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Ag ra r i an Structure and R u r a l Development
P S Appu
India's experience since Independence shows that there is a close inter-relation between agrarian
structure and rural development,
An outmoded agrarian structure is a serious obstacle to the modernisation of agriculture and r a p -
id rural development.
Such a structure is to he squarely blamed for the unequal distribution of the fruits of development
leading to widening of the disparities in income and wealth.
The upper classes who have cornered the bulk of the new prosperity have also succeeded in con-
solidating their political power. Consequently, it has become still more difficult to adopt and implement
far-reaching institutional reforms.
Even so, as the emerging agrarian structure has become a serious constraint to rural development
it will be disastrous to postpone the much-needed institutional reforms.
T H E agrarian structure plays a cruc ial
role in shaping the speed and spread
of rural development A n outmoded,
inegalitarian agrarian structure is not
merely a serious impediment to rapidrural develo pment, it is also the pr in ci -
pal cause of di st ort ing the results of
development. And, rural development
unaccompanied by essential in st it ut io n-
al reform makes it more difficult to
bring about structural changes in the
future. Th e experience of Ind ia duri ng
the years since Independence confirms
this view.
AGRAR IAN ST RUCT URE AT IN DE PEN DE NC E
In a vast coun tr y of such great
div ers ity as Ind ia , exposed as she had
been to different stands of political,
economic, social and cultural influences
in her long and chequered history, it
is, indeed, nat ura l to come across a
bewi lder ing variety o f tenurial condi-
tions. Tho ugh a mul tit ude of tenures
exis ted at the tim e of Independence
and the tenu rial condi tion s varie d a
great deal from region to region, and
even within a compact region, it is
possible to classify the numerous
tenures under tw o bro ad categories
the 'Zam inda ri ' and the 'Rai yatw ari 'systems. The essence of the Zamindari
system was the existence of one or
more layers o f prop rie tar y right s be-
tween the State and the actual holder
of the land. In the Raiyatwari system
no inte rmed iary interests ex isted be-
twe en the State and the lan dho lde r. It
is estimated that Zamindari tenures
covered one-half of the country at the
time of Independence.
Tra dit ion all y al l rulers in India,
Hi nd u as wel l as Mu sl im , appropriated
a share of the produce of the la nd
wh ic h was the pri nc ip al source of
revenue f or the State. In the years of
the decline and disintegration of the
Mu gh al Empi re, fi ndi ng themselves un-
equal to the task of co ll ec ti ng land
revenue, the Pr ov in ci al Governors
resorted to the device of appointing
revenue farmers drawn from the ranks
of vanquis hed potentates, feudal chi ef-tains, marauding free-booters, erstwhile
government functionaries, moneylen-
ders, speculators, etc. They cont racte d
to pay fixed sums to the government but
extorted as much as they could from
the landholders, keeping the difference
as their profit. Though these revenue
farmers were not proprietors, the
British administrators, familiar as they
had been with landlords and tenants
in their own country, recognised such
revenue farmers as landlords and
entered into firm agreements with them
for payment o f la nd revenue. An d theerstwhile landholders who had perma-
nent righ ts in the lan d and had actu-
ally been cultivating it, were reduced
to the status of insecu re tenants. Such
was the ori gin of the 'Za min dar i'
system. As a senior Br it is h adminis-
trat or of the last century put it, "the
prop riet ary rig ht was created by con-
solidating the position of revenue
farmers whom we found managing the
villa ges and payi ng the gover nment
revenue".1 Thus the Zamindar was the
person who m the governme nt recognis-
ed as the proprietor of an estate on
his agreeing to pay a certain sum as
la nd revenue . In cer tai n areas the
amount payable was fixed in perpetuity,
while in other areas the amount could
be revised from time to time. In some
parts of the country the settlement was
made with individuals, while in other
parts w i t h groups of persons. The
Za mi nd ar i estates were of va ry in g sizes.
While some of the big estates covered
hundreds of square miles spread over
more than one district, there were also
ver y smal l ones cove rin g a few acres
in a single village. Ma ny of the Zam in -
dars dive sted themselves of the tr oub le
of directly managing their estates and
col lec tin g rent from cult ivat ors by
leasing out the right to collect rent. In
course of time in some areas several
layers of such inte rmedi ary r ights were
created between the Zamindar and theactual cu lt iv at or. Eve ry one of these
intermediaries including the Zamindar,
appropriated a share of the rent paid
by the cult iva tor s and passed on the
balance to his immediate superior, At
the sum mit was the gove rnmen t to
whom the Zamindar paid land revenue.
Some parts of the cou ntr y, par ti-
cularly in the south and the west, were
free fro m the system o f revenue farm-
ing . In these areas the gov ern men t
entered int o direc t agreement w i t h
numerous landh older s for the pay-
ment of land revenue. This came to be
kn ow n as the 'R aiy atw ari ' system. It
must, however, be pointed out that all
those landholders were not cultivating
the lan d themselves. Ma ny of them had
leased out all their land or part of it
to tenants, mostly sharecroppers. The
dis ting uish ing feature of the Raiy atw ari
system was, ho wever , that the lan d-
holders paid land revenue directly to
the government and there was no in-
term ediar y between the l andh olde rs
and the government.
In it ia ll y the Zaminda rs were givenabsolute freedom to deal w i t h the ir
tenants as they pleased. In course of
time it was found that the Zamindars
were c ausi ng a great deal of harass-
ment to the tenants by res ort ing to
rack -rent ing and summary ejectment.
W i t h a vie w to affor ding a measure o f
pro tec tio n to the tenants, laws were
enacted subsequently for con fer rin g
security of tenure on certai n categories
of tenants who had been in possession
of the land for a lo ng t ime .
The Zamindars usually kept a portion
of their estates under their own dire ct
management. S uch lands consti tut ed
their home farms which they cultivated
thro ugh tena nts- at-w ill or farm ser-
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vants. Th ou gh the Rai ya twa ri system
came to be descri bed as a system of
peasant proprietors, right from its in-
cep tio n a sizeable percentage o f lan d-
owners used to lease out their land to
tenants who would pay fixed rent or
share the produce. Li tt le securi ty o f
tenure was available to the tenants on
the home-farms of the Zaminda rs i n the
Za mi nd ar i areas or to al l categories of
tenants in Raiyatwari areas. There is
li tt le doubt that on the eve of Indepen-
dence a considerable area of land was
under tenancy and that the bu lk of the
tenants enjoyed no security of tenure
or fixity of rent.
The agrarian structure was also
mar ked by great in equ ali ty in the
owner ship of land. Th ou gh data are
not available for that perio d, it is
estimated that a small number of big
landlor ds con tro lle d a substantial por-tion of the agricultural land, while mil -
li on s of sm al l peasants subjected to
numerous abuses and wei ghe d do wn
by perpetual indebtedness, eked out a
precarious existence on ti ny , fragment-
ed holdings employing primitive farm-
ing practices. A n d , at the bott om,
there existed a vast army o f landless
agricultural workers whose social and
econ omic status was even more pi ti -
able, A unique feature of the In dia n
situat ion is the close inter- rel atio n be-
tween the Hindu caste hierarchy and
the agrarian structure. The landownersin va ri ab ly bel onged to the so-called up-
per castes, the cu lti vat ors to the mi d-
dle castes and the agricultural workers
to the lowest castes, a situation that
led to economic dis abi lit ies bei ng ag-
gravated by social disadvantages.
LAND POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Such was the bac kgr oun d against
wh ic h the nati onal land pol icy was
evo lved after Independence. In the Five-
Ye ar Plans the obj ectives of lan d po-
licy have been laid down as, firstly, to
remove such mo tiv at ion al and other
impediments to increase in agricultural
production as arise from the agrarian
structure inherited from the past and,
secondly, to elim inat e, a ll ele-
ments of exploitation and social
injustice w it hi n the agrarian sys-
tem so as to ensure equa lit y of status
and opportunity to all sections of the
rura l popul atio n. Since lan d reform un-
der the Indian Constitution is a state
subject, and tenu rial conditio ns vary
fr om state to state, the Cen tr al gov-
ernment c ou ld only lay do wn the gene-
ral principles which provided the
framework for legislation as well as
administrative action. The principal
measures of land reform adopted for
secur ing the objectives of the la nd po-
licy laid down in the Five-Year Plans
have been the abolition of intermediary
tenures, refo rm of tenancy, i mpo si tio n
of ceilings on agricultural holdings and
re-d ist ribu tio n of land, and the con-sol ida tio n of fragmented agric ultu ral
holdings.
As we have already seen, the in-
termediary tenures covered about one-
ha lf of the count ry, mo stly in the No r-
the rn and Eastern parts. The abuses
of the Zamindari system had attracted
a great deal of att enti on in the lon g
years of the country 's struggle for
freedom. The Zam inda rs were a rather
unpop ular lot not only because of
the oppression practised by them, but
also because they had identified
themselves as the staunch suppor-ters of the Bri ti sh government, In
the circumstances, it was only-
natural that immediately after In-
dependence very hig h p ri or it y was ac-
corded to the abolition of intermediary
tenures so as to bri ng the tenants in to
direct relationship with the State. Ac-
cordingly, every state passed its own
legi sla tion for the abo lit ion of inter-
media ry rights on payment of com-
pensation. The impl eme ntat ion of the
enacted laws has been pra cti cal ly
completed. Only a few min or inter-
medi ary tenures st il l rema in to beabolished and efforts are afoot to do
away w i t h them also. As a result of
the abol iti on o f interme diary tenures
about 20 million erstwhile tenants are
estimated to have become peasant
proprietors owning land directly under
the State. Large areas of pr iv atel y
owned forests and waste land vested
in the State. One serious flaw in the
programme of abo lit ion of intermedi ary
tenures was that no effort was made
to l i m i t the size of the home farms of
the Zami ndar s or to extend prot ect ion
to the tena nts -at -wi ll, mos tly share-croppers on those home farms. The
abo lit ion of interm ediary tenures wo ul d
have led to far more satisfactory re-
sults i f steps had been taken si mu l-
taneously to l i m i t the size o f the home
farms and extend protection to the in-
secure tenants.
Right from the First Five-Year Plan
emphasis was also la i d on tenancy re-
form. Three important guidelines were
laid down in the Five-Year Plans for
the refo rm of tenancy. Fir st, rent
sho uld not exceed one- fif th to one-
fo ur th of the gross produce; secondly,
the tenants sho uld be acco rded per-
manent right s in the la nd they cul -
tivate subject to a li mi te d right of
resu mpti on to be granted to land -
owners; and thirdly, in respect of non-
resumable l and, the land lord -te nant re-
lati onsh ip sho uld be ended by con-
ferring ownership rights on tenants.
A l l states have enacted le gi sl at io n fo r
regul ating the rent payable by cu lt iv at -ing tenants. Yet ma xi mu m rates of
rent permis sible under the law con-
tinue to be above the lev el suggested
in the plans in a few states. Several
states have also enacted laws fo r con -
ferring security of tenure on tenants.
However, under the existing law the
position of tenants continues to be in-
secure in some areas. On ly a few
states have as yet enacted legislation
to enable tenants to acqu ire owner-
ship rights. Thus, in several states, the
enacted leg is lat ion falls short of the
accepted pol icy , and impl eme nta tio nhas been weak and ine ffe cti ve. The
Planning Commission's Task Force on
Agrar ian Re la ti on s (1973) has summed
up the po si ti on thus :
"The imp lem ent ati on of the enact-ed laws has been half-h earted, halt-ing and unsatisfactory in large partsof the coun try. The legal prot ect iongrant ed to tenants has often beenineff ecti ve. In accordance w it h thepolicy laid down in the Second Five-Year Plan the laws enacted by seve-ra l States pro vi ded for the resump-tion within certain limits of tenantedlands by landowner s for personal cul-
tiv ati on. The term 'personal cul ti-vation' was wide enough to cover allcases of cul ti va ti on under the land -owner's own super visi on or the su-pervis ion of a member of his fam ily .The prov isi on for resum ption oftenanted land by la ndowners result-ed in the ejectment of many tenants.Th en there were large scale eject-ments throug h the device of Vo lu n-tary surrender s'. In many cases,tenancies have been pushed under-ground and converted into wo rk-contracts. Even where the law pro-vides for security of tenure, tenantshave, in practice, found it extremelydifficult to claim successfully tenancyrights because mos t of the leases,parti cula rly crop-sharing arrange-ments, are oral and informal. Wheretenancy is insecure, legal provisionsregarding fair rent are useless and notenant dares to in it ia te ac ti on fo r get-tin g fair rent fix ed. Th is is so be-cause the tenant who has the auda-city to pray for fixation of fair rentfaces the ris k o f inst ant ejectment.Thus the objective of ensuring fairrent and security of tenure st il l re-mains unattained in large parts ofthe counlry."2
W i t h a vie w to reduci ng disparities
in the owne rshi p of lan d and make
some land available for distribution to
the landless labourers and s mall ho ld -
ers, the Second Fi ve -Ye ar Plan recom-
mended the imposition of ceilings on
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agri cul tur al holdi ngs. In accordance
wi th that pol icy , ce ilin g laws were en-
acted by the diff erent states by 1961.
There were wide variations between the
ce il in g laws o f diff erent states in the
matter of the lev el of cei ling , un it of
application, exemptions, etc. At one
end, the ceil ing law of Kera la prov idedfor a cei li ng of 4 to 8 hectares for a
family, while at the other extreme, the
law of An dh ra Pradesh fix ed the ceil -
in g area in the range o f 11 to 130 hec-
tares dependi ng upo n the class of
land . In some laws fa mi ly was the
unit of appli cati on, wh ile in some
others cei lin g was fixe d for i nd iv id ua l
landholders. A l l the laws pro vid ed for
a large number of exempti ons. The
enactment of the ceiling laws had been
preceded by a na ti onal dehate attend-
ed wi th a great deal of pu bl ic it y. Na-
turally, all prudent landowners tooksteps in good tim e to dis tri but e the
surplus land among their relatives,
friends and dependants, and in some
cases they arranged paper transactions
to show dis tr ib utio n among ficti t ious
persons. Subsequent efforts to nu l li f y
such transfers have not been very suc-
cessful. As the Planning Commission's
Task Force has put it ". .. as a result
of the high leve l o f ceil ing, large num-
ber of exemptions from the law, mala-
fide transfers and partitions, and poor
imple menta tion , the results achieved
have been meagre".3
The poor resultsare demonstrated by the fact that on
the imp lem ent ati on of the ceiling laws
only about one million hectares of land
could be declared surplus. That works
out to be less than one per cent of the
tota l arable lan d in the coun try . On
fi ndi ng that the results were unsatis-
factory, the Governmen t of India issued
revise d guideli nes in Au gu st 1972 in
order to reduce the lev el of ce il in g
and bri ng about a measure of uni fo r-
mi ty i n the laws of the diffe rent states.
Accord ing to the new po li cy , the fa mi ly
is the unit for the determination ofce il in g area and most of the exemp-
tions have been wi th dr aw n. The state
governments have amended their ceil -
ing laws in accordance with the new
guideli nes and they have ind ic at ed
that on the implementation of the new
laws about 1.5 m i l l i o n hectares of sur-
plus land is likely to become available.
It remains to be seen whether this ex-
pectation will be fulfilled,
In In dia most of the agri cult ural
holdings are not only small but they
are also fragmented. Hence emphasis
was laid on consolidation of holdings
in the Fiv e-Y ear Plans. By the end of
1972, about 33 m i l l i o n hectares of
land was consolidated, mostly in the
states of Punjab, Hary ana and Ut ta r
Pradesh. A major weakness of the
programme was that consolidation was
done without taking effective steps to
ensure security of tenure to tenants,
par tic ula rly sharecroppers. In the re-
sult, cons olid atio n of holdings hasoften led to large-scale ejectment of
insecure tenants. Th is happened be-
cause the sharecropping tenancies sub-
sisted in respect of part icu lar plots of
land and after cons olid atio n the iden-
ti ty of those plots was lost. Thus con-
solidation often helped the landowner
in getting ri d of his tenants. No t wi t h-
standing this serious drawback, conso-
li da ti on of holdings has played a sig-
nificant role in the modernisation of
agri cul ture in Punjab, Hary ana and
western Uttar Pradesh.
A f t e r reviewing a l l the measures o f
la nd refo rm adopted since Inde pen-
dence, the Planning Commission's
Task Force concluded:
"A broad assessment of the pro-grammes of la nd ref orm adoptedsince Independence is that the lawsfor the abol it io n of interme diarytenures have been impl eme nte d fai r-ly efficiently, while in the fields oftenancy reform and cei lin g on hol d-ings, leg isl ati on has fal len short ofproclai med poli cy and implementa-ti on of the enacted laws has beentardy and inefficien t. W i t h the abo-
l i ti o n of inter mediar y interests theowne rshi p of la nd became morebroad-based and the erstwhile supe-rior tenants acquired a higher socialstatus. It sho uld not, howe ver, beoverlooked that as a result of thetenancy laws enacted in the decadespr io r to Independence the superio rtenants had already been enj oyi ngsecurity of tenure and fixity of rent.It is a moot p oi nt whether the abo-li t io n of interm ediary interests con-ferred any new economic benefits onthe tenants. The programmes wh ic hco ul d have led to a rad ic al changein the agrar ian stru ctur e and theelimination of some of the elementsof exploitation in the agrarian systemand ushered in a measure o f di st ri -butive justice were those of tenancyreform, c ei l ing on agricu ltural hold-ings and distribution of land to thelandless and sma ll holders . As al-ready pointed out these programmescanno t be said to have succeeded.Hi gh ly explo itat ive tenancy in theform of crop-sharing still prevails inlarge parts of the coun try . Suchtenancy arrangements have not onlyresulted in the perpetuation of socialand economi c inju sti ce but havealso become insurmountable hurdlesin the path of the spread of moderntechnology and improved agricultu-ral practices. Thus the overa ll as-
sessment has to be that programmesof la nd re for m adopted since Inde-pendence had failed to bring about
the required changes in the agrarianstructure."4
RURAL DEVE LOPM ENT AND AGRARIAN
STRUCTURE
The last tw o decades o f pla nned eco-
nomic development have witnessed the
fo rm ul at io n and the execution of seve-ral programmes aimed at rural deve-
lopment. The most impo rtant among
these are the Co mmu nit y Devel opmen t
Programmes, a massive effo rt in ex-
panding irrigation facilities and a
comprehens ive programm e aimed at
achieving rapid increase in agricultural
pro duc ti on in certa in selected areas.
India's Second Five-Year Plan viewed
the Co mm uni ty Developme nt Program-
me as the chie f instrument for imp ro-
vi ng a ll aspects of ru ra l li fe . It was
expected that the relat ive ly smal l allo-
cations made by governmen t for financ-ing projects l ike i rrigati on work s, vi l-
lage roads, schools and hospitals wo ul d
be substant ially augmented by con tri -
butions from the public, and that the
village community itself would assume
respo nsibi lity for the executio n and
future maintenance of those proje cts.
A large army of gove rnment fu nc ti o-
naries was app oin ted to help in the
execution of the projects and provide
extension services in agr icul ture , ani-
ma l husbandry, co-ope ration , educa-
ti on , health, etc. It was hoped that
the programme would promote self-help, lead to concerted c omm una l en-
deavour for a better lif e for i ndi vid ual s
as we ll as for the communi ty as a
whose, and would ultimately pave the
way for self-sustained rur al develop-
ment. Community Development blocks
were opened to cover the whole
country.
The achievements of the Co mm un it y
Development Programme have been
rather uneven. In a few areas some
progress was achieved, particularly in
the adoption of mo dern agri cul tura l
practices. A number of min or irr iga -
tion wo rks, rural roads, school bui ld-
ings, community halls, etc, were also
constructed. Public contr ibution in
these efforts was, however, far below
the expected level. Not wit hst andi ng
these small gains, it Is gene rall y ac-
cepted that the Community Develop-
ment Programme failed to achieve its
objectives. Th e bu lk of the benefits o f
the programme accrued to substantial
landowners. The landless agri cul tur al
workers, sharecroppers and sma ll pea-
sants derive d very lit tl e benefit from
the program me. N or has the Co mm u-
nity Development Programme resulted
in an urge for co-operative endeavour
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for rura l development or prom oted
self-help.
The root cause for the failure of the
Community Development Programme
is that the inhabitants of an Indian v i l -
lage do not constitute a community.
The data col lec ted d ur in g the seven-
teenth ro un d of the Na ti on al Sample
Survey in 1961 showed that 12 per
cent of the rural households owned no
land at all and 32 per cent owned less
than 0.4 hectare per househo ld. Af t er
a decade of la nd re fo rm the size-class
dis tri but ion of land holdings c ontinued
to be extremely skewed, with 72 per
cent of the agr icu ltu ral hol dings being
bel ow 2 hectares in area and account -
ing for only 20 per cent of the total
agricultural land. At the other end of
the scale, ho ld ings above 8 hectares i n
area accounted for 5 per cent of the
total number of holdings and 36 percent of the to ta l la nd . A t the 1961
census it was es timated that one quar-
ter of the agric ult ura l land was under
tenancy and that over 80 per cent of
the tenanci es were insecu re. The po-
pula tion of a typ ica l Indian village
consists of big , me di um and smal l
landowners, tenants, the bulk of whom
are insecure share-croppers, village
artisans and agr icu ltu ral workers. The
economic interests of these classes are
often in conf lict . The landowners and
tenants arc interested i n keep ing agri-
cu lt ur al wages as lo w as possible, a lllandowners are anxious to raise their
share of the produce of the land and
also to eject their tenants, and the big
landowners who are also invariably the
vil lag e moneyl enders , oppress al l the
other classes in the village.
The eco nomic i nequali ties and clea-
vages are aggravated by social disabi-
lities and conflicts rooted in the caste
system. A ty pic al Ind ian villag e has
over three dozen castes and sub-castes
which can broadly be divided into the
so-called upper, mid dle and lowercastes. In spite of all the changes that
have taken place du ri ng the last quar-
ter of a century since Independence,
the ownership of la nd is st il l generally
con fin ed to the members of the up-
per and the middle castes, tenants are
mostly drawn from the middle castes,
and those who belon g to the bot to m
rungs of the caste hi er ar chy are, by
and large, agric ult ura l labourers.
Suc h be ing the state of affair s, the
inhabitants of an Indian village have
no soci al cohesion or comm on econo-
mic interests. The extremely inegahta-ri an character of the agrar ian struc-
ture i s cle ar ly one of the ro ot causes
for the failure of the Community De-
velo pmen t Programme. The poor per-
formance of the co-operative societies
and the village panchayats (organs of
local self-government) should also be
at tr ib ut ed to the same cause. The
co-operative societies, con tro ll ed as
they are in most parts of the country
by rich farmers, seldom cater to the
needs of the weaker sections of the
populat ion. Si mil ar ly the vil lage pan-
chayats arc also domi nat ed by the
rur al elite, and the und er-pr ivil eged
classes usually take no interest in their
fu nct ion in g. Ha d steps been taken to
lev el do wn inequali ties, all these ins ti-
tutions would have fared better.5
Gi ve n the character of the Ind ian
ru ra l struct ure, the fail ure of the
Com mu ni ty Development Programme
is not in the least surprising. But even
development programmes wh ic h pro-
vi de d for massive publ ic investmentand di d not cal l for any concer ted
communal action, did not fare as well
as expected because of the fa il ure to
effect necessary ins ti tu tio na l reform.
To this category belong the prog ram-
me for development of ir ri ga ti on and
the intensive efforts for agr icu ltu ral
development in certain selected areas.
A n in ve stment of Rs 2,650 cro res made
in major irrigation schemes up to 1973
is estimated to have resulted in an ad-
ditional ir rigati on potential of 10 mi l-
lion hectares.0 Act ual ut i l isa t ion for
the country as a whole is estimated to
be of the order of 80 per cent of the
potential created. Ut il isa ti on is, how-
ever, par ti cu la rl y poor in c erta in sche-
mes like the Kosi Project.
Kos i is a multi purp ose project exe-
cuted at an expenditure of about Rs
100 crores providing flood control and
irrigat ion in the Kosi Div isi on of Bi-
har. The writer had occasion to study
different aspects of this project.7 The
irr iga tio n potential created is 0.32 mi l-
lion hectares for autumn crops, 0.1
million hectares for spring crops and0.15 m i l l i o n hectares for summer crops.
Th ou gh the canals have been i n ope-
ration for about a decade, the highest
utilisation so far has been only 40 per
cent of the potentia l duri ng autumn,
15 per cent in spring and 10 per cent
in summer. The main features of the
agrarian structure of the Ko si Are a
are extreme concentration in the
ownersh ip of land , absentee la nd lor d-
ism, widespread sharecropping and a
preponderance of landless a gri cul tur al
labourers. It has now been established
that the mai n reasons for the l ow ut i-l isa tion of the irr iga tio n potential, par-
ti cu la rl y in the spring and summer
seasons, are concentration in the
ownership of la nd and widesprea d
share croppi ng on terms unfa ir to the
sharecroppers. In the K os i area the
main crop is paddy harvested towards
the end of November or early in De-
cember. Imme dia tel y after har vest ing
the paddy crop, the farmers get only
two to three weeks to prepare thelan d and sow wheat. Un der cond i-
tions of trad ition al agriculture using
scrub bullocks for draught power, the
farmers find it difficult to plant wheat
on more tha n 6 to 8 hectares. Frag-
mented hol din gs, and the fact that
many of the big la ndowners are ab-
sentee la nd lo rds, have added to the
diff icul ties. Large holdi ngs have been
found to be one of the main reasons
for the low util isat ion of the irri ga-
ti on potenti al. Sharecropping has been
found to be an equally important ob-
stacle to a fuller utilisation of the ir-rigat ion potential. Ac cor di ng to the
terms on wh ic h sharecropping is prac-
tised in the Kosi Area, all the inputs
have to be pr ov id ed by the share-
emppor; yet be must give ha lf the
produce i n each season to the la nd -
lord. Unde r the Bihar Tenancy Ac t
the landlord is entitled to only 25
per cent of the gross produce, but
sharecroppers w ho insist upon thei r
legal rights face ejectment. Therefore,
in practice, half the produce is given
to the landowners. Experience shows
that in this region an average crop of
paddy yie ld in g about 10 to 12 quin -
tals per hectare can be grown with-
out app lyin g chemic al fertilisers or
using improved seeds. Growing wheat
is, however , more costly . The addi-
ti onal cash expendi ture is at least
Rs 250 per hecta re. As he has to par t
w i th one ha lf of the produce, the
sharecropper docs not fi nd it wo r th
his while to grow wheat by incurring
add iti ona l expenditure to meet wh ic h
he has. anyway, to borrow money on
usurious terms. The likely return from
the second crop wi l l not ju st if y the
add iti ona l investment and the atten-
dant risk. This is another reason why
the land under sharecropping usually
remains unc ult iva ted dur ing spring.
The same exp lan ati on holds goo d for
the summer crops as well.
The ineg alit aria n agrarian structure
is to be blamed squarely for the un-
equal dist ri bu ti on of the benefits of
the scheme. The project has, no doubt,
led to considerable ag ric ult ura l pros-
perit y. La nd values have apprec iated
phenomenally. Persons ow ni ng large
areas of land have benefited greatly.
Sma ll landowner s have also recei ved
some benefits. They have not, however,
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been able to make fu l l use of the
irrigation in the absence of access to
necessary inpu ts. Furt herm ore , thei r
dependence on bi g land owne rs for
credit has rendered the position of the
smal l holders rather vulnerable. The
enhanced la nd values have whe tte d
the appetite of the big landowners to
acquire more land and expand the size
of their holdings . Ma ny a small holder
has been obliged to mortgage or sell
his lan d to big landowner s. The
position of the sharecroppers has
considerably deteriorated. The rise in
agr icu l tura l product iv i ty and land
values has pro mpt ed the land owne rs
to get rid of their sharecroppers lest
the latter succeed in esta blis hing a
cl ai m to the land. Several sharecrop-
pers have been evicted from the land
they had been cu lt iv at in g for years.
The iro ny of the situati on is that evenafter the ol d sharecroppers are evic -
ted the lan down ers seldom bother to
cultivate the land personally. In most
cases they get the la nd cu lt iv at ed
through new sharecroppers who are
not l i ke ly to cla im tenancy r ights. As
the prevailing agrarian structure is not
conducive to the development of in-
tensive agri cul tur e, there has been
only marginal improvement in the in-
tensity of cropping. Hence, there has
been no sign ific ant expansion of em-
ployment opportunities with the result
that the dail y wages of agr icu ltu ralfabourers con tin ue to be among the
lowes t in the coun try. Thus, the be-
nefits of the project have been shared
in this manner: substantial lan dow n-
ers have benefited subst antia lly, smal l
landowners have made small gains but
their posi tio n has become vulnerable,
the sharecroppers have suffered great-
ly and the landless agricultural labour-
ers survive i n the same condi tio ns of
abject poverty in which they have al-
ways l ived.
In the clo si ng years of the Second
Fiv e-Y ear Plan it became fa ir ly clear
that the Co mm un it y Devel opment Pro-
gramme was not likely to succeed and
that the pol ic y o f spreading the availa-
ble resources th in ly alt over the coun-
try would not lead to the required in-
crease in agri cul tur al prod uct ion . This
was the background against which a
new agri cul tur al strategy was e volved
The essence of the new strategy was
to concentrate all development effort;
in areas with assured irrigation. The
introduction of the Intensive Agricul-tural District Programme in three dis
tricts in 1960-61 marked the first stage
of the new strategy. Late r the pro
gramme was extended to another
thi rte en dis tri cts . I n 1964-65 and sub-
sequent years, a modified version of
the scheme, style d as Intensive A g r i -
cul tur al Ar ea Programme, was exten-
ded to more districts. The appearance
of high-yielding varieties of wheat and
rice seeds from 1964 onwards turned
out to be the harbinger of a break-
thr ough on the agricu ltu ral front. Ef-
forts continued to be concentrated in
areas w i t h potent ial for rap id agric ul-
tur al gro wt h, but the strategy was
further mo dif ied emphasising the pi vo -
tal roles on the high-yielding varieties
of seeds and mul tip le- cro ppi ng. The
great spurt in food pro duc ti on that
fo ll ow ed was rather inacc uratel y and
hasti ly hail ed as the 'Green Rev olu -
tion'. The increase recorded in food
production was no doubt impressive
by any standard. The output of food-
grains shot up from 89 million tonnes
in 1964-65 w hi c h was the best year
before the so-called revolution, to 100
m i l l i o n tonnes i n 1969-70. In 1973-74
the output is estimated to have been
about 107 mi l l io n tonnes. St i l lm or ei m-
pressive was the increase in the out-
put of whea t, the cereal that respo n-
ded most to the new package of prac-
tices. Du ri ng the six years fro m 1964-
65 to 1970-71 wheat pro du ct io n in-
creased at a compound rate of about
14 per cent per annum.8
When the new strategy was evolved,
it was con fid ent ly hope d that the ap-
pl ica ti on of science and techno logy
backe d by investment w ou ld take
Ind ian agricult ure out of the woods.
Perhaps, it was even believed that the
unpleasant question of ins tit uti ona l
ref orm co ul d be by-passed. The eupho-
ria of the in it ia l years of the so-ca lled
'Green Revolution' did not, however,
last long, Soon it became evident that
the bul k of the gains were bei ng cor-
nered by the big farmers, Several stu-
dies, mos tly em piri cal, show that the
disparities in income and wealth have
increased. Soci al ten sion has also been
on the increase. The new tec hno log y
is, no doubt, scale-neutral in the sense
that it can be applied with equal ef-
fectiveness on big and small farms,
provided water and the other inputs
are available in right quantities at the
right time. Considerable investment is
cal led for in irr i gati on, la nd improve -
ment, seeds, fertilisers and pesticides.
W i t h the higher investments, the risks
are also highe r. La ck of access to cre-
dit and other inputs and their in ab il it y
to undertake risk s, make it rather di f -
fi cu lt for the sma ll farmers to adopt
the fu ll package of mode rn farming
practices. Hence the dispa ritie s bet-
ween the bi g and the sma ll farmers
are incre asing. The tenants, par tic ula r-
l y insecure sharecroppers, have fared
even worse. In the context of rising
income and la nd values, landowners
have been trying hard to eject their
tenants and bring the land under their
direct cultivat ion. W ol f Ladejinsky9
and Francine Frankel10 have reported
the ejectment of tenants i n c erta in dis-
trict s where the new agr icu ltu ral stra-
tegy was adopted. A n d Pranab Bar-
dhan's studies11 indicate that there
has been no impro vem ent in the real
wages of agricultural labourers except
in Ke ra la where they are somewhat
better organised. There is plenty of
evidence to show that the new pros-
pe rit y has been shared ve ry un equ all y,
the bulk of the gains accruing to the
big farmers.
Whe n it was fou nd that the la ck of
access to credi t was rend erin g it
very difficult for the small farmers to
moderni se the ir far min g, a scheme
kn ow n as the Small Farmers Deve lop-
ment Agency was sanctioned in the
Fou rth Fiv e-Ye ar Plan to help sm all
farmers who own less than 2 hectares
of land . A few distri cts were cover-
ed under the scheme on an experi -
mental basis in the Fourth Plan and
it is proposed to cover about one-
half of the country in the Fifth Plan.
The main thrust of the scheme is in
providing credit and subsidies for land
improvement and irriga tion. The draw-
back of thi s scheme is that unless a
person owns a minimum area of land,
say at least 0.4 hectare, he wi ll not
fi nd it ec onomi c to inves t even in a
masonry we ll . A m i no sharecropper
will, for obvious reasons, make any
investment in irr iga tio n works. A s al-
ready pointed out, 44 per cent of the
rural households own no land or less
than 0.4 hectare. Hence even th is
scheme, which is specially designed to
help the weaker sections of the ru ral
society, wi l l prac ticall y leave out in
the cold the bottom half of the rural
popul atio n. It wo ul d, of course, be
possib le, to ensure that part of the
benefits accrue t o that class i f the exe-
cution of the scheme is accompanied
by a red is tri but ion of la nd and the
conferm ent of permanent righ ts on
renants-at-will.
There is evidence to show that the
outmo ded agrarian structure is alsostanding in the way of the spread of
the so-called 'Green Re vo lu ti on ' to
many areas where considerable poten-
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t ia i ex is ts for rap i d agr i cu l tu ra l
gro wth . In the Indo -Gang etic pla in
and the deltas o f the great ri ve rs ,
In di a has some of the wo rl d' s most
r ich ly endowed agr icu l tura l t racts with
un ri va l l ed gro und water resources.
S igni f ic ant increase in agr i cu l tu ra l
pro duc ti on has taken place only in
the western po rt io n of the Ind o-Ga n-
getic plai n. In this area the bu lk of
the lan d is cult iva ted by own er far-
mers and sha rec rop pin g tenanc y is
very rare indee d. The new f ou nd agri-
cu lt ur al prosp erity of this area is ba-
sed on the exploitation of ground wa-
ter. Cur re nt ly 80 per cent of the avai-
lable ground water is tapped in this
region to support mu lt ip le crop ping .
But in the eastern portion of the Gan-
getic pl ai n and the deltas the exp lo i-
tati on of gro und water continues to
be poor. In some of these areas the in-
cidence of share croppi ng and absen-
tee Ian dow ner shi p contin ues to be
hig h. A n outmodoel agraria n struc-
ture is one of the mai n l i mi t i ng fac-
tors in the spread of the 'Gre en Re-
volution' to these areas.
CONCLUSIONS
The fo l l ow in g conclusion s emerge.
India's experience since Independence
shows that there is a close inter-rela-
t i on between agrarian structure and
ru ra l development. A n ou tmode d agra-
ri an str uct ure is a serious obstacle to
the mode rni sati on of agri cult ure and
rap id rur al development. Such a struc-
ture is to be squarely blamed for the
unequal d is t r i but ion of the fru i ts of
develo pment leadin g to wi de ni ng of
the dispar ities in inc ome and wea lth.
The upper classes who have cornered
the bu lk of the new pro spe rit y have
also succeeded in con sol ida ti ng thei r
polit ical power. Consequently, it has
become st i l l more dif f i cu lt to adopt
and implem ent far-reaching inst i tu-
ti on al refor ms. Eve n so, as the emer-
gin g agrarian struc ture has become
a serious const rain t to ru ra l deve-
lopm ent it w i l l be disastrous to
postpone the much-needed institutional
reforms.
Notes
[The views expressed in this paper
are the write r's ow n and not neces-
sarily those of the Gove rnm ent ofIndia.]
1 B H Bade n-Po wel l, "La nd Systems
of Br it is h India", Vo l II , p 464.2 P la nning Commi ss ion , New D el h i
(1973), "Report of the Task Forceon Ag ra ri an Rel atio ns", pp 3-4.
:3 Ibid, p 4.
i Ibid, pp 6-7.5 For a frank and lu ci d revi ew of
the Comm uni ty Developmen t Pro-
gramme, the Co-oper ative Socie-ties an d Panchay ats see Gu nn arMyr da l , "As i an D rama" , V o l I I ,Chap ter s 18, 22 and 26.
6 Govern ment of Ind ia, M i n i st ry ofIrr igat ion and Power, Annual Re-port (1972-73), pp 48-49.
7 P S Ap pu , "Un equ al Benefitsfrom Kosi Project", Economic andPolitical Weekly, June 16, 1973.
8 Wo l f Ladej in sky, "Ho w Green IsThe Green R evol utio n ?" Economicand Political Weekly, December29, 1973.
9 Wo l f Ladejinsky, "Ironies ofIndia's Green Revolution", Foreign
Affairs, July 1970.
10 Francin e R Fran kel, "India'sGreen Revo lu t ion" .
11 Pranab Bardha n, "Gree n Rev olu -t ion and Ag r i cu l tu r a l Labourers ",Economic and Political Weekly,Speci al Nu mb er , July 1970.
Uti lisation of Ground Water Resources
Public versus Private Tubewells
B D Dhawan
This paper is basically a review article. The author has picked a few studies on tubewells and
attempted to probe some of the major economic claims being advanced in favour of private tubewells.
The economic underpinnings of the thesis that private tubewells are superior to public tubewells
appear to be weak on closer scrutiny.
Also examined is the problem of 'mismanagement' of state tubewells, which is the root cause of
disenchantment with them in several quarters.
IN contrast to the dis mal shortfalls wi t-
nessed i n most targets set by the Pla n-
ning Comm issi on, the F our th Plan
achievement i n grou nd water explo ita-
tion is comme ndable . Thi s remarkable
achievement has come about due to a
veritable tube well "explosion'. It is
estimated that about one hundred
thousand tube wells are bein g inst all ed
in the country every year.1
There were about 3,000 pu bl ic and
21,000 pri vat e tubewel ls i n the country
at the beginning of the planning era.
By the end of the Fo ur th Pl an perio d,
about 20,000 public tubewells are said
to have been ins tal led . On the other
hand, the corr espon ding numbe r of
priva te tubewell s may be pla ced in the
range 0.6-1.0 mil l ion. 2 Wh i l e one wel-
comes the emergence of this dy na mi c
enterprise in the countryside, one ought
to keep in mind the support rendered
by the State in the dev elo pme nt o f
pri vat e tub ewe lls . The State has not
only p rov ide d Substantial indi rect
finance for pri vat e tubew ell s but has also
undertaken massive programmes of rural
e lectr i f icat ion.3 Ru ral electrif icat ion is
probably the more important of these
tw o factors e spec iall y since 1967 wh en
the programme of rural electr if icat ion
was sharply reoriented, where by the
pr im ar y c oncern o f the progr amme be-
came the energisation of agr icu ltu ral
pumpsets instead of ele ctr ifi cat ion of
vi ll age habitati ons. It is this extension
of the pow er system to the In di an
coun trys ide that has no w made the agr i-
cul tur e sector a major contender f or
available power supplies in many
states.4
When one looks at the comparative
rates of growth of state and private
tube well s, one notices the rel ati vel y
slower growth in the number of state
tubewel ls. Since priv ate tubewel ls are
a feasible pro pos iti on lo r farmers wi t h
rel ati vely large lan dhol ding s, a faster
incre ase in th eir numbers w ou l d accen-
tuate the prob lem of ine qui ty in the
rura l sector as small and margi nal farm-
ers' water needs are not taken care of
through pub li c ir rig at ion works. In this
perspective, the choice between private
and pu bl ic tubewells appears to bo il
down to the famil iar problem of growth
versus equ ity . The ref ore , it is not
sur pri sin g that one conies across mis -
givings bein g aired both wi th regard
to the developmen t of priv ate as w el l
as pub li c tubewells.5
Th is paper is basic ally a rev iew
article . But the rev iew is far fr om com-
prehen sive. The author has ju st pi ck ed
up a few studies on tub ewe lls . Th e
effort here is to probe i nto some majo r
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