8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
1/21
1
[G.R. No. L-59180. January 29, 1987.]
CLEMENTINO TORRALBA and RE L. RUGAY,petitioners,vs.THE MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR and ITS MUNICIPAL OFFICERS,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
Challenged in the instant Petition, as violative of Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, is BatasPambansa Blg. 56, enacted on 1 February 1980, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan de
Sur. The pertinent provisions of BP 56 read:
"Sec. 1The barangay of Ilihan, Sinai, Sibagat, El Rio, Afga, Tabontabon, Perez, Magsaysay, Santa Cruz,
Santa Maria, San Isido, Villagit, Del Rosario, Anahauan, Mahayahay, and San Vicente, all in the Municipality
of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur, are hereby separated from said municipality to form and constitute
an independent Municipality of Sibagat without affecting in any manner the legal existence of the mother
Municipality of Bayugan.
"Sec. 2.The boundaries of the new Municipality of Sibagat will be: Beginning at the point of intersection of
the Cabadbaran-Old Bayugan and Surigao del Sur boundaries; thence in a southernly direction following theOld Bayugan and Cabadbaran, Old Bayugan and Butuan City, Old Bayugan and Las Nieves boundaries, until
it reaches the point of intersection of Old Bayugan, Esperanza and the Municipality of Las Nieves; . . .
"Sec. 3.The seat of government of the newly created municipality shall be in Barangay Sibagat.
"Sec. 4.Except as herein provided, all provisions of laws, now or hereafter applicable to regular
municipalities shall be applicable to the new Municipality of Sibagat.
"Sec. 5.After ratification by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted in the area or
areas affected within a period of ninety (90) days after the approval of this Act, the President (Prime
Minister) shall appoint the Mayor and other Officials of the new Municipality of Sibagat."
Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino Torralba, being amember of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal officers are the local
public officials of the new Municipality. prcd
Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, said to have been infringed, is reproduced hereunder:
"Sec. 3.No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government
Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected."
The thrust of petitioners' argument is that under the aforequoted provision, the Local Government Code
must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantialalteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government
Code had as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly
complied with any criteria when respondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null and void.
It is a fact that the Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP
56 was enacted, the code was not yet in existence. The evidence likewise discloses that a plebiscite had
been conducted among the people of the unit/units affected by the creation of the new Municipality, who
expressed approval thereof; and that officials of the newly created Municipality had been appointed and
had assumed their respective positions as such.
8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
2/21
2
We find no trace of invalidity of BP 56. The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its
enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal
corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification
of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It contains no
requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua nonfor the creation of a municipality,
in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local
Government Code. What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation,
modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In theinterregnum, before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the
creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite
called for the purpose.
The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and
the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit
(parag. 5, Petition; p. 7, Memorandum). In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned herein. The
officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their
functions. A de jureentity has thus been created.
It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in
nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it
deems essential for the more efficient administration of government (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
3rd ed., 509). The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then
vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. LibLex
We are not unmindful of the case of Tan vs. COMELEC (142 SCRA 727 [1986]), striking down as
unconstitutional BP Blg. 885 creating a new province in the Island of Negros known as the Province of
Negros del Norte, and declaring the plebiscite held in connection therewith as illegal. There are significant
differences, however, in the two cases among which may be mentioned the following: in the Tancase, the
Local Government Code a]ready existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3
December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP Bldg. 885 in the Tancase confined the plebiscite to
the "proposed new province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas, in contravention of the
Constitutional mandate and of the Local Government Code that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit or
units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." In
fact, as previously stated, no question is raised herein as to the legality of the plebiscite conducted. Thirdly,
in the Tancase, even the requisite area for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg.
885. No such issue in the creation of the new municipality has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent
haste" attended the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the Tancase;
on the other hand, BP 56 creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of
legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the period specified in that law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 114783. December 8, 1994.]
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO
R. TOBIAS, JR.petitioners,vs.HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER
WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila,respondents.
8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
3/21
3
D E C I S I O N
BIDIN, J p:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged toonly one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this
legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A.
No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into
a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of
the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these
results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49
thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
"As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first
representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of
the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan
with its first representative to be elected at the same election."
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one
subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Constitution, to wit:
"Sec. 26 (1).Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed inthe title thereof."
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter
embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city;
and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No.
7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed
in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of
the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5 (1) and (4) of the Constitution, whichprovide, to wit:
"Sec. 5 (1).The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations."
"Sec. 5(4).Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section."
8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
4/21
4
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under
Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners
contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities
have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the
effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) as
aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative"provisoin the Constitution:
". . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative" (Article VI, Section 5 (3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate
congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No.
7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural
and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675. "An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily
includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court
so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, inSumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that
the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the titleexpresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v.
Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
"Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It
suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequencesof the
proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mentionin the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does
not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having
passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it
is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by
Congress in the enactment of said laws.
8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
5/21
5
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set
forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted,
shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by
law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative
districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the
glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,
including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the
validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite
on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of
merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the
inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the
change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is
the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of
credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the
author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district,
having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency
has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 89651. November 10, 1989.]
DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC
DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTAHA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER,and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other taxpayers of
Mindanao,petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C.
CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,respondents.
[G.R. No. 89965. November 10, 1989.]
ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O,petitioner,vs. HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Budget, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associatesfor petitioners in G.R. Nos. 89651 and 89965.
8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
6/21
6
Abdullah D.Mama-ofor and in his own behalf in 89965.
SYLLABUS
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6734 (AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR
AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO); STANDARD FOR INQUIRY INTO ITS VALIDITY,
PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION, NOT THE PROVISIONS OF THE TRIPOLI AGREEMENT. It is
now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The
standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in theConstitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli
Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act. cdasia
2.ID.; ID.; AN AMENDMENT TO THE TRIPOLI AGREEMENT. Assuming for the sake of argument that the
Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of
the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the
Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320
(4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)].
Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law.
3.ID.; ID.; CREATION OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION SHALL TAKE EFFECT ONLY WHEN APPROVED BY A
MAJORITY OF THE VOTES CAST BY THE CONSTITUENTS UNITS IN A PLEBISCITE. Under the
Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces
and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; MAJORITY VOTE IN EACH CONSTITUENT UNITS, EMPHASIZED. Comparing Article XVIII,
Section 27 of the Constitution with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region under Art. X,
sec. 18. parag. 2, it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region made to depend, not on
the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and
the proviso underscores this. For if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority
of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the
ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." It is thus clear that what is required
by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units
and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units.
5.ID.; ID.; ASCERTAINMENT BY CONGRESS OF THE AREAS THAT SHOULD CONSTITUTE THE
AUTONOMOUS REGION, A POLITICAL QUESTION. The Constitution lays down the standards by which
Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these
constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within
the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into
the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental
powers. cdll
6.ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; PERMITS OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION; CASE
AT BAR. Equal protection permits of reasonable classification. InDumlao v.Commission on
Elections[G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392], the Court ruled that one class may be treated
differently from another where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee
of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been made by Congress on
the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself.
8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
7/21
7
7.ID.; JUDICIAL POWER; ACTUAL CONTROVERSY, ESSENTIAL. As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial
power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual
controversy between litigants must first exist.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists.
There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of
religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a
perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and national law.
9.ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS, CONSTRUED. Administrative regions are not territorial and political
subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. They
are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan
(1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres. Dec. No. 1, Pres. Sec. No. 742].
10.ID.; PRESIDENT; POWER TO MERGE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS; NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REQUIRING A PLEBISCITE IN THE MERGER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution,
it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflictbetween the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision
requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a
merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative
regions.
11.ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6734; ORGANIZATION OF THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE, WILL NOT DELAY
THE CREATION OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION. Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous
region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. If the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes
cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately
takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an Oversight Committee to supervise the
transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the OversightCommittee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at
effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government.
12.REMEDIAL LAW; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; EVERY LAW HAS IN ITS FAVOR THE
PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY; CASE AT BAR. Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must
clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail.
D E C I S I O N
CORTES, J p:
The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao
and Palawan,1scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An
Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."
These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to
the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional.
After a consolidated comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondents, which the Court
considered as the answer, the case was deemed submitted for decision, the issues having been joined.
http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/20498?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=20498&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=29326&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=13510&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19746&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17533&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=42488&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1586&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=22973&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=16298&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19094&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5210&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=30569&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18415&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=14759&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=3876&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52144&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17444&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5643&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=12887&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52683&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=abbas+vs+comelec&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote1_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/20498?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=20498&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=29326&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=13510&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19746&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17533&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=42488&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1586&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=22973&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=16298&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19094&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5210&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=30569&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18415&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=14759&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=3876&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52144&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17444&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5643&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=12887&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52683&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=abbas+vs+comelec&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote1_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/20498?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=20498&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=29326&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=13510&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19746&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17533&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=42488&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1586&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=22973&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=16298&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19094&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5210&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=30569&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18415&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=14759&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=3876&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52144&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17444&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5643&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=12887&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52683&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=abbas+vs+comelec&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote1_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/20498?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=20498&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=29326&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=13510&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19746&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17533&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=42488&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1586&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=22973&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=16298&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19094&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5210&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=30569&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18415&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=14759&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=3876&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52144&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17444&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5643&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=12887&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52683&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=abbas+vs+comelec&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote1_08/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
8/21
8
Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a "Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File Reply on Respondents'
Comment and to Open Oral Arguments," which the Court noted.
The arguments against R.A. No. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the
following:
(a)that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b)that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial
Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic
Conference" took effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the
Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of autonomy." 2
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which for the first time provided for regional autonomy. Article X,
section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevantcharacteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." cdasia
To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:
Sec. 16.The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws
are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17.All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.Sec. 18.The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the
President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure
of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of
which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise
provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19.The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of
organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras.
Sec. 20.Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws,
the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1)Administrative organization;
8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
9/21
9
(2)Creation of sources of revenues;
(3)Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4)Personal, family, and property relations;
(5)Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6)Economic, social and tourism development;
(7)Educational policies;
(8)Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9)Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people
of the region.
Sec. 21.The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police
agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws.
The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government. llcd
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.
1.The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by petitioners, i.e. that certain
provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the
land, being a binding international agreement. The Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is
neither a binding treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign
state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding international
agreement.
We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement
and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public international or internal Philippine
law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore
be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and
the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the
Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or
international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal law it would
not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the
same class as the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money
Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would
be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court
that R.A. No. 6734 contravenes the Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought.32.The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have been raised by
petitioners.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao,
contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the
creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite. LexLib
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that
"[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and
http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/20498?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=20498&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=29326&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=13510&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19746&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17533&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=42488&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1586&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=22973&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=16298&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19094&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5210&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=30569&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18415&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=14759&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=3876&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52144&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17444&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5643&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=12887&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52683&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=abbas+vs+comelec&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote3_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/20498?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=20498&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=29326&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=13510&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19746&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17533&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=42488&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1586&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=22973&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=16298&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19094&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5210&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=30569&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18415&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=14759&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=3876&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52144&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17444&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5643&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=12887&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52683&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=abbas+vs+comelec&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote3_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/20498?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=20498&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=29326&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=13510&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19746&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17533&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=42488&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1586&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=22973&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=16298&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19094&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5210&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=30569&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18415&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=14759&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=3876&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52144&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17444&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5643&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=12887&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52683&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=abbas+vs+comelec&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote3_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/20498?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=20498&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=29326&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=13510&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19746&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17533&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=42488&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1586&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=22973&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=16298&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=19094&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5210&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=30569&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=18415&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=14759&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=3876&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52144&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=17444&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=5643&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=12887&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=52683&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=abbas+vs+comelec&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote3_08/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
10/21
10
cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution." Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an
autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an
autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were
obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.
First, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of the Constitutionwhich sets forth the conditions necessary for the creation of the autonomous region. The reference to the
constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous
region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific
provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the
same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13.The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this
Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty
(120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and citieswhich in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions: Provided,however, That the President may, by administrative determination, merge
the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect
only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous
region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the
autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein.
The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of(1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities,
among those enumerated inR.A. No. 6734, shall comprise it. [See III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION 487-492 (1986)].
As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is made
effective upon the approval "by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer
to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the
constituent units, or both?
We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.
If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the
plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his
Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
held for the purpose. . . ." Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region,
which reads:
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and
8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
11/21
11
geographic areas voting, favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X,
sec. 18, para. 2]. prcd
it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total
majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the
proviso underscores this. For if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of
the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the
ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic
Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put
together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement
in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they
ratified the Constitution.
Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other hand, maintains thatonly those areas which, to his view, share common and distinctive historical and natural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of
the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of
Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and
Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess
such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas
which do not strictly share the same characteristics as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has
expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the Constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall
determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria,the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of
the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.
This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers. [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA
424].
After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o
would then adopt the extreme view that other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered.
He argues that since the Organic Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its scope should be further
broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the others to similarly enjoy
the benefits of autonomy. Petitioner maintains that the failure of R.A. No. 6734 to include the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, and therefore is violative of the Constitution.
Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he had earlier invoked. Any
determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should comprise the autonomous region, taking into
account shared historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. As earlier stated, such
determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for the autonomous region
constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.
8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
12/21
12
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1936); Laurel v.
Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February
18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. In Dumlao v.Commission on Elections[G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95
SCRA 392], the Court ruled that one class may be treated differently from another where the groupings are
based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this
case, the classification having been made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth
by the Constitution itself.
Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional
guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic
Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the
Tribal Code (still to be enacted) on the one hand, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah
courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the Islamic Law
(Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any
"man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of
conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law
might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions. prcd
As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. As a condition precedent for the
power to be exercised, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In the present
case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the
application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in
this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the
provisions of the Muslim Code and national law.
Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which, among
others, states:
. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however,
that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is
not conferred by the Constitution upon the President. That the President may choose to merge existing
regions pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution which provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e.
Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the
land by Pres. Dec. No. 1, Pres. Sec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial and political
subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution].
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict
8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
13/21
13
between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision
requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a
merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative
regions.
Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create an Oversight
Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the powers, appropriations, and
properties vested upon the regional government by the Organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said
provisions mandate that the transfer of certain national government offices and their properties to the
regional government shall be made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and
that such transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the regional
government.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because while the Constitution states
that the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement
of organizing an Oversight Committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and properties to the
regional government would in effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. If
the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite,the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No.
6734 requiring an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of
effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the
operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the
regional government. The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no
basis therefor. LibLex
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387
(1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc, supra; Peralta
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who petition this Court to declare a
law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise,their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these
two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 148622. September 12, 2002.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, in his capacity
as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
CLARENCE L. BAGUILAT, in his capacity as the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region XI
and ENGR. BIENVENIDO L. LIPAYON, in his capacity as the Regional Director of the DENR-
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU (DENR-EMB), Region XI,petitioners, vs. THE CITY OF
DAVAO, represented by BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, City Mayor,respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
14/21
14
The City Legal Officer for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao
City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI. The same,
however, was denied on the ground that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area;
that the City of Davao must first undergo the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Respondent then filed a petition for mandamuswith theRegional Trial Court (RTC), and the latter ruled in favor of respondent.
As the project in issue is not classified as environmentally critical or within an environmentally critical area,
the DENR has no choice but to issue the CNC. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can
be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued herein by the trial court. The petition filed by the
Republic was denied.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT;
FUNCTIONS. Section 15 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, defines a
local government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it inconformity with law. As such, it performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental
functions are those that concern the health, safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as
affecting the public generally. Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits
or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. When exercising governmental
powers and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government. When
engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local
affairs. ASDTEa
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCLUDED FROM THE COVERAGE OF PD 1586 (ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT SYSTEM). Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to
promote the people's right to a balanced ecology. Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, can notclaim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an
LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.
Further, it is a rule of statutory construction that every part of a statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context, i.e., that every part must be considered with other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the enactment. Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that "no person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative." The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political
subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are juridical persons. Undoubtedly therefore, local government
units are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586. Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said
law intends to implement the policy of the state to achieve a balance between socio-economic development
and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable development. The first paragraph of
the Whereas clause of the law stresses that this can only be possible if we adopt a comprehensive and
integrated environmental protection program where all the sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the
government and the private sectors. The local government units, as part of the machinery of the
government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the scope of the EIS system.
3.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY RESPECTED;
EXCEPTIONS. The trial court, after a consideration of the evidence, found that the Artica Sports Dome is
not within an environmentally critical area. Neither is it an environmentally critical project. It is axiomatic
8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
15/21
15
that factual findings of the trial court, when fully supported by the evidence on record, are binding upon
this Court and will not be disturbed on appeal. This Court is not a trier of facts. There are exceptional
instances when this Court may disregard factual findings of the trial court, namely: a) when the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; b) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; f) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary tothose of the trial court; h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and j) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion. None of these exceptions, however, obtain in this case.
4.ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; MANDAMUS; PROPER FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF A MINISTERIAL DUTY.
The Artica Sports Dome in Langub is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an
environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-
Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled by writ
of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,J p:
Before us is a petition for review1on certiorariassailing the decision2dated May 28, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, which granted the writ ofmandamus and injunction in favor of
respondent, the City of Davao, and against petitioner, the Republic, represented by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The trial court also directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of
Non-Coverage in favor of respondent.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 11, 2000, respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its
proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB),
Region XI. Attached to the application were the required documents for its issuance, namely, a) detailed
location map of the project site; b) brief project description; and c) a certification from the City Planning
and Development Office that the project is not located in an environmentally critical area (ECA). The EMB
Region XI denied the application after finding that the proposed project was within an environmentally
critical area and ruled that, pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1586, otherwise known as the
Environmental Impact Statement System, in relation to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1151, also
known as the Philippine Environment Policy, the City of Davao must undergo the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed
with the construction of its project.
Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage, respondent filed a petition
for mandamusand injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Davao, docketed as Civil Case No. 28, 133-
2000. It alleged that its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an
environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system. Hence, it was the ministerial
duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of
the required documents.
http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote1_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote1_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote1_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote2_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote2_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote2_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote2_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote1_08/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3
16/21
16
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, judgment granting the writ of mandamusand
injunction is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner City of Davao and against respondents Department
of Environment and Natural Resources and the other respondents by:
1)directing the respondents to issue in favor of the petitioner City of Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with the construction by the Cityof Davao of the Artica Sports Dome;
2)making the preliminary injunction issued on December 12, 2000 permanent.
Costsde oficio.
SO ORDERED.3
The trial court ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction
No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA system), which requires local government
units (LGUs) to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government,
including government owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entitiesare mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects which have significant effect on
the quality of the environment. A local government unit, not being an agency or instrumentality of the
National Government, is deemed excluded under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The trial court also declared, based on the certifications of the DENR-Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO)-West, and the data gathered from the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and
Seismology (PHIVOLCS), that the site for the Artica Sports Dome was not within an environmentally critical
area. Neither was the project an environmentally critical one. It therefore becomes mandatory for the
DENR, through the EMB Region XI, to approve respondent's application for CNC after it has satisfied all the
requirements for its issuance. Accordingly, petitioner can be compelled by a writ of mandamusto issue theCNC, if it refuses to do so.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition for
review.
With the supervening change of administration, respondent, in lieu of a comment, filed a manifestation
expressing its agreement with petitioner that, indeed, it needs to secure an ECC for its proposed project. It
thus rendered the instant petition moot and academic. However, for the guidance of the implementors of
the EIS law and pursuant to our symbolic function to educate the bench and bar,4we are inclined to
address the issue raised in this petition.
Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,5otherwise known as the Local Government Code, defines a localgovernment unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity
with law. As such, it performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are
those that concern the health, safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the
public generally.6Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn
pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit.7When exercising governmental powers
and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government.8When engaged in
corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local affairs.9
http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote3_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote3_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote3_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote4_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote4_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote4_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote5_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote5_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote5_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote6_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote6_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote6_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote7_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=7719&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=944&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=148622&q%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=&q%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q%5Byear_start%5D=#footnote7_0http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/1650?hits%5B%5D%5Bid%5D=1650&hits%5B%5D%5Btype%5D=Jurisprudence&