Pub Corp Cases Set 3

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

1/44

EN BANC

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, G.R. No. 177597

Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSandDIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,

Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 178628

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,

- versus - AZCUNA,TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,

REYES,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

andBRION, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:Respondent. July 16, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These consolidated petitions[1]

seek to annul Resolution No.

7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district

of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.[2]

The Facts

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

2/44

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned

two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first

legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight

municipalities.[3]

Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region

in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act,

Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No.

9054 (RA 9054).[4]

Although under the

Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first

legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII,

having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held

in November 1989.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM

Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under

Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5]

enacted Muslim Mindanao

Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating

the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight

municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201

provides:

Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira,Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog,Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upiare hereby separated fromthe Province ofMaguindanao and constituted into adistinct and independent province, which is herebycreated, to be known as the Province of ShariffKabunsuan.

x x x x

Sec. 5. The corporate existence of thisprovince shall commence upon the appointment bythe Regional Governor or election of the governorand majority of the regular members of theSangguniang Panlalawigan.

The incumbent elective provincial officials ofthe Province of Maguindanao shall continue to servetheir unexpired terms in the province that they willchoose or where they are residents: Provided, thatwhere an elective position in both provincesbecomes vacant as a consequence of the creationof the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbentelective provincial officials shall have preference forappointment to a higher elective vacant position andfor the time being be appointed by the RegionalGovernor, and shall hold office until their successors

shall have been elected and qualified in the nextlocal elections; Provided, further, that they shallcontinue to receive the salaries they are receiving atthe time of the approval of this Act until the newreadjustment of salaries in accordance withlaw. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be nodiminution in the number of the members of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province.

Except as may be provided by national law,the existing legislative district, which includesCotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.

Later, three new municipalities[6]

were carved out of the original nine

municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total

number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao

were the municipalities constituting its second legislative

district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first

legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

3/44

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans

creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.

On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the

COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the

conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular

province under MMA Act 201.

In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued

Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo

with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the FirstLegislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, which

adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department

under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,[7]

provides in

pertinent parts:

Considering the foregoing, the CommissionRESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt therecommendation of the Law Departmentthat pending the enactment of the appropriate

law by Congress, to maintain the status quowith Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan inthe First Legislative District ofMaguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)

However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the

COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845

stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only

of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.[8]

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902,

subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by

renaming the legislative district in question as

ShariffKabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First

District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).[9]

In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14

May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan

with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC

Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes

cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff

Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under

Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution[10]

and Section 3 of the

Ordinance appended to the Constitution.[11]

Thus, Sema asserted

that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in

issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in

Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs

earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as

the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative

district.[12]Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902,

the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion

legislative districts.

In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the case

and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

4/44

certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the

COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not

quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition

in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of

respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1

June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff

Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.

In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema

is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902

because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007,

Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of

Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City. Respondent

Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is

constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for

Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in

Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first legislative

district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC

could not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make

Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion

legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that

Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement

under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a

legislative district within a city.[13]

Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters

raised in respondents Comments and reiterating her claim that the

COMELEC acted ultra viresin issuing Resolution No. 7902.

In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required

the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether a

province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section

19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the

House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a

legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted their

compliance as follows:

(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the

following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa v. Salas[14]

stated that

when a province is created by statute, the corresponding

representative district comes into existence neither by authority of

that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by

apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a

reapportionment; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA

7160) affirms the apportionment of a legislative district incident to

the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the

Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the

Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in

newly created provinces.

(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG,

apparently abandoned its earlier stance on the propriety of issuing

Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema,

contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is self-

executing. Thus, every new province created by the ARMM

Regional Assembly is ipso factoentitled to one representative in the

House of Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

5/44

(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the

negative on the following grounds: (a) the province contemplated in

Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created by

an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on

the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054

withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact

measures relating to national elections, which encompasses the

apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of

Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every

province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the

disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of

Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinceswithout regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and

(d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than 250,000, is not

entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.

On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in

G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments on the following issues:

(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the

ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is

constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created

under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one

representative in the House of Representatives without need of a

national law creating a legislative district for such new province.[15]

In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007,

the parties in G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective Memoranda on

the issues raised in the oral arguments.[16]

On the question of the

constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in

G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions:

(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is

constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of

the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the

Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their

organic acts, legislative powers over other matters as may be

authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the

people of the region and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA

7160.[17]

However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in

Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly

of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in

RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article

X of the Constitution.[18]

Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19

should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from

prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the minimum

criteria under RA 7160.[19]

(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section

19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the following

grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those

granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the

Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA

9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe

standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

6/44

the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the

Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and

(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with

respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the

COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4

September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA

9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and

Section 6,[20]

Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create

provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section

20, Article X of the Constitution.

On the question of whether a province created underSection 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in

the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating

a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent

Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted

in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The

COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this

issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is

unconstitutional.

The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was

disclosed during the oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in

the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R.

No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R.

No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC

acted ultra viresin issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the

voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of

Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in

G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG,

maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a

temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the

appropriate law.

The Issues

The petitions raise the following issues:

I. In G.R. No. 177597:

(A) Preliminarily

(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and

Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC

Resolution No. 7902; and

(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as

representative

of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the

petition in G.R. No. 177597.

(B) On the merits

(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to

the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,

municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

7/44

(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the

ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section

19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the

House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a

legislative district for such province.

II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether

COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status

quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as Shariff

Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of

Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the

Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding

Cotabato City).

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19,

Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the

ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities;

(2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void;

and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.

On the Preliminary Matters

The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate

to Test the Constitutionality of

Election Laws, Rules and Regulations

The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse

of discretion by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or

quasi-judicial functions.[21]

On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus

will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person

to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a

duty.[22]

True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in

the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[23]

Nor is there a

law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from

canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of

ShariffKabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however,

do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597

because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

8/44

and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the

constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.[24]

RespondentDilangalens Proclamation

Does Not Moot the Petition

There is also no merit in the claim that respondent

Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for

representative of ShariffKabunsuanProvince with Cotabato Citymooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent

Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of

COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of

MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the

outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the

votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of

ShariffKabunsuan Province with Cotabato City will be included in

the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is

no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel

issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not

only the recently concluded elections but also all the other

succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power

of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional

provinces.

On the Main Issues

Whether the ARMM Regional AssemblyCan Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan

The creation of local government units is governed by Section

10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, orbarangay may be created, divided, merged,abolished or its boundary substantially alteredexcept in accordance with the criteria established inthe local government code and subject to approvalby a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in thepolitical units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units

province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three

conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow

the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such

creation must not conflict with any provision of the

Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units

affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of

authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

9/44

local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.

However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can

delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local

government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no

conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,

Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal

councils, the power to create barangays within their

jurisdiction,[25]

subject to compliance with the criteria established in

the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local

Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create

provinces, cities or municipalities.[26]

Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated

to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,

cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress

made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because

the power to create local government units is not one of the express

legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative

bodies.[27]

In the present case, the question arises whether the

delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create

provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any

provision of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the

delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create

municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the

Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and

cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution

provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty

thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in

the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance

appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may

hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter

increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in

the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative

district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the

Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the

Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district.

Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of

250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative

district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than

250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because

once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically

becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI

of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the

Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city

inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a

province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the

power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can

Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

10/44

power to create legislative districts for the House of

Representatives? The answer is in the negative.

Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned

Only by an Act of Congress

Under the present Constitution, as well as in

past[28]

Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable

membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion

legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5,

Article VI of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 5. (1) The House of

Representatives shall be composed of not more

than two hundred and fifty members, unless

otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from

legislative districts apportioned among the

provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in

accordance with the number of their respective

inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and

progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by

law, shall be elected through a party-list system of

registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or

organizations.

x x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise,

as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and

adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at

least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,

shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of

every census, the Congressshall make a

reapportionment of legislative districts based onthe standards provided in this section. (Emphasis

supplied)

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress

the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in

the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to

reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative

districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts

out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law

that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or

local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

11/44

House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative

districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law

passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29]

we held that the

power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the

power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in

Congress.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power

to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a

national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or

in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislativedistricts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can

enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local

legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a

national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body,

created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the

membership of the superior legislative body.

The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative

powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest

Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This

is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as

amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction

and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and

national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions

shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural

resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property

relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planningdevelopment;

(6) Economic, social, and tourism

development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the

cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be

authorized by law for the promotion of the general

welfare of the people of the region.

Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes

autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or

reapportion legislative districts for Congress.

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

12/44

On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054

amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, The Regional

Assembly may exercise legislative powerx x x except on the

following matters: x x x (k)National elections. x x x. Since the

ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws

relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district

whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever

Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first

representative is always elected in the next national elections from

the effectivity of the law.

[30]

Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to

Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the

House of Representatives, is a national official.[31] It would be

incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional

Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers

extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district

representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its

occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent

limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional

legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices,

respectively, and it can never create a national office.

To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national

office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs

territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the

Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the

Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial

jurisdiction x x x.

The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff

Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to

create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating

a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201provides that:

Except as may be provided by national

law, the existing legislative district, which includes

Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall

remain. (Emphasis supplied)

However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative

district because the Constitution mandates that each province shall

have at least one representative. Thus, the creation of the

Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is

unconstitutional.

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

13/44

Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5

(3), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

Each legislative district shall comprise, as

far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and

adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at

least two hundred fifty thousand, oreach

province, shall have at least one representative.

(Emphasis supplied)

and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, whichstates:

Any province that may hereafter be

created, or any city whose population may

hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty

thousandshall be entitled in the immediately

following election to at least one Member or

such number of Members as it may be entitled to

on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and

according to the standards set forth in

paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the

Constitution. The number of Members apportioned

to the province out of which such new province was

created or where the city, whose population has so

increased, is geographically located shall be

correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on

Elections but such adjustment shall not be made

within one hundred and twenty days before the

election. (Emphasis supplied)

serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff

Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to

one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007

elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes thestatement in Felwathat when a province is created by statute, the

corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by

authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by

apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a

reapportionment.

The contention has no merit.

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether

Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet,

Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for

congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was

unconstitutional for creati[ng] congressional districts without the

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

14/44

apportionment provided in the Constitution. The Court answered in

the negative, thus:

The Constitution ordains:

The House ofRepresentatives shall be composedof not more than one hundred andtwenty Members who shall beapportioned among the severalprovinces as nearly as may beaccording to the number of theirrespective inhabitants, but eachprovince shall have at least oneMember. The Congress shall by law

make an apportionment within threeyears after the return of everyenumeration, and not otherwise.Until such apportionment shall havebeen made, the House ofRepresentatives shall have thesame number of Members as thatfixed by law for the NationalAssembly, who shall be elected bythe qualified electors from thepresent Assembly districts. Eachrepresentative district shall comprise

as far as practicable, contiguousand compact territory.Pursuant to this Section, a representative

district may come into existence: (a) indirectly,through the creation of a province for eachprovince shall have at least one member in theHouse of Representatives; or (b) by directcreation of several representative districts withina province. The requirements concerning theapportionment of representative districts and theterritory thereof refer only to the second method of

creation of representative districts, and do not applyto those incidental to the creation of provinces,under the first method. This is deducible, not onlyfrom the general tenor of the provision abovequoted, but, also, from the fact that theapportionment therein alluded to refers to that whichis made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when aprovince is created by statute, thecorresponding representative district, comesinto existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor byapportionment, but by operation of theConstitution, without a reapportionment.

There is no constitutional limitation as to the

time when, territory of, or other conditions under

which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if

the consequence thereof were to exceed the

maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed

in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the

legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact,

provinces have been created or subdivided into

other provinces, with the consequent creation of

additional representative districts, without complying

with the aforementioned

requirements.[32]

(Emphasis supplied)

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

15/44

Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695

because (1) it validly created legislative districts indirectlythrough

a special law enacted by Congresscreating a province and (2)

the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the

maximum number of legislative districtsprovided under the 1935

Constitution. Felwadoes not apply to the present case because

in Felwathe new provinces were created by a national law enacted

by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by

a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.

What Felwateaches is that the creation of a legislativedistrict by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress power

to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress power to

create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative

district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is

created by operation of the Constitution because the

Constitution provides that each province shall have at least

one representative in the House of Representatives. This does not

detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create

legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely

prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from creating

provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such

legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In

short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative

district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the

power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.

Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a

legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will

leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative

district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a

legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it

had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone

as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate

Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x

x x, shall have at least one representative.

Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition

and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section

19,[33]

Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can

create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard

to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum

annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of

2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.[34]

The

following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:

(1) An inferior legislative body like theARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or moreprovinces and thus increase the membership of a

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

16/44

superior legislative body, the Houseof Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national lawprovides otherwise);

(2) The proportional representation in theHouse of Representatives based on onerepresentative for at least every 250,000 residentswill be negated because the ARMM RegionalAssembly need not comply with the requirement inSection 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every provincecreated must have a population of at least 250,000;and

(3) Representatives from the ARMMprovinces can become the majority in the House ofRepresentatives through the ARMM RegionalAssemblys continuous creation of provinces or citieswithin the ARMM.

The following exchange during the oral arguments of the

petition in G.R. No. 177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas

position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces:

Justice Carpio:

So, you mean to say [a] Local Government

can create legislative district[s] and pack

Congress with their own representatives [?]

Atty. Vistan II:[35]

Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows

that.

Justice Carpio:

So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM

can create and create x x x provinces x x

x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five

(35) new representatives in the House of

Representatives without Congress agreeing

to it, is that what you are saying? That can

be done, under your theory[?]

Atty. Vistan II:

Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual

circumstances.

Justice Carpio:

Under your theory, the ARMM legislature

can create thirty-five (35) new provinces,

there may be x x x [only] one hundred

thousand (100,000) [population], x x x, and

they will each have one representative x x x

to Congress without any national law, is that

what you are saying?

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

17/44

Atty. Vistan II:

Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your

Honor, that is what we are saying.

x x x x

Justice Carpio:

So, they can also create one thousand

(1000) new provinces, sen[d] one

thousand (1000) representatives to theHouse of Representatives without a

national law[,] that is legally possible,

correct?

Atty. Vistan II:

Yes, Your Honor.[36] (Emphasis supplied)

Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the

provisions in Article X on regional autonomy,[37]

nor Congress in

enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous

consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of

government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or

reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but

must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional

Assembly recognizes this.

The Constitution empowered Congress to create or

reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section

3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, [A]ny province

that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the

immediately following election to at least one Member, refers to a

province created by Congress itself through a national law. Thereason is that the creation of a province increases the actual

membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only

Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th

Congress,

there are 219[38]

district representatives out of the maximum 250

seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members

shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there

should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in

case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves

only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219

incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for

Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the

House, even before Congress can create new provinces.

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

18/44

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot

prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution

expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies

are limited [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the

provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x. The

Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the

ARMM Government is established within the framework of the

Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution

which mandates that the ARMM shall be created

x x xwithin the

framework of this Constitutionand the national sovereignty as

well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

The present case involves the creation of a local government

unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative

district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the

creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with

the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of

such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of

legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an

appropriate case.

In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,

insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to

create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of

Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as

Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only

Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of

provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative

districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5,

Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance

appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly

cannot create a province without a legislative district because theConstitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative

district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a

law creating a national office like the office of a district representative

of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional

Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in

Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act

201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the

Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution

Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902,

preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

19/44

of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies

with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the

Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the

Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic

Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the

Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we

declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the

Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that

COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the

Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

20/44

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992

LEVY D. MACASIANO, Brigadier General/PNP Superintendent,Metropolitan Traffic Command, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Branch62, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, MUNICIPALITYOF PARAAQUE, METRO MANILA, PALANYAG KILUSANGBAYAN FOR SERVICE,respondents.

Ceferino, Padua Law Office for Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for service.

Manuel de Guia for Municipality of Paraaque.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtseeking the annulment of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Makati, Branch 62, which granted the writ of preliminary injunctionapplied for by respondents Municipality of Paraaque and PalanyagKilusang Bayan for Service (Palanyag for brevity) against petitionerherein.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed OrdinanceNo. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel,G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets

located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishmentof a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by themunicipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979,authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipalstreets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sitesfor flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms andconditions.

On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approvedOrdinance No. 86, s. 1990 of the municipal council of respondentmunicipality subject to the following conditions:

1. That the aforenamed streets are not used forvehicular traffic, and that the majority of theresidents do not oppose the establishment of theflea market/vending areas thereon;

2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as fleamarket/vending area shall be marked distinctly, andthat the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall beused by pedestrians;

3. That the time during which the vending area is tobe used shall be clearly designated;

4. That the use of the vending areas shall betemporary and shall be closed once the reclaimedareas are developed and donated by the PublicEstate Authority.

On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Paraaque issued aresolution authorizing Paraaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enterinto contract with any service cooperative for the establishment,operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/orvending areas.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondentPalanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement wherebythe latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

21/44

aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to thetreasury of the municipal government of Paraaque. Consequently,market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the saidstreets.

On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNPSuperintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered thedestruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. GabrielSt. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondentPalanyag.

On October 16, 1990, petitioner Brig. General Macasiano wrote aletter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days todiscontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall bedismantled.

Hence, on October 23, 1990, respondents municipality and Palanyag

filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibitionand mandamuswith damages and prayer for preliminary injunction,to which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to theissuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

On October 24, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restrainingorder to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter-order of October16, 1990 pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminaryinjunction.

On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding thevalidity of Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990 of the Municipality' of Paraaque

and enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing hisletter-order against respondent Palanyag.

Hence, this petition was filed by the petitioner thru the Office of theSolicitor General alleging grave abuse of discretion tantamount tolack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial judge in issuingthe assailed order.

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not anordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque

authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares assites for flea markets is valid.

The Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, contends that municipalroads are used for public service and are therefore public properties;

that as such, they cannot be subject to private appropriation orprivate contract by any person, even by the respondent Municipalityof Paraaque. Petitioner submits that a property already dedicated topublic use cannot be used for another public purpose and thatabsent a clear showing that the Municipality of Paraaque has beengranted by the legislature specific authority to convert a propertyalready in public use to another public use, respondent municipalityis, therefore, bereft of any authority to close municipal roads for theestablishment of a flea market. Petitioner also submits that assumingthat the respondent municipality is authorized to close streets, itfailed to comply with the conditions set forth by the MetropolitanManila Authority for the approval of the ordinance providing for the

establishment of flea markets on public streets. Lastly, petitionercontends that by allowing the municipal streets to be used by marketvendors the municipal council of respondent municipality violated itsduty under the Local Government Code to promote the generalwelfare of the residents of the municipality.

In upholding the legality of the disputed ordinance, the trial courtruled:

. . . that Chanter II Section 10 of the LocalGovernment Code is a statutory grant of powergiven to local government units, the Municipality of

Paraaque as such, is empowered under that law toclose its roads, streets or alley subject to limitationsstated therein (i.e., that it is in accordance withexisting laws and the provisions of this code).

xxx xxx xxx

The actuation of the respondent Brig. Gen. LeviMacasiano, though apparently within its power is infact an encroachment of power legally vested to the

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

22/44

municipality, precisely because when themunicipality enacted the ordinance in question the authority of the respondent as PoliceSuperintendent ceases to be operative on theground that the streets covered by the ordinanceceases to be a public thoroughfare. (pp. 33-34, Rollo)

We find the petition meritorious. In resolving the question of whetherthe disputed municipal ordinance authorizing the flea market on thepublic streets is valid, it is necessary to examine the laws in forceduring the time the said ordinance was enacted, namely, BatasPambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as Local Government Code, inconnection with established principles embodied in the Civil Code anproperty and settled jurisprudence on the matter.

The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into

property for public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423, CivilCode). As to what consists of property for public use, Article 424 ofCivil Code states:

Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces,cities and municipalities, consists of the provincialroads, city streets, the squares, fountains, publicwaters, promenades, and public works for publicservice paid for by said provinces, cities ormunicipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is

patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. GarciaExtension and Opena streets are local roads used for public serviceand are therefore considered public properties of respondentmunicipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted topublic service are deemed public and are under the absolute controlof Congress (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City ofZamboanga, L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334). Hence,

local governments have no authority whatsoever to control orregulate the use of public properties unless specific authority isvested upon them by Congress. One such example of this authoritygiven by Congress to the local governments is the power to closeroads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the Local GovernmentCode, which states:

Sec. 10. Closure of roads. A local governmentunit may likewise, through its head acting pursuantto a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordancewith existing law and the provisions of this Code,close any barangay, municipal, city or provincialroad, street, alley, park or square. No such way orplace or any part of thereof shall be close withoutindemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. Aproperty thus withdrawn from public usemay beused or conveyed for any purpose for which otherreal property belonging to the local unit concernedmight be lawfully used or conveyed. (Emphasisours).

However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority tolocal government units to close roads and other similar public placesshould be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principlesalready established by law. These basic principles have the effect oflimiting such authority of the province, city or municipality to close apublic street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays downthe basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted topublic use and made available to the public in general are outside

the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by thelocal government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirementof due process which should be complied with before closing a road,street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose ofwithdrawing the road or other public property from public use whencircumstances show that such property is no longer intended ornecessary for public use or public service. When it is alreadywithdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonialproperty of the local government unit concerned (Article 422, CivilCode; Cebu Oxygen, etc. et al. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474,August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). It is only then that the respondent

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

23/44

municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which otherreal property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfullyused or conveyed" in accordance with the last sentence of Section10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local Government Code. In onecase, the City Council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared theterminal road of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City as anabandoned road, the same not being included in the CityDevelopment Plan. Thereafter, the City Council passes anotherresolution authorizing the sale of the said abandoned road throughpublic bidding. We held therein that the City of Cebu is empoweredto close a city street and to vacate or withdraw the same from publicuse. Such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property whichcan be the object of an ordinary contract (Cebu Oxygen andAcetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No.L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). However, those roadsand streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarilyused for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devotedto public use. In such case, the local government has no power to

use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to privatepersons. This limitation on the authority of the local government overpublic properties has been discussed and settled by this Court enbancin "Francisco V. Dacanay, petitioner v. Mayor Macaria Asistio,Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. 93654, May 6, 1992." This Courtruled:

There is no doubt that the disputed areas from whichthe private respondents' market stalls are sought tobe evicted are public streets, as found by the trialcourt in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street isproperty for public use hence outside the commerceof man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outsidethe commerce of man, it may not be the subject oflease or others contract (Villanueva, et al. v.Castaeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142 citing theMunicipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602;Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil.869; And Muyot v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860).

As the stallholders pay fees to the City Governmentfor the right to occupy portions of the public street,

the City Government, contrary to law, has beenleasing portions of the streets to them. Such leasesor licenses are null and void for being contrary tolaw. The right of the public to use the city streetsmay not be bargained away through contract. Theinterests of a few should not prevail over the good ofthe greater number in the community whose health,peace, safety, good order and general welfare, therespondent city officials are under legal obligation toprotect.

The Executive Order issued by acting Mayor Roblesauthorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as avending area for stallholders who were grantedlicenses by the city government contravenes thegeneral law that reserves city streets and roads forpublic use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may notinfringe upon the vested right of the public to use citystreets for the purpose they were intended toserve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles andpedestrians.

Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality hasthe authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot bevalidly implemented because it cannot be considered approved bythe Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance byrespondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former forthe approval of the ordinance, to wit:

1. That the aforenamed streets are not used forvehicular traffic, and that the majority of theresidents do(es) not oppose the establishment of theflea market/vending areas thereon;

2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as fleamarket/vending area shall be marked distinctly, andthat the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall beused by pedestrians;

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

24/44

3. That the time during which the vending area is tobe used shall be clearly designated;

4. That the use of the vending areas shall betemporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed

areas are developed and donated by the PublicEstate Authority. (p. 38, Rollo)

Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it hascomplied with the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval ofthe ordinance. The allegations of respondent municipality that theclosed streets were not used for vehicular traffic and that the majorityof the residents do not oppose the establishment of a flea market onsaid streets are unsupported by any evidence that will show that thisfirst condition has been met. Likewise, the designation byrespondents of a time schedule during which the flea market shalloperate is absent.

Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area arecongested with people, houses and traffic brought about by theproliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allowthe establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz,Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaranwould not help in solving the problem of congestion. We take note ofthe other observations of the Solicitor General when he said:

. . . There have been many instances ofemergencies and fires where ambulances and fireengines, instead of using the roads for a more direct

access to the fire area, have to maneuver and lookfor other streets which are not occupied by stalls andvendors thereby losing valuable time which could,otherwise, have been spent in saving properties andlives.

Along G.G. Cruz Street is a hospital, the St. RitaHospital. However, its ambulances and the peoplerushing their patients to the hospital cannot passthrough G.G. Cruz because of the stalls and the

vendors. One can only imagine the tragedy of losinga life just because of a few seconds delay broughtabout by the inaccessibility of the streets leading tothe hospital.

The children, too, suffer. In view of the occupancy ofthe roads by stalls and vendors, normaltransportation flow is disrupted and school childrenhave to get off at a distance still far from theirschools and walk, rain or shine.

Indeed one can only imagine the garbage and litterleft by vendors on the streets at the end of the day.Needless to say, these cause further pollution,sickness and deterioration of health of the residentstherein. (pp. 21-22, Rollo)

Respondents do not refute the truth of the foregoing findings andobservations of petitioners. Instead, respondents want this Court tofocus its attention solely on the argument that the use of publicspaces for the establishment of a flea market is well within thepowers granted by law to a local government which should not beinterfered with by the courts.

Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. Theyare subject to limitations laid down by toe Constitution and the lawssuch as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powersshould be subservient to paramount considerations of health andwell-being of the members of the community. Every local

government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that willenhance the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peaceand order, and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants ofthe local units. Based on this objective, the local government shouldrefrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adverselyaffect the general welfare.

As what we have said in the Dacanay case, the general public havea legal right to demand the demolition of the illegally constructedstalls in public roads and streets and the officials of respondent

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

25/44

municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office toclear the city streets and restore them to their specific publicpurpose.

The instant case as well as the Dacanay case, involves an ordinance

which is void and illegal for lack of basis and authority in lawsapplicable during its time. However, at this point, We find it worthy tonote that Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, known as Local GovernmentLode, has already been repealed by Republic Act No. 7160 knownas Local Government Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1,1992. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights andobligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code andarising out of contracts or any other source of prestation involving alocal government unit shall be governed by the original terms andconditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time suchrights were vested.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of therespondent Regional Trial Court dated December 17, 1990 whichgranted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner as PNPSuperintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command from enforcing thedemolition of market stalls along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan,Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets is hereby RESERVED andSET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ.,

concur.

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

26/44

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122058. May 5, 1999]

IGNACIO R. BUNYE, JAIME R. FRESNEDI, CARLOS G.TENSUAN, ROMAN E. NIEFES, ROGER C. SMITH,RUFINO B. JOAQUIN, NOLASCO L. DIAZ, and RUFINOIBE, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECONDDIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and theKILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGAMAGTITINDA SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NGMUNTINLUPA, INC., (KBMBPM), respondents.

DECISIONPURISIMA, J.:

Docketed as Criminal Case No. 13966 before the SecondDivision

[1]of the Sandiganbayan, the Amended Information charging

the herein petitioners with a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) ofR.A. No. 3019,

[2]alleges:

That on or about August 1988, in the Municipality of Muntinlupa,Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused all public officers being

the Mayor (Ignacio R. Bunye), Vice Mayor (Jaime D. Fresnedi),Municipal Attorney (Victor C. Aguinaldo), Municipal Councilors(Carlos C. Tensuan, Alejandro L. Martinez, Epifanio A. Espeleta, ReyE. Bulay, Lucio B. Constantino, Roman E. Niefes, Nemesio Q. Mozo,Rufino J. Joaquin, Nolasco L. Diaz and Roger C. Smith, BarangayChairman of Putatan (Rufino Ibe) and Barangay Chairman ofAlabang (Nestor Santos), all in the municipality of Muntinlupa, MetroManila, said accused while in the performance of their officialfunctions in conspiracy with one another and taking advantage oftheir official positions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, andfeloniously enact Kapasiyahan Bilang 45 on August 1, 1988, and on

the basis thereof, forcibly took possession of the New Public Marketin Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and thereafter took over theoperation and management of the aforesaid public market startingAugust 19, 1988, despite the fact that, there was a valid andsubsisting lease contract executed on September 2, 1985 for a termof 25 years, renewable for another 25 years, between theMunicipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, represented by the formerMunicipal Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr. and the Kilusang Bayan saPaglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda sa Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ngMuntinlupa, Inc. (Kilusang Magtitinda, for brevity), a Cooperative,represented by its General Manager then, Amado G. Perez, anddespite also the warnings from COA Chairman Domingo and MMMCGovernor Cruz that appropriate legal steps be taken by the MMCtoward the rescission/annulment of the contract xxx to protect theinterest of the Government, and x x x to evaluate thoroughly andstudy further the case to preclude possible damages of financialliabilities which the Court may adjudge against that municipality asan off-shoot of the case, which forcible take-over had caused undue

injury to the aforesaid Cooperative members, and in effect, theherein accused themselves, unwarranted benefits, advantage orpreference in the discharge of their official functions as aforesaid,through evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence,considering that, the Cooperative members had introducedimprovements, including the construction of the KBS Building, RRSection-Phases I and II, asphalting of the roads surrounding themarket place, and for the purpose, the cooperative had investedThirteen Million Four Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand NineHundred Pesos (P13,479,900.00) in connection therewith, which hadbeen deposited in trust to the Municipal Government, and inconsideration thereof, the cooperative was extended the above long

term lease to manage and operate the public market and to pay amonthly rental of P35,000.00 only -- said offense having beencommitted by the accused in their performance of official duties.

[3]

On July 24,1992, petitioners interposed a Motion toDismiss,

[4]placing reliance on the September 23, 1991 Decision

[5]of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 16930[6]

that unless anduntil declared to be unconstitutional and expressly annulledResolution No. 45

[7]deserves the presumption of constitutionality

and therefore is entitled to obedience and respect.[8]

8/4/2019 Pub Corp Cases Set 3

27/44

On September 23, 1992, the respondent court deniedpetitioners motion to dismiss on the ground that the C.A. Decisioncited by movants did not touch squarely on the constitutionalityof the subject Resolution No. 45

[9].

After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan came out with

its July 26, 1995 Decision,[10]

finding petitioners guilty of a violationof the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act and sentencing them,thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered findingaccused Ignacio Bunye y Rivera, Jaime Fresnedi y de la Rosa,Victor Aguinaldo y Duliabi, Carlos Tensuan y Gutierrez, RomanNiefes y Esporlas, Nemesio Mozo y Rillana, Rufino Joaquin y Bunye,Nolasco Diaz y Lampito, Roger Smith y de la Cruz and Rufino Ibe yLacanilao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in theviolation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, asamended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

Act, and each of them are hereby sentenced to suffer theindeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARSand ONE (1) MONTH, as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARSand ONE (1) DAY, as the maximum, to indemnify, jointly andseverally, the offended party, the Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod NgMga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa, Inc.(KBMBPM) in the amount of P13,479,900.00 as actual damages,and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of this action.

xxx

SO ORDERED.

With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration,[11]

petitionersfound their way to this Court via the present Petition for Review onCertiorari anchored on the following submissions:

I.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURTSDECISION PROCEEDS FROM THE GRAVELY ERRONEOUSPREMISE THAT A COURT ACTION IS NECESSARY IN

REVOKING AND CANCELLING THE LEASE CONTRACT DATED02 SEPTEMBER 1985 (EXHIBIT D-5) DESPITE THE FACT THATIT IS INDUBITABLY A VOID CONTRACT;

II.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULDHAVE RENDERED A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL SINCEKAPASIYAHAN BILANG 45 (EXHIBIT K and K-1) HAS NOTBEEN DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL WHICH IS THEREFOREENTITLED TO OBEDIENCE AND RESPECT; THUS, ALL OFFICIALACTS DONE PURSUANT THERETO, SUCH AS THECHALLENGED ACTS OF THE ACCUSED-MOVANTS, ARE VALIDAND LEGAL.

III.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE RECORDS SHOW THAT THEACUSED-MOVANTS DID NOT VIOLATE SECTION 3,PARAGRAPH (E) OF REPUBLIC ACTS NO. 3019, AS AMENDED(THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), SINCEELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

A. THE ACCUSED-MOVANTS DID NOT COMMIT ANYPROHIBITED ACTS.

B. NO UNDUE INJURY WAS CAUSED TO ANY PARTY.

C. NO UNWARRANTED BENEFITS, ADVANTAGE ORPREFERENCE WAS GIVEN TO ANY PARTY.

D. THE ACCUSED-MOVANTS DID NOT ACT WITH MANIFESTPARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR GROSS INEXCUSABLENEGLIGENCE.

E. THE ACCUSED-MOVANTS CLEARLY ACTED IN GOODFAITH IN REVOKING AND CANCELLING THE LEASE CONTRACTDATED 02 SEPTEMBER 1985 (EXHIBIT D-5) AND IN