Question 2: John Lewis Gaddis, in The Landscape of History, described the concepts of continuity and contingency. How does he define these terms and what.

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Question 2: John Lewis Gaddis, in The Landscape of History, described the concepts of continuity and contingency. How does he define these terms and what usefulness do they have for historians, academics in other fields, and military practitioners? Consider a reading from one of the

SAMS courses that reflects the presence of continuities and contingencies (whether or not the author explicitly referred to them as such) and discuss how your understanding of those terms helped you as you read and interpreted the text. For example, place a historical campaign or war

you read about in context by using the concepts of continuity and contingency as Gaddis described them.

P 30-31: continuities are patterns that extend across time, phenomena that recur with sufficient regularity to make themselves apparent to usContingencies phenomena that do not form patterns, these may include the actions individuals take for reasons known only to themselves (ie. Hitler or Lee Harvey Oswald) “Black Swan”-Contingencies can be limited using scenario planning (Schwartz) helping to limit the unpredictable and bring it closer to the predictable-Gaddis ideas of contingencies and continuities is similar to Mintzberg’s ideas of deliberate and emergent strategies-EOA tie in 1973 Arab Israeli war, Israeli based doctrine on superior armor and air force, and assumed that Egypt would be unable to attack without a superior air force based on their experience in the 48, 58, 67 wars (continuities); Egyptians determined to use man portable anti-tank and ADA systems to shift the balance, the Israelis also falsely assumed their intelligence network would give them 48 hours advanced warning (contingencies)-Cohen and Gooch “Military Misfortunes”: Anticipate, learn and adapt; in 73 the Israelis failed to anticipate changes in the technology and nature of war, but were able to learn and adapt rapidly to be victorious

Intended Deliberate Realized

Emergent Mintzberg page 24

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Herbst – States & Power in Africa THEORY=YES• Continuities (central control) vs. contingencies (colonies/UN)

• Utility – Explains why gov’t of w/ sparsely populated areas & minimal external threats centralize control geographically; Control land vs control population; think infl of urbanization

• Abstract (Y) – can extend causal mech over time of Africa; Meaning (Y) – IR theories; Logical (Y) – compare AF to EU; Empirical (Y) – pop/road density, maps, historical analysis

3a. (TOA) Choose one of the applicatory readings from TOA (Kalyvas, Herbst, Mintzberg, Dolman), and argue whether the author developed a theory or not, and regardless, how the reading illustrated the utility of theories, models, and frameworks to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem or develop a strategy or plan to deal with it.

Kuhn – The Structure of Scientific Revolutions• Paradigm shifts = revolutions (incommensurability)• Normal science vs. extraord. science• Norm science -> crisis -> paradigm shiftReynolds – A Primer in Theory Construction• Theory provides sense of understanding (Causal Process); a

formal description of idea (paradigm)• Characteristics of Sci Knowledge– Abstract, Intersubjectivity

(Meaining & Logical), Empirical Relevance• Ideas – Kuhn paradigm, paradigm, paradigm variation • Develop Sci Knowledge – Composite Approach (Explore-

>Describe->Explain)

Kalyvas – The Logic of Violence in Civil War• Theory – Yes• Paradigm - control gets collab;

indiscriminant violence counter-productive• Causal process - examines indiscrim vs.

selective violence• Abstract (Y) – mult. examples; Meaning (Y)

– scopes & defines; Logical (Y) – all civil wars; Empirical (Y) – case studies vs hypothesized predictions

• Utility – Examines problem on multiple levels (macro, meso, micro); suggests how we should selectively use violence to evidence control and gain collaboration among population.

Gaddis – Landscape of History• Historical application/analysis valuable• Meeting of continuities & contingencies• Tools - selectivity, shifting scale, simultaneity, infinite

divisibility• Interdependence of mult. Variable sensitive to init

cond.CvC – On War [140-42]• Task of theory = study the nature of ends & means• Tactics easier than strategy• Theory ≠ doctrine; = guide to analyze military history

Causal Process

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1= Pre-colonial2=Colonial3=Independent

Theory of Theory

Buss

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04 - Compare/Contrast Jomini & CvC

Carl Von Clausewitz• 1780-1831• Son of Prussian 1LT• Served throughout the Napoleonic

Wars (Losing to France a lot)• Kreigsakademie graduate, later director

of Berlin War Academy• Influenced by German Romantic

Movement (Kant, Hegel)– Improvement of knowledge– Question accepted concepts

• On War proposes a theory of war in dialogue with the reality of war

• Paradoxical Trinity (Passion, Reason, Chance & Probability) most often found in secondary trinity (People, Government, General & his army)

• Best Generals posses genius (coup d’oeil and determination)

• Study of history does not supplant experience but makes achievement of experience easier (fingerspitzengeful)

Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini• 1779-1869• Son of middle class Swiss• Rose through ranks to become Corps

Chief of Staff under Napoleon• Wrote frequently during and after

Napoleonic wars• The Summary of the Art of War

represents mature thinking on the subject of war and its many facets

• Influenced by Bulow and Lloyd• Presents a rational way to explain war• Underlying principle of war at all

levels is Mass• Strategic level- Mass against an

enemy in a theater and then maneuver to encounter his army

• Tactical- Mass at the decisive point ( the place or object that once captured or destroyed results in the defeat of the enemy)

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04 - Compare/Contrast Jomini & CvC

Carl Von Clausewitz• Sampled history to illustrate support

for his theories• Advocated the use of case studies to

learn principles of warfare• Viewed Jomini disparagingly- too

formulaic• CvCs description of the Center of

Gravity not out of line with Jomini’s decisive point

• Center of gravity featured prominently in US Army and Joint doctrine (probably more at the strategic level- less so at the tactical)

• War as an extension of politics lends itself to the discussion of endstates and termination criteria

• Understanding chance and friction assist commanders and staffs plan for uncertainties and contingencies- building flexibility into plans

• Link to Linn Echos of Battle Heros

Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini• Used examples from the campaigns

of Napoleon- structured as successes• Regarded Clausewitz as too abstract• Description of decisive point is very

similar to Center of Gravity• Jomini’s principles of mass,

maneuver, lines of operation, and objective survive in US Army doctrine

• Discusses combined arms warfare and battlefield operating systems in ways that apply even to day

• Example- Rational for number of artillery pieces per number of infantry is almost dead on with the number of tubes in a BCT to day.

• While CvC dismisses logistics- Jomini discusses at length

• US Military often looks for Jominian solutions to tactical problems

• Link to Linn Echos of Battle Guardians

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7. Using a historical example and the doctrinal principles of mission command, explain how a commander and his staff developed and conducted a successful campaign.

• ADP 6-0, Mission Command – the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

• 6 Mission Command principles: Build cohesive teams through mutual trust, Create shared understanding, Provide clear commander’s intent, Exercise disciplined initiative, Use mission orders, Accept prudent risk

Mid-Atlantic Campaign, American Revolution02 July 1776 – Howe brothers garrison Staten Island22-25 August 1776 – Howe turns Putnam’s left flank; Battle of Brooklyn Heights29-30 August 1776 – Americans evacuate Long Island12 September 1776 – Americans abandon NY15 September 1776 – Kip’s Bay16 September 1776 – Harlem Heights16-20 November 1776 – Forts Washington and LeeNov-Dec 1776 – American retreat through NJ26 December 1776 – Battle of Trenton2 January 1777 – Washington moves behind Cornwallis3 January 1777 – Battle of Princeton; Washington defeats Cornwallis’ reinforcements at Princeton and captures supplies. He withdraws to Morristown before Cornwallis can attack from Trenton.

Mission Command Principles

1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust

- Principles of the American Revolution

- Shared experiences

2. Create Shared Understanding

- Importance of Army in Being

- Importance of initiative

- Impact of low morale

3. Provide Clear Commander’s Intent

- 3 DOS, Ready to March

- Wet powder/bayonet story

4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative

- Raid on Trenton

- Maneuver away from Cornwallis

- Defeat reinforcements at Princeton

- Avoiding Decisive Battle

5. Use Mission Orders

- Ewing raids into NJ

- Cadawalader conducts diversionary attack to prevent reinforcements

- Ewing seizes bridge to encircle Trenton

- Washington assaults

6. Accept Prudent Risk

- Cross Delaware

- Attack under cover of storm

- Continued assault after Ewing and Cadawalader failed to cross

- Left camp fires burning to evade Cornwallis

Kotter’s 8 Step Change Model and the Mission

Command Principles both produce highly flexible

organizations where the sum of the parts is greater than

the whole.

After defeats on Long Island and Manhattan, Washington’s Continental Army retreated to PA/NJ for the winter. To maintain the revolution, Washington knew he must keep a continental “army-in-being.” To that end, he executed the principles of mission command to maintain the “army-in-being” and regain the initiative from the British.

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8. What are the challenges of command at the operational level? How do they differ from tactical command? Give examples from the course.

JP 1-02 strategic level of war — The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.

JP 1-02 operational level of war — The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.

JP 1-02 tactical level of war — The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.

Janine Davidson – Politicians want options.

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TLPs to execute tactical mission tasks

Challenge #1 – Transition of ambiguous strategic guidance into tactical actions. - Example: Afghanistan surge under Obama; Military presented different COAs for one options; not numerous options; constantly changing end state; lack of specified end state. - Davidson – Politicians want options; Don’t want solutions to reduce options

Challenge #2 – Sequencing of tactical actions through time, space, and purpose - Example: Vicksburg 1863; Grant managing campaign vs Sherman, McPherson, McClerndon, and Porter - Gaddis – Scope and Scale; Tactical commanders control singular events; Operational commanders control multiple events.

Challenge #3 – Flexible interpretation of operational level - Example: 1806 – Napoleon is the operational artist; OIF/OEF – BN level commanders are operational artists - ADRP 1-02/3-0 does not define levels of war - JP 1-02 defines levels of war but does not identify echelon

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OpArt: The pursuit of strategic objectives , in whole or in part, by the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose.

Q11 (EOA) Discuss the tension between strategy, operations, and tactics. Provide at least one example from the course. Achim Hesse

- “Tension” not defined in doctrine. Proposals: cognitive tension between abstract and detail (Naveh, 9,13); strategy and tactics are theoretical opposed, but never alone (Dolman, 14)

- All course of AMSP reflect tensions: no common theory about the relation of the levels of policy/war (TOA), variety of examples (EOA, SCOA), necessity to constantly reframe to mitigate tension (DOA)

Selected historical/current examples (every EOA,SCOA example is about tension!): • Korea ‘50: imprecise ends and ways given by UN (crossing the 38th parallel)• Vietnam ’69: Mismatch of strategy (Vietnamization) and end state (end the war vs. win the

war)• Afghanistan: Missing strategy in ‘01, COIN vs. CT ways and means, post 2014 strategy?

Ends

Means Ways

Politics/Policy Strategy Tactics

Concept Detail

Campaigns, Operations

(potential)tension

Pursuit of interdependent outcomes in the context of participant's beliefs about the importance and nature of just relationship, procedures, and outcomes (Lamborn)

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Q12: Moltke has stated that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. Agree or disagree and provide examples.

First important step: define “plan.” Are we talking overall operational approach (no details), a hasty course of action (some details), or a deliberate COA (many details)? The plan is more likely to survive first contact the fewer details it involves.

Agree (plan won’t survive) Disagree (plan will survive)- LTG Knutson (guest speaker): “a plan that can’t survive

first contact is a pretty poor plan.”- One result of ADM is the commander’s intent, which

might be considered the overarching “plan.” Assuming a decent understanding of the OE and the actors because of ADM, the cdr’s intent will survive for a while.

- Eventually, reframing will need to occur. ADRP 5-0 (2-11):

- Assessment reveals lack of progress- Key assumptions prove invalid- Unanticipated success or failure- Major event causes catastrophic change in OE- Periodic review shows a problem- Change in mission or end state from higher

- Pushback: is cdr’s intent really a plan? It might be simply a vision or an end state, which always endure better than plans.

- Examples where overarching plan seemed to endure: - GEN Scott’s campaign in Mexico- Philippines 1898-1901- (But again – did the plan endure, or only the end

state?)

- Complexity of war (CvC, Senge, etc.)- Interdependence of system elements- Whole more than sum of parts- System involves humans (Dolman, 123)- Emergent problems and opportunities

- Continuities make for meaningful plans, but contingencies will always appear (Gaddis) (contingencies are probably another way of getting at the emergence above).

- Initial understanding of a system will always be limited, so plan must change with increased understanding after contact.

- Impossible for the plan to survive contact, but also undesirable, since sticking to a plan may cause one to miss opportunities or fail to learn, adapt, and anticipate (Cohen/Gooch).

- Examples where original plan did not survive:- T.E. Lawrence: had to develop radically different

approach than initial idea to mass Arabs against Turks in a European way of war.

- Franco-Prussian War 1870-71: Moltke constantly modified plan to take advantage of emerging possibilities (trapping Bazaine at Metz, then encirclement at Sedan) and adapt to new challenges (declaration of Third Republic after Napoleon III surrendered, guerrilla attacks along LOCs)

Amount of Detail…

Even if the plan does not survive first contact, planning is still worth it. GEN Eisenhower: “the plan is nothing, but planning is everything.”

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# 13. What is the relationship between Strategy and Operational Art? - What factors should be considered in examining the strategic context for Op’ Art?

1) DEFINE: According to FM 1-02 and ADP 5-0/JP 5-0Strategy: The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in and

synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, or muli-national objectives. Op’ Art: The organization and employment of Military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (A

cognitive approach by CDRs and Staffs to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations.)

~ strategy is more of the art (the what) a vision with a known end-state; whereas op’ art is the how to achieve that vision that incorporates the science of war, its tactics, constraints and limitations.

2) Use ADM to illustrate the relationship:OP ENV Desired E.S.MEANS OP Approach ENDS WAYSWhat we

physically have to deal with

How we will get there

To achieve this goal

3) EXPL: 1973 War (Egypt Perspective)Strategy: Defeat a superior IDF/IAF to gain regional

and world wide recognition IOT gain leverage in Middle East Peace Process.

OP ENV Desired E.S. OP Approach

-Egypt Modernized Army- Soviet Assistance- Superior IDF/IAF

-Counter Israel capability- Penetrate Def- Exploit & Hold Terrain- Element of Surprise- Form Alliances

-Achieve political victory w/o tactical surrender

4) Factors to Consider: Historical Context (1967; US/Soviet interest)Lamborn’s 5 (PLTLR)Thucydides (F,H,I)OP Environment includes: Terrain, WX, Actors

and Motivations

5) Successful Strategies: Include plans that are Flexible; with planners and leaders that are able to Learn, Adapt, Anticipate (Cohen/Gooch) ; Iterative Assessments and Reframing as needed.

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Strategy, Operational Art, Tactics, ADM and Mission Command

TacticsArt / Science

20 / 80

OperationsArt / Science

50 / 50

StrategyArt / Science

80 / 20

CMDControl

Conceptual

ADM

Detailed

MDMPOP ART

Direct Describe Visualize Understand

Science Art

(This is not directed toward any specific question, however it aims to tie, questions 13 and 18 together. )

Yin YangSenge - Balance

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16- Using a Historical Example, examine the relationship between the application of military force and the use of diplomacy

Cuban Missile Crisis- October 1962• 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion

– US supported attempt to overthrow Castro- Failure– Lack of US Air Support– Invasion members cut off and decimated

• Khrushchev and Castro agree to place Soviet Missiles in Cuba as – Deterrent to future invasion– Response to US missiles in Turkey

• US identifies site prep with U2 flights• Soviet missiles in Cuba are a direct threat to US• USSR influence in Cuba violation of Monroe Doctrine• US places forces on high alert- USSR does not• US commits to “quarantine” of Cuba. A blockade in name only as a blockade is

an act of war• Land forces begin mobilization for invasion, 5 MEB moves from Pacific to

Caribbean• U2 shot down by soviet missile over Cuba• Kennedy and the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) plan immediate response

to the introduction of offensive weapons to Cuba• Diplomatically Adlai Stevenson brings issue to the UN (Soviet veto means no

action from the security council)• Backchannel communications US Brazil Cuba “US will not invade if the

Soviets remove missiles• Backchannel discussions with Soviets through USSR Ambassador- developing a

win set that can gain approval from both sides ratifies (Two-party game)• Khrushchev shows two sides in communications (internal-Politburo and

external-Kennedy audience) Tommy Thompson knew Khrushchev personally and encourages Kennedy to listen to what Khrushchev needs to in order to save face

• Kennedy brokers deal through UN Secretary General, USSR removes missiles and US agrees to never invade Cuba. Secretly US agrees to remove missiles from Turkey and Italy.

• Utility of Deterrence• Presence of missiles

eclipsed shortly after by new technology (Submarine launched ICBMs)

• Win sets and Time Horizons

• Two party game• Diplomacy and Military

action in synchronization

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(SCOA) #17: Explain how economics and economic theory can influence military operations.

• Economics: study of the efficient and effective distribution of scarce resources• Economic principles

– People are rational – People seek to maximize (satisfy) utility– The best decisions are made at the margins

• Free Market economic theories argue that:– The market (Adam Smith’s invisible hand) is the best means to determine the true worth of goods. – Nations, enterprises should engage in activities where they have a comparative advantage (David Ricardo originator of the idea of

“comparative advantage”). (U.S. nanotechnology v. Vietnamese catfish farming). • Not all governments at all times have subscribed to classical free market economic theories

– 18th century governments believed in “mercantilism” economic theory based on a state satisfying all its economic need internally not by trade.

– Nations pursued colonies to acquire resources. Examples British/French competition for West Indies and Indian Sub-Continent– Naval blockade is a traditional means of trying to defeat an enemy by interrupting trade.

• Examples: British Blockade of Germany during WWI• Union Blockade of CSA during the American Civil War• Confederacy attempted to leverage its perceived monopoly on cotton by embargoing exports to Europe to encourage European nations to recognize the

CSA.

– Race for Africa in 1880s.– Nazi Germany believed in autarkic self sufficiency. Can make an economic argument for attack east. Need to acquire sufficient

land/resources to allow Germany to be self-sufficient.– Soviet Union believed in Marxist economics. All wars were capitalist wars. Capitalist nations fought each other for access of markets.

Imperialism was the final stage of capitalism because capitalists had expropriated all the surplus wealth in the home nation and had to colonize foreign territories for resources and to find new wealth to expropriate. Eventually capitalist economies would collapse due to their internal contradictions and Marxism would triumph.

– Strong argument that U.S. commitments in the Middle East are driven by the need to maintain free flow of relatively inexpensive oil. Carter Doctrine, Desert Storm/Desert Shield.

– OPEC Decision to embargo oil during the 1973 Yom Kippur War is an example of Arab nations seeking to exploit their control of much of the world’s oil supply for military gain.

• Ability to borrow money/engage in deficit spending critical to fighting wars – First U.S. income tax passed during the American Civil War. Also first use of fiat money in the U.S. “Greenbacks”– Stability of US financial markets/economy critical to US strategic strength. – Financial crisis was a threat to the U.S. strategically

Page 14

# 18. Using History, Theory, and Doctrine explain the relationship between conceptual and detailed planning.

1) DEFINE: According to ADP 5-0, FM 1-02, and JP 5-0.Conceptual Planning: Best described via the Army definition of design – “A method for

applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize and describe complex and ill structured problems, and develop approaches to solve them. Strategic and High Operational Level. An iterative and dynamic process. Reflects on going learning, adaptation. Asking: Is the mission scoped properly?

Detailed Planning: best example is MDMP as a means to attack and solve an already identified problem to reach a decision or course of action. In MDMP receipt of mission is treated as a known end-state, the problem is defined.

• Operational Art is the link between the two: Developing a plan that organizes and employs military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.

• Together, Detailed and conceptual planning provides a holistic approach to planning, they are mutually supporting.

2) EXPL: FP War 1870

ADM D.E – Unify Germany

O.E. – FR Army, Nap III, Terrain, FR vs DE Infra’, AlliancesO.A. – 1 Front vs 3 Fronts(Deciding which approach best gets from the current env’ to the desired end-state.

MDMP – Once O.A. is decided MDMP details the best COAs to achieve the End-state.

1. Receipt Mission2. MA3. CO Dev4. COA Analysis5. COA Comparison6. COA Approval7. Orders Production Re

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•Defining an acceptable operational approaches is based on the means and ability of those means to address the problem and achieve the ends. •MDMP is the detailed planning of the operational artist's approach toward organizing and employing military forces along specific LOO/LOEs to the achieve the ends, weighing heavily on the knowledge of the science.

3) Concepts to Reference:

- G: Mapping the Mess - Cohen/Gooch: LAA - Lynn: Discourse of War - Gaddis: Contingencies - Schwartz: Futures - Dolman: Strategy

Page 15

Strategy, Operational Art, Tactics, ADM and Mission Command

TacticsArt / Science

20 / 80

OperationsArt / Science

50 / 50

StrategyArt / Science

80 / 20

CMDControl

Conceptual

ADM

Detailed

MDMPOP ART

Direct Describe Visualize Understand

Science Art

(This is not directed toward any specific question, however it aims to tie, questions 13 and 18 together. )

Yin YangSenge - Balance

Page 16

Question 19, Using theory, history, and doctrine explain the relationship between design and operational art.

JP 5-0, page III-2 ADRP 5-0, page 2-3

• operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose (ADRP 3-0, page 4-1)

• Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADRP 5-0, page 2-4)

• Applying operational art requires a shared understanding of an operational environment with the problem analyzed through the Army design methodology (ADRP 3-0, page 4-2)

• CvC (Bk 2, chp 5, page 156): historical inquiry, first discovery and interpretation of facts; second, tracing the effects back to their cause; third , investigation and evaluation of means employed

• JP 3-0, page 2-4 Operational design extends operational art’s vision with a creative process that helps commanders and planners answer the ends–ways–means–risk questions.

• operational art and operational design strengthen the relationship between strategy and tactics.

History Theory (Explain) Doctrine

tactics operations campaigns strategy

Operational Art Design

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21. (DOA) Explain the difference between complex and complicated systems. Using theory, a historical campaign(s), and personal experience give examples of both, and explain the implications for how to ensure relevant action when performing simple, complicated, and complex tasks.

Chaos Theory• Non-linear• Open systems• Driven by positive feedback• High sensitivity to initial conditions• Emergent self-organization• Limited long-term predictability, but allows for

predictability in short-term• Discovered by natural scientist in 1970s, enabled

by computers for calculations/simulations

Complexity Science• Focused on interconnectivity of elements w/in

system, & btwn system & its environment• “Edge of chaos” – balance btwn forces of order &

disorder, btwn fixed rigid structures & chaotic motion

• Complex Adaptive System (CAS) – retains systematic structure, but also most flexible and creative. Suited for dealing w/ contingency & unpredictability. Uses feedback from enviro & system interaction w/ envrio to develop schemata/model for how to act.

Theorist – CvC• Interaction btw animate obj, positive feedback

tends to absolute war• Friction = non-linear, small events-big impact• Chance - unpredictable

See Bousquet & Beyerchen Theorist – Boyd• OODA Loop like CAS• Orientation phase analyzes enviro & how we affect

enviro• Embraces uncertainty & adjusts to it

Historical Campaign – WWII, Burma Campaign, Field Marshall Slim• Initial defeat chaotic – sensitive to initial conditions (force available), open system (side campaign in WW),

driven by + feedback (JPN offensive), emergent self-org (tactical losses drove retreat), short-term predictable• Burma Corps = CAS – Slim analyzed environment & his cmd’s interaction with it, developed mental model,

provided vision to bring order to chaos

Relevant Action• Simple tasks – battle drills developed through habit, 2d nature• Complicated tasks – analyze to determine structure, hierarchical organizations ok (Bar Yam)• Complex tasks – need hybrid organization (Bar Yam); systems thinking to see interrelationships & change

(Senge), map the mess (Gharajedaghi)

See Bousquet & Osinga

Buss

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Q22: Discuss the function and utility of narrative in design as well as its relationship to discourse. Focus on defining what narrative and discourse are, what comprises them, how you 'do' them, how they function, and how they inform design.

Narrative: “a story constructed to give meaning to things and events” (ADRP 5-0). More than rhetoric, a narrative is grounded in people’s experience, interests, values, possibly giving belonging or purpose (Freedman, Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 23).Discourse: debate; open sharing of competing or complementary ideas, often in written form (Linn – TOA; Abbott – DOA)Relationship: people use narratives to participate in discourse (Abbott – DOA)

Narrative’s function and utility in design:- Helps to understand the actors in the OE (ADRP 5-0).

- Summary of an actor’s worldview, circumstances, meaning, motivations.- Heart and mind, and when they might disagree (Freedman – SCOA).

- Better anticipate behavior, given the understanding above.- Narratives help influence others (soft power and hard power; Nye – SCOA).

- Soft power: a well-constructed narrative can help attract others’ cooperation.- Hard power: narratives can help identify what coercion methods will work and

what ripple effects will be.

Discourse’s function and utility in design:- Fosters exchange of open ideas, especially between commander and

staff/subordinates.- Collaboration and dialogue (ADRP 5-0)- Complex problems require open testing of ideas (Red teams)

- Discourse helps create shared understanding (ADRP 6-0, Msn Command, 1-2)

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23.(DOA) Define adaptive work and describe how one leads this type of effort.

ADP 6-0, Mission Command – the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile

and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

6 Mission Command principles: Build cohesive teams through mutual trust, Create shared understanding, Provide clear commander’s intent, Exercise disciplined initiative, Use mission

orders, Accept prudent risk

Planning is a way of adapting the organization to its surroundings in two ways: by designing actions in advance of the need to act and by supporting the exercise of initiative during execution.

Cohen & Gooch•Learning•Adaptive•Anticipate

Adaptive work is able to adjust (someone or something) to different conditions, a new environment, or capitalize on emerging opportunities while being able to fit, change, or modify to suit a new or different purpose.

Because of the unpredictability of war, a good plan should be flexible, allowing us to adapt quickly to a broad variety of circumstances. This obviates the need to develop explicitcourses of action for an unlimited number of possible contingencies. The level of flexibility in a plan should be in direct proportion to the level of uncertainty and fluidity in the situation.

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(DOA) #25: Using a military historical case, explain how an organization or individual achieved their design goals.

• ADM: Define the current state; Define the desired endstate; Define the problem; develop an operational approach(es)

• ADRP 5.0 definition: “methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize and describe problems and approaches to solving them”

• Means to begin understanding and developing potential solutions to “ill structured” problems • Curtis LeMay use of B-29

– Designed for high altitude, precision bombing in formation with HE ordnance from China. Used by LeMay for low altitude area bombing with incendiary bombs . Bombers did not fly in formation. Attacks launched from the Marianas.

• German Army 1917 Infiltration tactics– How to launch successful offensive on the WWI Western Front despite trenches, massive artillery, poor comms

etc. German answer, short suppression barrages, specially trained infantry units bypassed resistance, light automatic weapons for added firepower in the assault. Tactical success in spring 1918. Strategic failure.

• Grant 1863 take Vicksburg from the south• Grant 1864 fight a distributed campaign to destroy Confederacy. Single “decisive” battles not sufficient • Nathanael Greene Southern Campaign 1780-81 undermine British control of NC, SC without winning battles • Ridgeway 1950 stabilize front, restore 8th Army’s morale, employ limited offensives, seek comparative

advantage to facilitate negotiations • Petreaus 2007 Reframe from previous campaign plan. Secure Iraqi population from Baghdad out to allow

political solution to insurgency. – Exploit Sunni awakening as an additional opportunity

CONCLUSION: Successful military leaders throughout time have used methods that resemble ‘Design’ to achieve their goals. ADM is an effort to reintroduce flexibility into planning that MDMP lacked.

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Question 27: What is the Utility of scenario for anticipating future conflicts. What did you learn about operational art from this process?

The Application: Gold Stone “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability”Purpose: Created a model to forecast the onset of political instability in Africa. accurately and with a two-year lead time. Model for instability variables—infant mortality, conflictin neighboring states, political/economicregime type The onset of political instability is rare but importantand our goal has been to develop a model capable offorecasting its occurrence accurately and with a two-year

The HOW:Peter, Schwartz : “The art of the long view”1.ID Focal issue or Decision (work inside out)2. Key Forces in local environment(Key factors influencing success3. Driving Forces (STEP OR PMESI- PT)4. Rank by importance for success or degree of uncertainty If we can simplify our entire list of related uncertainties into two orthogonal axes, then we can define a matrix (two axes crossing) that allows us to define four very different, but plausible, quadrants of uncertainty. Each of these far corners is, in essence, a logical future that we can explore.5.Select scenario logic6. Flesh out scenario•Implications of the scenario, what does it mean?•Leading Signposts Indicators (indicate likelihood of scenario occurring)

The WHAT: Scenario planning provides options and possibilities at the higher operational/ strategic level from which to determine what is or may become a problem. Scenario planning serves as a starting point from which to begin addressing the current operational environment and the possible desired endstate environment. Scenario planning also allows the exploration of the possible second and third order effects caused by the operational approach (Heisenberg Principle) Theorists:

The WHY: Lawrence Wilkinson: “How to Build Scenarios, Planning for long fuse, big bang problems in an era of uncertainty.”The purpose of scenario planning is not to pinpoint future events but to highlight large-scale forces thatpush the future in different directions (long fuse, big bang problems). Whatever you decide to do will play out with a big bang—often a life or death difference to an organization—but it can take years to learn whether your decision was wise or not. (Dolman, no victory in strategy, goal is continued position of advantage) Worse yet, “long fuse, big bang” questions don’t lend themselves to traditional analysis; it’s simply impossible to research away the uncertainties on which the success of a key decision will hang. Scenario planning derives from the observation that, given the impossibility of knowing precisely how the future will play out, a good decision or strategy to adopt is one that plays out well across several possible futures. To find that “robust” strategy, scenarios are created in plural, such that each scenario diverges markedly from the others. These sets of scenarios are, essentially, specially constructed stories about the future, each one modeling a distinct, plausible world in which we might someday have to live and work.

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29 - (FOA) What trends will influence the future operating environment? How will these trends affect operations in the next 5–10 years?

Technology• Cyber/Space: increasing reliance and prevalence of use

which increases risk to infrastructure (JOE 2010). Colin Gray “The greater the dependency on a capability, the higher the payoff to an enemy who can lessen its utility, in effect turning our strength into a weakness.”

• Increase in A2AD capes: Iran, China, Russia - (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Pri for 21st Century Defense Jan 2012)

Resource scarcity (The JOE, USJFCOM 2010)• Pop growth – expect global pop growth of 60 million per

year. Birth rates increase in developed areas compounded by migration to developed areas (JOE, 2010)

• Energy – to meet growing demands - global energy production need to increase 1.3% per year. Petrol expected to be basis of energy thru 2030.

• Food – expect global supply adequate but local shortages – Joint force assist in distro (JOE)

• Water – Pop growth & pollution increasing risk of water scarcity esp in Africa; Tensions increase over water use – control of water in rivers which cross state lines

Violent extremists – (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Pri for 21st Century Defense Jan ‘12)Nuclear proliferation / WMD is here to stay (Colin Gray• We can try to slow, arrest, reverse Nuclear proliferation but

we CAN’T stop it – to do so falsely assumes others will allow themselves to be beaten conventionally rather than escalate with nukes

• Iran/nK efforts to gain nuclear capes/ WMDEconomic – “Resource constrained era” - Sequestration, US debt and globally connected economies (sustaining US global ldrship, 2012)

Technology•US emphasis on C3I as advantage (Gen Odierno) = challenge to others to counter our strengths and turn them into a weakness (Colin Gray) = US Strength at risk•CYBER – how to integrate into “PLT lvl” & avoid CYBER Fratricide•Tim Thomas – CH and RU coordination in CYBER to counter US•A2AD – limit/prevent US from FOM in global commons; cheap / availability of weapons tech increases A2AD range Resource scarcity •US MIL can expect to be used to aid distro and provide security ISO USAID/NGO/UN efforts. •Energy – growing number of countries needing to transport energy requires defense of global commons(USN, USAF, FID…)•Food: secure / distro and increase partnering with USAID in 6-9 month famine forecasting & deployments•Water – Dip efforts on water use where it impacts multi-states; US provide MIL Observers in UN treaty monitoring (PKO) (UNTSO ex)•Pop – Ted Talk – Global POP will cap at 10BillionGlobal trends show increasing wealth and decreasing birthrates challenging JOE pop growth; countries w/ high mortality have high birthrates and pop growth. Birthrates have stabilized and will fill age age gaps upto 10 Billion mark (TED Hans Rosling)Violent extremists •Future = mix of regular &irregular wars - the challenge is to try to confine military ops to situations where one enjoys major asymmetrical advantages (Colin Gray)•Presence of VEO will drive US MIL use and complicate force employment in other situations•VEO seek ungoverned spacesNuclear proliferation / WMD is here to stay•Can not stop proliferation must change narrative•nK – Wildcard = emboldened S. Korea•Iran – wild card = Israel, AMB Oren talk•SY – regional instability/access to chemical weapons Economic:•Taleb – Globalization has created interconnected FRAGILITY in economy (discuss REALIST vs Liberalist views on globalized economy)

BPCLimited BOG commitments

Poss future MIL: Post war (Post hero, Lynn) Limited$ Use of special enablers (Refuel, trans

Vital InterestsDrones and stand off weapons

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31 – (EX) Explain the commander’s role in the Army’s Military Decision Making Process. How does the commander employ Mission Command to ensure the staff

meets his intent and higher headquarters’ mission requirements? DOCTRINE: CRD’s role in MDMP

•ADP 3-0 Commanders use the operations process (planning, preparing, executing, and assessing Military ops) to drive the conceptual (ADM) and detailed planning (MDMP) necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their unique operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations. ADP 5-0: Commanders role in MDMP:–Encourage active collaboration among all orgs affected by operations to build shared understanding, –Participate in COA dev & decision-making, –Resolve conflict before publish plan/order. ADP 5-0: Commander’s Role in MDMP–Commanders Focus Planning by providing:–Commander’s intent,–Planning guidance, –Discipline to the process IOT meet requirements of time, simplicity, detail, desired outcomes, is relevant and suitable for subordinates, & legalADRP 5-0 Commander’s Role in MDMP (adds)–During MDMP, CDRs focus activities on understanding, visualizing, & describing–Initiate MDMP –CDR = most important participant in MDMP. –CDR uses experience, knowledge, judgment to guide staff planning efforts.–In addition to formal meetings-> optimal planning results when CDR informally & frequently meets w/staff during MDMP.

•Build cohesive teams thru mutual trust•Create Shared Understanding•Provide clear commander’s intent•Exercise disciplined initiative•Use mission orders•Accept prudent risk

Commander Tasks:•Drive Ops process thru activities of understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, & assess•Develop teams both within their org and with unified action partners•Inform & influence audiences, inside and outside their org

Mission Command rests on a CDR’s ability to thrive in the conceptual while maintaining the ability to communicate in the detail:- Understand & Visualize require conceptual ability- Decide, Direct require details

from staffSCOA: Emile Simpson on “Strategic Dialogue”: focused on the strategy but applies to the CDR using MSN CMD-Plans should result fm a “dialogue

b/t desire & possibility”-CDRs need to inform their

understanding/visualization by staff provided detailsDOA: Swain, Richard. “CDR’s Business: Learning to Practice Op Design” ’09 (concerns design, it applies to MSN CMD)- Discourse learning technique where ideas fm multiple perspectives are offered/tested in argument, challenging fact w/ fact-triangulating meaning. -- Shared understanding, which may be achieved not only by discourse but also by dialogue, a clear substantive directive, or explanatory memoranda, is a requirement for decentralized operations -TOA: CVC Pg 88-98 importance of statesmen and MIL CDRs to establish the “kind of war on which they are embarking” ->this transitions down to the CDR to use MSN CMD to inform his staff

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Question 33: M&W, Explain the moral dilemmas posed by civilians on the battlefieldMain Theorist Michael Walzer, “Just and Unjust Wars “ / St Thomas Aquinas , St Augustine- Jus In Bello, Church DoctrineTheoryThe Principles of Jus In Bello or justice in war, emerged from Roman Catholic theologians around 1250 A.D to govern the rules of just conduct in which war is prosecuted.-Civilians on the battlefield are covered by the Jus In Bello principles of proportionality and discrimination. That is to say determining who is and who is not a legitimate target and what degree of force is morally appropriate to use against them . Also fitting are the principles of responsibility, in that actors in war are held legally accountable for their conduct either collectively or as individuals, and military necessity, being the acceptance of certain levels of collateral damage depending on the significance of the military target being engaged.

(Walzer) Just war theory prohibits acts include bombing civilian residential areas that include no military targets and committing acts of terrorism or reprisal against civilians. An attack cannot be launched on a military objective in the knowledge that the incidental civilian injuries would be clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. An attack or action must be intended to help in the military defeat of the enemy, it must be an attack on a military objective, and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This principle is meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction.

As the scope and lethality of war increases , issues arise over the legitimacy of targeting civilians. Civilians lose their “Innocent/ Protected status for the following reasons as witnessed in modern war: Identification- When they take up arms (Non Uniformed Insurgents) Example 2003: Iraq, The Fedayeen Saddam, non uniformed paramilitary fighters.Militarization (Civilian who works in military industry) WWII German aircraft factory employees Responsibility ( A Civilian required for the operation of a weapon system) Dr Oppenheimer during the Manhattan project..

Giulio Douhet, “Air Power” Advocate of the intentional targeting of civilians through air attacks to include poison gas and the targeting of first responders to these attacks IOT maximize destruction and terror. Douhet claimed this was a just course of action in that the affected population would pressure the government to sue for peace, preventing a longer war in which many more innocents would perish.

Historical examples of targeting civilians WWII-Grayling A.C. “Among the Dead Cities” addresses the intentional targeting of civilians in German and Japanese industrial centers as a means to hastening the end of the second world war. Explores Strategic bombing campaign especially the fire bombings of Dresden, Hamburg, and various cities in Japan. He Concludes the bombing was immoral despite the decision to bomb being tied to legal intent of attacking enemy war production. Despite Japan’s industry being co located with the population which equals a legitimate target the inaccurate “area” bombardment particularly with fire bombs according to Grayling remains an unjust act.

Atomic/Nuclear weapons – President Truman dropping the Atomic bombs on Japan to end the war and prevent the invasion of Japan. Mutually Assured Destruction: Bernard Brodie/Thomas Schelling (Deterrence), The willingness to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet population in order to prevent attack

Current- Drone strikes/ Air strikes with collateral damage/no “on the ground “ control-assessment, War on terror CIA/DOD Applicable Doctrine-UCMJ, Rule of Law, ROE (Hostile intent, covers identification) Positive IDEnd state: The dilemma for the commander becomes “just because you physically can do something, morally should you.” Moral relativism in decision making (Sometimes right, sometimes wrong) relative to the specific instance.

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34. (M&W) Make a moral argument for or against the use of unmanned (armed) aerial systems in war. Use theory and history to frame your discussion.

Moral criteria for war: Walzer, Orend, etc.

• Jus ad bellum (Go to War)– Proper Authority – minimally legitimate sovereign– Last Resort – all diplomatic means exhausted.– Just Cause – Self defense or other defense.– Proper Motives – the just cause is not a cover for profit

or revenge– Reasonable chance of Success - – Proportionality – Universal costs < Universal benefits

• Jus in bello (Just actions in war)– Discrimination – combatant vs non-combatant– Proportionality – action proportional to the objective. – Military Necessity – Militarily relevant target– DDE (Doctrine of Double Effect)

- Legitimate act of war- Acceptable effect- Intent is good, no intent for bad, active intent to minimizw

bad by accepting cost to oneself

• Jus post bellum (Lasting peace)– Proportionality – peace measured and reasonable– Rights Vindication – Human Rights reestablished– Discrimination – punishment for leaders, and war

criminals, not civilians.– Compensation – proportionate and discriminate.– Rehabilitation – reform institutions depending on

depravity

Argument: Drones are neither moral or immoral. They are tools. Morality is injected into the discussion in the way drones are used.

• An M16, like a drone, is neither moral or immoral. Yet when used in violation of the principles of Jus in Bello, they can be part of an immoral act.

– My Lai

• Jus Post Bellum– Comparative low cost, and low risk to friendly human

life may increase the likelihood of the use of force by groups with armed drones

• Jus In Bello– Much less collateral damage compared to ICBM’s or

cruise missiles– Only as good as supporting intelligence– -Post hoc analysis does not meet criteria of

discrimination.

• Justitiam Focos (Just use of drones)– Doctrine of Double Effect– Raid on Bin Laden Compound

• Discrimination was so important, U.S. risked the lives of SOF to ensure we killed him.

• If the U.S. is willing to risk Soldier’s lives to increase discrimination of particular combatants, then the same standard must be upheld to also discriminate between combatant and non-combatant.

• Currently, the U.S. in many cases is not using drones within the just war standard. We would not accept post hoc analysis inside the United States nor by an adversary.

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35. (M&W) Explain how you, a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies, evaluate the moral constraints and moral implications of operational actions in war. Moral criteria for war: Walzer, Orend, etc.

• Jus ad bellum (Go to War)– Proper Authority – minimally legitimate sovereign– Last Resort – all diplomatic means exhausted.– Just Cause – Self defense or other defense.– Proper Motives – the just cause is not a cover for profit or

revenge– Reasonable chance of Success - – Proportionality – Universal costs < Universal benefits

• Jus in bello (Just actions in war)– Discrimination – combatant vs non-combatant– Proportionality – action proportional to the

objective. – Military Necessity – Militarily relevant target– DDE (Doctrine of Double Effect)

- Legitimate act of war- Acceptable effect- Intent is good, no intent for bad, active intent to

minimizw bad by accepting cost to oneself• Jus post bellum (Lasting peace)

– Proportionality – peace measured and reasonable– Rights Vindication – Human Rights reestablished– Discrimination – punishment for leaders, and war

criminals, not civilians.– Compensation – proportionate and discriminate.– Rehabilitation – reform institutions depending on

depravity

Argument: The role of the SAMS planner, commander, or staff officer is to continually think through and be cognizant of the 2d and 3d order of effects regarding Jus in bello.

• Escalation: CVC page 87 highlights the concerns for war’s tendency to move towards absolute. The actions of one protagonist give validation and instigation of the actions of others.

• Political Objective: Doleman argues that there is no strategic ‘end state’ but rather the goal is to achieve a position of continuing relative advantage. CvC on page 89 states that war is a political instrument or a continuation of politics by other means.

• If the goal of warfare is to achieve a position of advantage through political actions via other means, the character of actions conducted within war color the position of advantage to be achieved post conflict.

• Given the stated goals of the U.S. in the National Security Strategy values the actions taken in war must continually represent and support our view of post war world.

– Strengthen the Power of Our Example– Promote Democracy and Human Rights Abroad– Promote Dignity by Meeting Basic Needs

“Two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.” Karl Von Clausewitz