QUIZ. Discussion Real-life examples from the news that differ in problem structure terms used from last class From NYT two INTERNATIONAL problems that.

QUIZ

Discussion

• Real-life examples from the news that differ in problem structure terms used from last class

• From NYT • two INTERNATIONAL problems that illustrate one of the

differences we have discussed

Outline

• Problem structure from Game Theory perspective

• Reviewing 9 key questions

Key questions of problem structure

• Q1: Is it conflict, cooperation, or harmony?• Q2: Who are the actors?• Q3: Absolute capacities and relative power• Q4: Incentives/preferences• Q5: Information/knowledge• Q6: Norms• Q7: Violation tolerance• Q8: Inherent transparency• Q9: Response incentives

ROW’S PERSPECTIVECOLUMN

Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW

Silence(Cooperate) R gets 2 yr R gets 10 yr

Confess(Defect) R gets 0 yr R gets 5 yr

COLUMN’S PERSPECTIVECOLUMN

Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW

Silence(Cooperate)

C gets 2 yr C gets 0 yr

Confess(Defect)


OVERALL GAMECOLUMN

Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW

Silence(Cooperate)

C gets 2 yr

R gets 2 yr

C gets 0 yr

R gets 10 yr

Confess(Defect)

C gets 10 yr

R gets 0 yr

C gets 5 yr

R gets 5 yr


Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW



What should Row do?


Confess(Defect)

ROW

Silence(Cooperate) R gets 10 yr

Confess(Defect) R gets 5 yr

First, assume Column confessed. What should Row do?


Confess(Defect)

ROW



If Column confessed, Row clearly prefers to Confess.


Silence(Cooperate)

ROW



Now, assume Column stayed silent. What should Row do?


Silence(Cooperate)

ROW



If Column stayed silent, Row still prefers to Confess.


Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW



So, no matter what Column does, Row prefers to Confess!


Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW

Silence(Cooperate)


Confess(Defect)


What should Column do?


Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW

Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)


First, assume Row confessed. What should Column do?


Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW

Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)


If Row confessed, Column clearly prefers to Confess.


Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW

Silence(Cooperate)


Confess(Defect)

Now, assume Row stayed silent. What should Column do?


Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW

Silence(Cooperate)


Confess(Defect)

If Row stayed silent, Column still prefers to Confess.


Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW

Silence(Cooperate)


Confess(Defect)


So, no matter what Row does, Column prefers to Confess!

OVERALL GAMECOLUMN

Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW

Silence(Cooperate)

C gets 2 yr

R gets 2 yr

C gets 0 yr

R gets 10 yr

Confess(Defect)

C gets 10 yr

R gets 0 yr

C gets 5 yr

R gets 5 yr

BUT, since both Column and Row confess, they end up bothgetting 5 years,

OVERALL GAMECOLUMN

Silence(Cooperate)

Confess(Defect)

ROW

Silence(Cooperate)

C gets 2 yr

R gets 2 yr

C gets 0 yr

R gets 10 yr

Confess(Defect)

C gets 10 yr

R gets 0 yr

C gets 5 yr

R gets 5 yr

BUT, since both Column and Row confess, they end up bothgetting 5 years, even though they both would prefer 2 years!

Question 1: Is it conflict?

• Is it conflict or would it be if no institution?• Is it harmony?• If conflict, is it Deadlock, i.e., unresolvable?• Potential for resolution REQUIRES absolute

gains frame

Deadlock

Stop engaging in conflict

Continue engaging in

conflict

Stop engaging in conflict

2

2

4

1

Continue engaging in

conflict

1

4

3

3

Harmony

Allow education of foreigners in your

universities

Do not allow education of

foreigners in your universities

Allow education of foreigners in your

universities

4

4

2

3

Do not allow education of

foreigners in your universities

3

2

1

1

Q2: Actors• Who is involved? What actors are causing or affected by the

problem? Who could help fix the problem?• What roles do actors have?

– Perpetrator (fishing countries, upstream polluting state)– Victim (other fishing countries, downstream states)– Vested interests (US in Middle East)– Could be interested (debt for nature swaps)– Uninterestable (landlocked African states and whaling)

• Types of actors– Many problems due to actions by governments– Others due to non-government actors– Differ in whose behavior must be controlled and relationship between

governments who create institutions and actors who must change behavior

Q3: Capacities and power

• Do “perpetrators” of problem have capacity to engage in “good” behavior?

• If not, it’s a “Positive Externality Plagued by Incapacity”. E.g.,– Protecting accidental detonation of nuclear weapons– Reducing AIDS in developing countries– Helping small countries defend selves from attack

• Behavior not a result of logic of consequences or logic of appropriateness

Positive ExternalityPlagued by Incapacity

Incapable state =>

Capable state –V

Contribute to AIDS prevention (but NOT

POSSIBLE)

Don't contribute to AIDS prevention

Contribute to AIDS prevention

4

3

3

2

Don't contribute to AIDS prevention

2

4

1

1

Q4: Incentives

• How do material consequences for perpetrators depend on other countries?

• Types of incentive problems– Upstream / downstream – Coordination – Collaboration

• All involve logic of consequences issues

Upstream/Downstream

Upstream ==>

Downstream -V

Contribute to pollution reduction

Don't contribute to pollution reduction

Contribute to pollution reduction

1

4

3

2

Don't contribute to pollution reduction

1

3

3

1

Coordination

Train pilots in Row Language

Train pilots inCol Language

Train pilots in Row Language

3

4

2

2

Train pilots inCol Language

1

1

4

3

Collaboration

Maintain Low Tariffs

Maintain High Tariffs

Maintain Low Tariffs

3

3

4

1

Maintain High Tariffs

1

4

2

2

Q5: Information/knowledge

• Any unknown effects that perpetrators would care about if they knew about them?

• Two types of info/knowledge problems– Epistemic/knowledge problems (unsure about

how the world works): e.g., acid rain in Europe, trade wars, health quarantine regulations

– Assurance problems (unsure about how other actors will behave): e.g., war games

• Largely still logic of consequences

Q6: Norms

• Problem is not material consequences but violations of values and notions of legitimacy

• Normative problems involve “conflicts over values”, e.g.,– Human rights abuses– Apartheid or treatment of women– Choice of government

• Involves logic of appropriateness

Q7: Violation Tolerance

• Consequences of violation and violation tolerance– What are consequences if institution rules

violated? • Problems vary in how much states will tolerate

violation• Compare non-proliferation to tariffs to human

rights to environmental protection

Q8: Inherent Transparency

• Inherent transparency and ability to act secretly– Before any institution at all, does each actor know

what other actor is doing?• Compare – Security: nuclear weapons vs. war games– Trade: tariffs/quotas vs. NTBs/subsidies– HR: civil/political vs. economic/social

Q9: Response Incentives

• If there is a violation, do those harmed have sufficient incentives to respond?

• Weak incentives to respond to HR and environmental violations but strong for trade and VERY strong for weaponry– Notice that in weapons agreements the

“response” is implicit ending of agreement• Cost of responding vs. cost of not responding

Types of problemReview

• Deadlock• Positive externality plagued by incapacity• Upstream / downstream problems• Coordination • Collaboration• Epistemic / knowledge problems• Assurance problems• Normative problems

QUIZ. Discussion Real-life examples from the news that differ in problem structure terms used from last class From NYT two INTERNATIONAL problems that.

Documents

defect row silence

yr slide

defect c

overall game column

quiz slide

game theory perspective

outline problem structure

problem structure terms