PSA Teachers' Materials - Pressure Groups and Government

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Topic: pressure groups and government

A guide for politics teachers in sixth form colleges and schools

- Professor Paul Cairney

Image: Hayden CC BY-NC-ND

PSA Teachers’ Topic Guides

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CONTACT:

[email protected]

@cairneypaul

PRESSURE GROUPS AND GOVERNMENT (2015)

by Professor Paul Cairney (Stirling), Professor of Politics and PublicPolicy

Paul joined the Division of History and Politics, University of Stirling, inFebruary 2013 having began his lecturing career at the University ofAberdeen in 2004.Paul’s research and teaching interests are in comparative public policy. Thisincludes:

● comparisons of policy theories (e.g. Understanding Public Policy,2012)

● policy outcomes in different countries (Global Tobacco Control, 2012(with Donley Studlar and Hadii Mamudu))

● Scottish politics and policy (The Scottish Political System SinceDevolution, 2011 and Scottish Politics 2nd ed, 2013 with NeilMcGarvey)

● comparisons of UK and devolved government policymaking (‘HasDevolution Changed the British Policy Style?’, British Politics, 3, 3,350-72)

● comparisons of policy outcomes across the UK (‘PolicyConvergence,Transfer and Learning in the UK under Devolution’,Regional and Federal Studies, 22, 3, 289-307 with Michael Keatingand Eve Hepburn).

Paul is currently writing a single-authored book called 'Policy andPolicymaking in the UK' and co-editing (with Robert Geyer) a book oncomplexity theory and its applications to policymaking. Paul is also currentlyfunded (October 2013-15) by the Economic and Social Research Council toresearch the policymaking process in Scotland, focusing on areas such aspreventative spending.

Published by the Political Studies Association 2015Copywrite© Political Studies Association. All rights reserved.Registered charity no. 1071825Company limited by guarantee in England and Wales no. 3628986

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Specific focus: what has changed in British politicsand how does it affect student learning?

AIMS

This guide is pitched for A-level teachers looking to keep up withmodern developments, and/ or to provide material to moreadvanced students who may be able to go beyond the basics andeither grasp more difficult concepts or read further on the topic.This guide consolidates some of the literature's key themes intocore and advanced topics and provides some new case studies:

1. The Classic Studies: core and advanced topics.

An overview to show the longevity of some approaches to thestudy of group-government relations. Starting with WynGrant's book - his insider/ outsider distinction is still a keyreference point for A-level students - and then furtherproviding some material that builds on it.

2. Contemporary Studies: core and advanced topics.

An example of developments in multi-level policymaking,which is based on more recent material but still has a sense oflongevity. This topic links to discussions of devolved andEuropean Union policymaking.

3. Case Studies:

i) Mental Health Policy. A brief case study of mental healthpolicymaking, used to develop further the idea that group-government relations are multi-level and that some arenasmay be of diminishing importance. The contemporary focushas links to discussions of the changing nature of UK centralgovernment. The mid-2000s focus allows us to discuss what'normal' policymaking is, and to put some examples of highprofile group-government disputes in context.

ii) Scottish Independence: A chance for 16 year olds to vote.This is a bonus discussion, prompted by the Scottishindependence referendum.

Topic: pressure groups and government- Professor Paul Cairney

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The classic way for students to understand the role of pressuregroups is to think about Wyn Grant's distinction between'insiders' and 'outsiders'. The outsiders are the groups likeGreenpeace and Fathers 4 Justice who use attention grabbingstunts to raise issues and put media and public pressure ongovernments. The insiders are more likely to be consultedregularly by government. Our focus is on their insider/ outsiderstatus (are they consulted regularly by the government?) andstrategy (do they engage in public campaigns or operate behindthe scenes?). Some groups are insiders or outsiders in both cases.Others, such as Greenpeace, may sometimes display a mix of thetwo, such as when groups engage in highly public criticism ofgovernment (an outsider strategy) and consult regularly withgovernment.

Wyn Grant's basic distinction has underpinned A-level teachingand allowed students to begin to understand some importantdistinctions between the types of pressure groups, and theextent to which pressure group activity compares with broadersocial movements. Some examples tend to dominate casestudies, partly because the groups are visible - students will haveheard of them, which gives teachers a way to ground discussionin shared experience. The down side is that these, often old anddated, examples of high profile activity may be unrepresentativeof British politics; student interest comes at the expense ofaccuracy.

Work by Grant Jordan and colleagues in the 1990s made someimportant distinctions between 'core' and 'peripheral' insidergroups, to show that it is not difficult to be consulted bygovernment, and highlight the difference between 'cosmetic' andmeaningful consultation. It also provided a way to introducemore advanced students to logical arguments regarding thenature of government and the role of groups. A focus on 'core'groups can be linked to the 'policy communities' that oftendevelop when policymakers interact regularly with certaingroups. It helps us invite students to consider what takes place'beyond the headlines' and understand why high profilecampaign group activity is not representative of the world ofgroup-government relations. We can break this down into aseries of logical steps, each of which could be discussed in moredetail:

1. The reach of government is now so extensive that it isdifficult to think of any aspect of our lives that are notregulated or influenced by public policy in some way.

1. The Classic Studies: core and advanced topics

INVITE STUDENTS TOCONSIDER WHAT TAKES

PLACE 'BEYOND THEHEADLINES'

Image: Cory Doctorow CC BY-NC-ND

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2. The state comprises millions of public sector workers, andthousands of public bodies, and it taxes and spends hundredsof billions of pounds.

3. It is overseen by a small number of senior electedpolicymakers, including Cabinet secretaries and juniorministers.

4. Those policymakers only have the ability to pay attention to,and seek to influence, a tiny proportion of the things forwhich they are responsible*. They are busy people - lookingafter their constituencies, playing a role in their parties,appearing regularly in Parliament and the media, dealingwith crises, and focusing on the next election - and they oftenonly last one or two years in their posts, which is not enoughtime to develop expertise. Even if they were not busy, andspent many years in post, they would still only be able to payattention to a small number of issues in any great depth.Sometimes, they might pay disproportionate attention tocampaigns by groups pursuing outsider strategies. Or, someformer ministers talk about picking one issue on which tofocus. If so, what happens in all other areas?

5. Ministers delegate most policymaking responsibility to civilservants.

6. Senior civil servants also have to manage huge departments,and they delegate most responsibility for the research anddevelopment of policy to less senior civil servants.

7. Although these civil servants may be more knowledgeable ofpolicy, they still tend to be 'generalists' rather thanprofessional or scientific experts. So, they rely on otherpeople, groups and organisations for information and advice.

8. Those groups trade information and advice for access to, andpossible influence within, government.

9. If civil servants and groups talk to each other regularly, theyoften develop a shared understanding of policy. They beginto trust each other. Civil servants start to rely on a smallnumber of groups, picking up the phone to only a few peoplewhen they have day-to-day problems to address.

This is how we become to discuss terms such as 'policycommunities' or, at least, the 'logic' of this kind of group-government relationship. It represents the main response ofpolicymakers to the size of government; a way to makegovernment more manageable.

If the more advanced students can grasp these ideas, they canbegin to think about the difference between:

1. The headline grabbing activity that we all know about, butwhich only represents a tiny amount of what goes on inpolitics, and the less visible but more routine part ofpolicymaking, which represents the bulk of governmentactivity.

2. The power to: (a) grab a fleeting amount of attention for acause, but often without any long term results; and, (b)

IF CIVIL SERVANTS ANDGROUPS TALK TO EACH

OTHER REGULARLY, THEYOFTEN DEVELOP A

SHARED UNDERSTANDINGOF POLICY

*The next section begins to relatethis point into a focus on the natureof central government, introducing

students to the contrast between the'Westminster model', which stressesthe tendency of the UK electoral and

political system to concentrate powerin the hands of a governing elite

('core executive'), and terms such as'multi-level governance', which stress

the diffusion of power to a largenumber of governmental, non-governmental and 'quasi-non-governmental' organisations.

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interact routinely with government, to the extent that therelationships are taken for granted.

3. They might also reflect on the peripheral role of Parliamentin this process.

Possible examples to develop:

The case of Brent Spar. Brent Spar was a North Sea oil storageunit owned by Shell. In the mid-1990s, Shell secured agreementfrom the UK Government to dispose of the unit by sinking it indeep water in the North Atlantic. This decision was opposed byGreenpeace, whose high profile global campaign prompted Shellto abandon its plans and resort to on-shore disposal (and somere-use of the materials). The advantage to this case study is thatit initially:

▪ Anchors student learning in an example of a group withwhich they are familiar.

▪ Illustrates the initial insider (Shell) and outsider(Greenpeace) strategies.

▪ Highlights a classic business/ environmental struggle.▪ For the more advanced students, it highlights the next part

of the story, which is that these groups then pursued insiderstrategies and came to a negotiated settlement, withgovernment, on how to proceed. The initial public disputewas followed by regular discussions and shifting positions.So, we go a bit beyond insider/ outsider towards a focus onshifting strategies over time.

▪ This case study story is recounted in a 1997 article by GrantJordan and William Maloney (and a subsequent book byJordan), so there is some scope for further reading.

Immigration and business. The simple story here is thatpolicymaking processes often seem to have at least two differentlevels. The first is the high profile headline-grabbing focus onpolitical parties competing to appear to be tough on immigration.The second is a quieter strategy by business groups to encourageimmigration as a way to keep wages down and/ or secure awilling and skilled workforce. The advantage to this case study isthat it:

▪ Encourages students to think about what goes on in politics'beyond the headlines'.

▪ Provides another example of the logic, and effect, of regularconsultation between governments and certain groups.

▪ Provides a way into complementary studies of the EuropeanUnion (since most migration is to and from the EU) andperhaps UKIP.

▪ For advanced students, it may prompt discussions abouthow issues are 'framed' (understood and addressed) bydifferent groups or to different audiences. Is it a highlysalient and urgent issue (UKIP) or something that businessgroups and part of government would like to portray asroutine?

POLICYMAKINGPROCESSES OFTEN SEEMTO HAVE AT LEAST TWO

DIFFERENT LEVELS

Image: Marc Wathieu CC BY-NC-ND

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Contemporary Studies: core and advanced topics2.Let's consider a major shift in the way that we understand therelationship between 'pressure groups' and 'the government'. Inboth cases, these phrases may no longer be adequate as ways todescribe contemporary British politics and policymaking.

From 'pressure groups' to 'pressure participants'

Grant Jordan and colleagues prefer 'pressure participant' becausethey worry about 'pressure group' or 'interest group' being usedas default terms whenever we are not quite sure how to describelobbying activity. They argue that 'pressure group' can bemisleading in two main ways. First, it conjures up a particularimage of a group which may not be accurate. We may think ofsubscription-based unions or large membership groups likeGreenpeace, even though many groups (and 'think tanks') arefunded by single patrons. Second, the organisations most likely tolobby governments are not pressure groups. Instead, they arebusinesses, public sector organisations such as universities andother types of government.

From 'the government' to 'multi-level governance'

We talk about multi-level policymaking because the UKGovernment has devolved or transferred many policymakingfunctions to other levels of government. It is a member state inthe European Union and has signed a series of treaties to give EUinstitutions primary responsibility in key areas (including aspectsof trade, labour, migration, agricultural and environmentalpolicy). It is also a member of the Council of Europe and hassigned up to the European Convention of Human Rights, whichinfluences policy in areas such as criminal justice. In 1999, itdevolved policy responsibility to Scottish, Welsh and NorthernIreland governments. Local governments are responsible for theimplementation of UK government policies and, to some extent,policy making in some areas. There is also a degree of devolutionof economic development and related powers to English regionalbodies, although an unsuccessful Labour government agenda tointroduce elected regional assemblies was replaced recently bycoalition government plans to transfer many regional powers tolocal authorities.

We talk about 'governance' to recognise the ways in whichelected politicians, such as ministers, share policymakingresponsibilities with a wide range of people in governmental,non-governmental and quasi-non-governmental ('quango')organisations. For example:

▪ The UK Government's executive oversees a large number ofdepartments and agencies. Departmental ministers overseebroad policy sectors (such as health, education, crime, and

THE ORGANISATIONSMOST LIKELY TO LOBBY

GOVERNMENTS ARE NOTPRESSURE GROUPS

WE TALK ABOUTMULTI-LEVEL

POLICYMAKING BECAUSETHE UK GOVERNMENT

HAS DEVOLVED ORTRANSFERRED MANY

POLICYMAKINGFUNCTIONS TO OTHER

LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

Image: First Minister CC BY-NC-ND

Image: Mariano Mantel CC BY-NC-ND

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agriculture) which are divided further into a large number ofsubsectors (such as public health, pre-school education,probation, and dairy farming). Departments also shareresponsibilities for cross cutting issues such as poverty andsocial inclusion, inequalities, and mental health. Eachdepartment has its own 'clientele', including theorganisations it uses to develop and implement policy andthe interest groups with which it consults the most.

▪ Ministers also devolve many responsibilities to 'quangos'and other public bodies. They provide the funding, and are incharge of the broad legislative and regulatory framework inwhich public bodies operate, but also take a 'hands off'approach to the detailed operations of those bodies. Acommon phrase to describe modern government is that it'steers' rather than 'rows' - in other words, it providesdirection rather than running public services directly. Thephrase 'localism' has also became a way to describe thecoalition government's frequent desire to shift policymakingresponsibility from government departments to other publicbodies.

The term 'multi-level governance' can therefore be used todescribe a rather fragmented policymaking process. It is difficultto identify the UK's reputation - often summed up in the phrase'Westminster model' - for having power concentrated at thecentre of government. Instead, we have a large number of bodiesinteracting with UK central government, either playing their partin the joint production of policy or becoming responsible for theirown policy decisions.

If we put these two elements - pressure participants and multi-level governance - together, we begin to build up a morecomplicated picture in which a large number of pressure groups,and other organisations, have to think about much more thantheir insider/ outsider strategies and status in UK centralgovernment. They have to consider their status within differentlevels or types of government, and produce a strategy todetermine which level or type of government they should try toinfluence the most.

Indeed, we can gain quick insights into shifting patterns ofgovernment by looking at how well-established groups behave.The main shift has been towards the European Union, to reflectits growing influence, in specific areas such as agricultural andenvironmental policy, and broad areas influenced by trade,labour and competition laws. Many groups have also adapted toUK devolution by boosting their ability to lobby devolvedgovernments. For example, the Scottish Government now has thepower to legislate in areas such as health, education and localgovernment policy.

Yet, a focus on group strategies does not give us the wholeanswer, for two main reasons. First, many groups may lack theresources to lobby more than one kind of government. This is a

A COMMON PHRASE TODESCRIBE MODERN

GOVERNMENT IS THAT IT'STEERS' RATHER THAN

'ROWS'

THE TERM 'MULTI-LEVELGOVERNANCE' CAN

THEREFORE BE USED TODESCRIBE A RATHER

FRAGMENTEDPOLICYMAKING PROCESS

Image: Pikakoko CC BY-NC-ND

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particular problem when central governments pursue a 'localism'agenda, in which they devolve substantial policymakingresponsibilities to a very large number of local bodies. Second,groups may not know how to best divide their time. Fragmentedgovernment is very difficult to understand, and even the mostexperienced group representatives can be caught off guard byshifts in government thinking. Further, if policy responsibilityshifts from one body to another, they need to spend time todevelop new relationships with new people.

▪ We can relate this discussion further to a broader focus onthe nature of central government, introducing students tothe contrast between the 'Westminster model', whichstresses the tendency of the UK electoral and politicalsystem to concentrate power in the hands of a governingelite ('core executive'), and terms such as 'multi-levelgovernance', which stress the diffusion of power to a largenumber of governmental, non-governmental and 'quasi-non-governmental' organisations.

▪ The more advanced students might be invited to reflect onthe meaning of 'insider' and 'outsider' groups in this context.

▪ It would be possible to develop a discussion of 'policy styles'for more advanced students. The Scottish and Welshgovernments have reputations for being more consultativeand enjoying more consensual relationships with interestgroups than their UK government counterparts. We couldprovide some critical analysis of that argument, examiningwhy their styles may or may not differ. I have done somepublished work on this, which could be further reading.

Image: 38 Degrees CC BY-NC-ND

ADVANCED STUDENTSMIGHT BE INVITED TOREFLECT ON THEMEANING OF 'INSIDER'AND 'OUTSIDER' GROUPS

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Case Study: Mental Health Policy

There are two possible elements of the case study to develop.

1. The role of pressure groups in mental health law reform

Key themes to develop (summarised from a journal article that Iwrote in 2009):▪ The early post-war history of UK mental health law reform –

1959 and 1983 - suggests that the government often actedas a conduit or referee between groups with very differentideas – such as psychiatric groups traditionally at the centreof treatment, and user groups or charities seeking a greaterrole for the ‘user’ voice in service design. Relations betweengroups and government were consensual, based on a broadcommitment to service modernisation and patients’ rights.

▪ Reform from the late 1990s was very different. The Labourgovernment’s mental health legislative reform agenda wasopposed by almost every mental health pressure group, andthe experience produced remarkable consensus amonggroups that had traditionally been in competition with eachother.

▪ This experience can be used to discuss the ‘normal’ way inwhich the government interacts with groups. In other areas,such as the reform of mental capacity law, and the strategyfor mental health services within the NHS, their relationshipswere generally consensual. Indeed, in many cases, we couldsee a consensual process operating alongside one of conflict,with the same people involved in both processes. If we alsotake into account the historical experience, all-but-oneexperience points to generally low profile and consensus-seeking strategies by governments. This would not beapparent if we focused exclusively on the headline-grabbingcases.

▪ The UK government experience contrasts markedly with thatof the Scottish Government. They appeared to have different‘policy styles’ when reforming mental health law. The UKGovernment oversaw 10 years of conflict and eventuallywithdrew most of its bill. The Scottish Government took twoyears to produce widespread agreement on bill that is similarin many respects. For example, it contained similar measuresto introduce compulsory psychiatric treatment in thecommunity. Groups in Scotland and the UK had concerns

3.i Case Study: Mental Health Policy

THE LABOURGOVERNMENT’S MENTAL

HEALTH LEGISLATIVEREFORM AGENDA WAS

OPPOSED BY ALMOSTEVERY MENTAL HEALTH

PRESSURE GROUP

Image: NHS Confederation CC BY-NC-ND

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about the reform of legislation to allow ‘sectioned’ patientsto be treated in the community rather than in hospitals,partly because the limits on hospital capacity used to limitthe number of sectioned patients.

For advanced students, we could delve further into the idea ofbursts of high profile conflict during long periods of routinepolicymaking. If one specific example of group-governmentconflict appears to depart from the ‘normal style’, it may beworth trying to explain what caused the conflict in that case. Alarge part of the conflict centred on the idea that people withmental health problems could be detained before they became adanger to the public. The government introduced a new term‘dangerous people with severe personality disorder’ (DSPD). Theidea was that, if someone was diagnosed with DSPD, they couldbe detained against their will (‘sectioned’) under new mentalhealth legislation. This proposal went against the idea in previouslegislation that people should only be deprived of their liberty ifthey could be treated and had a reasonable chance of their healthimproving through treatment (personality disorder has oftenbeen described in the UK as untreatable). Its roots can be foundin a number of factors that came together in the late 1990s:

1. A rapid shift from hospital to community-based treatmentswhich caused a rise in media and public concern about thedangers of mentally ill people living in the community.

2. A European Court of Human Rights case which blamed thepolice (and, effectively, the Home Office) for not protecting aschool pupil and his father from a predictable attack by histeacher (based on the teacher’s behaviour preceding theattack).

3. The Labour government’s focus on being ‘tough on crime’and introducing anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs).Compulsory treatment orders were often described as‘mental health ASBOs’.

4. High profile cases that made the headlines and reinforced thecriminal side to mental health reform. Groups talked inparticular about ministers paying high attention to the caseof Michael Stone in the Daily Mail.

Consequently, ministers took an unusually high interest in thereforms – and elements 2 and 3 produced unusually high HomeOffice involvement in an area traditionally run by the Departmentof Health. While the Department of Health initially produced aconsensual proposal to reform mental health legislation (as inScotland), it was largely rejected by ministers, who wereprepared to challenge mental health pressure groups to pursuetheir own agenda. This produced a very long ‘stand-off’ betweengovernment and groups, leading eventually to the governmentwithdrawing its bill, in favour of a much shorter bill required tosatisfy the ECHR. In the end, neither side got what they wanted.

MINISTERS [WERE]PREPARED TO CHALLENGE

MENTAL HEALTHPRESSURE GROUPS … THIS

PRODUCED A VERY LONG‘STAND-OFF’ BETWEEN

GOVERNMENT ANDGROUPS

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2. Mental health policy and the changing role of the Departmentof Health

I am continuing to do research in this area, so the further readingwould be different (or take some time to develop). There is onekey theme worth developing in particular: the effect of ‘localism’and policy delegation on group-group government relations:

1. The UK Government produced a strategy document NoHealth Without Mental Health based on a remarkableamount of consultation and consensus with pressure groups.It contains a major principle – ‘We are clear that we expectparity of esteem between mental and physical healthservices’ – and a set of aims on improving mental health inthe population, helping people ‘recover’ from mental healthillnesses, improving the physical health of people with mentalhealth problems, improving care and support, enhancingservices to prevent the development of mental healthproblems, and reduce the stigma associated with mentalillness. Groups are generally positive about the message thatthe strategy document sends.

2. However, recent decisions by bodies such as NHS Englandappear to have undermined this strategy by making fundingdecisions that do not ensure parity of services.

3. The interesting development is how ministers now deal withthe problem. In the past, we may have expected them tointervene directly in the running of the NHS. The phrase‘command and control’ was a feature of the previous Labourgovernment. Now, they may decide to criticise the decisionsof public bodies without intervening to change them. See, forexample: ‘Norman Lamb, the care services minister, hascalled the decision to penalise mental health services "flawedand unacceptable"’ (The Guardian 12.3.14). The publicannouncement may be welcomed by groups, but that is as faras it may go.

4. The consequence may be a major shift in group-governmentrelations. In the past, groups may have focused successfullyon ministers and civil servants in government departments.Now, ministers may take a ‘hands off’ strategy and civilservants may have moved on to public bodies like NHSEngland.

GROUPS ARE GENERALLYPOSITIVE ABOUT THE

MESSAGE THAT THESTRATEGY DOCUMENT

SENDS

[MINISTERS] MAY DECIDETO CRITICISE THE

DECISIONS OF PUBLICBODIES WITHOUT

INTERVENING TO CHANGETHEM

Image: Liberal Democrats CC BY-NC-ND

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Case Study: Scottish Independence - a chancefor 16 year olds to vote

For Modern Studies (or A-level politics) students living inScotland, the independence referendum presented an unusualopportunity to take part in the very thing they were studying. Thiswas a rare opportunity, made possible by the ScottishGovernment’s decision to lower the voting age, for this votealone, to 16. In that context, two main questions arose: shouldthey be allowed to vote, and what issues should they considerwhen they vote?

Should 16 year olds be allowed to vote?

The debate about voting from 16, rather than 18, does not causefights to break out in pubs or supermarkets, or even come up veryoften in polite conversation - but it can often seem like apolarised discussion. The issue became party political in Scotland(briefly) because the vote-at-16 proposal came primarily from theSNP Government, prompting some to wonder aloud if themeasure was being used to boost the Yes-to-independence vote.However, the evidence at the time seemed to suggest that 16-18year olds were no more likely to vote for independence than(many) older people; the under 18 population looked likely toproduce a No vote (using polls tracked a the time on the websiterun by John Curtice -http://whatscotlandthinks.org/topics/referendum-voting-intention). Further, this move has since been proposed by othermajor figures, such as UK Labour’s former leader Ed Miliband(calling for 16 year olds to have the vote in UK General Elections).

The handy thing about this kind of polarised discussion is that it isbased on (albeit well-reasoned) simple assertion on both sides.Some of the arguments are set out here -http://www.democraticaudit.com/?p=1524 – and I summarisethem below:

On the one side is the argument that people are notknowledgeable or mature enough to make important decisionsat that age.On the other side is the argument that voting is a fundamentalhuman right.

On this basis, the debate revolves around making these claimsconsistent with this sort of evidence:

Case Study: Scottish Independence3.ii

THE ISSUE BECAME PARTYPOLITICAL IN SCOTLAND

Image: flickrtickr2009 CC BY-NC-ND

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▪ The age of maturity. People can make other major decisions(such as join the army) and do important things (such as paytax) when they are 16, so giving them the right andresponsibility to vote is consistent with their other rights andresponsibilities. However, in many cases, under-18s needparental permission to make major life choices (although inScotland you can marry at 16) and tend not to paymeaningful amounts of tax at that age. Further, 18 seemslike the major symbol of maturity in this regard – voting at 18may be the ‘international norm’, and recent decisions by theUK and Scottish Governments (such as raising the smokingage to 18, the same as the buying-alcohol and buying-fireworks age) suggest that they see 18 as the dawn ofmaturity. The choice of 18 may be both an arbitrary andconsistent position supported by the majority of the public.

▪ Many people are disengaged from politics. So, lowering thevoting age may encourage a sense of citizenship at an earlierage. It may also encourage younger people to seek a politicalcareer, which might help reduce the average age of electedrepresentatives. Or, in the absence of a fundamental shift inculture/ attitudes, in which voting and other politicalparticipation feels like a civic duty, it will just exacerbate lowvoting rates and low participation in politics. Much of theargument may relate to the symbolism of extending thefranchise. Social groups given the vote for the first time (suchas women, social classes and ethnic minorities) may havegiven it great symbolic value and felt compelled to use itwisely as a result – but would this feeling apply to youngpeople in the same way? Can we identify the same demandfor representation based on a widespread perception ofinjustice?

What should you consider when you vote?

Let’s say you want to make a mature, well informed, decision.How would you decide? What should you consider? We canidentify a range of issues, from the philosophical to the self-interested to the psychological.

The philosophical questions

What does independence mean? In the olden days, independenceused to refer to the autonomy to direct all domestic affairs withina well-defined territory. Now, we are much less certain aboutwhere domestic affairs end and international affairs begin. Forexample, an independent Scotland would be subject to a widerange of binding international commitments, particularly if it waspart of the European Union (examples include migration,agriculture, fishing, environmental policy, and rates of manytaxes – all determined largely at the EU level). If it kept the pound,or joined the Euro, it would rely on a central bank outside ofScotland to direct monetary policies (such as setting interest

MUCH OF THEARGUMENT MAY RELATE

TO THE SYMBOLISM OFEXTENDING THE

FRANCHISE

NOW, WE ARE MUCHLESS CERTAIN ABOUT

WHERE DOMESTICAFFAIRS END AND

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRSBEGIN

Image: SecretLondon123 CC BY-NC-ND

Image: First Minister CC BY-NC-ND

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rates). In an age of ‘globalisation’, it would also be unable tosimply ‘direct all domestic affairs’ since national governmentsrely upon other governments to produce collective, international,policy solutions. They might even make domestic policy with oneeye on their neighbours, since it is difficult to contain policyeffects within one’s borders (think, for example, about the effectof independence on HE tuition fees – what would happen?). Theyare also influenced by major transnational corporations whichseek low government regulations and corporation taxes whenthey invest in countries. These complications are currently a bigfeature of the independence debate. People sometimes arguethat voters shouldn’t bother with independence (or ‘indy lite’),since they would just be keeping the Queen, the pound, the BBCand inheriting international commitments. Other people arguethat it’s OK to vote for independence because they’ll be keepingthe Queen, the pound, the BBC and inheriting internationalcommitments.

Do I feel Scottish and/ or British? People often argue that theindependence vote is not about national identity, partly becausea reference to nationhood is portrayed, by many, as some sort ofreflection of bigotry. One might be invited to picture a large,dirty-bearded, ginger man in a kilt telling the English to get out oftheir country (let’s call this ‘ethnic nationalism’). A more subtlestrategy is to brand people as ‘nationalist’ to mean parochial andextremist. The more acceptable form of nationalism is ‘civic’. Itsuggests that, if a clear nation exists, it should share a boundarywith the state; if we feel that we live in the Scottish nation, weshould have a Scottish Government to represent us. This is wherenational identify comes in – surveys have suggested for sometime that Scots’ primary identity is Scottish rather than British(however, you ask the question). However, surveys also suggestthat most people favour devolution (current or furtherdevolution) over independence. They may feel Scottish andBritish, seeking some kind of governing autonomy and inclusionwithin a wider Union.

The self-interested question: would independence benefit me?

A lot of the debate surrounds the idea that independence willsave or cost people money. I have seen reports that it will eithermake everyone at least £500 better or worse off (the ScottishDaily Mail, 26.3.12, wins the prize for hyperbole - ‘Breaking upBritain will cost every Scot £20,000’). I have heard one ridiculoussuggestion that it will cost everyone £1 each. Each and everyproblematic calculation is based on things like: Scotland’s futureshare of North Sea oil revenue; its share of UK Government debtsand assets; and, the effect of independence on economicbehaviour (such as foreign investment in Scottish business,Scottish trade with other countries, and the ScottishGovernment’s credit rating). John Curtice’s research suggeststhat this economic question is often at the forefront of peoples’minds when they think of independence. However, given that we

SURVEYS HAVESUGGESTED FOR SOME

TIME THAT SCOTS’PRIMARY IDENTITY IS

SCOTTISH RATHER THANBRITISH (HOWEVER, YOU

ASK THE QUESTION)

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don’t know the economic effect of independence, people arebasing their preferences on their perception of an uncertainfuture. It presents one of those classic causality problems:perhaps you are more likely to vote for independence if you thinkyou will benefit; or perhaps you are more likely to think you willbenefit if you plan to vote for independence.

The psychological question: how should I deal with theuncertainty?

Much of the debate is driven by various attempts to worry orassure people about the uncertainty of Scottish independence.Questions include:

▪ Would Scotland be a part of the European Union and amember of international organisations?

▪ What would an independent Scotland look like? Forexample, might it become a high-tax-high-spending socialdemocratic state (something we associated with some of theNordic countries)? Or would it simply inherit the culture andinstitutions of the UK?

▪ Could an independent Scotland have survived the economiccrisis?

▪ What currency would Scotland adopt?▪ How would independence affect Scotland’s security (from its

defence, to its supply of energy and other resources)?

To a large extent, this uncertainty is a better resource for peoplearguing for the maintenance of the Union as a ‘security blanket’.However, we can also see the potential to exploit the uncertainfuture of the UK. This is key feature of the debate on the‘bedroom tax’ and other welfare reforms – people may argue thatonly an independent Scotland would have the powers to maintainthe welfare state as a ‘security blanket’.

[INDEPENDENCE]PRESENTS ONE OF THOSE

CLASSIC CAUSALITYPROBLEMS

MUCH OF THE DEBATE ISDRIVEN BY VARIOUS

ATTEMPTS TO WORRY ORASSURE PEOPLE ABOUT

THE UNCERTAINTY OFSCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE

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Related reading from thePSA Blogwww.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog

■ Is anti-politics explained by depoliticisation?(12/04/15) - Nick Clarke, Will Jennings, JonathanMoss and Gerry Stoker

■ Radicalisation: a political or public health problem?(12/03/2015) - Kamaldeep Bhui

■ Gender inequality in academia: Not just aboutnumbers (19/02/2015) - Fran Amery

■ The moment of truth for Greece, and for theEurozone (27/01/2015) - Roman Gerodimos

■ Podemos's Shift towards the Centre Ground?(05/05/2015) - Paul Kennedy

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