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Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica QuSoft Seminar Friday, 22 January 2016
39

Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

Jan 18, 2018

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3 What will you learn from this Talk? Introduction to Quantum Mechanics Quantum Key Distribution Position-Based Cryptography
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Page 1: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

Quantum Cryptography

Christian Schaffner

Research Center for Quantum Software

Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)University of Amsterdam

Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica

QuSoft SeminarFriday, 22 January 2016

Page 2: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

2

1969: Man on the Moon

NASA

The Great Moon-Landing Hoax?

How can you prove that you are at a specific location?http://www.unmuseum.org/moonhoax.htm

Page 3: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

3 What will you learn from this Talk?

Introduction to Quantum Mechanics Quantum Key Distribution Position-Based Cryptography

Page 4: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

4Quantum Bit: Polarization of a Photonqubit as unit vector in C2

Page 5: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

5Qubit: Rectilinear/Computational Basis

Page 6: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

6Detecting a Qubit

Bob

No photons: 0

Alice

Page 7: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

7Measuring a Qubit

Bob

No photons: 0Photons: 1

with prob. 1 yields 1Measurement:

0/1

Alice

Page 8: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

8Diagonal/Hadamard Basis

with prob. ½ yields 0

with prob. ½ yields 1

Measurement:

0/1=

Page 9: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

9Measuring Collapses the State

with prob. ½ yields 0

with prob. ½ yields 1

Measurement:

0/1=

Page 10: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

10Measuring Collapses the State

==

Page 11: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

11Quantum Mechanics

with prob. 1 yields 1Measurements:

+ basis

£ basis

with prob. ½ yields 0

with prob. ½ yields 1

0/1

0/1

Page 12: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

Wonderland of Quantum Mechanics

Page 13: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

13EPR Pairs

prob. ½ : 0 prob. ½ : 1

prob. 1 : 0

[Einstein Podolsky Rosen 1935]

“spukhafte Fernwirkung” (spooky action at a distance) EPR pairs do not allow to communicate

(no contradiction to relativity theory) can provide a shared random bit

EPR magic!

Page 15: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

15

Demonstration of Quantum Technology

15

generation of random numbers

(diagram from idQuantique white paper)

no quantum computation, only quantum communication required

50%

50%

Page 16: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

16 What will you Learn from this Talk?

Introduction to Quantum Mechanics Quantum Key Distribution Position-Based Cryptography

Page 17: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

17No-Cloning Theorem

??

?

Quantum operations: U

Proof: copying is a non-linear operation

Page 18: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)Alice

Bob

Eve Offers an quantum solution to the key-exchange problem which

does not rely on computational assumptions (such as factoring, discrete logarithms, etc.)

Puts the players into the starting position to use symmetric-key cryptography (encryption, authentication etc.).

[Bennett Brassard 84]18

k = 0101 1011 k = 0101 1011

k = ?

Page 19: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

Quantum Cryptography Landscape19

attackers

systems

efficient classicalattacks

efficient quantumattacks

everlasting security (store and break

later)

AES confident longer keys brute force

SHA confident longer outputs brute force

RSA, DiscLogs confident Shor brute force

Hash-Based Sign probably probably brute force

McEliece probably probably brute force

Lattice-based probably probably brute force

QKD

physical security

Post Quantum

Crypto te

chni

cal d

ifficu

lty (€

)

Page 20: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)[Bennett Brassard 84]20

0 1 1 1 0

0 0 1 1 0

k = 110

k = 110

Page 21: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)[Bennett Brassard 84]21

0 1 1 1 0

0 0 1 1 0

k = 10 k = 10 Quantum states are unknown to Eve, she

cannot copy them. Honest players can test whether Eve

interfered.

? ? ? ??

k = ?

Page 22: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)Alice

Bob

Eve

technically feasible: no quantum computer required, only quantum communication

[Bennett Brassard 84]22

Page 23: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)Alice

Bob

Eve

technically feasible: no quantum computer required, only quantum communication

[Bennett Brassard 84]23

Page 24: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

24Quantum Hacking

e.g. by the group of Vadim Makarov (University of Waterloo, Canada)

Page 25: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

25 What will you Learn from this Talk?

Introduction to Quantum Mechanics

Quantum Key Distribution Position-Based Cryptography

Page 26: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

26Position-Based Cryptography

Typically, cryptographic players use credentials such as secret information (e.g. password or secret key) authenticated information biometric features

Can the geographical location of a player be used as cryptographic credential ?

Page 27: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

27Position-Based Cryptography

Possible Applications: Launching-missile command comes

from within your military headquarters Talking to the correct assembly Pizza-delivery problem /

avoid fake calls to emergency services …

Can the geographical location of a player be used as sole cryptographic credential ?

Page 28: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

28

Basic task: Position Verification

Prover wants to convince verifiers that she is at a particular position

no coalition of (fake) provers, i.e. not at the claimed position, can convince verifiers

(over)simplifying assumptions: communication at speed of light instantaneous computation verifiers can coordinate

Verifier1 Verifier2Prover

Page 29: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

29

Position Verification: First Try

Verifier1 Verifier2Prover

time

distance bounding [Brands Chaum ‘93]

Page 30: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

30

Position Verification: Second Try

Verifier1 Verifier2Prover

position verification is classically impossible ! [Chandran Goyal Moriarty Ostrovsky 09]

Page 31: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

31

The Attack

copying classical information this is impossible quantumly

Page 32: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

32

Position Verification: Quantum Try[Kent Munro Spiller 03/10]

Can we brake the scheme now?

?

?

?

Page 33: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

33

?

Attacking Game

Impossible to cheat due to no-cloning theorem

Or not?

?? ?

?

Page 35: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

35

Teleportation Attack

It is possible to cheat with entanglement !! Quantum teleportation allows to

break the protocol perfectly.

? ?

?

?

[Bell]

?[Bell]

Page 36: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

36No-Go Theorem

Any position-verification protocol can be broken using an exponential number of entangled qubits.

Question: Are so many quantum resources really necessary?

Does there exist a protocol such that: honest prover and verifiers are efficient, but any attack requires lots of entanglement

[Buhrman, Chandran, Fehr, Gelles, Goyal, Ostrovsky, Schaffner 2010] [Beigi Koenig 2011]

see http://homepages.cwi.nl/~schaffne/positionbasedqcrypto.php for recent developments

Page 38: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

38

What Have You Learned from this Talk?

Position-Based Cryptography

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

Page 39: Quantum Cryptography Christian Schaffner Research Center for Quantum Software Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam.

Thank you for your attention!

Questions

check http://arxiv.org/abs/1510.06120 for a survey about quantum cryptography beyond key distribution