Protests in The ME and Game Theory March 16, 2011 Swiss Global Economics.

Protests in The ME and Game Theory

March 16, 2011

Swiss Global Economics

Violent Protests and Game Theory

• Puzzle– Many people protest, but few protest violently– Violent protests are almost always costly– The fact that some people enjoy violence does not

explain the whole story• Game Theoretic Solution– Model 1: Violence as a Signal– Model 2: Screening– Model 3: Gambling for Salvation

Signaling: Intuition

• When institution is not sure about protesters’ commitment, violent protest may serve as a signal to convey their willingness to fight for their cause

• Institutions do not want to give in, but will do so if it expects that protesters are committed

• Examples: Egypt, Yemen

P 1-p

CU

F A

A

A

A F

F

F

(0,0) (0,0)

(0,-50)(800,-50)

(500,-100)

(-40,-50)

(-50,-100)

(0,-20)

(100,-50)

(500,-1000)(10,-25)

(200,-50)

(0,-50)(-40,-50)

(-50,-100)

(1000,-50)

ighl

Separating Equilibrium

• In this game there is a separating equilibrium where– C types always choose to protest violently – U types always choose to protest peacefully– The government • will give in after violent protest and not after peaceful

protest • believes that all low types protest peacefully, and all

high types protest violently

Implications• Communication fails (e.g. no democracy)• Costs/Benefits– Low costs of violence (e.g. weak legal system)– High expected benefits for the high types

E.g. if the institution is unstable, likely to give in or if the costs of violence are high for the institution

– “U shaped” relation between violence and repression

(Francisco, (1996), Moore, (1998), Rasler, (1996))

• Institution has an incentive to avoid precedents

The signaling model is useful, but many violent protests start peacefully

• Still an information asymmetry problem:– The government doesn’t know the type of

protesters: “committed” or “not committed.”– Before engaging in bargaining with the protesters,

the government would like to know if it has the “bargaining power.”

• The government uses its police force as a screening mechanism…

Screening Model of Violent Protests

• Players: Protesters and Government• Types: Committed and Uncommitted protesters.• Actions:

Gov’t

Bargaining

“ex-ante”

Send the Police

Same negotiation

approach for all groups.

Rioters

Go away

if not

committed

Respond with

violence if

committed

Gov’t has bargaining

power.

Gov’t has to give in to

the demands.

Egyptian anti-government protesters clash with riot police

Violent Protest to Raise Awareness

• Violence is a cheap way to get attention• But it is not necessarily good attention• A risky gamble for raising awareness about

your cause

LybiaYemen

Why Would Groups Take a Risky Gamble?

• Gambling For Salvation: When your back is against the wall, downside risks

don’t matter.

NONVIOLENTPROTEST

VIOLENTPROTEST

FavorableAttention

FavorableAttention

Where you are now

Where you need to be

Where you need to be

Common Theme?

Violence provides information