History, Territory and Japan’s growing isolation in East Asia Thomas U Berger Associate Professor Department of International relations Boston University For Presentation at Temple University, Tokyo November 27, 2012
May 11, 2015
History, Territory and Japan’s growing isolation in East Asia
Thomas U BergerAssociate Professor
Department of International relationsBoston University
For Presentation at Temple University, Tokyo November 27, 2012
The Basic Problem
• Despite:A) growing regional interdependence, andB) a military balance that strongly favors the
US and its allies We have growing regional acrimony, fueled by tensions over history and minor territorial issues
Why?
A vigorous Dispute over historical commemoration
and the portrayal of history
Tensions spill over into maritime disputes with China
The 2010 Trawler Incident
and Korea…
…with Russia in the mix as well
The intensity has increased
Efforts to re-establish harmony seem to not meet with enduring success
Premier Wen Jiao Bao in Yoyogi Park, May 31, 2010
Three Questions:
• What is the basis of the ways countries think about history and territory (the Official Narrative)?
• When and why do differing historical narratives become the source of inter-state conflict?
• What – if anything – can be done about it?
Forces shaping the Official Narrative
• Historical Determinist – historical memory based on individual experiences
• Instrumentalist – historical memory manipulated by cynical elites for their own gain
• Culturalist – historical memory part of the larger political culture of a society
• Combination of the above
Historical Determinism
• Powerful experiences can create powerful memories
• Memories can be suppressed both by individuals or society, but they often resurface, even after many decades
• Individuals and groups press to have their memories reflected in the official narrative
The Carriers of Memory
Atomic Bomb survivor
Instrumentalism
• Politicians and other elites manipulate official narrative to promote their own agendas
• The balance of power between politicians and interest groups determines the official narrative
The Political Uses of History
Nazi Era Postcard
Culturalism
• The interpretation of events and interest are central elements of a society’s political culture
• Each generation is socialized with a particular historical narrative – through education, movies, plays, etc.
• Over time, the historical narrative evolves as each generation reinterprets events in its own way
• The existing historical narrative set the boundarie for the kind of historical narrative a state can adopt
Cultural Vectors of Memory – novels plays, movies and popular history
The History of the History issue in Asia
• 1945-1951 – Initial Settlement• 1951-1982 – Successful Japanese damage
control• 1982 – 1992 – the beginning of the “history
issue”• 1992-2002 – era of apology diplomacy• 2002 –Deadlock over history – apology fatigue
Period 1 - Initial Settlement
• The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal• Reverse Course in US occupation policy• Ascent of the Conservative LDP in Japan• The Treaty of San Francisco – Article 11 – Japan accepts the IMTFE VerdictArticles 14-21 – limited reparations regime, Western Allies give up further claims• Ambiguous Boundaries created
Trial and Rehabilitation
The International Military Tribunal in the Far East – 1946-1948
The Treaty of San Francisco signed November 1951-
Ambiguous Boundaries left open
Period 2 - 1951-1978 Successful Japanese Damage Control
• Japan chooses to focus on damage control• Taiwan and South Korea unsuccessfully push
for compensation and concessions by Japan• Japan signs normalization treaties with all
major Asian nations except the DPRK 1952 Taiwan 1965 South Korea 1978 The PRC
Things were more orderly in Beijing
Reasons for First Equilibrium
• Politics in Command - Instrumental factors predominate historical memory and cultural discourse
• PRC, ROK, Taiwan all authoritarian states• The Left in Japan focuses on Japanese
victimization• Japanese conservatives not interested in
pursuing “War Responsibility”
Period III – History Issue Resurfaces
• 1982 – The First textbook Controversy• New MOE guidelines on textbooks• Nakasone apology in Korea• 1985 – Nakasone visits Yasukuni
Drivers for the Emergence of the History Problem
• Strong, historically rooted Anti-Japanese discourse in China and Korea (Cultural discourse)
• Pluralization allows victims groups to come to the fore (Historical memory)
• Increased interdependence of Asian countries– First strategic (Cold war)– Then economic
• Use of human rights norms by victims groups
The Birth of Modern Chinese and Korean Nationalism
The March 1rst, 1919 Movement in Korea
Korea – Colonial Modernity – authoritarianism made in Japan
Park Cheung Hee – as an officer in the Japanese Imperial Army, ca. 1944 and as President of the Republic of Korea
Replacing Mao with “Patriotic Education”
Period IV – Groping for Reconciliation
• 1991 - Kaifu in Singapore – history key to a more active role in Asia
• 1992 – Emperor visits China• 1993 – Kono statement on the Comfort Women• 1995 – Asian Women’s Fund Murayama Statement• 1998 – Kim Dae Jung-Obuchi Keizo Summit• 2002 – Korea-Japan host the World Cup
Limited Reconciliation with Korea
Develop into powerful Narratives of Victimization
Japan also feels victimized
Period IV – Deadlock over history
• 2001-2006 Under Koizumi tensions flare up• Collapse of territorial negotiations with Russia• Korean-Japanese reconciliation founders
under Lee Myun Bak• Anti-Japanese riots in 2005 in China• Japanese Apology fatigue• Escalates into territorial disputes
Reasons for Deadlock
• Japanese conservative backlash and “apology fatigue”
• Lack of active support for reconciliation from the Korean government
• Lack of interest in reconciliation by the Chinese government
• Temptation to utilize popular sentiments for domestic political agenda
• Inability of governments (China, Korea and Japan) to re-establish control over the diplomatic agenda
China’s diminishing leaders
Aggressively Patriotic Sentiments
Translation: Even if the whole of China is covered with tombs, [we] must kill all Japanese; even if no grass grows in China, we must recover Diaoyudao [the Senkakus]
Sentiments are hard to control
In Japan as well populist sentiments intrude on Foreign Policy
Politicians can use for their own agendas
Bottom Line – a Paradox
• The broad framework of international relations – balance of power and interdependence - favors general stability
• The political dynamics of the history issue – the combination of historical memory, cultural discourse and instrumental use of the issue by opportunistic politicians – creates volatility
Risks for Japan and the US-Japan Relationship
• Japan risks diplomatic isolation in East Asia• Lack of sympathy on the part of the US –
especially with regard to the Comfort women issue
• Danger of accidental escalation in the Senkakus
US Sympathy for the Comfort Women
US Fears of entanglement
Possible Counter measures
• Greater flexibility on territorial issues• Damage control on history with China/
reconciliation with Korea – if Korea is ready• CSBMs on Senkakus – when China is ready• Is this politically possible for Japan and its
neighbors?