ARTICLE VI THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
ARTICLE VI THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT1. Section 1. The
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.a. Define legislative
power
Basic concepts of the grant of legislative power:1. it cannot
pass irrepealable laws
2. principle of separation of powers
3. non-delegability of legislative powers
reason for principle that the legislature cannot pass
irrepeablable laws
Separation of Powers
Read:
a. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139 b. PLANAS VS.
GIL, 67 Phil. 62 c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178 d.
GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106e. Bondoc vs. HRET, Sept. 26,
1991
f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
b. Nature of legislative power
c. What are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers
to the legislature?
d. Explain the doctrine of non-delegation power.
e. Permissive delegation of legislative power.
1) Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI (Emergency powers to the President
in case of war or other national emergency, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as Congress may provide, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by Resolution of Congress,
such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.2) Sec.
28 (2) of Article VI. The Congress may by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the government. Other exceptions: traditional3. Delegation to local
governments
The reason behind this delegation is because the local
government is deemed to know better the needs of the people
therein.
a. See Section 5 of Article X
b. Read:
aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 Phil. 660 bb. PEOPLE VS. VERA,
65 Phil 56A law delegating to the local government units the power
to fund the salary of probation officers in their area is
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection of the laws.
In areas where there is a probation officer because the local
government unit appropriated an amount for his salaries, convicts
may avail of probation while in places where no funds were set
aside for probation officers, convicts therein could not apply for
probation.
a. Reason for the delegation
4) Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies
5) Delegation to the People (Section 2, Art. XVII of the
Constitution and Section 32, Article VIThe Congress shall, as early
as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and
the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress of local legislative body after the
registration of a petition thereof signed by at least 10% of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters thereof.f. Delegation of rule-making power to administrative
bodies.
1) What is the completeness test? The sufficiency of standard
test?
Read: 1. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the
President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos.
93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370,
reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by
Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section
3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act
shall come under the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected,
a new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one may be
changed by the provincial board of the province, upon
recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities
in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of
the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by
at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council:
Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its
population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became
effective, barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the
voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council
of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio
is situated. Petitioner argues, accordingly: If the President,
under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios
are units of municipalities?
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon
which the disputed executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by
executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any
province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district,
or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the
territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or
more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a
province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such
subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so
created, and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine
Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained
whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be
defined or any province is to be divided into one or more
subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of
the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of
the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer
or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the
Department having executive control of such officer, shall
redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and
assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create
municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue
delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of
Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he
claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case
involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere
transfer of territory from an already existing municipality
(Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing
at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Govt of the P.I. ex
rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34
Phil. 518, 519-5201) in consequence of the fixing and definition,
pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two
municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such
common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an
administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means
and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities
the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature. Although 1a Congress may delegate to another
branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential,
to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and
(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard,
there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power,
not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it,
by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and,
consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican
system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet
these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power
to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do
not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first
sentence of Section 68, the President:
may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the
case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase as the
public welfare may require, in said Section 68, qualifies all other
clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil.
726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld
public welfare and public interest, respectively, as sufficient
standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the
law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial
pronouncements must be construed in relation to the specific facts
and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not
constitute precedents and have no binding effect. The law construed
in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote
safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand,
the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular
Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or
permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved
grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise
of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of
questions of fact.
2 TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 (Most representative)1. US VS.
ANG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1At its special session of 1919, the
Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay,
rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to
issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an
appropriation for this purpose, the material provisions of which
are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever,
for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise
in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with
the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in,
palay, rice or corn.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation
fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang
Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price
as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive
Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the
1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1,
2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily,
illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice
at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater
than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General
of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the
authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to
five months imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he
appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in
finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and
effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and
in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its
approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the
Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August,
1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August,
1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the
20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act
No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix
the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that
section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise
in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of
temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of
the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify
or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may
be issued for any cause, and leaves the question as to what is any
cause to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says:
For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise
in the price of palay, rice or corn. The Legislature does not
specify or define what is an extraordinary rise. That is also left
to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that
the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, is
authorized to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act. It does not
specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure,
or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain
in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to
say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or
defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole
judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or
what is not a cause, and what is or what is not an extraordinary
rise in the price of rice, and as to what is a temporary rule or an
emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act.
Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the
Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at
which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice,
sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have
been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and
there may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General
found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and
rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the
Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in the
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the
Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law;
and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no
authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no
authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no
power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only,
the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction,
and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the
Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without
deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the
price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to
another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No.
2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to
the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is
vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the
Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate
the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law
unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to
authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to
carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the
law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other
hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a
law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law
or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General,
then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and void.
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and
clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could
be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in
respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act
could not possibly be put in use as an act in conformity to which
all fire insurance policies were required to be issued.The result
of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in
all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch
of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the
electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or
event.
4. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208 5. FREE
TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA 757 (Affecting National interest)
6. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, December 18, 1989Fundamental is the rule
that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the
legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of
the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the
administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case,
establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must
have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature;
otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of
power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of
rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative
authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has
been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power
delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute
for the lawful exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is
empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent
to the operation of public service communications which necessarily
include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection
therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546,
respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public
safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining
effective competition of private entities in communications and
broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which
provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it
is specifically provided that the national economic viability of
the entire network or components of the communications systems
contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates.
II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned
order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu
proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a
hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an
initial evaluation, which is a unilateral evaluation, but had
petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before the
order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate
reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service
could have been shown and demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner
argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC
is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative;
thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof
results in a violation of due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the
fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is
quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the
function of the administrative agency is legislative, notice and
hearing are not required, but where an order applies to a named
person, as in the instant case, the function involved is
adjudicatory. Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts
obtaining the order in question need not be preceded by a hearing,
not because it was issued pursuant to respondent NTCs legislative
function but because the assailed order is merely interlocutory, it
being an incident in the ongoing proceedings on petitioners
application for a certificate of public convenience; and that
petitioner is not the only primary source of data or information
since respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of the
rates charged.
We find merit in petitioners contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission,
we made a categorical classification as to when the rate-filing
power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is
legislative, thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to
fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake
of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order
complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner
herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of
fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing
Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its
invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the
latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and
to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or
explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion
drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said
finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a
quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands
previous notice and hearing.
This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The
Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of
the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not
required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative
Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: If the nature of
the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the
requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity
of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights
of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined
according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct
application of a policy to a specific individual) It is said in 73
C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages
452 and 453: Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and
hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of
the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as
generalization is possible in view of the great variety of
administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
administrative action where the administrative body acts in the
exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions;
but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or
quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate
rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or
property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and
hearing.
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no
doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of
fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a
reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial
evaluation of petitioners financial statements-without affording
petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular
aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a
corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor
were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate
reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be
in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the
viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result
from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the
multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking
of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend
greater credence to petitioners ratiocination that an immediate
reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and
the quality of its service to the public considering the
maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake
and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued
the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by
respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its
quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and
hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely
incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in
nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.
g. May rules and regulations promulgated by administrative
bodies/agencies have the force of law? penal law? In order to be
considered as one with the force and effect of a penal law, what
conditions must concur? See U.S. vs. GRIMMAUD, 220 U.S. 506 (1911)
or the 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION a reviewer Primer by FR.
JOAQUIN BERNAS, 1987 edition.5. PEO. VS. ROSENTHAL, 68 Phil. 328 6.
US VS. BARRIAS, 11 Phil. 327 7. VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO
HO, 86 SCRA 270h. Delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of
Art. XVII.
i. Classify the membership of the legislative department.
Differentiate their qualifications, elections/selections and as to
the participation of the Commission on Appointments in order to
validate their membership.
j. Manner of election and selection
1) Read again TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 1082. Sections 2. The
Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be
elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may
be provided for by law.3. Section 3. No person shall be a Senator
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the
day of the election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
not less than 2 years immediately preceding the day of the
election. 4. Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be
six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the 30th day of June next following their election.No
Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Qualifications, term of office, etc., of a senator or member of
the House of Representatives.
2. Sections 5. [1] The House of representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.[2] The party-list representatives shall constitute
20% of the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list. For three (3) consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women youth, and such other
sectors, as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.[3]
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least one hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative. [4] Within 3
years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on standards
provided in this sectionSection 6. No person shall be a member of
the House of Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen of
the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least 25
years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election.Read:
1. ANTONIO BENGSON III VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO CRUZ, 357 SCRA 545
Rep. Act No. 2630Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
Citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in,
the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United states, acquired US citizenship, MAY
REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY TAKING AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND REGISTERING THE SAME WITH THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRY IN THE PLACE WHERE HE RESIDES OR LAST RESIDED
IN THE PHILIPPINES. The said Oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
2. Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 2. Natural born citizens are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform an act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
Citizenship in accordance with par. 3* , Section 1 shall be deemed
natural born citizens.
OCAMPO VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARIO CRESPO, a.k.a.
MARK JIMENEZ, June 15, 2004Who takes the place of the winning
candidate as a Member of the House of Representatives who was
disqualified after he was proclaimed as such?
Facts:The petitioner and Mark Jimenez were candidates for
Congressman of the 6th District of manila for the May 14, 2001
elections. Mark Jimenez won over the petitioner with 32,097 votes
as against petitioners 31,329 votes.
3. Petitioner filed an electoral protest before the HRET based
on the following grounds: 1] misreading of ballots; 2]
falsification of election returns; 3]substitution of election
returns; 4] use of marked, spurious fake and stray ballots; and 5]
presence of ballots written by one or two persons.
4. On March 6, 2003, the HRET issued its Decision in the case of
ABANTE, ET AL. VS. MARI CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, et al.,
declaring Mark Jimenez ineligible for the Office of Representative
of Sixth District of Manila for lack of residence in the District.
Mark Jimenez filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied.
As a result of said disqualification of Jimenez, the petitioner
claimed that all the votes cast for the former should not be
counted and since he garnered the second highest number of votes,
he should be declared winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and be
proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of
manila.
Issues:Are the votes of Mark Jimenez stray votes and should not
be counted?
Whether the petitioner as second places should be proclaimed
winner since the winner was disqualified?
Held:1. There must be a final judgment disqualifying a candidate
in order that the votes of a disqualified candidate can be
considered stray. This final judgment must be rendered BEFORE THE
ELECTION. This was the ruling in the case of CODILLA VS. DE
VENECIA. Hence, when a candidate has not been disqualified by final
judgment during the election day he was voted for, the votes cast
in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The
reason behind this is that the people voted for him bona fide and
in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be
the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
government.
2. The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes does not entitle the second placer to
be declared the winner. The said principle was laid down as early
as 1912 and reiterated in the cases of LABO VS. COMELEC, ABELLA VS.
COMELEC and DOMINO VS. COMELEC.
Section 7. The members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of 3 years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next following
their election. No member of the House of Representative shall
serve for a period of more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.Section 8. Unless otherwise
provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second
Monday of May.a. On the manner of nomination and appointment of
Sectoral representatives to the Hose of Representatives.
Read: 1. Exec. Order No. 198, June 18, 19872.. DELES VS.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, September 4, 1989b. On
gerrymandering
Read: CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 7634. Section 9. In case of
vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special
election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner
prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
representatives thus elected shall serve only the unexpired
term.Read: 1. LOZADA vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337 COMELEC cannot call
a special election (for the legislative districts whose Congressmen
resigned or died while in office) without a law passed by Congress
appropriating funds for the said purpose. 2. RA 6645-RE: Filling up
of Congress Vacancy, December 28, 19875. Section 10. The salaries
of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be
determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the Senate and the House of representatives approving
such increase.
a. How much is the present salary of the members of Congress?
P204,000.00 [P17,000.00 per month] as per Section 17, Art. XVIII of
the Constitution. The Presidents salary is P300,000.00 per annum,
while the VP, Speaker, Senate President and Chief Justice is
P240,000.00 per annum. The Chairman of the Constitutional
Commissions salary is P204,000.00 and the members, P180,000.00 per
annum.
b. Read:
1. Section 17, Article 18) (P300,000.00 for the President;
P240,000.00 for VP, Senate President; Speaker; Chief Justice;
P204,000.00 for Senators, Representatives, Chairmen of CC;
P180,000.00 for members of the Constitutional Commissions)2.
PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 15 SCRA 479;3. LIGOT VS. MATHAY, 56 SCRA
8236. Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
6 years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress
is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.
a. Privilege from arrest
Read: Martinez vs. Morfe, MARTINEZ VS. MORFE, 44 SCRA 22
b. Freedom of Speech and debate
Read:
1) OSMENA VS. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863 2) JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG,
17 SCRA 8767. Section 12. All members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall
notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that
may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they
are authors.8. Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned and controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither
shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.Read:
1) ADAZA vs. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431After taking his oath as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress) , he is deemed to have
resigned his position as Governor of Negros Oriental because as a
legislator, he is not allowed to hold any other office in the
government.2) PUNZALAN vs. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153A provincial
governor who took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa as
appointed member for being a member of the Cabinet is allowed to
return to his former position as Governor if he resigns from the
Batasan. This is so because he was just an appointed member as
distinguished from the Adaza Case. (Note: It appears that an
appointed member of the Batasan is placed in a better position than
the elected members)3) Compare with Section 10, Art. VIII of the
1973 Constitution
9. Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court
of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial
bodies and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly
or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or
any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any
government owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his
office.Read:
1) VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI, 113 SCRA 39
2) PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 31
What could not be done directly could not likewise be done
indirectly. So a member of Congress who is a stockholder of the
corporation involved in a case is not allowed to appear under the
guise that he is appearing as such, not as counsel for the
corporation.
10. Sections 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on
the 4th Monday of July for its regular season, unless a different
date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such
number of days as it may determine until 30 days before the opening
of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any
time. Section 16. [1] The Senate shall elect its President and the
House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all
its respective members. Each house shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary. [2] A majority of each house shall
constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may
provide. [3] Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the
concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall mot exceed sixty
days.NOTE: In the cases of:
1. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN; and
2. REP. PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
-the Supreme Court held that a member of Congress may also be
suspended by the Sandiganbayan in accordance with Section 13 of RA
3019. This preventive suspension applies to all public officials,
including members of Congress. Otherwise, the same will be
considered class legislation if Senators and Congressmen who commit
the same is exempt from the preventive suspension imposed
therein.
Other than the foregoing, a member of Congress can be suspended
by the Congress itself.
[4] Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one fifth of the members present,
be entered in the journal.Each House shall also keep a record of
its proceedings.[Neither House during the sessions of the Congress,
shall without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three
days, nor to any place than that which the 2 Houses shall be
sitting.Read:
1) AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17, Read also the motion for
reconsideration dated March 14, 19492) Disciplinary measures on
erring members
Read: OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 8633) Dual purpose for
keeping a journal
4) Journal entry and enrolled bill theories; which is conclusive
over the other?
Read:
U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729The journal prevails over extraneous
evidence like accounts of newspaper journalists and reporters as to
what the proceedings all about. b. MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil.
1CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347The enrolled bill prevails over
the journal. If the enrolled bill provides that it is urea
formaldehyde is the one exempt from tax, and not urea and
formaldehyde which appears in the journal which was really
approved, the former prevails and only CURATIVE LEGISLATION COULD
CHANGE THE SAME, NOT JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.
d. MORALES vs. SUBIDO, 27 Phil. 131 e. ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS, 56
SCRA 714(NOTE: The journal prevails over the enrolled bill on all
matters required to be entered in the journals, like yeas and nays
on the final reading of a bill or on any question at the request of
1/5 of the members present. )5) Differentiate a regular from a
special session.11. Section 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all election contests relating to election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective members. Each
Electoral tribunal shall be composed of 9 members, 3 of whom shall
be justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or
House of Representatives as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior justice in the Electoral
tribunal shall be its Chairman.See Sec. 2 (2) of Art. IX-C and last
par. Sec. 4, Art. VII
Read:
1) LAZATIN VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80007, January 25, 1988 2)
FIRDAUSI ABBAS, ET AL. VS. THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,October
27, 1988 3)ENRILE VS. COMELEC & SANCHEZ; ENRILE VS. COMELEC
& RAZUL AND SANCHEZ VS. COMELEC, Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 57 4.
BONDOC VS. HRET, supra11. Section 18. There shall be a Commission
on Appointments consisting of the Senate President, as ex-oficio
chairman, 12 senators and 12 members of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the commission shall not vote,
except in case of a tie. The commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress
from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority of
all the members.Read:
1. RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December 21, 1989 If the changes
in the political party affiliations of the members of Congress is
substantial so as to dramatically decrease the membership of one
party while reducing the other, the number of representatives of
the different parties in the Commission on Appointments may also be
changed in proportion to their actual memberships. (NOTE: In
Cunanan vs. Tan, the membership of the Senators was only temporary
so as not to result in the change of membership in the Commission
on Appointments)2. GUINGONA VS. GONZALES, October 20, 1992Since 12
Senators are members of the Commission on Appointments, in addition
to the Senate President as the head thereof, every two (2) Senators
are entitled to one (1) representative in the Commission. Parties,
however, are not allowed to round off their members, I.e., 7
Senators are entitled to 3 representatives in the Commission on
Appointments, not 4 since 7/2 is only 3.5. Further, there is
nothing in the Constitution which requires that there must be 24
members of the Commission. If the different parties do not
coalesce, then the possibility that the total number of Senators in
the CA is less than 12 is indeed a reality. (Example: Lakas13
Senators; LDP11 Senators. In this case, Lakas is entitled to 6
members in the CA (13/2= 6.5) while LBP would have 5 members (11/2=
5.5)3. GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993 (Resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration of the October 20, 1992 Decision)To be
discussed later together with Sec. 16, Art. VII.
12-a. Section 19. The electoral tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within 30 days after the Senate
and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the
election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on
Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at
the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members, to
discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon
it.13. Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress
shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with
law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit
which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to
and expenses incurred for each member.14. Section 21. The Senate or
the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.Read: 1)
ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO, 87 Phil. 29A witness who refuses to answer a
query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the
members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too
long as to violate the witness right to due process of law.
Power of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation; question hour
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 16977, April 20, 2006CARPIO MORALES, J.:The Facts:In the
exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines,
through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia,
the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police
(PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a
whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North
Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and
Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public
hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and
other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail
Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise
issued invitations dated September 22, 2005 to the following
officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP
Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo;
Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA)
Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant, Corps of
Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as
resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28,
2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled Bunye has Provided
Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive
Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005; (2)
Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July
26, 2005 entitled The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of
the World; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered
on August 1, 2005 entitled Clear and Present Danger; (4) Senate
Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal
Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security
to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National
Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called Gloriagate
Scandal; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon
Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security
to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping
of the President of the Philippines.
Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28
2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by
letter dated September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement due
to a pressing operational situation that demands [his] utmost
personal attention while some of the invited AFP officers are
currently attending to other urgent operational matters.
On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon
received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter[1]
dated September 27, 2005 respectfully request[ing] for the
postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to
which various officials of the Executive Department have been
invited in order to afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that
they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation.
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote[2] Executive Secretary
Ermita that the Senators are unable to accede to [his request] as
it was sent belatedly and [a]ll preparations and arrangements as
well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the
previous] week.
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005
a letter from the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation
Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail
project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the
UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project
had been secured.
On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued
E.O. 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect
for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For
Other Purposes, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as
follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress.
In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and
to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of
powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House
of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality based on
executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government
and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further,
Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials
and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office and
not made available to the public to prejudice the public
interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified
information between the President and the public officers covered
by this executive order, including:
1. Conversations and correspondence between the President and
the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs.
Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters
which in the interest of national security should not be divulged
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
December 1998).
3. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
December 1998);
4. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
December 1998);
5. Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez
v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive
order:
1. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment
of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
2. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
3. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege;
4. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege;
and
5. Such other officers as may be determined by the
President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress.
All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall
secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle
of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive
privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing
in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly
republican state. Even in the early history of republican thought,
however, it has been recognized that the head of government may
keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public
interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only
one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional
Convention said: Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will
generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more
eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in
proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
diminished.
Considering that no member of the executive department would
want to appear in the above Senate investigations in aid of
legislation by virtue of Proc. No. 464, the petitioners filed the
present petitions to declare the same unconstitutional because the
President abused her powers in issuing Executive Order No. 464.
I S S U E S:1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry
vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion
when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
H E L D:Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the
constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the
requisites for a valid exercise of the Courts power of judicial
review are present is in order.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power
of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.[3]Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic
Protectionism Association v. Ongpin[4] and Valmonte v. Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office,[5] respondents assert that to be
considered a proper party, one must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain
direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.[6]The Supreme
Court, however, held that when suing as a citizen, the interest of
the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws,
presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct
and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives,[7] this
Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
I The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision.
Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,[8] a case decided in 1950
under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the
power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly
anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the
Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a
leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon
by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of
the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the
Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senates power to
punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is
so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In
other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which
is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.[9] . . .
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of
the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power
of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power
to legislate.[10] The matters which may be a proper subject of
legislation and those which may be a proper subject of
investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government,
being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation.
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of
the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the
power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the
most familiar with and informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to
enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the
legislative process. If the information possessed by executive
officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise
legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has
the right to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee,[11] the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of
legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress.
Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically,
one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in
Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed
statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such
statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of
the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in
furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on
the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of
legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards
that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision
requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or
Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the
constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly
published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be
respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the
guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries
in aid of legislation.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining
to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which
is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while
the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress
oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department
heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President
to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of
legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the
same reasons stated in Arnault.[12]In fine, the oversight function
of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is
consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of
executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under
Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate
by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim
of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from
this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of
Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to
inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in
its application to appearances of department heads in the question
hour is therefore CONSTITUTIONAL.
It is different insofar as Sections 2 and 3 are concerned.
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated
in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all
officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security
officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated
in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the
AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are
covered by the executive privilege.
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be
determined by the President. Given the title of Section 2 Nature,
Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege , it is evident that
under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the
President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar
finding of coverage under executive privilege.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the
issue of whether executive privilege may be invoked against
Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain
information in the possession of the executive may validly be
claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case
holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by
petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of
powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings
which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other
collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of
Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information
cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank
exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare
of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to
exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not
the situation in the instant case.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation
to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is
merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons
for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is
woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the
withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of
each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of
Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be
invalidated.
2E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the
right to information on matters of public concern. There are clear
distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a
citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to
information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena
duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to
information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not
to an individual citizen.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are
generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance
tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such
investigations necessarily deprives the people of information
which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to
be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied
access to information which they can use in formulating their own
opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then
communicate to their representatives and other government officials
through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of
expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. BelmonteIt is in the interest of
the State that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be
responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be
effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and
thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the
participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have
access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.[14]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a
consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained
above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of
inquiry.
3 The implementation of Proc. 464 before it was published in the
Official Gazette as illegal. Due process thus requires that the
people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was
implemented. This is clear from the doctrine laid down in the case
of TANADA VS. TUVERA.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3
of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), Ensuring Observance of
the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes, are declared VOID.
Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Nov. 20, 1991This
is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the
petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the
alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa
Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners
contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry has no
valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of
legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez
corporations is a purely private transaction which is beyond the
power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3)
the inquiry violates their right to due process.
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
1Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its
exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the
Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure and that the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that
the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled to testify against ones self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in
specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries
may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in
connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of
future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante
alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the
inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body
making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power
in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel
a member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer
to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by
any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry
in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the
character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech
or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be
made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he
(Senator Enrile) made a statement which was published in various
newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo Baby Lopa of
having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies. As a consequence
thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September
1988 categorically denying that he had taken over the FMMC Group of
Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself
categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on
Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him
(Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a takeover on his
(Lopas) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of
the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17
so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to
vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the
Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enriles)
charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies
are baseless and malicious. Thus, in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile
said, among others, as follows:
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by
respondent Committee is not really in aid of legislation because it
is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress,
since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not
the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a
matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather
than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial
notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held :
The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in
the legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses
inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of
defects in our social, economic, or political system for the
purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes
into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption,
inefficiency or waste. But broad as is this power of inquiry, it is
not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private
affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the
functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor
General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law
enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive
and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in
itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate
task of Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal
aggrandizement of the investigators or to punish those investigated
are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations.
Since congress may only investigate into those areas in which it
may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into
matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other
branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the
Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the
concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in
what exclusively belongs to the Executive. Moreover, this right of
the accused is extended to respondents in administrative
investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal
proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs.
Pamaran, 26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan
(6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the
right against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings
but also in all other types of suit
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that
petitioners may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to
appear, testify and produce evidence before it, it is only because
we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation
and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation
of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of
government, ordained by the Constitution.
Investigation in aid of legislation; Executive PrivilegeROMULO
L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. (En Banc)THE FACTS:On April
21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to
be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. In connection with
this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the
Senat
At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant
to the consideration of three (3) pending bills in the Senate.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending
invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved
in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was
summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and
October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26
hearing, claiming he was out of town during the other dates.
In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia
III testified that several high executive officials and power
brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN
Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially
approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March
29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a
government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan
from the Chinese Government.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent
Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed that then Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive
privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,[15][6]
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,[16][7] and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.[17][8]Unrelenting,
respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to
petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20,
2007.
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent Committees to
dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of executive
privilege. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to
Secretary Romulo Neri to appear and testify again on 20 November
2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it will be recalled
that Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively discussed the
ZTE / NBN project, including his conversation with the President
thereon last 26 September 2007.
Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the
President, Sec. Neri asked for time to consult with his superiors
in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita,
488 SCRA 1 (2006).
Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible
invocation of executive privilege on the following questions, to
wit:
a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?b) Were
you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?c) Whether the President said to
go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged
bribe?Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing
questions fall under conversations and correspondence between the
President and public officials which are considered executive
privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v.
PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002).
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is
that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic
of China. In light of the above considerations, this Office is
constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege
as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri
accordingly.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before
respondent Committees. Thus, on November 22, 2007, the latter
issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should
not be cited in contempt. The Letter reads:
Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the
Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
(Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National Defense and Security
require you to show cause why you should not be cited in contempt
under Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue
Ribbon).
The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December
2007.
On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent
Committees, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the
Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions
were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege,
thus:
It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In
fact, I have cooperated with the task of the Senate in its inquiry
in aid of legislation as shown by my almost 11 hours stay during
the hearing on 26 September 2007. During said hearing, I answered
all the questions that were asked of me, save for those which I
thought was covered by executive privilege, and which was confirmed
by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15 November 2007. In good
faith, after that exhaustive testimony, I thought that what
remained were only the three questions, where the Executive
Secretary claimed executive privilege. Hence, his request that my
presence be dispensed with.
In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his
counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating, among others that: (1)
his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the
President; and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt
with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic
matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving
high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of
foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter ended
with a reiteration of petitioners request that he be furnished in
advance as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may
adequately prepare for the hearing.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the
present petition for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter
dated November 22, 2007.
Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations
unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance
notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the
Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent
Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of
the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear
and give his testimony. The said Order states:
ORDERFor failure to appear and testify in the Committees hearing
on Tuesday, September 18, 2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007;
Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday, November 20, 2007, despite
personal notice and Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and received
by him, which thereby delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in
fact delayed, impeded and obstructed the inquiry into the subject
reported irregularities, AND for failure to explain satisfactorily
why he should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29 November
2007), herein attached) ROMULO L. NERI is hereby cited in contempt
of this (sic) Committees and ordered arrested and detained in the
Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he will
appear and give his testimony.The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby
directed to carry out and implement this Order and make a return
hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its enforcement.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of
the above Order.[18][9] He insisted that he has not shown any
contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest. He emphasized
his willingness to testify on new matters, however, respondent
Committees did not respond to his request for advance notice of
questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed
on Decemb