Punishing the Poor: The international isolation of Kampuchea

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PUNISHINGTHEPOORThe International IsolationofKampuchea

EVAMYSLIWIEC


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First published inFebruary 1988 Oxfam 1988British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataMysliwiec, EvaPunishing the Poor: the international isolation of Kampuchea.I. Kampuchea, 1970-1987I. Title959.6'04

ISBN 0-85598-090-7ISBN 0-85598-089-3 Pbk

Published by Oxfam274 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 7DZ, UK.Set in 11 poin t Garamond by Typo Graphics of OxfordPrinted by The Camelot Press PLC, Southampton

This book converted to digital file in 2010


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CONTENTSPage

Acknowledgements iPreface by Sir Robert Jackson iiMap .viiiIntroduction ixWho's Who xiChronology of Political Developm ents xii

Chapter 1. The Legacy of War and the Khmer Rouge 1Kampuchea: The Land in BetweenThe Khmer Rouge YearsThe V ietnamese InvasionThe Aftermath of WarSurvivalProfile of a Village

Chapter 2. Recovery: 1979-1987 21A New StartAgricultureReorganisation of Agriculture and Land TenureAWidowofBabongThe EconomyEducationHealthCultureReligion ^The Legal System

Chapter 3. Obstacles and Needs 51Obstacles to RecoveryPhysical NeedsEffects of WarWomen's BurdenEffects of Isolation

Chapter 4. A Window to the Outside 65The role of NGOs in K ampuchea


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Chapter 5. De velo pm ent Aid D en ied 71Aid as a Political InstrumentUniversal Declaration of Human RightsSource s of AidMultilateral AidThe European Economic CommunityBilateral AidAustraliaUnited States of America'Vietnamisation'The PRK GovernmentSecurityHuman RightsGenocide

Chapter 6. The Thai-Kampuchean Border. 93Th e Political Uses of RefugeesOrigins of the Refugee ProblemThe Border Campslife in the CampsGreen Hill CampSite 2Site 8The Role of ThailandThe Role of the United N ationsTheRoleofUNHCRTheRoleoflCRCThe N eed for Urgent Action

Chapter 7. The Poverty of Diplom acy 121Political Pawn sRoots of the ConflictIn Search of a Solution: Chron ologyThe Diplomatic StalemateSigns of Hope?Com pon ents of a Viable Solution

Chapter 8. Summary and Re com mend ations 137ConclusionsRecommendationsFootnotes 143Appendices 151Further Reading 172


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This book grew o ut of the shared exp erienc e and co ncern s ofnon-governmental organisations working with K hmer peop le both inKampuchea and on th e Thai-Kampuchean bord er. It was comm issionedby:American Friends Service CommitteeAustralian Catholic ReliefAustralian Council for Overseas AidAustralian Freedom from Hunger CampaignBroederlijk Delen (Flemish Lenten Campaign in Belgium)CAFOD (Catholic Fund for Overseas D ev elo pm en t)Canadian Catholic Organ isation for D ev elo pm en t and Pea ceCanadian University Service OverseasCEBEMO (Catholic Organisation for Co-financing ofDevelopment Programmes) (Netherlands)Christian AidCom m unity Aid AbroadEntraide et Fraternite (B elg ium )Fastenopfer (Sw iss Catholic Lenten Fu nd)HEKS (Swiss Inte rch ur ch Aid)ICCO (Ecumenical Coordination

Com mission for De velopm ent Projects)Japan International Volun teer CentreKoordinierungsstelle Fur InternationaleEntwicklungsforderung (Austria)Mani Te seMennonite Central CommitteeNOVIB (Netherlands Organisation forInternational Development)Oxfam AmericaOxfam-Belgique/BelgieOxfam (UK)Quaker Council for European AffairsQuaker Peace and ServiceQu aker Service A ustraliaRedd Barna (Norw ay)SCIAF (Scottish C atholic Intern ationa l Aid F un d)Trocaire (Catholic Age ncy for World D ev elo pm en t) (Ireland)Vastenaktie (Dutch Bishops' Lenten Campaign)World Cou ncil of Chu rches


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AcknowledgementsFirst and foremost I wish to thank the Kampuchean people whogenerously gave the best of themselves during the five years I haveworked w ith them in the PRK and during the research for this book. Theyare the source of inspiration for "Punishing the Poor". I alsowish to thankthose Kampuchean government officials who generously gave their timeand help during the preparation of the book.I am grateful to the Bangkok office of the Special Representative of theSecretary-General of the United Nations for Humanitarian Assistance tothe Kampuchean people and to UNBRO for facilitating my visit to theborder camps. Thanks also to Khmer camp officials at the border,embassy officials in Bangkok, and to representatives of NGOs andinternational organisations working with refugees and displaced Khmersfor sharing their thoughts and experiences.The book represents the collective experience of NGOs working w ithKampucheans in the PRK and at the bo rder since 1979. Special thanks aredue to the many colleagues and friends from those organisations for theircollaboration, moral and material support. Many also offered suggestionson earlier drafts. Unfortunately it is not possible to list them all hereindividually.I am most grateful to Ben Kiernan, Chanthou Boua, Sir Robert Jackson,Isamu Konishi, Dave Elder, Dr J Reynell and Tony Jackson for theirspecial contributions.Finally, particular thanks go to my editing committee from AFSC,NOVIB, Oxfam-Belgique/Belgie, WCC and colleagues at Oxfam UK fortheir guidance and help.

Eva MysliwiecOxfamOctober 1987


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Prefaceby Commander Sir RobertJackson,AC, K.C.V.O., C.M.G., O.B.E.Under-Secretary General and Senior Adviser to the UnitedNat ions.

WHEN I WAS IN CHARGE of the operations in Europe of the UnitedNations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) after thesecond World War, one of our greatest and most harrowingresponsibilities was to do everything possible for the tragic victims of theconcentration camps. In addition, we had some 8,500,000 displacedpersons in camps the flotsam and jetsam of the cataclysm that hadswept over the Continent for nearly six years. At that time, I believed thatI would never again in my lifetime witness human tragedy and sufferingon such a vast scale. I was wrong.Just over thirty years later in November 1979 I was asked by theSecretary-General of the United Nations to take charge of the varioushumanitarian operations then being initiated in Kampuchea and on itsborder with Thailand by several international institutions (notablyUNICEF, UNHCR and WFP), and coordinate them with other assistancebeing provided by the International C ommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC)and a large number of non-governmental organisations. This invitationhad come about largely as a result of pressure from President Carter,whose wife, Rosalynn, had been greatly concerned at the very confused

situation she had observed during a visit to Bangkok a few days earlier. Iagreed to serve as the Personal Representative of the Secretary-Generaland, after urgent meetings in New York, Washington, Geneva and Rome,proceeded to Bangkok within a few days, where I had asked seniorrepresentatives of the UN organisations concerned, and the ICRC, tomeet with me.I already had some idea that terrible events had taken place inKampuchea during the last few years for I had also been coordinatingsince 1975 various UN humanitarian operations in Indo-China (always,

and tragically, totally inadequate as a result of the intense politicalconfrontations that existed at that time). Amongst those who attendedwas my friend and frequent colleague Mr. John Saunders who, on myii


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recommendation, had been appointed some weeks earlier as UNICEF'srepresentative in Phnom Penh.From John and others I began to gain some idea of the almostunbelievable horror to which the men, women and children inKampuchea had been subjected during the previous four years: ceaselesskillings (the mass graves bore testimony to that), torture, persecution,iron discipline ruthlessly imposed, hunger and starvation, deprivation ofeven the most elementary essentials of life. Some of the methods oftorture and execution were, if anything, more obscene than thosepractised by the Nazis, and degraded the human mind and body in waysnever before known. And, it must be emphasised, in the latter part of1979 only part of this vast tragedy was known; years were to pass beforethe full extent of it becam e clear, and even today more than 10 yearslater new aspects continue to come to light. In seven years, some twomillion Kampucheans a quarter of the entire population perished,representing genocide on a scale never before witnessed in terms of asingle country.This is not the place to recount the efforts made to help the victims inKampuchea of the war in Vietnam and, to a far greater extent, of theinhuman cruelty of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge. But, wheneverconsidering the Kampuchean tragedy, it is essential always to keep inmind two fundamental facts. First, rarely in history has the entirepopulation of a nation been subjected to such bestial and inhumantreatment as that endured by the Kampuchean people under Pol Pot.Without doubt, it is the greatest human tragedy of the twentieth century.Second, in my experience, no humanitarian operation in this century hasbeen so totally and continuously influenced by political factors, with theresult that hundreds of thousands of men, wom en and ch ildren who hadalready undergone untold pain, agony, and despair are still, today,deprived of the elementary needs of life because of international politicalconfrontations of which they are the innocent victims. To thosefundamental factors could be added an extraordinary phenomenon. Theworld at large has never been permitted to forget the horrors of the Naziconcentration camps, an event now often referred to as The Holocaust,and references to it are an almost daily occurrence. In stark contrast, atragedy in Kampuchea of the same dimensions a tragedy which is stillprolonged is forgotten. References to it are rare. It is almost as if theworld wants to forget what happened in Kampuchea and not only PolPot, but also the external events that led to his accession and pow er. TheKampuchean tragedy could be described as The Forgotten Tragedy. Itmay well be that in the West, the trauma that still surrounds the war inVietnam which, once again, millions of people wish to erase from theirmemorieshas extended to embrace the grim memories of Kampuchea

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as well, a process intensified in some cases by a sense of guilt.Of the hum anitarian operations it can be said, generally speaking, thatall concerned the international agencies, bi-lateral governmentalsources, and the non-governmental organisations workedexceedingly well during the years when I was directly concerned (1979-1985) in their efforts to help the people of Kampuchea who them selvesdid most to preserve their lives after the cataclysms betw een 1969, whenthe American bombing began, and 1979. Their courage, resilience, andsense of community w ere above praise. But and it is a decisive "but"-the heartbreaking fact remains that, because of the intense and crudepolitical factors to which I have referred, the resources available to thoseendeavouring to help the Kampuchean people were from the outsetinadequate, and over the years virtually withered away apart from theassistance provided by the Socialist countries, UNICEF and the non-governmental organisations. Initially, funds provided by the UnitedStates under the Carter Administration were of major importance, but inJanuary 1981, that support ceased as part of a policy introduced by thenew Administration, frequently described as "Bleed Vietnam white".Simultaneously, as the political confrontations intensified and alliancesbecame more rigid,financialsupport from othe r governm ents also driedup.

In a disaster operation, th ree phases are normally distinguished: Relief,Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development. In the case ofKampuchea, not even the phase of relief has been advanced to what inother humanitarian operations (e.g. Bangladesh from 1972 to 1975)would be regarded as "just adequate". At best, it can be said that the livesof the people have been preserved after their holocaust but no more.There has been no real economic recovery, the infrastructure, as a resultof bombing during the Vietnam war, remains in ruins, and now, as I write,despite the valiant efforts of the Kampuchean people to restore asemblance of the agricultural production that once characterised theircountry, they are threatened with the worst drought during the last 10years. Kampuchea is indeed the home of tragedy.As I have said, this is not the place to describe the actual reliefoperations carried out between 1979 and 1985, but I do wish to referparticularly to the invaluable role played by the non-governmentalagencies throughout that period both inside Kampuchea and on theborder.From the days of UNRRA now over 40 years ago I have done mybest to impress on governments the exceptional assistance that can beprovided by the NGOs in responding to both natural and man-madedisaster. Progress was made during the Bangladesh operation, and I liketo feel that the Kampuchean operation represents a breakthrough in thisiv


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respect. It is encouraging to observe the willingness now of many donorgovernments to use the expertise and recognise the dedication of thestaffs of the NGOs, and this is reflected in their response to the foodemergency which recently engulfed several African countries. In anylarge operation coordinated by the United Nations, I believe it is quitesufficient for the UN organisations and Specialised Agencies to providewhat might be described as a political and technical infrastructure(requiring relatively few officials) and then to rely to a maximum on thelocal government and its people, and to work with the NGOs to make theoperation effective. From personal experience, I am convinced that thestaffs provided by the NGOs have three great advantages. First, in theirvarious fields of expertise they are quite as capable as personnel drawnfrom any other source. Second, their dedication is unsurpassed. Third,they cost much less than anyone else, thus enabling more of the availablefinancial resources (which are invariably inadequate) to be devoted totheir primary purpose of assisting the people afflicted by the disaster.Thus, in the case of Kampuchea, one of myfirst tems on the agenda forthe meeting in Bangkok of representatives of the UN organisations andthe ICRC was the role of the NGOs. At that time, there were a small groupof them in Phnom Penh, where the NGOs were already doing invaluablework much of it pioneering under cond itions of extrem e difficulty,and over 90 on the Thai-Kampuchean border.Today many governments regard the United Nations Border ReliefOperation, an operation predominantly staffed by the NGOs, as the best-run relief operation in the world. These Kampuchean refugees shouldnever be forgotten, yet governments continue to bury their heads in thesand like ostriches, refuse to reflect on the political and social effects ofhopelessness, frustration, and deprivation have they learnt nothingfrom the lesson of the Palestinian refugees? Apparently not. In the case ofthe refugees on the Thai-Kampuchean border about a quarter of amillion remain there after eight years the majority exist in a kind ofpurgatory. They are afraid to return to Kampuchea; there is no sign of anyother country being willing to give them a new home. The tragedy iscompounded.In Phnom Penh, die work of the small number of NGOs is beyondpraise. From the moment it becam e possible, about the middle of 1979,for small numbers of their representatives to enter the country, they havegiven of their best, usually working under conditions of real hardship,wearied by bureaucratic delays, and subject to endless frustrations. Yetthey have persevered, and stuck to their guns no matter how manyobstructions they have encountered. They have undoubtedly savedmany lives, they have given succour, and they have given life. As part ofthe "Forget Kampuchea" syndrome, their work receives no publicrecognition.

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One can only hope St. Peter keeps good records!Finally, the NGOs have recently provided yet another service in theefforts of those who wish to re-awaken the world's conscience to theterrible tragedy that has engulfed Kampuchea. In September 1986, morethan a dozen of them from Europe, the United States, Japan and Australiamet in Amsterdam, and the result of their work is reflected in this book.I trust that it has a very wide circulation.One must pray that the agony of the Kampuchean people will not beprolonged for much longer, but it is difficult to be optimistic. For the past8 years I have described the political situation in South-East Asia as a"drifting stalemate", and at present there is no sign that the drift will bearrested. One can envisage certain political changes that could lead tonew initiatives, but the tragic fact remains that Kampuchea remains avery valuable tactical pawn in the strategic game of chess which thesuper-powers continue to play, and thus imperil the lives of the peoplethey claim to pro tect . We can only hope and pray, and do anything in ourpow er to help reduce the endless suffering of these innocent and tragicvictims of war and politics.

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Who's WhoD e m o c r a t i c K a m p u c h e a : The name given to Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge period1975-79. Subsequently the name of the exiled Khmer Rouge 'government' seated at the UN, 1979-81 . Currently comprising a coalition of the Khmer Rouge, Son Sann and Sihanouk, seated at the UNin 1982 as the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in exile.H e n g Sa m r i n: President of the Vietnamese-backed regime inPhnom Penh, th e People's Repub-lic of Kampuchea, since 1979. Formerly a member of a pro-Vietnamese faction of the Khmer Rouge.A regional official in the Khmer Rouge Government. Took part in an unsuccessful uprising againstthe Pol Pot regime in 1978, before defecting to Vietnam.K h m e r : Used interchangeably with "Kampuchean" or "Cambodian", as in "Khmer people".K h m e r R o u g e : left-wing insurgent movement in the Cambodian countryside. Took power1975-79, led by Pol Pot. Now the dominant partner in the Coalition 'governm ent' seated at the UN.Presently reported to maintain some 36,000 troops in base camps located in Thailand.K h i e u S a m p h a n : Khmer Rouge Head ofState of Pol Pot'sDemocratic Kampuchea 1976-1978.In 1982 he became vice-president and foreign minister of the CGDK.L ot l No l : Minister of Defence and Prime Minister under Sihanouk before 1970. OverthrewSihanouk in coup, March 1970. Prime Minister, Commander-in -Chief and Head of State of "KhmerRepublic", 1970-75. Fled to Hawaii, April 1975. Died 1986. The Kampuchean People's National Lib-eration Front (KPNLF) contains many of his followers and former colleagues.P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f K a m p u c h e a : The name given to Kampuchea under the Heng Sam-rin Government since 1979.P o l P o t : Formerly Saloth Sar, a Cambodian Marxist who fled Phnom Penh in 1963. Leader of theKhmer Rouge. Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, 1963. Prime Minister of"Democratic Kampuchea", 1976-78. Comm ander-in-Chief of the Khmer Rouge army from 1979-85.President of the 'Higher Institute for National Defence' 1985-7.S i h a n o u k , P r in c e N o r o d o m : King of Cambodia, 1941-55. Abdicated 1955, ruled as Princeand Head of State until deposed by Lon Nol in 1970. Titular Head of coalition government-in-exile1970-75 with the Khmer Rouge. Returned to Phnom Penh as nominal Head of State under KhmerRouge, 1975. Forced into retirem ent, 1976. 1982-1987, President of the exiled CGDK from whichhe took leave of absence for a year in May 1987. The FUNCINPEC (French acronym for the UnitedNational Front for an Independent, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) led by Sihanouk and itsmilitary wing the ANS (Arme Nationale S ihanoukiste) is reported to maintain up to 3,000 troops onthe Thai-Kampuchean border.S o n S a n n : Former Prime Minister of Cambodia, under Sihanouk. Now President of the KhmerPeople's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and Prime Minister in the "Democratic Kampuchea"Coalition. The KPNLF reportedly maintains some 5,000 troops in Thailand. 1984-5 suffered a seri-ous internal split, which continues to plague it.S o n S e n : 1975-1979, Defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. September 1985 replacedPol Pot as military chief of Democratic Kampuchea segment of the CGDK.

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Chronology of Political Developm ents1954: Cambodia gains independence from France.Geneva Conference on Indochina (co-chaired by UK and USSR)

recognises Cambodia's neutrality.1963: Left-wing opponen ts of Sihanouk (includ ing Pol Po t) leave PhnomPenh for the jungles and mountains of Cambodia.1967: Sihanouk's forces crush a left-wing peasant revolt in Battambangprovince.1969: March 18: US bom bings of Cambodia begin, largely in secret, aimed atVietnamese comm unist 'base camps' on Cambodian territory.1970: March 18: Sihanouk overthrow n in a coup by Lon Nol.March 23 : Sihanouk announces formation of United Front with hisformer enemies the Khmer Rouge, to oppose the Lon Nol regime.

April 30: US and South Vietnamese troops invade Cambodia, withoutLon Nol's knowledge or approval, in order to attack com munist bases.US troops withdraw on June 30.

1972: 2 million Cambodians made homeless by the war between Lon Nol andthe Khmer Rouge.1973: January 27 : Paris Agreement signed, ending the war in Vietnam. Article

20 called on all foreign coun tries to "put an end to all military activitiesin Cambodia".February 8: Massive US bom bing resumed after a halt since January 27.August 15: US bombing ceases by act of US Congress.1975: April 17: Khmer Rouge enter Phnom Penh and begin emptying majortowns and cities.May 3: Border clashes between Kampuchea and Vietnam.September 9: Sihanouk retu rns to Phnom Penh as Head of State of"Democratic Kampuchea".

1976: April 4: Sihanouk resigns and remains virtually under house arrest.1977: Heavy fighting on Kampuchea-Vietnam border begins when DK troopslaunch cross-border raids. DK calls for "liberation" of sou thernVietnam. Half a million Vietnamese forced to flee their homes.1978: October: President Carter abandons restoration of relations withHanoi in favour of building ties with Peking.November: Vietnam signs 25 year friendship treaty with USSR.December 15: Restoration of US-China relations announced.December 25 : Vietnam invades Kampuchea on C hristmas Day.1979: January 7, Phnom Penh ca ptu red . Heng Samrin Head of new "People'sRepublic of Kampuchea". Fighting continues as Khmer Rouge driventowards Thai border. Aid effort to Kampuchea begins, initially fromVietnam and the Eastern bloc, then from international and w estern

agencies.February: Chinese forces invade Vietnam from the north in order to"teach it a lesson".xii


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March: Vietnam allows USSR access to naval base of Cam Ranh Bay.1979-81: "Dem ocratic K ampuchea" (Pol Pot 's Khmer R ouge) seated at UN.1982: Coalition formed by Kh me r Roug e, Son Sann and Sihanouk. Coa litionGo vernm ent of Dem ocratic Kam puchea seated at UN.1984-95: Vietnam ese and PRK offensive d estroy s DK bases along theThai-Kampuchean b order, driving camp residents and opposition

forces into Thailand. Dispersal of DK fighters marks new phase of warwith continuing guerrilla activity inside Kampuchea.1986: KPNLF in disarray. Son Sann's lead ersh ip reje cte d by KPN militaryleader, General Sak Sutsakhan.1987: Thailand closes Khao-I-Dang, a refugee camp under UNHCRprotec tion, and proce eds with relocation of its residents to cam psadm inistered by various factions of DK coalition.7 May: Sihanouk steps down for a year as President of UN-recognisedCoalit ion Go vernm ent of Dem ocratic Kam puchea be cause of attackson his followers by Kh mer R ouge, his coalition par tners . Leadership ofthe CGDK is han ded ove r to Son Sann.

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Punishing the Poor: The international isolation of Kampuchea

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