Quiet Diplomacy, the European Union and Conflict Prevention: Learning from the HCNM on Issues of Social Cohesion

International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 19 (2012) 243–265

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI 10.1163/15718115-01903006

brill.nl/ijgr

Quiet Diplomacy, the European Union and Confl ict Prevention: Learning from the HCNM on Issues of

Social Cohesion

Michael Johns * Assistant Professor of Political Science, Laurentian University

Barrie Campus, Barrie, ON, Canada

Abstract Th is article examines the issue of social cohesion inside the European Union (EU). While the organisation is currently experiencing an economic crisis the article argues that issues surrounding minority rights are deeper and more troubling. Within the EU’s current and prospective borders there remain issues surrounding national minorities, traditional migrants and intra-EU migrants. Th e intra-EU migrants are of particular interest in that they bridge the gap between the other two groups as they are migrants – with EU protected rights. Th is article argues that the EU itself must become involved in the maintenance of social cohesion. It recommends the use of quiet diplomacy, best illustrated by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe High Commissioner on National Minorities. After an examination of the use of quiet diplomacy by the various High Commissioners the article outlines the issues of social cohesion facing the EU. It concludes with the recommendation that the European Commission adopt the tenets of quiet diplomacy as a means of infl uencing dialogue and to promote minority protection within the union.

Keywords quiet diplomacy ; European Union (EU) ; social cohesion ; minority protection ; OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)

1. Introduction

With the recent economic crises in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and elsewhere within the European Union (EU), it is clear to even the most casual observer that the ever closer union is at a cross-road. Th e EU appeared to have an uninterrupted run of success dating back to its precursor organisations, the European Economic Community and the European Coal and Steel Community. A series of agree-ments originally designed to help struggling economies recover from the destruc-tion of World War II had fl ourished into an economic, political and social union that was envied for its prosperity and progress. With the free movement of goods

*) E-mail: [email protected]. Th e author wishes to thank John Packer for his comments on this article.

244 M. Johns / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 19 (2012) 243–265

and people followed by the development of the common currency (the Euro) the EU has become the largest economy in the world. It expanded from two, to six and eventually to 27 members stretching from Portugal in the West to Estonia and Latvia in the East; from Sweden and Finland in the North to Malta and Greece in the South. With the fall of communism in 1989 and subsequent expan-sion into Central and Eastern Europe by the EU starting in 2004 it appeared that the dream of a united, strong, inclusive, peaceful Europe had fi nally been realised. Appearances can be misleading, however. Long before the recent eco-nomic crises highlighted the divide between rich and poor states and illustrated the potential weaknesses in the EU there were other signs that not all was or would be well.

A number of examples illustrate the point. For example, in February of 2009 a large bomb exploded outside of a construction company in Madrid. While not fatal, the bomb caused extensive damage. Th e Basque nationalist/separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatsuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Liberty) claimed responsibil-ity for the attack. Th is attack was one of numerous bombings or failed bombings throughout Spain by the ETA since the organisation broke its 2006 self-imposed cease-fi re in 2007.

In April of 2007 one person was killed and several injured when thousands of ethnic Russians took to the streets in Estonia’s capital of Tallinn. Th e protesters were demanding the return of a monument dedicated to Soviet soldiers who were killed during the ‘liberation’ of Estonia during the Second World War. For ethnic Estonians this monument was a constant reminder of the oppression they endured while under Soviet control. For ethnic Russians its removal was seen as an attempt at erasing their history. Th e confl ict moved from the streets to cyberspace and the Estonian government, banking system and media outlets all were attacked and temporarily shut down causing millions of dollars of damage.

In May of 2008 the international community roundly criticised the local gov-ernments in Naples and Milan for the openly discriminatory policies toward their Roma population. After a special Roma census they were forcibly moved away from the city centres. Th e discrimination culminated with a mob of well over a thousand people attacking Roma settlements with sticks and torches.

In June 2009 a series of attacks in suburbs of Belfast forced over 100 Romanian migrants, many of them ethnically Roma, to seek refuge under police protection. Th eir homes had been targeted repeatedly by racist gangs of mostly youths. Th e attacks were so severe that the majority of the migrants chose to leave Northern Ireland and return to Romania. Th e attacks were deemed to be hate crimes and opened up new wounds in the already divided Northern Irish society which was already dealing with the attack on two British soldiers by persistent remnants of the Irish Republican Army earlier in March.

Th ese events were overlooked by many simply because, unlike economic issues, they fall under what is still seen as the domain of the state. In isolation each of

M. Johns / International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 19 (2012) 243–265 245

these incidents could be dismissed as local problems or criminal activities. When taken collectively, however, they illustrate a persistent and growing problem for the European Union. Th is article will argue that while the EU is currently not able or inclined to address questions surrounding national minorities and new intra-EU minorities/migrants, it is the only institution capable of exerting infl u-ence on the whole region. It is argued below that the European Union is facing a growing crisis of social cohesion. Here ‘social cohesion’ is loosely defi ned as the societal bonds tied to citizenship (in its general sense, i.e., not in the international legal meaning of ‘nationality’). Th ese bonds must supersede ethnic or national bonds in order for a modern, globalised society to function. By treating all types of minorities (national or migrant) collectively it is possible to see how the EU, if it so choses and was enabled, could exert great infl uence and leadership. After outlining where these threats to social cohesion are most threatening, this article concludes by providing a road map for the EU for potential action. Th e article proposes that the EU, through the European Commission, should engage in the use of engagement with states, minority groups and practitioners using a tactic known as quiet diplomacy (QD). Th is article begins with an introduction to the concept of QD and, as an exemplar, an examination of its eff ectiveness through a summary of its use by the various Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioners on National Minorities (HCNM). It is imperative to acknowledge that I am under no misconceptions that what is being advocated below is currently under consideration by the EU. Many of the specifi c issues associated with social cohesion are either just beginning to be seen or could begin soon. Th is article can be seen as both a thought exercise and a warning to the EU that there are problems that go beyond economics within the states of the Union. Many of these problems have been caused or exacerbated by EU policies; therefore the EU must begin to consider ways to address these issues. Th e article argues that by using QD the European Commission would be able to operate outside of the public spotlight, work with states and groups and implement stan-dards and policies designed to promote and maintain social cohesion.

2. Quiet Diplomacy and its Use by the HCNM

As mentioned above, this article argues that in order to begin to address the issues of social cohesion within the states of the EU, the European Commission would need to rely on QD as a key tool. Despite recent greater attention in inter-national relations (notably at the United Nations), 1 QD is a relatively unknown

1) See the 9 September 2011 Fact Sheet for UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s report on ‘Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results’ (UN doc. S/2011/552) at: < www.un.org/…/Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Preventive%20Diplomacy%20Report.pdf >.


and little used option for organisations and practitioners involved in the fi eld of confl ict prevention. In reality determined and eff ective confl ict prevention as a whole is somewhat rare. States and the international community at large have a poor track record in confl ict prevention, preferring to focus on post-confl ict resolution. 2 Th ere are diffi culties with judging the impact international actors have in preventing confl ict and, more recently, peace building. It is impossible to say if no confl ict occurs what role the confl ict prevention strategy had. As Lund notes, the lack of will for forward-thinking diplomatic eff orts exists “not only because threats are neither imminent nor pressing, and are sometimes so remote in time as to seem hypothetical”. 3 While the threats may seem hypothetical, there are far too many examples throughout history that demonstrate the results of inaction. Strategies and protocols must be developed and used to try to prevent confl icts from starting, and if started, spreading before the situation explodes.

Quiet diplomacy is one such tool. As the name indicates, it is a strategy that emphasises non-public and largely confi dential negotiations. It follows the belief that at times public diplomacy may make an already volatile situation worse. Public negotiations give both sides opportunities to pander to their most extreme believers, forcing them to further dig-in their position and ratchet up the tension. As Baum describes in his work on the use of public versus private diplomacy involving United States presidents, public negotiations entail two risks. First, “if the audience tunes in despite a leader’s eff orts to avoid public scrutiny, she may be less inclined to incur the heightened political risk associated with employing military force” and, second, “if a leader actively courts public scrutiny to create audience costs and the audience fails to respond, she may fi nd herself in a weaker position vis-à-vis the adversary than if she had not gone public in the fi rst place”. 4 Th erefore, on issues that are emotionally charged−such as issues concerning inter-ethnic relations with questions of social cohesion−working outside of the public glare is often preferable.

Collins and Packer defi ne quiet diplomacy as “high-level, or Track I, diplo-macy that engages offi cial decision-makers, though each case is unique and likely blends various options and techniques that may include interactions with Track II (non-offi cials) or Track I ½ (blended) processes”. 5 Th ey elaborate further saying that this tactic is characterised by “ dis-interest , impartiality, neutrality and

2) S. Telhami, ‘Changing Roles’, in M.J. Esman and S. Telhami (eds.), International Organizations and Ethnic Confl ict (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995). 3) M. Lund, Preventing Violent Confl icts (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC 1996) pp. 27–28. 4) M. Baum, ‘Going Private: Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric, and Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises’, 48:5 Journal of Confl ict Resolution (2004) p. 628. 5) C. Collins and J. Packer, Options and Techniques for Quiet Diplomacy (Initiative on Quiet Diplomacy and the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Edita, Stockholm, 2006) p. 10.


independence”. 6 By ‘dis-interested’ they are referring to the lack of a hidden agenda or pre-ordained outcome. Put more simply, QD rests on the two pillars of confi dentiality and impartiality. Due to the nature of this type of behind-the-scenes diplomacy, Collins and Packer are right to point out the need for this work to occur at a ‘high’ or elite level. As the goal of QD is to fi nd compromises and develop generally accepted policy it is necessary for those who are actually capable of enacting those policies to be involved in the negotiations. Th e negotiator(s) must also have clout and ideally international weight behind them. As Barash and Webel explain: “when the third party is a high-ranking representative … he or she presumably does not merely act as a messenger but also can engage in various forms of arm-twisting”. 7 Th ey go on to state that “[t]his further suggests why some forms of diplomacy are best conducted in secret: it may be politically unac-ceptable, for example, for a state to appear to buckle under such pressure, although it may be better for everyone concerned if it does so”. 8 Th erefore, as with public diplomacy there is the opportunity to use both carrots and sticks to encourage both sides to compromise, however the diff erence is that through quiet diplo-macy the public is not aware of the carrots and sticks.

Quiet diplomacy usually takes time. It is often a long process of shuttle diplo-macy, with cooling off periods and evolving policy formation. As such, to be eff ec-tive as a confl ict prevention strategy, it is best used well in advance of any potential confl ict. Returning to Lund, he notes that if “an outbreak of violence is possible but not imminent, there is still time to reduce, restrain, or regulate” which pro-vides the breathing space needed for future “peaceful modes of resolution by strengthening local, national, and/or international political institutions and pro-cedures such as power-sharing arrangements, special commissions, legislatures, and multilateral forums, or by assisting in the creation of these institutions where they do not exist”. 9 When used eff ectively and early, quiet diplomacy allows the negotiator “to identify and then draw attention to the ‘enlightened self-interest’ of parties to a confl ict, devising genuine and workable solutions to real problems, advancing argument , and using experience and prestige to infl uence”. 10

Th e institution that has come to exemplify the face of quiet diplomacy is the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities. Th e HCNM position was created in the early 1990s as a response to the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989. Th e OSCE, as well as many other scholars, politicians and international organisations were concerned that there would be an explosion of

6) Ibid. , pp. 10-11, italics in the original. 7) D.P. Barash and C. P. Webel, Peace and Confl ict Studies , 2nd edition (Sage Publishing, Los Angeles, 2009) p. 254. 8) Ibid. 9) Lund, supra note 2, p. 45. 10) Collins and Packer, supra note 4, p. 12.


pent-up ethnic confl ict in the region. As such the (then) CSCE created the posi-tion of HCNM and provided the position with the mandate to:

provide ‘early warning’ and, as appropriate ‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues, which have not yet developed beyond and early warning stage, but in the judgement of the High Commissioner, have the potential to develop into confl ict with the CSCE area. 11

It is clear that the OSCE was aware of the importance of timing for the success of quiet diplomacy. Th us, the HCNM was to engage in early warning, fi nd where confl ict was possible and then use the resources available to him to stop the con-fl ict from escalating. But beyond this need for early engagement, the mandate was quite vague. Due to the uneasiness many states in Western Europe had with the idea of outside interference in their ‘internal aff airs’ much of the rest of the mandate was concerned with where the HCNM could not go. Th e HCNM was not to become involved in his own country, nor where confl ict was already occur-ring or if terrorism was involved.

Despite the limitations the so far three individual HCNMs, each in his own way, have been very successful in using quiet diplomacy to fulfi l this mandate. While it is true that, as current HCNM Senior Advisor for Russia/Baltics/Central Asia Sabine Machl notes, the exact percentage of prevention the High Commis-sioner is responsible for cannot be quantifi ed, she is also right to say that such a particular level of analysis is not so important. 12 Th ere has been much scholarly analysis of the early work of the HCNM and the great majority of those who have examined the use of quiet diplomacy by the HCNM recognise its value. 13 As Estebanez eloquently explains,

the role of the HCNM has been more than that of an insubstantial mechanism of con fl ict pre-vention. Although the HCNM’s activity may not have changed the fundamental relationship

11) Cited in W. Zellner, ‘Th e OSCE: Uniquely Qualifi ed for a Confl ict Prevention Role’, in P. van Tongeren, H. van de Veen and J. Verhoven (eds.), Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia (Lynne Reinner Publishers, Boulder, 2002) p. 19. 12) Interview with Sabine Machl, Senior Advisor−Russia/Baltics/Central Asia, HCNM, Th e Hague, Th e Netherlands, 18 June 2009. 13) See P. Czáky, ‘Experience from Co-operating with the OSCE HCNM’, 8:1 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2001) pp. 21–22; N. Daag, ‘Th e OSCE and Confl ict Prevention’, 8:1 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2001) pp. 23–24; A. Rönquist, ‘Th e Functions of the High Commissioner on National Minorities with Special Regard for Confl ict Prevention’, in E. Klein (ed.), Th e Institutions of a Commissioner for Human Rights and Minorities and the Protection of Human Rights Violations (Arno Spitz, Berlin, 1994); D. Chandler, ‘Th e OSCE and the Internationalization of Minority Rights’, in D. P. Forsythe (ed.), Human Rights in the New Europe (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1994); S. Holt ‘Th e Activities of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities January 2001–May 2002’, 1 European Yearbook on Minority Issues (2001) pp. 563–589; S. Vasilev, ‘Th e HCNM Approach to Confl ict Prevention’, 3 Helsinki Monitor (1999) pp. 45–57.


between the parties to minority tensions, it has, at least, aff ected this relationship by increasing the awareness of existing problems and off ering substantive alternatives for their solution. 14

Zellner puts it more simply, calling the HCNM “the success story of the OSCE”. 15 Much of that success is due to the actions of the fi rst HCNM, Max van der

Stoel (from Th e Netherlands), who held the position from 1993 through June 2001. Van der Stoel’s infl uence is due to both the fact that he faced the highest number of pressing threats to peace during his tenure and that he was responsible for developing the best practices of the offi ce in the use of quiet diplomacy. Van der Stoel acknowledged this need to create best practices when he said in his acceptance speech in 1992 that he “will have to explore a path which has not been trodden before−a path moreover, that might sometimes be quite slippery”. 16 He began his work immediately and used the vagueness of the mandate to his advan-tage. 17 While complying with the rules of where he could not go he went to work in the areas that he felt posed the greatest threats to peace. He started with the relationship between ethnic Russians and the newly independent states of Estonia and Latvia. 18 Early on in his work in the Baltic region, Van der Stoel recognised that to be eff ective he needed to move beyond traditional confl ict prevention and at times needed to become more directly involved in confl ict management, become a policy advisor and take on many other roles. Former Director of the Offi ce of the HCNM John Packer referred to his various roles as “Pyrometer, Prophylactic and Pyrosvestis”. 19 What was clear, however, was the value of quiet diplomacy in carrying out his work. In order to work with both sides he had to prove his impartiality. Th is at times proved diffi cult and Van der Stoel himself noted that often the one thing both sides had in common is that they thought he favoured the other. 20 It was imperative that he proved to both sides that he was the High Commissioner on National Minorities, not for National Minorities—an advocate for neither ‘side’, but an aide to both/all. His success can also be attributed to the confi dentiality in which he worked. As Kemp notes for the

14) M. A. M. Estebanez, ‘Th e High Commissioner on National Minorities: Development and His Mandate’, in M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas (eds.), Th e OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security (Kluwer Law International, Th e Hague, 1997) p. 136. 15) Zellner, supra note 10, p. 19. 16) M. van der Stoel, Peace and Stability Th rough Human and Minority Rights (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden Baden, 2001) p. 31. 17) Interview with Max van der Stoel, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 1993–2001, Th e Hague, Th e Netherlands, 26 June 2003. 18) J. Bernier, ‘Nationalism in Transition: Nationalizing Impulses and International Counterweights in Latvia and Estonia’, in M. Keating and J. McGarry (eds.), Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001). 19) J. Packer, ‘Th e OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: Pyrometer, Prophylactic, Pyrosvestis’, in N. Ghanea and A. Xanthaki (eds.), Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination (Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005). 20) Interview Van der Stoel, 2003.


HCNM “confi dentiality bred confi dence”: “Confi dential meetings allowed the parties to open up to the High Commissioner, and to each other. If they knew that they would not be subject to external pressures or would not be seen to be climbing down from entrenched positions, they were usually willing to consider issues and solutions which would be less politically palatable if they were dis-cussed under public scrutiny.” 21 While confi dentiality was an important aspect of his work, Van der Stoel learned in Estonia and Latvia that at times this was fl ex-ible. If he was unable to get the two sides to compromise, he would periodically speak with the media or discuss his concerns more openly. Kemp quotes Van der Stoel as referring to this modifi cation as ‘Quiet Diplomacy Plus’ which was only used as a last resort. 22

Van der Stoel was able to provide the political space (and education) for ethnic Russians, Estonians and Latvians to compromise and avoid confl ict. Th is is a remarkable achievement based on the fact that many of the early laws in the two countries were openly hostile to the Russians who comprised 40 per cent of Latvia’s population and over 30 per cent in Estonia. He took his successes in the Baltic and used what he had learned about quiet diplomacy as he continued to work throughout Central and Eastern Europe fi nding successes in Croatia, Slovakia, Macedonia and elsewhere.

Th e second HCNM, Rolf Ekéus (from Sweden) had a diff erent interpretation of QD. Ekéus was in the position from mid-2001 to mid-2007 and his time as High Commissioner was marked by his strong belief in the mandate and the confi dentiality of Quiet diplomacy. In one of his fi nal interviews before leaving the position he reiterated his belief in behind-the-scenes diplomacy when he stated “trust is so fragile” therefore “you have to be disciplined enough not to do any grandstanding”. 23 Some argue that Ekéus went too far in his confi dentiality. A simple review of the number of documents made public by the HCNMs on the OSCE website illustrates a profound diff erence between Ekéus and the HCNM before and after him. 24 Ekéus felt that his job as HCNM was to move beyond the crisis mode that Van der Stoel often operated in and was to build partnerships, look more toward Central Asia, establish programmes and work on larger issues rather than specifi cs. 25 Part of this reluctance to engage specifi c cases in Central and Eastern Europe may be explained by the fact that by the time he came to the position much of Central and Eastern Europe was close to

21) W. Kemp, Quiet Diplomacy in Action (Kluwer Law International, Th e Hague, 2001) pp. 42–43. 22) Ibid. 23) V. Coulloudon, ‘Integration and Diversity: Applying the Same Formula Across the OSCE Area’, October–November OSCE Magazine (2007) pp. 15–17. 24) < www.osce.org/hcnm >, visited on 28 March 2011. 25) Interview with Rolf Ekéus, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Th e Hague, Th e Netherlands, 24 June 2003.


achieving EU membership. 26 Van der Stoel had the ability to use accession as a carrot (or stick) in his negotiations, but Ekéus generally lacked that particular option. Th at said, it may be that he was too quiet and in a time when there was an opportunity to use quiet diplomacy to maximum eff ect and to lead, he demurred. 27

With the third HCNM, Knut Vollebaek (from Norway), we see a return to more of the Van der Stoel interpretation of quiet diplomacy. While he strongly believes in the power of confi dentially to help lead politicians through diffi cult decisions, he is more than willing to become more vocal to show that he believes an issue is serious. 28 For example after several trips to the Abkhazia region of Georgia and seeing no improvement, he made a strongly worded public declara-tion on 14 April 2009 calling for an end to ethnic tensions. While ultimately not successful, it does show that he is willing to use the infl uence of his title to raise awareness in the media and elsewhere. In June of 2008, Vollebaek released the ‘Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations’. 29 In this document he outlines what he hopes to be new protocols for all minorities within the OSCE region. Th e recommendations accomplish two things: fi rst, they set out workable targets for states; and, second, they redefi ne the role of the offi ce in a way not seen since Van der Stoel.

An examination of the three HCNMs and their use of quiet diplomacy high-light a few important issues. First, QD is somewhat fl exible in terms of confi den-tiality. Impartiality is untouchable, but at times as Van der Stoel and Vollebaek illustrate it is necessary to raise public awareness and break strict confi dentiality. All of the HCNMs stress that there is no value in ‘naming and shaming’ but it may be necessary to move to ‘Quiet Diplomacy Plus’ if the situation dictates. Second, the person matters in QD. Th e personality and history of the three men impact their ability and readiness to use QD. Vollebaek and Van der Stoel were less tied to the letter of the mandate and more interested in the ideas and thrust behind it. Ekéus believed that he could not and should not move too far away from what was written down. Tied to this is their experience. As former Senior Legal Advisor to the HCNM Francesco Palermo observes, Van der Stoel and Vollebaek are former politicians while Ekéus was a diplomat; Palermo argues that Vollebaek understands politicians and is able to speak to his interlocutors in a way that they understand and can get them to make agreements that they cannot

26) E. Jurado, ‘Liberalising Estonia’s Citizenship Policy’, in J. McGarry and M. Keating (eds.) European Integration and the Nationalities Question (Routledge, London, 2006). 27) J. Packer, ‘Confronting the Contemporary Challenges of European Minorities’, 3 Helsinki Monitor (2005) pp. 227–231. 28) Interview with Knut Vollebaek, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Th e Hague, Th e Netherlands, 19 June 2009. 29) Th e full text of the Recommendations may be found at: < www.osce.org/hcnm/68722 >.


back out of. 30 Ekéus – a career diplomat – was more familiar with traditional diplomacy and this may have shaped how he viewed his position and how he interacted with politicians and minority leaders. All of this must be taken into account if the EU were to move into the fi eld of social cohesion and implement a program of eff ective quiet diplomacy.

3. Problems Facing the EU

While there are many issues within the EU that could be broadly defi ned as problems of social cohesion 31 which could benefi t from quiet diplomacy, it is beyond the scope of this article to examine them all. Moreover, this article argues for a narrow interpretation of social cohesion concerning minorities in all their forms. As such, the analysis and recommendations with follow this narrow interpretation.

3.1. Problems with National Minorities

While some of the specifi c problems facing states within the EU concerning national minorities were mentioned in the introduction of this article, the prob-lems are broader and deeper than those incidents. While it is true that there has been remarkable peace across the EU since the end of World War II, the region has had a long history of issues concerning minorities. As Jennifer Jackson Preece notes “there is ample evidence of disgruntled national minorities threatening European order and stability−and a corresponding international concern”. 32 Th erefore, there continues to be problems and the potential for ever greater prob-lems within the states of the EU concerning the relationship between the state and its minorities. A quick examination of the Minorities at Risk Dataset (MAR) helps illustrate this point; MAR tracks over 280 ethnic groups around the world and codes several factors that could lead to confl ict or rebellion. 33 Using the most recent data available, for years 2004–2006 (which corresponds to the expansion of the EU eastward) the number of groups which have troubling characteristics is startling. Table 1 provides a snapshot of ethnic relations inside the EU during those years. POLDIS and ECDIS measure political and economic discrimination

30) Interview with Dr. Francesco Palermo, Former Senior Legal Advisor HCNM, Th e Hague, Th e Netherlands, 18 June 2009. 31) See for example Barbara Einhorn’s analysis of the growing divide in gender policies throughout the EU and how it represents a crisis of citizenship for the entire union, B. Einhorn, Citizenship in an Enlarging Europe: From Dream to Awakening (Palgrave, New York, 2010). 32) J. J. Preece, National Minorities and the European Nation-State System (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) p. 4. 33) See T. R. Gurr, Peoples Versus States (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2000).


respectively with a coding of 2 indicating the presence of discrimination without remedial policies with higher scores indicating increasing levels of exclusion. CULPO2 measures restrictions on language with any score indicating some restrictions, increasing in severity. SEPX codes the presence of separatist move-ments, with a score of 3 indicating an active or recently active movement. Finally, PROT codes recorded protests by the group, with a score of 3 indicating small demonstrations of less than 10,000 people, increasing in severity. See the Appendix for a full description of the MAR coding.

While rudimentary, the table provides a clear picture of minority issues across the whole of the EU−East and West. Many of the cases of political and economic discrimination involve the Roma population who continue to encounter racism and generally poor treatment throughout the region. Beyond the Roma many other problem areas remain. For example, there are separatist movements in France, Spain and Britain. Th ere are ethnic problems in Bulgaria and Romania and as mentioned earlier tensions remain high in Estonia and Latvia. It could be argued that the ethnic tensions along the Slovakia/Hungary border involving dia-sporas from both sides represent some of the biggest challenges within the EU. MAR has identifi ed issues involving established migrant populations such as Muslims in France, Turks in Germany and the Afro-Caribbean community in Britain. Even in confl icts/situations that many have deemed ‘successes’, trouble remains. In Northern Ireland, even without the violence of the summer of 2009, the Protestant and Catholic communities in Belfast are separated at night by 40 foot high walls that are optimistically called ‘peace walls’. Maybe the most glaring of all the current or potential ethnic confl ict hot-spots inside the EU is Cyprus. As Alain Deletroz, Vice President (Europe) for the International Crisis Group, notes, allowing Cyprus to join the European Union without fi rst resolving the decades old confl ict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots was the EU’s greatest mistake in recent memory. 35 Th e reason for this is simple. Th e EU during the

34) Minorities at Risk Project Codebook (2009), < www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar >, visited on 24 March 2011. 35) Interview with Alain Deletroz, Vice President (Europe), International Crisis Group, Brussels, Belgium, 17 June 2009.

Table 1. Reported Cases of MAR Variables of Groups inside the EU 34 MAR Variable Reported Cases

POLDIS (Code of or higher) 10ECDIS (Code of or higher) 17CULPO (Code of or higher) 8SEPX (Code of ) 13PROT (Code of or higher) 16


accession process set out a clear mandate that a key condition for membership was a resolution to the divided status of the island. As Nugent warned long before 2004, if Cyprus had met that condition it “would allay concerns about the probable damaging eff ects of Cyprus’ accession”. 36 Nugent correctly observed that allowing Cyprus in without a resolution that was satisfactory to the Turkish Cypriots would further divide the two sides and increase the strain on the EU-Turkey relationship.

Based on the discussion above it is obvious that Cyprus is not alone in gaining EU membership without fully resolving its ethnic issues. Th e same argument could be made for Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia and Latvia, but due to the magni-tude of the problem in Cyprus it is the most glaring, and most problematic for the EU in the realm of social cohesion.

Th e Cyprus problem is not only an issue that the EU will have to address for the stability of the Union and for its long-term relationship with Turkey (and all of the issues of potential Turkish accession); it impacts future expansion and the EU’s ability to try to infl uence candidate countries on minority issues. During the 2004–2007 expansion the EU set out minority rights as one of the conditions that must be met for membership (in line with its Copenhagen criteria adopted in 1993). It required states to change laws, policies and at times even constitu-tions in order to remove the potential for confl ict with the EU member states. Many of the conditions placed on Cyprus were obviously not met, yet due to its economic status it was considered the least problematic candidate country. When the time came to make a fi nal decision on membership, the EU chose (current) economic success over social cohesion. Th is has led many candidate countries to believe that they can ignore those aspects of their membership criteria as long as they meet their economic commitments. As Robert Schupp, HCNM Senior Political Advisor for the Balkans, notes, it has become diffi cult to convince some in a candidate country such as Croatia that they must address concerns over their Serbian population. 37 Th e EU itself seems, in Schupp’s view, to reinforce this message, leaving the government of Croatia to believe that membership is based more on ITCY compliance and ship-building. 38

Other candidate countries will also look to the Cyprus case as proof that minority protection is less important than other political or economic condi-tions. Serbia, for example, can look to Cyprus and rightfully claim a double-standard of treatment. Th ey have been denied the ability to start the process due to, among other ethnic issues, the Kosovo situation, yet Cyprus was able to

36) N. Nugent, ‘EU Enlargement and the “Cyprus Problem”’, 38:1 Journal of Common Market Studies (2000) p. 141. 37) Interview with Robert Schupp, Senior Political Advisor for the Balkans, HCNM, Th e Hague, Th e Netherlands, 18 June 2009. 38) Ibid.


gain membership. 39 Th e same will hold true for other potential candidates such as Bosnia and Macedonia. Not only does this make the HCNM’s job more diffi cult in these states as it has eff ectively removed a useful carrot, it almost encourages those who want to work against minority protection to fl aunt EU recommendations.

3.2. Problems with ‘New Minorities’

While the above discussion indicates that the EU would have enough issues inside its borders on minority relations if it concentrated only on traditional ‘national minorities’, there is a growing issue that it also must contend with. Th is is the movement of EU citizens (and others) into other EU countries in large numbers and establishing themselves as permanent communities constituting minorities. Most of these large communities of intra-EU migrants are found cur-rently in Britain and Ireland and come from the Eastern states. In Ireland the community is made up of mostly Poles, drawn to Ireland during its economic boom and fi nding the prevalence of the Catholic Church a comfort. In Britain, there are more migrants and they come from many states including Poland and Lithuania. Th e Council of Europe, OSCE and EU have always been quick to point to the diff erence between migrant workers and established national minori-ties, with emphasis placed on the latter, but upon closer examination the line between the two types of groups becomes blurred and seemingly semantic. Th e fl agship document that the EU cites on minority protection has been the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), but even that document acknowledges in its explanatory notes that there is a lack of “any defi nition of a national minority in these texts”. 40 Moreover, as McGarry et al. argue, groups such as the Russian communities in Estonia and Latvia (who are treated by the EU, OSCE and others as ‘national minorities’) possess many characteristics of a traditional migrant group. Th ey go on to argue that this categorical diff erence is often fuelled by national minorities wishing to diff erentiate themselves from other minority groups as they appear to receive more rights and greater international attention. 41

Th e intra-EU migrants occupy even more of a middle ground between minori-ties and migrants due to their EU citizenship. Th is citizenship provides them (theoretically) with rights and privileges not accorded to third-party ( i.e ., foreign)

39) Ibid. 40) Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, < www.coe.int >, visited on 15 March 2011. 41) J. McGarry, M. Keating and M. Moore, ‘Introduction’, in J. McGarry and M. Keating (eds.), European Integration and the Nationalities Question (Routledge, London, 2006) p. 2.


immigrants. 42 Prior to the 2004 expansion, there was much debate about how many of the East Europeans would in fact move West. Th ere was a concern in many established EU member states that with the accessions thousands of migrants would fl ood into their countries all willing to work for less than the local population. 43 In France this was known as the “Polish Plumber Problem”. Some early survey data and modelling seemed to reinforce this belief. For exam-ple, when asked one quarter of Lithuanian pharmacists intended on migrating if given the opportunity. 44 Kupiszewski predicted an almost immediate move of up to one million Poles in a massive, quick migration. 45 One of the largest studies was carried out by Bauer and Zimmermann in 1999; they determined that approximately 200,000 people per year for 15 years (3 million people total) would be moving. 46 Th is would constitute a remarkable 3 per cent of the entire population of Eastern Europe, with the majority moving to the Western states located closest geographically. 47 In light of this evidence it is not surprising that states such as Germany and Austria were insistent that rules were put in place prior to accession to control the movement of people. 48 Th e EU left these controls in the hands of the states and not surprisingly the states closest to the expansion area produced the most restrictive policies. Th e only condition the EU placed on states was that whatever policy was implemented was concluded by 2011 (this does not apply to Romania and Bulgaria). Due to their then need for labour and distance from Eastern Europe, Britain and Ireland placed limited con-trols on workers arriving. Combined with the fact that many of the migrants’ second language was English, the vast majority of intra-EU migration ended up moving to those two countries. While the exact numbers were not known, hun-dreds of thousands moved to Britain and in 2006 alone 40,000 Poles moved to Ireland. 49 By 2006 most of the other states recognised that the feared fl ood of migrants was not going to occur and that Ireland and Britain had benefi ted by the

42) M. Johns, ‘A Problem by Th eir Own Hands: Intra-EU Migration and its Implications for Europe’, in F. Laursen (ed.), Th e EU and Federalism: Polities and Policies Compared (Ashgate, London, 2011). 43) L. McDowell, ‘Old and New Economic Migrants: Whiteness and Managed Migration Policies’, 35:1 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2009) pp. 19–36. 44) K. Smigelska, L. Starkiene and Z. Padaiga, ‘Do Lithuanian Pharmacists Intend to Migrate?’, 33:3 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2007) p. 505. 45) M. Kupiszewski, ‘How Trustworthy are Forecasts of International Migration Between Poland and the European Union?’, 28:4 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2002 pp. 627–645). 46) T. K. Bauer and K. F. Zimmerman, ‘Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure and its Labour Impact Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe’, July IZA Research Report #3 (1999) p. 31. 47) Ibid. , p. 47. 48) M. Bahna, ‘Predictions of Migration from the New Member States after Th eir Accession in the EU: Successes and Failures’, 42:4 International Migration Review (2008) pp. 844–860. 49) A.M. Barrett and D. Duff y, ‘Are Ireland’s Immigrants Integrating into its Labour Market?’, 42:3 International Migration Review (2008) pp. 597–619.


infl ux of workers willing to take lower paying jobs – and so they dropped their restrictions.

Even without the doomsday scenario of millions of people fl ooding into Western Europe coming true, the impact of intra-EU migration has been felt, particularly in Ireland and Britain due to their more lenient initial policies. Poles are now the largest minority group in Ireland and a walk through Dublin reveals Polish stores, newspapers and Polish Catholic churches. In Britain there are far more Poles than Cornish and there are evidently signifi cant communities of other Central and East Europeans, particularly in the larger cities. 50 Most had assumed that this migration would be temporary but that does not appear to be the case. 51 Even with the economic slowdown across Europe and in particular Ireland, the number of migrants remains relatively constant. As Sliwinska notes, fewer Poles may be now choosing to come to Ireland, but the ones who are there appear con-tent to stay. 52 Th is would indicate that these migrant groups are choosing to establish themselves in new countries for the long term – holding jobs, raising children, contributing to cultural activities and generally settling. With the restrictions removed for the 2004 class and soon all restrictions on Bulgaria and Romania also removed, it seems unlikely that this trend will change. While num-bers may moderate, the principal diff erence is where these migrants may choose to move. Now that there are communities in Ireland and Britain, to assume that large numbers will not move to Germany, Th e Netherlands or elsewhere seems foolhardy. Where the problems will develop as these groups stay depends largely on how they are treated in their new countries, what access they have to govern-ment programmes and whether or not they achieve political and economic equal-ity with their new fellow citizens. Perhaps most importantly, in times of economic slowdown and higher unemployment, will they be blamed for others’ inability to fi nd a job and be targeted by an angry, resentful and scared populace? And how will the states of their residence respond to these developments – and how might their states of origin subsequently react should there be repression or unfair treatment?

4. A Question of Social Cohesion – Why Should the EU Be Involved?

If McGarry et al. are correct, the only diff erence between the Russians in Estonia (deemed a national minority) and the Poles in Ireland (considered a migrant

50) Interview with John Packer, former Director in the Offi ce of the OSCE HCNM, and now Director of the Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex, Colchester, England, 28 June 2009. 51) Bauer and Zimmerman, supra note 43. 52) E-mail correspondence with Elizabeth Sliwinska, journalist for the Polska Gazeta (Dublin), 3 July 2009.


group) is the amount of time they have been in the country. Th ey share many of the same attributes, concerns, wants and grievances. For example, as Packer notes, one of the issues that both groups share is access to media in their own language. He elaborates and emphasises that from a human rights perspective, it does not matter how long a group has resided somewhere: they are to be treated with respect and deserve dignity and freedom. 53 Th ose freedoms should be protected no matter to which category the group may be said to ‘belong’. In this article, non-EU immigrants will not be included in this discussion of social cohesion, but from the perspective of human rights (which does not discriminate on the basis of nationality or country of origin) one would not be wrong to include them as well. For now, it is enough to show that the current and potential problems faced by the ‘new’ minorities are similar enough to established national minorities to look for common solutions and potential EU diplomacy. By removing the defi nitional arguments and replacing it with the broader concepts of public good and social cohesion, it is possible to fi nd commonalities and to identify the tools and best practices needed to address all potential issues for minorities (however labelled). 54 By treating both groups the same it also raises awareness of the role of the majority in this process. Some would argue that migrants and national minor-ities diff er due to the fact that migrants are choosing to change an aspect of their identity by moving, while national minorities fi ght to avoid assimilation. 55 Th is may or may not be true for some people, but at a macro-level it is less important, particularly if the majority group chooses not to accept this identity change and continues to view them as outsiders. Th e majority has as much to do with the labelling of minorities as the group itself and by democratic power the majority has evidently greater infl uence, if not control. In any event, any confl ict between the majority and a minority is a threat to social cohesion, and with the EU so entwined, a threat to one is potentially a threat to the stability of the whole.

Even if the two groups are treated the same and deemed simply ‘minorities’ within the state, a further question could be asked: why should the EU become involved in questions regarding the social cohesion of an independent, sovereign state? Th e fi rst reason is that, as mentioned above, any issue within one state can impact the Union as a whole. Th is is particularly true when considering the large number of EU diasporas found in other EU states. Second, as the EU made issues of minority rights an aspect of the 2004–2007 accession process, it obviously sees a need for stability in this regard. Moreover, the EU has recently become more active in its protection of the Roma population. As noted by Spirova and Budd,

53) Interview Packer, 2009. 54) Interview with Dr Natalie Sabanadze, Senior Advisor to the OSCE HCNM, Th e Hague, Th e Netherlands, 18 June 2009. 55) Interview with Dr Klemens Buescher, Senior Advisor to the OSCE HCNM, Th e Hague, Th e Netherlands, 18 June 2009.


the Roma can be described as ‘Europe’s minority’ and face a variety of problems across Europe even after an accession process was meant to improve their condi-tion in specifi c states. 56 Th e EU appears to have acknowledged this and released a report calling for better co-ordination, monitoring, legal provisions and EU-level funding to improve the condition of Roma throughout the region. 57 Th ird, the EU helped create many of the issues surrounding social cohesion directly or indi-rectly and therefore has a responsibility to become engaged. Only the 2004 and 2007 accession classes were forced to address issues of minority rights. Th e EU was not willing to try to infl uence Western states when they were going through the process. As a result, the EU has set up a double standard in treatment where minority groups in Eastern Europe enjoy greater rights and protections than their counterparts in Western Europe. 58 Th is has created bitterness on behalf of the states in the East who feel that they were forced to change their societies and now that they are members have little interest in providing greater rights, while in the West minorities demand the same protections found in the East. In terms of ‘new’ minorities, it is the EU policy of the free movement of goods and people that allowed for this potential movement of people throughout Europe. It is also the development of European Citizenship laws that help protect these groups and allow them to demand certain rights. As Ackers states, “citizenship provides full access to social provisions in host welfare systems on the basis of non-discrimination”; thus, while “Community law cannot guarantee a stan-dardised platform of social entitlement, it does provide for very broad application of the non-discrimination principle”. 59 Th ese citizenship and mobility rights cre-ate the conditions where EU citizens can make greater demands on the state and the state must not discriminate. Th is ties the state’s hands in terms of certain poli-cies and helps create conditions that may lead to a backlash against the group. If EU policy can increase the potential threats to minority/majority relations, the EU must in the future fi nd a way to help states reduce these threats.

5. What Can/Should the EU Do?

It has been argued above that the EU has a responsibility to become engaged in issues surrounding minorities. It is acknowledged that there is little apparent

56) M. Spirova and D. Budd, ‘Th e EU Accession Process and the Roma Minorities in New and Soon-to-be Member States’, 6 Comparative European Politics (2008) p. 81. 57) European Commission, Report: Improving the Tools for the Social Inclusion and Non-Discrimination of Roma in the EU (2010), <ec.europa.eu/progress>, visited on 3 March 2011. 58) M. Johns, ‘Do As I Say, Not As I Do: Th e European Union, Eastern Europe and Minority Rights’, 17:4 East European Politics and Societies (2003) pp. 682–699. 59) L. Ackers, ‘Citizenship, Migration and the Valuation of Care in the European Union’, 30:2 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2004) p. 375.


appetite in the European Commission to begin such work and there would be even less enthusiasm from the member states to give the Commission this author-ity. Th erefore, the fi rst option available to the EU is to simply do nothing. It can continue to treat all migration the same and operate programmes through the Justice and Home Aff airs Offi ce (JHA) or the relatively weak Fundamental Rights Agency. It can hope that questions of discrimination can be addressed through the European Court of Human Rights. It can release reports calling for better treatment of the Roma without concrete policies in place to deal with govern-ment enforced relocations and open discrimination. It can argue that it has adopted the European Council’s Copenhagen Criteria on National Minorities, ignoring the fact that the Commission ultimately allowed each state to determine on their own if they were in compliance. It can simply argue that these issues are the internal aff airs of the state. But all these would be mistakes. Th e EU must become more engaged, and quiet diplomacy off ers an immediate and eff ective means to do so.

A second option would be to work closer with the OSCE HCNM and allow that offi ce to work with the European Commission on minority issues wherever they arise within the OSCE including within the EU. HCNM Vollebaek has indicated that he would like to work more closely with the EU on issues of minor-ity rights and feels that they could co-operate on a number of issues. For example, he believes that the EU could stress to their members that minority protection should be a life-long goal, not just a test to be passed at accession. 60 Th e HCNM has expertise in the use of QD and the offi ce has developed best practices and accumulated considerable experience on complex issues such as language use that could be implemented throughout Europe. Th e problem with this option is that the HCNM is a part of the OSCE and is bound by his mandate. In order for the HCNM to begin to work on issues involving all minorities, the mandate might need to be clarifi ed or practice would need to be established which in eff ect expands the work (arguably, as naturally evolved reacting to changes in ‘security’ threats, challenges and perceptions). Retooling the mandate would require the states of the OSCE agreeing – at least acquiescing – to give the HCNM more authority across some new situations. Many countries that were happy with the HCNM infl uencing East European states vis-à-vis their national minorities would be far less accommodating with the HCNM coming to work with them on issues associated with what is referred to here as ‘social cohesion’. Political real-ity suggests this is not likely.

Th is leaves a third option: the European Commissioner working infor-mally with states and groups on these issues. Hoff meister sees an opportunity for greater European Community (EC) involvement in minority issues, stating:

60) Interview Vollebaek, 2009.


“Th e Commission, as a political body, could engage in more systematic review. It could enrich its present monitoring through the experience gained in the enlarge-ment process.” 61 Here, QD is the perfect tool. As Collins and Packer note, acting quietly can “facilitate access to actors and information, establish and maintain confi dences, and create space for ad hoc or sustained dialogue”. 62 Th e European Commission is considered secretive by inclination, so confi dentiality would not be an issue. It could expand JHA or the Fundamental Rights Agency and either create the EC equivalent of the HCNM (without the ‘National’ in the title) or work with states and groups in an ad hoc fashion. By taking a greater, yet under-stated role, relying on QD the European Commission could identify areas with specifi c problems and work to provide a dialogue between groups and the govern-ment before a problem reaches a point where public diplomacy would be needed. Over time those involved in QD inside the European Commission could pro-duce their own best practices and policies to provide states with proven strategies to lower confl ict. As the European Union is the pre-eminent international player in Europe, the EC would be better able to assert authority and encourage both sides to compromise – and due to quiet diplomacy’s allergy to ‘naming-and-shaming’, states would avoid the backlash from those in the public who would be less willing to compromise. In short, moving an aspect of QD into the deter-mined work of the European Commission would allow for the body inside Europe with the greatest infl uence to work behind the scenes to encourage greater social cohesion within states, leading to a greater chance for a more stable, peace-ful EU.

6. Concluding Th oughts

Th is article has argued that the European Union—partly due to its own actions, inaction and policies—now fi nds itself with the potential to face a variety of minority issues all across the Union. By refusing to address questions of social cohesion seriously throughout its history, even while it was paying lip-service to the idea, it has also made future expansion more diffi cult. Th e article has argued that it is no longer practical in the EU to try to stick to outdated and semantic defi nitions of ‘national minorities’ and ‘migrants’ nor is it useful to attempt to address diff erently those various groups’ essentially similar needs and wants.

61) F. Hoff meister, ‘Monitoring Minority Rights in the Enlarged European Union’, in G. N. Toggenburg (ed.), Minority Protection and the Enlarged European Union: Th e Way Forward (Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2004) p. 100. 62) C. Collins and J. Packer, ‘Quiet Diplomacy: Preventing confl ict through discreet engagement’, in S. Wolff and C. Yakinthou (eds.), Confl ict Management in Divided Societies: Th eories and Practice (Routledge, London, 2012 p. 109.


What is required is for the EU and specifi cally the European Commission to begin to engage states and minority leaders in constructive dialogues on issues and to look to remove the potential for confl ict long before it reaches a point where it is no longer able to be controlled. Europe is changing, and not all for the better. Th e rise and success of anti-immigrant, xenophobic political parties throughout Western Europe should be all the proof states and the EU need that the potential for confl ict is prevalent. Minority groups are going to continue to demand an end to political and economic discrimination and relying on the courts to resolve these issues in a timely manner is not realistic. Moreover, even as migration to Ireland or Britain from the East slows down, those communities are now engrained in society and will continue to demand the rights aff orded to them due to their EU citizenship, notably non-discrimination and full equality. All the while, people will continue to move into other countries and new com-munities will form. Th e time to create the mechanisms to help states and groups work together is now.

Th e article advocates the use of quiet diplomacy ultimately for one simple reason: it works. In fact, QD is “indisputably cheap, both in terms of human lives saved and suff ering avoided and in terms of actual fi nancial expenditures”. 63 Th e EU prefers to have the European Commission work behind the scenes so a pro-tocol that relies on impartiality and confi dentiality makes perfect sense. Th e EU has an excellent reference and guide in the OSCE HCNM and his offi ce who would be able to share experiences, resources and ideas. Th e Commission could also learn from the diff erent experiences of the diff erent HCNMs to fi nd those whose personality best suits the type of diplomacy they would want to engage in. For all of this to occur states, minority groups and the EU itself would fi rst have to acknowledge the problem, accept that they all need to work together to fi nd a solution, and trust each other enough to try. Th ere is much to be gained if they do and great risks ahead if they do not.

Appendix- MAR Coding Used in Table 1. POLDIS

Political discrimination index:

0 No discrimination

1 Neglect/remedial polices Substantial under-representation in political offi ce and/or participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are designed to protect or improve the group’s political status.

63) Packer, supra note 18, p. 268.


2 Neglect/no remedial policies Substantial under-representation due to historical neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. No evidence of pro-tective or remedial public policies.

3 Social exclusion/neutral policy Substantial under-representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inad-equate to off set discriminatory social practices.

4 Exclusion/repressive policy Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group's political participation by comparison with other groups. (Note: Th is does not include repression during group rebellions. It does include patterned repression when the group is not openly resisting state authority.)

-99 No basis for judgment

ECDIS

Economic discrimination index:

0 No discrimination

1 Neglect/remedial polices Signifi cant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations due to his-torical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group’s material well being.

2 Neglect/no remedial policies Signifi cant poverty and under-representation due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no pub-lic policies aim at improving the group's material well-being.

3 Social exclusion/neutral policy Signifi cant poverty and under-representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if posi-tive, inadequate to off set active and widespread discrimination.

4 Exclusion/repressive policy Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group's economic opportunities by contrast with other groups.



CULPO2

Restrictions on use of language or language instruction:

0 No restrictions

1 Activity informally restricted Th e activity is restricted by widespread but informal social practice (e.g., by dis-crimination against people who speak the group’s language)

2 Activity somewhat restricted

3 Activity sharply restricted


SEPX

Separatism index:

0 None

1 AUTLOST> 0 but no separatist (independence/revanchist) or autonomy movements in past 50 years

2 Separatist or autonomy movement that persisted as an active political force for at least 5 years in the past 50 years, but not in the past 25 years

3 Active separatist or autonomy movements in the past 25 years


PROT

Protest:

0 None reported

1 Verbal opposition Requests by a minority-controlled regional group for independence (public let-ters, petitions, posters, publications, agitation, court action, etc.).

2 Symbolic resistance Sabotage, symbolic destruction of property OR political organizing activity on a substantial scale (e.g. sit-ins, blockage of traffi c).


3 Small demonstrations A few demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, the largest of which has total participation of less than 10,000

4 Medium demonstrations Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, the largest of which has total par-ticipation between 10,000 and 100,000

5 Large demonstrations Demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, the largest of which has total par-ticipation over 100,000


(Minorities at Risk Project 2009)

Quiet Diplomacy, the European Union and Conflict Prevention: Learning from the HCNM on Issues of Social Cohesion

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