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G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Suntay for petitioner.

Barrios and Fule for respondent.

SANCHEZ, J .:

The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is RepublicAct 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in theProvince of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "Nobill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall beexpressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the

present original petition forcertiorariand prohibition.

On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known asRepublic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verbareads:

Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-boDigakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, KapataganBongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos andMagolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao delSur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct andindependent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality ofDianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipalityshall be in Togaig.

Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shalbe elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for localofficials.

Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within themunicipality ofBuldon,Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, SarakanKat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan areparts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality ofParang, also in theProvinceof Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967,the pertinent portions of which are:

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For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for otherelection purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, thenew municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios ofKapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, LosainMatimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao deSur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon,Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,

Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in themunicipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.

Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the provinceof Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about achange in the boundaries of the two provinces.

Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the Presidentthrough the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that theoperation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation,declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional bythe Supreme Court."

This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan,a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualifiedvoter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declaredunconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September

20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.

1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill whichmay be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall beexpressed in the title of the bill."2

It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dualimitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomerationunder one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to becouched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those

concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be"expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit ofcommand."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does notexact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of thebill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only itstitle was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House ofRepresentatives4 where the bill, being of local application, originated.5

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Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of anenactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all thecontents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purposeof the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in thesubject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of theproposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of thebill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent

surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6

In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with theconstitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:

The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, whichtechnical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in expressterms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is souncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the

purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which ismisleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another ordifferent one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression orindication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

xxx xxx xxx

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its formshould be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, ofgiving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.7

With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. Thetitle "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao deSur"8 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected bythe creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in theadjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. Thephrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makesthe title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianatonpurportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the

province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, aprovince different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive.Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it didnot apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in theprovince of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from theirtowns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept thepublic in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.

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These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RepublicAct 4790.

Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in"the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely theincidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianatonand that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away

"need not be expressed in the title of the law." This posture we must say butemphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the billTransfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessityinvolves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the correspondingincrease of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality.

And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.

Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, ascontrolling here. The Felwa case is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic

Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain ProvinceIfugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon theaverment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the electiveofficials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the bill. We thereruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provincesmust be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" whichis "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. Thestatute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping together ofbarrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural norlogical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of

boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a newmunicipality and vice versa.

As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Villageof Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Actto Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute,however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that thefollowing described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: .. . be, and the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of theVillage of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident ofOttawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction andcontrol, including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV ofthe Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace more than oneobject, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the statuteand defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decreeof nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:

It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would havebeen a sufficient title, and that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were

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unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the words last quoted may,for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.

. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of thetitle of an act for the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq.649, 39 A. 539.

A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention ofthose affected by the act to its provisions."Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.

The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegoncounty. The act goes beyond the restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly,supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleading."9

Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, whichlegislative purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared

unconstitutional."10

We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference tothe nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with themere nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in themunicipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoningadvocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in theprovince of Lanao del Sur.

We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, thatwhere a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, theparts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives theexception to this rule, thus:

. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected,as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, asto warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all

could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residueindependently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions whichare thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them,11

In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in thejurisprudence of this Court, thus:

The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to theOrganic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion if separable from theinvalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must

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be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that theLegislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they couldnot constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a completeintelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . Thelanguage used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacyfor any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative wilindependently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate, . . . .12

Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to createthe restricted area ofnine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Surinto the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and ParangCotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.

Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentalityof the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as anagency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the lattercharacter that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not asubdivision of the State.13

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a groupof barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongstthese are population, territory, and income. It was apparently these same factors whichinduced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking ofthe original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatorynote to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:

The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is largeand the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.

This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to governthemselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.

When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of thetwenty-one barrios not nine barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof.That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted intolaw, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the

municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number ofquestions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive community, large aggregatepopulation, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, stilapply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assumethat the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they beformed into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of anindependent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the incometo be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, andother corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of these

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disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer them inthe negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute toCongress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created uponthe basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population andsufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton withonly nine of the original twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government still left tobe conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent

beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes thejudiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditionaseparation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read aDianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, ifthese nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not ofthis Court, to spell out that congressional will.

Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.14

3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, thatpetitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation ofRepublic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the reaparty in interest.

Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates theconstitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacityto sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests areimpaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where heis residing has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.

The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislationcreating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place ofresidence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction.15

Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to votein his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, asis the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may notdesire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are fanned intothe new town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was

constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He maynot even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to votefor anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the townbefore dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must beshown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby,16 itstands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of anycitizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge theconstitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.

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For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and toprohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.

No costs allowed. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castroand Angeles, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court, I findmyself unable to give my assent. Hence these few words to express my stand.

Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality ofDianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subjectmatter of such an enactment. The mere fact that in the body of such statute barriosfound in two other municipalities of another province were included does not of itselfsuffice for a finding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked. At themost, the statute to be free from the insubstantial doubts about its validity must beconstrued as not including the barrios, located not in the municipalities of Butig andBalabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon, Cotabato.

The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shalembrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. 1 Thisprovision is similar to those found in the Constitution of many American States. It isaimed against the evils, of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, andagainst surreptitious or unconsidered enactments.2 Where the subject of a bill is limitedto a particular matter, the members of the legislature as well as the people should beinformed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provisionthus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision notgermane to the subject matter of the bill.

It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. Theconstruction must be reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title becomprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statuteseeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for theaccomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is notrequired to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The constitutionalprovision is satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its subject find expression inits title.3

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The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of thePhilippines, in 1938, construing a provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong &Shanghai Bank,4 held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No. 4007, theReorganization Law, providing for the mode in which the total annual expenses of theBureau of Banking may be reimbursed through assessment levied upon all bankinginstitutions subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner was not violative of such arequirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act. Justice Laurel, however

vigorously dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the act wasreorganization, the provision assailed did not deal with reorganization but with taxationWhile the case ofGovernment vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bankwas decided by a baremajority of four justices against three, the present trend seems to be that theconstitutional requirement is to be given the liberal test as indicated in the majorityopinion penned by Justice Abad Santos, and not the strict test as desired by themajority headed by Justice Laurel.

Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions beginning with Sumulong v

Commission on Elections,

5

up to and including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,

6

theopinion coming from Justice Concepcion.

It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,7 one of the grounds on which theinvalidity of Republic Act No. 3836 was predicated was the violation of the aboveconstitutional provision. This Retirement Act for senators and representatives wasentitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-SECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OFCOMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDEDBY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As we noted, theparagraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed objectionable "refers to members of

Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the GovernmentService Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials,would relate to a subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186In other words, this portion of the amendment ( re retirement benefits for Members ofCongress and appointive officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms foreach house) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for bothretirement and insurance benefits to its members." Nonetheless our opinion wascareful to note that there was no abandonment of the principle of liberality. Thus: "we

are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts toconstrue the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act,liberally."

It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. 4790 is notsusceptible to the indictment that the constitutional requirement as to legislation havingonly one subject which should be expressed in his title was not met. The subject wasthe creation of the municipality of Dianaton. That was embodied in the title.

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It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court, some of theopinions coming from jurists illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and theiracknowledged erudition, that, with all due respect, I find the citation from Corpus JurisSecundum, unnecessary and far from persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do notdeem controlling, as the freedom of this Court to accept or reject doctrines thereinannounced cannot be doubted.

Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several barrios of twomunicipalities outside Lanao del Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton ofthat province. That itself would not have given rise to a constitutional questionconsidering the broad, well-high plenary powers possessed by Congress to alterprovincial and municipal boundaries. What justified resort to this Court was thecongressional failure to make explicit that such barrios in two municipalities located inCotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created municipality of Dianaton,Lanao del Sur.

To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to excludefrom Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found inmunicipalities outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the testof the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What wascreated was a new municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. Thisconstruction assures precisely that.

This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in basic principlesunderlying precedents, which if not precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring.In Radiowealth v. Agregado,8 certain provisions of the Administrative Code were

interpreted and given a "construction which would be more in harmony with the tenetsof the fundamental law." In Sanchez v. Lyon Construction,9 this Court had a similarruling: "Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance with [therelevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above principle gained acceptance at amuch earlier period in our constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In reGuaria:10"In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem itour duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress,if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflictwith the higher law. In doing so, we think we should not hesitate to disregardcontentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator which would lead to theconclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act ofCongress. However specious the argument may be in favor of one of two possibleconstructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on thecontention that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of hisauthority, and that his apparent intention was to enact an invalid law."

American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then Justice, later ChiefJustice, Stone, construed statutes "with an eye to possible constitutional limitations soas to avoid doubts as to [their] validity."11 From the pen of the articulate jurist

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Frankfurter:12 "Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying activities" in the resolution must begiven the meaning that may fairly be attributed to it, having special regard for theprinciple of constitutional adjudication which makes it decisive in the choice of fairalternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional questions avoidedby another." His opinion in the Rumely case continues with the above pronouncementof Stone and two other former Chief Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft,'(i)t is our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach conclusion which will

avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality', Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. UnitedStates, 275 US 331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194, 198, 72 L. ed. 303. . . . As phrased by Mr.Chief Justice Hughes, "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinaprinciple that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairlypossible by which the question may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 L.ed. 598, and cases cited." The prevailing doctrine then as set forth by Justice Clark in a1963 decision,13 is that courts "have consistently sought an interpretation whichsupports the constitutionality of legislation." Phrased differently by Justice Douglas, the

judiciary favors "that interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater change of

surviving the test of constitutionality."14

It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that alegislative measure, in the language of Van Devanter "should not be given aconstruction which will imperil its validity where it is reasonably open to constructionfree from such peril."15 Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such riskand is free from the peril of nullity.

So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the practicalconsiderations clearly brought to light in the opinion of the Court.

G.R. No. L-22766 August 30, 1968

SURIGAO ELECTRIC, CO., INC. and ARTURO LUMANLAN, SR., petitioners,vs.MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO and HON. PUBLIC SERVICECOMMISSION, respondents.

David G. Nitafan for petitioners.Provincial Fiscal Bernardo Ll. Salas for respondent Municipality of Surigao.Office of the Solicitor General for respondent Public Service Commission.

FERNANDO, J.:

On June 18, 1960, Congress further amended the Public Service Act, one of thechanges introduced doing away with the requirement of a certificate of publicconvenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission for "public services

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owned or operated by government entities or government-owned or controlledcorporations," but at the same time affirming its power of regulation,1 more specificallyas set forth in the next section of the law, which while exempting public services ownedor operated by any instrumentality of the government or any government-owned orcontrolled corporations from its supervision, jurisdiction and control stops short ofincluding "the fixing of rates."2

In this petition for review, a case of first impression, petitioner Surigao Electric Co.,Inc., a legislative franchise holder, and petitioner Arturo Lumanlan to whom, onFebruary 16, 1962, the rights and privileges of the former as well as its plant andfacilities were transferred, challenge the validity of the order of respondent PublicService Commission, dated July 11, 1963, wherein it held that it had "no otheralternative but to approve as [it did approve] the tentative schedule of rates submittedby the applicant," the other respondent herein, the Municipality of Surigao.3

In the above order, the issue, according to respondent Commission, "boils down towhether or not a municipal government can directly maintain and operate an electricplant without obtaining a specific franchise for the purpose and without a certificate ofpublic convenience and necessity duly issued by the Public ServiceCommission."4 Citing the above amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 2677respondent Commission answered the question thus: "A municipal government or amunicipal corporation such as the Municipality of Surigao is a government entityrecognized, supported and utilized by the National Government as a part of itsgovernment machinery and functions; a municipal government actually functions as anextension of the national government and, therefore, it is an instrumentalityof thelatter; and by express provisions of Section 14(e) of Act 2677, an instrumentality of the

national governmentis exempted from the jurisdiction of the PSC except with respectto the fixing of rates. This exemption is even clearer in Section 13(a)." 5

The above formulation of respondent Commission could be worded differently. There isneed for greater precision as well as further elaboration. Its conclusion, however, canstand the test of scrutiny. We sustain the Public Service Commission.

The question involved is one of statutory interpretation. We have to ascertain the intentof Congress in introducing the above amendments, more specifically, in eliminating therequirement of the certificate of public convenience and necessity being obtained by

government entities, or by government-owned or controlled corporations operatingpublic services. Here, the Municipality of Surigao is not a government-owned orcontrolled corporation. It cannot be said, however, that it is not a government entity.

As early as 1916, in Mendoza v. de Leon,6 there has been a recognition by this Courtof the dual character of a municipal corporation, one as governmental, being a branchof the general administration of the state, and the other as quasi-private and corporate

A well-known authority, Dillon, was referred to by us to stress the undeniable fact that"legislative and governmental powers" are "conferred upon a municipality, the better to

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enable it to aid a state in properly governing that portion of its people residing within itsmunicipality, such powers [being] in their nature public, ..."7 As was emphasized by usin the Mendoza decision: "Governmental affairs do not lose their governmentalcharacter by being delegated to the municipal governments. Nor does the fact thatsuch duties are performed by officers of the municipality which, for convenience, thestate allows the municipality to select, change their character. To preserve the peace,protect the morals and health of the community and so on is to administer government,

whether it be done by the central government itself or is shifted to a locaorganization."8

It would, therefore, be to erode the term "government entities" of its meaning if we areto reverse the Public Service Commission and to hold that a municipality is to beconsidered outside its scope. It may be admitted that there would be no ambiguity at alhad the term "municipal corporations" been employed. Our function, however, is to putmeaning to legislative words, not to denude them of their contents. They may be attimes, as Cohen pointed out, frail vessels in which to embark legislative hopes, but we

do not, just because of that, allow them to disappear perpetually from sight to findeternal slumber in the deep. It would be far from manifesting fidelity to the judicial taskof construing statutes if we were to consider the order under review as a failure toabide by what the law commands.

The above construction gives significance to every word of the statute. It makes theentire scheme harmonious. Moreover, the conclusion to which we are thus led isreinforced by a manifestation of public policy as expressed in a legislative act of well-nigh contemporaneous vintage. We refer to the Local Autonomy Act,9 approved a yearearlier. It would be to impute to Congress a desire not to extend further but to cut short

what the year before it considered a laudatory scheme to enlarge the scope ofmunicipal power, if the amendatory act now under scrutiny were to be so restrictivelyconstrued. Municipal corporations should not be excluded from the operation thereof.

There would be no warrant for such a view. Logic and common sense would beaffronted by such a conclusion, let alone the sense of esteem which under the theoryof separation of powers is owed a coordinate branch. Again, this is one instance whereassuming the ambiguity of the words employed in a statute, its overriding principle, toparaphrase Holmes, fixes the reach of statutory language.

With the view we thus take of the amendatory statute, the errors assigned bypetitioner, which would seek to fasten, mistakenly to our mind, an unwarrantedrestriction to the amendatory language of Republic Act No. 2677, need not be passedupon.

An alleged error imputed to respondent Commission, however, needs furtherdiscussion. Petitioners seek refuge in the legislative franchise grantedthem. 10 Whatever privilege may be claimed by petitioners cannot override the specificconstitutional restriction that no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual or

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corporation except under a condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alterationor repeal by Congress. 11 Such amendment or alteration need not be express; it maybe implied from a latter act of general applicability, such as the one now underconsideration.

Moreover, under a well-settled principle of American origin, one which upon theestablishment of the Philippine Government under American tutelage was adopted

here and continued under our Constitution, no such franchise or right can be availed ofto defeat the proper exercise of the police power. An early expression of this view isfound in the leadingAmerican case of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,12 an1837 decision, the opinion being penned by Chief Justice Taney: "The continuedexistence of a government would be of no great value, if by implications andpresumptions it was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of itscreation; and the functions it was designed to perform, transferred to the hands ofprivileged Corporations. .. While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, wemust not forget that the community also have rights, and that the happiness and well-

being of every citizen depend on their faithful preservation."

13

Reference by petitioners to the statute providing the procedure for the taking over andoperation by the government of public utilities, 14 in their view "to further strengthen[their] contention", as to the commission of this alleged error is unavailing, even if suchstatute were applicable, which it is not. In the language of their own brief: "This Actprovides for the procedure to be followed whenever the Government or any politicalsubdivision thereof decides to acquire and operate a public utility owned and operatedby any individual or private corporation." 15What is to be regulated, therefore, by thisenactment is the exercise of eminent domain, which is a taking of private property for

public use upon the payment of just compensation. There is here no taking. There ishere no appropriation. What was owned before by petitioners continue to remain theirsThere is to be no transfer of ownership.

Rather, a municipal corporation, by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 2677, may furtherpromote community welfare by itself engaging in supplying public services, without theneed of a certificate of public convenience. If at all then, the exercise of thisgovernmental prerogative comes within the broad, well-nigh, undefined scope of thepolice power. It is not here, of course, the ordinary case of restraint on property orliberty, by the imposition of a regulation. What the amendatory act in effectaccomplishes is to lend encouragement and support for the municipal corporation itselfundertaking an activity as a result of which, profits of a competing private firm would beadversely affected.

Clearly, then, the relevancy of the statute providing for the taking or operation of thegovernment of public utilities, appears, to put it at its mildest, far from clear. Petitionerscontention as to this alleged error being committed, therefore, far from beingstrengthened by such a reference, suffers from a fate less auspicious.

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No other alleged error committed need be considered.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Public Service Commission of July 11, 1963,as well as the order of February 7, 1964, denying the motion for reconsideration, areaffirmed. Costs against petitioners.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and

Angeles, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 105746 December 2, 1996

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ, through its MAYOR ELEUTERIO A. QUIMBO, VICE-MAYOR ROBINSON B. LOMO, COUNCILORS TEOFILO GALORIO, CASIANOADORABLE, MARIO APAO, ANTONIO BIENES, VEDE SULLANO, MARIETO TAN,SR., HERMINIO SERINO, BENJAMIN DANO, and CRISPULO MUNAR, and

ELEUTERIO A. QUIMBO, ROBINSON B. LOMO, TEOFILO GALORIO, CASIANOADORABLE, MARIO APAO, ANTONIO BIENES, VEDE SULLANO, MARIETO TAN,SR., HERMINIO SERINO, BENJAMIN DANO, and CRISPULO MUNAR, in theirprivate capacities as taxpayer in the Province of Misamis Occidental and in theMunicipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, and BENJAMIN C. GALINDO andBENHUR B. BAUTISTA, in their private capacities as taxpayers in the Province ofMisamis Occidental and the Municipality of Jimenez, MisamisOccidental, petitioners,vs.

HON. VICENTE T. BAZ, JR., Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 14, 10th JUDICIAL REGION, OROQUIETA CITY, and MUNICIPALITY OFSINACABAN through its MAYOR EUFRACIO D. LOOD, VICE-MAYOR BASILIO MBANAAG, COUNCILORS CONCEPCION E. LAGA-AC, MIGUEL F. ABCEDE,JUANITO B. TIU, CLAUDIO T. REGIL, ANICETO S. MEJAREZ NAZIANCINO PAYE,JOSE P. BANQUE, NUMERIANO B. MARIQUIT, and FEDERICO QUINIMON, andTHE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL through the PROVINCIAL BOARD OFMISAMIS OCCIDENTAL and its members, VICE-GOVERNOR FLORENCIO LGARCIA, BOARD MEMBERS MARIVIC S. CHIONG, PACITA M. YAP, ALEGRIA V.CARINO, JULIO L. TIU, LEONARDO R. REGALADO II, CONSTANCIO C. BALAIS,

and ERNESTO P. IRA, and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, through its Chairman,HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO, and THE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTthrough its Secretary, HON. LUIS SANTOS (now HON. CESAR SARINO), and THEDEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, through its Secretary, HON.GUILLERMO CARAGUE (now HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ), and The Hon.CATALINO MACARAIG (now HON. FRANKLIN DRILON), EXECUTIVESECRETARY OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, respondents.

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MENDOZA, J .:p

This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 4, 1992 of the Regional TrialCourt, Branch 14 of Oroquieta City, 1 affirming the legal existence of the Municipality ofSinacaban in Misamis Occidental and ordering the relocation of its boundary for thepurpose of determining whether certain areas claimed by it belong to it.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No. 258 of thenPresident Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917The full text of the Order reads:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 258

CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABANIN THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior, and pursuant tothe provisions of Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, there ishereby created, in the Province of Misamis Occidental, a municipality to beknown as the municipality of Sinacaban, which shall consist of the southernportion of the municipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, moreparticularly described and bounded as follows:

On the north by a line starting from point 1, the center of the lighthouse onthe Tabo-o point S. 84 30'W., 7,250 meters to point 2 which is on the bankof Palilan River branch; thence following Palilan River branch 2,400 meterssouthwesterly to point 3, thence a straight line S 87 00' W, 22,550 metersto point 4, where this intersects the Misamis Occidental-Zamboangaboundary; on the west, by the present Misamis Occidental-Zamboangaboundary; and on the south by the present Jimenez-Tudela boundary; andon the east, by the limits of the municipal waters which the municipality ofSinacaban shall have pursuant to section 2321 of the Revised

Administrative Code, (Description based on data shown in Enlarged Map ofPoblacion of Jimenez, Scale 1:8:000).

The municipality of Sinacaban contains the barrios of Sinacaban, whichshall be the seat of the municipal government, Sinonoc, Libertad, thesouthern portion of the barrio of Macabayao, and the sitios of Tipan,Katipunan, Estrella, Flores, Senior, Adorable, San Isidro, Cagayanon,Kamanse, Kulupan and Libertad Alto.

The municipality of Jimenez shall have its present territory, minus theportion thereof included in the municipality of Sinacaban.

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The municipality of Sinacaban shall begin to exist upon the appointmentand qualification of the mayor, vice-mayor, and a majority of the councilorsthereof. The new municipality shall, however, assume payment of aproportionate share of the loan of the municipality of Jimenez with theRehabilitation Finance Corporation as may be outstanding on the date of itsorganization, the proportion of such payment to be determined by theDepartment of Finance.

Done in the City of Manila, this 30th day of August, in the year of Our Lord,nineteen hundred and forty-nine, and of the Independence of thePhilippines, the fourth.

(SGD.) ELPIDIOQUIRINOPresident of thePhilippines

By the President:

(SGD.) TEODORO EVANGELISTAExecutive Secretary

By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No 171, 2 dated November 22, 1988Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao,

Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto, 3 based on the technical description in E.O. No258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the

Municipality of Jimenez.

In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 thedisputed area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of anagreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement was approved bythe Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77, dated February18, 1950, which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez as follows: 4

From a point at Cagayanon Beach follow Macabayao Road until itintersects Tabangag Creek at the back of the Macabayao Elementary

School. Follow the Tabangag Creek until it intersect the Macabayao Riverat upper Adorable. Follow the Macabayao River such that the barrio ofMacabayao, Sitio Adorable and site will be a part of Jimenez down and thesitios of San Vicente, Donan, Estrella, Mapula will be a part of Sinacaban.(Emphasis added)

In its decision dated October 11, 1989, 5 the Provincial Board declared the disputedarea to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving theagreement between the municipalities was void because the Board had no power to

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alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being vested inCongress pursuant to the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.PBlg. 337), 134. 6 The Provincial Board denied in its Resolution No. 13-90 datedJanuary 30, 1990 the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration. 7

On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition forcertiorari, prohibitionand mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14. The suit was

filed against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Boardthe Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget andManagement, and the Executive Secretary. Jimenez alleged that, in accordance withthe decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 8the power to create municipalities isessentially legislative and consequently Sinacaban, which was created by an executiveorder, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis-a-vis Jimenez, of which it remains part. Jimenez prayed that Sinacaban be enjoined fromassuming control and supervision over the disputed barrios; that the Provincial Boardbe enjoined from assuming jurisdiction over the claim of Sinacaban; that E.O. No. 258

be declared null and void; that the decision dated October 11, 1989 and Resolution No.13-90 of the Provincial Board be set aside for having been rendered withoutjurisdiction; that the Commission on Audit be enjoined from passing in audit anyexpenditure of public funds by Sinacaban; that the Department of Budget andManagement be enjoined from allotting public funds to Sinacaban; and that theExecutive Secretary be enjoined from exercising control and supervision over saidmunicipality.

During pre-trial, the parties agreed to limit the issues to the following:

A. Whether the Municipality of Sinacaban is a legal juridical entity, dulycreated in accordance with law;

B. If not, whether it is a de factojuridical entity;

C. Whether the validity of the existence of the Municipality can be properlyquestioned in this action on certiorari;

D. Whether the Municipality of Jimenez which had recognized theexistence of the municipality for more than 40 years is estopped to question

its existence;

E. Whether the existence of the municipality has been recognized by thelaws of the land; and

F. Whether the decision of the Provincial Board had acquired finality.

On February 10, 1992, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of whichreads:

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the finding of this Court that thepetition must be denied and judgment is hereby rendered declaringa STATUS QUO, that is, the municipality of Sinacaban shall continue toexist and operate as a regular municipality; declaring the decision datedOctober 11, 1989 rendered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan fixing theboundaries between Sinacaban and Jimenez, Misamis Occi. as null andvoid, the same not being in accordance with the boundaries provided for in

Executive Order No. 258 creating the municipality of Sinacaban; dismissingthe petition for lack of merit, without pronouncement as to costs anddamages. With respect to the counterclaim, the same is hereby ordereddismissed.

The Commissioners are hereby ordered to conduct the relocation survey ofthe boundary of Sinacaban within 60 days from the time the decision shallhave become final and executory and another 60 days within which tosubmit their report from the completion of the said relocation survey.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC, inter alia, held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it hadcompletely organized itself even prior to the Pelaezcase and exercisedcorporate powers for forty years before its existence was questioned; thatJimenez did not have the legal standing to question the existence of Sinacaban,the same being reserved to the State as represented by the Office of the SolicitorGeneral in a quo warrantoproceeding; that Jimenez was estopped fromquestioning the legal existence of Sinacaban by entering into an agreement with

it concerning their common boundary; and that any question as to the legalexistence of Sinacaban had been rendered moot by 442(d) of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shallcontinue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districtsorganized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and whichhave their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at thetime of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regularmunicipalities.

On March 17, 1990, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision but itsmotion was denied by the RTC. Hence this petition raising the following issues: (1)whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim, and (2) if it has, whether it isthe boundary provided for in E.O. No. 258 or in Resolution No. 77 of the ProvincialBoard of Misamis Occidental which should be used as the basis for adjudicatingSinacaban's territorial claim.

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First. The preliminary issue concerns the legal existence of Sinacaban. If Sinacabanlegally exists, then it has standing to bring a claim in the Provincial Board. Otherwise, itcannot.

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipacorporation is the ruling inPelaez v. Auditor Generalthat the creation of municipacorporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without

power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in thiscase has been reiterated in a number of cases 9 later decided. However, we havesince held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is laterimpliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longerbe questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 10this Courtconsidered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipalcorporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive orderof the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that fornearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been

challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaezno quo warranto suit wasfiled to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3)the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organizedas part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in theConstitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it washeld that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipalitymust be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant topresidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets ofelective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth

be considered as regular municipalities."

Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at leasta de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has beenrecognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence forsixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor Generalwas decided on December 24, 1965Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because ithad laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be

underscored because under Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suitagainst a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5)years from the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, theState and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban'scorporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of thisCourt, as reiterated by 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129),Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment ofMunicipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlierrecognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their

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common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of theProvincial Board of Misamis Occidental.

Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended tothe 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, whichconsidered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreoverfollowing the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of

the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in thecreation of Sinacaban. This provision states:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shallcontinue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districtsorganized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and whichhave their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at thetime of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regularmunicipalities.

Second. Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160, 442(d) is invalid, since it doesnot conform to the constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding ofplebiscites in the creation of newmunicipalities. 11

This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously explained, Sinacaban hadattained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 21987, it is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. This requirement applies onlyto newmunicipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. Actually, the

requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, 3 of the previousConstitution which took effect on January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied tomunicipal corporations created before, such as the Municipality of Sinacaban in thecase at bar.

Third. Finally, Jimenez argues that the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of theboundary of Sinacaban because the barangays which Sinacaban are claiming are notenumerated in E.O. No. 258 and that in any event in 1950 the parties entered into anagreement whereby the barangays in question were considered part of the territory ofJimenez.

E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now calledbarangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that "Sinacaban contains" those barrioswithout saying they are the only ones comprising it. The reason for this is that thetechnical description, containing the metes and bounds of its territory, is controlling.The trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of determiningthe boundaries of the municipality and consequently the question to which themunicipality the barangays in question belong.

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Now, as already stated, in 1950 the two municipalities agreed that certain barriosbelonged to Jimenez, while certain other ones belonged to Sinacaban. This agreementwas subsequently approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. Whetherthis agreement conforms to E.O. No. 258 will be determined by the result of the surveyJimenez contends, however, that regardless of its conformity to E.O. No. 258, theagreement as embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board, is binding onSinacaban. This raises the question whether the Provincial Board had authority to

approve the agreement or, to put it in another way, whether it had the power to declarecertain barrios part of one or the other municipality. We hold it did not if the effectwould be to amend the area as described in E.O. No. 258 creating the Municipality ofSinacaban.

At the time the Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 77 on February 18, 1950, theapplicable law was 2167 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which provided:

Sec. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. How settled. Disputes as tojurisdiction of municipal governments over places or barrios shall bedecided by the provincial boards of the provinces in which suchmunicipalities are situated, after an investigation at which the municipalitiesconcerned shall be duly heard. From the decision of the provincial boardappeal may be taken by the municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of theInterior [now the Office of the Executive Secretary], whose decision shall befinal. Where the places or barrios in dispute are claimed by municipalitiessituated in different provinces, the provincial boards of the provincesconcerned shall come to an agreement if possible, but, in the event of theirfailing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the Secretary of Interior

[Executive Secretary], whose decision shall be final.

As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 12 the power of provincial boards to settleboundary disputes is "of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoptionof means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities." It is apower "to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdictionbetween adjoining municipalities." It is thus limited to implementing the law creating amunicipality. It is obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordancewith the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but itsamendment. 13If, therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of MisamisOccidental is contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, itcannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.

Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the decision of October 11, 1989 andResolution No. 13-90 of the Provincial Board. Its action is in accordance with the LocaGovernment Code of 1983, 79 of which provides that in case no settlement ofboundary disputes is made the dispute should be elevated to the RTC of the province.In 1989, when the action was brought by Jimenez, this Code was the governing law.

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The governing law is now the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),118-119.

Jimenez's contention that the RTC failed to decide the case "within one year from thestart of proceedings" as required by 79 of the Local Government Code of 1983 andthe 90-day period provided for in Article VIII, 15 of the Constitution does not affect thevalidity of the decision rendered. For even granting that the court failed to decide within

the period prescribed by law, its failure did not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide thecase but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible administrative sanction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisionof the Regional Trial Court ofOroquieta City, Branch 14 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY;COUNCILORS: DEOGRACIAS R. ARGOSINO III, BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUELR. CORTEZ, NORMANDO MONTILLA, LEONARDO C. UY, FIDEL C. AURELLANA,PEDRO C. CARABIT, LEONARDO D. AURELLANA, FABIAN M. MEDENILLA,TRINIDAD F. CORTEZ, SALVADOR M. MEDENILLA, CERELITO B. AUREADA andFRANCISCA A. BAMBA, petitioners,vs.HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch62, 4th Judicial Region, Gumaca, Quezon; MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES,QUEZON; MAYOR FRANCISCO DE LEON; COUNCILORS: FE LUPINAC, TOMASAVERIA, MANUEL O. OSAS, WILFREDO O. FONTANIL, ENRICO U. NADRES,RODELITO LUZOIR, LENAC, JOSE L. CARABOT, DOMING AUSA, VIDALBANQUELES and CORAZON M. MAXIMO, respondents.

Manuel Laserna, Jr. for petitioners.

Florante Pamfilo for private respondents.

VITUG, J .:

On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No.

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353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from themunicipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero

Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.

Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President andcoursed through the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of SanNarciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24 May 1959. 1

By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by PresidentDiosdado Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres was later officiallyrecognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515. 2The executive order addedthat "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed inHouse Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives."

On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition forquo warranto withthe Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of theMunicipality of San Andres. Docketed Special Civil Action No. 2014-G, the petitionsought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and prayed that therespondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered torefrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. 3Invokingthe ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 4the petitioning municipalitycontended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation ofthe inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle ofseparation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of theMunicipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and

functions of their respective offices that righfully belonged to the corresponding officialsof the Municipality of San Narciso.

In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way ofaffirmative and special defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitionermunicipality that the Municipality of San Andres was given life with the issuance ofExecutive Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped fromquestioning the creation of the new municipality; 5that because the Municipality of San

Andred had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer beassailed; and that, considering the petition to be one forquo warranto, petitioner

municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative beingreserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General. 6

On 18 July 1991, after the parties had submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, thetrial court resolved to defer action on the motion to dismiss and to deny a judgment onthe pleadings.

On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a motion to dismissalleging that the case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic

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Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which tookeffect on 01 January 1991. The movant municipality cited Section 442(d) of the lawreading thusly:

Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. . . .

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shal

continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districtsorganized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and whichhave their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at thetime of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regularmunicipalities.

The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the aboveprovision of law was inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since theenactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whosemode of creation had been void ab initio. 7

In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court 8finally dismissed the petition 9forlack of cause of action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State, addingthat "whatever defects (were) present in the creation of municipal districts by thePresident pursuant to presidential issuances and executive orders, (were) cured by theenactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991." In anorder, dated 17 January 1992, the same court denied petitioner municipality's motionfor reconsideration.

Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari." Petitioners

10

argue that in issuing theorders of 02 December 1991 and 17 January 1992, the lower court has "acted withgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction." Petitionersassert that the existence of a municipality created by a null and void presidential ordermay be attacked either directly or even collaterally by anyone whose interests or rightsare affected, and that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no office and isinoperative such as though its has never been passed. 11

Petitioners consider the instant petition to be one for "review on certiorari" under Rules42 and 45 of the Rules of Court; at the same time, however, they question the orders

of the lower court for having been issued with "grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no other plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to petitioners to correct saidOrders, to protect their rights and to secure a final and definitive interpretation of thelegal issues involved." 12Evidently, then, the petitioners intend to submit their case inthis instance under Rule 65. We shall disregard the procedural incongruence.

The special civil action ofquo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Governmentcan call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises

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a public franchise." 13When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a bodypolitic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding forquo warranto or any othercredit proceeding. 14It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of thePhilippines" 15and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed bythe President of the Philippines . . . ." 16Such officers may, under certaincircumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation of anotherperson" with the permission of the court. 17The Rules of Court also allows an individuato commence an action forquo warranto in his own name but this initiative can bedone when he claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfullyheld or exercised by another." 18While the quo warranto proceedings filed below bypetitioner municipality has so named only the officials of the Municipality of San Andresas respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of theMunicipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.

At any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of theMunicipality of San Andres, the Court shall delve into the merits of the petition.

While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic ActNo. 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a defacto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition forquo warranto hadbeen filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired avested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt toapply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative ofdue process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably

brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres wasissued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality ofthe executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality,of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a dulycreated local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer toquestion his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year periodcan abrogate an action belatedly filed, 19so also, if not indeed with greatestimperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of apolitical subdivision be timely raised. 20Public interestdemands it.

Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of anunconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining inthis case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San

Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, ifnot in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdomcannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353,the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on

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24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor Generalwas promulgated. The ruling could havesounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive OrderNo. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts allpointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San

Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after havingsurpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit TrialCourts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuitsorganized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by thisCourt pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, theMunicipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court ofSan Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.

At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be

dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seatsof the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipalityof San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalitiescomposing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organizedpursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respectivesets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the)Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension ofunconstitutionality per seof Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is proferred.It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to

create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that whenit has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence areretrospective, 21and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalidunder existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly acceptedin this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vestedrights. 22

All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province ofQuezon must now be conceded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition forcertiorariis hereby DISMISSED. Costs againstpetitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ. concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

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G.R. No. 116702 December 28, 1995

THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, acting through its SanguniangBayan and Mayor, petitioner,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA, BOHOL, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PANGANIBAN, J .:

This is a petition for review on certiorariof the Decision of the Court ofAppeals 1promulgated on June 28, 1994,reversingthe judgment 2of the Regional Tria

Court (Branch I) of the City of Tagbilaran, Bohol.

The lower court's decision, among other things, declared "barrio/barangay Pagahat aswithin the territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol, thereforesaid barrio forms part and parcel of its territory, therefore, belonging to said plaintiffmunicipality", and further permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia "torespect plaintiff's control, possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahatand never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the samebarrio" (RTC decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 86).

On appeal, the respondent Court stated that "(S)crutiny of the conflicting claims andthe respective evidence of the parties lead to the conclusion that the trial courtcommitted an error in declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction ofplaintiff-appellee (municipality of Candijay)." Said Court rejected the boundary linebeing claimed by petitioner based on certain exhibits, since it would in effect place"practically all of Barrio Pagahat . . . , part of Barrio Cagongcagong and portions ofBarrio Putlongcam and La Hacienda and all of Barrio Mahayag and Barrio del Montewithin the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee Candijay." Added the respondentCourt, "As aptly pointed out by defendant-appellant in its appeal brief, 'the plaintiff

municipality will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of the barrios ofPutlongcam, Mahayag, Del Monte, Cagongcagong, and a part of the Municipality ofMabini. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territoria

jurisdiction under the law creating her. Her claim opens the floodgate of controversiesover boundaries, including with Mabini.'" (Decision p. 4; rollo, p. 35.) The respondentCourt concluded that "the trial court erred in relying on Exh. X-Commissioner [exhibitfor petitioner], because, in effect, it included portions of Barrios Putlongcam and LaHacienda within the jurisdiction of appellee Candijay when said barrios are

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undisputedly part of appellant's (Alicia) territory under Executive Order No. 265creating the latter" (Decision, p. 6, rollo, p. 37).

The respondent Court also found, after an examination of the respective survey plansof petitioner and respondent submitted as exhibits, that "both plans are inadequateinsofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between [petitioner] and theMunicipality of Mabini (which is not a party to this case) as declared by the Provincial

Board of Bohol. Neither plan shows where Looc-Tabasan, Lomislis Island, TagtangCanlirong, mentioned in the aforequoted boundary line declared by the ProvincialBoard of Bohol, are actually located." (Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 35.) The respondentCourt, after weighing and considering the import of certain official acts, includingExecutive Order No. 265 dated September 16, 1949 (which created the municipality of

Alicia from out of certain barrios of the municipality of Mabini), and Act No. 968 of thePhilippine Commission dated October 31, 1903 (which set forth the respectivecomponent territories of the municipalities of Mabini and Candijay), concluded that"Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the

barrios constituted as part of defendant-appellant Municipality of Alicia. Neither do theyshow that Barrio Pagahat forms part of plaintiff-appellant Municipality of Candijay."

On that basis, the respondent Court held that:

Clearly, from the foregoing, there is equiponderance of evidence. TheSupreme Court has ruled:

Equiponderance of evidence rule states:

When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there isnothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or theother, the court will find for the defendant.

Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of hisevidence and not on the weakness of defendant's claim. Even ifthe evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of thedefendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side ifsuch evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause ofaction.

(Sapu-an, et al. v. Court of Appeals, Oct. 19, 1992, 214 SCRA701, 705-706.)

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is reversed and set aside. Anotherjudgment is hereby entered dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No2402. No costs. (Decision, p. 6, rollo, p. 37.)

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Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been rejected by the respondent Courtpetitioner came to this Court, alleging (i) improper application by the respondent Courtof Appeals of the so-called principle of "equiponderance of evidence", for having basedits ruling against petitioner on documentary evidence which, petitioner claims, are void,(ii) the respondent municipality's purported lack of juridical personality, as a result ofhaving been created under a void executive order, and (iii) that the challengedDecision "does not solve the problem of both towns but throws them back again to their

controversy." (Petition, p. 6, rollo, p. 21.)

After deliberating on the petition, comment and reply, this Court is not persuaded togrant due course to the petition.

With respect to the first and third grounds, we find that the issues of fact in this casehad been adequately passed upon by respondent Court in its Decision, which is well-supported by the evidence on record. The determination of equiponderance ofevidence by the respondent Court involves the appreciation of evidence by the lattertribunal, which will not be reviewed by this Court unless shown to be whimsical orcapricious; here, there has been no such showing.

In connection with the foregoing, that the assailed Decision, in dismissing thecomplaint in Civil Case No. 2402, may leave the parties where they are or may notresolve their problem one way or the other, is of no moment. The fact remains that, ascorrectly evaluated by the respondent Court, neither party was able to make out acase; neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence ithad. They are thus no better off than before they proceeded to litigate, and, as aconsequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are. In such cases,

courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions.

On the second issue, we noted that petitioner commenced its collateral attack on thejuridical personality of respondent municipality on 19 January 1984 (or some thirty fiveyears after respondent municipality first came into existence in 1949) during theproceedings in the court a quo. It appears that, after presentation of its evidence,herein petitioner asked the trial court to bar respondent municipality from presenting itsevidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. Petitioner contended thatExec. Order No. 265 issued by President Quirino on September 16, 1949 creatingrespondent municipality is null and void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the

Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order was based, constitutedan undue delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and wastherefore declared unconstitutional, per this Court's ruling in Pelaez vs.AuditorGeneral. 3

In this regard, we call to mind the ruling of this Court in Municipality of San Narciso,Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr. 4, which will be found very instructive in the case at bench.Therein we stated:

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While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160[Local Government Code of 1991] may have converted the Municipality ofSan Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend that sincethe petition forquo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said lawpetitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullificationof Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 ofRepublic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process

and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner's theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case beenseasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal districtof San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almosthirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narcisofinally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In themeantime, the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres,began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created

local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officerto question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly file, so also, if not indeed withgreatest imperativeness, must a quo warrantoproceeding assailing thelawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interestdemands it.

Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being theresult of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiarcircumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than

to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a statusuniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a defactomunicipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to beotherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, theMunicipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six yearswhen, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor Generalwaspromulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similardeclaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it wasnot to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to

the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of SanAndres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, ExecutiveOrder No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth classmunicipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out inRepublic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwiseknown as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted asmunicipal circuits, in the establishmen