45
EN BANCG.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P.
LIMBONA,Petitioner, vs.CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI,
PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ,
ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and
BIMBO SINSUAT,Respondents.Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law
Offices for petitioner petitioner.chanrobles virtual law
libraryMakabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.SARMIENTO,J.:The acts
of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this
petition. The antecedent facts are as follows:1. On September 24,
1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member
of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region
XII, representing Lanao del
Sur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library2. On
March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly for brevity).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members.
Two of said members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil
Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on
Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11,
1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but
they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter
resumed again their positions as members of the
Assembly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library4.
On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of
the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives,
invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga
City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly,
Region XII, in a letter which reads:The Committee on Muslim Affairs
well undertake consultations and dialogues with local government
officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders
on the recent and present political developments and other issues
affecting Regions IX and XII.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law libraryThe result of the conference, consultations and
dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the
two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute
immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the
Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryYou are requested to invite some members of the Pampook
Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987,
with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence,
unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.5.
Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to
Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all
Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as "our
presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic)
precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ...
."chanrobles virtual law library6. In compliance with the aforesaid
instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to
the members of the Assembly the following telegram:TRANSMITTING FOR
YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER
LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE
IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15.
HENCE WERE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN
NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS
TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF
MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.7. On November 2, 1987, the
Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with the
following assemblymen present:1. Sali, Salicchanrobles virtual law
library2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)chanrobles virtual law library3.
Dagalangit, Rakilchanrobles virtual law library4. Dela Fuente,
Antoniochanrobles virtual law library5. Mangelen, Contechanrobles
virtual law library6. Ortiz, Jesuschanrobles virtual law library7.
Palomares, Diegochanrobles virtual law library8. Sinsuat,
Bimbochanrobles virtual law library9. Tomawis, Acmadchanrobles
virtual law library10. Tomawis, JerryAfter declaring the presence
of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in
the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant,
all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the
chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5,
1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following
Assemblymen present:1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officerchanrobles
virtual law library2. Ali Salicchanrobles virtual law library3. Ali
Salindatuchanrobles virtual law library4. Aratuc, Malikchanrobles
virtual law library5. Cajelo, Renechanrobles virtual law library6.
Conding, Pilipinas (sic)chanrobles virtual law library7.
Dagalangit, Rakilchanrobles virtual law library8. Dela Fuente,
Antoniochanrobles virtual law library9. Ortiz, Jesuschanroble10
Palomares, Diegochanrobles virtual law library11. Quijano,
Jesuschanrobles virtual law library12. Sinsuat, Bimbochanrobles
virtual law library13. Tomawis, Acmadchanrobles virtual law
library14. Tomawis, JerryAn excerpt from the debates and proceeding
of said session reads:chanrobles virtual law libraryHON.
DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the
presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session
today, I move to call the names of the new comers in order for them
to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare the position
of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also that the
designation of theSpeaker Pro Temporeas the Presiding Officer and
Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last
November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's
session.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryHON. SALIC ALI: I second the
motions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryPRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two
motions presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are
approved. ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryTwelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare
the seat of the Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted
against.1Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as
follows:chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-chanrobles virtual
law library(a) This Petition be given due course;chanrobles virtual
law library(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from
proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and
on any day thereafter;chanrobles virtual law library(c) After
hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by
respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and
void;chanrobles virtual law library(d) Holding the election of
petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan
Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting,
andchanrobles virtual law library(e) Making the injunction
permanent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryPetitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be
just and equitable.2Pending further proceedings, this Court, on
January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang
Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII,"3on the grounds, among
other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and
signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin
Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of
Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in
the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the record of the
Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was
ever made . . ."4and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying
Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the
Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the
Assembly,"5that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of
so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the
non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly
[sic],"6and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court
against some members of the Assembly on question which should have
been resolved within the confines of the Assembly,"7for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and
academic".8 chanrobles virtual law libraryThe first question,
evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner
(pending litigation) has made the case moot and
academic.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWe
do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by
reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the
petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition
moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it
academic.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryOn
the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold
that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the
first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted
an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard
in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or
otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what
appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least,
the respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the
petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook."9"To be
sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a
conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City,"10but
that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and
settled."11Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out
and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a
substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWhile
we have held that due process, as the term is known in
administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a
party need only be given the opportunity to be heard,12it does not
appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made
aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption
before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was
accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands,
then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that
cannot warrant expulsion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law libraryIn the second place, (the resolution) appears
strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen
against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be
abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution)
speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before
the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved
within the confines of the Assemblyman act which some members
claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and
character as representative of the people"13an act that cannot
possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is
guaranteed by the Constitution,14and, unless the recourse amounts
to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking
redress in the courts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law libraryWe therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that
should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal,
the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence
proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary
requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion
of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues,
their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this
Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave
abuse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIt
is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang
Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully
intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We
come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous
governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to
the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is
the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous
governments of Region IX and XII?chanrobles virtual law libraryThe
autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and
XII by Presidential Decree No. 161815promulgated on July 25, 1979.
Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy"16in
the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and
its Constitution,"17with legislative and executive machinery to
exercise the powers and responsibilities18specified
therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIt
requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all
internal administrative matters for the respective
regions,"19except to "act on matters which are within the
jurisdiction and competence of the National Government,"20"which
include, but are not limited to, the following:(1) National defense
and security;chanrobles virtual law library(2) Foreign
relations;chanrobles virtual law library(3) Foreign
trade;chanrobles virtual law library(4) Currency, monetary affairs,
foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external
borrowing,chanrobles virtual law library(5) Disposition,
exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all
natural resources;chanrobles virtual law library(6) Air and sea
transportchanrobles virtual law library(7) Postal matters and
telecommunications;chanrobles virtual law library(8) Customs and
quarantine;chanrobles virtual law library(9) Immigration and
deportation;chanrobles virtual law library(10) Citizenship and
naturalization;chanrobles virtual law library(11) National
economic, social and educational planning; andchanrobles virtual
law library(12) General auditing.21
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over the Autonomous Regions ..."22chanrobles virtual law
libraryNow, autonomy is either decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable,"23"and ensure their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners
in the pursuit of national development and social progress."24At
the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises "general supervision"25over them,
but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according
to law."26He has no control over their acts in the sense that he
can substitute their judgments with his own.27chanrobles virtual
law libraryDecentralization of power, on the other hand, involves
an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future
with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to
"self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government
becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.28chanrobles virtual law libraryBut the question of
whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power
rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this
petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit
constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution.
Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this
case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at
the proper time and in the proper
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryUnder
the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in
these two senses, thus:Section 1. The territorial and political
subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided.29chanrobles virtual law librarySec. 2. The territorial
and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.30xxx xxx
xxxchanrobles virtual law librarySee. 15. Mere shall be created
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.31An autonomous government that enjoys
autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.]
is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the
other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we
noted, under the supervision of the national government acting
through the President (and the Department of Local Government).32If
the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the
latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this
Court in perhaps the same way that theinternalacts, say, of the
Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it
is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably
under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential
Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us
that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of
self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place,
mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."33In the second
place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to
discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:SEC. 7. Powers of
the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise
local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework
of national development plans, policies and goals, in the following
areas:chanrobles virtual law library(1) Organization of regional
administrative system;chanrobles virtual law library(2) Economic,
social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;chanrobles
virtual law library(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial
programs for the Autonomous Region;chanrobles virtual law
library(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous
Region;chanrobles virtual law library(5) Urban and rural planning
for the Autonomous Region;chanrobles virtual law library(6)
Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this
Decree;chanrobles virtual law library(7) Maintenance, operation and
administration of schools established by the Autonomous
Region;chanrobles virtual law library(8) Establishment, operation
and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services,
programs and facilities;chanrobles virtual law library(9)
Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and
culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; andchanrobles virtual
law library(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by
law,including the enactment of such measures as may be necessary
for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the
Autonomous Region.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryThe President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary
to assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and
the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this
Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and
programs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryThe Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the
Batasang Pambansa.34chanrobles Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And
if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal
as Speaker.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryBriefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster
as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on
November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the
office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of
the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and
(2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective
nevertheless for lack of
quorum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryUpon
the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987
sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the
Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or
adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook,"35 but it
provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion,
declare a recess of "short intervals."36Of course, there is
disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the
recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15,
1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner
says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents
and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by
their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up
so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and
obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity.37The Court agrees with the
respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of
"short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the
Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly
had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the
same Rules.38Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could
possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord
with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in
question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it
was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the
second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason
for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess
could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called
his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they
opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act
of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For
this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good
faith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIt
does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted
to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from
bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings
before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what
precipitated it.cnroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryIn holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are
not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a
recess can not be validly declared without a session having been
first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving
him acarte blancheto order recesses in the future in violation of
the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryNeither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the
Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful
prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the
event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the
Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to
thwart them.39chanrobles virtual law libraryIn view hereof, we find
no need in dwelling on the issue of
quorum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryWHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the
petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2)
REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.cSO ORDERED.Republic of
the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 91649 May 14,
1991ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND
LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING
CORPORATION (PAGCOR),respondent.H.B. Basco & Associates for
petitioners.Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for
petitioners.Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent
PAGCOR.PARAS,J.:pA TV ad proudly announces:"The new PAGCOR
responding through responsible gaming."But the petitioners think
otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to
annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and order, and because A. It constitutes a waiver of a right
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It
waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and
license fees, which is recognized by law;B. For the same reason
stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded
into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license
fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined
principle of local autonomy;C. It violates the equal protection
clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together
with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;D. It violates
the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and
crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2,
Amended Petition; p. 7,Rollo)In their Second Amended Petition,
petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared
national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's
will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to
have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections
11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3
(2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second
Amended Petition; p. 21,Rollo).The procedural issue is whether
petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco
being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City
Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869
on the alleged grounds mentioned above.The Philippine Amusements
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D.
1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D.
1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and
maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally
conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist."
The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a
potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and
socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978
for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.Subsequently, on July 11,
1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government
to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by
existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following
declared policy Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby
declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate
all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following
objectives:(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority
to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to
be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.(b) To
establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and
recreation, including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football,
lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation
including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1)
generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and
socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs,
beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan
Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other
essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated
facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing
tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate,
all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally
prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and
casinos without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D.
1869)To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial
jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's
repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed,
amended or modified.It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest
source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned
P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a
total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income
share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In
addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable
projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental
agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its
3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR
remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December
31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9)
casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four
Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.But the
petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They
allege that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to
morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends
toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection
clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the
state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and
Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II,
Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.This
challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough
scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court,
involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as
"the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the
judicial department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C.
144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).As We enter upon the task of
passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the government We need not be reminded of the
time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that
a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be
indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that
We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear
that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has
over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We
should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as
fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v.
Martinez,supra).InVictoriano v.Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,et al,
59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the . .
. thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all
cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant
cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of
constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable
doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived
which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger
must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned
with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and
that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. (Danner v.
Hass, 194 N.W.2nd534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W.2nd660,
663; 59 SCRA 66;seealsoe.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739
[1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978];
and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in
Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory
Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)Of course, there is first, the procedural
issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of
petitioners to file the instant petition.Considering however the
importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with
the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether
or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this
petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas
Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)With particular regard to the requirement
of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the
same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each
of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate
injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even
if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is
still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and
resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.In the first
Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving
only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the
public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper
parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public
of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of
procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many other
cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).Having disposed of the
procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues
raised.Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is
generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean
that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its
police power.The concept of police power is well-established in
this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta,
35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).Its scope, ever-expanding
to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the
greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta,supra)It finds no specific
Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its
origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent
domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty.
It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom
the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the
plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe,
American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the
State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most
aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell &
Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables
the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.What was the
reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?P.D. 1869 was enacted
pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and
centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas
clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and
centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity the
PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in
general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the
cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact
projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation,
supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD
1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of
the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with
gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD
1896.Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the
right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that
the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of
local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of
P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying
any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or
Local."(2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of
any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or
levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be
assessed and collected under this franchise from the Corporation;
nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the
earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%)
percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the
Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax
shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and
shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments
of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or
collected by any municipal, provincial or national government
authority (Section 13 [2]).Their contention stated hereinabove is
without merit for the following reasons:(a) The City of Manila,
being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v.
Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7
SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an
intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it"
(Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax"
therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior
having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent
power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution,
Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is
subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that
"municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v.
Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to
"create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general
legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo
v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of
control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124,
July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or
even take back the power.(c) The City of Manila's power to impose
license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975,
the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant
of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771
and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:Sec. 1.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority
of chartered cities and other local governments to issue license,
permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and
establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of
gambling is hereby revoked.Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or
franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race
tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the
national government upon proper application and verification of the
qualification of the applicant . . .Therefore, only the National
Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the
operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect
license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or
permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.(d) Local
governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation
with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are
owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate
powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory
powers thus:Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall
maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise
all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the
Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities
mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited
to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in
corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters
concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions
of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary
notwithstanding, except only with respect to original
incorporation.PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate
gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it
in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government.
Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and
actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might
be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
government.The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to
retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4
Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy"
of the National Government over local governments.Justice Holmes,
speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire
absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way
(taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States
(Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed thatno state
or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in
such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal
responsibilities,or even to seriously burden it in the
accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol.
2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)Otherwise, mere creatures of the State
can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local
authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise
using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez,
340 US 42).The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as
the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland,supra) cannot be
allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity
which has the inherent power to wield it.(e) Petitioners also argue
that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated
by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987
Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:Sec. 5. Each local
government unit shall have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other chargessubject to such
guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (emphasis
supplied)The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees"
is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by
law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended,
repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its
"exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the
power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot
therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle
of local autonomy.Besides, the principle of local autonomy under
the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records
of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in
Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol.
II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."Local
Government has been described as a political subdivision of a
nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such
as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local
governments can only be anintra sovereign subdivision of one
sovereign nation, it cannot be animperiuminimperio. Local
government in such a system can only mean a measure of
decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis
supplied)As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what
may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of
policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political
question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy
Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).What is settled is that the matter
of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State
concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to
retain it or delegate it to local governments.Asgamblingis usually
anoffense against the State,legislative grant or express charter
power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to
deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of
power to enact,ordinance provisions on this subject which are
inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala
App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757
following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280,
11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3Ibid, p. 548, emphasis
supplied)Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR
conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82,Rollo).We,
likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The
petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the
clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A
law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or
things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21,
1989).The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects
upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G.
2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they
were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).Just how P.D. 1869 in
legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal
protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact
that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse
racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and
races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain
conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the
applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.If the law
presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be
overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have
been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)The equal protection
clause of the 14thAmendment does not mean that all occupations
called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may
do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of
those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the
harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were
made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US
2651).Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the
"avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony
economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to
state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D.
1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies
then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress
its repeal or amendment.The judiciary does not settle policy
issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the
law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are
within the domain of the political branches of government and of
the people themselves as the repository of all state power.
(Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).On the issue of
"monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:Sec. 19. The
State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so
requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and
Patrimony)It should be noted that, as the provision is worded,
monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The
state must still decide whether public interest demands that
monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of
policy for the Legislature to decide.On petitioners' allegation
that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12
(Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social
Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that
these are merely statements of principles and, policies. As such,
they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be
passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles.In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the
executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature
failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy
was not judicial or political. The electorate could express their
displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature
through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)Every
law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong
Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734;
Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287).
Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there
is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v.
Comelec,supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or
parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis
for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based
on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this
petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869
remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality,
monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the
state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational
values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.As this Court
held inCitizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v.Energy
Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521 Presidential Decree No. 1956, as
amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor
the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners
Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not
undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which
they claim to have been violated by that statute. This Court,
however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the
assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the
Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that
petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice
and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are
not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may not
constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather
to the political departments of government: the President and the
Congress.Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is
generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling
resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends
not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family
but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life.
However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their
material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their
lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly
attributable to gambling.Gambling may have been the antecedent,but
certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences
could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise,
work, and even sex.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.SO ORDERED.
KIDA V SENATE
OnJune 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act
Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and
Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted. The law reset
the ARMM elections fromthe 8thof August 2011, to the second Monday
of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with
the countrys regular national and local elections. The law as well
granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge
(OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional
Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office.Even before its formal
passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned
petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate
Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this
Court.These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual AntecedentsThe State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and theCordilleras.Section 15
states:Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in theCordillerasconsisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of thePhilippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress
to enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely
carry into effect the granted autonomy.Section 18. The Congress
shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative
commission composed of representatives appointed by the President
from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act
shall define the basic structure of government for the region
consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and representative of the
constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise
provide for special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution
and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.On August 1,
1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao.A plebiscite was held onNovember 6, 1990as required by
Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).The initially
assenting provinces were Lanaodel Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and
Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the
regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days
nor later than 90 days after its ratification.RA No. 9054 (entitled
An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act
No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, as Amended) was the next legislative act
passed.This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM
structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140[1]-
onJune 22, 2001.This law reset the first regular elections
originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, toNovember 26, 2001.It
likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later
thanAugust 15, 2001.RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held
onAugust 14, 2001.
TheprovinceofBasilanandMarawiCityvoted to join ARMM on the same
date.RA No. 9333[2]was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the
ARMM regional elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the
same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No.
9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should
have been held onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for
these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
the various regional offices to be elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA
No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House
Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections
scheduled onAugust 8, 2011. OnMarch 22, 2011, the House of
Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one
(191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own
version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), onJune 6, 2011.
Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. OnJune 7,
2011, the House of Representative concurred with the Senate
amendments, and onJune 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153
into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a
petition filed with this Court G.R.No. 196271[3]-assailing the
constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and
challenging the validity ofRA No. 9333 as well for non-compliance
with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter,
petitioner BasariMapupuno inG.R. No. 196305filed another
petition[4]also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.With the
enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections.The law gave rise as well to
the filing of the following petitions against its
constitutionality:a)Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition[5]filed
by Rep. EdcelLagman as a member of the House of Representatives
against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197221;b)Petition
for Mandamus and Prohibition[6]filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal as
a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No.
197282;c)Petition forCertiorariand Mandamus, Injunction and
Preliminary Injunction[7]filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against the
COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed
asG.R. No. 197392; andd)Petition forCertiorariand Mandamus[8]filed
by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives
against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC,
docketed asG.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners AlamarimCentiTillah and DatuCasanConding Cana as
registered voters from the ARMM, with the PartidoDemokratiko
Pilipino Lakasng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the
ARMM regional elections scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus[9]against the COMELEC,
docketed asG.R. No. 197280, to assail the constitutionality of RA
No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum
Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their
ownMotion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and
Comment-in-Intervention datedJuly 18, 2011. OnJuly 26, 2011, the
Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered
the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the
constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA
No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held onAugust 9, 2011andAugust 16,
2011.Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their
respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.
OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the
incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their
functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their
term onSeptember 30, 2011.
The ArgumentsThe petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus,
have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA
No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading
requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also
cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of
suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to
the elective and representative character of the executive and
legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners
challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs
to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the
officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have
assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of
appointment also gave the President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the
Constitution.
The IssuesFrom the parties submissions, the following issues
were recognized and argued by the parties in the oral arguments of
August 9 and 16, 2011:I.Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of electionsII.Whether the passage of RA No. 10153
violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
ConstitutionIII.Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a
supermajority vote and plebisciteA.Does the postponement of the
ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7,
Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?B.Does the requirement of a
supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054
violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?C.Does
the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of
autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the
1987 Constitution?IV.Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy
granted to the ARMMV.Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs
violates:A.Section 15, Article X of the 1987 ConstitutionB.Section
16, Article X of the 1987 ConstitutionC.Section 18, Article X of
the 1987 ConstitutionVI.Whether the proposal to hold special
elections is constitutional and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented
above.OUR RULINGWe resolve toDISMISSthe petitions and
therebyUPHOLDthe constitutionality of RA No. 10153in
toto.I.Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandateThe
respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the
Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this
position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:Section 1. The
first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.The first local
elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the
President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the
Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan
Manila area.Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitutionshall serve untilnoonofJune 30, 1992.Of the Senators
elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the
highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining
twelve for three years.Xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,for purposes
of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June
30, 1992.The first regular elections for President and
Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.We agree with this position.While the
Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards
this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution,[10]which show the extent to
which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to
attain synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all
elective officials, done among others through the shortening the
terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of
votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections
whether national or local to once every three years.This intention
finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations.
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all
serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the
synchronization of the national and local elections as a
constitutional mandate. InOsmea v. Commission on Elections,[14]we
explainedIt is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987
Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and
the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour,
date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned
Sections that the term ofsynchronizationis used synonymously as the
phraseholding simultaneouslysince this is the precise intent in
terminating their Office Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This
common termination date will synchronize future elections to once
every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).That the election for Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials
(under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the
election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art.
XVIII) is likewise evident from the x xxrecords of the proceedings
in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]Although
called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election
based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words
used should be understood in the sense that they have in common use
and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails.As this Court explained inPeople v. Derilo,[a]s the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, its language
should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its
words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed.
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to
something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited
district, often a community or minor political subdivision.Regional
elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor
and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this
classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who
will serve within the limited region of ARMM.From the perspective
of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the
forms of local governments, as evident from Article Xof the
Constitution entitled Local Government.Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article
the article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous
region is considered a form of local government is also reflected
in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of thePhilippinesare the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao, and theCordillerasas hereinafter provided.Thus, we
find the contention that the synchronization mandated bythe
Constitution does not include the regional elections of the ARMM
unmeritorious.We shall refer to synchronization in the course of
our discussions below, as this concept permeates the consideration
of the various issues posed in this case and must be recalled time
and again for its complete resolution.
II.The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No.
10153The petitioners inG.R. No. 197280also challenge the validity
of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section
26(2), Article VI of the Constitutionwhich provides that before
bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws,
they must pass through three readings on separate days. The
exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the
bills immediate enactment.
The Court, inTolentino v. Secretary of Finance,explained the
effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in the
following manner:The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill
on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies
to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI,
Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate
days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.Xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the
requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari
jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate
version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and
third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [May
14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as
urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections.Following
ourTolentinoruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the
immediate enactment of these bills since there was no public
calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our
ruling inTolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the
writ ofhabeas corpusor declaration of martial law Art.VII, Section
18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the
delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI,
Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of
individuals may be of hazard.Butthe factual basis of presidential
certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by
members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard
of review.[Emphasis supplied.]
The House of Representatives and the Senate in the exercise of
their legislative discretion gave full recognition to the
Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153.Under
the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion
under our power of judicial review.
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or
justification for this course of action.Hence, while the judicial
department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the
President's certification by both the House of Representatives and
the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our
co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the
Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]In any case,
despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that
underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of
every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and
other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond
to them.Specifically,the purpose with respect to Members of
Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they
shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in
progress through the enactment process.
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law,
that both advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had
sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no
reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.III.A.RA
No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054The
effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been
challenged because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions
require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution,
this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate voting
separately.Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic
Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the
vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be
held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90)
days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends
RA No. 9054.As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054
only provides for the schedule of thefirstARMM elections and does
not fix the date of the regular elections.A need therefore existed
for the Congress to fix the date of thesubsequentARMM regular
elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA
No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not
change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely
filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing
the date of the subsequent regular elections.
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the
determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to
legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent history.To
recall,RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled
the ARMM elections.The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did
not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix
the specific date of the first ARMM elections,leaving the date to
be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No.
7647,RA No. 8176,[RA No. 8746,[RA No. 8753,and RA No. 9012were all
enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections.Since
these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No.
6734, they were not amendments to this latter law.Consequently,
there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for
ratification.The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into
law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be
held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress
passed RA No. 9140[30]to reset the date of the ARMM
elections.Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No.
9054),the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No.
9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held
to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No.
9333,which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections.
Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of
Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent
ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts.
Congress only acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA
No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of
RA No. 9054.
III. B.Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for
giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement
required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054has to be
struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable
law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. In
other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the
quorum needed to conduct business and hold session.Within a quorum,
a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve
acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a
vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House
of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order
to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting
requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the
passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.The
Courts pronouncement inCity of Davao v. GSIS[33]on this subject
best explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxiousanathema to democratic
principlesfor a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
actions of future legislative body, considering that both
assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do
the same plenary powers.Perpetual infallibility is not one of the
attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which
attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its
enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.xxxA state
legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects,
whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial
jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old,
unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal
constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind
itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when
so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the
acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may
be exercised at the same session at which the original act was
passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it
becomes a law.This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to
a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the
intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal,
it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on
the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it
significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and
flexibility.III. C.Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section
18, Article X of the Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted
supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as
embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act.As we did on
the supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the
plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a
violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the
plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions
and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas
will be included in the autonomous regions. While the settled rule
is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the
plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,[35]questions
on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably
arise because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution
and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to
be required foreverystatutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose.With these wordings as
standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments
to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to
the creation ofautonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in
the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite.These
amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the
basic structure of the regional government; (b) the regions
judicial system,i.e., thespecialcourtswithpersonal, family, and
property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the
legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.[36]
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to
provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the
supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any
change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a
substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require
compliance with these requirements.
IV.The synchronization issueAs we discussed above,
synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional
mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronization
must include the ARMM elections.On this point, an existing law in
fact already exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA
No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of
local elections with the national and congressional elections.Thus,
what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments
(with the exception of barangayandSanggunianKabataanelections where
the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a
reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that
regional elections are in reality local elections by express
constitutional recognition.[37]
To achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile
the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been
held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule
of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be
held in May 2013).During the oral arguments, the Court identified
the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this
problem. These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in
the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to
Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in
the synchronized elections assume office;[38](2) to hold special
elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire
when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or
(3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section
3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office.As will be abundantly clear in the
discussion below, Congress, in choosing to grant the President the
power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No.
10153 as a completely valid law.
V.The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153A.Basic Underlying
Premises
To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying
material premises must be fully understood.Thefirstis the extent of
the powers of Congress to legislate; thesecondis the constitutional
mandate for the synchronization of elections; and thethirdis on the
concept of autonomy as recognized and established under the 1987
Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive.[39]The legislative body possesses plenary power for
all purposes of civil government.[40]Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.[41]Except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and
extends to all matters of general concern or common interest
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either
express or implied. The express limitations are generally provided
in some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article
3).Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy
provisions of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The
implied limitations are found in the evident purpose which was in
view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the
enactment of the particular provision as a part of organic law
The constitutional provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections
15 to 21 of Article X of the Constitution constitute express
limitations on legislative power as they define autonomy, its
requirements and its parame