Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pure Intentionalism Angela Mendelovici Princeton University January 15, 2009 1 / 67
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pure Intentionalism
Angela Mendelovici
Princeton University
January 15, 2009
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Outline
1 Motivating intentionalism
2 Unavailable contents
3 Non-perceptual statesThoughts and other occurrent conceptual statesNon-conscious occurrent states
4 Reductionism
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Outline
1 Motivating intentionalism
2 Unavailable contents
3 Non-perceptual statesThoughts and other occurrent conceptual statesNon-conscious occurrent states
4 Reductionism
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Two mental phenomena
Phenomenal consciousness
It’s “like something” to be in certain states (Nagel, 1974).
What it’s like is a state’s phenomenal character.
Mental representation
Some mental states display aboutness, ofness, or intentionality(Brentano, 1874).
Some mental states represent, or have content.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Two mental phenomena
Phenomenal consciousness
It’s “like something” to be in certain states (Nagel, 1974).
What it’s like is a state’s phenomenal character.
Mental representation
Some mental states display aboutness, ofness, or intentionality(Brentano, 1874).
Some mental states represent, or have content.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Two mental phenomena
Phenomenal consciousness
It’s “like something” to be in certain states (Nagel, 1974).
What it’s like is a state’s phenomenal character.
Mental representation
Some mental states display aboutness, ofness, or intentionality(Brentano, 1874).
Some mental states represent, or have content.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Two mental phenomena
Are these two mental features related?
Intentionalism
Phenomenal character is in some way determined byrepresentational content.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Two mental phenomena
Are these two mental features related?
Intentionalism
Phenomenal character is in some way determined byrepresentational content.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Motivation 1: Transparency intuitions
When we pay attention to ourexperiences, all we notice is representedcontents. (Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995;Byrne, 2001; Jackson, 2004)
We only notice one mental feature.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Motivation 1: Transparency intuitions
When we pay attention to ourexperiences, all we notice is representedcontents. (Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995;Byrne, 2001; Jackson, 2004)
We only notice one mental feature.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Motivation 2: An impressive correlation
Differences in phenomenal character arecorrelated with differences inrepresentational content.
We get similar results with conceptualcontents.
We get similar results for other perceptualmodalities.
We would not expect these results ifrepresentation was not related toconsciousness.
Intentionalism explains this correlation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Motivation 2: An impressive correlation
Differences in phenomenal character arecorrelated with differences inrepresentational content.
We get similar results with conceptualcontents.
We get similar results for other perceptualmodalities.
We would not expect these results ifrepresentation was not related toconsciousness.
Intentionalism explains this correlation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Motivation 2: An impressive correlation
Differences in phenomenal character arecorrelated with differences inrepresentational content.
We get similar results with conceptualcontents.
We get similar results for other perceptualmodalities.
We would not expect these results ifrepresentation was not related toconsciousness.
Intentionalism explains this correlation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Motivation 2: An impressive correlation
Differences in phenomenal character arecorrelated with differences inrepresentational content.
We get similar results with conceptualcontents.
We get similar results for other perceptualmodalities.
We would not expect these results ifrepresentation was not related toconsciousness.
Intentionalism explains this correlation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Motivation 2: An impressive correlation
Differences in phenomenal character arecorrelated with differences inrepresentational content.
We get similar results with conceptualcontents.
We get similar results for other perceptualmodalities.
We would not expect these results ifrepresentation was not related toconsciousness.
Intentionalism explains this correlation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Motivation 2: An impressive correlation
Differences in phenomenal character arecorrelated with differences inrepresentational content.
We get similar results with conceptualcontents.
We get similar results for other perceptualmodalities.
We would not expect these results ifrepresentation was not related toconsciousness.
Intentionalism explains this correlation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Motivation 2: An impressive correlation
Differences in phenomenal character arecorrelated with differences inrepresentational content.
We get similar results with conceptualcontents.
We get similar results for other perceptualmodalities.
We would not expect these results ifrepresentation was not related toconsciousness.
Intentionalism explains this correlation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Motivation 3: A unified theory of mind
It would also be theoretically very nice if we could reduce twoproblems of mind to one. A unified theory would be simpler.
This motivation gains some force together with the other two.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Motivation 3: A unified theory of mind
It would also be theoretically very nice if we could reduce twoproblems of mind to one. A unified theory would be simpler.
This motivation gains some force together with the other two.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Motivating intentionalism
1 Transparency intuitions
2 An impressive correlation
3 A unified theory of mind
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pure versus impure intentionalism
Pure intentionalism
Phenomenal character is determined by representationalcontent alone.
Impure intentionalism
Phenomenal character is determined by representationalcontent and certain non-representational features (e.g.functional role).
On impure intentionalism, but not on pure intentionalism, it ispossible to have two states alike in representational contentbut differing in phenomenal character.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pure versus impure intentionalism
Pure intentionalism
Phenomenal character is determined by representationalcontent alone.
Impure intentionalism
Phenomenal character is determined by representationalcontent and certain non-representational features (e.g.functional role).
On impure intentionalism, but not on pure intentionalism, it ispossible to have two states alike in representational contentbut differing in phenomenal character.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pure versus impure intentionalism
Pure intentionalism
Phenomenal character is determined by representationalcontent alone.
Impure intentionalism
Phenomenal character is determined by representationalcontent and certain non-representational features (e.g.functional role).
On impure intentionalism, but not on pure intentionalism, it ispossible to have two states alike in representational contentbut differing in phenomenal character.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pure intentionalism is preferable
The first two of the preceding considerations only properlymotivate the relevance of representational content tophenomenal character, not the relevance of other features.
If we want to include extra ingredients, they will have to beindependently motivated.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pure intentionalism is preferable
The first two of the preceding considerations only properlymotivate the relevance of representational content tophenomenal character, not the relevance of other features.
If we want to include extra ingredients, they will have to beindependently motivated.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pure intentionalism is preferable
The first two of the preceding considerations only properlymotivate the relevance of representational content tophenomenal character, not the relevance of other features.
If we want to include extra ingredients, they will have to beindependently motivated.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Preview
Intentionalism faces various challenges.
These challenges motivate some theorists to move to impureintentionalism.
My claims:1 The impure elements are unmotivated and oftentimes
unsuccessful.2 A pure intentionalist strategy is possible.3 The pure intentionalist strategies are not available on a
tracking theory of mental representation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Preview
Intentionalism faces various challenges.
These challenges motivate some theorists to move to impureintentionalism.
My claims:1 The impure elements are unmotivated and oftentimes
unsuccessful.2 A pure intentionalist strategy is possible.3 The pure intentionalist strategies are not available on a
tracking theory of mental representation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Preview
Intentionalism faces various challenges.
These challenges motivate some theorists to move to impureintentionalism.
My claims:1 The impure elements are unmotivated and oftentimes
unsuccessful.2 A pure intentionalist strategy is possible.3 The pure intentionalist strategies are not available on a
tracking theory of mental representation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Preview
Intentionalism faces various challenges.
These challenges motivate some theorists to move to impureintentionalism.
My claims:1 The impure elements are unmotivated and oftentimes
unsuccessful.2 A pure intentionalist strategy is possible.3 The pure intentionalist strategies are not available on a
tracking theory of mental representation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Preview
Intentionalism faces various challenges.
These challenges motivate some theorists to move to impureintentionalism.
My claims:1 The impure elements are unmotivated and oftentimes
unsuccessful.2 A pure intentionalist strategy is possible.3 The pure intentionalist strategies are not available on a
tracking theory of mental representation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Preview
Intentionalism faces various challenges.
These challenges motivate some theorists to move to impureintentionalism.
My claims:1 The impure elements are unmotivated and oftentimes
unsuccessful.2 A pure intentionalist strategy is possible.3 The pure intentionalist strategies are not available on a
tracking theory of mental representation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Outline
1 Motivating intentionalism
2 Unavailable contents
3 Non-perceptual statesThoughts and other occurrent conceptual statesNon-conscious occurrent states
4 Reductionism
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unavailable contents
Sometimes it is easy find representationalcontents that “match” a givenphenomenal character.
But other times, there’s no goodcandidate content.
. . . as in the case of pain.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unavailable contents
Sometimes it is easy find representationalcontents that “match” a givenphenomenal character.
But other times, there’s no goodcandidate content.
. . . as in the case of pain.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unavailable contents
Sometimes it is easy find representationalcontents that “match” a givenphenomenal character.
But other times, there’s no goodcandidate content.
. . . as in the case of pain.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pain
The challenge with pain is to find therepresentational contents that account for thephenomenal character of pain-experience.
Pain-experiences represent bodily damageat a certain bodily location and of acertain type. (Tye, 1995)
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pain
The challenge with pain is to find therepresentational contents that account for thephenomenal character of pain-experience.
Pain-experiences represent bodily damageat a certain bodily location and of acertain type. (Tye, 1995)
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pain
But this doesn’t seem to capture thephenomenology of pain-experiences.
It leaves the painfulness of pain out.
And it lets in other contents that don’t do anywork in determining the phenomenology.
The problem is that there is no good candidatefor a property of our bodies that we’rerepresenting and that plausibly “matches” ourphenomenal experience.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pain
But this doesn’t seem to capture thephenomenology of pain-experiences.
It leaves the painfulness of pain out.
And it lets in other contents that don’t do anywork in determining the phenomenology.
The problem is that there is no good candidatefor a property of our bodies that we’rerepresenting and that plausibly “matches” ourphenomenal experience.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pain
But this doesn’t seem to capture thephenomenology of pain-experiences.
It leaves the painfulness of pain out.
And it lets in other contents that don’t do anywork in determining the phenomenology.
The problem is that there is no good candidatefor a property of our bodies that we’rerepresenting and that plausibly “matches” ourphenomenal experience.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pain
But this doesn’t seem to capture thephenomenology of pain-experiences.
It leaves the painfulness of pain out.
And it lets in other contents that don’t do anywork in determining the phenomenology.
The problem is that there is no good candidatefor a property of our bodies that we’rerepresenting and that plausibly “matches” ourphenomenal experience.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Modes of presentation
Possible solution
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage undera “pain-y” MoP (Bain, 2003).
Problems1 The MoP is doing almost all the work (save the
part of phenomenology deriving fromrepresentation of bodily location).
2 MoPs are themselves representational. But whatdo they represent that accounts for the feltpainfulness of pain? We’re back where westarted.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Modes of presentation
Possible solution
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage undera “pain-y” MoP (Bain, 2003).
Problems1 The MoP is doing almost all the work (save the
part of phenomenology deriving fromrepresentation of bodily location).
2 MoPs are themselves representational. But whatdo they represent that accounts for the feltpainfulness of pain? We’re back where westarted.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Modes of presentation
Possible solution
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage undera “pain-y” MoP (Bain, 2003).
Problems1 The MoP is doing almost all the work (save the
part of phenomenology deriving fromrepresentation of bodily location).
2 MoPs are themselves representational. But whatdo they represent that accounts for the feltpainfulness of pain? We’re back where westarted.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Modalities
Possible solution
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage in aparticular modality (Crane, 2008).
This is impure intentionalism.
Problems1 A dedicated pain modality? Then the pain
modality is doing almost all the work. Thisdoesn’t look very much like intentionalismanymore.
2 A tactile modality? The modality still has to dotoo much of the work.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Modalities
Possible solution
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage in aparticular modality (Crane, 2008).
This is impure intentionalism.
Problems1 A dedicated pain modality? Then the pain
modality is doing almost all the work. Thisdoesn’t look very much like intentionalismanymore.
2 A tactile modality? The modality still has to dotoo much of the work.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Modalities
Possible solution
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage in aparticular modality (Crane, 2008).
This is impure intentionalism.
Problems1 A dedicated pain modality? Then the pain
modality is doing almost all the work. Thisdoesn’t look very much like intentionalismanymore.
2 A tactile modality? The modality still has to dotoo much of the work.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Modalities
Possible solution
Pain-experiences represent bodily damage in aparticular modality (Crane, 2008).
This is impure intentionalism.
Problems1 A dedicated pain modality? Then the pain
modality is doing almost all the work. Thisdoesn’t look very much like intentionalismanymore.
2 A tactile modality? The modality still has to dotoo much of the work.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pain properties
A better solution
Pain-experiences represent bodilylocations as having pain properties.
There are different kinds of painproperties: stingy-painful,throbbing-painful, etc.
These properties are probably neverinstantiated.
We reliably misrepresent our body partsas being painful.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pain properties
A better solution
Pain-experiences represent bodilylocations as having pain properties.
There are different kinds of painproperties: stingy-painful,throbbing-painful, etc.
These properties are probably neverinstantiated.
We reliably misrepresent our body partsas being painful.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pain properties
A better solution
Pain-experiences represent bodilylocations as having pain properties.
There are different kinds of painproperties: stingy-painful,throbbing-painful, etc.
These properties are probably neverinstantiated.
We reliably misrepresent our body partsas being painful.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pain properties
A better solution
Pain-experiences represent bodilylocations as having pain properties.
There are different kinds of painproperties: stingy-painful,throbbing-painful, etc.
These properties are probably neverinstantiated.
We reliably misrepresent our body partsas being painful.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Pain properties
A better solution
Pain-experiences represent bodilylocations as having pain properties.
There are different kinds of painproperties: stingy-painful,throbbing-painful, etc.
These properties are probably neverinstantiated.
We reliably misrepresent our body partsas being painful.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Reliable misrepresentation
A state reliably misrepresents when all ormost of its activations (or tokens) arenonveridical and occur in similarcircumstances.
Reliable misrepresentation arises when arepresentation represents one thing buttracks something else.
Reliable misrepresentation can be just asuseful as veridical perception.
Reliable misrepresentation allows us torespond differently to different situations.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Reliable misrepresentation
A state reliably misrepresents when all ormost of its activations (or tokens) arenonveridical and occur in similarcircumstances.
Reliable misrepresentation arises when arepresentation represents one thing buttracks something else.
Reliable misrepresentation can be just asuseful as veridical perception.
Reliable misrepresentation allows us torespond differently to different situations.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Reliable misrepresentation
A state reliably misrepresents when all ormost of its activations (or tokens) arenonveridical and occur in similarcircumstances.
Reliable misrepresentation arises when arepresentation represents one thing buttracks something else.
Reliable misrepresentation can be just asuseful as veridical perception.
Reliable misrepresentation allows us torespond differently to different situations.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Reliable misrepresentation
A state reliably misrepresents when all ormost of its activations (or tokens) arenonveridical and occur in similarcircumstances.
Reliable misrepresentation arises when arepresentation represents one thing buttracks something else.
Reliable misrepresentation can be just asuseful as veridical perception.
Reliable misrepresentation allows us torespond differently to different situations.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Reliable misrepresentation
A state reliably misrepresents when all ormost of its activations (or tokens) arenonveridical and occur in similarcircumstances.
Reliable misrepresentation arises when arepresentation represents one thing buttracks something else.
Reliable misrepresentation can be just asuseful as veridical perception.
Reliable misrepresentation allows us torespond differently to different situations.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Reliable misrepresentation
A state reliably misrepresents when all ormost of its activations (or tokens) arenonveridical and occur in similarcircumstances.
Reliable misrepresentation arises when arepresentation represents one thing buttracks something else.
Reliable misrepresentation can be just asuseful as veridical perception.
Reliable misrepresentation allows us torespond differently to different situations.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Tracking theories of mental representation
This view is not open to the tracking theorist.
Mental representation is a species of causal orcausally-mediated co-variation relation, atracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995).
We are just sophisticated thermometers.
This is related to a general problem of trackingviews in allowing for adaptive and reliablemisrepresentation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Tracking theories of mental representation
This view is not open to the tracking theorist.
Mental representation is a species of causal orcausally-mediated co-variation relation, atracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995).
We are just sophisticated thermometers.
This is related to a general problem of trackingviews in allowing for adaptive and reliablemisrepresentation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Tracking theories of mental representation
This view is not open to the tracking theorist.
Mental representation is a species of causal orcausally-mediated co-variation relation, atracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995).
We are just sophisticated thermometers.
This is related to a general problem of trackingviews in allowing for adaptive and reliablemisrepresentation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Tracking theories of mental representation
This view is not open to the tracking theorist.
Mental representation is a species of causal orcausally-mediated co-variation relation, atracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995).
We are just sophisticated thermometers.
This is related to a general problem of trackingviews in allowing for adaptive and reliablemisrepresentation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Tracking theories of mental representation
This view is not open to the tracking theorist.
Mental representation is a species of causal orcausally-mediated co-variation relation, atracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995).
We are just sophisticated thermometers.
This is related to a general problem of trackingviews in allowing for adaptive and reliablemisrepresentation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Summary
Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism.
Other examples:
Itches and other bodily sensationsSweetnessColorHotness and coldness
This tempts some intentionalists to impurity.
The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms ofreliable misrepresentation.
This route is not open to the tracking theorist.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Summary
Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism.
Other examples:
Itches and other bodily sensationsSweetnessColorHotness and coldness
This tempts some intentionalists to impurity.
The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms ofreliable misrepresentation.
This route is not open to the tracking theorist.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Summary
Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism.
Other examples:
Itches and other bodily sensationsSweetnessColorHotness and coldness
This tempts some intentionalists to impurity.
The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms ofreliable misrepresentation.
This route is not open to the tracking theorist.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Summary
Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism.
Other examples:
Itches and other bodily sensationsSweetnessColorHotness and coldness
This tempts some intentionalists to impurity.
The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms ofreliable misrepresentation.
This route is not open to the tracking theorist.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Summary
Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism.
Other examples:
Itches and other bodily sensationsSweetnessColorHotness and coldness
This tempts some intentionalists to impurity.
The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms ofreliable misrepresentation.
This route is not open to the tracking theorist.
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Outline
1 Motivating intentionalism
2 Unavailable contents
3 Non-perceptual statesThoughts and other occurrent conceptual statesNon-conscious occurrent states
4 Reductionism
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Non-perceptual states
Intentionalism looks good for perceptual states.
What about non-perceptual states?
ThoughtsNon-conscious non-conceptual states
These states are a source of counterexamples.
Example
Case 1: A perceptual state representing rednessCase 2: A thought about rednessCase 3: A non-conscious state representing redness
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Non-perceptual states
Intentionalism looks good for perceptual states.
What about non-perceptual states?
ThoughtsNon-conscious non-conceptual states
These states are a source of counterexamples.
Example
Case 1: A perceptual state representing rednessCase 2: A thought about rednessCase 3: A non-conscious state representing redness
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Non-perceptual states
Intentionalism looks good for perceptual states.
What about non-perceptual states?
ThoughtsNon-conscious non-conceptual states
These states are a source of counterexamples.
Example
Case 1: A perceptual state representing rednessCase 2: A thought about rednessCase 3: A non-conscious state representing redness
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Non-perceptual states
Intentionalism looks good for perceptual states.
What about non-perceptual states?
ThoughtsNon-conscious non-conceptual states
These states are a source of counterexamples.
Example
Case 1: A perceptual state representing rednessCase 2: A thought about rednessCase 3: A non-conscious state representing redness
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Non-perceptual states
Intentionalism looks good for perceptual states.
What about non-perceptual states?
ThoughtsNon-conscious non-conceptual states
These states are a source of counterexamples.
Example
Case 1: A perceptual state representing rednessCase 2: A thought about rednessCase 3: A non-conscious state representing redness
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Non-perceptual states
Intentionalism looks good for perceptual states.
What about non-perceptual states?
ThoughtsNon-conscious non-conceptual states
These states are a source of counterexamples.
Example
Case 1: A perceptual state representing rednessCase 2: A thought about rednessCase 3: A non-conscious state representing redness
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The impure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Non-Phenomenal Thoughts
Non-conscious states
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The impure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Non-Phenomenal Thoughts
Non-conscious states
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A pure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Thoughts
Non-Phenomenal Non-conscious states
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A pure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Thoughts
Non-Phenomenal Non-conscious states
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Outline
1 Motivating intentionalism
2 Unavailable contents
3 Non-perceptual statesThoughts and other occurrent conceptual statesNon-conscious occurrent states
4 Reductionism
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Red wall
Example
Case 4: A visual experience of a uniformly painted,uniformly textured unique red (pure red) wall
Case 5: An occurrent thought that there is auniformly painted, uniformly textured unique redwall
Tye: Only nonconceptual states havephenomenal character.
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Red wall
Example
Case 4: A visual experience of a uniformly painted,uniformly textured unique red (pure red) wall
Case 5: An occurrent thought that there is auniformly painted, uniformly textured unique redwall
Tye: Only nonconceptual states havephenomenal character.
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Tye’s view
Having a concept of P is a matter of beingable to recognize instances of P on separateoccasions (perhaps among other things).A state has nonconceptual content just incase a subject need not have thecorresponding concepts in order to be in thatstate.E.g. the visual representation BLUE421)On this way of cashing out theconceptual/nonconceptual distinction, it is adistinction between types of states ratherthan types of contents (what Heck (2000)calls the “state view”).And so Tye’s view is a form of impureintentionalism.
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Tye’s view
Having a concept of P is a matter of beingable to recognize instances of P on separateoccasions (perhaps among other things).A state has nonconceptual content just incase a subject need not have thecorresponding concepts in order to be in thatstate.E.g. the visual representation BLUE421)On this way of cashing out theconceptual/nonconceptual distinction, it is adistinction between types of states ratherthan types of contents (what Heck (2000)calls the “state view”).And so Tye’s view is a form of impureintentionalism.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Tye’s view
Having a concept of P is a matter of beingable to recognize instances of P on separateoccasions (perhaps among other things).A state has nonconceptual content just incase a subject need not have thecorresponding concepts in order to be in thatstate.E.g. the visual representation BLUE421)On this way of cashing out theconceptual/nonconceptual distinction, it is adistinction between types of states ratherthan types of contents (what Heck (2000)calls the “state view”).And so Tye’s view is a form of impureintentionalism.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Tye’s view
Having a concept of P is a matter of beingable to recognize instances of P on separateoccasions (perhaps among other things).A state has nonconceptual content just incase a subject need not have thecorresponding concepts in order to be in thatstate.E.g. the visual representation BLUE421)On this way of cashing out theconceptual/nonconceptual distinction, it is adistinction between types of states ratherthan types of contents (what Heck (2000)calls the “state view”).And so Tye’s view is a form of impureintentionalism.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Tye’s view
Having a concept of P is a matter of beingable to recognize instances of P on separateoccasions (perhaps among other things).A state has nonconceptual content just incase a subject need not have thecorresponding concepts in order to be in thatstate.E.g. the visual representation BLUE421)On this way of cashing out theconceptual/nonconceptual distinction, it is adistinction between types of states ratherthan types of contents (what Heck (2000)calls the “state view”).And so Tye’s view is a form of impureintentionalism.
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Problems with Tye’s “nonconceptual” requirement
1 It denies that it’s like anything to useconcepts in thought.Supporters of conceptual phenomenology:
G. Strawson (1994)Siewert (1998)Horgan and Tienson (2002)Pitt (2004)Husserl (1900a,b)
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Problems with Tye’s “nonconceptual” requirement
1 It denies that it’s like anything to useconcepts in thought.Supporters of conceptual phenomenology:
G. Strawson (1994)Siewert (1998)Horgan and Tienson (2002)Pitt (2004)Husserl (1900a,b)
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Problems with Tye’s “nonconceptual” requirement
1 It denies that it’s like anything to useconcepts in thought.Supporters of conceptual phenomenology:
G. Strawson (1994)Siewert (1998)Horgan and Tienson (2002)Pitt (2004)Husserl (1900a,b)
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Why think there is conceptual phenomenology
Question: Is the phenomenology of thought exhausted by thephenomenology of concurrent verbal or other imagery.
Standard arguments that verbal and other imagery can’taccount for phenomenology associated with thought:
1 Cases where the verbal imagery is the same butphenomenology differs (e.g. ambiguous sentences (Husserl,1900a; Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004))
2 Cases where other imagery is the same but phenomenologydiffers (e.g. thinking about a chiliagon versus thinking about amyriagon (Husserl (1900b), example due to Descartes)
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Why think there is conceptual phenomenology
Question: Is the phenomenology of thought exhausted by thephenomenology of concurrent verbal or other imagery.
Standard arguments that verbal and other imagery can’taccount for phenomenology associated with thought:
1 Cases where the verbal imagery is the same butphenomenology differs (e.g. ambiguous sentences (Husserl,1900a; Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004))
2 Cases where other imagery is the same but phenomenologydiffers (e.g. thinking about a chiliagon versus thinking about amyriagon (Husserl (1900b), example due to Descartes)
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Why think there is conceptual phenomenology
Question: Is the phenomenology of thought exhausted by thephenomenology of concurrent verbal or other imagery.
Standard arguments that verbal and other imagery can’taccount for phenomenology associated with thought:
1 Cases where the verbal imagery is the same butphenomenology differs (e.g. ambiguous sentences (Husserl,1900a; Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004))
2 Cases where other imagery is the same but phenomenologydiffers (e.g. thinking about a chiliagon versus thinking about amyriagon (Husserl (1900b), example due to Descartes)
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Why think there is conceptual phenomenology
Question: Is the phenomenology of thought exhausted by thephenomenology of concurrent verbal or other imagery.
Standard arguments that verbal and other imagery can’taccount for phenomenology associated with thought:
1 Cases where the verbal imagery is the same butphenomenology differs (e.g. ambiguous sentences (Husserl,1900a; Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004))
2 Cases where other imagery is the same but phenomenologydiffers (e.g. thinking about a chiliagon versus thinking about amyriagon (Husserl (1900b), example due to Descartes)
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Why think there is conceptual phenomenology
Question: Is the phenomenology of thought exhausted by thephenomenology of concurrent verbal or other imagery.
Standard arguments that verbal and other imagery can’taccount for phenomenology associated with thought:
1 Cases where the verbal imagery is the same butphenomenology differs (e.g. ambiguous sentences (Husserl,1900a; Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004))
2 Cases where other imagery is the same but phenomenologydiffers (e.g. thinking about a chiliagon versus thinking about amyriagon (Husserl (1900b), example due to Descartes)
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A quick way to illustrate the point
If the phenomenology corresponding to thoughts onlyconsisted in visual and verbal phenomenology, then thinkingabout a megagon would be something like this:
“This is a megagon.”
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A quick way to illustrate the point
If the phenomenology corresponding to thoughts onlyconsisted in visual and verbal phenomenology, then thinkingabout a megagon would be something like this:
“This is a megagon.”
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A quick way to illustrate the point
If the phenomenology corresponding to thoughts onlyconsisted in visual and verbal phenomenology, then thinkingabout a megagon would be something like this:
“This is a megagon.”
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Problems with Tye’s “nonconceptual” requirement
1 It denies that it’s like anything to useconcepts in thought.
2 It constrains what we can say about othercases involving conceptual contents.
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Problems with Tye’s “nonconceptual” requirement
1 It denies that it’s like anything to useconcepts in thought.
2 It constrains what we can say about othercases involving conceptual contents.
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The duck-rabbit
Example
Case 6: Seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck
Case 7: Seeing the duck-rabbit as a rabbit
It’s plausible that representing theduck-rabbit as a duck versus as a rabbitaccounts for much of the phenomenaldifference.
But the contents duck and rabbit areconceptual contents.
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The duck-rabbit
Example
Case 6: Seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck
Case 7: Seeing the duck-rabbit as a rabbit
It’s plausible that representing theduck-rabbit as a duck versus as a rabbitaccounts for much of the phenomenaldifference.
But the contents duck and rabbit areconceptual contents.
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The duck-rabbit
Example
Case 6: Seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck
Case 7: Seeing the duck-rabbit as a rabbit
It’s plausible that representing theduck-rabbit as a duck versus as a rabbitaccounts for much of the phenomenaldifference.
But the contents duck and rabbit areconceptual contents.
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Alternative solution
Example
Case 4: A visual experience of uniformly painted,uniformly textured unique red wall
Case 5: An occurrent thought that there is auniformly painted, uniformly textured unique redwall
The two cases are not representationally alikeafter all.
The concept of unique red and the visualrepresentation of unique red have differentcontents.
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Alternative solution
Example
Case 4: A visual experience of uniformly painted,uniformly textured unique red wall
Case 5: An occurrent thought that there is auniformly painted, uniformly textured unique redwall
The two cases are not representationally alikeafter all.
The concept of unique red and the visualrepresentation of unique red have differentcontents.
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Alternative solution
Example
Case 4: A visual experience of uniformly painted,uniformly textured unique red wall
Case 5: An occurrent thought that there is auniformly painted, uniformly textured unique redwall
The two cases are not representationally alikeafter all.
The concept of unique red and the visualrepresentation of unique red have differentcontents.
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The efficient concept view
The concepts used in thought are structurally simpler andhave simpler contents than we might have previously thought.
E.g. the concept MODAL REALIST doesn’t represent believerof the view that possible worlds exist in the same way that theactual world exists. Rather it represents something simpler,like someone who holds some view about possible worlds.
Concepts can be unpacked to yield more contents.
The results of unpacking are experienced as further cashingsout of what you were previously thinking.
We can define notions of derived content that capture theseresults of unpacking that are experienced in this way.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
The efficient concept view
The concepts used in thought are structurally simpler andhave simpler contents than we might have previously thought.
E.g. the concept MODAL REALIST doesn’t represent believerof the view that possible worlds exist in the same way that theactual world exists. Rather it represents something simpler,like someone who holds some view about possible worlds.
Concepts can be unpacked to yield more contents.
The results of unpacking are experienced as further cashingsout of what you were previously thinking.
We can define notions of derived content that capture theseresults of unpacking that are experienced in this way.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
The efficient concept view
The concepts used in thought are structurally simpler andhave simpler contents than we might have previously thought.
E.g. the concept MODAL REALIST doesn’t represent believerof the view that possible worlds exist in the same way that theactual world exists. Rather it represents something simpler,like someone who holds some view about possible worlds.
Concepts can be unpacked to yield more contents.
The results of unpacking are experienced as further cashingsout of what you were previously thinking.
We can define notions of derived content that capture theseresults of unpacking that are experienced in this way.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
The efficient concept view
The concepts used in thought are structurally simpler andhave simpler contents than we might have previously thought.
E.g. the concept MODAL REALIST doesn’t represent believerof the view that possible worlds exist in the same way that theactual world exists. Rather it represents something simpler,like someone who holds some view about possible worlds.
Concepts can be unpacked to yield more contents.
The results of unpacking are experienced as further cashingsout of what you were previously thinking.
We can define notions of derived content that capture theseresults of unpacking that are experienced in this way.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
The efficient concept view
The concepts used in thought are structurally simpler andhave simpler contents than we might have previously thought.
E.g. the concept MODAL REALIST doesn’t represent believerof the view that possible worlds exist in the same way that theactual world exists. Rather it represents something simpler,like someone who holds some view about possible worlds.
Concepts can be unpacked to yield more contents.
The results of unpacking are experienced as further cashingsout of what you were previously thinking.
We can define notions of derived content that capture theseresults of unpacking that are experienced in this way.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
The efficient concept view
The concepts used in thought are structurally simpler andhave simpler contents than we might have previously thought.
E.g. the concept MODAL REALIST doesn’t represent believerof the view that possible worlds exist in the same way that theactual world exists. Rather it represents something simpler,like someone who holds some view about possible worlds.
Concepts can be unpacked to yield more contents.
The results of unpacking are experienced as further cashingsout of what you were previously thinking.
We can define notions of derived content that capture theseresults of unpacking that are experienced in this way.
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Alternative solution
The concept of redness and the visualrepresentation of redness have differentcontents, but the same derived contents.
Thoughts involving the concept of rednesshave impoverished representational contentto match their impoverished phenomenalcharacter.
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Alternative solution
The concept of redness and the visualrepresentation of redness have differentcontents, but the same derived contents.
Thoughts involving the concept of rednesshave impoverished representational contentto match their impoverished phenomenalcharacter.
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Alternative solution
Conceptually representing red versusnon-conceptually representing red involves adifference in content, not necessarily in typeof state (although there might be such adifference as well).
Note: This makes it possible to understandthe conceptual/nonconceptual distinction asa distinction between types of contents,rather than types of states.
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Alternative solution
Conceptually representing red versusnon-conceptually representing red involves adifference in content, not necessarily in typeof state (although there might be such adifference as well).
Note: This makes it possible to understandthe conceptual/nonconceptual distinction asa distinction between types of contents,rather than types of states.
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Tracking theories of mental representation
So this kind of view is not easily available to thetracking theorist.
Difficult to say the two cases representdifferently: The concept RED and the visualrepresentation of redness might track the sameor relevantly similar things.
Difficult to account for the impoverishedphenomenology of thought: Our conceptspresumably track contents more complex thanwhat those that can account for theirimpoverished phenomenology.
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Tracking theories of mental representation
So this kind of view is not easily available to thetracking theorist.
Difficult to say the two cases representdifferently: The concept RED and the visualrepresentation of redness might track the sameor relevantly similar things.
Difficult to account for the impoverishedphenomenology of thought: Our conceptspresumably track contents more complex thanwhat those that can account for theirimpoverished phenomenology.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Tracking theories of mental representation
So this kind of view is not easily available to thetracking theorist.
Difficult to say the two cases representdifferently: The concept RED and the visualrepresentation of redness might track the sameor relevantly similar things.
Difficult to account for the impoverishedphenomenology of thought: Our conceptspresumably track contents more complex thanwhat those that can account for theirimpoverished phenomenology.
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The impure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Non-Phenomenal Thoughts
Non-conscious states
The pure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Thoughts
Non-Phenomenal Non-conscious states
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The impure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Non-Phenomenal Thoughts
Non-conscious states
The pure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Thoughts
Non-Phenomenal Non-conscious states
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The impure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Non-Phenomenal Thoughts
Non-conscious states
The pure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Thoughts
Non-Phenomenal Non-conscious states
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Outline
1 Motivating intentionalism
2 Unavailable contents
3 Non-perceptual statesThoughts and other occurrent conceptual statesNon-conscious occurrent states
4 Reductionism
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Vertical line
Example
Case 8: A conscious visual state representing a vertical line
Case 9: A non-conscious occurrent state representing avertical line
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Tye’s “poised” requirement
Tye invokes an extra constraint: A state must bepoised to affect conceptual states in order for it toqualify as having phenomenal character.
Non-conscious occurrent states are not poised, and soare ruled out from having phenomenal character.
This is impure intentionalism.
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Tye’s “poised” requirement
Tye invokes an extra constraint: A state must bepoised to affect conceptual states in order for it toqualify as having phenomenal character.
Non-conscious occurrent states are not poised, and soare ruled out from having phenomenal character.
This is impure intentionalism.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Tye’s “poised” requirement
Tye invokes an extra constraint: A state must bepoised to affect conceptual states in order for it toqualify as having phenomenal character.
Non-conscious occurrent states are not poised, and soare ruled out from having phenomenal character.
This is impure intentionalism.
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Vertical line
Example
Case 8: A conscious visual state representing a vertical line
Case 9: A non-conscious occurrent state representing avertical line
The state in Case 9 is not poised, so it does not havephenomenal character.
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Vertical line
Example
Case 8: A conscious visual state representing a vertical line
Case 9: A non-conscious occurrent state representing avertical line
The state in Case 9 is not poised, so it does not havephenomenal character.
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The poised requirement
Is the idea that non-conscious states don’t affect occurrentconceptual states?
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The poised requirement
Is the idea that non-conscious states don’t affect occurrentconceptual states?
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The poised requirement
Is the idea that non-conscious states don’t affect occurrentconceptual states?
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The poised requirement
Maybe there’s a particular way W in which non-consciousstates affect conceptual states.
Replace the poised requirement with a poised-in-way-Wrequirement.
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The poised requirement
Maybe there’s a particular way W in which non-consciousstates affect conceptual states.
Replace the poised requirement with a poised-in-way-Wrequirement.
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The poised requirement
This is a winning strategy.
And that’s what’s wrong with it.
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The poised requirement
This is a winning strategy.
And that’s what’s wrong with it.
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The poised requirement
We don’t want any difference between phenomenal states andnon-conscious occurrent states.
We want the difference that accounts for the fact thatconscious perceptual states but not non-conscious states havephenomenal character.
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The poised requirement
We don’t want any difference between phenomenal states andnon-conscious occurrent states.
We want the difference that accounts for the fact thatconscious perceptual states but not non-conscious states havephenomenal character.
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Unmotivated impurity
Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap styleconcerns.
Why should this brain state result in that phenomenalexperience?Why should representing red result in that phenomenalexperience?
Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red?Just like it is.
But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to thereduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten toarise.
Poised/poised-in-way-W requirementsNonconceptual contentSystemic representations with the potential for calibration(Dretske, 1995)
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unmotivated impurity
Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap styleconcerns.
Why should this brain state result in that phenomenalexperience?Why should representing red result in that phenomenalexperience?
Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red?Just like it is.
But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to thereduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten toarise.
Poised/poised-in-way-W requirementsNonconceptual contentSystemic representations with the potential for calibration(Dretske, 1995)
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unmotivated impurity
Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap styleconcerns.
Why should this brain state result in that phenomenalexperience?Why should representing red result in that phenomenalexperience?
Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red?Just like it is.
But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to thereduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten toarise.
Poised/poised-in-way-W requirementsNonconceptual contentSystemic representations with the potential for calibration(Dretske, 1995)
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unmotivated impurity
Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap styleconcerns.
Why should this brain state result in that phenomenalexperience?Why should representing red result in that phenomenalexperience?
Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red?Just like it is.
But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to thereduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten toarise.
Poised/poised-in-way-W requirementsNonconceptual contentSystemic representations with the potential for calibration(Dretske, 1995)
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unmotivated impurity
Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap styleconcerns.
Why should this brain state result in that phenomenalexperience?Why should representing red result in that phenomenalexperience?
Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red?Just like it is.
But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to thereduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten toarise.
Poised/poised-in-way-W requirementsNonconceptual contentSystemic representations with the potential for calibration(Dretske, 1995)
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unmotivated impurity
Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap styleconcerns.
Why should this brain state result in that phenomenalexperience?Why should representing red result in that phenomenalexperience?
Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red?Just like it is.
But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to thereduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten toarise.
Poised/poised-in-way-W requirementsNonconceptual contentSystemic representations with the potential for calibration(Dretske, 1995)
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unmotivated impurity
Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap styleconcerns.
Why should this brain state result in that phenomenalexperience?Why should representing red result in that phenomenalexperience?
Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red?Just like it is.
But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to thereduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten toarise.
Poised/poised-in-way-W requirementsNonconceptual contentSystemic representations with the potential for calibration(Dretske, 1995)
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unmotivated impurity
Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap styleconcerns.
Why should this brain state result in that phenomenalexperience?Why should representing red result in that phenomenalexperience?
Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red?Just like it is.
But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to thereduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten toarise.
Poised/poised-in-way-W requirementsNonconceptual contentSystemic representations with the potential for calibration(Dretske, 1995)
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unmotivated impurity
The problem is that while mental representation seemsrelevant to phenomenal consciousness, it is not clear thatbeing poised in way W is relevant.
The real issue here is one of explanation or plausibleidentification.
Mere extensional correctness is not enough.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unmotivated impurity
The problem is that while mental representation seemsrelevant to phenomenal consciousness, it is not clear thatbeing poised in way W is relevant.
The real issue here is one of explanation or plausibleidentification.
Mere extensional correctness is not enough.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Unmotivated impurity
The problem is that while mental representation seemsrelevant to phenomenal consciousness, it is not clear thatbeing poised in way W is relevant.
The real issue here is one of explanation or plausibleidentification.
Mere extensional correctness is not enough.
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The vertical line case
We can say something different about the vertical linecase.
Suggestion: Deny that non-conscious states haverepresentational content in the same sense of “content”in which conscious states have content.
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The vertical line case
We can say something different about the vertical linecase.
Suggestion: Deny that non-conscious states haverepresentational content in the same sense of “content”in which conscious states have content.
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Why do we think non-conscious states represent?
They track certain features in the environment, e.g. bodilydamage.
They eventually give rise to certain contentful consciousstates, e.g. pain-experiences.
But bodily damage 6= pain.
These considerations motivate conflicting content attributions.
This can happen whenever we have reliable misrepresentation.
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Why do we think non-conscious states represent?
They track certain features in the environment, e.g. bodilydamage.
They eventually give rise to certain contentful consciousstates, e.g. pain-experiences.
But bodily damage 6= pain.
These considerations motivate conflicting content attributions.
This can happen whenever we have reliable misrepresentation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Why do we think non-conscious states represent?
They track certain features in the environment, e.g. bodilydamage.
They eventually give rise to certain contentful consciousstates, e.g. pain-experiences.
But bodily damage 6= pain.
These considerations motivate conflicting content attributions.
This can happen whenever we have reliable misrepresentation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Why do we think non-conscious states represent?
They track certain features in the environment, e.g. bodilydamage.
They eventually give rise to certain contentful consciousstates, e.g. pain-experiences.
But bodily damage 6= pain.
These considerations motivate conflicting content attributions.
This can happen whenever we have reliable misrepresentation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Why do we think non-conscious states represent?
They track certain features in the environment, e.g. bodilydamage.
They eventually give rise to certain contentful consciousstates, e.g. pain-experiences.
But bodily damage 6= pain.
These considerations motivate conflicting content attributions.
This can happen whenever we have reliable misrepresentation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Why do we think non-conscious states represent?
They track certain features in the environment, e.g. bodilydamage.
They eventually give rise to certain contentful consciousstates, e.g. pain-experiences.
But bodily damage 6= pain.
These considerations motivate conflicting content attributions.
This can happen whenever we have reliable misrepresentation.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
R doesn’t really represent
R tracks bodily damage and gives rise to pain-experiences, and Rprobably interacts with other states. It plays a certaincausal/functional role in virtue of all that.
We can define a notion of computational content in terms of theseroles.
Computational content is not the same thing as representationalcontent.
1 Computational content is cheap.2 There are different constraints on attributions of
computational content versus representational content.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
R doesn’t really represent
R tracks bodily damage and gives rise to pain-experiences, and Rprobably interacts with other states. It plays a certaincausal/functional role in virtue of all that.
We can define a notion of computational content in terms of theseroles.
Computational content is not the same thing as representationalcontent.
1 Computational content is cheap.2 There are different constraints on attributions of
computational content versus representational content.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
R doesn’t really represent
R tracks bodily damage and gives rise to pain-experiences, and Rprobably interacts with other states. It plays a certaincausal/functional role in virtue of all that.
We can define a notion of computational content in terms of theseroles.
Computational content is not the same thing as representationalcontent.
1 Computational content is cheap.2 There are different constraints on attributions of
computational content versus representational content.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
R doesn’t really represent
R tracks bodily damage and gives rise to pain-experiences, and Rprobably interacts with other states. It plays a certaincausal/functional role in virtue of all that.
We can define a notion of computational content in terms of theseroles.
Computational content is not the same thing as representationalcontent.
1 Computational content is cheap.2 There are different constraints on attributions of
computational content versus representational content.
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40
60
80
mm
Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
R doesn’t really represent
R tracks bodily damage and gives rise to pain-experiences, and Rprobably interacts with other states. It plays a certaincausal/functional role in virtue of all that.
We can define a notion of computational content in terms of theseroles.
Computational content is not the same thing as representationalcontent.
1 Computational content is cheap.2 There are different constraints on attributions of
computational content versus representational content.
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40
60
80
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
R doesn’t really represent
R tracks bodily damage and gives rise to pain-experiences, and Rprobably interacts with other states. It plays a certaincausal/functional role in virtue of all that.
We can define a notion of computational content in terms of theseroles.
Computational content is not the same thing as representationalcontent.
1 Computational content is cheap.2 There are different constraints on attributions of
computational content versus representational content.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Vertical line
Example
Case 8: A conscious visual state representing a vertical line
Case 9: A non-conscious occurrent state representing avertical line
Case 9 is neither a case of representation nor a case ofconsciousness. So this isnt a counterexample.
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Vertical line
Example
Case 8: A conscious visual state representing a vertical line
Case 9: A non-conscious occurrent state representing avertical line
Case 9 is neither a case of representation nor a case ofconsciousness. So this isnt a counterexample.
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Tracking theories of mental representation
This solution is not open to tracking theories ofmental representation.
Non-conscious states reliably track things.
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Tracking theories of mental representation
This solution is not open to tracking theories ofmental representation.
Non-conscious states reliably track things.
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Tracking theories of mental representation
This solution is not open to tracking theories ofmental representation.
Non-conscious states reliably track things.
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The impure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Non-Phenomenal Thoughts
Non-conscious states
The pure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Thoughts
Non-Phenomenal Non-conscious states
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The impure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Non-Phenomenal Thoughts
Non-conscious states
The pure intentionalist strategy
Representational Non-RepresentationalPhenomenal Perceptual states
Thoughts
Non-Phenomenal Non-conscious states
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Summary so far
Impure intentionalist strategies to dealing with non-perceptualcases are unsatisfactory.
Pure intentionalism is possible.
To the extent to which we like intentionalism, we should moveaway from tracking views.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Summary so far
Impure intentionalist strategies to dealing with non-perceptualcases are unsatisfactory.
Pure intentionalism is possible.
To the extent to which we like intentionalism, we should moveaway from tracking views.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Summary so far
Impure intentionalist strategies to dealing with non-perceptualcases are unsatisfactory.
Pure intentionalism is possible.
To the extent to which we like intentionalism, we should moveaway from tracking views.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Summary so far
Impure intentionalist strategies to dealing with non-perceptualcases are unsatisfactory.
Pure intentionalism is possible.
To the extent to which we like intentionalism, we should moveaway from tracking views.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Outline
1 Motivating intentionalism
2 Unavailable contents
3 Non-perceptual statesThoughts and other occurrent conceptual statesNon-conscious occurrent states
4 Reductionism
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The reductive intentionalist program
Reductive intentionalists will complain that pureintentionalism, as I have described it, requires abandoning thisproject.
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The reductive intentionalist program
Reductive intentionalists will complain that pureintentionalism, as I have described it, requires abandoning thisproject.
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Reductionism
But their project fails anyway: If representation is justtracking, we can’t adequately deal with all the problem cases.
A failed reduction is not a reduction.
There may be reason to think we can’t account forrepresentation in terms of tracking either.
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Reductionism
But their project fails anyway: If representation is justtracking, we can’t adequately deal with all the problem cases.
A failed reduction is not a reduction.
There may be reason to think we can’t account forrepresentation in terms of tracking either.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Reductionism
But their project fails anyway: If representation is justtracking, we can’t adequately deal with all the problem cases.
A failed reduction is not a reduction.
There may be reason to think we can’t account forrepresentation in terms of tracking either.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Reductionism
No one has a reductive theory.
You don’t get points just for trying.
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Reductionism
No one has a reductive theory.
You don’t get points just for trying.
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Reductionism
But intentionalism is still well-motivated.1 Transparency intuitions2 An impressive correlation3 A unified theory of mind
It’s time to re-explore other versions of intentionalism.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Reductionism
But intentionalism is still well-motivated.1 Transparency intuitions2 An impressive correlation3 A unified theory of mind
It’s time to re-explore other versions of intentionalism.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
Reductionism
But intentionalism is still well-motivated.1 Transparency intuitions2 An impressive correlation3 A unified theory of mind
It’s time to re-explore other versions of intentionalism.
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
The End
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Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References
References I
Bain, D. (2003). Intentionalism and pain. Philosophical Quarterly, 53:50252.Brentano, F. (1973/1874). Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.Byrne, A. (2001). Intentionalism defended. Philosophical Review,
110(2):199–240.Crane, T. (2008). Intentionalism. Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of
Mind, pages 474–493.Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge.Harman, G. (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. Philosophical
Perspectives, 4:31–52.Heck, R. (2000). Nonconceptual content and the “space of reasons”. The
Philosophical Review, 109:483–523.Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and
the Phenomenology of Intentionality, pages 520–533. Oxford UniversityPress, Oxford.
Husserl, E. (2001/1900a). Logical Investigations I. Routledge Press, Trans.J. N. Findley. London.
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References II
Husserl, E. (2001/1900b). Logical Investigations II. Routledge Press, Trans.J. N. Findley. London.
Jackson, F. (2004). Representation and experience. Representation in Mind:New Approaches to Mental Representation, pages 107–124.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review,83(4):435–450.
Pitt, D. (2004). The phenomenology of cognition or what is it like to thinkthat P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(1):1–36.
Siewert, C. (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton.
Strawson, G. (1994). Mental Reality. MIT Press, Cambridge.Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of
the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge.Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press, Cambridge.
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