Repo:t No.5592-GUA Guyana A Framework for Economic Recovery May 15, 1985 Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Document of the world Bank Thfis document hasa restricted distribution andmay be used by recipients onlyin the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents maynototherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.. 5 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
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Repo:t No. 5592-GUA
GuyanaA Framework for Economic Recovery
May 15, 1985
Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Document of the world Bank
Thfis document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipientsonly in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwisebe disclosed without World Bank authorization..
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit: Guyana Dollar
The Guyana dollar floated with the pound sterl'ng from July 1972 toOctober 1975, when the Government announced its linkage to the USdollar at G$2.55 = US$1.00. A new rate of G$3.00 = US$1.00 wasestablished on June 1, 1981. On January 11, 1984, it was adjusted toG$3.75 = US$1.00. Since October 6, 1984, it is adjusted weekly withrespect to movements ia a basket of currencies consisting of the PoundSterling, the Deutsche Mark, the French Franc, the Netherlands Guilderand the Japanese Yen.
FOR OFFMCIAL USE ONLYTITLE: Guyana - A Framework for Economic Recovery
COUNTRY: Guyana
REGION: Latin America and the Caribbean
SECTOR: Country Economic
ABSTRACT: Following three years of rapid decline in gross domestic product(GDP) Guyana's economic performance in 1984 exhibitedconsiderable improvement in terms of growth. Compared to the 10%fall in real GDP in 1983, the growth rate is estimated at about5% in 1984 (based on 1977 prices), although the absolute level ofGDP was still below that attained in the early 1970s. As aresult of drastic restraints on imports and non-payment ofexternal interest obligations, the balance of payments currentaccount deficit continued to improve although this was offset bya rapid build-up of external arrears. Moreover, despite someadvances in production, public sector finances continued to beweak in 1984, particularly because of low capacity utilization inthe leading public sector corporations, increases in publicsector wages in 1984 and the compounding of domestic interestpayments. As part of a Bank/IDA supported structural adjustmentprogram, the Government implemented a number of policies during1981-84 that included energy resource development, establishmentof institutions for export promotion and pricing (especially withrespect to electricity and rice).
The main tasks ahead include:
(a) reducing the size of the public sector deficit throughexpenditure controls at the Central Government level and improvedperformance of the leading public corporations;
(b) improving Guyana's currency adjustment system, with the objectiveof enhancing the profitability of domestic export industries andarresting the rapidlv expanding parallel market;
(c) reducing price distortions by limiting the number of commoditiessubject to official price controls to those that are highlyessential in nature with low elasticities of demand;
(d) promoting exports, especially through the removal of obstacles toprivate initiative and the further provision of direct assistanceto exporters of non-traditional commodities; and
(e) rescheduling of external debt which can only take place after anagreement on an IMF program.
The medium- and long-term economic prospects of Guyana dependlargely on the inflow of substantial external resources at highlyconcessional terms. If external resources are made available ona timely basis and the Government undertakes relevant policyadjustments, the economy should be able to grow at about 5% p.a.in real terms during the next decade.
This dooument has a resrited distibunon and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties Its contents may not otherwise be discbsed without World Bank authonzation.
This report is based on the work of an IBRD economic mission toGuyana in January/February 1985. The mission consisted of Mr. James Sackey(mission leader), Messrs. Roger Robinson, Feridon Gharib, andMs. Maria Benito. Mr. Alan Slusher (CDB) provided assistance to themission on the analysis of the monetary sector. The UNDP resident missionin Guyana assisted the mission in compiling the technical assistance list.The report was reviewed and discussed with the Government in May 1985.
GUYANA
A Framework for Economic Recovery
Table of Contents
Page No.COUNTRY DATA
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ......................... i - vi
I. ECONOMIC OVERVIEW ....................... o ............. 1A. Background .................... .............. . 1B. Recent Economic Developments .................... 2C. The Source of the Economic Crisis ............... 7
II. MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY 9A. Government Response to Crisis ................... 9B. Recent Economic Reforms ..... .. ..... 11C. Macro-Aspects of Economic Recovery .14
III. SECTORAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 17A. Policy Issues in the Leading Sectors . ... 17B. Diversification and Role of Private Sector 24
IV. ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR ................. 29A. Role of the Central Government ......-...------ 30B. Public Enterprises: State as an Entrepreneur 35
V. LEVEL AND ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT . . 39A. Overview of Investment Needs . . 39B. The 1985 Investment Program . . .41
VI. EXTERNAL TRADE AND FINANCE ... 45A. External Trade Policy and Issues . . .45B. Management oi External Debt .. 49
VII. DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS ... 52A. Background. .. 52B. Sectoral Targets ... . .52
1. Real Growth of GDP by Sectors ................................ 22. Investment and Savings ............................ .......... 33. Outstanding Domestic Credit ............. ................... 44. Balance of Payments ....... ; 65. Selected Macroeconomic Indicators ........................... 116. Official Exchange Rates and Trade Weighted Index ............. 137. Bauxite - Index of Output and Earnings .......... * ............ 178. Capacity and Output of Bauxite Industry ........ .............. 189. Share of Public Sector in Consumption/Investment .. .* 2910. Public Sector Savings ....... ................................. 3011. Measures of Tax Effort . ... ................................... 3112. Central Government Expenditures .............................. 3313. Performance of Public Corporations ..... ...................... 3614. Sectoral Allocation of Public Sector Capital Expenditures .... 4015. External rrade Indicators ........ ............................ 4616. Indicators of External Reserve Position ...................... 4917. Average Terms of New Commitments, 1970-84 ................. ... 5018. External Payment Arrears . .................................... 5019. Selected Macroeconomic Targets ...................... 5320. External Capital Requirements ...... .......................... 56
Poeg I of 2 pages
COUNITR DATA - OUTAHA
AREA POPULATION DENSITY
214.370 km72
773 mlle ion t.l_19931 3.7 per hm2
Not. of Growthe 1 (from 1370 to 1953)
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS (1964) HEALTH 1981
Crude Birth fots (per 1.000) 21.3 Populatlon per physicIle 7350
Crude Dueth Rate (per 1.000) 7.6 Pepultlon per huspitel bad 200
intfet Mortality (per 1.000 lle births 19821 45.0
INCOME OISTRIWUTION DISTRIiOITION OF LAND OWIEISHIP
S of national Incmee, iigobet quintile S owned by top 20l1 a owners
lowest quintile . S owned by buttoo 102 of owners
ACCESS TO PIPED WATER £119603 ACCESS TO ELECTRICITT (16901
S of popaletlee - erbho 35.4 S of populatlen - urban 90.3
- rural 71.8 - rural 53.6
NUTRITION EDUCATION C1360)
Caloril Isteho as I of reqelronents 117.0 Adalt literacy rate Z 31.3
Per capita protels lotako 65.0 PrImary school enrollment S 67.0
CNP PER CAPITA Is 196 3
1a, USSs20
CROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IN 1354 (..t-) ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH (S. constant 2977 pricesl
Met Reserves teed-year) T. . et. Ousttandieg 5 Dsabursed 13.5
RATE OF EXCHANGE B8Ro/IDA LENDING, DECE1BER 31, 1354
US$ Mis.
Oct.1375 - June 1, 131
USt1.0 - 652.55 uetstansdlg 6 OlDbursed 30.1
051.00 - US80.332 Ucdlobhused 14.1
Outstaidleg lel. Usdlabursed 104.2
June 1. 1951 - Dec. 1363
US$1 .00 - 963.00
cCI.00 - USO0.333
Average, 1354
USe1.00 - 653.521
051.00 - USe0.261
0/ Jlse. 1354 (averege of pariod).bi Ratio of e-bt Soreits to Experts of Geode aod lieu-Factor Servicse.
set available
.et applicable
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Economic Overview
i. Economic developments in Guyana during the 1970s were mixed.During the first half of the decade, real GDP grew by about 4% per annum asa result of the rapid growth in Government expenditures and favourableprices for Guyana's major export commodities. In contrast, during 1975-80,there was a rapid economic decline resulting in about 5% p.a. drop in percapita income, 2% p.a. drop in consumption and 10% p.a. drop ininvestment. The economic deterioration was precipitated by the poor outputperformance of the two main productive sectors-bauxite and sugar-exacerbated by a dramatic worsening of the terms of trade as a result offalling sugar prices and further oil price increase in 1979. During1975-80, the resource gap averaged 12% of GDP, compared to less than 2%during 1971-75, resulting in a rapid deterioration in the balance ofpayments.
ii. The economic crisis of the second half of the 1970s persistedthrough 1981-83, with output in 1983 approximately 18% lower than the levelin 1979. There were significant declines in output in the bauxite andsugar sectors because of technical, labor and managerial problems. Theeconomy, however, experienced a substantial recovery in output in 1984,primarily as a result of improvements in bauxite production. The level ofGDP in real terms in 1984 was, nevertheless, still below the levelsattained during the early 1970s. The rate of price increases, as measuredby the official consumer price index (CPI), accelerated in 1984 to 20%,compared to 12% in 1983 as a result of the currency devaluation in Januaryand subsequent weekly adjustments initiated in October. The official CPI,however, underestimates the rate of inflation as some commodities used forits compilation are either price contrclled or only available at theparallel market at substantially higher prices. The deterioration of thereal economy in Guyana during 1981-83, unaccompanied by timely policies toreduce demand, has resulted in a significant worsening of public sectorfinances. Public sector savings have been negative since 1981, and theoverall deficit widened from 13% of GDP in 1978 to 60% in 1984. Until1981, the current account deficit of the Central Government was offset bythe s-.rpluses of the public corporations. However, the decline ininternational demand for the output of Guyana's two main publiccorporations in the bauxite and sugar sectors, compounded by low domesticproduction, has meant a substantial decline in revenues and large operatingdeficits. To finance the public sector deficits the Government hasresorted to short- to medium-term domestic borrowing mainly from thebanking system, with resultant dramatic increases in interest payments inrecent years.
iii. Despite a fall in exports during 1980-84 of 44%, the resource gaphas widened by only 14%; the reason is a substantial decline in importsduring the period. The current account deficit in 1984 represented 26% ofGDP, compared to 22% in 1980. The current account deficits of the balanceof payments have been financed by concessional capital inflows and theshortfalls have been accounted for by the accumulation of external
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arrears. At the end of 1984, Guyana's external arrears amounted to US$625million or 158% of GNP. Guyana's medium- and long-term external debt as ofDecember 31, 1984 was US$683 million or 172% of GNP. Since 1981, becauseof the worsening foreign exchange situation, Guyana has been unable toservice its external payment obligations. It is in arrears on most of itsexternal debt and in 1984, its debt service payments (interest andamortization) amounted to US$31 million, or 13% of the Exports of Goods andNon-factor services, compared to scheduled payments (excluding arrears) ofUS$88 million or 38% of Exports of Goods and non-factor services. Guyanais thus not creditworthy for non-concessional financing. In June 1981, theGovernment devalued the Guyana currency when the exchange rate was adjustedfrom GS2.55 to G$3.00 per US$1.U0. In January 1984, a further 20%devaluation occurred to bring the rate to G$3.75 per US$1.00. SinceOctober 1984, the exchange rate has been adjusted on a weekly basisaccording to the movements in the basket of currencies of Guyana's majortrading partners, excluding the US. Despite these devaluations, it isestimated that the real effective exchange rate of the Guyana dollar hascontinued to appreciate as a result of high rates of underlying inflationand the continuing poor export performance.
Government Response to the Crisis
iv. The Government's response to the crisis has included theimplementation of a short-term stabilization program in 1978, supported byan IMF Stand-by agreement and a Bank/IDA Program Loan/Credit; a three-yearIMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement in 1979 which was revised andaugmented in 1981; and Bank/IDA Structural Adjustment Program in 1981strengthened in mid-1982 through the adoption of the Government ActionProgram. The measures, nevertheless, failed to revive the economy, in partbecause of a slow rate of implementation and the continuing poor productionperformance of the bauxite and sugar sectors which exacerbated thecountry's foreign exchange shortage.
v. In compliance with the Bank/IDA supported structural adjustmentprogram, the Government implemented a number of policies and actions during1981-83. The main ones were those on energy resource development, exportpromotion and industrial development and pricing (especially with respectto electricity and rice). In addition, during 1984-85, the Government'sbudget outlined the national development priorities which emphasizeagricultural thrust and food self-sufficiency, resource allocation(including a program of regionalism and cooperatism), institutionalrestructuring and solutions to the domestic and external debt problems.The programs, however, fall considerably short of what is required forsustained recovery of the economy.
Macro-Aspects of Economic Recovery
vi. On the basis of progress made so far and policy proposals in the1984-85 budget documents, it is evident that a proper planning of policy
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initiatives aud augmentation of the recovery program with quantified sectortargets are necessary. In the short term, the recovery program shouldfocus on restoring production levels in the bauxite and sugar sectors to atleast their pre-1980 levels through improvements in factor productivity andthe elimination of short-term production constraint such as the shortage ofspare parts and raw materials. The latter will require a prudent adheranceto foreign exchange planning along the lines currently being employed bythe Bank of Guyana.
vii. In the long term, policies should be oriented toward expandingthe productive base of the economy through:
(a) measures to utilize fully the expanding productive capacity forrice through the expanded irrigation projects;
(b) diversification efforts into other mining, especially gold anddiamonds with active efforts to promote external private capital in thesesectors; and
(c) promotion of export manufacturing, especially of those items thatwill encourage backward and forward linkages within the economy.
viii. The recovery efforts over the past two years (and the developmentefforts since independence in general) have been conducted largely on anannual basis through the Government's budget. This approach is notsuitable for long-term planning. Rather, the formulation of a medium-termprogram with quantifiable targets within the framework of existingresources and constraints should form the basis of the economic strategy.Given rigidities of the economy, excess capacity and severe foreignexchange constraints, the process of adjustment should entail twofundamental stages: liberalization and rehabilitation. Although suchcompartmentalization is theoretical and overlap is bound to occur in realimplementation, the sequencing is important to free the economy of numerousdistortions and regidities that have resulted from the ad hoc adjustmentsof the past several years to unfavorable external environment and domesticperformance.
Role of the Public Sector
ix. Until the late 1960s, the economy of Guyana was relativelydominated by the private sector. The situation changed when the Governmentbegan to play a more active role. The share of public consumption in GDPalmost doubled during 1970-79, while public investment which in 1970 hadbeen equal to private investment, was four times as large by 1984.Furthermore, the public sector's purview over economic activity and futureinvestment has been extended by import license and foreign exchangeallocation procedures and price control system. The Government's increaseddominance on the economy has placed considerable demand on itsadministrative capacity to ensure adequate coordination and control. This
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may, in part, explain the gradual deterioration in finances and theincreased incidence of institutional, managerial and organizational bottle-necks within the public sector. A major contributory factor to theeconomic malaise of Guyana in recent years has therefore been theincreasing inability of the public sector to manage the vast resourcesavailable to it.
x. To improve the finances of the public sector, the Governmeat hasproposed a number of policy measures in its 1985 budget. With respect tothe Central Government finances, the Government's efforts have beendirected at containing the rapid expenditure growth as its revenue effortshave been reasonably successful. The proposed programs involve:
(a) management of domestic debt so as to reduce the rapidlyincreasing interest payments. While this proposal is in the right direc-tion, it is not based on an adequate review of the structure of domesticdebt although such a review is urgently needed as background for thisprogram;
(b) improvement in the efficiency of labor resources through reasses-sing the roles of the ministries with a view to redeploying labor to theregions where their productivity may be higher and through organizationaland motivational changes in the public sector.
Given the prevailing shortage of skilled personnel in the Central Govern-ment, the implementation of this program requires careful planning andmonitoring.
xi. In order to arrest the rising deficit of the public corporationsand to limit transfers from the Central Government, the Government hasannounced the organizational restructuring of the Guyana State EnterprisesCorporation (Guystac) and the Guyana Rice Board (GRB). The former involvesthe restructuring of Guystac into four groups, viz utilities, agriculture-based entities, commercial companies I and II. The objective is to promoteefficiency through the application of performance contracts. With respectto the GRB, the Government in December 1984 restructured it into threeentities, viz the Guyana Rice Milling and Marketing Authority, the GuyanaRice Export Board and the National Paddy and Rice Grading Centre. Thisrestructuring formed part of an overall reorganization of the rice sectorunder an Inter-American Development Bank financed program of efficiencyimprovement.
xii. A proper financial restructuring of the corporations should be anintegral part of the recovery program. At the moment no detailed analysishas been done for the corporations, except for the C=yana Mining Enterprise(Guymine). The proposals with respect to the financial restructuring ofGuymine (essentially the conversion of its deficits into preferred stockwhich is cumulative and redeemable) are inadequate. A comprehensivefinancial restiucturing of Guymine (and also the other financially weak
corporations) would require: (a) conversion of their deficits into equity,or other instruments; (b) the provision of an adequate level of workingcapital; and (c) rescheduling of both their domestic and external debt inan effort to reduce the debt burden. Finally, a detailed review of thecorporations indicates substantial scope for divestiture and closurewithout affecting the public sector's control of the economy. In view ofthe scarce management personnel in Guyana, divestiture and closure offeralternative options for containing the rapid growth of the public sector.
Public Sector Investment
xiii. Because of the uncertainty surrounding resource inflows tosupport the public sector investment, the program for 1985 is restricted toongoing projects of medium-term duration with identified external supportand short-term programs of major domestic importance. For the same reason,the projected levels and sectoral allocation of future investments cannotbe made available. The public sector investment, as reflected in theGovernment's 1985 budget documents, envisages expenditures of G$748million, which is some 142% above the level of actual expenditures for1984. This level of investment is clearly unattainable given identifiedsources of finance: G$264 (or US$64) million or about 35X of totalexpenditures from external sources and G$483 from local sources. Given thetight financial position of the public sector it is unlikely that thedomestic financing, part of which is required in foreign exchange, will beavailable. As in 1983 and 1984, the level of actual public investment islikely to be lower than projected. Given this likelihood, it is importantto review during mid-year, progress on the implementation of the investmentprogram and to limit, if need be, disbursements to high priority projects.
Development Prospects
xiv_ In view of the severity of the economic crisis facing Guyana andthe magnitude of its disequilibrium, it may not be possible to sustaingrowth without substantial external assistance. Since considerableuncertainty surrounds the availability of external resources to support therecovery program, analysis of medium- and long-term feasibility andconsistency of the development policies reviewed above may not berelevant. Instead, the overview of the development prospects will focus onmajor macroeconomic targets to which the Government should direct itsefforts over the next decade (1985-95). The goal would be to restoreproduction levels to those attained during the early 1970s. That is, by1990, the real level of GDP at factor cost should exceed that attained in1975 (a 30Z increase over the level in 1984), while the export levels inreal terms should be restored by 1995 to those of 1977 (a 73% increase overthe level in 1984'.
xv. If the projections of current account receipts and payments arerealized the cumulative deficit of the balance of payments will be aboutUS$851 million during 1985-90 or about US$142 million per year. Short-term
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finance will probably not be available in the medium term until an IMFprogram is in place. This can only take place when Guyana becomes currenton its repayment obligations to the IMF. In the long term, however,short-term financing will probably increase in line with the volume oftrade to be financed, provided the reduction of arrears and otherrescheduling negotiations are successful. The balance of the capitalrequirements should primarily have to come from inflows of long-term loansfrom official concessionary sources.
xvi. For potential donors, the implications of the above analysis arethreefold: First, Guyana will need a large infusion of external capital tosustain the recovery and rehabilitation of its economy. Second, a shifthas to take place from project to program assistance including recurrentfinancing and balance of payments support. Third, the donors have tocoordinate their assistance and to channel it largely for rehabilitation ofexisting capital stock and completion of ongoing investment programs(including those not originally supported by them). Since 1982, most ofthe external donors have made substantial new assistance to Guyanacontingent on an IMF program.
xvii. Over the past two years, the Government has been in the processof introducing major policy reforms in response to the economic crisis. Inorder to obtain the support of external donors, the Government shouldnot only continue these efforts but strengthen its program with additionalpolicy measures to include:
(a) reduction of the size of the public sector deficit throughexpenditure controls at the Central Government level and improvedperformance of the leading public corporations;
(b) improvement of Guyana's currency adjustment system, with theobjective of enhancing the profitability of domestic export industries andarresting the rapidly expanding parallel market;
(c) elimination of price distortions by limiting the number ofcommodities subject to official price controls to those that are highlyessential in nature with low elasticities of demand; and
(d) promotion of exports, especially through the removal of obstaclesto private initiative and the further provision of direct assistance toexporters of non-traditional commodities.
xviii. The speed and extent of the policy adjustments are, however,constrained by resource unavailability, especially of foreign exchange.The Government's efforts are part of a two-pronged approach dealingsimultaneously with the supply-side and the demand management problems. Inour judgement this approach is the only realistic one. Past attempts tofocus separately on demand management have been less than successful. Ifour judgement is correct, then a strong case exists for external donors totailor the volume and timing of their support accordingly, rather than toconsider the two sides of the equation separately and sequentially.
CHAPTER I - ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
A. Background
1.01 The economy of Guyana is primarily dependent on the production ofsugar, rice, bauxite and alumina. Most of the agricultural activity isconcentrated along the coastal plains of the country, whereas the resourceswithin the densely tropical hinterland remain largely unexploited with theexception of bauxite mining. The mineral and timber rescurces containedwithin the interior are extensive, but access is limited because ofundeveloped infrastructure. At the time of Guyana's independence in 196b,the bauxite and sugar sectors were controlled by foreign interests, withthe indigenous private sector involved in local trading and distribution,agriculture and some small-scale manufacturing. Since the early 1970s,this distribution of ownership has changed substantially. The Governmentnationalized the bauxite and sugar sectors, and has progressively becomethe main actor in the other economic sectors. It is the major employer andcontrols over 90% of the official import and export trade. As part of itsobjective of developing a trisectoral mixed economy, the Government hasalso actively encouraged the development of cooperatives.
1.02 Economic performance during the 1970s was mixed. During thefirst half of the decade, real income grew by about 4.0% per annum as aresult of the rapid growth in Government expenditures and favourable pricesfor Guyana"s major export commodities. Unlike many other developingcountries, the rapid increases in oil prices during 1973-74 were onlyslightly disruptive in the short-term, as they were offset by a boom in theprice of sugar in 1974-75. The terms of trade for Guyana improved byapproximately 30% during 1970-75. National per capita income increased byabout 6% per annum, resulting in a rapid expansion in consumption andinvestment (5X and 10X per annum, respectively). Much of the growthoccutrred in the public sector, which utilized the windfall associated withsugar (approximately US$140 million during 1974 and 1975) to expand bothCentral Government consumption and investment expenditures.
1.03 As soon as sugar prices fell and there was a weakening in thedemand for Guyana's main exports, there was a rapid economic decline.During 1975-80, per capita income fell by about 5% per annum, consumptionfell by about 2% per annum, and investment declined by 10% per annum. Theeconomic decline reflected the continuing weak output performance of thetwo main productive sectors, bauxite and sugar. The resulting poor exportperformance of the two main sectors was further exacerbated by a dramaticworsening of the terms of trade as a result of falling sugar prices and thefurther oil price increase in 1979. The terms of trade fell byapproximately 30%, wiping out che gains enjoyed in the first half of thedecade. Moreover, the level of aggregate demand failed to adjust promptlywith negative implications for the balance of payments. During 1975-80,the resource gap averaged 12% of GDP compared to less than 2% during1971-75, resulting in a rapid-deterioration in the balance of payments.
-2-
B. Recent Economic Developments
Domestic Sector
1.04 Output. During 1981-83, real GDP contracted significantly, withoutput in 1983 approximately 18% lower than the level achieved in 1979.There were significant declines in the bauxite and sugar sectors due to acombination of technical, labor and managerial problems. Problems inproduction-particularly of bauxite-not only reduced the operatingrevenues of individual corporations, but also drastically reduced foreignexchange earnings. This situation in turn inhibited the importation of thespare parts and machinery necessary to overcome the technical problems ofthe two sectors. The production and export problems were exacerbated bythe continued deterioration in the terms of trade for both bauxite andsugar and weak external demand for bauxite products.
a/ Compound growth rate (X) p.a.b/ Includes processing.c/ Includes electricity, gas, water and construction.
Source: Statistical Appendix Table 2.3.
1.05 The economy experienced substantial recovery in output in 1984,primarily as a result of improvements in bauxite production. Value addedin the bauxite sector grew by 47%, as a result of an 8% increase in driedmetal grade bauxite production and a 67% increase in calcined bauxiteproduction. Since 1983, Guymine undertook, with external technicalassistance, a program to streamline its operations and rehabilitate itsequipments. There was also a significant recovery in rice production,which increased by 23% to reach about 181,000 long tons in 1984, thehighest level since 1978. The improvement resulted from a 28% increase inthe acreage reaped and generally favourable weather conditions. Sugarproduction, however, continued to be disappointing, with output declining
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by 5.5Z to its lowest level in over ten years. The decline resulted fromunusually heavy rainfall during the fall of 1984 which impeded harvesting.Other manufacturing activities continued to be very depressed owing to alack of imported spare parts and inputs.
1.06 As a result of the deteriorating economic performance since 1980,the real level of domestic aggregate expenditures has steadily declined.The adjustment to lower levels of national income has taken place mainly inthe form of reduced real consumption, both public and private. The drasticcontraction in private consumption is evidenced by the shortages in basicconsumer commodities and the substitution of previously less popularconsumer items for those no longer being imported. The growth of theunofficial consumer market underscores the magnitude of the problem andindicates the inappropriateness of the official statistics on aggregateconsumption expenditures. The rate of decline in consumption may thus besignificantly lower than the level indicated by the official statistics.
1.07 Investment and Savings. Investment as a percentage of GNP hasdeclined steadily since 1981; it was 26Z in 1984 compared to 37Z in 1981.This decline resulted from the worsening fiscal situation, the lack offoreign exchange, and the drop in external project-related inflows inrecent years. The above features are reflected in the trends in nationalsavings which have declined in absolute and relative terms since 1978. Themain reason for the decline has been the deterioration of public finances,particularly since 1981. Foreign savings have thus financed an increasingproportion of total investment since 1978.
Table 2: Investment and Savings
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984As Z of Gross Domestic Investment
Gross National Savings i4.9 16.8 12.2 3.8 -1.5 0.8 3.7
Foreign Savings 6.7 16.1 19.8 33.1 30.4 28.1 20.3
Source: Statistical Appendix Tables 2.5 and 3.1.
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1.08 Public Finances. The deterioration in the real economy of Guyanaduring 1981-83, unaccompanied by timely demand reduction policies, hasresulted in a significant worsening of the public sector finances over thepast four years. Public sector savings have been negative since 1981, andthe overall deficit widened from 13% of GDP in 1978 to bO% in 1984. Until1981, the current account deficit of the Central Government was offset bythe surpluses of the public corporations. However, the decline ininternational demand for the output of the bauxite and sugar sectors hasmeant a substantial decline in revenues and large operating deficits. Theproblem has been further compounded by a decline in real zeonomic activityand an increase in the size of the parallel market, both of which havehelped to erode the Government's revenue base. While the Government hassought to curtail the growth of expenditures its measures have been slowand insufficient to offset the decline in real revenues. To finance thepublic sector deficit, and particularly the substantial capitalexpenditures of 1980-82, the Government resorted to short- to medium-termdomestic borrowing, mainly from the banking system. This policy has putincreasing pressure on Central Government expenditures as domestic interestpayments have risen sharply. Interest payments have increased by 238%since 1980; in 1984 alone they represented 30% of total Central Governmentexpenditures. The Government plans to restructure most of the short- tomedium-term domestic debt into longer term instruments (the related policyproposals are discussed in detail in Chapter IV).
1.09 Credit and Prices. The movements in domestic credit and monetaryaggregates in Guyana have been determined largely by the public sector'sfinancial performance. The annual average growth of net credit to thepublic sector from 1980 to 1984 has been about 30%, whereas the comparablefigure for the private sector has been about 24%.
Table 3: Outstanding Domestic Credit
(Z of GDP)
Credit to Public Credit to Private RatioSector (G) Sector (P) G/P
1.10 Net domestic credit to the public sector was mainly in the formof sales of treasury bills to both the commercial banks and the Bank ofGuyana. The credit expansion to the public sector has been facilitated bya number of factors. First, the commercial banks have become increasinglymore liquid over the past two years as private sector investmentopportunities have declined because of the lack of foreign exchange.Further, the time and savings deposits of the private sector have grownsignificantly in recent years reflecting both the decline in theavailability of consumer goods and the increased parallel market activity.Some commercial banks have refused to accept further private deposits.Second, the capacity of the Bank of Guyana to extend credit to the publicsector was enhanced by the import payments deposit scheme introduced in1978. These funds, meant to be repatriated when foreign exchange isavailable, had risen to G$465 million by end-December 1984, compared toabout G$53 million at the end of 1978.
1.11 Interest rates were adjusted upward on three occasions since1980. The rates were adjusted by the authorities in compliance with WorldBank/IMF programs. Despite the adjustments, interest rates have beennegative in real terms. However, the excess liquidity of the privatecommercial banking sector indicates that deposit and lending rates, eventhough negative in real terms, may not reflect market conditions. Atpresent, the commercial banks have no alternative investment outlets otherthan the purchase of treasury bills, given the total lack of normal privatedemand for credit because of the current low level of economic activity.
1.12 The rate of price increases, as measured by the official consumerprice index, accelerated in 1984, primarily as a result of the currencydevaluations in January and subsequent weekly adjustments initiated inOctober. The average rate of increase in 1984 was 20%, as compared to 12%in 1983. During 1984 the prices on a number of consumer items wereraised to reflect the exchange rate adjustment. Transportation tariffswere raised by 50%, and electricity tariffs were also increased between 5%for household consumption and 30% for industrial use. The domestic priceof sugar has been raised to 63 Guyana cents per pound from 33 cents, andrice prices have been adjusted by 25%. The full effects of the 1984devaluations on domestic prices have not, however, been felt completely, asthe utility price adjustments, for example, only took place in 1985. Theofficial price index also underestimates the rate of inflation as some ofthe items contained in the consumer basket used for its compilation areeither price controlled or only available at the parallel market atsubstantially high price premia.
External Sector
1.13 Balance of Payments. Despite a 44% decline in exports during1980-84, the resource gap has widened by only 14%, reflecting thesubstantial decline in imports that occurred over the period. The currentaccount deficit in 1984 represented 26% of GDP compared to 22% in 1980.The performance in 1984 represents a significant improvement over the
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the average of 31% of GDP during 1981-83. The current account deficitswere financed by concessional capital inflows while the shortfalls wereaccounted for by the accumulation of external arrears which amounted toUS$625.4 million or 158% of GNP at the end of 1984.
Change in Arrears(Increase-+) 22.2 5.2 17.0 91.0 113.1 201.1 174.8
Change in Net Reserve(Increase-+) -9.8 48.6 81.0 -28.8 -19.6 -12.6
Source: Statistical Appendix Table 3.1.
1.14 With the exception of a moderate increase in 1984, exports ofgoods and non-factor services have declined continually since 1980, as aresult of the poor production performance in the sugar sector and weakexternal demand for bauxite products. In 1984, sugar exports were 49% of1980 levels (volumes declined by 34%), and bauxite about 48% (with a volumedecline of 43%). The fall in export earnings of the two leading sectorsalso resulted from the decline in export prices; the price for sugar fellby 26% while that for bauxite fell by 15%. The Government's system ofimport license and foreign exchange allocation has been vigorously enforcedin an effort to reduce the level of official merchandise imports. Inparticular, importation of consumer and intermediate goods has beensignificantly reduced; by 1984 they were 28% and 54% respectively of their1980 levels. Furthermore, as the result of the build-up of externalcommercial arrears, external financial and commercial agencies have since1983 refused to extend suppliers' credit facilities to support Guyana'simports, which are currently on cash basis.
1.15 In compliance with an IMF stand-by program (see para. 2.02), theGovernment devalued the Guyana currency in June 1981, when the exchangerate was adjusted from G$2.55 to G$3.00 per US$1.00. in January 1984 afurther 20% devaluation was announced to bring the rate to G$3.75 perUS$1.00. The mid-1981 devaluation did not have the desired effect, in part
because consumers were largely shielded from its immediate impact as thepublic sector failed to adjust fully the prices it charges for the goods itproduces, imports or controls. In 1984, the Government passed through tothe consumer most of the devaluation induced cost increases. Since October1984, the exchange rate has been adjusted on a weekly basis according tothe movements of a basket of currencies and by end-December 1984, stood atG$4.25 per US$1.00. Despite these devaluations, it is estimated that thereal effective exchange rate of the Guyana dollar has continued toappreciate as a result of high rates of underlying domestic inflation andthe continuing poor export performance (see Chapter II).
1.16 External Debt. Because of the rapid build-up of externalarrears, very few new M & LT loans were extended to Guyana during 1982-84.New commitments fell from US$201 million in 1981 to less than US$12 millionin 1983 and rose to US$44 million in 1984. Guyana's disbursed andoutstanding medium and long term (M & LT) debt as of December 31, 1984 wasUS$683 million or 172% of GNP. In addition to the M & LT debt are arrearsamounting to US$625.4 million. Actual debt service payments in 1984amounted to US$31 million (of which US$16 million were for interestpayments) or 13X of Exports of Goods and Non-factor services; compared to20% in 1983. These payments were considerably below the scheduled debtservice payment (excluding arrears) which amounted to US$88 million (ofwhich US$29 million were for interest payments) or 38% of Exports of GNFSin 1984. Since 1981, because of the worsening foreign exchange situationGuyana has been unable to service all of its external paymentsobligations. Guyana is in arrears on most of its external debt. Theseriousness of the situation and the magnitudes involved warrant specialattention (Chapter VI discusses in detail the nature of the problem alongwith the Government's proposed solutions).
C. The Source of the Economic Crisis
1.17 External developments, including the deterioration in the termsof trade, and exogenous domestic factors such as poor weather conditions,have played an important role in the economic decline that has taken placein recent years. However, the main cause may be traced to the rapid growthof the public sector through excessive increase in current expendituresunmatched by the same levels of revenues, which took place since the early1970s and its inability to adequately manage the vast available resources.With the completion of the nationalization of the bauxite and sugarindustries (the two leading sectors) and the sharp expansion of its role inother sectors of the economy, the public sector severely overextended itsmanagerial and technical capabilities at the same time that thosecapabilities were being severely eroded by a large outflow of technicalmanpower which resulted in part from government employment policies.
1.18 The interrelated symptoms of the underlying crisis created by therapid growth of the public sector are manifested in:
(a) poor domestic production - the difficulties the public sectorfaces in managing efficiently the assets it has acquired, and the privatesector's lack of confidence, resulting from the manner of public sector
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expansion has led to decreasing levels of output, prevented the publicinvestments from yielding additional output, and held back privateinvestment;
(b) overregulation and allocative distortions - the capacity of thepublic sector to master the vast array of policy variables and hence tomanage resource allocation in an overly centralized economic structure hasresulted in price distortions (including the exchange rate) and resourcemisallocation which have exacerbated the deteriorating productionperformance; and
(c) weak economic base - the inability of the economy to withstandexternal shocks (in terms of the weak international demand and prices forGuyana's main exports and the high prices for critical imports) may beattributed to the narrow productive base of the economy which has changedonly marginally since the early 1970s. The rapid growth of the publicsector constituted primarily the acquisition of resources from the privatesector. Its failure to improve on the returns of the assets it acquired,as evidenced by the deficits of the public corporations, has severelylimited its ability to expand the productive base of the economy.
1.19 In order to overcome the economic crisis, the Government needsto carefully review the role of the public sector in Guyana vis-a-vis theprivate and cooperative sectors. The recovery process will also requirepolicies to constrain (and if possible, reduce) the growth of the publicsector and minimize its influence on the economy. Furthermore, effortsshould be made to promcte in the public sector organizational andmanagerial systems that are responsive to changing financial and economicrealities.
CHAPTER II - MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY
A. Government Response to Crisis
2.01 The Government's first coherent response to the post 1975 crisiswas the implementation of a short-term stabilization program in 1978,supported by an IMF Stand-by agreement and a Bank/IDA Program Loan/Credit.The program succeeded in temporarily improving fiscal performance and thebalance of payments by sharply reducing aggregate demand by nearly 20% inreal terms in 1978. The public sector current Zt--.Lt turned from adeficit of 3% of GDP in 1977 to a surplus of 4% in 1978, while the overalldeficit went from 21X to 13% of GDP. The deficit on the current account ofthe balance of payments also dropped from 22% to 6Z of GDP in 1978. Theprogram did not, however, adequately address the underlying structuralconstraints to increasing and sustaining investment, savings and outputlevels and to adjusting the economy to the new international economicenvironment.
Structural Adjustment/Stabilization Program
2.02 Recognizing that a longer term program was required to addressthe fundamental development constraints of the economy, in 1979 theGovernment entered into a three-year IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF)arrangement. Guyana, however, failed to meet the program targets as aresult of (i) its inability to reduce government expenditures and containdomestic financial imbalance, and (ii) the continuing production problems,related in particular to the labor unrest in the key export-orientedsectors during 1979 and a further deterioration in the terms of tradebrought about by the second round of sharp oil price increases.
2.03 Faced with the continuing economic crisis, in 1980 the Governmentbegan to formulate an economic program that aimed at resuming economicgrowth, generating employment and strengthening the balance of paymentsthrough the development and expansion of export-generating and efficientimport-substituting activities. In the short term, the program aimed atimproving the utilization of existing productive capacity, especially ofexportable goods, the execution of a production-oriented investment programin both the public and private sectors, and substantial increases in thelevel of national savings. In the longer term, it hoped to achieve astructural transformation of the economy through:
(a) sustained growth in the production of agricultural commodities,of mining, fishing and forestry products, and of non-traditionalmanufactures, and a simultaneous restraint in the rate of growth of theGovernment sector;
(b) diversification of the output of the productive sectors byintroducing new activities and by increasing processing of raw materialssuch as timber, root crops, etc;
(c) substitution of the imports of fossil fuels by the development ofhydroelectric power and also by utilizing local and imported sources ofenergy more efficiently; and
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(d) broadening the productive base by the development of industry toinclude, in the longer term, the smelting of aluminum using hydroelectricpower.
2.04 The Government's program was supported by a new IMF Extended FundFacility of SDR 100 million (augmented to SDR 150 million in mid-1981), anda Bank/IDA Structural Adjustment Loan/Credit of US$22 million equivalent.Under the IMF/EFF arrangements, the Government undertook, among otherthings, to initiate the removal of price distortions, improvements in theproductivity of labor, increased agricultural yields, and improvements inthe relationship between the Government and the private sector, particular-ly through the removal of obstacles to private initiatives. Similarly,under the Bank/IDA structural adjustment program, specific sector policieswere formulated which pertained to energy resource development andconservation; export development, especially relating to sugar, rice,fisheries, timber, bauxite/alumina and non-traditional manufactures;rationalization of pricing policies; and improving organizational andmanagerial efficiency.
2.05 These policies were further broadened and strengthened in May1982 through the adoption of the Government Action Program (see EconomicReport 3951-GUA). The main elements of the program were: (a) theconclusion of a partnership arrangement with a foreign company in thebauxite industry; (b) a reduction in the scope of activities of the GuyanaRice Board (GRB), the adoption of a rice pricing policy based on anIDB-financed study to maintain adequate producer prices, and a review ofrice marketing arrangements to ensure optimal returns to producers and theeconomy; Cc) adjustments in remuneration to attract and retain techniciansin the agricultural sector, a strengthening of regional agriculturalinstitutions, and a review of land tenure and holding policies supported byFAO; (d) measures to expand manufacturing, particularly for exports,including the adoption of a comprehensive investment code to be preparedwith assistance of Bank-financed consultants, import tax concessions,priority allocation of foreign exchange and power, the establishment of ajoint/private export council and of representative councils for industry,the appointment of a liaison between private enterpreneurs and the Govern-ment; (e) the limitation of public sector enterprises in manufacturing topresent activities, a strengthening of public sector enterorises managementthrough technology and marketing partnership arrangements, and equityparticipation by the foreign and domestic private sector in existing publicsector enterprises; (f) the continued implementation of measures agreedunder Bank/IDA Structural Adjustment Loan/Credit and the IDB's AgriculturalSector Loan including, inter alia, efforts to improve savings through arestraint of government spending and an increase in interest rates; and(g) a general strengthening of the Government's administrative systems andinstitutions, based in part on IDB-financed planning assistance.
Macroeconomic Effects of Program
2.06 The performance of the program during 1981-83 fell far short ofthe targets set (see table 5 below). In mid 1982, the IMF arrangement was
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terminated because of Guyana's failure to meet its targets. Since then,Guyana has been unable to conclude another program with the IMF, althoughthe IMF and the Bank have urged the Government to initiate measures on itsown to strengthen the balance of payments, such as: the removal of pricecontrols; an adjustment of the exchange rate through either systematicderegulation or floating of the Guyana currency; and greater emphasis ondomestic resource mobilization, particularly through a reduction ofdeficits in the public sector.
Growth Rates (1977 prices)GDP (at factor cost) 5.7 3.6 -6.6Exports 10.8 8.7 -12.3Imports 6.0 3.9 -14.1Consumption per Capita 1.1 -0.1 -5.0Change in Terms of Trade 3.1 3.1 -12.5
Ratio to GDP (current prices)Consumption 81.5 82.3 89.2Investment 27.3 26.4 29.7Gross Domestic Savings 18.5 17.7 10.7Gross National Savings 14.7 13.5 !.0Exports of GNFS 65.1 64.8 55.6Imports of GNFS 73.9 73.5 74.bResource Gap 8.8 8.7 19.0Current Account Deficit 12.6 12.9 27.9
a/ President's Report P-2935-GUA, page 20.
B. Recent Macroeconomic Reforms
2.07 A number of policies were implemented during 1981-83, but theywere microeconomic in nature and are reviewed in Annex III. Apart fromthose with respect to the bauxite and rice industries, the main ones dealtwith energy resource development, export promotion and industrialdevelopment and pricing (especially with respect to electricity and rice).They were implemented largely in compliance with the Bank/IDA supportedstructural adjustment program. The Government's own efforts inmacroeconomic policy formulation and implementation to address the economiccrisis were initiated in its budget for 1984 and 1985. As would beexplained in later parts of this report, the programs fall considerablyshort of what is required for sustained recovery of the economy.
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Development Strategies
2.08 The Government's national development priorities as outlined inits budget for 1984 and 1985 emphasize agricultural thrust with a view tofood self-sufficiency, as well as the need for more efficient resourceallocation (including a program of reginnalism and cooperatism),institutional restructuring and solution to the domestic and external debtproblems. The related policy initiatives are reviewed in subsequentchapters. This chapter, looks at the main macro-policy initiatives since1984 with a view to assessing additional requirements, if any, for havingan effective impact on the economy. The review focuses on policy changeswith respect to the exchange rate, the public sector deficit and priceliberalization.
2.09 Exchange Rate Policy. In an effort to arrest the rapidlydeteriorating foreign exchange situation and to reduce the parallel marketpremia payable by consumers and producers as a result of the disequilibriumin the official exchange rate, the Government on January 11, 1984 devaluedthe Guyana currency by about 20% vis-a-vis the US dollar. This was thesecond devaluation since October 9, 1975; the first was on June 2, 1981.Concurrently, the Government re-introduced the mechanism of a currencybasket (originally conceived of in 1981) for monitoring the value of theGuyana dollar. The mechanism involved the adaptation of a formula devisedyears ago for the payment of bauxite exports. Under it, payments were madeby buyers in a basket of hard currencies, the purpose being to buffer theindustry's hard currency earnings against rate fluctuations. In the caseof the Guyana dollar, the present basket consists of the Pound Sterling,the Deutsche Mark, the French Franc, the Netherlinds Guilder, and theJapanese Yen. The system was designed to stabilize the value of the Guyanadollar around a level of G$15 to the basket, wich adjustment of the G$/US$rate only if the basket value moved outside a predetermined band of 10% ofthe target level.
2.10 ln order to determine the "correctness" of the G*15 level forstabilizing the Guyana dollar value vis-a-vis the basket, the Governmentwith the assistance of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation(CFTC), monitored the system. However, until October 19b4, the GS waspegged to the US$ irrespective of what happened to its relationship withthe basket. In October 1984, it was decided that in view of thestrengthening of the US dollar against all other major internationallytraded currencies, the 10% band around the G$15 stabilization level wouldbe abandoned. A regime of exchange rate determination on a weekly basiswas thus instituted with the resultant rate at end-December 1984 beingG$4.25JUS$1.00, a 12% devaluation compared to the January 1984 exchangerate.
2.11 The Government's effort at adjusting the exchange rate of theGuyana dollar vis-a-vis the currencies of its major trading partners iscommendable. The estimated Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) index,despite its weaknesses brought about by the inappropriateness of theGuyana consumer price index and theoretical difficulties related to thechoice of base year, indicates considerable appreciation of the GS relative
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Table 6: Official Exchange Rates & Trade Weighted Index
to its major trading partner currencies, including the US dollar. Inaddition, the policy objective of stabilizing the G$ earnings for the mainexport industries by the use of the currency basket mechanism is adeviation from the conventional economic framework in which the price offoreign exchange is determined by the market mechanism of demand andsupply. The exchange rate corrections under implementation reflect onlychanges in the value of US$ vis-a-vis the basket. What is needed isadjustment of the level of G$ with respect to the basket, including theUS$, to reflect the interplay of market forces in determining its value.
2.12 The Public Sector Deficit. Given that Guyana's economy isinfluenced predominantly by the public sector, the size of the publicsector deficit has tremendous implications for creditworthiness. Until1981, the main source of the public sector current account deficit was theCentral Government whose current expenditures always exceeded currentrevenues. Since 1981, however, the losses of the public corporations aswell as the compounding of domestic interest payments have exacerbated theproblem. The Government is cogvuizant of the problem, but except for somelimited retrenchment of labor in the leading public corporations, an actionthat has had only marginal results in terms of expenditures, as yet it hasimplemented no comprehensive policies. The 1985 budget, however, proposesa number of policy instruments to deal with the public sector deficit.They are discussed in detail in Chapter IV.
2.13 Price Liberalization and Incomes Policy. Apart from the pricingpolicies with respect to electricity, petroleum products and rice initiatedunder the structural adjustment program (1981-83), no comprehensive pricingapproach has been adopted except those proposed in the 1985 Budget. TheGovernment is cognizant of the distortionary effects of administered pricesand during 1984 relaxed a number of controls on prices, in particular thoseon sugar and alcoholic beverages. The Government plans to periodicallyreview the remaining items on the price control list and to empLoy theprice mechanism to determine the desirableC allocation of resources byusing it as an instrument to discourage consumption, to change consumptionpatterns, and to raise the efficiency of utilization. As an adjunct tothis policy approach, the Government proposes to abolish all ineffectual-
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subsidies as a means of discouraging the expansion of the parallel market.While the proposed elimination of subsidies is in the right direction, thecontinuing existence of administrative controls on the pricing of theseitems may render the whole policy instrument ineffective.
2.14 Guyana has had no income policy in the past. Previous wagechanges have been ad hoc with a concomitant adverse effect on public sectorfinances. The 1985 budget proposes two approaches to this issue:
(a) the establishment of a standing committee, with trade unionrepresentation, to review the levels and distribution of public sectorincomes. It is proposed that appropriat_ adjustments will be made fromtime to time on the basis of these reviews; and
(b) the promotion of agricultural production on individual plotsor in group arrangements to supplement personal income. The proposedincentives would include easier access to land, marketing and technicalsupport.
The latter policy requires a careful rethinking within the framework ofagricultural fragmentation and past experience in Guyana with the promotionof the cooperative movement.
C. Macro-Aspects of Economic Recovery
Objectives
2.15 On the basis of progress to date and the policy proposals in the1985 budget, it is evident that proper planning of policy initiatives andaugmentation of the recovery program with quantified sector targets arenecessary (the latter are the focus of subsequent chapters). The broadframework for the systematic planning of policy initiatives in Guyana isoutlined below.
2.16 The aim of any adjustment program and policies should be tosustain the recovery process initiated in 1984. In the short-term, therecovery program should focus on restoring production levels in thebauxite/sugar sectors, to at least pre-1980 levels by improving factorproductivity and eliminating short-term production constraints such as theshortages of spare parts. The latter will require prudent adherence toforeign exchange planning along the lines currently being employed by theBank of Guyana.
2.17 In the long-term, policies should be oriented toward expandingthe productive base of the economy through:
(a) measures to utilize fully the expanding productive capacity forrice through the expanded irrigation projects;
(b) diversification into the mining of other resources, especiallygold and diamonds. Efforts to promote external capital in these sectorsshould be actively pursued; and
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(c) promotion of export manufacturing, especially of those items thatwill encourage backward and forward linkages within the economy.
Strategy
2.18 The recovery efforts over the past two years (and the developmentefforts since independence in general) have been directed largely on anannual basis by the Government's budget. This approach is not suitable forlong-term planning. Rather, the formulation of a medium-term program withquantifiable targets within the framework of existing resources andconstraints should form the basis of economic strategy. Given rigiditiesof the economy, excess capacity and severe foreign exchange constraints,the process of adjustment should entail two fundamental phases:liberalization and rehabilitation. Although such a division istheoretical, and overlap is bound to occur in implementation, thesequencing is important in order to free the economy of numerousdistortions and rigidities that have resulted from the ad hoc adjustmentsof the past several years to an unfavourable external environment anddomestic performance.
2.19 The liberalization phase would entail a reduction of pricedistortions (including the exchange rate system), an elimination ofexcessive claims on consumption, i.e. an increase in domestic savings, anda reduction of Government intervention in the economy as a whole. Thelatter would include curtailment of direct productive activities by thepublic sector to current levels and a restructuring of the publiccorporations along the lines proposed in the Government's 1985 budget. Therationale behind this proposal is that the overly rapid expansion of thepublic sector has had a negative impact on its administrative capacity (aproblem that has further been exacerbated by the shortage of skilledmanpower). It is not prudent to continue to overextend the public sector.The formulation and implementation of policies to support the liberaliza-tion phase should, on the basis of progress made so far, take at least twofiscal years.
2.20 The rehabilitation phase would involve improving the capacityutilization of existing capital assets as a precondition for recovery andfor further expansion. At this phase, external donor assistance, in theform of balance of payments support, will be crucial. It is against thisbackground that the authorities in Guyana face a dilemma. While the needsof the economy resulting from the long neglect of the last decade areenormous (estimates are provided in Chapter VII), the resources in sight,at this stage are limited. Guyana's domestic social and foreign policieshave also affected the perception of Guyana among its main external donorsand generated skepticism in the domestic private sector. The rationale forthe liberalization phase is thus to restore external confidence in theeconomy, to increase the efficiency of resource use and to integrate theexpanding parallel economy into the mainstream.
2.21 It should be stressed that the implementation of the first phasewill not necessarily result in rapid recovery. However, once therehabilitation process is complete, the economy should be capable of
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sustained real growth at significant levels. The sequencing of the phasesand policy measures, discussed in subsequent chapters, are neitherconclusive nor definitive. They merely suggest a framework for developinga comprehensive medium-term plan to support the economic recovery processin Guyana.
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CHAPTER III - SECTORAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES
3.01 The preceding chapters outlined the nature of the economic crisisin Guyana, the Government's response and the macro economic policyframework required for recovery. The next set of chapters discusses themicroeconomic aspects of the crisis in selected key sectors, theGovernment's policy response and additional policy requirements for astrong recovery process. The analysis is conducted within the generalframework proposed in the preceding chapter, namely, that the policyinitiatives formulated during the liberalization phase of recovery shouldprovide the basis for the rehabilitation phase and subsequent sustainedgrowth.
A. Policy Issues in the Leading Sectors
Bauxite
3.02 Background. Bauxite production in Guyana is undertaken by thestate-owned Guyana Mining Enterprise Limited (Guymine). Wuymine operatesmines and plants at four locations: at Linden on the Demerara River, atKwakwani at the Berbice River, at Ituni between Linden and Kwakwani and atEverton near the mouth of the Berbice River. Two of Guymine's products arecalcined in rotary kilns-that is, heated to the temperature at which bothfree moisture and chemica'ly bound water are driven off. These areRefractory Bauxite (RASC), used in producing high alumina bricks, andAbrasive A Grade Calcine (AAC), used as a feed material for producing fusedalumina in electric furnaces. Guymine also produces three products whichinvolve only crushing, screening and drying. These are MetallurgicalBauxite (MAZ), which is feed for alumina plants which in turn producealumina for the production of aluminum; Chemical Grade Bauxite (CGB) a feedmaterial for production of such chemicals as aluminum sulfate, aluminumflouride and cryolite; and an Aluminous Cement Grade Bauxite (ACGB) which,as the name implies, is used to manufacture high alumina cement.
Table 7: Bauxite - Index of Output and Earnings
(peak production/export = 100)
Peak Production'000 Long Average IndexTons Year 1971-75a/ 1976-80 1981-t4
a/ Data for 1971-75 refer to export volumes.b/ Alumina production was discontinued in 1982; figure is an average for
1981-82.
Source: Statistical Appendix Table 7.1.
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3.03 Since 1974, following the complete nationalization of theIndustry, output performance has declined consistently. By 1983, the levelof output was far below that before 1970 (see Table 7). Apart from thedemand problems which Guyana faced for its bauxite products, domesticproduction and marketing problems (including unreliability of supplies anda decline in quality standards) and the emergence of new competitors, ledto a sharp decline in Guyana's share of the market for calcined bauxitefrom about 8OX in the late 1960s and early 1970s to just ov-r 50% in recentyears. Since 1983, the industry has moved from a majo- net foreignexchange earner into a net foreign exchange loser and has accounted for thesevere foreign exchange shortage facing the country.
3.04 Issues. Four main factors account for the poor performance inrecent years. They are: poor condition of plants, high operating cost,weak management and organization, and poor market conditions. The existingplants and equipments are generally in poor condition and will requireextensive rehabilitation. The immediate problem is one of spare parts, andthe Government has responded in 1984 by permitting Guymine to retain itsforeign exchange earnings but this has led to ad hoc procurement practicessince the need is greater than available resources. The poor condition ofplant and equipment has implied low capacity utilization. A review in 1980(which is still relevant now) indicated that with appropriate rehabilita-tion, output levels could be expanded considerably (see Table 8 below).
a/ Concentrate from tailings plant is mixed with dried metal gradebauxite to produce alumina.
b/ Including inputs for alumina plant (about 225 in 1980).c/ Of which approximately 280 metal grade, 420 chemical grade and 50
aluminous cement grade.
3.05 The low level of capacity utilization brought about by poor plantand equipment condition has implied high operating costs. In 1984, fueloil (G$144.1 million) and employment (GS59.8 million) were 47% of Guymine's
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costs. Both are considered unusually high for the type of operations atGuymine. In the case of fuel, cost controls in the mines and plant areweak. The combustion practices in the kilns and dryers, until recently,were without control and even lack normal indicators to tell the operatorhow much fuel and air were being supplied to the burners. A number of fuelefficiency methods and proposals are being put in place; they include theinstallation of metal cold-end seals to selected kilns and heat exchangerquadrants. Another contributing factor is the relative overstaffing whichresults from Government policies. Since 1980, however, the level ofemployment has declined from 7,620 to 4,796 in 1984, partly as a result ofnormal attrition and large retrenchment of staff in 1983 following theclosure of the alumina plant.
3.06 Guymine's management and organizational problems derived from thecxodus of skilled manpower from the country as a result of the Government'slabor policies and the deteriorating economic situation since 1978i. Theorganization and human resource rehabilitation is a necessary but notsufficient condition for a recovery of the bauxite sector. It isnevertheless a precondition for a technical rehabilitation of the sector.Improved performance in 1984, which resulted partly from improvedmanagement style and incentive structure, is a manifestation of the roleof efficient management and organization. The proposed efforts includingreorganization of staff, introduction of training and redefinition ofresponsibilities and an incentive system based on sales maximization andcost reduction are commendable. External assistance to fill in criticalmanagement gaps should be actively sought.
3.07 Guymine's performance problems also originated from weakmarket conditions. The revenues from its main product, RASC droppeddrastically in recent years. Two major factors have contributed to thisdecrease-the general slowdown in the world steel industry which is themajor consumer of RASC and the deep penetration of the refractory bauxitemarket by the People's Republic of China (PRC). Up _o 1979, Guymine hadabout 85% of the RASC market; opera.ting as a monopoly through rationingsupply to its customers. In the mid-1970s, PRC entered the market with aninferior product but moved aggressively in pricing and sales efforts topenetrate the market. Guymine has now about 40% of the market. Theenterprise is cognizant of the problem and in 1983, with the assistance ofits external marketing agency has initiated a marketing strategy whichinvolves close contact with potential customers and the development of newproducts.
3.08 Government's Response. With a view to overcoming the technicalproblems confronting the bauxite sector, a number of foreign contractorsand consultants have been engaged in recent years to assist Guymine in theoperation of the industry. The industry has also continued, as notedabove, to retain the services of its foreign agent to assist in themarketing of bauxite products. Simultaneously the foreign exchangeconstraint of the industry has been relieved by the allocation of part ofthe Bank Group's Structural Adjustment Loan/Credit proceeds to the bauxitesector and by the re-introduction in 1983 of a retained foreign exchangeearnings account, both of which enable Guymine to obtain some of itsinputs. The Government is also seeking financial assistance from the EEC
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and the Bank for its proposed rehabilitation program. It is also arrangingfinancial and material assistance through technical cooperation agreementson bilateral basis. In an effort to reduce the industry's unit cost, theGovernment has proposed to reduce the social cost component of itsoperation by employing a 60/40 cost sharing formula between the CentralGovernment and/or the Regional administration and the industry for theprovision of medical facilities. (Issues related to the financialrestructuring of Guymine are discussed in Chapter IV.)
3.09 While these steps are useful and necessary and may contribute toimprove conditions, the piecemeal approach and slow pace at which the mainissues are dealt with are likely to be counterproductive. The short-termissues are management, marketing and organization which will not cost muchbut require deep commitment and rapid action on the part of the Governmentand Guymine. In the medium term, the rehabilitation of Guymine, in view ofnew product development and changing market conditions, should form themain preoccupation of the authorities. The need for an effectivecoordination of technical and financial assistance on a timely basis isparamount.
Sugar
3.10 Background. Cane sugar production, the oldest agriculturalindustry in Guyana was, until its nationalization between 1974-76, anentirely private sector enterprise. It was, and still is, run on aplantation basis with a fairly heavy dependence on lacor. In recent years,production and productivity has been falling as a result, inter alia ofgeneral decline in prices in world markets, severe foreign exchangeavailability which has limited needed rehabilitation, and generaladministrative problems. The industry has, however, been the main -hardcurrency' earner over the past three years and its short-term recovery isthe prime concern of the Government.
3.11 Wlen the Government nationalized the two foreign-ownedenterprises that constituted the sugar industry of the country, the GuyanaSugar Corporation Ltd. (GUYSUCO) was instituted to control its operationsincluding every aspect of production from growing sugar cane to itsprocessing and marketing. GUYSUCO owns an important fraction of thecultivable land of Guyana (about bO,U0O acres) and its farming operationsare carried out through ten estates. These estates each farm about 5,000acres every year and together produce betweer bO8 and 85Z of the sugarcane. The rest is produced mostly at three big private operations,although there are still about 2,500 private sugar cane growers in thecountry. GUYSUCO provides all the extension, research and marketingservices even to the small farmers outside its own estates.
3.12 The industry has faced a variety of production problems in recentyears. While the area planted with sugar cane has expanded in the last twodecades, sugar produced per acre has declined from 3.1 ton/acre in theearly 1960s to 2.1 ton/acre in the early 1980s. The labour strike of 1979resulted in an accumulation of over-age cane which, when processed, reducedmilling yields and substantial jump in the employment of Guysuco as some ofthe temporary personnel hired during the strike were given permanent
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status. Heavy rainfall patterns during the 1979-84 harvesting periodsdepressed sucrose content. The lack of experienced field labor has led toan increase in the amount of trash delivered to the mills. Smut and rusthave threatened the crop, requiring the replanting of disease-resistantvarieties. Field and milling machinery and equipment are alsodeteriorating at a rapid rate, despite increased emphasis on improvedmaintenance, reclamation and rebuilding.
3.13 Policy Response. Leaving aside the present circumstances inwhich the sugar industry is suffering the impact of a depressed worldmarket, GUYSUCO conveys the impression of being a well managed entity. Itnow faces a big challenge: the design and implementation of a program torestore its production capacity to historical levels in the presence of asevere foreign exchange scarcity. Recognizing this, the Corporation isexperimenting with alternative production methods. A mechanical tillageand replanting trial was carried out on 25,000 acres in 1980 and 1981.Experience from this exercise has shown that the key is precision landlevelling. Mechanical harvesting with two types of machines (choppers andwhole stalk) has been evaluated with the objective of systematic adoption,subject to foreign exchange availability.
3.14 More recently, the industry formulated a comprehensive program torevive production and improve efficiency. It includes:
(a) reduction of expenditure - expenditures on employment have beencurtailed through redundancy of 5,000 persons since 1980 and by theelimination of inessential expenditures such as payments for overtimeduring non-harvesting periods. Efforts are being made to further reducecosts through "direct purchasing of such inputs as fertilizers;
(b) implementation of essential repairs and capital expenditureprograms - this involves timely application of herbicides, pesticides andfertilizers; rehabilitation of in-field drains and dams; factoryrehabilitation and improvements in the replanting rates which have droppedfrom 15.9% in 1979 to only 10.5% in 1981; and
(c) organizational improvements - this may include improved inventorymanagement (ordering, storing and distribution procedures), refined andimproved husbandry.
3.15 The industry's efforts should be supported in the short-term bythe Government through an allocation of a higher proportion of foreignexchange retention than the existing 10%. This may contribute to a timelyrehabilitation of some of GUYSUCO's field and factory equipment.Furthermore, the problems of overcoming the shortage of cane cutters incertain estates and ensuring prompt transport of canes from field tofactory should be urgently resolved through temporary relocation ofpersonnel during harvesting. In the long term, although GUYSUCO isinterested in diversification and is currently engaged in the production ofcorn, beans, rice and cassava, as well as pilot development for fishfarming, its main expertise lies in sugar cultivation. Future expansion ofcane production for energy development would seem a distinct possibility; arecent Bank financed study indicates viability in a number of factories.
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Excess bagasse not required for distillation heating might be converted,along with excess bagasse from the existing factories into electricity tobe fed into the national grid. In the light of present nigh cost ofimported fuels in Guyana, this would seem preferable to other possible usesof waste products as animal feeds or particle board manufacture. Furtherstudies of the processes and costs need to be undertaken.
Rice
3.16 Basic Characteristics. Among the three main sectors of theeconomy, the rice sector is the only one whose output level during thesecond half of the 1970s was higher than it had been during the first halfof the decade. Nevertheless, after reaching a record 212,000 long tonsfrom a harvested area of about 350,000 acres in 1977, production fell to anaverage of only about 165,000 long tons from 250,000 acres during 1978-81.The industry's physical potential is likely to increase substantiallyfollowing the completion of ongoing irrigation and drainage schemes.Furthermore, rice is seen by the Government as having greater potential forexport growth in the immediate future than either of the two other majorexport commodities, bauxite and sugar.
3.17 Unlike that of cane sugar, the production of rice has always beenand remains a small-holder private enterprise activity. The crop was firstgrown by run-away slaves even before emancipation in 1834 but as anindustry rivalling sugar, rice was the work of Indian immigrants whointroduced new techniques and varieties into it. Production, however, didnot assume any commercial significance in export terms until the end of the19th century. Furthermore, the rice industry in Guyana is unusual in thatit is an almost completely mechanized industry of small farmers utilizingmodern equipment. By early 1980s, there were approximately 30,000 farmfamilies in Guyana who harvested around 220,000 acres of rices, or anaverage of 7 acres per farm.
3.18 The history of rice marketing practices in Guyana is also unusualas compared to most other rice regions. Until 1946, when the first largescale organized rice production program was started by the British, thiswas in a most unsatisfactory state. At that time they established a RiceMarketing Board as the sole marketing agency for rice. In May 1965, thenewly independent Guyanese Government took over this Board and continuedits basic practices. In 1969, it was replaced by the Guyana RiceCorporation which provided the same functions and acted as the sole legalauthority to buy and sell rice. In 1973, this board was replaced by theGuyana Rice Board (GRB) with similar but broader functions. It was thesole legal purchaser of milled rice, the sole seller and distributor ofmilled rice to domestic wholesale outlets and to all export markets, wasthe pr.ce-support agency purchasing paddy from farmers at minimum fixedprices, and provided certain services to rice farmers including theprocurement and distribution of inputs, the credit needs, the seedproduction program, the rice research program, extension services, operatedpaddy storage and drying centers to handle most of the crop, owned andoperated rice mills to mill most of it, and provided equipment services tosome of the farmers.
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3.19 Reorganization. The carrying out of all these functions by theGRB, whose efficiency was impaired by shortages of skilled technical andmanagerial manpower and its lack of accountability, posed a majorconstraint to realizing the country's significant potential. As part ofthe Government's structural adjustment program in 19b2, efforts were madeto drastically reduce its role in the industry. Some of its non-marketingfunctions (including the importation and distribution of inputs, theprovision of credit and of research and extension) were discontinued. Allof the overall marketing control were left unchanged. However, in December1984, the GRB was restructured into three corporate entities, viz theGuyana Rice Milling and Marketing Authority, the Guyana Rice Export Boardand the National Paddy and Rice Grading Centre. The main issues remainingto be resolved in 1985 include the establishment of the accounting, marketinformation, quality control, and domestic distribution system tocomplement the reorganization program.
3.20 Issues. Apart from the general constraints that affect all formsof agriculture in Guyana (notably research and extension services andcredit), three issues specific to the rice sector may be highlighted. Theyare: the probable impact of the reorganization of the sector, the need forhigh-quality rice and the development of a rice pricing and incentivesystem.
3.21 The rigid single-agency complete control that was followed in thepast gradually caused the rice industry to become inefficient andhigh-cost. The farmers were constrained by various regulations that madethem indifferent to new technology or procedures as there were fewincentives for improved productivity. The single board public storing,milling, and marketing system gradually eliminated most of the privatemillers and traders. The ongoing reorganization opens up, in a limitedway, a role for the private sector in the rice sector. However, therestructuring is not yet backed up by adequate supply of resources (e.g.milling capacity) to the private sector. The scope for competition, whichis perceived to promote efficiencies and improved services, may also beeffectively resLricted by the discretionary controls that are built intothe new Rice Bill cf 1984 (Regulation of Manufacturing and Marketing). Thenew proposals reduce the monopoly status of the public sector entities butthe basic principles of operations have not yet been substantially altered.
3.22 The need for high-quality rice will be an issue of importance inthe future as Guyana's production level substantially exceeds the demandsin the local and CARICOM markets. Consumer's in Guyana do acceptmedium-quality rice with up to 25Z broken grains and some impurities. TheCARICOM markets, however, require two different quality types: (a) long-grain translucent white rice with few impurities or red grains and a lowpercentage of broken grains, and (b) a light-colored aroma-free parboiledrice with no mixtures and a very low percentage of broken grains. Tosupply these demands, Guyana has found it necessary to operate a veryexpensive remilling, blending, and re-packaging system. If markets are tobe expanded beyond CARICOM outlets, it will be necessary to produce evenhigher quality rice than that obtained by this process. Quality riceproduction is determined by first producing high-quality paddy and second
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processing this paddy in the most efficient manner to maintain the initialquality of the paddy. The existing rice paddy procurement system and therice milling procurement and processing systems do not encourage theproduction of high quality rice and that produced is obtained only at anexcessively high cost. Changes are needed throughout the system to solvethis problem.
3.23 The ongoing rationalization of pricing policies in the sector mayprovide the required incentives for intensive farming, improvedproductivity, and the mobilization of additional lands for ricecultivation. As part of the Bank supported Structural Adjustment Program(1981-83), a number of price adjustments were implemented. Paddy pricespaid to farmers, which had increased by 12-15% in early 1981, were furtherincreased by 20% in early 1982. At the same time, rice purchase priceswere increased by 25-30%, thus improving miller's margins and domesticconsumer prices for rice by about 70%. In the course of 1982-83, parboiledrice purchase prices and domestic consumer prices were comparable with, oreven exceeded, (depressed) international rice price levels (at the officialexchange rate of GS3.00 to US$1.00). As part of the ongoing restructuringof the rice industry, the Government, with the assistance of theInter-American Development Bank, has adopted a formula for the periodicadjustment of paddy and rice prices in ord2r to improve producer margins.
B. Diversification and Role of Private Sector
Diversification
3.24 As noted above, Guyana's economy is based primarily on theproduction of bauxite, sugar and rice. The population and much of theeconomic activity are concentrated along a narrow coastal strip where sugarand rice are grown. With the exception of bauxite mining and associatedproduction, the hinterland remains economically undeveloped. Besides poordomestic production, the economic decline of recent years, could beattributed to the narrow production base of the economy and its failure towithstand the external shocks brought about by the second round of oilprice increases and weak international demand for bauxite products andsugar. The rapid decline in export earnings for bauxite and sugar fromUS$309 million in 1980 (constituting about 80% of total merchandiseexports) to US$151 million in 1983 (about 73% of total merchandise exports)accounts for the present foreign exchange shortage and the failure of theother sectors of the economy to grow because of the lack of spare parts andother imported inputs requiring foreign exchange.
3.25 In the short to medium term, the recovery program should aim atrestoring production levels in the bauxite/sugar sectors to at leastpre-1980 levels through policies outlined above. In the medium to longterm, policies should be oriented at expanding the productive base of theeconomy through diversification efforts in agriculture, forestry, fisheriesand mining (especially in gold and diamonds). The Government has initiateda number of efforts in these areas in recent years, which include promotingforeign private capital in the gold and diamond sectors. The forestry andthe mining sectors, nevertheless, provide the highest export potential inthe short to medium term. The promotion of private sector manufacturing is
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another high potential for supplementing the Government's efforts inachieving vertical integration, export expansion and diversification of theproductive base of the economy.
3.26 Forestry. The total forest area of Guyana has been estimated atabout 18.2 million ha (45 million ac), covering about 83% of the land.Exploitable timber in the forests is abundant; roughly one-half the forestarea consists of forests with 25 to 35 m3/ha of exploitable timber, ofwhich greenheart (ocotea rodiaci) is in great international demand formarine construction. Guyana presently exports 16 species (about 8%greenheart) and uses more than 30 additional species locally. Despite theconsiderable wood resources, the forestry sector contributes less than 1%of GDP and 2% of total merchandise exports. Export earnings from timberhas declined from the peak of G$16.2 million (US$6.4 million equivalent) in1980 to G$13.7 million (US$3.3 million equivalent) in 1984. The potentialfor quadrupling the export earnings in the medium term is very high, givenappropriate policies and investment program.
3.27 The Government's policy in the forestry sector is designed toincrease both public and private sector participation in forestrydevelopment and restructuring the tenure relating to forestry concession.Recent public sector participation has included the establishment of theDemerara Woods Limited (with capacity of 18 million board meters per annum)with external support including IBRD/IDA. In addition, efforts have beendirected at the production of prefabricated housing, rehabilitation of theGuyana Timbers Limited and the improvement in administration, training andresearch in the forestry sector. Similarly, with respect to the privatesector, financial resources for sawmilling and logging equipment, mainly toreplace absolete equipment, have come from external assistance, includingCIDA, the EEC and the IDB, channelled mainly through the GuyanaAgricultural and Industrial Bank (GAIBANK). The Interior ForestryIndustries, a private sector operation currently under way, with a capacityof 20 million board meters per annum, is expected to significantly increasethe country's exports of timber products.
3.28 Utilization of state-owned forest land in Guyana used to be basedon forest concessions which conferred exclusive rights for exploitation ofa defined area. This arrangement was replaced in 1977 by a Timber SalesAgreement, which confers rights to a firm to cut a specified group ofspecies within an area, according to a logging and utilization plan agreedbetween the firm and the Forestry Department (now the Forestry Commissionunder the Ministry of Forestry). In case the recipient of a Timber SalesAgreement does not log the total obligatory species and volume, othercompanies can be given cutting rights in the same area. The primaryobjective is to extract and utilize the highest possible proportion of thesecondary species in each concession area by gradually increasing theirshare in the cutting list. However, the Guyana Forestry Commission, theprincipal public sector institution responsible for coordinating activitiesin this sector, is constrained by financial difficulties as well asresponsibilities considerably larger than its capabilities. It isrecommended that given its financial constraints, the Government shouldreview the role of the Forestry Commission in terms of its supervisory andmonitoring duties as well as its market intelligence and general services.
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3.29 The forestry industry in Guyana has historically produced logswhich have been sold in the round, hand hewn into poles (round) or piles(square or round), sawn into lumber, or converted to shingles. Lumber hasbeen further processed by molding and planing and, to a limited extent, foruse in the construction of prefabricated housing units. Uther conversionof timber is limited to the small-scale production of furniture for localuse. In order to increase the value added in the sector, the developmentthrust should seek to emphasize improving the management of extraction fromthe forest, on improving sawmilling, wood treating and wood curingfacilities and on expanding export markets (especially, extra-regional) fora wide variety of wood items. The marketing strategy should includepromotional efforts involving exhibitions of Guyana's available woodproducts.
3.30 Mining. Besides bauxite, Guyana has a potential for theproduction and export of gold, diauond, manganese, feldspar and columbite-tentalite. Of the above, preliminary estimates of annual productionpotential are: 375,000 oz for Gold, 70U,000 ct for diamond and 200,00Utons for manganese. Estimates for the other minerals are not available.Gold and diamonds provide the highest short-term export potential as theframework for their exploitation is well established. The current declaredproduction levels for gold and diamonds are about 11,000 oz and 10,000 ctrespectively, although actual output levels might be considerably higher.The current export revenues for gold and diamonds are approximately G$5million and G$0.6 million respectively, far below their potential.
3.31 The current production structures for both gold and diamonds arerelatively primitive. They are handled by private individuals ranging fromone-man operations to a well organized enterprise. Raw gold is bought bythe Guyana Gold Board which releases allocations to local jewellers andexports the remaining through the Ministry ot Finance, mainly in the UKmarket. Raw diamonds are processed by four diamond cutting a.d polishingfactories for local consumption and export. In view of the unstructurednature of production and processing, it is believed large quantities ofboth gold and diamonds are, in recent years, illegally exported toneighbouring countries and the Caribbean spurred up by the shortage offoreign exchange. The Government is in the process of restrnr.turing thesector and in recent years has been promoting external investment in thesector. Enterprises from Canada, Yugoslavia, Korea and Brazi have beenlicensed to exploit gold, while a US private firm is currently examiningthe diamond potential of the country. Efforts to promote private externalinvestment in this sector should be pursued vigorously.
Promotion of Export Manufacturing
3.32 Potential. The manufacturing sector in Guyana, exclusive ofbauxite processing and sugar and rice milling, is very small accounting forless than 10% of GDP and export earnings. About two-thirds of thismanufacturing activity is carried out by private sector enterprises. Whilethe manufacturing sector has grown much faster than the rest of the economyduring the past decade (except for the past three years), its contributionto the economy has remained far below its potential, which is considerable
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given Guyana's natural resource endowment and the availability and cost ofmanpower. The difficult foreign exchange and power situation in recentyears have posed significant constraints to manufacturing development.However, the fundae ntal cause of the sector's lack of dynamism has been alack of confidence by the private sector (both local and foreign), theoverregulation of the economy and the uncertain investment climate.
3.33 The sector is faced with some controls and regulations, both dejure and de facto, e.g. with regard to trading and pricing of inputs andoutputs, many of which are faced by both private and public sectormanufacturing enterprises. In addition, it is claimed that controls andregulations are not always applied in a consistent and predictable fashion,which leads to considerable confusion. The uncertainty of the investmentclimate in the past found its base in the nationalizations of the early1970s, the lack of a clear definition of the activities opened to tLeprivate sector (in spite of the adoption of an investment code in 1979),and the perception that Government actions were not always consistent withits stated intention to seek an adequate role for the private se-toralongside the public and cooperative sectors.
3.34 Government Response. The Government recognizes that there is aneed to reduce or eliminate the uncertainties about the private sector'srole that remain in spite of the adoption of the investment code in 1979.As part of its structural adjustment program (1981-83) it put in place anumber of export promotion and industrial development policies, besides theestablishment of an Export Development Fund (EDF) with the Bank's financialsupport. They included the establishment of a no-fund import licensingscheme in 1982, which allows the importation of up to US$3,000 in spareparts and machinery without licensing provided no use is made of officialforeign exchange. The Government has also granted a remission ofconsumption taxes on all inputs for manufactured goods intended for exportsand has implemented a foreign exchange retention scheme for producers ofnon-traditional exports. The latter scheme has, however, not beeneffective because most of Guyana's exports go to the CARICOM market and theneed is for hard currency. The Government has also established an exportunit within the Ministry of Trade. An Export promotion Council andIndustrial Promotion Council (both with private sector representation) havealso been set up but as a result of cabinet changes in 1984, the regularmeetings that were held between representatives of the privatemanufacturing sector and the Government have temporarily been discontinued.
3.35 Policy Alternatives. Despite these efforts, a number of otherfactors that require Government's attention affect the viability of thesector. They include the impact of the consumption tax structure, andGovernment policies on enclave-type manufacturing. In recent years, theprofitability of manufacturing has been negatively affected by theintroduction of consumption taxes on both imported inputs and sales in thedomestic market. The tax on imported inputs has affected the internationalcompetitiveness of Guyana's manufactured exports. The Government hasprovided a drawback of such taxes for a limited number of exporters on anad hoc basis. Consideration could be given to extending the drawback toall exporters of manufactured goods, preferably by linking the actualdrawback to actual export earnings, which would reduce the *dif*istrative
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complexity inherent in most drawback systems and discourage, to someextent, illegal exports. The implementation of the above proposal howevermay affect the income base of the tax structure and may be inconsistentwith the CARICOM trade arrangements. A further review may be required onthis issue.
3.36 The formulation and adoption of an appropriate investment codewhich clearly spells out the role of the private sector (both domestic andforeign) will be an important contribution to improving the investmentclimate. Such a project was initiated under the Bank supported Structuraladjustment program (1981-83). A foreign consultant financed under theSecond Technical Assistance Loan (1949-GUA) submitted a preliminary reportto the Government in mid-1983. While the Government has stated itsintention to discontinue the project because of cost overrun and domesticpersonnel constraints, a further rethinking of the Government decision isrecommnded in view ot the project's positive implication for improvingexternal perception of the Government's willingness to promote privatesector initiatives in the development process. A new investment code willalso be particularly useful in the context of Guyana if it is associatedwith (i) a consolidation or reduction of public sector activities inmanufacturing and related activities; (ii) a general streamlining andsimplification of the regulations which affect the manufacturing sector;and (iii) the consolidation of a rational system of incentives to encourageexport manufacturing and efficient import substitution.
3.37 The Government has generally favoured the development of anatural resource-based manufacturing sector with strong backward linkages.The development of such a manufacturing structure has medium to long termimplications. In the short to medium term, increased attention could alsobe given to the promotion of assembly-type enclave export industries whichcould make an important contriDution to alleviate unemployment, developindustrial skills required for further manufacturing development, anddemonstrate to potential external investors that manufacturing in Guyana isa feasible and viable proposition. Barbados' experience in this area is atestimony of the substaatial role of assembly-type enclave exportindustries in the medium-term development process. The setting up ofinstitutions to facilitate this effort is a prerequisite for success.
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CiAPTER IV - ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Overview
4.01 Until the late 196Us, the economy of Guyana was relativelydominated by the private sector. The public sector (especially during thepre-independent period) was small and played mainly a controlling role inthe development process. Public agencies provided few basic services(water and sewerage, for example) and their investments were small andconcentrated in the main urban areas. The situation altered when theGovernment began to play a more active role in the economy. The share ofpublic consumption in the GDP almost doubled during 1970-79 and publicinvestment outstripped private investment (see Table 9). In addition tothe provision of basic services (infrastructure, education, health andutilities), the Government became the prime agent in the economy's mainsectors (bauxite, and sugar) and is involved in other wide range ofproductive activities. These include enterp-ises producing alcoholicbeverages, processed food, soaps and detergents, paints, forest products,printing, fishing, construction and retailing and distribution. Over 9OZof all official exports are marketed through state controlledorganizations. Furthermore, the public sectors purview over economicactivity and future investment is extended by import license and foreignexchange allocation procedures and price control systems.
Table 9: Share of Public Sector in Consumption/Investment
Expenditures as Percentageof GDP (current market prices) 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84
Source: Bank of Guyana/State Planning Secretariat.
4.02 The Government's increased dominance on the economy has placedincreasing demands on its administrative capacity to ensure adequatecoordination and control. In part, this additional responsibility mayexplain the gradual deterioration in public finances and the increasedincidence of institutional, managerial and organizational bottleneckswithin the public sector. A major contributory factor to the economicmalaise of Guyana in recent years has therefore been the increasinginability the public sector to manage the vast resources available toit.
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4.03 Public sector finances have deteriorated steadily since 1978, asgrowth in current revenues have not kept pace with the growth in currentexpenditures. P-iblic sector savings became negative in 1981, and theoverall deficit has widened from 13.3Z of GUP in 1978 to 60.2Z in 1984. Tosome extent, the full impact of this rising deficit on prices and thebalance of payments has been mitigated by the fact that a significant partof the increasing domestic interest payments are retained within the Bankof Guyana in the form of undistributed profits. This effectively reducesthe expansion of net domestic credit. Prior to 1981, the publiccorporations as a group were able to provide surpluses sufficient to coverthe deficits of the Central Government. However, reduced internationaldemand for the output of Guyana's two major public corporations in thebauxite and sugar sectors, has meant a substantial decline in revenues fromthe public corporations. Furthermore, Central Government revenues expandedat a much slower pace in recent years as a result of diminishing realeconomic activity and an increase in the volume of transactions undertakenin the parallel market.
4.04 Guyana has a centralized government structure. The delegation ofauthority by the central government to the local government has been arecent phenomenon. Even with the development of the local governmentsystem, they are seen as entities reflecting a centralized objective andacting merely as implementing agencies. Consequently, the CentralGovernment and its agencies have dominated the economic system bothadministratively and financially. The public enterprises are alsosimilarly centrally directed in terms of policy but have some managerialautonomy with respect to pricing and employment.
4.05 As part of the overall expansion of the public sector, theCentral Government in the post-1970 era has intensified its developmentefforts. Government services have been expanded, especially foragriculture, rural development, education and other social services. Aboveall, infrastructure expenditures by the Central Government have increasedsignificantly, and large capital transfers have taken place to thecorporate sector in order to develop new enterprises. Local governments
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have been encouraged, especially over the past three years, to participateactively in development through direct financial assistance. Thesedevelopments, in part, have been made possible by the increase in revenueswhich was brought about by the sugar boom of the mid-1970 and the relativeprofitability of the newly acquired public enterprises.
Central Government Financing
4.06 Revenues. To assess the Central Government's revenue perfor-mance, the tax ratio, the marginal tax rate and the tax bouyancy areestimated for group of periods covering 1973-1984 (Table 11). Guyana's taxratio is relatively high, rising, on average, from about 25Z of GDP during1977-80 to about 32Z in 1981-84. The marginal tax rate which indicates theproportion of additional national product that the Government has been ableto divert to the public sector is also relatively high. The high rate forthe 1981-84 period is accounted for by the rapid decline in GDP during theperiod and the substantial increase in non-tax revenues. As a summaryindex the tax bouyancy, which reflects the percentage change in revenueswith respect to a percentage change in GDP, supports the general observa-tion that the Government's performance in revenue mobilization has beenreasonably successful. The high level of tax effort has been possiblethrough numerous discretionary tax policies. During 1974-77, the imposi-tion of the sugar levy, aimed at the windfall profits of the sector duringthat period, accounted for slightly over 45% of total revenues from directtaxes. In subsequent years new indirect tax measures were introduced in1978, 1980, and each subsequent year.
a! Computed by dividing the marginal tax rate by the tax/GDP ratio.b/ The high level is accounted for by the sugar levy resulting from the
sugar boom of the 1975-76.
Source: Staff estimates.
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4.07 In 0.n effort to mobilize further the revenues to support itsdevelopment program the Government is committed to expand its revenuebase. In the 1985 Budget statement, a number of new tax instruments wereinstituted. They include:
(a) annual license fees for television receiving sets (at G$200 perannum per set);
(b) annual license fee for television transmitter systems (atG$40,000 per annum per system);
(c) annual license fees for television Dish" receiver systems; i.e.,where reception is entirely for personal use (at G,i250 per annum persystem);
(d) a monthly 'sticker" system for taxi operators (at G$100 per monthper vehicle); and
(e) an ad valorem export tax on shrimp export (at IOX).
In addition, the Government is exploring alternative measures to improvethe efficiency of tax administration and collection.
4.08 Three major factors, however, will continue in the short term toimpinge upon the capacity of the Central Government to raise currentrevenues. First, although precise estimates of the extent of the parallelmarket are impossible, it has become clear since 1982, that parallel marketactivities and transactions in Guyana have been increasing. If parallelmarket activities continue to increase, the scope for Central Governmentcurrent revenue enhancement via income and consumption based taxes woulddiminish. Second, the severe foreign exchange shortage that the country ispresently experiencing has reduced tax revenues accruing from internationaltrade. Third, the declining performance of the public corporations hasreduced the flow of dividends to the Central Government. The Government'sefforts for harnessing new revenue sources should be sought in those areasthat have a limited parallel market activity. This may include the need tolevy some charges for specific Government services, such as health andeducation. Notwithstanding these efforts, improvements in current revenuewould only be achieved by substantial macro economic policy adjustmentsthat allow prices to reflect real resource scarcities and as a result,forestall further growth in parallel market economic activity.
4.09 Expenditures. The main source of fiscal problems of the CentralGovernment may be traced to the rapid increase in expenditures. TotalCentral Government expenditures have risen substantially over the past fiveyears, with the level in 1984 being almost double that in 1980, in nominalterms. The main cause of the rapid growth in Central Governmentexpenditures has been the rise in domestic interest payments. The largeinterest expenses in recent years reflect the compounding effects of theCentral Government taking over (as equity participation) the large deficitsof the public corporation. In 1984, the Government awarded an average of
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15% wage increase to the public sector. While the wage increase has had anegative effect on the fiscal deficit, it should be noted that there hadbeen no wage increase since 1979, and given the high rate of inflation, theincrease is negative in real terms.
4.10 The Central Government's overall deficit has been financed inrecent years, largely through domestic borrowing, especially from theCentral Bank of Guyana. Substantial recourse has also been made onresources of the National Insurance Scheme and various pension funds andbonds. These resources are, nevertheless, limited and further access tothem are counterproductive because of their "crowding out effect. TheGovernment is cognizant of the fact that a lasting solution to the problemlies in expenditure reduction. Efforts in this area, however, have beenlargely unsuccessful. In 1977-78, total expenditures were reduced by aboutone third as part of fiscal retrenchment program that reduced capitalexpenditures and those on goods and services. However, by 1978-80, totalexpenditures expanded rapidly as a result of increases in capitalexpenditures--the cutback in expenditures in 1977-78 represented, for themost part, the postponement or rephasing of major investment projects.Similarly, since 1982, attempts to reduce outlays for wages and salariesthrough a wage freeze and labor retrenchment program (during October1981-mid-1982, approximately 17% of Central Government workforce was laidoff to reduce overstaffing) have been largely ineffective. TheGovernment's new efforts to contain expenditures are now directed at (a)the management of the domestic debt, and (b) improved efficiency throughthe proposed regionalization program which may involve the reallocation oflabor resources.
4.11 Management of Domestic Debt. As noted above, the main element inthe high expenditure growth in recent years is the interest on domesticdebt. Up to 1981, the level of domestic debt was manageable; since then ithas tripled from G01.8 billion to G$4.5 billion by December 1984. New
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borrowings have mainly been in short-term securities with the effect thatbetween 1970 and 1984, outstanding short-term securities moved from 34% to78% of the total domestic debt. The characteristics of short-term debt arehigher interest rates and short maturities which compound the alreadyprecarious financial position of the Central Government. In 1984, theGovernment made the first attempt to address the issue by encouragingholders of Government securities to reinvest their principal and interestpayments in two-year securities. But because of delays by parliament inamending the relevant legislation and other bureaucratic problems, theproposal was not effective. The Government has also proposed therescheduling of treasury bills through their conversion into fixed-dateddebentures of 3-24 months.
4.12 While these proposals are steps in the right direction, theyare not backed by an adequate review of the structure of existing domesticdebt and the implications for the future. Proper planning of domestic debtmanagement involving differential interest rates and maturities requires acomprehensive data base. At present, the size of the domestic debt to beaffected by the above proposals and the interest savings involved are notclear. Since the proposals are voluntary, they may not be effective in thefuture when resources are needed by the relevant lending agencies andindividuals for either their internal use during the recovery process orfor alternative investment purposes. What is needed is a rescheduling ofshort term debt into medium and long term debt.
4.13 Labor Reallocation. The Government also plans to containexpenditure growth through improved efficiency. In this effort, it intendsto:
(a) reassess the roles of the various ministries with a view to theredeployment of labor resources to the regions. It is hoped that this willstrengthen the implementation capabilities and efficiency of the regionaladministration which are involved in many of the Government's developmentprograms; and
(b) improve productivity of labor through organizational andmotivational changes in the public sector.
While it is not clear the exact nature of programs that will be formulatedto achieve the above objectives, they will not in the short-term lead to asignificant reduction in employment costs because of the relocation costsinvolved. In the long-term, if properly implemented, the resultantproductivity increase may enhance the viability of the proposals.Furthermore, given the prevailing shortage of skilled personnel in theCentral Government, the implementation of the above proposals requirescareful planning and monitoring. There is also the need to increase thepace of program implementation in new areas of policy changes in theadministrative structure of the Central Government, the setting of newpriorities for current and capital outlays and the formulation of taxreforms.
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The State as Controller
4.14 While the Government has a pervasive influence over the economyvia its directly productive activities and the scale of operations of theCentral Government, its control over the allocation of resources is furtherextended by the administrative control of some prices and the allocation offoreign exchange. In the case of prices, there is a system o pricecontrol administered by the Mini_:.y of Trade and Consumer Protection. Asof February 1985, there was a list of 39 broad categories of items thatwere subject to controls either via direct price setting or controls onmark up levels. These items, together with price control on some services,cover about 40% of the CPI basket of commodities. The Government'scapacity to monitor prices is, however, very limited, which together withthe reduced availability of many items at 'official' prices, has meant thatthe impact of price controls on resource allocation is limited although itmay provide the incentives for parallel market activities.
4.15 With respect to foreign exchange, the allocation of scarceresources is administrated on the basis of sectoral and individual firmpriority considerations. The main goals of the system are to conserveforeign exchange, modify consumer tastes and support local industry, andtherefore to give to those agencies that are efficient and which generateforeign exchange. In recent years, heavy external debt servicingobligations in the face of limited "hard currency' export inflows haveplaced a considerable burden on the allocation process and affected itssmooth operation.
B. Public Enterprises: State as Entrepreneur
Structure and Performance
4.16 The non-financial public.enterprises in Guyana comprise about 34corporations. They are engaged in activities which include bauxite mining,sugar and rice production and marketing, agro-based food production, deepsea trawling and shrimping, heavy engineering including ship building,broadcasting and communications, air transport and commercial operations.The corporations are organized under two holding companies: (a) theBauxite Development Corporation (Bidco) which controls the Guyana MiningEnterprise (Guymine), the Guyana Construction corporation (Guyconstruct),Guytrade and Guybulk; and (b) the Guyana State Corporations (Guystac),which controls all the other corporations. Three corporations, Guymine,Guyana Sugar Corporation (Guysuco) and the Guyana Rice Board (currentlybeing restructured) are the most important. Together, they account forabout 50X of the operating revenues and expenditures of the corporationsand their weak performance in recent years has accounted for the risingcurrent account deficit of the public corporations.
4.17 Since 1981, the performance of the public corporations hassteadily deteriorated, with a continual growth of the operating deficit toa level constituting 32.3% of the consolidated public sector currentaccount deficit. The worsening of the financial performance isattributable primarily to a difficulties experienced by Guymine and
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Guysuco. The difficulties include a weak international demand for bauxiteproducts and sugar, technical and managerial problems that have inhibitedoutput, and scarcity of necessary imported raw materials, spare parts andcapital goods.
4.18 Apart from the production difficulties being experienced by thethree main corporations, all of the others, except the commercial entitiesand the NIS, encountered extreme difficulty in 1983 and 1984 in maintainingtheir output levels. Capacity utilization averaged approximately 35%, withmany plants operating below 20%. The prime cause for these productiondifficulties has been the lack of spare parts and imported inputs becauseof the shortages of foreign exchange. Costs of operations have also beenadversely affected. In order to maintain even low production levels, thevarious corporations have had to resort to considerable improvization,which involved using expensive and less efficient substitutes. In someinstances the corporations have had to resort to the parallel market toobtain spare parts at higher than the controlled prices. Some corporationsclaim they have endeavored to substitute labor for capital, with resultanthigh costs and low productivity.
Government's Response
4.19 In order to arre3t the rising deficit of the corporations and tolimit transfers from the Central Government, the Government has proposed:(a) organizational restructuring of Guystac and the Guyana Rice Board, and(b) financial restructuring of Guymine. These efforts are the result of anextensive review of the major corporations (Guymine and GKB) with theassistance of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)and a review of the Guystac by external consultants, financed from theGovernment's own resources.
4.20 Organizational Restructuring. The Government's program proposesthe restructuring of Guystac (excluding GRB and Guysuco) into four groups,viz utilities, agriculture-based entities, commercial companies I and II.
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Each group would be controlled by a Supervisory Council, responsible forgeneral policy guidance and control. A single secretariat is proposed toservice these councils, to be formed from the existing GuystacSecretariat. Each corporation Js to enter into a Performance Contract withits appropriate Supervisory Council, for which the manager of theCorporation will be held accountable upon periodic review. The councilswould be responsible for approving the investment budget, the operatingbudget and the medium-term plans of the corporation. Specific details ofindividual performance contracts have not yet been completed; it istherefore not clear the degree of autonomy that the management of thecorporations will have.
4.21 In principle, the desire to monitor closely the performance ofindividual corporations is commendable. At this time, however, it is farfrom clear whether the management of the corporation will be able tooperate flexibly in response to changing market realities, or will findthat specific conditions within their performance contracts severely limittheir range of discretionary activity. If the latter, then the hope forefficiency may prove unattainable, particularly if the Supervisory Councilsfind themselves unable to authorize mid-term changes in the PerformanceContract as a result of higher level policy prescriptions. A closelyrelated issue which may also require policy direction is the way in whichoperating surpluses are to be dealt with in future: should the individualenterprises be allowed to reinvest earnings (either in its main line ofbusiness or in new and unrelated fields of production) or should at leastsome net earnings be transferred to the Budget of the Central Government?In the past, the lack of policy with respect to the above has affected theexpansion of enterprises during favourable business environment.
4.22 The restructuring of the Guyana Rice Board into three separateentities has been discussed in para. 3.19 above. The exercise formed partof an overall reorganization of the rice sector under an IDB financedprogram. The immediate financial implication of the reorganization is toimprove the cost structure of the three entities through the elimination ofoverstaffing. Except for 1982 and 1983 when GRB incurred deficits on itsoperations it has generally showed a surplus, partly as the result of lowerprices it paid for paddy in the past. The reorganization should helpimprove the finances of the new agencies. The only unresolved issue is theadditional constraint on the limited management personnel in the publicsector that the establishment of three new entities would pose.
4.23 Financial Restructuring. A proper financial restructuring of thecorporations should form an integral basis of the recovery program. At themoment no detailed analysis has been done for all the corporations exceptfor Guymine. Proposals with respect to Guymine included: (a) conversionof deficit into equity; (b) conversion of deficit into preferred stockwhich is cumulative and redeemable; (c) conversion of deficit intopreferred stock which is automatically converted into a loan at some pointin time; and (d) conversion of deficit into a convertible loan. TheGovernment in 1984, adopted the second option in respect to Guymine. Whilethis effort is commendable, it does not constitute a complete financialrestructuring. One of the main weaknesses of Guymine's finances is the
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lack of working capital and any restructuring program should cater forthis. A comprehensive financial restructuring of Guymine (and thus theother financially weak corporations) would require: (a) conversion intoequity, or other instruments, of existing deficit; (b) the provision of areasonable level of working capital; and (c) rescheduling of both domesticand external debt. Finally, a close review of the corporations, especiallythe smaller ones in agro-based food productian indicates a substantialscope for divestiture and closure without affecting the public sectorscontrol of the economy. In view of the scarcity of management personnel inGuyana, divestiture and closure are alternative options for containing therapid growth of the public sector.
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CHAPTER V - LEVEL AND ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT
A. Overview of Investment Needs
Past Trend in Investment
5.01 A striking feature of recent developments in Guyana has been thehigh level of investment relative to output--the investment GDP ratio rosefrom about 23% in 1970 to 37% in 1976 and remained, on average, above 30Ztill 1982 when it fell to 27% and declined thereafter. The estimate of theincremental output/capital ratio for the period 1974-83 is negativeindicating a low level of marginal efficiency of capital in Guyana.Unfortunately there are no data available on the sectoral allocation ofinvestment during the period, so it is not possible to pinpoint the reasonfor what appears to be a relatively inefficient use of resources.Nevertheless, a large share of fixed investment (about 80%), especiallyafter 1971 was concentrated in the public sector so that analysis of thesectoral composition of the public sector investment will provide aninsight into the causes of the inefficiency of investment in Guyana.
5.02 Table 14 presents the sectoral allocation of public sectorinvestment for 1978-1984. The data highlight several characteristics ofinvestment in the public sector: (a) investments in agriculture--mainly inirrigation systems-have accounted for an average 37% of total publicinvestment in recent years; (b) the mining sector (especially bauxite whichwas the main foreign exchange earner) has seen a significant decline ininvestment since 1980; and (c) industry has also seen a relative decline inpublic investment, although government efforts have been constrained inrecent years by the shortage of foreign exchange. The public sectorinvestment in irrigation systems and in agriculture, in general, has notyielded adequate results, in part because of inadequate pricing policies inthe past. Similarly, public investment in manufacturing has been beset bythe general inefficiencies of the public corporations, poor projectexecution and the absence of working capital. Finally, almost one-third oftotal public sector investment program (PSIP) consisted of numerous smalldomestically financed projects which were not properly evaluated beforeimplementation and whose execution extended over an unusually long periodof time and presented a continuous drain on limited resources withoutassociated output benefits.
5.03 The growth of public sector investment expenditures reflected theGovernment's policy of a reduced role of the private sector through furthernationalization and the establishment of non-financial state enterprises,the expansion of social services, and an optimistic assessment of theavailability of resources. While consistent with the objective of makingthe public sector the main engine of growth within its overall developmentthrust, the public sector investment program failed to consider theconstraints of the economy's managerial (manpower) and absorptivecapacity. Thus, while expenditures rose rapidly, physical project
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Table 14: Sectoral Allocation of Public Sector Capital Expenditure
a/ Includes expenditures on sea and river defense.
Source: Statistical Appendix Table 5.8.
implementation was beset by major manpower constraints that impeded thecompletion of many projects on a timely basis and led to considerable costoverrun.
Prioritization of Investment
5.04 In 1980, following the establishment of the State PlanningCommission, the Government in close cooperation with the World Bank,embarked on a review of the medium-term development requirements and theidentification of projects consistent with the objectives of the Governmentand cognizant of the expected availability of financing. This reviewformed part of the preparation of the program of institutional and policyreforms that was supported by the Structural Adjustment Loan/Credit. Theprogram involved the continuation of ongoing projects with a renewed Gover-nment commitment to the improvement in the efficiency of project executionin keeping with a development strategy which envisaged exports as the majorengine of growth. The program aimed primarily at increasing the volume andquality of production for exports and upgrading essential supporting infra-structure. While the program was generally appropriate in terms of magni-tude and composition, the projected financial resources were overly-optimistic, particularly with respect to public sector savings. The severeshortage of counterpart funds hampered progress on many projects. Theactual inflow of external resources also fell short of expectation, inpart, because of the unavailability of domestic counterpart funds,administrative delays and the slow pace of physical project implementation.
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5.05 The focus now should be on the completion of ongoing projects aswell as on the productive use of existing capital stock. In the presenceof scarce resources, prioritization of the investment program isparamount. The Government is cognizant cof the limitation of resources andhas adopted a methodology for project selection in its 1985 budget (seepara. 5.07). The policy thrust emphasizes agriculture (including forestryand fisheries), supporting infrastructure, and manufacturing, particularlywith a view to expand export. A basic limitation of the Government's newthrust is the lack of direct and definite recognition (as in recent past)in the selection criteria, for the need of minimum rehabilitation-typeinvestments that will be required to achieve a recovery of output of themain enterprises, particularly sugar and bauxite.
B. The 1985 Investment Program
Program Level and Composition
5.06 Because of the uncertainty surrounding resource inflows tosupport the public sector investment, the program for 1985 is of necessityrestricted to ongoing projects of medium term duration with identifiedexternal support and short-term programs of major domestic importance.Projected levels and sectoral allocation of future investment are notavailable. The public sector investment as reflected in the 1985 budgetenvisages expenditures -of G5748 million, which is some 142X above the levelof actual expenditure for 1984. This level of investment expenditures isclearly unattainable given identified sources of finance (see below).
5.07 Project Selection. For selecting projects which constituted the1985 central Government investment program, projects were classified aseither -critical' or -other-. Critical projects were those whosenon-implementation, according to the State Planning Secretariat, would giverise to intolerable' results. The criteria for determining what isintolerable results were not defined. For the "other" projects, the agencymaking the proposal was expected to rate each project, using a rank scoreof one to ten, on the basis of twelve unranked criteria which embodynational development and welfare priorities and the availability of publicsector financial resources. The individual scores were then aggregated bythe State Planning Secretariat by applying different weights to the twelvecriteria, in effect ranking them.
5.08 It is not clear from the list of proposed projects whether any ofthe ongoing projects were rejected. Since the criterion for selectingcritical- projects was not defined as rigorously as that for otherprojects, a considerable high element of discretion appeared to prevail.It is recommended that for a comprehensive review of the PSIP, themethodology for ranking should be applied to all ongoing and proposedprojects for the purpose of making decision on phasing-out the ongoingprogram. Furthermore, the methodology for project selection would alsorequire refinement. The goals against which projects are rated are ofnecessity broader than economic efficiency as measured by traditionalcost-benefit analysis. However, any ranking framework directed at project
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selection should also explicitly recognize the costs and benefits of theproject in an intertemporal framework. The time dimension is an importantfactor that the Government's framework does not explicitly recognize.
5.09 Composition. The sectoral composirton of the proposed 1985investment program does not differ in any significant way from previousyears. This is mainly because the program is made up largely by theongoing projects, with slightly less than 10 proposed new projects. Apartfrom a Global Manpower project with external assistance from theInter-American Development Bank, the proposed disbursements on almost allnew projects are less than GS2 million each. This is also because most ofthe proposed new projects have no identified external assistance.
5.10 Agriculture (including forestry and fishing) remains the -dinthrust of the proposed PSIP, accounting for about 36X of the proposedexpenditures for 1985. The main components are the two irrigation projects(to benefit mainly rice production) at Abary and Blackbush, both withproposed IDB assistance. The Abary water control system constitutes thesecond phase of the massive Mahaica-Mahaicony-Abary project which wasinitiated in 1984. The rehabilitation of the Black Bush project which wasconceived in 1979 is being executed in 1985 following a long period ofadministrative bottlenecks and project modifications. Completion of theTapakuma irrigation project with local financing is expected in 1985. Thetwo other major agricultural projects involve the continuation andcompletion of the Agricultural Sector Program and the Food Crop Productionand Marketing, both of which are supported by the IDB. In the forestrysector, a major attempt is proposed for revitalizing the Upper DemeraraForestry project with IDA, IDB ard EDF financing. The project is expectedto be completed in the next one and a half years.
5.11 Apart from the dominance of the agriculture sector, the othermajor proposed projects for implementation are under physicalinfrastructure. The execution of the Hydro-electric power project atEclipse is the prime objective of the Government with expenditureallocation of G$25 million for 1985. No firm external assistance has asyet been concluded, but the assistance of the Democratic People's Republicof Korea is envisaged. The project aims at providing energy for industrialand agricultural development in the project area. A large number oftransport infrastructure and communication projects are envisaged for1985. The most significant one is, however, the Essequibo Sea and RiverDefense project. Sea and river defense systems, like the water controlsystems, are extremely essential for minimizing the adverse effects onagriculture resulting from flooding since most part of the coastal andarable area in Guyana is below sea level.
5.12 A large amount of expenditure has been devoted in recent years tomiscellaneous administrative and rehabilitation-type projects associatedwith the Central Government. These projects are usually executed whollywith domestic financial resources. Together, they are projected to amountto G$57.3 million, or 8% of total investment, for 1985. While these minorrepair works and rehabilitation expenditures appear critical for the smooth
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functioning of the Central Government, rigid control are essential tocontain costs. Of the proposed investment program for the public corpora-tions, those by the Guyana Airways Corporation (GAC), Bidco/Guymine, GuyanaSugar Corporation (Guysuco) and the Guyana Electricity Corporation (GEC)merit review. The GAC proposes to purchase two new aircraft for itsexternal operations. The Bidco/Guymine rehabilitation project is largelycontingent on envisaged external support from the EEC/EDF and possibly theWorld Bank; the uncertainty of resource inflows may delay execution. BothGuysuco and GEC expect financial assistance from the IDB and the rehabili-tation programs proposed by the two corporations are on schedule. TheGuyana Fisheries Ltd. may also benefit from CIDA's assistance. As to theother corporations, uncertainties with respect to foreign exchange availa-bility may limit the size of their investments.
Implementation and Monitoring
5.13 Financial Implications. The implementation of the 1985 invest-ment progr3m amounting to G$748 million is contingent on the expectedinflow of project resources by external donors, given the tight public sec-tor fiscal situation. The Government expects an external inflow of aboutG$264.4 (US$63.7) million or about 35Z of the total 1985 public investmentprogram. Given the tight financial condition in Guyana it is unlikely thatdomestic financing of the balance of G$483.2 million (part of which isrequired in foreign exchange) will be available. As of 1983-84, the levelof actual public investment 's likely to be lower than projected. Giventhis likelihood, it is important to review during mid-year, progress on theimplementation of the investment program and to limit, if need be,disbursements to high priority programs on the basis of the criteriadiscussed earlier. The above concerns will require flexibility on the partof the donors regarding the use of committed funds as well as additionalfinancial support to cover shortages in both foreign and local financing.
5.14 Monitoring. Physical project implementation has been unsatisfac-tory in the past because of manpower constraints and a weak project monito-ring system. The latter problem is expected to persist in 1985 andbeyond. With technical assistance financed by the World Bank, a projectmonitoring system was established at the State Planning Secretariat in1981. Unfortunately, the execution of the program was below expectation,in part because of the high staff turnover and limited agency involvement.A revival of the monitoring system is urgently needed to involve theexecuting agencies in a more meaningful way, supplemented by a thoroughreview of ongoing projects to assess their expected impact on the recoveryprocess. A more structured and formalized monitoring system shouldmaintain a standard and efficient project-monitoring format. Actual targetand variance data should be regularly analyzed for key projects andprograms. Furthermore, coordination among the many external agencies willbe necessary if the execution of the PSIP is to be improved.
5.15 The administrative capacity of the line agencies responsible forimplementing major parts of the public investment program is crucial forits success. In areas such as power and irrigation, the proposed increasesin investment will undoubtedly stra4n this capacity. To keep the programs
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on schedule, the Government will have to pay close attention to the needsof technical and managerial staff and to the planning and administrativeprocedures of the line agencies. As with the proposals regarding medium-term planning discussed in Chapter II, medium-term investment planning atthe agency level is desirable. The eventual goal should be to have eachoperating agency define sectoral investment plans to be coordinated by theState Planning Secretariat.
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CHAPTER VI - EXTERNAL TRADE AND FINANCE
6.01 Since 1976, Guyana has had a history of balance of paymentsdifficulties which have worsened in recent years. Over the past threeyears, Guyana has suffered from a chronic shortage of foreign exchange thathas led to major policy adjustments including import restrictions anddevaluations of the currency. Given the negligible capital inflows since1982, the import capacity is determined principally by the levels of exportearnings. The root cause of the balance of payments problem is thus thedecline in export earnings resulting from poor domestic performance. IfGuyana is to escape the constraint on growth that has been imposed by thelack of foreign exchange, a substantially better performance in the growthof exports (and by implication, domestic production) will be needed in thefuture.
6.02 Exports must grow more rapidly than imports in order for Guyanato reduce its present large resource gap. A further reduction on thealready depressed levels of imports, however, is inadvisable. Whether thenecessary growth in imports can be achieved will depend on the country'sability to increase production for export, on the expansion of overseasmarkets, and on trade policies that will keep exports competitive. All theabove is also constrained by the dominant feature of Guyana's exportstructure which entails reliance on three main export commodities: bauxiteproducts, sugar and rice. Despite the official policy of diversifying theproductive base of the economy, the past over-reliance on a policy of'import replacement" and -self-sufficiency has not helped to diminish thecountry's reliance on the three main export commodities for foreignexchange. In recent years, capital inflows have also almost dried up:private capital has shied away because of uncertainties with respect toGovernment policies, commercial lending was not feasible due toaccumulation of large arrears and lack of creditworthiness while officialaid was reduced as a result of the lack of a speedy action on macroeconomicpolicy adjustment.
A. External Trade Policy and Issues
External Trade Indicators
6.03 An analysis of trends Ln the movements of foreign tradeindicators for the period since 1976 is more meaningful than the balance ofpayments movements in demonstrating the factors underlying Guyana'sexternal sector problems. Table 15 shows that both the exportIGDP andimport/GDP ratios have declined dramatically from about 75% in 1975 to lessthan 52% in the case of exports and 68% in the case of imports by 1984.The steep decline in export revenues resulted from poor performance fromthe two main sectors: sugar and bauxite, both of which output performancehas been disappointing since the mid-1970s. Unfortunately for Guyana, thedecline in the quantum of exports took place at a time of deterioratingterms of trade. As a result of the shrinkage in the import capacity, theeconomy, so dependent on imports, suffered chronic and lately acuteshortages of raw materials and spare parts. This in turn has affected theexport sector and local industry.
Export price index divided by the import price index.D/ Export earnings deflated by import unit value index.
Source: Statistical Appendix Table 3.7.
6.04 As imports are significant inputs into domestic production forboth local consumption and exports, the effect of the austere import policyimposed on the economy lhas been severe. import volumes in 1984 were 50%below that of 1975 and about a third of that in 1970 and have fallencontinuously since 1976. Because of the emergence of a parallel market,the official recorded data on imports do not, of course, provide a completepicture of what is actually happening in the economy. As noted elsewhere,there is no doubt that external factors such as the world price and demandconditions contributed to the economic difficulties of Guyana, especiallysince 1982, but their impact could have been minimized if the domesticenvironment was relatively more favourable in terms of policies conduciveto output expansion.
Expanding the Capacity to Import
6.05 If Guyana is to sustain a real growth in imports sufficient topromote growth, exports will have to increase rapidly in the futurecompared to the negative average compound rate of 8% during the past 5years (see Chapter VII). The expansion of exports will depend on theimplementation of an aggressive recovery program in the bauxite and sugarsectors and the stimulation of exports in non-tradition commodities (bothmanufactures and agriculture). The bauxite sector should be expected togrow slowly despite the remarkable recovery in 1984, and increasing
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emphasis must be placed on marketing. Large investments in extractiveindustries are proposed to increase the value of mineral exports by thedevelopment of new mineral products (notably gold and diamonds). In theshort and medium-term, the performance of the sugar sector would becritical since it is the sole 'hard' currency earner as the bauxite sectorhas become a net foreign exdhange loser since 1983 and rice exports aremainly to the CARICOM market to offset Guyana's arrears to the CARICOMClearing Facility. Export levels attained (in volumes) during the early1970s are possible with concerted effort to improve productivity andyields.
6.06 It seems likely that substantially larger volumes of traditionalagricultural products, rice and wood products, will be exported during thenext ten years, although actual earnings could be affected somewhat byprice changes. With the completion of ongoing irrigation and watercontrol projects, the country's rice export capacity would be trippled inthe next decade. Similarly, ongoing forestry projects are expected to morethan double the country's potential in that area. For most sectors, themain uncertainty with regard to supply appears to be the availability ofadequate resources in terms of foreign exchange to support the recoveryprogram. On the other hand, the crisis over the past three years hasfavoured investments in production intended primarily for the domesticmarket (through the policy of self-sufficiency). The relativeattractiveness of investments in production for exports will therefore haveto be increased by changes in the structure of incentives for exports andimport- substituting industries. This will probahly require furtherchanges in the effective rates of foreign exchange and gradual tradeliberalization.
6.07 The other factor that will influence the capacity to import isthe behaviour of the external terms of trade. The instability of theinternational commodity market in recent years has been a forceful reminderof the extent to which import capacities can be affected by changes in theterms of trade. It also underscores the importance of having adequateforeign exchange reserves to minimize the disruptive effects of slumps inexport earnings and proper management of the resources during periods ofexport price booms. In the case of Guyana, the need for a program toreschedule its external payment obligations is urgent before it can beginthe painful process of rebuilding external reserves (see Chapter VII). Inthe meantime, the Government's efforts at expanding countertrade relations,aimed at market expansion and insulation against declining terms of tradeand weakening demand, cast doubts on its ability to rapidly build up itsexternal reserves in the conventional manner. The problem with counter-trade is that repurchases are ii- goods and services and in most cases thecommodity composition and quality are non-optimal. The Government iscognizant of this and the establishment of the Department of InternationalTrade Relations to monitor countertrade activities is aimed at ensuringoptimum benefit to the country. The Deputy Prime Minister for Planning hasbeen made responsible for this activity. Countertrade should, however, beviewed as a short to medium term solution to the external trade problem ofGuyana as it reinforces existing distortions by making claims on futureresources. An attempt to return to conventional trade relations should bepursued as quickly as possible.
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Issues in Trade Policy
6.08 Promotion of Non-Traditional Exports. As noted above, in theshort to medium term, expansion in exports in the traditional sectors(bauxite, sugar and rice) is the key to economic recovery in Guyana. Inthe long term, the extent to which Guyana can successfully expand exportsand improve its reserves will depend not only on the ability to increaseproduction in the non-traditional areas like gold and diamond, but also onthe expansion of overseas markets through promotional activities andmeasures to keep exports competitive. The bulk of Guyana's exports in thepast have been directed at the UK, CARICOM, the US, Canada and the EEC.The concentration of trade to these countries has resulted from thecomposition of export commodities: sugar to the UK and EEC, bauxite/alumina to predominantly Canada, US and EEC and rice to mainly the CARICOMcountries. Recent changes in policy to encourage foreign investment,especially in mineral exploration would increase the participation offoreign investment in the export drive. Through their contacts with theinternational market, these foreign investors can greatly assist in thediversification of trade sources and the exploration of new markets.
6.09 Expansion and diversification of non-traditional exports areconstrained by a number of factors including (a) the need for a policyframework more conducive to export development; (b) the lack of foreignexchange n-eded by the export oriented development because of the importdepeadent nature of existing industrial structure; and (c) the non-existence of specific institutional infrastructure to provide guidance,technical expertise and service to the exporting sector. On the firstissue, the Government is in the process of developing the relevant policyframework for promoting export development. In 19B3, as part of thestructural adjustment program, it established the Guyana Export PromotionCouncil (GEPC) to provide the type of developmental and promutional supportrequired by the producer and exporters so as to enable them to penetratemore effectively into international markets in non-traditional exports.The GEPCs activities have, however, been constrained by institutionalweakness (which it is currently remedying with technical assistance fromthe UNDP) and the general foreign exchange shortage noted above. The issueof the non-existence of specific institutional infrastructure to provideguidance is also being addressed by the UNDP technical assistance. TheUNDP program comprises institutional building, the development of exporttrade information, market/product identification (which includes new marketopportunities abroad) and the development of a systemetic and comprehensiveexport incentives system.
6.10 Administrative Constraints. Export promotion in Guyana is alsoconstrained in the short-term by the need for overall strengthening andstreamlining of import operations including simplification of the importlicensing scheme and consumption tax regime. As part of the IBRD/IDAsupported structural adjustment program, the import licensing system wassimplified for the EDF users but the more general simplification did nottake place, in part because of the sharp deterioration of the foreignexchange situation. Similarly, a number of programs including the
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remission of consumption taxes on imported inputs and foreign exchangeretention for selected non-traditional exporters have been implemented withmixed results. As regards the remission scheme it appears that it has anumber of shortcomings typical of such rebate systems, i.e. the manufac-turer needs the approval of various government entities and the scope ofadministrative discretion is considerable. Through the technicalassistance of the UNDP, the Government is in the process of strengtheningthe technical capability of the Ministry of Trade in the rationalization ofits import regulating and licensing procedures and the establishment of animport management system.
B. Management of External Debt
International Reserves and External Debt
6.11 The cumulative deficit in the current account of the balance ofpayments of some US$975 million during 1976-84 has caused a completedepletion of net international reserves. The net international reserves ofGuyana are negative.
Table 16: Various Indicators of External Reserve Position
(USS million)
DecemberCategory 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
International reserves (net) -206.5 -267.4 -362.2 -552.4 -663.4Net reserves of the Central Bank -202.1 -258.4 -347.0 -539.4 -655.4Net reserves of Commercial Banks -4.4 -9.0 -15.2 -13.0 -8.0
Gross Foreign Assets of Central Bank 12.7 6.9 10.1 6.2 5.7Weeks of Imports covered by theGross Foreign assets of the 1.7 0.9 1.9 1.3 1.3Central Bank
Source: Statistical Appendix Table 6.4.
6.12 The balance of payments deficit has been financed largely by arapid increase in public debt. During 1975-82, disbursed and outstandingpublic medium and long term (M & LT) debt more than doubled from a level ofless than US$300 million or about 60% GNP, at the end of 1975 to US$660million, or about 160% of GNP at the end of 1982. Over the same period,the ratio of disbursed public M & LT debt to exports of goods and NFStripled from 78. in 1975 to 258% in 1982 while the public debt serviceratio increased from less than 5% in 1975 to over 20% in 1981. In 1982-83,the ratio of scheduled debt service to actual exports was on average about35%, but the actual debt service ratio fell to about 15% on average asGuyana was unable to service all its debt (see para. 6.15).
6.13 Guyana obtained relatively favourable terms on its new debtsduring the 1970-84 period reflecting the relative importance of
- 50 -
non-commercial type borrowin,g, which accounted for three quarters of allnew commitments during 1976-832 (of which more than half from multilateralinstitutions). The average maturity of new debts committed during thisperiod was 20 years (including about 5 years of grace) at the averageinterest rate of 5.6% in spite of the relatively hard terms on commercialtype debts particularly with regard to amortization periods (Table 17).The share of commercial-type debt in total outstanding public debt, whichhad reached 50% by the end of 1976 in fact declined subsequently. Despitethe relatively favourable debt structure (only about one-third of the debtfalls due during the next 5 years), the poor export performance as notedabove has created considerable debt servicing problems.
Table 17: Average Terms of New Commitments 1970-84 a/
Non-Commercial Commercial b/ Total
Interest Rate (X) 10.9 3.7 5.6Maturity (Years) 6.0 26.7 20.3Grace Period (Years) 1.7 6.5 5.3Grant Element (%) -3.2 46.9 32.2
a/ Weighted Average.b/ Bilateral and Multilateral Loans and Official Export Credit.
Source: Statistical Appendix Table 4.3.
6.14 Very few new medium- and long-term loans were extended to Guyanaduring 1982-84 (new commitments fell from US$200 million in 1981 to lessthan US$44 million in 1984). Gross disbursements of public and publiclyguaranteed capital dropped by about 84% to US$26 million in 1984,reflecting a decline in gross disbursements related both to the absence ofnew commitments and
the slowdown in the execution of the externally supported public sectorinvestment program. The chronic foreign exchange shortage also led to arapid increase in debt arrears during 1982-84 (Table 18).
Government Response
6.15 The Government's solution to the debt/arrears problem has beenvaried and specific to individual circumstances. Since 1982, principal andinterest payments due to Alcan under the nationalization debt have beenpaid in kind with shipments of bauxite. Similarly, with regard to thecommercial banks, arrangements have been put in place for deferral(currently until July 1985) of the principal payments due. In addition,agreement was reached with a number of non-OECD bilateral creditors for therescheduling on a limited basis of bilateral debts. The OECD bilateralcreditors, of which the US, UK and Canada are the main ones, which wereapproached by the Government to reschedule debts, indicated a requirementfor a meeting of the Paris Club which can only take place after agreementon a new IMF program. Such a program has not been possible because ofGuyana's overdue payments to the IMF. Guyana is, however, servicing debtto some multilateral agencies, but the projected debt service burden, inthe absence of a comprehensive rescheduling, is unbearable and may becounterproductive.
6.16 For 1985, the Government proposes to pursue the approachesadopted in the recent past to deal with the external debt:
(a) to reschedule those bilateral debts not requiring Paris Clubmeetings, commercial and nationalization debts on favourable terms that mayinvolve (i) extension of maturity, (ii) modification of original interestrates, and (iii) when possible, repayment of the principal by goods; and
(b) with particular but not exclusive reference to CARICOM debt, toestablish joint venture arrangements whereby a production entity located inGuyana is linked to a finance and marketing entity located in the territoryto which Guyana is indebted. The latter entity would provide inputs forthe operation of the production entity in Guyana which in turn woulddeliver all its output to the external entity. The value of exports, netof the value of the imported inputs provided would go toward the reductionof Guyana's indebtedness to the creditor.
6.17 Both approaches are innovative given Guyana's failure to obtainadditional financing from both commercial and official creditors to coverthe high level of debt service payments. Furthermore, given the alreadylow levels of imports, it is not prudent to reduce further foreign exchangeoutlays on non-debt related items such as essential consumer goods bycutting domestic expenditures and tightening controls on imports. In themedium term, however, the Government should continue to pursue its effortsto conclude a program with the IMF, which may pave the way for a majorrescheduling of the OECD bilateral creditors and the restoration of normallevels of bilateral inflows. A program with the IMF would in addition toshort-term balance of payments resources establish a macroeconomicframework for outgrowing the debt overhang, inducing domestic savings andincreasing incentive to export.
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CHAPTER VII - DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS
A. Background
7.01 The focus of thip report has been the development of a frameworkfor the economic recovery of Guyana. Many of the policies recommended hereare directed at restructuring the economy to permit a relatively modestrate of growth. Given the severity of the crisis facing Guyana and themagnitude of its disequilibrium, it may not be possible to sustain growthwithout substantial external assistance. Since considerable uncertaintysurrounds the availability of external resources to support recovery,analysis of the medium- and long-term prospects made to test thefeasibility and consistency of the development policies reviewed in theprevious chapters may not be relevant. Instead, the focus of this overviewof development prospects is on the major macroeconomic targets to which theGovernment's efforts over the decade should be directed. This exerciseconstitutes a quantitative framework to support the policy discussions ofthe previous chapters.
7.02 In developing quantitative targets, considerable emphasis isplaced on the recommended sequencing of the recovery program as outlined inChapter II. The two phases--liberalization and rehabilitation--areextremely important in the selection of targets in view of theuncertainty surrounding external financing and the magnitude of Guyana'sexternal payment obligations. Further, good short-term economic management(the key ingredient of the liberalization phase) is a springboard for arecovery strategy designed to address the rehabilitation issues, which areessentially medium- to long-term in nature. The targets proposedundoubtedly represent the maximum that could be achieved, given existingcapacity constraints, and may be difficult to attain. Nevertheless, theyprovide the reference points for restructuring the economy to sustain therecovery initiated in 1984.
7.03 The selected indicators outlined in Table 19 represent thepossible quantitative dimensions of the development strategy discussed inthe previous chapters, if the external resources identified in para. 7.13are made available to Guyana. The targets represent a distinct departurefrom the performance indicators of the past decade and appear modest. Theyrepresent the expectation to restore production levels to those attainedduring the early 1970s. Thus, by 1990, the real level of GDP at factorcosts should exceed that attained in 1975 while export levels in real termsby 1995 should be restored to that of 1976. If these levels are notattained, Guyana will not be able to meet its external obligations and itsdevelopment prospects will be bleak. (Further details on the targets arefound in Appendix tables 9.1 - 9.5).
B. Sectoral Targets
Domestic Sector
7.04 Output. The medium- and long-term prospects for the economydepend on the restoration of bauxite and sugar output to their pre-1975levels. In that context, the Government's program should aim at a growth
- 53 -
Table 19: Selected Macroeconomic Targets
Average1983 1984 1985 1986-1990 1991-1995
Z GDP mp (real)Investment 24.9 18.3 27.8 27.0 28.8
rate of GDP (at factor cost) averaging 4% in the medium term (1985-88) and5.5% thereafter up to 1995. To attain those levels, recovery in thebauxite and sugar sectors should be the Government's priority in themedium-term. The 1984 production levels of dried metal grade and calcinedbauxite were 823,000 long tons and 517,000 long tons respectively. Sinceexisting capacities without rehabilitation are estimated at about 1.3million and 700,000 long tons for dried metal grade and calcined bauxite(see para. 3.04) and about 1.8 million and 1.2 million long tons,respectively with rehabilitation, it is assumed that by 1995 the productionof both commodities should have attained about 80% of their existingcapacity. That is, (without major rehabilitation--except for the adequateprovision of spare parts) production levels in bauxite should be restoredto at least their 1976 levels. With rehabilitation, the pre-1975 levelscould be exceeded.
7.05 Since 1974, sugar output declined consistently from 340,000 longtons to only 238,000 long tons in 1984. With adequate rehabilitation asenvisaged by the Government's program, production could be restored toabout 350,000 long tons by 1995. At that level, it is assumed that some200,000 long tons will go to meet the quota requirements of the EEC and the
- 54 -
US, some 50,000 long tons will be available for local consumption and theremainder will go to the free market.
7.06 Output of the rice and other agriculture products exhibits thehighest potential for growth. With the expected completion of on-goinginvestment projects in the next few years, Guyana's physical capacity forrice production should expand sharply. The projected targets assume thatwith the reorganization of the rice industry currently underway, productionshould increase from the 1984 level of 181,000 long tons to about 2b0,000long tons by 1995 or an average annual growth rate of about 3.5% over theperiod. Agricultural diversification programs, if properly implemented,should complement efforts in the sugar and rice sectors and raise overallagricultural output. The target for 1995 should be to exceed the 1978 peaklevel of G$229 million (in real terms) by over 15%.
7.07 As to objectives in the other productive sectors, manufacturing,construction, government and services they should complement the mainsectors. The target for manufacturing is to grow at about the same rate asagriculture, since it involves mainly agriculture-based processing.Construction activities couid be maintained at about 6% of GDP at realfactor cost. In view of policy efforts to reduce the public sector deficitthrough less expenditures, the objective should be to progressively reducegovernment services from 22% of GDP in 1984 to about 20% of GDP by 1995.This reduction implies an average growth rate of about 3.5% p.a., about1-1.5% less than the target growth of GDP at factor cost.
7.08 Aggregate Expenditures. The target levels for investment (about27% of GDP during 1986-90 and 28.8Z during 1991-95) are slightly lowrelative to the historic levels of about 30% during 197b-80. Given thatthe output of the productive sectors fell by more than 20% over the pastdecade, there should be considerable scope for increases in the utilizationof existing capital stock through institutional and policy adjustments, andinvestment should focus on rehabilitation and replacement of capital stockand completion of on-going projects, particularly in the short to mediumterm. The implicit incremental output/capital ratio should rise from 12%in 1985 to 19% in 1990 and decline thereafter to 17% by 1995, a reflectionof the above investment levels. Aggregate consumption, on the other hand,should be reduced from about 75% of GDP in 1983 to 70% by 1995 if thetargets for the mobilization of domestic savings are to be attained. Theprincipal objective is to reduce public consumption from the present levelsof about 22% of GDP to about 18% by 1995.
7.09 Public Finances. The objective of the Government's recoveryprogram should be to improve public sector finances through both areduction in Central Government expenditures and a strengthening of thefinances of the non-financial public enterprises (notably Guymine andGuysuco). As for the first, the policy objective should be to reduceCentral Government's current account deficit, which is presently 33% ofGDP, to about 24% during 1986-90 and to 12% during 1991-95. This targetcan be attained mainly through expenditure reduction programs, as revenue/GDP levels above 35% may be counterproductive in encouraging increasedproductivity by the private sector given the existing constraints on
- 55 -
Consumption. Central Government current expenditures should be reducedfrom the existing 68% of GDP in 1984 to about 42Z during 1991-95 through(a) the rescheduling of the domestic debt as proposed in the Government's1985 budget, and (b) a reduction in non-wage expenditures by improved costmonitoring, and in wage expenditures through moderation in employment andin the level of wage changes.
7.10 The Government's prime efforts should be directed in the medium-term to improving the finances of the non-financial public enterprises.The policy initiatives discussed in Chapter IV, if implemented properly andpromptly should help improve the finances of the corporations. Withrespect to Guymine, the objective should be a financial restructuring,along with the proposed management reforms and technical rehabilitation,aimed at returning the industry to break-even by 1988. Guysuco should aimat restoring its operating surplus by 1986 assuming the projected uutputand export levels discussed in para. 7.05 are attained. The restructuringof the GRB should as with the Guystac group, improve its operatingbalance. Thus, in general the Government's objective should be to restorethe finances of the public corporations to surplus positions in the short-term. The public sector current account balance should be reduced from adeficit of 39% of GDP in 1984 to minus 18Z of GDP during 1986-90 and toabout minus 4% of GDP during 1991-95. The objective should be to reducethe overall public sector deficit from the 60Z of GDP in 1984 to about 31%in 1995.
External Sector
7.11 Exports/Imports. Both exports and imports declined rapidlyduring 1981-84, a reflection of the economic decline of the period. If theproduction targets outlined in paras. 7.04-7.07 are attained, exportsshould reach their pre-1977 levels by 1995. This target implies a compoundgrowth rate of about 5% p.a. in real terms during 1985-95. The growth rateof exports is anticipated to be the same as that of GDP. Importprojections, on the other hand, may assume a growth rate of about 4% overthe decade, which is lower than that for exports because of the existenceof a considerable room from improving capacity utilization. The objectiveshould be to reduce the import/GD? ratio from 68% to 57% by 1995. Inattaining the import targets, the assumption 1s made that half of Guyana'sfuel imports are used in the bauxite sector and that up to 1990, the volumeof fuel imports will reflect the level of activity in that sector. Thesubstitution of hydropower for about 20% of the fuel needs should be thetarget for 1990 and beyond.
7.12 Balance of Payments. On the basis of no anticipated improvementsin the resource balance during the decade, the recovery program should aimat no further deterioration in the balance of payments. By implication,the objective is to maintain a ratio of interest payments to Exports ofGoods and NFS of 10% during 1985-87 and 15Z thereafter. The ratio of thebalance of payments deficit to GDP (at current market prices) should thusaverage 20% during 1986-90 and 21% during 1991-95. These are reasonabletargets only if appropriate rescheduling of existing payment obligationstake place in the short term and if substantial resource inflows occur tosupport the Government's program.
- 56 -
C. Inflows of External Capital
Resource Requirements and Sources
7.13 If the projections of the current account receipts and paymentsoutlined in the preceding sections are realized, the cumulative deficit onthe balance of payments will be about US$851 million during )85-90 andabout USS1.7 billion in the subsequent five year-period. There is a needto make provisions for increases in external reserves--prudent managementof the balance of payments suggests that they be kept at the equivalent ofat least one month of imports-and that existing external payment arrearsbe eliminated, either through gradual repayment or conversion into medium-and long-term loans. It is assumed that there will be no improvement inGuyana's external reserve position during 1985-90. Similarly, it isassumed there will be neither a build-up nor reduction of external arrearsduring 1985-90 and that the external arrears at 1984 level will beconverted into a 15 year loan, with repayments beginning in 1991. Thismeans that besides reducing external arrears, the reserves should increaseby about US$373 million during 1991-95. Thus, Guyana will require a netinflow (excluding the assumed capital available-Table 20) of foreignexchange of about USS736 million between 1985-95 which will have to be metfrom medium- and lcng-term loans, and direct private investment. These
II Assumed Capital Available 89.9 395.bM1 & LT Loans (Committed) 74.9 145.8 -Direct investments d/ 15.0 250.0Short-term Trade Finance - -
III Additional Financing Required 68.6 736.4 2458.2
a/ Includes for 1985, interest payments of US$24.3 million; for 1985-1990,interest payments of US$111.8 million and for 1990-95, interestpayments of US$56.5 million for M & LT debt. Also included are someinterest payments for servicing arrears at current levels.
b/ Scheduled amortization on outstanding debt (including undisbursed);does not assume rescheduling of existing debt (Table 4.2).
c/ Assumes no further build-up of arrears beyond 1984 levels. Arrears tobe reduced over 15 years beginning 1991.
dl Includes bilateral arrangements, especially those identified in recentcontracts with non-Western countries.
- 57 -
figures imply a resource gap of about US$123 million p.a. during 1985-90.By constraining interest payments to 10% of Exports GNFS during 1985-87 and15% thereafter, the additional resource inflows should be highly conces-sionary at close to zero interest rate during 1985-90; and at no more than8X interest during 1991-95.
7.14. The identified sources of financing indicate a net inflow ofdirect investment (mainly in the mining sector as well as bilateralarrangements with non-Western donor countries) that will increase in themedium term and could provide a total of US$250 million during 1985-90.Short-term financing will probably not be available in the medium termuntil an IMF program is in place. In the long term, however, it willprobably increase in line with the volume of trade to be financed, providedarrears reduction and other rescheduling negotiations are successful. Thebalance of the capital requirement will have to come from inflows ofmedium- and long-term loans, the committed resources of which would bephased out by 1990. The bulk of new resources would have to be obtainedfrom official concessional sources, mainly members of the ConsultativeGroup.
Foreign Aid
7.15 For potential donors the implications of the above analysis arethreefold. First, Guyana needs large irnflows of external capital tosustain the recovery and rehabilitation of the economy. Second, a shifthas to take place from project to program assistance, including recurrentfinancing and balance of payments support. Third, the donors shouldcoordinate their assistance and channel it largely for rehabilitation ofexisting capital stock and completion of the ongoing investment program(including those not necessarily originally supported by them). Guyana hasin place a large capital stock that is chronically under-utilized. Smallinvestments in rehabilitation can have very high rates of return, sincethey bring existing capital back into production. While substantialconcessional resources will be required during the 1985-95 period, thesupply response of the export sectors should generate additional resourcesand reduce the needed external resources in the long term.
7.16 Multilateral and bilateral aid has been a major component ineconomic development in Guyana since the 1960s and has provided financingof both investments and institutional development. Most of the foreignassistance during the 197Us came from bilateral sources, primarily in theform of grants and similar assistance. In the latter part of the 1970s andearly 1980s, a significant portion came from multilateral sources. Since1975, public capital provided about 79X of the financing of the balance ofpayments deficit. Since 1952, following the poor performance of theeconomy, most of the external donors have maue substantial new assistancecontingent on an IMF program. Thus, there have been no major newcommitments to Guyana, except from the Inter-American Development Bank.
- 58 -
7.17 The Government, over the past two years, has been in the processof introducing major policy reforms in response to the crisis to improveeconomic performance in Guyana. In order to elicit the support of externaldonors, the Government should strengthen its program along the linesdiscussed in the previous chapters. In particular, as noted in Chapter II,the main tasks during the liberalization phase (during the next 2-3 years)should include:
(a) Reducing the size of the public sector deficit throughexpenditure controls at the Central Government level and improvedperformance of the leading public corporations. The target should be toreduce the Central Government current expenditures from 68% of GDP in 1984to about 57Z in 1987 through rescheduling of domestic debt and limitingexpenditures on wages and salaries by rationalizing labor resources. Thefinances of the Corporations could be improved through the elimination ofprice distortions and improvements in the management of the enterprises.
(b) Improving Guyana's currency adjustment system, with the objectiveof enhancing the profitability of domestic export industries and arrestirgthe rapidly expanding parallel market. The Government may adjust itscurrency with respect to the SDR in which case it will allow the interplayof market forces in determining its value.
(c) Reducing price distortions by limiting the number of commoditiessubject to official price controls in the medium term to only those thatare highly essential in nature with low elasticities of demand. In thelong term, the objective should be the total elimination of price controls.
'd) Promoting exports, especially through the removal of obstacles toprivate initiatives and the provision of direct assistance to exporters ofnon-traditional commodities. The review of the investment code with theobjective of eliminating the uncertainty with respect to the Government'sintentions relating to the private sector (both domestic and external)should be urgently conducted. Direct assistance for exporters ofnon-traditional commodities should include the earmarking of foreignexchange, as soon as practicable, to restore the Export Development Fund(established under the Structural Adjustment program) to normal levels ofoperations.
7.18 The speed and extent of the policy adjustments are, however,constrained by resource unavailability, especially of foreign exchange.The Government's efforts are part of a two-pronged approach dealingsimultaneously with the supply-side and the demand management problems. Inour judgement this approach is the only realistic one. Past attempts tofocus separately on demand management have been less than successful. Ifour judgement is correct, then a strong case exists for external donors totailor the volume and timing Df their support accordingly, rather than toconsider the two sides of the equation separately and sequentially.
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A NOTE ON ANNEXES I AND II
Annexes I and II contain a list of ongoing technical assistanceprograms and technical assistance requirements for 1985. The list wascompiled with the assistance of the UNDP Resident Mission in Guyana.Estimated costs are to be regarded as indicative.
ABBREVIATIONS
- UrknownCIDA - Canadian International Development AgencyDTCD - Department of Technical Cooperation for Development (UN)EEC - European Economic CommunityFAO - Food and Agricultural Organization (UN)GTSL - Guyana Transport Service LimitedGUYSTAC - Guyana State CorporationLAST - Institute of Applied Science and TechnologyIDB - Inter-American Development BankIFAD - International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentIICA - Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on AgricultureILO - International Labor OrganizationITC - International Trade CentreITU - International Telecommunication UnionLIDCO - Livestock Development Corporation (Guyana)ODA - Overseas Development Assistance of the United Kingdom (UK)OPE - Office of Project Execution (UNDP)PAHO - Pan American Health OrganizationTA - Technical AssistanceUN - United NationsUNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUNDP - United Nations Development ProgramUNEP - United Nations Environment ProgramUNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganizationUNICEF - United Nations Children's FundUNIDO - United Nations Industrial Development OrganizationUSAID - United States Agency for International DevelopmentWFP - World Food ProgramWHO - World Health OrganizationWMO - World Meteorological Organization
- 60 -
ANNE I
Page 1 of 5
GUYANA - ONGOING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRANSE
Sector *ad Source of Amnunt
ProjectVActivity Asalstance (Millon U8#) Duration Nature of Assistance
I, PROJECT-RELATED
AGRICULTURE
Rice NodernIzation USAID 1.250 1975-85 To Increuss emil rice farmers Income
cphn*e 11) through Increased yield, reduced cost of
production and lmprovemnt of the rice
grading systeom
East Bank Berblce EEC 0.750 1984-85 To access needs for supplementary
Group Study drinage and/or Irrigation works. In
order to promote the agricultural
development In the area.
Institutlonal Strengthening/ IDB 1.350 1981-85 Institutional strengthbnIng of Guyana
FlP bries Flshbrleu Ltd.. and provision of
assistance for financing, fleet
operation and maintenance.
Institutional Strengtheningf lD8 1.050 1984- Parallel to Loan for Abary Project, to
Irrigation strengthen Institutlonal capscity of
Abary Development Authority.
Feasibility Study/Dairy 1DB 0.370 1984 Feaslblilty study to determine optimum
Sector Invest nts for long-ter development of
the dairy sector.
INDUSTRY
FeasibilIty Study/ Energy [OB ... 1980-85 Study for gpnerating electricity from
woodwaste; lmpliamntd through
consulting firm.
11. OTHERS
GENERAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
POLICY AND PLANNING
lnat2tutionni Strengthening/ IDB lZ25 1980-85 Institetlonsi strengthening through
Plannlng training and consultency of personnel of
the State Planning Secretariat and
Guyana Managenmnt Institute.
Institutlonal Support/ UNDP 1.185 1903-86 Strengtbening of administrative.
Dopart_ent of International managerial and technical capability wIth
Energy Planning & Coordination UNDP ... To develop a systemntic and scientific Under review.
approach to energy sector planning and
coordination within te m_dical system's
overall development plan. (To be *xeeuted
by UN/OTCDT. IOB hes also exprossed
Interest In this aresl possibility of
cost-shering can be considered.
EDUCATION
Edueatlo, Loan IDS 0.50 4snpowr development through the training Approved to
of Individuals In particular skill areas. start 3rd
quarter 198S.
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ANNEX II
Page 3 of 5
GUYANA - PROPOSED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE LIST, 1935
Sector and Source of Entimated Coat
ProjectUActlIt Asmistance (Million UIS) Nature of Assistance Status
II. Otbhrs
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY &
FISRERIES
Institutional Strengthening lDS 0.60 Support for the implementatlen of new Approved to
of Rice Sector inotitutlonal changee In the mector, start 2nd
quarter 1965.
Rural Marketing Centres ID8 0.12 Training of managers of marketing centres Approved to
financed under the Food Crop Productlon £ start let
Marketing Program. quarter 196S.
Food Support Services IDO Not determined To Increase productllty of emoll farmers Probably to
Programa through development and diffusion of start 3rd
Improved technology and efficient quarter 193S.
marketing.
Forestry Conservation 5. CIDA Approximately To upgrade nmnagesmnt cpablilty of the Under review.
Mnagement UNfP 2.00 sector.
FAO
Fisheries Legislation FAO 0.012 Development of Fisheries Legislation. Approved to
start 1985.
In-service Training FAO 0.015 Saw-doctoring in-service training. Approved to
start 1985.
Food Protection ... ... Development of a oltilsectoral system of Under review.
food protection trom the farming
comnunity level through to the
agricultural extension and pubilc heaith
services (WHO/FAO).
Progra.ming/Formulation UNMP 0.04 identiflcatIon of neds for technical To start In
Mission asssltance In agriculture, forestry and March 1985.
rural development; and formulation of
specific projects. (To be executed by
FAG.)
Agroa_terology & Hydrological UNOP 0.329 To computerize all Hydroe_t data; 4 year Under review.
Data Processing programne. (To be executed by fl.)
Legislative Drafting UNOP 0.171 To asaist In the preparation of draft To start In
legislation to give effect to the March 1986.
agricultural, locel government and rural
policles of the Government. (To be
executed by UNDTCD.)
- 68 -ANNEX II
Page 4 sf 5
GUYANA - PROPOSED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE LIST, 1985
Seoter and Source of Estimated Cost
Projeot/Activlty Aaslstence MlliIon US$) Nature of Aaslntanoe Status
EDUCATION
Multi-Seatoral Programme UNDP 0U093 Assistance In Health, Agriculture Approved.
Education (Executed by UNV Programme).
Strengthening of Edueatlonl UNESCO 0 300 Development of Centre through provision Approved.
Contre of equipment and training of educational
personnel.
Video Productlon Unit UNOP/UNESCO 0.125 Provislon of training In video tape Under revieW
production and editing. approved.
Institute of Aquatic Science UNESCO 0.300 Establishmnt of Institute at the Under review.
University of Ouyan through tle
development of humn resoures eapability
In research and training In m*rine
s oences.
Centre of Excellence for UNESCO 0.101 To asslst In upgrading the teaching of Under review.
Science * Mathemetlca natural science and mothematics
Teaching throughout the edueation system.
Clobrl Training Programme IOB 2.00 Tralning progremnm for m_nagement and Approved to
mid-level human resource development. start In 3rd
quarter 1985.
EMPLOYMENT
Actumriel Review UDoP 0.060 Actusrial Review o1 National Insurance Approved.
Schemel 6 months project (Executed by
ILO).
Management Training UNDP 0.800 Assistance for 2 years to Guyana Under review.
Management Institute. (To be executed by
OTCO/ILO.)
Vocational Training UNOP 0.116 Om ibus operation and maintenance In Under review.
occupatlonal training (STSL) Phose 1.
(To be executed by ILO.)
GENERAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUESs
POLICY & PLANNING
National Planning Systm IOB 0.90 To support system through the collection Under dlecua-
and distribution of basic data for alone to begin
planning purposes, soentle In
1985.
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Page S of 5
CUYAMA - PROPOSD TECHNICAL ASSISTAhCE LIST, 1985
Sector and Source of Eatimteoa Coat
Project/ActIvIty Asalatance (Nilli"e USI) Nature of Asalstence Statun
INDWSTRT
WUnSTAC PMengement UNDP 0.501 Continatlon of assistatce In dlagnoatic Approved to
Developmnt Unit studies, developmsnt/. oaitorlag start 1955.
performanes contracts sad anagemen t
training. (Executed by UNMDTCD/UNIDO).
Drying Kiln UmoP 0.028 Construction of prototype Solar Timber Approved for
Drying Kilo. 19e5.
RlieVan Pilot Project UblOO 0.024 To assist In the development nd Under review.
marketing of local food prepared from
ludigenous cereal flours snd other
floursx
NATURAL RESOURCES
Researeh & Dsvelopment IAST UNDIP 0.S98 Proposed expansion of project activities Approved to
and extenimon of the project by one start 1985.
year. (Executed by Government bad
UNIDO.)
Water Reseorces Dovelopemnt FAO 0.020 Drafting leglslation with special Approved.
& Manegemnt Legislation reference to dralege and Irrigation
schemes.
INTElRATIONAL TRADE &
DEVELOPMNT FINACE
Strengtboelag of the UNOP 0.360 To expand and diversify the Under review.
institutional Fraomwork for coe-traditioal exports of Guyana.
Trade Developmat & Promotloo through the strengtbhning of CEPC,
Improvement of trade lnforastlon system,
market studi-r, etc. (To be executed by
ITC. Possible IGB/EEC cost-rhsrlng
envisaged.)
Debt Moeltorlg System UNCTAD 0.040 To manage n a comsprobnive bas is the Under review.
external debt including the anlysis of
all trade Informtlon.
HEALTH
Carlbbean Health Laboraeory UNOP 0.04 Development of s4rvices especially In Under review.
Se!vices rural areas throughout the country. CTo
be executed by WHO/PARD.)
National Nablria servics UNOP and O.SO0 Strengthening of the National inolris Under review.
Othbr Services, Including provision of
Sources vehicles. equipme_t end sppilel (to be
executed by VHO/PAHO).
- 70 -AMin IIIPage I of 7
GUYNA - STUCAURRAL ADJUSTMENT PROCRAM
MAJOR POLICr ACIEVEMEN"T
(1981-U3)
POLICY OBJECTIVE PROGRAM ACHIIEVEIENT
1. Blanc. of Paymntc.
A. Rising petroleum Import Energy coeservation measures and A program to link the GOYINE
bill which has contributed targets adopted by gUtNIWE, GUYSUCO electricity system witb CEC's natlonal
to declining terms of nd other public cerporatlons. system was completed by 1982 and excess
trade and eroaslo In real generation by GUYNINE Is being fed Into
Income levels, and the natlonal grid. GUYSUCO In currently
exacerbated Inflatilon. undertaking program to improve the
efficiency of the us of begasse for the
generation of electricity In a number of
Its factories.
Full transfer of fue price The Energy Authority was *stabilhed In
Increases to con_mers. Closing of 1982 and has Implemented the closure of
gasoline stations n weekends. gasoline statloes on w ekends but
discontinued It In 1983 for safety
reasens. The transfer of fuel price
Increase to consumers b been undertaken.
Rohabilitation and Improved The rehabIlItation of CECOx gonerating
mintenance of CEC generating equlpment In underway. Witb Ia-line
equip-ant and upgrading of CEC's management assistance frm externl
management. eonsultants, som progress Is being ende
to roduce GEC's adeinistrative problems.
Studies of opportunitles for Tho Energy Authority Is coordinatingIncreased use of alternative energy research Into hydro potential, prepars-
sources, tory studies for hydro power development
were midertaken under Bank Loan 1906 and
various Iternative schmes bave been
Identifird.
Studies of eletricity and The findings of the study on tho ration_-
transportation tariff structure and lization of electrIcity tariffs beve been
program for executlon, partial ly lmplemnted through tim adjust.
mnt of electricity tariffs In two stages
by an average of 40S during the first balf
of 1981 and by a further 13S In 1982. The
transportation tariff study Is presently
under review by the Governmnt, but Inple-
mntation Is constrained by the poor per-
formance of the Guyana Transport Corpora-
tion and the Goverment uniIIIpgess to
Increase transport tariff under such
circumstance.
- 71 -A-M IIIPage 2 of 7
GUYANA - SRUCTURAL ADJUSTIENT PROtRAM
MAJOR POLICf ACHIEVEIENt
POLICY OBJECTIVE PROGRAM AOilEVEVENT
B. Stagnant or dcci 1lng Expansion of export actlon program:
export VoalI.
1. Sr - Increased supplies of The lack of foreign excbange as, In
fertilizer and spare recent years. reduced the officlency of
parts. QUYSUCOa mchinery nd equipmnt. The- expanalon of wage wage Incentive progrm has boon
Incentive program expanded. Furthbr cest reduction maures
are being planned by GUTSUCO.
2. Rice2 Coverment Action
Program
- Reconstructlon of the - The program Is copieted; WRe's
Central Rica Board. workforce has been reduced by about 700
peramos In 1982.
- Ectabilsbent of five - A law providing for tie establsiuent
Regional Boards as of up to five reglonal boards, with
commerclally viable memership of at least fIwe rice
operating entities. producers, was passed by Parliament In1962.
- Ellminatlon of CRB's - The functions have been transferred to
functions regarding camercial Importers and dlitributors.
Importation and In addition, millers nd farmrs are
distributing Inputs. now allowed to Import spare parts and
equipment on a no-fund license hoasd.
- Elimination of ORB's - ORB'a credit functions have been
function regardleg the transferred to Guyana Agricoltural and
provision of credit. Industrial Developmnt Bank tCAIBAIK).
- Elimination of ORB's - Transferred to the Hinistry of
functln regarding Agriculture.
extension and research.
- Cloliug of ORB's 'emi1 - ORB's _m1l mills, tractors and
mill*' and leasing or combines hew been taken over by the
seillng prmises to Regional Administrations which re to
prIvte milIlers, organize farmrs cooperatives for the
cooperatives and operation of the mills and mchinery.
regional organizations.
Page 3 of 7
41YAIA - SIRUCTURAL ADJUSINEIIT PROCRA4
MAJOR POLICY ACHIEVEWENT
Cl98l-S3)
POLICY OBJECTIVE PROGRAM ACHIEVEMENT
- Decentrallzing ORB's - Farmers and mIIlr& are now *llcwsd to
local mrketing sall rice directly to retailers and
arrangements. consumers In comptition with the CRB.
ORB however remaina responsible for
administerlng paddy and rice prices
which are set by the Covernment.
- Rolvewlng CRB's - Agroemnt In early 1984 wIth IOB for
external mrketing COC to permit private producers limited
arrangments. access to export markets.
- Phosing out GCB's role - implmnted In mid-1984.
In reeerch and
provision of sued.
3. Beuxite Alwina Government
Actlon Program
Government undertook to - Following Initial discussions with
secure managerial, foreign companies, It becam obvious
techaolgical and that no forelga company wonted te
mrketing support as becoue Involved with the sector without
weil as equity first undertaking a study and that
participation from a equity participation would not be
forelgn company In the considered Intbe short term because of
bauxite Industry. the deprosoed state of International
mrket for bauxite products. In *arly
1983. the Government concluded
contracts with too U.S. companles; one
to prepare a comprehensive water plan
and to provide technialI assistance In
baux It operation, and the other to
conduct diagnostic study with ephasIs
on marketing. The stedies completed In
late August 1983 are under revlew by
COG.
4. Mon-traditional manufacturrer
-Establisment of Export - The EOF was duly established and
Developmnt Fund CEDF) stsffed by early 1981. Towards the and
to provide foreign of 1982 the level of operations of the
exchange for the EDF was reduced because Its resources
manufcturlng sector. were not revolving owing to the
;nability of the Bank of Guyana to
convert soft currency (I.e., CARICOM)export: oroceods Into herd correacy
required.
- 73 -ANMEX Ill
Pap 4 of 7
CUYAKA - STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
MAJOR POLICY ACHIEVEMENT
(1981-83)
POLICY OBJECTIVE PROGRAM ACI4IEVEMENT
- Appointment of - No action to date.
Industrial Development
Adviser.
- Estabilslnent of Export - Done.
Promotion Unit.
- Estabilialmnt of Export - Tbe Export-Promotion Council and In-Promotlon Council with dustrial Prematlon Council (both with
representatives from private sector representatlon) bave
public mnd private been set up and regular m_tinga are
ectors. being hold between the prlvate t_on-
factoring aector and the Government.
S. Long-term Export Program
- Completion of long-term - The studles and the formlation of the
export program by June loag-t.rm axport action program hove
30, 1981. been delayed. The Government, however,
has initiated a request te GATT/
UNCTAD's International Trade Centre and
the EEC to asIct with those tacks.It. Investment
A. Delays, cost overruns and
Inefficiencies In the Continued close monitoring of pro- The State Planning Secretariat (SPS) Is
public sector Investment. gres of investment program. Uti- currebtly concidering an Improved project
lizatlon of external technical execution and monitoring system with the
assistance to minlmlze potential assistance of an external consultant. An
bottlenecks to project execution. lDB technical asslstance program assisted
In upgrading the staff of the SPS and
Expedition of declsion on contract other project related agencies. Reforms
awards. to expedite physical project lmplement-
tion bhve been slow because of skilled
Delegatlon of greatar authority to m*npowr constraInts (exacerbated by the
project mngers. migration of skilled personnel) and the
country's foreign exchange and fiscalReorganization of NInistry of Works constraints.
to Include specialized functions In
engineering consultancy and addl-
tlonal construction capacity.
- 74 -. tam
Page 5 of 7
GUYANA - STRUCNRAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
MAJOR POLICY ACM IEVEIENT
(1981-)3)
POLICY OBJECTIVE PROARM ACH IEVEIENT
B. Declining real level of Clariticatlon and expansion of The Sovernment his angaged * foreigo
private lunv9tmt. lIvestnt Code. consultant for drafting the Rowlesed
lnvesbtot Code and a draft aubmltted In
mid-1983 Is currently under review.
lncrease credit resoures available Limited progress becoums of the severity
to private sectors. of the foreign exchange shortage In
Ouyan. esecially since 1982. However
In Iov_ber 1982, the Covernnent decided
to grant mnulacturers a rmlsslon of
cesnptlen taxes an ail Inputs for
goods Intended for export.
Establishent of EOF, Industrlai (See Section 1-8 above).
Adv sar and Export Prmtion
Council.
Ill. Downard Trend In National
Savina
A. Pblic. Sector Savings
1. Persistent current Contined improvemnt In tax Improvements In tax collection and
budgetary deficit, collection sad admlnlstration. edministretion Introduced in oid 1961
reaultOd In a 24Z Increase In Government
current revenues. However In 1982-83. tax
revenues fell below budgeted levels
prlmrily becaune of lower receipts frao
Import duties and consmumption taxes which
reflected the decline In Imports and
economic activity.
Rigorous control of current expen- Current expenditures continued to grow at
diture levels through reductim of a rapid pace Cby about 29Z) In 1981, owing
subsidies and limltationes to a sharp ris In interest paymnts.
Increases In public employment. which accounted for half of the absolute
Incresoe In current outlays. The
Governments' current deficit reached 13S
of CP In 1981. Current expeonditurs
decilied by about 6S In 1962 as a result
of reduction of subsidies and retrecanent
from the traditional cvil l rvice, but
the current account deficit rmelned above
budgeted level at 11.53 of COP. tCompared
to SAL expectation of reduction frm 9S to
SZ of CSP by 1983).
- 75 -ANNEX III
Page 6 of 7
GUYANA - STRUCTURAL ADJUSTIENT PROGRAM
MAJOR POLICY ACHIEVEPENT
(1981-83)
POLICY OBJECTIVE PROGRAM ACH IEVEWEiT
2. Low savings generated Retionlizatlon of pricing policiea The rstloaalizmtlon of electricity
by public for public corporations, pricing ftr GEC and the lmplemntattlom of
corporations. price adjurt_nt were undertaken as
discussed In section IA abeve. Ceneral
ratlonalizatlon of pricing policies for
alI public corporations has been delayed
pending the conclusion of the exercise to
restructure the public corporations upon
the recommendstion of Its Inventmnt
advisory group of foreign consultants.
Estabiisheat of saving targets for In Its 1983 Budget, the Covernment
oil public corporation. reiterated Its Intention to nake all
pubilc corporations viable, but no con-
crete saving targets htvo been
establithed as yet, pending the
reorganization exercise discussed above.
B. Declining real levels of Gradual omvemnt toward real In June 1982, dom_stic Interest rates were
private sector savings. Interest rates through annual up- adjusted upward by betwesn 0.5 to ISf
mrd adjustmeat of 1-2 percentage points, but as a result of lncroases In
points, the rate of Inflation Cabout 201 In 1982)
tbe real Interest rate romned negativo.
IV. Inappropriate Pricing
Policies
A. Low fragnete prices for CompletIon of study and adoption of Paddy prices paid to farmra ware
rice resulting In a system for perIodle adjusatnt of Increeaad by 12-15S In 1981 and by a
reduction In acreage Inputs, farmypte and domastlc con- further 20S In early 1982 In accordance
devoted to crop. sumar priees. with the recosmadations of tho SAL
supervision misslon. At the sam time,
rice purchase pricam were Increased by
25-301, thus Improving mIllers' mrgin and
domestic concsumr prices by about 351. In
ali, between 1981 and 1983, paddy prices
have been Increased by about 40-451 and
domestic consumer pricen by about 701. As
regards further effort to address the
Issue of agricultural commodity prices nd
ectabilsb a systomatic framework for their
revisw nd periodic adjuat nt. the
CoveraLwnt Is currently rewlewing the
findings and recommendations of the
1OU-f itonced consult nts,
- 76 -
MNNEX II I
Page 7 o 7
CUYMA - STRUC1URAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
MAJOR POLICY ACHIEVEMENT
C1981-1)
POLICY OBJECTIVE PROGRAM ACHIEVEMENT
B. Ratbonelization of Further Increases of electricity Electricity tariffs have been Increased
electricity tariffs. tariffs by 153 In Feb. 1981. Addi- as noted In section IA above. However,
tional nassurem na roquirmd to In mplts of the Improveast resulting from
ilminnte CEC'r cash deficit by the tariff action, CEC's finances bave re-
July 1, 1981. Continuous transfer mined weak because of rising operating
of Increase In fuel costs to cost relating to * docilne In sales and
consomrs. problem of power losses, debt collection
and poor mnagownt. Howver, with
In-line mngemnt assistance from ex-
ternal consultants, progress Is being ovdd
towards reducing theom prebl_.
V. Inmtitutlomel Wakness
A. External debt Continued monitoring and Increased The Governownt loc contracted the mervicea
mnagem_t. control over external borrowing of of Morgan Gronfell Consult ents and the
all public agencles. CFTC to establish systems of mlnitoring
especlally at the corporation level.
B. Public Flnaoce Strengthening of coordination at Limited progres made on both Issues be-
Adminietration. operational levels. cuse of skilled nnpower shortage, ex-
acerbated by migration. However, the
Strengthening of accounting and Governmnt has engaged an external con-
auditing arrangements throughout multant to assist In reforms of the
public mector. GUISTAC group of public corporations.
C. Import Licensing System. Completion of simpilfication of Import IIcensing for EOF more has been
Import licensing procedures In simplified In accordance with the agree-
first quarter of 1981. _nt, but the more general simpilfica-
tion bas not taken place as yet.
VI. Labor Productivity. Continued efforts to clarify and The government plans In Its 1983 budget to
extend wage Incentive schem. provide wage Incentive to selectod skilledmanpower In order to retain thm but the
specific mchanism has not as yet been
worked out.
Extension of on-and-off-the-job The Goverment through an ID8 financed
training scheme to Include middle technical assistance Is providing on-
and senlor mnmagement and skilled tbe-job tralning for professional and
and aei-skilled technical staff. technical staff at the State Planning
Secretariat and the Ministries. There are
plans to extend the program to Include
middle and senior ma_ngmnt personeil.
- 77 -
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table of Contents
I. Pdpulation and Labor Force
1.1 Population Trends1.2 Employment in the Public Sector1.3 Work Stoppages in the Public Sector
II. National Income Accounts
2.1 Sectoral Origin of Gross Domestic Product at CurrentFactor Cost, 1970-84
2.2 Sectoral Origin of Gross Domestic Product at ConstantFactor Cost, 1960-76
2.3 Sectoral Origin of Gross Domestic Product at ConstantFactor Cost, 1970-84
2.4 Implicit Deflators, 1970-842.5 Expenditures on Gross Domestic Product at Current Prices2.6 Expenditures on Gross Domestic Product at 1960
Prices, 1960-762.7 Estimate of Expenditure on Gross Domestic Product
at Constant 1977 Prices, 1976-842.8 National Income Ratios
III. Balance of Payments and International Trade
3.1 Balance of Payments3.2 Exports FOB3.3 Nerchandise Imports (CIF) by End-Use Category3.4 Value, Volume and Unit Value of Principal Fuel Imports3.5 Direction of Foreign Trade3.6 Trade with CARICOM3.7 Trade Volumes, Unit Values and Terms of Trade
IV. External Debt
4.1 External Public Debt Outstanding Including Undisbursedas of December 31, 1984
4.2 Service eayments, Commitments, Disbursements andOutstanding Amounts of External Debt
4.3 Structure and Terms of External Public Debt4.4 External Public Debt by Type of Creditor4.5 Selected External Debt Indicators
- 78 -
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table of Contents (Cont'd)
V. Public Sector Finances
5.1 Cencral Government Revenues5.2 Central Government Expenditures by Economic
Classification5.3 Summary of Accounts of Central Government5.4 Central Government Financing5.5 Summary Current Account of Public Sector Corporations5.6 Summary Accounts of Public Sector5.7 Public Sector Investment Program5.8 Summary of Public Sector Capital Expenditures
by Sector
VI. Money and Banking
6.1 Summary Accounts of the Monetary Authorities6.2 Summary Accounts of the Commercial Banks6.3 Summary Accounts of the Monetary System6.4 Net International Reserves of the Banking System6.5 External Payment Arrears6.6 Selected Interest Rates6.7 Commercial Bank Credit to Private Sector and
Public Enterprises6.8 Central Government Bonded Debt by Holder6.9 Private Sector Holdings of Selected Financial Assets
VII. Production
7.1 Output of Selected Commodities
VIII. Prices
8.1 Consumer Price Indices8.2 Consumer Price Index by Quarter8.3 Real Effective Exchange Rate and Related Series8.4 Paddy and Rice Prices
IX. Macroeconomic Projections
9.1 Actual and Projected Sources and Uses of Resources9.2 Actual and Projected Balance of Payments9.3 Actual and Projected Exports and Imports9.4 Projected Public Sector Finances9.5 Selected Macroeconomic Indicators
- 79 -
A Note on the National Income Accounts, Consumer PriceIndex and Population Estimates
The data assembled in this appendix were provided by theGovernment of Guyana. Since 1981, the quality of the national accounts,consumer price index and population estimates has deteriorated considerablyfor reasons noted below. The overall data situation has also deterioratedbecause of internal inconsistencies in the accounts and editing problems.
National Income Accounts - The estimates of the gross domesticproduct have deteriorated as a result of a reduction in coverageattributable to non-reporting and the expansion of the parallel market(which affects the import/export data). Furthermore, the expenditure andindustrial surveys that form the basis of the national income accounts areoutdated. The indications are that GDP is underestimated.
Consumer Price Index - The coverage is limited as a result of theprevalence of price controls and the unavailability of a large number ofconsumer commodities originally in the basket. These problems havenecessitated the use of substitutes. The expansion of the parallel marketarnd associated higher prices suggest that the CPI underestimates the rateof increase in prices.
Population Data - The population estimates are based on the 1970population census. The Government has not as yet published the results ofthe 1980 population census. Estimates of births and deaths have also beenmade by the Statistical Bureau of Guyana from 1977 and 1979 onwards,respectively.
lOTAL EXIERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 682,486 145,769 828,255 107.946 28,426
NOTES: (1) ONLY DEBTS WITH AN ORIGINAL OR EXTENDED MATURITY OF OVER ONE YEAR ARE INCLUDED IN THIlS TABLE.(2) DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDES PRINCIPAL IN ARREARS BUT EXCLUDES INTEREST IN AnREARS.
Page 1 of 7Table 4.2 - GUYANA
SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBtJRSFD AS OF DEC. 31. 19F4DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN TH1OUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TOTAL
YEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT r R A N S A C T I O N S D U R I N G P E R I O D OIHER CHANGES-BEGINNING OF PERIOD
D OISBURSED : INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST-: ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT
* THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONEYEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
Page 2 of 7Table 4.2 - GUYANA
SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31. 1984DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TYPE OF CREDITOR SUPPLIERS CREDITS
TOTALYEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I O N S D U R I N G P E R I O D OTHER CHANGES
BEGINNING OF PERIOD
DISBURSED : INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST-ONLY :UNDISBURSEO: MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT *
* THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN rTIE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONEYEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
Page 3 of 7Table 4.2 - GUYANA
SERVICE PAYMENTS. COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1984DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TYPE OF CREDITOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
TOTALYEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I O N S D U R I N G P E R I G D OTHER CHANGES
: BEGINNING OF PERIOD
DISBURSED : INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST-: ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS MENTS ----------- -----------:----------- LATIONS MENT
. THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARIT11METIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONEYEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
Page 4 of 7Table 4.2 - GUYANA
SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT
PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1984DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TYPE OF CREDITOR BONDS
TOTALYEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT : T R A N S A C T I 0 N S D U R I N G P E R I 0 D : OTHER CHANGES
BEGINNING OF PERIOD:
: DISBURSED : INCLUDING : COMMIT- : DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S : CANCEL- : ADOtJST-* ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS : MENTS ---------- -: - ----- LATIONS : MENT
* * * * * * THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE PROJECTED * ' * * I
1985 4,603 4,603 - 4,603 122 4.725 --
* THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT O3UTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONE
YEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
Page 5 of 7Table 4.2 - GUYANA
SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS. DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXrERNAL PUBLIC DEST
PROJECTIONS BASEO ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1984DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TYPE OF CREDITOR NATIONALIZATION
TOTALYEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I O N S D U R I N G P E R I O D OTHER CHANGES
BEGINNING OF PERIOD
DISBURSED : INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST-: ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS MENTS -----------:-----------:----------- LATIONS MENT
* THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED FROM ONEYEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
Page 6 of 7Table 4.2 - GUYANA
SERVICE PAVMENTS. COMMITMENTS, DISBURSEMENTS AND OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PU[LIC DIEl
PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1984DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TYPE OF CREDITOR MULTILATERAL LOANS
TOTALYEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I O N S D U R I N G P E R I D . OTHER CHANGES
: BEGINNING OF PERIOD
DISBURSED : INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST-: ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS MENTS ----------- ----- -- ----------- I.ATIONS MENT
4 THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNOISEURSED FRCM ONEYEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
Page 7 of 7Table 4.2 - GUYANA
SERVICE PAYMENTS, COMMITMENTS, OIS4URSEMENrS AND OUTSIANDING AMOUNTS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEr.r
PROJECTIONS BASED ON DEBT OUTSTANDING INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DEC. 31, 1984DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOIJSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)TYPE OF CREDITOR BILATERAL LOANS
TOTALYEAR DEBT OUTSTANDING AT T R A N S A C T I O N S D U R I N G P E R I O D OTHER CHAtIGES
BEGINNING OF PERIOD
DISBURSED : INCLUDING COMMIT- DISBURSE- S E R V I C E P A Y M E N T S CANCEL- ADJUST-ONLY :UNDISBURSED: MENTS MENTS ----------- ----------- :----------- LATIONS MENT '
* THIS COLUMN SHOWS THE AMOUNT OF ARITHMETIC IMBALAIJCE IN THE AMOUNT OUISTANDING INCLUDING UtDISBURSEO FROM ONEYEAR TO THE NEXT. THE MOST COMMON CAUSES OF IMBALANCES ARE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES AND TRANSFER OF DEBTSFROM ONE CATEGORY TO ANOTHER IN THE TABLE.
Page 1 of 10Table 4.3 - GUYANA
STRUCTURE AND TERMS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBTCOMMITMENTS JAN. 1, 1970 - DEC. 31. 1984 *DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. OOLLARS)AVERAGE TERMS
PERIOD ENDING ----------------------------------------------------------TYPE OF CREDITOR INTEREST MATURITY GRACE GRANT GRANT TOTAL***CREDITOR COUNTRY AMOUNT** () (YRS) (YRS) ELEMENT(X) EOUIVALENT AMOUNT
e INCLUDES INCREASES DURING THIS PERIOD TO DEBTS WITH ORIGINAL COMMITMENT DATES FROM JAN. 1. 1900 TO DEC. 31, 1984.* TOTAL LOANS HAVING INTEREST, GRACE PERIOW AND MATURITY INFORI'ATION AVAILABLE. USED TO COMPUTE AVERAGE TERMS.
a.' TOTAL OF ALL LOANS IN THIS BREAKDOWN REGARDLESS OF AVAILABILITY OF INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD. AND MATURITY INFORMATION.
Page 2 of 10Table 4.3 - GUYANA
STRUCTURE AND TERMS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBTCOMMITMENTS JAN. 1. 1970 - DEC. 31. 1984 *DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)AVERAGE TERMS
PERIOD ENDING -----------------------------------------------------R---GTYPE OF CREOITOR INTEREST MATURIlY GRACE GRANT GRANT TOTAL-CREDITOR COUNTRY AMOUNT** (X} (VRS) (YRS) ELEMENT(%) EQUIVALENT AMOUNT
TOTAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 22.668 12.477 6.6 2.8 -10.1 -2,279 22.668
* INCLUDES INCREASES DURING THIS PERIOD TO DEBTS WITH ORIGINAL COMMITMENT DATES FROM JAN. 1. 1900 TO DEC. 31. 1984.'. TOTAL LOANS HAVING INTEREST. GRACE PERIOD AND MATURITY INFORMATION AVAILABLE. USED TO COMPUTE AVERAGE TERMS.
... TOTAL OF ALL LOANS IN THIS BREAKDOWN'REGARDLESS OF AVAILABILITY OF INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD. AND MATURITY INFORMATION.
Page 3 of 10Table 4.3 - GUYANA
STRUCTURE AND TERMS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBTCOMMITMENTS JAN. 1, 1970 D DEC. 31, 1984 *DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)AVERAGE TERMS
PERIOD ENDING ..........................................................TYPE OF CREDITOR INTEREST MATURITY GRACE GRANT GRANT TOTAL*40CREDITOR COUNTRY AMOUNT. (%) (YRS) (YRS) ELEMENT(%) EOUIVALENT AMOUNT
* INCLUCES INCREASES DURING THIS PERIOD TO DEBTS WITH ORIGINAL COMMITMENT DATES FROM JAN. 1, 1900 TO DEC. 31, 1984,* TOTAL LOANS HAVING INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD AND MATURITY INFORMATION AVAILABLE, USED TO COMPUTE AVERAGE TERMS.*. TOTAL OF ALL LOANS IN THIS BREAKDOWN REGARDLESS OF AVAILABILITY OF INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD, AND MATURITY INFORMATION.
Page 4 of 10Table 4.3 - GUYANA
STRUCTURE AND TERMS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBTCOMMITMENTS JAN. 1, 1970 - DEC. 31, 1984 *DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)AVERAGE TERMS
PERIOD ENDING ..........................................................TYPE OF CREDITOR INTEREST MATURITY GRACE GRANT GRANT TOTAL*$*CREDITOR COUNTRY AMOUNT** (%) (YRS) (YRS) ELEMENT(%) EQUIVALENT AMOUNT
7712SUPPLIERS CREDITSUNITED STATES 623 9.500 6.7 0.7 0,8 5 623
TOTAL SUPPLIERS CREDITS 623 9.500 6.7 0.7 0.8 5 623
* INCLUDES INCREASES DURING THIS,PERIOD TO DEBTS WITH ORIGINAL COMMITMENT DATES IROM JAN. I, 1900 TO DEC. 31, 1984.*. TOrAL LOANS HAVING INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD AND MATURITY INFORMATION AVAILABLE, USED TO COMPUTE AVERAOE TERMS.
s.e TOTAL OF ALL LOANS IN THIS BREAKDOWN REGARDLESS OF AVAILABILITY OF INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD, AND MATURITY INFORMATION.
Page 5 of 10Table 4.3 - GUYANA
STRUCTURE AND TERMS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBTCOMMITMENTS JAN. 1, 1970 - DEC. 31, 1984 *DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANOS OF U.S. DOLLARS)AVERAGE TERMS
PERIOD ENDING .......TYPE OF CREDITOR INTEREST MATURITY GRACE GRANT GRANT TOTALe*CREDITOR COUNTRY AMOUNTss (%) (YRS) (YRS) ELEMENT(%) EQUIVALENT AMOUNT
* INCLUDES INCREASES DURING THIS PERIOD TO DEBTS WITH ORIGINAL COMMITMENT DATES FROM JAN. I, 1900 TO DEC. 31, 1984.*. TOTAL LOANS HAVING INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD AND MATURITY INFORMATION AVAILABLE, USED TO COMPUTE AVERAGE TERMS.*** TOTAL OF ALL LOANS IN THIS BREAKDOWN REGARDLESS OF AVAILABILITY OF INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD, AND MATURITY INFORMATION.
Page 6 of 10Table '.3 - GUYANA
STRUCTURE AND TERMS OF EXTERNAL PURLIO OEBTCOMMITMENTS JAN. 1, 1970 - DEC. 31, 1984 sDEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)AVERAGE TERMS
PERIOD ENDING -..-.........................--......--......-...........TYPE OF CREDITOR INTEREST MATURITY GRACE GRANT GRANT TOTAL@**
9 INCLUDES INCREASES DURING THIS PERIOD TO DEBTS WITH ORIGINAL COMMITMENT DATES FROM JAN. 1, 1900 TO DEC. 31, 1984.* TOTAL LOANS HAVING INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD AND MATURITY INFORMATION AVAILABLE. USED TO COMPUTE AVERAGE TERMS.*' TOTAL OF ALL LOANS IN THIS BREAKDOWN REGARDLESS OF AVAILABILITY OF INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD, AND MATURITY INFORMATION,
Page 7 of 10Table 4.3 - GUYANA
STRUCTURE AND TERMS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBTCOMMITMENTS JAN, 1, 1970 - DEC. 31, 1984 *DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. OOLLARS)AVERAGE TERMS
PERIOO ENDING --------------..------..-..TYPE OF CREDITOR INTEREST MATURITY GRACE GRANT GRANT TOTAL**CREDITOR COUNTRY AMOUNT (X} (YRS) (YRS) ELEMENT(%) EQUIVALENT AMOUNT
* INCLUDES INCREASES DURING THIS PERIOD TO DEBTS WITH ORIGINAL COMMITMENT DATES FROM JAN. 1, 1900 TO DEC. 31. 1984.*e TOTAL LOANS HAVING INTEREST. GRACE PERIOD AND MATURITY INFORMATION AVAILABLE, USED TO COMPUTE AVERAGE TERMS.
**e TOTAL OF ALL LOANS IN THIS BREAKDOWN REGARDLESS OF AVAILABILITY OF INTEREST. GRACE PERIOD. AND MATURITY INFORMATION.
Page 8 of 10Table 4.3 - GUYANA
STRUCTURE AND TERMS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBTCOMMITMENTS UAN. f, 1970 - DEC. 31, 1984 .DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)AVERAGE TERMS
PERIOD ENDING ..... ..... .... ..... .... ..... ..... .... ..... ....TYPE OF CREDITOR INTEREST MATURITY GRACE GRANT GRANT TOTAL-CREDITOR COUNTRY AMOUNT- " {) (YRS) (YRS) ELEMENT(%) EQUIVALENT AMOUNT
* INCLUDES INCREASES DURING THIS PERIOD TO DEBTS WITH ORIGINAL COMMITMENT DATES FROM JAN. l. 1900 TO DEC. 31, 1984.a. TOTAL LOANS HAVING INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD AND MATURITY INFORMATION AVAILABLE. USED TO COMPUTE AVERAGE TERMS.*. TOTAL OF ALL LOANS IN THIS BREAKDOWN REGARDLESS OF AVAILABILITY OF INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD, AND MATURITY INFORMATION.
Page 9 of 10Table 4.3 - GUYANA
STRUCTURE AND TERMS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBTCOMMITMENTS JAN. 1, 1970 - DEC. 31, 1984 *DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)AVERAGE TERMS
PERIOD ENDING -- ----------------------------------------TYPE OF CREDITOR INTEREST MATURITY GRACE GRANT GRANT TOTAL***
e INCLUDES INCREASES DURING THIS PERIOD TO DEBTS WITH ORIGINAL COMMITMENT DATES FROM JAN. 1, 1900 TO DEC. 31, 1984.*. TOTAL LOANS HAVING INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD AND MATURITY INFORMATION AVAILABLE, USED TO COMPUTE AVERAGE TERMS.
*. TOTAL OF ALL LOANS IN THIS BREAKDOWN REGARDLESS OF AVAILABILITY OF INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD, AND MATURITY INFORMATION.
Page 10 of 10Table 4.3 - GUYANA
STRUCTURE AND TERMS OF EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBTCOMMITMENTS JAN. 1, 1970 - DEC. 31. 1984 *nEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY AND GOODS
(IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)AVERAGE TERMS
PERIOD ENDING ------ --- --------------------------------------TYPE OF CREDITOR INTEREST MATURITY GRACE GRANT GRANT TOTAL**-
TOTAL EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 1,085,238 5.584 20.3 5.3 32.2 349.827 1,085.331
* INCLUDES INCREASES DURING THIS PERIOD TO DEBTS WITH ORIGINAL COMMITMENT DATES FROM JAN. 1. 1900 TO DEC. 31. 1984.es TOTAL LOANS HAVING INTEREST. GRACE PERIOD AND MATURITY INFORMATION AVAILABLE, USED TO COMPUTE AVERAGE TERMS.* TOTAL OF ALL LOANS IN THIS BREAKDOWN REGARDLESS OF AVAILABILITY OF INTEREST, GRACE PERIOD, AND MATURITY INFORMATION.
/
- 119 -
Table 4.4i UiTMI - Exterml Pulic Debt by Tp f Creditor
End of Tw 72 1973 1974 197S 76 1977 1976 1979 1980 1911 1982 1963 1984
a/ From IS83 Included In capital transferx (grents and lase).bh From 1983. Includes National Service expenditures. previously deslgeeted es capital expenditures.
Sources Ministry of Fienne and staff *atim too.
Januery/Fsbrury 1985
- 123 -
Table 5.3S WYANA - SUMMARY ACCOUNTS OF CENTRAL OVERISNEI