Public Transfers and Domestic Violence: The Roles of Private Information and Spousal Control * Gustavo J. Bobonis † Melissa González-Brenes ‡ Roberto Castro § Current version: March 2012 First version: March 2006 Abstract: We study whether transfer programs in which funds are targeted to women decrease the incidence of spousal abuse. We examine the impact of the Mexican Oportunidades program on spousal abuse rates and threats of violence using data from a specialized survey. Beneficiary women are 40 percent less likely to be victims of physical abuse, but are more likely to receive violent threats with no associated abuse. This evidence is consistent with a model of decision- makers’ interactions with asymmetric information in the male partner’s gains to marriage, who can then use threats of violence to extract rents from their female partners. * A preliminary version of the paper was circulated as ‘Women’s Income, Female Status, and Spousal Violence: Effects of the Mexican Oportunidades Program” (March 2006). We are grateful to Michael Baker, Dwayne Benjamin, Morley Gunderson, Gillian Hamilton, Robert Pollak, Deborah Reed, Heidi Shierholz, and Aloysius Siow, as well as Hilary Hoynes (editor) and two anonymous referees, whose suggestions greatly improved the paper. We would also like to thank seminar participants at Toronto, the PAA 2006 Conference, the ASSA 2007 Conference, and the CEA 2011 Conference for helpful comments, as well as Caridad Araujo, Tania Barham, Marta Rubio, Iliana Yaschine, and the staff at Oportunidades for providing administrative data and their general support throughout. Research support from the Institute of Business and Economics Research at UC Berkeley and the University of Toronto Connaught Fund is gratefully acknowledged. We are responsible for any errors that may remain. † Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, BREAD and CIFAR. Address: 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G7, Canada. Tel: 416-946-5299; E-mail: [email protected] . ‡ Cove Strategy, 15 Kenwood St., Somerville, MA, 02133, USA. E-mail: [email protected] . § Professor, Regional Center for Multidisciplinary Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Apartado postal 4- 106, Cuernavaca, Morelos, 62431, México. Tel: (52-777)-329-1853. E-mail: [email protected] .
Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Public Transfers and Domestic Violence:
The Roles of Private Information and Spousal Control*
Gustavo J. Bobonis †
Melissa González-Brenes ‡
Roberto Castro §
Current version: March 2012
First version: March 2006
Abstract: We study whether transfer programs in which funds are targeted to women decrease
the incidence of spousal abuse. We examine the impact of the Mexican Oportunidades program
on spousal abuse rates and threats of violence using data from a specialized survey. Beneficiary
women are 40 percent less likely to be victims of physical abuse, but are more likely to receive
violent threats with no associated abuse. This evidence is consistent with a model of decision-
makers’ interactions with asymmetric information in the male partner’s gains to marriage, who
can then use threats of violence to extract rents from their female partners.
* A preliminary version of the paper was circulated as ‘Women’s Income, Female Status, and Spousal Violence: Effects of the Mexican Oportunidades Program” (March 2006). We are grateful to Michael Baker, Dwayne Benjamin, Morley Gunderson, Gillian Hamilton, Robert Pollak, Deborah Reed, Heidi Shierholz, and Aloysius Siow, as well as Hilary Hoynes (editor) and two anonymous referees, whose suggestions greatly improved the paper. We would also like to thank seminar participants at Toronto, the PAA 2006 Conference, the ASSA 2007 Conference, and the CEA 2011 Conference for helpful comments, as well as Caridad Araujo, Tania Barham, Marta Rubio, Iliana Yaschine, and the staff at Oportunidades for providing administrative data and their general support throughout. Research support from the Institute of Business and Economics Research at UC Berkeley and the University of Toronto Connaught Fund is gratefully acknowledged. We are responsible for any errors that may remain. † Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, BREAD and CIFAR. Address: 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G7, Canada. Tel: 416-946-5299; E-mail: [email protected]. ‡ Cove Strategy, 15 Kenwood St., Somerville, MA, 02133, USA. E-mail: [email protected]. § Professor, Regional Center for Multidisciplinary Research, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Apartado postal 4-106, Cuernavaca, Morelos, 62431, México. Tel: (52-777)-329-1853. E-mail: [email protected].
35
Tab
le 7
: Tes
ts o
f Stre
ss a
nd C
onfli
ct in
Hou
seho
ld H
ypot
hesi
s –
Vio
lenc
e ag
ains
t Chi
ldre
n
N
otes
: Rob
ust s
tand
ard
erro
rs in
par
enth
eses
, clu
ster
ed a
t the
vill
age
leve
l; si
gnifi
cant
at (
*) 9
0 pe
rcen
t, (*
*) 9
5 pe
rcen
t, (*
**) 9
9 pe
rcen
t con
fiden
ce le
vels
. Coe
ffic
ient
est
imat
es
from
vill
age
fixed
eff
ects
reg
ress
ions
wei
ghte
d by
sur
vey
sam
plin
g w
eigh
ts. C
ontro
ls in
clud
e in
dica
tor
varia
bles
for
wom
an a
nd p
artn
er's
age,
wom
an a
nd p
artn
er's
indi
geno
us
stat
us, w
omen
's sc
hool
ing-
leve
l ind
icat
ors,
the
partn
er’s
sch
oolin
g at
tain
men
t lev
el, h
ouse
hold
siz
e, c
ohab
iting
cou
ple
indi
cato
r, ye
ars
in u
nion
, and
var
iabl
es m
easu
ring
repo
rted
hist
orie
s of s
pous
al a
buse
in p
aren
tal h
ouse
hold
dur
ing
child
hood
. For
det
ails
on
poly
nom
ial a
nd in
tera
ctio
n te
rms,
see
Sect
ion
IV.
Related Documents
