adolph Hitler and cre-ate
emotionally compelling but factually unsound sto-ries about Iraqi
soldiers removing Kuwaiti babies fromincubators (See William Dorman
and StevenLivingston in Taken By Storm, W. Lance Bennett and
David Paletz (eds.) (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress,
1994)). Desired policy was achieved by creatingcompelling news
stories and frames.
I do not mean to suggest that the analytical frame-work offered
here explains more than a portion of theforeign policy process. Not
all policy is the result ofmedia content. There are many sources of
policy. Andjust as often as media influences policy, media
them-selves are the instruments of policymakers. If weassume some
portion of policy and policy outcomes arethe result of media
content (knowing also that mediacontent is itself often a
reflection of policy), whatmight those effects be?
7. James F. Hoge, Jr., Media Pervasiveness, ForeignAffairs,
Summer 1994. On-line without pagination.
8. Nicholas Burns, Talking to the World AboutAmerican Foreign
Policy, The Harvard InternationalJournal of Press/Politics, Fall
1996. Vol. 1, No. 4. pp.10-14.
9. Author interview with James A. Baker III,Houston, Texas, May
13, 1996. See also James A. Baker,III, The Politics of Diplomacy:
Revolution, War &Peace, 1989-92 (G.P. Putnams Sons, 1995) p.
103.
10. Author interview with Margaret Tutwiler,Alexandria,
Virginia, March 29, 1996.
11. The Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation-George Washington
University conference on Military,Media, and Humanitarian Crises.
May 5, 1995.
12. Frank J. Stech, Winning CNN Wars, Parameters,Autumn 1994, p.
38.
13. The Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation-George Washington
University conference on Military,Media, and Humanitarian Crises.
May 5, 1995.
14. The Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation-George Washington
University conference on Military,Media, and Humanitarian Crises.
May 5, 1995.
15. Michael R. Beschloss, Presidents, Television, andForeign
Crises, (Washington, D.C.: The AnnenbergWashington Program, 1993)
p. 9.
16. Beschloss, Presidents, Television, and ForeignCrises, p.
10.
17. Ibid.
18. Author interview with Marvin Kalb, ShorensteinCenter on the
Press, Politics and Public Policy, HarvardUniversity, May 29,
1996.
19. Author interview with Tutwiler. See also Baker,Politics of
Diplomacy, p. 34.
20. Nicholas Burns, Talking to the World AboutAmerican Foreign
Policy, The Harvard InternationalJournal of Press/Politics, Fall
1996. Vol. 1, No. 4. pp.10-14.
Endnotes
-
Steven Livingston 17
21. Maureen Dowd, War Introduces a Tougher Bushto the Nation,
The New York Times, March 2, 1991.How much this has proven to be
the case is an openquestion.
More recently, Thomas Friedman wryly remarkedthat if the Vietnam
syndrome was eliminated in 1991,then it has been replaced by the
Gulf War syn-drome. The Gulf War syndrome says that the U.S.will
engage in military operations abroad only if theytake place in a
desert with nowhere for the enemy tohide, if the fighting can be
guaranteed to last no morethan five days, if casualties can be
counted on onehand, if both oil and nuclear weapons are at stake,
ifthe enemy is a madman who will not accept any com-promise, and if
the whole operation will be paid for byGermany and Japan. Thomas
Friedman, GlobalMandate, The New York Times, March 5, 1995, p.
15.
On a more general level, the role of public opinionin U.S.
foreign policy has been the subject of consider-able debate. See
Donald L. Jordan and Benjamin I.Page, Shaping Foreign Policy
Opinion: The Role ofTelevision," Journal of Conflict Resolution,
June 1992,pp. 227-241; Philip J. Powlick, The Sources of
PublicOpinion for American Foreign Policy Officials,International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, 1995, pp.427-451.
22. See B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., A Common CryAcross the U.S.: Its
Time to Exit, The New YorkTimes, October 9, 1993, p. 1.
23. Ayers, A Common Cry p. 1. It may well havebeen the case that
once the October battle occurredthe Clinton Administration seized
the opportunity toextricate itself from a situation not of its
choosing.The pictures were less an impediment and more
anopportunity, unfortunate as it otherwise was.
24. John J. Fialka, Hotel Warriors: Covering the GulfWar
(Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson CenterPress, 1991), p. 2.
25. Fialka, Hotel Warriors, p. 1.
26. RW. Apple, Correspondents Protest PoolSystem, The New York
Times, February 12, 1991, p.14.
27. Editors Criticize Picture Limits, The New YorkTimes,
February 21, 1991, p. 14.
28. Barrie Dunsmore, The Next War: Live?, TheJoan Shorenstein
Center on Press, Politics andPublic Policy, Harvard University,
March 1996, p. 9.Edward N. Luttwak has questioned whether
televi-sion plays a role at all in creating an intolerance
ofcasualties, suggesting it is a superficial explana-tion. He noted
that the Soviets demonstrated suchan intolerance, despite the fact
that Soviet televisionwas not allowed to show the sort of gruesome
pic-tures that are of concern to some policy-makers inthe U.S. He
instead suggested that the smaller aver-age size of families in
contemporary post-industrialsociety has concentrated emotional
familial capitalinto fewer children, therefore raising the level
ofsacrifice in war to intolerable levels. Edward N.
Luttwak, Where are the Great Powers?; At HomeWith the Kids,
Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1994), on-line without pagination.
29. Jarol B. Manheim, Managing Kuwaits ImageDuring the Gulf
Conflict, and William A. Dorman andSteven Livingston, News and
Historical Content: TheEstablishing Phase of the Persian Gulf
Policy Debate,in W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz (eds.) Taken
ByStorm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. ForeignPolicy in the
Gulf War (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1994). See also
Jarol B. Manheim, StrategicPublic Diplomacy & American Foreign
Policy: TheEvolution of Influence (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress,
1994).
30. W. Lance Bennett, Marginalizing the Majority:Conditioning
Public Opinion to Accept ManagerialDemocracy in Michael Margolis
and Gary Mauser(eds.), Manipulating Public Opinion (Pacific
Grove,CA.:Brooks/Cole, 1989), pp. 320-361.
31. W. Lance Bennett and Jarol B. Manheim, Takingthe Media by
Storm: Information, Cuing, and theDemocratic Process in the Gulf
Conflict, PoliticalCommunication, 10, 331-351.
32. Jason DeParle, Long Series of Military DecisionsLed to Gulf
War News Censorship, The New YorkTimes, May 5, 1991, p. 1.
33. Barrie Dunsmore, The Next War: Live?, p. 9.
34. Thanks to Jonathan Moore of the Kennedy Schoolat Harvard for
helping me appreciate this importantdistinction.
35. Author interview with James A. Baker, III.,Houston, Texas,
May 14, 1996.
36. Jessica Mathews, Policy Vs TV, TheWashington Post, March 8,
1994, p. A19.
37. Michael Mandelbaum, Foreign Policy as SocialWork, Foreign
Affairs, January 1996, on-line withoutpagination.
38. Mandelbaum, Foreign Policy as Social Work,unpaginated.
39. Stanley Hoffmann, In Defense of Mother Teresa:Morality in
Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, March1996, on-line without
pagination.
40. Hoffman, In Defense of Mother Teresa.
41. United States Mission to the United Nations,Global
Humanitarian Emergencies, 1996, p. 1.
42. David C. Unger, Taking Haiti, The New YorkTimes Magazine,
October 23, 1994, p. 50. JimHoagland has also noted this whipsaw
effect ofmedia coverage. A wave of emotion roiled up by hor-rific
images that demand immediate action ispushed back by new sets of
heart-rending images. Agovernment initially lambasted for
callousness is sud-denly vulnerable to accusations of being
foolhardy.This whipsaw effect is the politicians
nightmare.Hoaglands larger point, however, is that this is a
con-
-
18 Clarifying the CNN Effect
dition created by the lack of a clearly articulated for-eign
policy. (Jim Hoagland, Dont Blame CNN, TheWashington Post, March 3,
1994, p. 29.)
43. Andrew Natsios, Illusions of Influence: TheCNN Effect in
Complex Emergencies, in FromMassacres to Genocide: The Media,
Public Policy, andHumanitarian Crises, Robert I. Rotberg and
ThomasG. Weiss (eds.), (The Brookings Institution, 1996),
p.150.
44. Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus,Humanitarian Crises and
U.S. Foreign Policy: Somaliaand the CNN Effect Reconsidered,
PoliticalCommunication, Vol. 12, 1995, pp. 417.
45. Livingston and Eachus, Humanitarian Crises andU.S. Foreign
Policy, p. 417.
46. Livingston and Eachus, Humanitarian Crises andU.S. Foreign
Policy, p. 426.
47. Events in 1993 presented another story. CNN-as-impediment
almost certainly explains the withdrawalof U.S. troops from
Somalia. My only point here is thatCNN-as-agenda-setter does not
serve as an acceptableexplanation for the intervention in Somalia
in 1992.
48. A point made clear to me in interviews of
foreigncorrespondents in Nairobi, Kenya in May 1994.
49. Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, Too LittleToo Late:
American Television Coverage of theRwanda Crisis of 1994, in Howard
Adelman and AstriSuhrke (eds) Untitled (Boulder, CO.: Westview
Press,forthcoming).
50. Steven Livingston, Suffering in Silence: MediaCoverage of
War and Famine in the Sudan, in FromMassacres to Genocide: The
Media, Public Policy, andHumanitarian Crises, Robert I. Rotberg and
ThomasG. Weiss (eds.), (Washington, D.C.: The BrookingsInstitution,
1996), pp. 68-89. See also Howard Adelmanand Astri Suhrke, The
International Response toConflict and Genocide: Lessons from the
RwandaExperience, Early Warning and ConflictManagement, (York,
Ontario: Centre for RefugeeStudies, York University), pp.
46-48.
51. The figures for Liberia are even more pronouncedwhen one
takes into consideration that most of theprint news items, and
nearly all of the broadcast newsitems, occurred in April and May
1996, at a time ofheavy combat and American evacuation missions
tothe stricken capital of Monrovia. For The New YorkTimes, 43
percent (71 of 164) of the news items tomention Liberia between
January 1995 and mid-May1996 were found in April and half of May
1996. ForABC News, nearly 88 percent (28 of 32) of its reportsfrom
Liberia came in April and half of May 1996.
52. Why Bosnia in 1995 and 96? To address this ques-tion well
would require another study. But certainlyhigh on the list of
reasons for the coverage would beNATOs involvement and the
deployment of U.S.troops there (as in Somalia).
53. Author interview with Brent Scowcroft,
Washington, D.C., March 27, 1996.
54. Author interview with James A. Baker, III,Houston, Texas,
May 14, 1996.
55. Author interview with James A. Baker, III,Houston, Texas,
May 14, 1996.
56. Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss,Humanitarian Policies
(Headline Series, Foreign PolicyAssociation, 1995), p. 36.
57. Douglas Jehl, US is Showing a New Caution onUN Peacekeeping
Mission, The New York Times,May 18, 1994, p. 1.
58. Each intervention type has been adapted fromRichard Haasss
Intervention: The Use of AmericanMilitary Force in the Post-Cold
War World (CarnegieEndowment Book, 1994)
59. See Nancy Ethiel (series editor) and StevenLivingston (ed),
Reporting the Next War (Chicago: TheRobert R. McMormick Tribune
Foundation, 1992), TheMilitary and the Media: the Continuing
Dialogue(Chicago: The Robert R. McMormick TribuneFoundation,
1993).
60. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke,Deterrence in American
Foreign Policy: Theory andPractice (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1974),p. 11.
61. Even the Reagan Doctrines claims to rolling backCommunist
control was careful not to risk the totaldestabilization of Europe
All-out war on the Europeancontinent was not an objective.
62. Author interview with Adm. Kendal Pease,Pentagon, September
1995.
63. Author telephone interview with Adm. KendalPease, March 12,
1996.
64. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use ofAmerican Military
Force in the Post-Cold War World(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment, 1994), p. 57.
65. Haass, Intervention, p. 62.
66. I was in Nairobi during this time and saw first-hand the
attempts made by correspondents such asTerry Leonard of the
Associated Press to get intoRwanda. It was simply too
dangerous.
67. Of course, this formulation might be criticized asmissing
the point that saving lives in political conflictis not apolitical
in nature. Certainly in the case of theefforts to save the lives of
largely Hutu refugees inGoma and elsewhere in Zaire, the results
were notpolitically neutral. Some of these very refugees
wereresponsible for the massacre of Tutsi and Hutu moder-ates in
the weeks before.
68. Livingston and Eachus, Humanitarian Crises andU.S. Foreign
Policy, p. 41.
-
The Joan Shorenstein Centeron the Press, Politics and Public
PolicyJohn F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138Telephone (617) 495-8269 Fax: (617)
495-8696
Web Site Address:
http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/~presspol/home.htm