PROTECTING MIGRANT WORKERS An Analysis of Overseas Filipino Workers’ Rights under the TPP Sarah Domondon Advisor: Keith Nitta, Ph.D. | Second Reader: Camille Walsh, J.D., Ph.D. A capstone project presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Policy Studies, Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences
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PROTECTINGMIGRANTWORKERSAnAnalysisofOverseasFilipinoWorkers’RightsundertheTPP
SarahDomondonAdvisor:KeithNitta,Ph.D.|SecondReader:CamilleWalsh,J.D.,Ph.D.
AcapstoneprojectpresentedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofMasterofArtsinPolicyStudies,InterdisciplinaryArtsandSciences
Chapter1
PURPOSEOFTHESTUDY
TheTransPacificPartnership(TPP)isamultinationalFreeTradeAgreement(FTA)negotiatedamongtwelvePacificrimcountries:Australia,Brunei,Canada,Chile,Japan,Malaysia,Mexico,NewZealand,Peru,Singapore,theUnitedStatesandVietnam.MembercountriesrepresentkeymarketsforPhilippineexports/imports,investments,andtechnology,andaccountfor40%ofglobaltrade.Ofthese,SingaporeandMalaysiarankamongthetop10destinationsfordeployedoverseasFilipinoworkers,accountingfor12%oftotaldeploymentsin2015.Theconsiderableincreaseinmigration(displacement)ofworkersthatfollowtheimplementationofFTAshasgeneratedsignificantconcernforthePhilippines’inclusionintheTransPacificPartnership.
Knownasalaborsendingcountry,laborexportisadefiningcharacteristicofthePhilippine’snationaldevelopmentstrategy,with10%ofGDPattributedtoremittancesalonein20151.ThebodyofresearchontheTPP,spanningeconomicimpacttoworkers’rightsonthePhilippines,employmodelsthatexcludethisfeatureofthelabormarket,creatingasignificantgapinanalysis.TheprimarydatasampleusedinthisresearchistheLaborForceSurvey,whichdoesnotincludedataonFilipinosemployedoverseas,orOverseasFilipinoWorkers(OFWs),astheyareconsideredapartofthelaborforceoftheircountryofemployment.Further,itisestimatedthat10%oftheFilipinoworkforceabroadaretraffickedindividuals;however,duetothenatureandinaccuracyofsuchdata,itisimportanttorecognizethatrelyingonquantitativemodelingisinadequatewhenassessingcontextsthatallowfortheirregularmovementofworkers.
Whilethisreportdoesnotseektodiscounttheimportanceofusingeconomicmodelingtoanalyzetradepolicies,itdoeschallengethesoleuseofComputerGeneratedEquilibrium(CGE)modelingastheprimarydecisionmakingtoolforthePhilippinesasitstandstoday.CGEprojectionsdonotprovideanyanalysisonimpactonoutboundlabormigration,ortheimpactsontheworkersthemselves.ThepermanenceoftheOFWprograminthePhilippines’developmentstrategyaswellasthesignificanteconomiccontributionsofremittancesdemandsconsiderationintheoverallimpactoftheTPP.
Buildinguponthebodyofresearchonthecorrelationbetweenmultilateralfreetradeagreements(FTAs)anddisplacementoflowskilledworkersindevelopingcountries,thisanalysisfocusesonthePhilippinecontextofitsLaborMigrationPolicyandasks:HowwouldtheTPPLaborprovisionschallengethecurrentprotectionsundertheOFWprogramframework?ThispaperprovidesatextanalysisoftheTPPlaborchapteranddiscussesthestateofOFWrightsandprotectionsundertheagreement.
1International Migration at All-Time High." World Bank. December 18, 2015. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/18/international-migrants-and-remittances-continue-to-grow-as-people-search-for-better-opportunities-new-report-finds
Chapter2
LITERATUREREVIEW
ThePhilippine’shistoryoftradeliberalizationpolicieshasbeencriticizedbyscholarsandactivistsalikeasineffectiveandunsustainableinitscontributiontooverallnationaldevelopment.Despiteitsengagementintheglobalmarketthroughfreetradeagreements,ithaslaggedingrowthandcompetitivenesscomparedtoitsneighboringcounterparts.ThecountryiscurrentlyengagedinelevenFreeTradeAgreements(FTAs),andhasexpressedseriousinterestinjoininginthesecondroundofnegotiationsfortheTrans-PacificPartnership(TPP).TheTransPacificpartnershipisamultinationalFTAnegotiatedamongtwelvePacificrimcountries:Australia,Brunei,Canada,Chile,Japan,Malaysia,Mexico,NewZealand,Peru,Singapore,theUnitedStatesandVietnam.Notably,thisblocincludesallmajoreconomiesalongthepacificrimwiththeexclusionofChina.
Followingsevenyearsofnegotiation,thefinalizedproposalwassignedonFebruary12,2016andisawaitingratificationfromall12countries.ThePartnershipaimsto“promoteeconomicgrowth;supportthecreationandretentionofjobs;enhanceinnovation,productivityandcompetitiveness;raiselivingstandards;reducepovertyinourcountries;andpromotetransparency,goodgovernance,andenhancedlaborandenvironmentalprotections.”2
The30-
chapteragreementaddressestradeandtraderelatedissues,andispurportedtobethemostambitiousandcomprehensivetradeagreementtodate.Severalconcernshavebeenraisedbycritics,particularlyaroundthesecrecyarounditsnegotiation,theasymmetricpowerwieldedtolargecorporations,andthreatstoworkers’rights.
TheTPPhasincludedachapteronlabor,buildinguponlandmarklaborprovisionsintheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA);however,expertsfromtheUnitedNationsaswellastheAmericanFederationofLaborandCongressofIndustrialOrganizations(AFL–CIO)warnagainstthepromiseofincreasedworkerprotectionsinmembercountries.TheLaborchapter(19)isbasedontheBasicLaborStandardsintheMay10Agreement3andrequiresthatallpartiesabidebythe1998InternationalLaborOrganization’sDeclarationonfundamentallaborrightsandpractices(Box1).Forsomecountries,thismeansexhaustiveamendmentstonationalpolicy,orsignificantinvestmenttocreatepreviouslynonexistentinfrastructureandoversight.Toensurecomplianceamongcountrieswithexhaustivetrackrecordsofsevereworkers’rightsviolations,theUnitedStateshasnegotiatedbilateral“consistencyplans”withBrunei,MalaysiaandVietnam.Astheyareintendedtomotivatereform,therearenostandardizedmeasurementsorinstrumentsforimplementationorenforcement.
2Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press- office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership3TheMay10agreementreferstotheBipartisanAgreementonTradePolicy,incorporatinginternationally-recognizedlaborprinciplesincorporatedintotradeagreements.SeeOfficeoftheUnitedStatesTradeRepresentative(2007).https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file127_11319.pdf
ThePhilippinesissignificantlyreliantonitspolicyoflabormigration,attributingroughly10%ofitsGDPtoremittancesalone,totalingabout$30billion.4
Theflowoflabormigrantsis
coordinatedthrougharobustmanagementmodelbasedinthePhilippines,andthroughbilateralagreementswithlabor-receivingcountries.TPPmembercountriesMalaysiaandSingaporereceive12%ofallOverseasForeignWorker(OWF)deploymentsfromthePhilippines.Thesecountriesarerankedat4and3,respectively,ontheITUCGlobalRightsIndex,theworld’smostcomprehensivedatabaseonworkers’rightsviolations(Burrow,2016)5IncomparisontocountriesadmittedintotheTPP,thePhilippineshasbeengivenascoreof5-noguaranteeofworkers’rights.ThegivenclimateofinabilitytoprotectworkersdomesticallywarrantsinvestigationonthePhilippines’abilitytoadheretoTPPlaborprovisionsfortheircitizensworkingabroad.
Inanticipationfortheopportunitytobeincludedinthe2ndroundofTPPnegotiations,preliminarystudieshavebeenconductedtoevaluatetheimpactofjoiningex-ante;however,thesestudiesemployeconomicmodelsthatneglecttoaccuratelyaccountfortheweightofmigrantlabor,oraddressmigrantlaborasavariableatall.Thisaspectofthelabormarketcannotbeignored,asexportlaborhasbecomeanenduringfeatureofboththeeconomicdevelopmentandnationalsecuritystrategyofthePhilippines.LabormigrationhasbecomeaninstitutionalizedemploymentmodelaswellasasocialnormwithinFilipinoculture.Furthermore,aTPPreadinessassessmentundertakenbytheUSAIDTrade-RelatedAssistanceforDevelopment(TRADE)Projectidentifiedissuesofconcernwithcurrentlaborlegislation,leadingtoquestionsofreformoftheOFWprogram.
Thisreportisdividedinto5parts.Chapter1outlinesthepurposeofthestudy,Chapter2willcoveraliteraturereviewoftheSocialandEconomiccontextbehindthePhilippines’phenomenonofmasslabormigration,migrationtrendsandcharacteristics,andanoverviewoftheTPP’slaborchapter.InChapter3Iwilldiscussthemethodologiesemployed,resultinginResultsandDiscussioninChapter4.Chapter5willconcludewithRecommendationsforfuturestudy.
B.SocialandEconomiccontext
ThePhilippineshasapopulationofapproximately102millionpeople,withalaborforceofabout43millionasofJuly2016.AccordingtotheLaborForceSurvey(LFS)fromthePhilippineStatisticsAuthority,thelaborforceparticipationratewas63.3%.Comprisedofqualifiedworkers,ages15-64,thelaborforceaccountsfor63%ofthetotalpopulation6,withthisratiobeingattributedtothehighpopulationofchildrenandelderly.26%ofthepopulationlivesbelowthepovertylevel,withanunemploymentrateof6.6%andanunderemployment
4Philippineshttp://data.worldbank.org/country/philippines5TheIndexisbasedoninformationrecordedintheITUCSurveyandcoversviolationsinlawandinpractice.Therankingisbasedon97indicatorsrankingcountries1-5,5beingtheworstratingsignifyinghighoccurrencesinworker’srightsviolations.https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/survey_ra_2016_eng.pdf6Populationages15-64(%oftotal)http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS?locations=PH5PhilippineEmploymentTrends2015Acceleratinginclusivegrowththroughdecentjobshttp://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilomanila/documents/publication/wcms_362751.pdf
rateof17.5%.Amongthoseemployed,38.6%wereinvulnerableemployment(own-accountworkersandunpaidfamilyworkers),and36.4%oftheemployedwereinpart-time(lessthan40hoursaweek)employment.
ThePhilippines’economyhasfailedtoattainlong-termstability,withitseconomicperformancecharacterizedasboomandbustforthelastfourdecades.7This,combinedwithhighlevelsofongoingcorruptionandarepressivedictatorshipuntilthe1986PeoplePowerRevolutionslowedthecountry’sdevelopmentincomparisontoitsneighborcountries.Further,thisledtoaneglectinpursuingstructuralreformsintheagricultureandmanufacturingsectors,leadingtochronicdevelopmentimbalances.8
Theoilcrisisoftheearly1970’sprovedpromising
inansweringthelackofdomesticinfrastructuretoemployalargeyoungandeducatedpopulation,spurringthemovementtoinstitutionalizeoverseasemployment.ScarcelocalopportunitiesandahighdemandforlaborabroadcreatedastrongincentiveforthePhilippinesgovernmenttocreateamanagementmodelforsendingworkersabroadandcapitalizingonremittances.
TheLaborCodeofthePhilippinesin1974wasinitiatedasastop-gapmeasuretoaddressanationallaborsurplustemporarilyuntilthecountryresolveditseconomicproblems.However,duetothepersistenceofdomestic‘push’factors,includingunemploymentinthedoubledigits,alackofeconomicandpoliticalstability,andarapidlygrowinglaborpool,thecountryhasinvestedinamorerobustmanagementoftheflowofoverseasworkers.Labormigrationhadbecomethecountry’ssolutiontoaddressthepopulationgrowththatexceededitseconomicgrowth.Amidthesuccessofthepolicytocontributetoeconomicstability,exploitationtraffickingofOFWswasrampant.StandardsofOFWprotectionswereimplementedthroughTheMigrantWorkersandOverseasFilipinosAct,inresponsetogrowingpublicunresttothegovernment’scomplicityinthehangingofaFilipinadomesticworkerinSingapore.Priortothis,thegovernment’sonlyrolewastopromoteandestablishaprogramforoverseaswork.
TheMigrantWorkersandOverseasFilipinoActisoneofseveralambitiouseffortsthePhilippineshastakentowardsprotectingworkers’rights,creatingagenciesandnewpoliciesdedicatedtothewellbeingofOFWs.OFWsareFilipinocitizens,protectedunderPhilippinelaw;however,OFWsareexcludedfromspecificlegislation,thelaborforcedatabaseandareconsideredapartofthecountryofemployment’sworkforce.Manydestinationcountriesexcludemigrantworkersand/oroccupationscommonlyfilledthroughmigrantlaborfrommajorworkers’rightslegislation,creatingthespecificityoftheOFWsituation.
C.LaborMigrationandTrade
PertheMigrationPolicyInstitute,theflowofoverseasforeignworkers(OFWs),totaledafewthousandsperyearintheearly1970s,andhassincegrowntomillions.thePhilippinesStatisticsAuthority(PSA)estimatedthetotalnumberofOFWsin2005tohittheonemillionmark,withcurrentestimatesofthispopulationreaching2.4millionin2015.Thisgroupmakes7CountryProfile,Philippineshttps://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/CMReport-Philipines-2013.pdf8Ibid.
thePhilippinesthethirdlargestrecipientofremittances,forecastedtobe$29.7billionbytheWorldBank.9RemittancesconstitutethelargestsourceofforeignexchangeincomeforthePhilippines.
Lookingatthe11FTAsthePhilippinesisengagedin,onlytwo,TheJapan-PhilippineEconomicPartnershipAgreement(JEPA)containsexplicitlaborprovisions.Largestakeholders,includingtheUnitedNationsandtheWorldBankciteseverallabormigrationtrendsthatarehighlyvisibleintheexampleoftheJPEPA.Notably,amismatchofskillsand‘braindrain’10werekeyissuesinthis,andmanyothersitesoflabor(Battistella,Liao,2013).These,amongothershavereceivednegativeattentionaseffectsofexternalmigrationfromdevelopingcountries.
D.TheTransPacificPartnershipAgreementLaborchapter
TheTransPacificPartnership(TPP)isamultinationalFreeTradeAgreement(FTA)negotiatedamongtwelvePacificrimcountries:Australia,Brunei,Canada,Chile,Japan,Malaysia,Mexico,NewZealand,Peru,Singapore,theUnitedStatesandVietnam.ThemainobjectivesoftheTPParetogenerateeconomicgrowthamongmembercountriesbymovingtoreducetariffsandotherbarrierstotradeandinvestmentandimprovemarketaccesstogoodsandservices.AttitudessurroundingtheTPPvary;intheUnitedStates,proponentsarguethatfailuretoreachafreetradeagreementwithAsianeconomieswouldallowChinatosettheglobalnorms,fearingChina’smercantilistforeignpolicywouldneglectenvironmentalstandards,laborrights,andintellectualpropertyrights,andsetalowbarforglobalstandards(Marston,2015)11WiththiscomeunderstandingsthattheTPPwillleveltheplayfieldbyaddressingmarketandlaborconditionsamongmembercountries.
Oneofthesemechanismsarelaborprotectionprovisionsthataddresscompetitionfromothercountrieswithpoorworkingstandards,undercuttingandoutcompetingtheUnitedStatesthroughcheaplabor.BuildingupontheMay10agreement,supportersoftheTPPclaimthatitisthemostambitioustradeagreementtodateinadvancingthelaboragenda;however,laboradvocatesareskepticalofsuchprovisionsduetoseveralissuessuchascompliance,thecapacityandpoliticalwillofacountrytoenforcetheprovisions,therelativityofabaselineforhealthandsafetyregulations,aswellasvaguelanguagewithintheagreementthatissubjecttointerpretation.
Anexampleofsuchlanguageisthediscouragementof‘importationofgoodsfromothersourcesproducedinwholeorinpartbyforcedorcompulsorylabor,includingforcedorcompulsorychildlabor.’
TheTPPalsocommitsmemberstodiscourageimportsofgoods
producedbyforcedlaborthrough‘initiativesconsideredappropriate’,lefttothediscretionofmembercountriestodefinetheterm‘appropriate’.Beyondambiguouslanguageistheomissionofgroupsaltogether,theTPPdoesnotexplicitlyaddressmigrantworkers,anarea
9WorldBankMigrationandRemittancesFactBook.https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/4549025-1450455807487/Factbookpart1.pdf10Thelossofhumancapitaltoforeignlabormarkets.WorldBank,InternationalMigration,Remittances,andtheBrainDrain11Marston,H.(2015).WhattheTrans-PacificPartnershipMeansforSoutheastAsia.RetrievedNovember13,2016,fromhttp://thediplomat.com/2015/07/what-the-trans-pacific-partnership-means-for-southeast-asia/
criticaltothePhilippines’laborforce.Therelativityofhealthandsafetyregulationsinaddressingworkers’safetyisconcerning;Brunei,VietnamandMalaysiaareTPPmembercountriesthatarenotablynegligentinaddressinghumanrightsabuses.ThereislittleprogressmadeonimplementingsafetyfeaturesforOFWs.
TheTPPlaborchapterobligesallmemberstoensurethatnationallawsconformtotherightsandprinciplesoftheILODeclaration:
• freedomofassociationandtheeffectiverecognitionoftherighttocollectivebargaining• eliminationofallformsofforcedorcompulsorylabor,• effectiveabolitionofchildlabor,and• eliminationofdiscriminationinrespectofemploymentandoccupation.
TheAmericanFederationofLaborandCongressofIndustrialOrganizations(AFL-CIO)criticizesthelimitsoftheTPPlaborprovisions,advocatingfortheadditionoftheeightfundamentalconventions(treatiesvoluntarilyratifiedbyILOmembers)thatcorrespondtotheILODeclaration(theEuropeanUnion’sapproachtolaborinFTAs)(AFL-CIO,2015).Thesefundamentalconventionsare:
• FreedomofAssociationandProtectionoftheRighttoOrganizeConvention,1948(No.87)
• RighttoOrganizeandCollectiveBargainingConvention,1949(No.98)• ForcedLaborConvention,1930(No.29)• AbolitionofForcedLaborConvention,1957(No.105)• MinimumAgeConvention,1973(No.138)• WorstFormsofChildLaborConvention,1999(No.182)• EqualRemunerationConvention,1951(No.100)• Discrimination(EmploymentandOccupation)Convention,1958(No.111)Workers’
rightsadvocatesclaimthatonlyDeclaration,andnottheConventions,arereferencedinFTAsbecausetheUnitedStateshasratifiedonlytwooftheeightconventions.
F.CGE:theprimaryassessmenttool
ComputableGeneralEquilibrium(CGE)modelshavebecomestandardtoolsamongeconomistsandstakeholdersalike,leadingthewayforquantitativetradepolicyanalysis.Ithasevolvedsinceitstheoreticalfoundationsofeconomicinterconnectivity(demand,prices,income),datingbacktoLeonWalras(1834-1910).Toaddresstheinfinitedimensionandpossibilitiesofeconomicinterconnectedness,modelersareforcedtoselectivelyfocusononlyafewfactors,creatingasetofassumptionsbasedonthemodeler’smethodology.ComputableGeneralEquilibriummodelinghasbuiltuponthis,attemptingtospecifyalleconomicrelationshipsinmathematicaltermsandputthemtogetherinaformthatallowsthemodeltopredictthechangeinvariablessuchasprices,outputandeconomicwelfareresultingfromachangeineconomicpolicies,giveninformationabouttechnology(theinputsrequiredto
produceaunitofoutput),policiesandconsumerpreferences(GlobalTradeAnalysisProject(GTAP),2011).
PreviousstudiesontradeliberalizationinthePhilippinesweresimulatedthroughaCGEmodel,witheachversionhavingvaryingsetsofassumptions.CurrentassessmentsoftheTrans-PacificPartnershipincludeCGEmodels,aswellasothers,suchasComparative,ProspectiveandInterestAnalyses,andImpactAssessments(Health,Environment,Sustainability,HumanRights),thoughthemostprominentofthesebeingCGEmodeling.OneofthemainstrengthsofCGEmodelsistheirtheoreticalconsistency;theyassumethatallexportsareimportedbyanothercountry,thatthesumofsectors'employmentdoesnotexceedthelaborforce,orthatallconsumptionbecoveredbyproductionorimports(Herteletal,2007).AnotherstrengthoftheCGEisitsabilitytoexploreandcomputeamuchlargerrangeandvarietyofvariablesthanothereconometricestimations.CGEhasemergedasapowerfultoolforpolicymakerstorepresentthecomplexinteractionsofmixedeconomies;however,researchshowsmixedreviewswhenCGEisappliedtodevelopingcountries,suchasthePhilippines.WhileCGEmodelinghasbecomeasinfluentialasitiscomprehensive,itsapplicationandvalidityhasbeenwidelycriticized.Amongthesecriticismsareitsutility,modellimitations,aswellaslevelofanalysis.JaimeDeMelo,aleadingeconomistininternationaltradeanddevelopment,claimsthatCGEmodelinghasamicroeconomicfocusinindustrializedcountries,whichisunsuitablefordevelopingcountriesforthreereasons:lackoftime-seriesdata,inconsistenciesindata,andtheshorttimeframethatbigchangesinpolicyleavefortestinghypothesis(DeMelo,1988).AllthreeoftheseissuesareapparentinthecontextofthePhilippines.Ratherthan“borrowing”parameterestimatesformindustrializedcountries,DeMelosuggeststhatfuturemodelingfortradeanalysisindevelopingcountrieswouldbenefitfromalteringtheirCGEtousedirecteconomicparameters,tailoredtoeachcountry,callingforfurtherconsiderationofamicroeconomicapproach.IncontrasttoDeMelo’sposition,Petri&Plummer(2016)claimthatCGEmodelingisbestsuitedformacroeconomicanalysiscallingforinclusionforamicroeconomicfocus.
Further,CGEmodelshavebeencriticizedashighlycomplexandrestrictedintheirusefulnesswhenpolicymakersareunclearaboutwhattheyare,theirpurposeandhowtointerprettheresults(Andriamananjara,2013).Iqbal(2001)andPetri(2016)agreethatCGEis,indeed,thebestformofquantitativeanalysisfortradepolicy,butsuggestthathaslimitationsandisinsufficientonitsowntofullyanalyzesocio-economicimpacts.Iqbal&Siddiqi(2001)presenttheselimitationsintermsofdata;CGEmodelsworkbestwithdata-richcountriesthathavetheresourcesandtechnologiestorunaccuratemodels.Assuch,CGEmodelsareofteninaccessibletoresearchersandaudiencesoutsideofformaleconomics.DespitethevaryingevidenceforandagainsttheuseofCGEmodelingintradepolicyanalysis,itisagreeduponthatithasthepotentialtoproducethemostcomprehensive,quantitativeviewofatradepolicy’simpactonaspecificeconomy,butshouldbesupplementedbysomeformofadditionalanalysis.
Aswithmostcountries,thePhilippineshasreliedonCGEmodelstoassesstheimpactofpreviousFTAs,reportingnetpositivegains;however,theresultsofex-postassessmentsfallshortofprojectedgains(Clarete,2005),suggestingthatalternativewaysofassessingtradeagreementsmustbeexplored.Oversightoncombinedeconomic,environmentalandsocial
impactshaveresultedinslowpovertyalleviation,alackofanindustrialstructureandlimitedcontributiontovalueadded(Aldaba,2013).
Additionally,thefailureofthePhilippinestoindustrializeattherateofitscounterpartshasledtodependencyonlaborexportasitscomparativeadvantage,inextricablylinkinglabor,tradeandmigration.ItiscriticaltoitsassessmentoftheTrans-PacificPartnershipthatthePhilippinesconsiderthiscontextwhenchoosingmodelsofanalysis.Whilequantitativeformsofanalysis,remainattheheartofinternationaltradepolicyanalysis,qualitativeanalysismodelsfocusonenvironmental,socialandothernon-marketconsiderations,yieldingalternateimpactsofapolicy.
Inresponsetothis,qualitativeanalysisisimperativetocreatingacomprehensivepictureofpotentialimpacts.DataonoverseasforeignworkersisprimarilyderivedfromoutboundOFWsduringprocessing,andissupplementedwithasurveyadministeredtoOFWs.ThemodeofadministrationisnotclearonthePhilippineStatisticsAuthoritysite,andcanbeassumedthatsuchdataisincomplete,leavingoutMigrantWorkersinanIrregularSituation(alsoknownasirregularmigrants;workersthathaveoverstayedtheircontractduration,traffickedindividuals,resultinginanillegalemploymentstatus)12
andthosewithoutaccessto
thesurvey.Theinclusionofsuchassumptionstocreatenumericprojectionsishighlyfavorable,however,thereisnoconclusivewaytoaccuratelyaccountforirregularmigrants.
Athoroughanalysisof“soft”variables,suchasacountry’ssocial,politicalandculturalhistory,iskeyintodepictinganaccurate,robustviewofpotentialimpacts.Considerationoflocalknowledgesintradenegotiationsisconducivetoimprovedpublicparticipation,perceptionandinvolvement,inclusionofwidelyconsideredsocialconstraints,andlesspotentialforrestrictiveorexclusionarypolicies-ultimatelyleadingtobetterdecision-making(GarciadeBrigard,2006).Existingliteraturesuggeststhatcomplimentingquantitativeresearchwithqualitativeanalysisiscriticaltoconstructingamorerobustviewofimpact,specificallyindevelopingcountries.
G.Workers’Rights-specificmodels
Severalmodelsassesscountry-specificqualityofworkers’rights,includingtheInternationalTradeUnionConfederation(ITUC)GlobalRightsIndex,theInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO)MeasurementofDecentWork,andtheCenterforGlobalWorkers’Rights(CGWR)LabourRightsIndicators13.Theseframeworksevaluatecountriesbasedontherightsoftheirworkers,thoughmultiplemethodsofin-depthanalysis.
TheITUCGlobalRightsIndexmethodologicalframeworkincludesareviewofnationallegislationandasurveyrepresenting176millionworkers,resultinginratingsofworkers’rightsviolationsinlawandinpractice.PertheITUC,thissurveyprovidesinformationonviolationsoftherightstofreedomofassociation,collectivebargainingandstrikeasdefinedbyILOConventions,particularlyILOConventionNos.87(FreedomofAssociationandProtectionofthe
12Thereisnointernationalconsensusonthedefinitionofsuchkeytermsas“economicmigrant”,“permanentmigrant”and“irregularmigrant”(Vittin-Balima,2002)13seeTable1
RighttoOrganize)and98(RighttoOrganizeandCollectiveBargainingConvention)aswellasjurisprudencedevelopedbytheILOsupervisorymechanisms14.
Similarly,theCGWRLaborRightsIndicatorsusesmultipletextsanddatabasestoprovidenumericalandtextualinformationoncountry-levelcompliancewithconventionsNos.87and98.Codedresultstranslateintocountryscoresandprofiles,outliningworkers’rightsviolationinlawandpractice.Lastly,theILO’sDecentWorkCountryprofilesassessnationallevelprogresstowarddecentwork.Thecreationoftheprofilesemploynationaldataonindicatorsofdecentworkwithaccompanyinglegalframeworkindicatorstoprovideacontext-specificanalysisofthepaceanddirectionofchangeacrossthedecentworklandscape.15TheprofilesusestatisticalandlegalframeworkstoevaluatetensubstantiveelementscorrespondingtothefourstrategicpillarsoftheDecentWorkAgenda(fullandproductiveemployment,rightsatwork,socialprotectionandthepromotionofsocialdialogue):employmentopportunities;adequateearningsandproductivework;decenthours;combiningwork,familyandpersonallife;workthatshouldbeabolished;stabilityandsecurityofwork;equalopportunityandtreatmentinemployment;safeworkenvironment;socialsecurity;and,socialdialogue,workers’andemployers’representation.16
14DigestofdecisionsandprinciplesoftheFreedomofAssociationCommitteeoftheGoverningBodyoftheILO(2006);ILOGeneralSurveyonFreedomofAssociationandCollectiveBargaining(1994)15DecentWorkCountryProfiles.http://www.ilo.org/asia/info/research-and-data/WCMS_204500/lang--en/index.htm16Ibid.
Chapter3
METHODOLOGY
ThestandarduseofCGEmodelingintradepolicyanalysisassumesthatcountriesutilizingthemhaverobustdata,accesstosophisticatedmodeling,andcanfindusefulnessinimplementingsuchresults.InalignmentwiththecurrentdebateagainstthesoleuseofCGEmodelingindevelopingcountries,thisresearchadvocatesforamorerobustscopeofimpactbyexaminingtheimpacttoFilipinomigrantworkersundertheTPPthroughtextanalysis.Byprovidingnation-specificcontextandfocusingontherightsofOFWunderproposedTPPlegislation,thisworkseekstocontributetoalarger,comprehensiveTPPassessmentforthePhilippines.
MyresearchisatextanalysisoftheTPP’sChapteronLabour(chapter19),usingqualitativecontentanalysistocomparesection19.3LaborRightstotwopiecesofPhilippineworkers’rightslegislation:thePhilippinesLaborCodeandtheMigrantWorkersAct(1995).Duetotimeconstraints,Ilimitedthescopeofmyresearchtoasmallpartofthechapter.HavingreadandconductingapreliminaryanalysisoftheentireLabourchapter,ithadbecomeapparentthatthesectionwiththemostinconsistencieswiththelegislativeframeworkofthePhilippineswassection19.3,outliningthefundamentalconceptsof“workers’rights”fortheentiretyoftheTPP.
Mylegalanalysistriangulatesthemethodologiesandfindingsfromallthreeframeworks(ITUCGlobalRightsIndex,ILOMeasurementofDecentWork,andtheCGWRLabourRightsIndicators).Followingtheirmethodsofdeterminingwhatconstitutesconceptssuchas“decentwork”,Ievaluatedtheprovisionsofsection19.3againstPhilippinelegislationquiteloosely.Forexample,violatingfreedomofassociationcanmanifestinmanyways,fromfinancialbarrierstoexcessiverequirementstolegalpersonhood.Peripheralformsofdiscouragingfreedomofassociationincludevulnerabilitiesimposedbypublicizingnamesandaddressesofunionleaders.
WhiletheLaborCodeincludesalllawsandregulationspertainingtoalllegallyrecognizedworkingindividuals,theMigrantWorkers’ActaddressesspecificitiespertainingtoOFWrights.OFWsaregrantedrightsasFilipinocitizens,howevertheymustabidebythelegalframeworkoftheircountryofemployment.IncludingtheMigrantWorkers’ActintheanalysiswidensthescopeoflegalprotectionsexaminedundertheTPP.
Chapter4
ANALYSIS
Article19.3ofChapter19isevaluatedforcompliancelegislationaswellasdocumentedexamplesofworker’srightsviolations.Thisarticlepresentsthefoundationforworkers’rightsundertheTPPandthusisexaminedthoroughlywithreferencetotheLaborCodeofthePhilippines,andtheMigrantWorkersAct.
Article19.3:LabourRights
1.EachPartyshalladoptandmaintaininitsstatutesandregulations,andpracticesthereunder,thefollowingrightsasstatedintheILODeclaration:
(a)freedomofassociationandtheeffectiverecognitionoftherighttocollectivebargaining;(b)theeliminationofallformsofforcedorcompulsorylabour;(c)theeffectiveabolitionofchildlabourand,forthepurposesofthisAgreement,aprohibitionontheworstformsofchildlabour;and(d)theeliminationofdiscriminationinrespectofemploymentandoccupation.
2.EachPartyshalladoptandmaintainstatutesandregulations,andpracticesthereunder,governingacceptableconditionsofworkwithrespecttominimumwages,hoursofwork,andoccupationalsafetyandhealth.
Article19.3.1delineatesthebaselinelaborrightsrequiredofTPPsignatories,asstatedintheILODeclarationonFundamentalPrinciplesandRightsatWork(1998).WithouttheinclusionofspecificConventionsorobligations,thesearemerelyprincipals.Thesubjectivityofthismatterresultsinvaguemetricsforcompliance,andlowlikelihoodofenforcement.Additionally,article19.3.2failstoclarify“acceptableconditionsofworkwithrespecttominimumwages,hoursofwork,andoccupationalsafetyandhealth.”Underthisprovision,thePhilippinesmusthavelawsinplaceregardingthesesubjectswithoutprovidingclarityonstandardsof‘acceptableconditions’.
ThePhilippineshasratifiedalleightfundamentalILOConventionsundertheDeclaration,aswellasadditionalconventionsthatprotectworkersinhigh-risksectors,suchastheserviceandentertainmentindustries.However,inexaminingthelegislativeframeworkofthePhilippines,thereareseveralinconsistenciesintheadherencetotheselaborstandards.A.Freedomofassociationandtherighttocollectivebargaining
ThefollowingarticlesofthePhilippines’LaborCoderestricttheabilityofworkerstoorganizefreelyandobstructtherighttocollectivebargaining.
1. Article231:Excessiverequirementsincludingdemonstrationofmajoritysupportforthebargainingunit,andregistrationfeesforcollectiveagreements.
2. Article234:Thisarticlepresentsrequirementslegalpersonalityforlabororganizations.Financialbarriers(P50registrationfee),posesdangertounionofficersbyrequiringnamesandaddressesofpersonalinformation,andahighminimumofparticipation(20%)limitstheabilityofworkerstoorganize.TheparticipationratehasbeendeemedexcessivebytheITUC,andisraisedto30%forgovernmentsectoroccupations.Further,thereissignificantdocumentationondisappearancesormurdersofregisteredunionleaders.
3. Article237:createsobstaclesforunionstoformallyestablishbranches,federationsandaffiliationswithinternationalorganizationsbyimposingthefollowingadditionalrequirements:a)eachchaptermusthaveachievedacollectivebargainingagreement,andb)fulldisclosureofmembers(notonlyleaders)isrequired.
4. Article239:Providestengroundsforcancellationofunionregistration,yieldingabsoluteadministrativepowertounilaterallydissolve,suspendorde-registertradeunionorganizations17
5. Article241:Extensiverulesandregulations,requiringstringentfinancialreporting,includingsignedstatementsaccompanyingeveryreceiptofallunionactivity.
6. Article245:Prohibitsmanagerialstafffromunionizing.Supervisoryemployeesarealsobarredfromunionactivities,butmayorganizeamongstthemselves.
7. Article253:limitstheduration,scopeandapplicationofcollectiveagreements8. Article269:Prohibitsunionactivitiesfornon-nationalsandmigrantworkers,unlessthey
areworkinginacountrywithavalidpermitfromDOLE,andareallowedtounionizebythatcountry’slaws.
B.Eliminationofallformsofforcedorcompulsorylabor
ThefollowingsectionsofMigrantWorkersActof1995createvulnerabilitiesforOFWstofallintoforcedlabor.
1. Rule1,Section1.OFWsshallonlybedeployedtocountriesthatrecognizeatleastonethreeguaranteeofrights:a)Ithasexistinglaborandsociallawsprotectingtherightsofworkers,includingmigrantworkers;orb)Itisasignatorytoand/oraratifierofmultilateralconventions,declarationsorresolutionsrelatingtotheprotectionofworkers,includingmigrantworkers;orc)IthasconcludedabilateralagreementorarrangementwiththegovernmentontheprotectionoftherightsofoverseasFilipinoWorkers.Thereisnostandardforwhatdefinestherightsofworkerswhichvarycountry-to-country,oftenresultinginformsofforcedlabor.
2. Rule4,Section1.Providesregulationsforrecruitmentagencies,definesillegalrecruitment,personsresponsibleandpenalties.Withlongperiodsbetweenagencyauditsanddocumentedbacklogsofforcedlaborcases,manyagenciesthathavetheir
17Philippines.http://survey.ituc-csi.org/Philippines.html#tabs-2
licensesrevokedcontinuetooperateunderthetableastheyarestillwell-connectedwithforeignemployers.In2009,thePhilippineOverseasEmploymentAgency(POEA)reportedabacklogof1,400illegalrecruitmentcases,andthearrestof74individuals.18
C.Effectiveabolitionofchildlabor
1. LaborCode,Article139-theminimumemployableageis15,whiletheminimumageforhazardousworkis18.TheUSChamberofCommercefindsthiscontrarytoTPPlaborlaws19
D.Eliminationofdiscrimination
1. LaborCode,Article130,131-Theprohibitionofuncompensatedpayforwomeninvolvedin“nightwork20”withexceptionsincluding:a)casesofurgentworktobeperformedonmachineries,equipmentorinstallation,toavoidseriouslosswhichtheemployerwouldotherwisesuffer;b}Wherethewomanemployeeholdsaresponsiblepositionofmanagerialortechnicalnature,orwherethewomanemployeehasbeenengagedtoprovidehealthandwelfareservices;c)Wherethenatureoftheworkrequiresthemanualskillanddexterityofwomenworkersandthesamecannotbeperformedwithequalefficiencybymaleworkers.
Specifically,inclausec,womeningenderedoccupationsareatahighriskofdiscriminationandexploitation.Thereisnolawdeterminingworkthatrequiresmanualskillordexterityonlypossessedbywomen.
18Omelaniuk,Irina(2012).GlobalPerspectivesinMigrationandDevelopment.p45.19ThePhilippinesandtheTrans-PacificPartnership:aReadinessAssessment.https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/2the_philippines_and_the_tpp-_a_readiness_assessment.pdf20referstoworktakingplacebetween10pm-6aminindustrialsettings,and12am-6amincommercialsettings.
Chapter5
RESULTSANDDISCUSSION
Ofthefourfoundationalworkers’rightsoutlinedinsection19.3oftheTPP,allfourhad
violationsinlawand/orpractice.Myresearchfound13instanceswheretheTPPprovisionswerefoundinconsistentwithPhilippinelaborlaw.Themostproblematicfindingswerethatofenforceabilityandlanguage.WhiletheTPPincludesworkers’rightsundertheILODeclaration,thetextfailstoclarifytheobligationsofthepartiestoadheretotheseprincipals,jeopardizingtheefficacyofimplementation,monitoringandenforcement.
FreedomofAssociationisespeciallythreatenedundertheDuterteadministration.Theadministration’ssweepinganti-drugcampaignisinternationallycriticizedforitsmasshumanrightsviolations,notonlyforitslackofdueprocess,butalsoforitsbrutalityandlinktopoliticallymotivatedkillings.Withanextensivehistoryofpoliticalcorruptionandtheuseofparamilitaryforcesagainsttargetedpeople/organizations,disappearancesamongunionoragriculturalleadershavebeenmetwithinsufficientinvestigation.Nosingularcentralizeduniondatabaseforthecountrydrivesunionstoimploretheuseofthemediatocallaccountabilitytoabductionsandkillingsoflaborleaders.InSeptemberof2016,laborgroupsPartidoManggagawa(PM)andPhilippineAirlinesEmployeesAssociation(PALEA)calledontheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment(DOLE)tostoppoliticalviolenceundertheauspiceoftheanti-drugcampaign.Thegroupsreportedtheassassinationoftwolaborleaders,sixfamers,andtheabductionofaunionofficer.21
Theanalysisoflegaltextsandexamplesofviolationsshowinconsistenciesandcontradictionsatthedomesticlevel;however,thesepartialprotectionsarerarelyenforcedinpracticeabroad.In2011,aclassactionsuitwasfilledagainstarecruitmentagencyanditscorrespondingUSemployerforinvoluntaryservitudeof500OFWstraffickedintoafraudulentemploymentcontact.Workersreportedabusiveandexploitativeworkingconditions,includingwagedeductionsof$2,000-$3,500monthlyforlivingexpensesandsharing100squarefootroomswithuptosixothers.22WorkersfearedorganizingasitviolatedtheircontractandmadenolegalefforttochallengetheiremployeruntilaplatformexplosionthatkilledthreeOFWsandinjuredseveralothers.Aftertheexplosiongainedtheattentionofthemediaandpublic,theworkerscameforwardandfilledthesuiteundertheFairLaborandStandardsAct
Ininstanceslikethis,eachfundamentalrightisviolatedandcanonlybeprotectedwhenmigrantworkershaveaccesstoattaininglegalprotection.Additionally,challenginganemployermysubjecttheworkertodiscrimination,abuse,orlossofemployment.WhileOFW’sareprotectedbybothPhilippineLawandTPPLaborProvisions,thereareexclusionsinUSlegislationforspecificsectors,suchasdomesticwork.TheUSisundernoobligationtoamend
21RallyistsaskDOLEtoactonkillingsofunionists,endoatPAL.http://partidongmanggagawa2001.blogspot.com.au/2016/09/labor-groups-calls-for-task-force-vs.html22Schleifstein,Mark.2012.“Filipinoex-employeessayGrandIsleShipyardpressedtheminto'involuntaryservitude'”http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/11/grand_isle_shipyard_charged_wi.html
thisasitdoesnotaffecttradeorinvestment23OFW’sareconsideredasapartoftheworkforceoftheiremployer’scountry,makingenforcementofrightsnearlyimpossibleoverseas.
Similarly,countrieswithpoorworkers’rightsrecordsareheldtovagueTPPstandardsandareundernoobligationtochangeexistinglegislationnotexplicitlyoutlinedintheconsistencyplans.InMalaysia,TheUSDepartmentofLabor(DOL)reportsthatchildlaborisprominentinsectorswithhighratesofforcedlabor,suchagarment,electronicsandpalmoilsectors.Despitelegalbarriers,prevalenceofchildtraffickingisstillanareaofhighconcern.TheUSDepartmentofState2015TraffickinginPersonsReportplacesMalaysiaonaTier2watchlist,citingMalaysiaasadestinationcountryformen,women,andchildrensubjectedtoforcedlabor,withwomenandchildrensubjecttosextrafficking(State.gov,2015).TheILO’sDecentWorkCountryProfilealsositesissueswithchildlaborindomesticandoverseaswork.
OFWsabroadinTPPCountrieswillcontinuetofacediscriminationdespitetheprovisionsinthelaborchapter.Forexample,TheTradeUnionsActinSingaporebansOFWsfroma)servingasanationalorbranchofficerofatradeunionunlesspriorwrittenapprovalisreceivedfromtheMinisterb)becominganemployeeofatradeunionwithoutpriorwrittenagreementfromtheMinister,andc)serveasatrusteeofatradeunionwithouttheMinister'swrittenpermission.Likewise,theNationalWageGuidelinesexcludealldomesticworkers,andisinfullcompliancewithTPPlaborprovisions.Approximately180,000migrantdomesticworkersareestimatedtobeexcludedfromtheseprotectionsguaranteedtootherworkers,suchasaweeklydayoff,limitsonworkinghours,annualleave,paidholidays,andcapsonsalarydeductions(ITUC,2016).
Astheregulatorybodyofworkers’rights,theILOaimstoprotect“theinterestsofworkersemployedincountriesotherthantheirownwithnoqualificationastotheirimmigrationstatus.Inprinciple,unlessotherwisestated,allinternationallaborstandardscoverallworkersirrespectiveoftheirnationalityorimmigrationstatus”(ILO,2011).Similarly,thePhilippineConstitutioncontainsguaranteestoafford“fullprotectiontolabor,localandoverseas,organizedandunorganized,andpromotefullemploymentandequalityofemploymentopportunitiesforall”.
Despitewhatmayseemlikeabeneficialoverlapinprotections,theresultssuggestalackofabilityorpoliticalwillfromthePhilippinestoaddressthegapinprotectionsoflabor-receivingcountriesforOFWs,citingverylittleapplicationoftheILOdeclarationtomigrantworkers.Furthermore,thePhilippineshasnotsustainablystrengtheneditsinfrastructuretoadequatelyhandlecasesagainstOFWrightsviolations.Howeverrobustthemigrationmanagementnetworkmaybe,itcontinuestostruggleinitsdeliveryofrightstoitsworker’sabroad.
23Article19.5:EnforcementofLabourLaws.NoPartyshallfailtoeffectivelyenforceitslabourlawsthroughasustainedorrecurringcourseofactionorinactioninamanneraffectingtradeorinvestmentbetweenthePartiesafterthedateofentryintoforceofthisAgreement.
Limitationsofthestudyandfuturestudy
Thestudywascertainlylimitedinmanyregards;first,therewasalackofaccuratedataonOFWs,withmostofthedatabasedoffestimatesthroughoutboundprocessingandsurveys.Neitherofthesemethodsofdatacollectionaccountedforworkersthatarenotlegallyrecruitedorhavelegalcontracts,weakeningtheaccuracyofOFWdatainrelationtoILOstandards.Typically,themostvulnerablepopulations(children,women,domesticworkers)arepronetotheuseofillicitemploymentchannels,andaresubjecttoemploymentwithoutanyworkingstandards.Oneareaoffuturestudywouldbetoidentifyadvocacyorganizationsatthelocallevelofmembercountriesandcreateadatabank.
AnotherlimitationwasthevaryingmethodsofcollectinginformationonOFWrights.Twooftheworkers’rightsframeworksrelieduponunionrepresentation,thisassumesthata)worker’srightscanonlybeenforcedandmonitoredthroughunions,b)thatunionleadersprovideaccuratedataforthegroupstheyrepresentandc)thattheunionsincludedarearepresentativesampleoftheentireworkforce.OFWsabroadoftenorganizeinformally,withnoassociationtoformalunions,excludingthispopulationfromrepresentationandaccesstounionprotections.FutureinquiryintointernationalorganizinganddatacollectionwouldcontributetoamoreaccuratedepictionofOFWrights.
Finally,theoverseasdocumentationofmigrantworkerabusesissparseandbarelyreportedbacktotheworkers’countryoforigin.Thoughdocumentedcasesofabuseexist,thePhilippinesgovernmentishardlytransparentinreportingthesetothepublicanddonotdiscloseanydetailsontheirwebsite.Finally,additionalresearchcanbedoneinotherlaborreceivingcountriesthatareincludedintheTPP,providingabroaderrangeofcasestudies,indicatinglong-termandcross-countrytrends.
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APPENDIX
Table1 Workers’RightsAnalysisFrameworksBox1 Summaryof1998ILODeclarationonFundamentalPrinciplesandRightsatWorkAppendixi Section19.3oftheTrans-PacificPartnership-LabourRightsAppendixii SelectedarticlesfromtheLaborCodeofthePhilippinesAppendixiii SelectedsectionsfromtheMigrantWorkers’Act(1995)
Table1 Workers’RightsAnalysisFrameworks
Box1 Summaryof1998ILODeclarationonFundamentalPrinciplesandRightsatWork
Article19.3:LabourRights1.EachPartyshalladoptandmaintaininitsstatutesandregulations,andpracticesthereunder,thefollowingrightsasstatedintheILODeclaration24,25:
(a)freedomofassociationandtheeffectiverecognitionoftherighttocollectivebargaining;(b)theeliminationofallformsofforcedorcompulsorylabour;(c)theeffectiveabolitionofchildlabourand,forthepurposesofthisAgreement,aprohibitionontheworstformsofchildlabour;and(d)theeliminationofdiscriminationinrespectofemploymentandoccupation.
2.EachPartyshalladoptandmaintainstatutesandregulations,andpracticesthereunder,governingacceptableconditionsofworkwithrespecttominimumwages,hoursofwork,andoccupationalsafetyandhealth.2624TheobligationssetoutinArticle19.3(LabourRights),astheyrelatetotheILO,referonlytotheILODeclaration.25ToestablishaviolationofanobligationunderArticle19.3.1(LabourRights)orArticle19.3.2,aPartymustdemonstratethattheotherPartyhasfailedtoadoptormaintainastatute,regulationorpracticeinamanneraffectingtradeorinvestmentbetweentheParties.26Forgreatercertainty,thisobligationrelatestotheestablishmentbyaPartyinitsstatutes,regulationsandpracticesthereunder,ofacceptableconditionsofworkasdeterminedbythatParty.
Appendixii-SelectedarticlesfromtheLaborCodeofthePhilippines
Art.231.Registryofunionsandfileofcollectivebargainingagreements.TheBureaushallkeeparegistryoflegitimatelabororganizations.TheBureaushallalsomaintainafileofallcollectivebargainingagreementsandotherrelatedagreementsandrecordsofsettlementoflabordisputesandcopiesofordersanddecisionsofvoluntaryarbitrators.ThefileshallbeopenandaccessibletointerestedpartiesunderconditionsprescribedbytheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment,providedthatnospecificinformationsubmittedinconfidenceshallbedisclosedunlessauthorizedbytheSecretary,orwhenitisatissueinanyjudiciallitigation,orwhenpublicinterestornationalsecuritysorequires.
Withinthirty(30)daysfromtheexecutionofaCollectiveBargainingAgreement,thepartiesshallsubmitcopiesofthesamedirectlytotheBureauortheRegionalOfficesoftheDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentforregistration,accompaniedwithverifiedproofsofitspostingintwoconspicuousplacesintheplaceofworkandratificationbythemajorityofalltheworkersinthebargainingunit.TheBureauorRegionalOfficesshallactupontheapplicationforregistrationofsuchCollectiveBargainingAgreementwithinfive(5)calendardaysfromreceiptthereof.TheRegionalOfficesshallfurnishtheBureauwithacopyoftheCollectiveBargainingAgreementwithinfive(5)daysfromitssubmission.
TheBureauorRegionalOfficeshallassesstheemployerforeveryCollectiveBargaining
Agreementaregistrationfeeofnotlessthanonethousandpesos(P1,000.00)orinanyotheramountasmaybedeemedappropriateandnecessarybytheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentfortheeffectiveandefficientadministrationoftheVoluntaryArbitrationProgram.AnyamountcollectedunderthisprovisionshallaccruetotheSpecialVoluntaryArbitrationFund.
TheBureaushallalsomaintainafileandshallundertakeorassistinthepublicationofallfinaldecisions,ordersandawardsoftheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment,RegionalDirectorsandtheCommission.(AsamendedbySection15,RepublicActNo.6715,March21,1989)Art.234.Requirementsofregistration.Anyapplicantlabororganization,associationorgroupofunionsorworkersshallacquirelegalpersonalityandshallbeentitledtotherightsandprivilegesgrantedbylawtolegitimatelabororganizationsuponissuanceofthecertificateofregistrationbasedonthefollowingrequirements.
1. Fiftypesos(P50.00)registrationfee;
2. Thenamesofitsofficers,theiraddresses,theprincipaladdressofthelabororganization,theminutesoftheorganizationalmeetingsandthelistoftheworkerswhoparticipatedinsuchmeetings;
3. Thenamesofallitsmemberscomprisingatleasttwentypercent(20%)ofalltheemployeesinthebargainingunitwhereitseekstooperate;(AsamendedbyExecutiveOrderNo.111,
December24,1986)
4. Iftheapplicantunionhasbeeninexistenceforoneormoreyears,copiesofitsannualfinancialreports;and
5. Four(4)copiesoftheconstitutionandby-lawsoftheapplicantunion,minutesofitsadoptionorratification,andthelistofthememberswhoparticipatedinit.(AsamendedbyBatasPambansaBilang130,August21,1981)
Art.237.Additionalrequirementsforfederationsornationalunions.SubjecttoArticle238,iftheapplicantforregistrationisafederationoranationalunion,itshall,inadditiontotherequirementsoftheprecedingArticles,submitthefollowing:
1. Proofoftheaffiliationofatleastten(10)localsorchapters,eachofwhichmustbeadulyrecognizedcollectivebargainingagentintheestablishmentorindustryinwhichitoperates,supportingtheregistrationofsuchapplicantfederationornationalunion;and
2. Thenamesandaddressesofthecompanieswherethelocalsorchaptersoperateandthelistofallthemembersineachcompanyinvolved.
Art.239.Groundsforcancellationofunionregistration.Thefollowingshallconstitutegroundsforcancellationofunionregistration:
1. Misrepresentation,falsestatementorfraudinconnectionwiththeadoptionorratificationoftheconstitutionandby-lawsoramendmentsthereto,theminutesofratificationandthelistofmemberswhotookpartintheratification;
2. Failuretosubmitthedocumentsmentionedintheprecedingparagraphwithinthirty(30)daysfromadoptionorratificationoftheconstitutionandby-lawsoramendmentsthereto;
3. Misrepresentation,falsestatementsorfraudinconnectionwiththeelectionofofficers,minutesoftheelectionofofficers,thelistofvoters,orfailuretosubmitthesedocumentstogetherwiththelistofthenewlyelected/appointedofficersandtheirpostaladdresseswithinthirty(30)daysfromelection;
4. FailuretosubmittheannualfinancialreporttotheBureauwithinthirty(30)daysaftertheclosingofeveryfiscalyearandmisrepresentation,falseentriesorfraudinthepreparationofthefinancialreportitself;
5. Actingasalaborcontractororengaginginthe"cabo"system,orotherwiseengaginginanyactivityprohibitedbylaw;
6. Enteringintocollectivebargainingagreementswhichprovidetermsandconditionsofemploymentbelowminimumstandardsestablishedbylaw;
7. Askingfororacceptingattorney’sfeesornegotiationfeesfromemployers;
8. OtherthanformandatoryactivitiesunderthisCode,checkingoffspecialassessmentsoranyotherfeeswithoutdulysignedindividualwrittenauthorizationsofthemembers;
9. FailuretosubmitlistofindividualmemberstotheBureauonceayearorwheneverrequiredbytheBureau;and
10. FailuretocomplywithrequirementsunderArticles237and238.Art.241.Rightsandconditionsofmembershipinalabororganization.Thefollowingaretherightsandconditionsofmembershipinalabororganization:
1. Noarbitraryorexcessiveinitiationfeesshallberequiredofthemembersofalegitimatelabororganizationnorshallarbitrary,excessiveoroppressivefineandforfeiturebeimposed;
2. Themembersshallbeentitledtofullanddetailedreportsfromtheirofficersandrepresentativesofallfinancialtransactionsasprovidedforintheconstitutionandby-lawsoftheorganization;
3. Themembersshalldirectlyelecttheirofficers,includingthoseofthenationalunionorfederation,towhichtheyortheirunionisaffiliated,bysecretballotatintervalsoffive(5)years.Noqualificationrequirementsforcandidacytoanypositionshallbeimposedotherthanmembershipingoodstandinginsubjectlabororganization.ThesecretaryoranyotherresponsibleunionofficershallfurnishtheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentwithalistofthenewly-electedofficers,togetherwiththeappointiveofficersoragentswhoareentrustedwiththehandlingoffunds,withinthirty(30)calendardaysaftertheelectionofofficersorfromtheoccurrenceofanychangeinthelistofofficersofthelabororganization;(AsamendedbySection16,RepublicActNo.6715,March21,1989)
4. Themembersshalldeterminebysecretballot,afterduedeliberation,anyquestionofmajorpolicyaffectingtheentiremembershipoftheorganization,unlessthenatureoftheorganizationorforcemajeurerenderssuchsecretballotimpractical,inwhichcase,theboardofdirectorsoftheorganizationmaymakethedecisioninbehalfofthegeneralmembership;
5. Nolabororganizationshallknowinglyadmitasmembersorcontinueinmembershipanyindividualwhobelongstoasubversiveorganizationorwhoisengageddirectlyorindirectlyinanysubversiveactivity;
6. Nopersonwhohasbeenconvictedofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitudeshallbeeligibleforelectionasaunionofficerorforappointmenttoanypositionintheunion;
7. Noofficer,agentormemberofalabororganizationshallcollectanyfees,dues,orothercontributionsinitsbehalformakeanydisbursementofitsmoneyorfundsunlessheisdulyauthorizedpursuanttoitsconstitutionandby-laws;
8. Everypaymentoffees,duesorothercontributionsbyamembershallbeevidencedbyareceiptsignedbytheofficeroragentmakingthecollectionandenteredintotherecordofthe
organizationtobekeptandmaintainedforthepurpose;
9. Thefundsoftheorganizationshallnotbeappliedforanypurposeorobjectotherthanthoseexpresslyprovidedbyitsconstitutionandby-lawsorthoseexpresslyauthorizedbywrittenresolutionadoptedbythemajorityofthemembersatageneralmeetingdulycalledforthepurpose;
10. Everyincomeorrevenueoftheorganizationshallbeevidencedbyarecordshowingitssource,andeveryexpenditureofitsfundsshallbeevidencedbyareceiptfromthepersontowhomthepaymentismade,whichshallstatethedate,placeandpurposeofsuchpayment.Suchrecordorreceiptshallformpartofthefinancialrecordsoftheorganization.Anyactioninvolvingthefundsoftheorganizationshallprescribeafterthree(3)yearsfromthedateofsubmissionoftheannualfinancialreporttotheDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentorfromthedatethesameshouldhavebeensubmittedasrequiredbylaw,whichevercomesearlier:Provided,ThatthisprovisionshallapplyonlytoalegitimatelabororganizationwhichhassubmittedthefinancialreportrequirementsunderthisCode:Provided,further,thatfailureofanylabororganizationtocomplywiththeperiodicfinancialreportsrequiredbylawandsuchrulesandregulationspromulgatedthereundersix(6)monthsaftertheeffectivityofthisActshallautomaticallyresultinthecancellationofunionregistrationofsuchlabororganization;(AsamendedbySection16,RepublicActNo.6715,March21,1989)
11. Theofficersofanylabororganizationshallnotbepaidanycompensationotherthanthesalariesandexpensesduetotheirpositionsasspecificallyprovidedforinitsconstitutionandby-laws,orinawrittenresolutiondulyauthorizedbyamajorityofallthemembersatageneralmembershipmeetingdulycalledforthepurpose.TheminutesofthemeetingandthelistofparticipantsandballotscastshallbesubjecttoinspectionbytheSecretaryofLabororhisdulyauthorizedrepresentatives.Anyirregularitiesintheapprovaloftheresolutionsshallbeagroundforimpeachmentorexpulsionfromtheorganization;
12. Thetreasurerofanylabororganizationandeveryofficerthereofwhoisresponsiblefortheaccountofsuchorganizationorforthecollection,management,disbursement,custodyorcontrolofthefunds,moneysandotherpropertiesoftheorganization,shallrendertotheorganizationandtoitsmembersatrueandcorrectaccountofallmoneysreceivedandpaidbyhimsinceheassumedofficeorsincethelastdayonwhichherenderedsuchaccount,andofallbonds,securitiesandotherpropertiesoftheorganizationentrustedtohiscustodyorunderhiscontrol.Therenderingofsuchaccountshallbemade:
1. Atleastonceayearwithinthirty(30)daysafterthecloseofitsfiscalyear;
2. Atsuchothertimesasmayberequiredbyaresolutionofthemajorityofthemembersoftheorganization;and
3. Uponvacatinghisoffice.
TheaccountshallbedulyauditedandverifiedbyaffidavitandacopythereofshallbefurnishedtheSecretaryofLabor.
13. Thebooksofaccountsandotherrecordsofthefinancialactivitiesofanylabororganizationshallbeopentoinspectionbyanyofficerormemberthereofduringofficehours;
14. Nospecialassessmentorotherextraordinaryfeesmaybelevieduponthemembersofalabororganizationunlessauthorizedbyawrittenresolutionofamajorityofallthemembersinageneralmembershipmeetingdulycalledforthepurpose.Thesecretaryoftheorganizationshallrecordtheminutesofthemeetingincludingthelistofallmemberspresent,thevotescast,thepurposeofthespecialassessmentorfeesandtherecipientofsuchassessmentorfees.Therecordshallbeattestedtobythepresident.
15. OtherthanformandatoryactivitiesundertheCode,nospecialassessments,attorney’sfees,negotiationfeesoranyotherextraordinaryfeesmaybecheckedofffromanyamountduetoanemployeewithoutanindividualwrittenauthorizationdulysignedbytheemployee.Theauthorizationshouldspecificallystatetheamount,purposeandbeneficiaryofthededuction;and
16. Itshallbethedutyofanylabororganizationanditsofficerstoinformitsmembersontheprovisionsofitsconstitutionandby-laws,collectivebargainingagreement,theprevailinglaborrelationssystemandalltheirrightsandobligationsunderexistinglaborlaws.
Forthispurpose,registeredlabororganizationsmayassessreasonableduestofinancelaborrelationsseminarsandotherlaboreducationactivities.Anyviolationoftheaboverightsandconditionsofmembershipshallbeagroundforcancellationofunionregistrationorexpulsionofofficersfromoffice,whicheverisappropriate.Atleastthirtypercent(30%)ofthemembersofaunionoranymemberormembersspeciallyconcernedmayreportsuchviolationtotheBureau.TheBureaushallhavethepowertohearanddecideanyreportedviolationtometetheappropriatepenalty.Criminalandcivilliabilitiesarisingfromviolationsofaboverightsandconditionsofmembershipshallcontinuetobeunderthejurisdictionofordinarycourts.Art.245.Ineligibilityofmanagerialemployeestojoinanylabororganization;rightofsupervisoryemployees.Managerialemployeesarenoteligibletojoin,assistorformanylabororganization.Supervisoryemployeesshallnotbeeligibleformembershipinalabororganizationoftherank-and-fileemployeesbutmayjoin,assistorformseparatelabororganizationsoftheirown.(AsamendedbySection18,RepublicActNo.6715,March21,1989)Art.269.Prohibitionagainstaliens;exceptions.Allaliens,naturalorjuridical,aswellasforeignorganizationsarestrictlyprohibitedfromengagingdirectlyorindirectlyinallformsoftradeunionactivitieswithoutprejudicetonormalcontactsbetweenPhilippinelaborunionsandrecognizedinternationallaborcenters:Provided,however,ThataliensworkinginthecountrywithvalidpermitsissuedbytheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment,mayexercisetherighttoself-organizationandjoinorassistlabororganizationsoftheirownchoosingforpurposesofcollectivebargaining:Provided,further,ThatsaidaliensarenationalsofacountrywhichgrantsthesameorsimilarrightstoFilipinoworkers.(AsamendedbySection29,RepublicActNo.6715,March21,1989)
Appendixiii-SelectedsectionsfromtheMigrantWorkers’Act(1995)Rule1,Section1.GuaranteesofMigrantWorkers’Rights.TheStateshallallowthedeploymentofOFWsonlyincountrieswheretherightsofFilipinomigrantworkersareprotected.ThegovernmentrecognizesanyofthefollowingasaguaranteeonthepartofthereceivingcountryfortheprotectionoftherightsofOFWs:
(a) Ithasexistinglaborandsociallawsprotectingtherightsofworkers,includingmigrantworkers;or
(b) Itisasignatorytoand/oraratifierofmultilateralconventions,declarationsorresolutionsrelatingtotheprotectionofworkers,includingmigrantworkers;or
(c) IthasconcludedabilateralagreementorarrangementwiththegovernmentontheprotectionoftherightsofoverseasFilipinoWorkers;
Provided,thatthereceivingcountryistakingpositiveandconcretemeasurestoprotecttherightsofmigrantworkersinfurtheranceofanyoftheguaranteesundersubparagraphs(a),(b),and(c)hereof.Rule1,Section6,7Definition.-ForpurposesofthisAct,illegalrecruitmentshallmeananyactofcanvassing,enlisting,contracting,transporting,utilizing,hiring,orprocuringworkersandincludesreferring,contractservices,promisingoradvertisingforemploymentabroad,whetherforprofitornot,whenundertakenbynon-licenseeornon-holderofauthoritycontemplatedunderArticle13(f)ofPresidentialDecreeNo.442,asamended,otherwiseknownastheLaborCodeofthePhilippines:Provided,Thatanysuchnon-licenseeornon-holderwho,inanymanner,offersorpromisesforafeeemploymentabroadtotwoormorepersonsshallbedeemedsoengaged.Itshalllikewiseincludethefollowingacts,whethercommittedbyanyperson,whetheranon-licensee,non-holder,licenseeorholderofauthority:
(a)TochargeoracceptdirectlyorindirectlyanyamountgreaterthanthatspecifiedinthescheduleofallowablefeesprescribedbytheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment,ortomakeaworkerpayoracknowledgeanyamountgreaterthanthatactuallyreceivedbyhimasaloanoradvance;(b)Tofurnishorpublishanyfalsenoticeorinformationordocumentinrelationtorecruitmentoremployment;(c)Togiveanyfalsenotice,testimony,informationordocumentorcommitanyactofmisrepresentationforthepurposeofsecuringalicenseorauthorityundertheLaborCode,orforthepurposeofdocumentinghiredworkerswiththePOEA,whichincludetheactofreprocessingworkersthroughajoborderthatpertainstononexistentwork,workdifferentfromtheactualoverseaswork,orworkwithadifferentemployerwhetherregisteredornotwiththePOEA;
(d)Toincludeorattempttoinduceaworkeralreadyemployedtoquithisemploymentinordertoofferhimanotherunlessthetransferisdesignedtoliberateaworkerfromoppressivetermsandconditionsofemployment;(e)Toinfluenceorattempttoinfluenceanypersonorentitynottoemployanyworkerwhohasnotappliedforemploymentthroughhisagencyorwhohasformed,joinedorsupported,orhascontactedorissupportedbyanyunionorworkers'organization;(f)ToengageintherecruitmentorplacementofworkersinjobsharmfultopublichealthormoralityortothedignityoftheRepublicofthePhilippines;(h)Tofailtosubmitreportsonthestatusofemployment,placementvacancies,remittanceofforeignexchangeearnings,separationfromjobs,departuresandsuchothermattersorinformationasmayberequiredbytheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment;(i)Tosubstituteoraltertotheprejudiceoftheworker,employmentcontractsapprovedandverifiedbytheDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentfromthetimeofactualsigningthereofbythepartiesuptoandincludingtheperiodoftheexpirationofthesamewithouttheapprovaloftheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment;(j)ForanofficeroragentofarecruitmentorplacementagencytobecomeanofficerormemberoftheBoardofanycorporationengagedintravelagencyortobeengageddirectlyorindirectlyinthemanagementoftravelagency;(k)Towithholdordenytraveldocumentsfromapplicantworkersbeforedepartureformonetaryorfinancialconsiderations,orforanyotherreasons,otherthanthoseauthorizedundertheLaborCodeanditsimplementingrulesandregulations;(l)FailuretoactuallydeployacontractedworkerwithoutvalidreasonasdeterminedbytheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment;(m)Failuretoreimburseexpensesincurredbytheworkerinconnectionwithhisdocumentationandprocessingforpurposesofdeployment,incaseswherethedeploymentdoesnotactuallytakeplacewithouttheworker'sfault.Illegalrecruitmentwhencommittedbyasyndicateorinlargescaleshallbeconsideredanoffenseinvolvingeconomicsabotage;and(n)Toallowanon-Filipinocitizentoheadormanagealicensedrecruitment/manningagency.
Illegalrecruitmentisdeemedcommittedbyasyndicateifcarriedoutbyagroupofthree(3)ormorepersonsconspiringorconfederatingwithoneanother.Itisdeemedcommittedinlargescaleifcommittedagainstthree(3)ormorepersonsindividuallyorasagroup.Inadditiontotheactsenumeratedabove,itshallalsobeunlawfulforanypersonorentitytocommitthefollowingprohibitedacts:
(1)GrantaloantoanoverseasFilipinoworkerwithinterestexceedingeightpercent(8%)perannum,whichwillbeusedforpaymentoflegalandallowableplacementfeesandmakethe
migrantworkerissue,eitherpersonallyorthroughaguarantororaccommodationparty,postdatedchecksinrelationtothesaidloan;(2)ImposeacompulsoryandexclusivearrangementwherebyanoverseasFilipinoworkerisrequiredtoavailofaloanonlyfromspecificallydesignatedinstitutions,entitiesorpersons;(3)RefusetocondoneorrenegotiatealoanincurredbyanoverseasFilipinoworkerafterthelatter'semploymentcontracthasbeenprematurelyterminatedthroughnofaultofhisorherown;(4)ImposeacompulsoryandexclusivearrangementwherebyanoverseasFilipinoworkerisrequiredtoundergohealthexaminationsonlyfromspecificallydesignatedmedicalclinics,institutions,entitiesorpersons,exceptinthecaseofaseafarerwhosemedicalexaminationcostisshoulderedbytheprincipal/shipowner;(5)ImposeacompulsoryandexclusivearrangementwherebyanoverseasFilipinoworkerisrequiredtoundergotraining,seminar,instructionorschoolingofanykindonlyfromspecificallydesignatedinstitutions,entitiesorpersons,exceptfprrecommendatorytrainingsmandatedbyprincipals/shipownerswherethelattershoulderthecostofsuchtrainings;(6)Forasuspendedrecruitment/manningagencytoengageinanykindofrecruitmentactivityincludingtheprocessingofpendingworkers'applications;and(7)Forarecruitment/manningagencyoraforeignprincipal/employertopassontheoverseasFilipinoworkerordeductfromhisorhersalarythepaymentofthecostofinsurancefees,premiumorotherinsurancerelatedcharges,asprovidedunderthecompulsoryworker'sinsurancecoverage.
Thepersonscriminallyliablefortheaboveoffensesaretheprincipals,accomplicesandaccessories.Incaseofjuridicalpersons,theofficershavingownership,control,managementordirectionoftheirbusinesswhoareresponsibleforthecommissionoftheoffenseandtheresponsibleemployees/agentsthereofshallbeliable.Inthefilingofcasesforillegalrecruitmentoranyoftheprohibitedactsunderthissection,theSecretaryofLaborandEmployment,thePOEAAdministratorortheirdulyauthorizedrepresentatives,oranyaggrievedpersonmayinitiatethecorrespondingcriminalactionwiththeappropriateoffice.Forthispurpose,theaffidavitsandtestimoniesofoperativesorpersonnelfromtheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment,POEAandotherlawenforcementagencieswhowitnessedtheactsconstitutingtheoffenseshallbesufficienttoprosecutetheaccused.Intheprosecutionofoffensespunishableunderthissection,thepublicprosecutorsoftheDepartmentofJusticeshallcollaboratewiththeanti-illegalrecruitmentbranchofthePOEAand,incertaincases,allowthePOEAlawyerstotaketheleadintheprosecution.ThePOEAlawyerswhoactasprosecutorsinsuchcasesshallbeentitledtoreceiveadditionalallowancesasmaybedeterminedbythePOEAAdministrator.
ThefilingofanoffensepunishableunderthisActshallbewithoutprejudicetothefilingofcasespunishableunderotherexistinglaws,rulesorregulations."1avvphi1Section6.Section7ofRepublicActNo.8042,asamended,isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:SEC.7.Penalties.–
(a)Anypersonfoundguiltyofillegalrecruitmentshallsufferthepenaltyofimprisonmentofnotlessthantwelve(12)yearsandone(1)daybutnotmorethantwenty(20)yearsandafineofnotlessthanOnemillionpesos(P1,000,000.00)normorethanTwomillionpesos(P2,000,000.00).(b)ThepenaltyoflifeimprisonmentandafineofnotlessthanTwomillionpesos(P2,000,000.00)normorethanFivemillionpesos(P5,000,000.00)shallbeimposedifillegalrecruitmentconstituteseconomicsabotageasdefinedtherein.Provided,however,Thatthemaximumpenaltyshallbeimposedifthepersonillegallyrecruitedislessthaneighteen(18)yearsofageorcommittedbyanon-licenseeornon-holderofauthority.(c)Anypersonfoundguiltyofanyoftheprohibitedactsshallsufferthepenaltyofimprisonmentofnotlessthansix(6)yearsandone(1)daybutnotmorethantwelve(12)yearsandafineofnotlessthanFivehundredthousandpesos(P500,000.00)normorethanOnemillionpesos(P1,000,000.00).
Iftheoffenderisanalien,heorsheshall,inadditiontothepenaltieshereinprescribed,bedeportedwithoutfurtherproceedings.
Ineverycase,convictionshallcauseandcarrytheautomaticrevocationofthelicenseorregistrationoftherecruitment/manningagency,lendinginstitutions,trainingschoolormedicalclinic.
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