38
G.R. Nos. L-10817-18 February 28, 1958ENRIQUE
LOPEZ,petitioner,vs.VICENTE OROSA, JR., and PLAZA THEATRE,
INC.,respondents.Nicolas Belmonte and Benjamin T. de Peralta for
petitioner.Tolentino & Garcia and D. R. Cruz for respondent
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. Jose B. Macatangay for respondent Plaza
Theatre, Inc.FELIX,J.:Enrique Lopez is a resident of Balayan,
Batangas, doing business under the trade name of Lopez-Castelo
Sawmill. Sometime in May, 1946, Vicente Orosa, Jr., also a resident
of the same province, dropped at Lopez' house and invited him to
make an investment in the theatre business. It was intimated that
Orosa, his family and close friends were organizing a corporation
to be known as Plaza Theatre, Inc., that would engage in such
venture. Although Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest of
the same, he agreed to supply the lumber necessary for the
construction of the proposed theatre, and at Orosa's behest and
assurance that the latter would be personally liable for any
account that the said construction might incur, Lopez further
agreed that payment therefor would be on demand and not cash on
delivery basis. Pursuant to said verbal agreement, Lopez delivered
the lumber which was used for the construction of the Plaza Theatre
on May 17, 1946, up to December 4 of the same year. But of the
total cost of the materials amounting to P62,255.85, Lopez was paid
only P20,848.50, thus leaving a balance of P41,771.35.We may state
at this juncture that the Plaza Theatre was erected on a piece of
land with an area of 679.17 square meters formerly owned by Vicente
Orosa, Jr., and was acquired by the corporation on September 25,
1946, for P6,000. As Lopez was pressing Orosa for payment of the
remaining unpaid obligation, the latter and Belarmino Rustia, the
president of the corporation, promised to obtain a bank loan by
mortgaging the properties of the Plaza Theatre., out of which said
amount of P41,771.35 would be satisfied, to which assurance Lopez
had to accede. Unknown to him, however, as early as November, 1946,
the corporation already got a loan for P30,000 from the Philippine
National Bank with the Luzon Surety Company as surety, and the
corporation in turn executed a mortgage on the land and building in
favor of said company as counter-security. As the land at that time
was not yet brought under the operation of the Torrens System, the
mortgage on the same was registered on November 16, 1946, under Act
No. 3344. Subsequently, when the corporation applied for the
registration of the land under Act 496, such mortgage was not
revealed and thus Original Certificate of Title No. O-391 was
correspondingly issued on October 25, 1947, without any encumbrance
appearing thereon.Persistent demand from Lopez for the payment of
the amount due him caused Vicente Orosa, Jr. to execute on March
17, 1947, an alleged "deed of assignment" of his 420 shares of
stock of the Plaza Theater, Inc., at P100 per share or with a total
value of P42,000 in favor of the creditor, and as the obligation
still remained unsettled, Lopez filed on November 12, 1947, a
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Civil Case
No. 4501 which later became R-57) against Vicente Orosa, Jr. and
Plaza Theater, Inc., praying that defendants be sentenced to pay
him jointly and severally the sum of P41,771.35, with legal
interest from the firing of the action; that in case defendants
fail to pay the same, that the building and the land covered by OCT
No. O-391 owned by the corporation be sold at public auction and
the proceeds thereof be applied to said indebtedness; or that the
420 shares of the capital stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc.,
assigned by Vicente Orosa, Jr., to said plaintiff be sold at public
auction for the same purpose; and for such other remedies as may be
warranted by the circumstances. Plaintiff also caused the
annotation of a notice oflis pendenson said properties with the
Register of Deeds.Defendants Vicente Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre,
Inc., filed separate answers, the first denying that the materials
were delivered to him as a promoter and later treasurer of the
corporation, because he had purchased and received the same on his
personal account; that the land on which the movie house was
constructed was not charged with a lien to secure the payment of
the aforementioned unpaid obligation; and that the 420 shares of
stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc., was not assigned to plaintiff as
collaterals but as direct security for the payment of his
indebtedness. As special defense, this defendant contended that as
the 420 shares of stock assigned and conveyed by the assignor and
accepted by Lopez as direct security for the payment of the amount
of P41,771.35 were personal properties, plaintiff was barred from
recovering any deficiency if the proceeds of the sale thereof at
public auction would not be sufficient to cover and satisfy the
obligation. It was thus prayed that he be declared exempted from
the payment of any deficiency in case the proceeds from the sale of
said personal properties would not be enough to cover the amount
sought to be collected.Defendant Plaza Theatre, Inc., on the other
hand, practically set up the same line of defense by alleging that
the building materials delivered to Orosa were on the latter's
personal account; and that there was no understanding that said
materials would be paid jointly and severally by Orosa and the
corporation, nor was a lien charged on the properties of the latter
to secure payment of the same obligation. As special defense,
defendant corporation averred that while it was true that the
materials purchased by Orosa were sold by the latter to the
corporation, such transactions were in good faith and for valuable
consideration thus when plaintiff failed to claim said materials
within 30 days from the time of removal thereof from Orosa, lumber
became a different and distinct specie and plaintiff lost whatever
rights he might have in the same and consequently had no recourse
against the Plaza Theatre, Inc., that the claim could not have been
refectionary credit, for such kind of obligation referred to an
indebtedness incurred in the repair or reconstruction of something
already existing and this concept did not include an entirely new
work; and that the Plaza Theatre, Inc., having been incorporated on
October 14, 1946, it could not have contracted any obligation prior
to said date. It was, therefore, prayed that the complaint be
dismissed; that said defendant be awarded the sum P 5,000 for
damages, and such other relief as may be just and proper in the
premises.The surety company, in the meantime, upon discovery that
the land was already registered under the Torrens System and that
there was a notice oflis pendensthereon, filed on August 17, 1948,
or within the 1-year period after the issuance of the certificate
of title, a petition for review of the decree of the land
registration court dated October 18, 1947, which was made the basis
of OCT No. O-319, in order to annotate the rights and interests of
the surety company over said properties (Land Registration Case No.
17 GLRO Rec. No. 296). Opposition thereto was offered by Enrique
Lopez, asserting that the amount demanded by him constituted a
preferred lien over the properties of the obligors; that the surety
company was guilty of negligence when it failed to present an
opposition to the application for registration of the property; and
that if any violation of the rights and interest of said surety
would ever be made, same must be subject to the lien in his
favor.The two cases were heard jointly and in a decision dated
October 30, 1952, the lower Court, after making an exhaustive and
detailed analysis of the respective stands of the parties and the
evidence adduced at the trial, held that defendants Vicente Orosa,
Jr., and the Plaza Theatre, Inc., werejointlyliable for the unpaid
balance of the cost of lumber used in the construction of
thebuildingand the plaintiff thus acquired the materialman's lien
over the same. In making the pronouncement that the lien was merely
confined to the building and did not extend to the land on which
the construction was made, the trial judge took into consideration
the fact that when plaintiff started the delivery of lumber in May,
1946, the land was not yet owned by the corporation; that the
mortgage in favor of Luzon Surety Company was previously registered
under Act No. 3344; that the codal provision (Art. 1923 of the old
Spanish Civil Code) specifying that refection credits are preferred
could refer only to buildings which are also classified as real
properties, upon which said refection was made. It was, however,
declared that plaintiff's lien on the building was superior to the
right of the surety company. And finding that the Plaza Theatre,
Inc., had no objection to the review of the decree issued in its
favor by the land registration court and the inclusion in the title
of the encumbrance in favor of the surety company, the courta
quogranted the petition filed by the latter company. Defendants
Orosa and the Plaza Theatre, Inc., were thus required to
payjointlythe amount of P41,771.35 with legal interest and costs
within 90 days from notice of said decision; that in case of
default, the 420 shares of stock assigned by Orosa to plaintiff be
sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof be applied to the
payment of the amount due the plaintiff, plus interest and costs;
and that the encumbrance in favor of the surety company be endorsed
at the back of OCT No. O-391, with notation I that with respect to
the building, said mortgage was subject to the materialman's lien
in favor of Enrique Lopez.Plaintiff tried to secure a modification
of the decision in so far as it declared that the obligation of
therein defendants was joint instead of solidary, and that the lien
did not extend to the land, but same was denied by order the court
of December 23, 1952. The matter was thus appealed to the Court of
appeals, which affirmed the lower court's ruling, and then to this
Tribunal. In this instance, plaintiff-appellant raises 2 issues:
(1) whether a materialman's lien for the value of the materials
used in the construction of a building attaches to said structure
alone and does not extend to the land on which the building is
adhered to; and (2) whether the lower court and the Court of
Appeals erred in not providing that the material mans liens is
superior to the mortgage executed in favor surety company not only
on the building but also on the land.It is to be noted in this
appeal that Enrique Lopez has not raised any question against the
part of the decision sentencing defendants Orosa and Plaza Theatre,
Inc., to payjointlythe sum of P41,771.35, so We will not take up or
consider anything on that point. Appellant, however, contends that
the lien created in favor of the furnisher of the materials used
for the construction, repair or refection of a building, is also
extended to the land which the construction was made, and in
support thereof he relies on Article 1923 of the Spanish Civil
Code, pertinent law on the matter, which reads as follows:ART.
1923. With respect to determinate real property and real rights of
the debtor, the following are preferred:x x x x x x x x x5. Credits
for refection, not entered or recorded,with respect to the estate
upon which the refection was made, and only with respect to other
credits different from those mentioned in four preceding
paragraphs.It is argued that in view of the employment of the
phrase real estate, or immovable property, and inasmuch as said
provision does not contain any specification delimiting the lien to
the building, said article must be construed as to embrace both the
land and the building or structure adhering thereto. We cannot
subscribe to this view, for while it is true that generally, real
estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it
is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and
distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute
real properties1could mean only one thing that a building is by
itself an immovable property, a doctrine already pronounced by this
Court in the case ofLeung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil.,
644. Moreover, and in view of the absence of any specific provision
of law to the contrary, a building is an immovable property,
irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which
it is adhered to belong to the same owner.A close examination of
the provision of the Civil Code invoked by appellant reveals that
the law gives preference to unregistered refectionary credits only
with respect to the real estate upon which the refection or work
was made. This being so, the inevitable conclusion must be that the
lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the
construction or repair of which the obligation was incurred.
Evidently, therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid
value of the lumber used in the construction of the building
attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the
obligors.Considering the conclusion thus arrived at, i.e., that the
materialman's lien could be charged only to the building for which
the credit was made or which received the benefit of refection, the
lower court was right in, holding at the interest of the mortgagee
over the land is superior and cannot be made subject to the said
materialman's lien.Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing
considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellant. It is so ordered.
G.R. Nos. L-10837-38 May 30, 1958ASSOCIATED INSURANCE and SURETY
COMPANY, INC.,plaintiff,vs.ISABEL IYA, ADRIANO VALINO and LUCIA
VALINO,defendants.ISABEL IYA,plaintiff,vs.ADRIANO VALINO, LUCIA
VALINO and ASSOCIATED INSURANCE and SURETY COMPANY.
INC.,defendants.Jovita L. de Dios for defendant Isabel Iya.M. Perez
Cardenas and Apolonio Abola for defendant Associated Insurance and
Surety Co., Inc.FELIX,J.:Adriano Valino and Lucia A. Valino,
husband and wife, were the owners and possessors of a house of
strong materials constructed on Lot No. 3, Block No. 80 of the
Grace Park Subdivision in Caloocan, Rizal, which they purchased on
installment basis from the Philippine Realty Corporation. On
November 6, 1951, to enable her to purchase on credit rice from the
NARIC, Lucia A. Valino filed a bond in the sum of P11,000.00 (AISCO
Bond No. G-971) subscribed by the Associated Insurance and Surety
Co., Inc., and as counter-guaranty therefor, the spouses Valino
executed an allegedchattelmortgage on the aforementioned house in
favor of the surety company, which encumbrance was duly registered
with theChattel Mortgage Register of Rizalon December 6, 1951. It
is admitted that at the time said undertaking took place, the
parcel of land on which the house is erected was still registered
in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation. Having completed
payment on the purchase price of the lot, the Valinos were able to
secure onOctober 18, 1958, a certificate of title in their name
(T.C.T. No. 27884). Subsequently, however, oron October 24, 1952,
the Valinos, to secure payment of an indebtedness in the amount of
P12,000.00, executed areal estate mortgageover the lot and the
house in favor of Isabel Iya, which was duly registered and
annotated at the back of the certificate of title.On the other
hand, as Lucia A. Valino, failed to satisfy her obligation to the
NARIC, the surety company was compelled to pay the same pursuant to
the undertaking of the bond. In turn, the surety company demanded
reimbursement from the spouses Valino, and as the latter likewise
failed to do so, the company foreclosed the chattel mortgage over
the house. As a result thereof, a public sale was conducted by the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal onDecember 26, 1952, wherein the
property was awarded to the surety company for P8,000.00, the
highest bid received therefor. The surety company then caused the
said house to be declared in its name for tax purposes (Tax
Declaration No. 25128).Sometime inJuly, 1953, the surety company
learned of the existence of the real estate mortgage over the lot
covered by T.C.T. No. 26884 together with the improvements thereon;
thus, said surety company instituted Civil Case No. 2162 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila naming Adriano and Lucia Valino
and Isabel Iya, the mortgagee, as defendants. The complaint prayed
for the exclusion of the residential house from the real estate
mortgage in favor of defendant Iya and the declaration and
recognition of plaintiff's right to ownership over the same in
virtue of the award given by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal during
the public auction held on December 26, 1952. Plaintiff likewise
asked the Court to sentence the spouses Valino to pay said surety
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs. Defendant
Isabel Iya filed her answer to the complaint alleging among other
things, that in virtue of the real estate mortgage executed by her
co-defendants, she acquired a real right over the lot and the house
constructed thereon; that the auction sale allegedly conducted by
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal as a result of the foreclosure of
thechattelmortgage on the house was null and void for
non-compliance with the form required by law. She, therefore,
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and anullment of the sale
made by the Provincial Sheriff. She also demanded the amount of
P5,000.00 from plaintiff as counterclaim, the sum of P5,000.00 from
her co-defendants as crossclaim, for attorney's fees and
costs.Defendants spouses in their answer admitted some of the
averments of the complaint and denied the others. They, however,
prayed for the dismissal of the action for lack of cause of action,
it being alleged that plaintiff was already the owner of the house
in question, and as said defendants admitted this fact, the claim
of the former was already satisfied.OnOctober 29, 1953, Isabel Iya
filed another civil action against the Valinos and the surety
company (Civil Case No. 2504 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila) stating that pursuant to the contract of mortgage executed
by the spouses Valino on October 24, 1952, the latter undertook to
pay a loan of P12,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum or P120.00
a month, which indebtedness was payable in 4 years, extendible for
only one year; that to secure payment thereof, said defendants
mortgaged the house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. 27884 located at
No. 67 Baltazar St., Grace Park Subdivision, Caloocan, Rizal; that
the Associated Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., was included as a
party defendant because it claimed to have an interest on the
residential house also covered by said mortgage; that it was
stipulated in the aforesaid real estate mortgage that default in
the payment of the interest agreed upon would entitle the mortgagee
to foreclose the same even before the lapse of the 4-year period;
and as defendant spouses had allegedly failed to pay the interest
for more than 6 months, plaintiff prayed the Court to order said
defendants to pay the sum of P12,000.00 with interest thereon at
12% per annum from March 25, 1953, until fully paid; for an
additional sum equivalent to 20% of the total obligation as
damages, and for costs. As an alternative in case such demand may
not be met and satisfied plaintiff prayed for a decree of
foreclosure of the land, building and other improvements thereon to
be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof applied to
satisfy the demands of plaintiff; that the Valinos, the surety
company and any other person claiming interest on the mortgaged
properties be barred and foreclosed of all rights, claims or equity
of redemption in said properties; and for deficiency judgment in
case the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property would be
insufficient to satisfy the claim of plaintiff.Defendant surety
company, in answer to this complaint insisted on its right over the
building, arguing that as the lot on which the house was
constructed did not belong to the spouses at the time the chattel
mortgage was executed, the house might be considered only as a
personal property and that the encumbrance thereof and the
subsequent foreclosure proceedings made pursuant to the provisions
of the Chattel Mortgage Law were proper and legal. Defendant
therefore prayed that said building be excluded from the real
estate mortgage and its right over the same be declared superior to
that of plaintiff, for damages, attorney's fees and costs.Taking
side with the surety company, defendant spouses admitted the due
execution of the mortgage upon the land but assailed the allegation
that the building was included thereon, it being contended that it
was already encumbered in favor of the surety company before the
real estate mortgage was executed, a fact made known to plaintiff
during the preparation of said contract and to which the latter
offered no objection. As a special defense, it was asserted that
the action was premature because the contract was for a period of 4
years, which had not yet elapsed.The two cases were jointly heard
upon agreement of the parties, who submitted the same on a
stipulation of facts, after which the Court rendered judgment dated
March 8, 1956, holding that the chattel mortgage in favor of the
Associated Insurance and Surety Co., Inc., was preferred and
superior over the real estate mortgage subsequently executed in
favor of Isabel Iya. It was ruled that as the Valinos were not yet
the registered owner of the land on which the building in question
was constructed at the time the first encumbrance was made, the
building then was still a personality and a chattel mortgage over
the same was proper. However, as the mortgagors were already the
owner of the land at the time the contract with Isabel Iya was
entered into, the building was transformed into a real property and
the real estate mortgage created thereon was likewise adjudged as
proper. It is to be noted in this connection that there is no
evidence on record to sustain the allegation of the spouses Valino
that at the time they mortgaged theirhouse and lotto Isabel Iya,
the latter was told or knew that part of the mortgaged property,
i.e., thehouse, had previously been mortgaged to the surety
company.The residential building was, therefore, ordered excluded
from the foreclosure prayed for by Isabel Iya, although the latter
could exercise the right of a junior encumbrance. So the spouses
Valino were ordered to pay the amount demanded by said mortgagee or
in their default to have the parcel of land subject of the mortgage
sold at public auction for the satisfaction of Iya's claim.There is
no question as to appellant's right over the land covered by the
real estate mortgage; however, as the building constructed thereon
has been the subject of 2 mortgages; controversy arise as to which
of these encumbrances should receive preference over the other. The
decisive factor in resolving the issue presented by this appeal is
the determination of the nature of the structure litigated upon,
for where it be considered a personality, the foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage and the subsequent sale thereof at public auction,
made in accordance with the Chattel Mortgage Law would be valid and
the right acquired by the surety company therefrom would certainly
deserve prior recognition; otherwise, appellant's claim for
preference must be granted. The lower Court, deciding in favor of
the surety company, based its ruling on the premise that as the
mortgagors were not the owners of the land on which the building is
erected at the time the first encumbrance was made, said structure
partook of the nature of a personal property and could properly be
the subject of a chattel mortgage. We find reason to hold
otherwise, for as this Court, defining the nature or character of a
building, has said:. . . while it is true that generally, real
estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it
is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and
distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute
real properties (Art. 415, new Civil Code) could only mean one
thing that abuilding is byitself an immovable property . . .
Moreover, and in view of the absence of any specific provision to
the contrary,a building is an immovable property irrespective of
whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered
to belong to the same owner. (Lopezvs. Orosa, G.R. Nos.supra, p.
98).A building certainly cannot be divested of its character of a
realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs
to another. To hold it the other way, the possibility is not remote
that it would result in confusion, for to cloak the building with
an uncertain status made dependent on the ownership of the land,
would create a situation where a permanent fixture changes its
nature or character as the ownership of the land changes hands. In
the case at bar, as personal properties could only be the subject
of a chattel mortgage (Section 1, Act 3952) and as obviously the
structure in question is not one, the execution of the chattel
mortgage covering said building is clearly invalid and a nullity.
While it is true that said document was correspondingly registered
in the Chattel Mortgage Register of Rizal, this act produced no
effect whatsoever for where the interest conveyed is in the nature
of a real property, the registration of the document in the
registry of chattels is merely a futile act. Thus, the registration
of the chattel mortgage of a building of strong materials produce
no effect as far as the building is concerned (Leung Yeevs. Strong
Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644). Nor can we give any consideration to
the contention of the surety that it has acquired ownership over
the property in question by reason of the sale conducted by the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, for as this Court has aptly
pronounced:A mortgage creditor who purchases real properties at an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale thereof by virtue of a chattel
mortgage constituted in his favor, which mortgage has been declared
null and void with respect to said real properties, acquires no
right thereto by virtue of said sale (De la Rivavs. Ah Keo, 60
Phil., 899).Wherefore the portion of the decision of the lower
Court in these two cases appealed from holding the rights of the
surety company, over the building superior to that of Isabel Iya
and excluding the building from the foreclosure prayed for by the
latter is reversed and appellant Isabel Iya's right to foreclose
not only the land but also the building erected thereon is hereby
recognized, and the proceeds of the sale thereof at public auction
(if the land has not yet been sold), shall be applied to the
unsatisfied judgment in favor of Isabel Iya. This decision however
is without prejudice to any right that the Associated Insurance and
Surety Co., Inc., may have against the spouses Adriano and Lucia
Valino on account of the mortgage of said building they executed in
favor of said surety company. Without pronouncement as to costs. It
is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-15334 January 31, 1964BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS,
CITY ASSESSOR and CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON
CITY,petitioners,vs.MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,respondent.Assistant
City Attorney Jaime R. Agloro for petitioners.Ross, Selph and
Carrascoso for respondent.PAREDES,J.:From the stipulation of facts
and evidence adduced during the hearing, the following appear:On
October 20, 1902, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 484
which authorized the Municipal Board of Manila to grant a franchise
to construct, maintain and operate an electric street railway and
electric light, heat and power system in the City of Manila and its
suburbs to the person or persons making the most favorable bid.
Charles M. Swift was awarded the said franchise on March 1903, the
terms and conditions of which were embodied in Ordinance No. 44
approved on March 24, 1903. Respondent Manila Electric Co. (Meralco
for short), became the transferee and owner of the
franchise.Meralco's electric power is generated by its
hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls, Laguna and is
transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission
wires, running from the province of Laguna to the said City. These
electric transmission wires which carry high voltage current, are
fastened to insulators attached on steel towers constructed by
respondent at intervals, from its hydro-electric plant in the
province of Laguna to the City of Manila. The respondent Meralco
has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City, on
land belonging to it. A photograph of one of these steel towers is
attached to the petition for review, marked Annex A. Three steel
towers were inspected by the lower court and parties and the
following were the descriptions given there of by said court:The
first steel tower is located in South Tatalon, Espaa Extension,
Quezon City. The findings were as follows: the ground around one of
the four posts was excavated to a depth of about eight (8) feet,
with an opening of about one (1) meter in diameter, decreased to
about a quarter of a meter as it we deeper until it reached the
bottom of the post; at the bottom of the post were two parallel
steel bars attached to the leg means of bolts; the tower proper was
attached to the leg three bolts; with two cross metals to prevent
mobility; there was no concrete foundation but there was adobe
stone underneath; as the bottom of the excavation was covered with
water about three inches high, it could not be determined with
certainty to whether said adobe stone was placed purposely or not,
as the place abounds with this kind of stone; and the tower carried
five high voltage wires without cover or any insulating
materials.The second tower inspected was located in Kamuning Road,
K-F, Quezon City, on land owned by the petitioner approximate more
than one kilometer from the first tower. As in the first tower, the
ground around one of the four legs was excavate from seven to eight
(8) feet deep and one and a half (1-) meters wide. There being very
little water at the bottom, it was seen that there was no concrete
foundation, but there soft adobe beneath. The leg was likewise
provided with two parallel steel bars bolted to a square metal
frame also bolted to each corner. Like the first one, the second
tower is made up of metal rods joined together by means of bolts,
so that by unscrewing the bolts, the tower could be dismantled and
reassembled.The third tower examined is located along Kamias Road,
Quezon City. As in the first two towers given above, the ground
around the two legs of the third tower was excavated to a depth
about two or three inches beyond the outside level of the steel bar
foundation. It was found that there was no concrete foundation.
Like the two previous ones, the bottom arrangement of the legs
thereof were found to be resting on soft adobe, which, probably due
to high humidity, looks like mud or clay. It was also found that
the square metal frame supporting the legs were not attached to any
material or foundation.On November 15, 1955, petitioner City
Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for
real property tax under Tax declaration Nos. 31992 and 15549. After
denying respondent's petition to cancel these declarations, an
appeal was taken by respondent to the Board of Assessment Appeals
of Quezon City, which required respondent to pay the amount of
P11,651.86 as real property tax on the said steel towers for the
years 1952 to 1956. Respondent paid the amount under protest, and
filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA for
short) which rendered a decision on December 29, 1958, ordering the
cancellation of the said tax declarations and the petitioner City
Treasurer of Quezon City to refund to the respondent the sum of
P11,651.86. The motion for reconsideration having been denied, on
April 22, 1959, the instant petition for review was filed.In
upholding the cause of respondents, the CTA held that: (1) the
steel towers come within the term "poles" which are declared exempt
from taxes under part II paragraph 9 of respondent's franchise; (2)
the steel towers are personal properties and are not subject to
real property tax; and (3) the City Treasurer of Quezon City is
held responsible for the refund of the amount paid. These are
assigned as errors by the petitioner in the brief.The tax exemption
privilege of the petitioner is quoted hereunder:PAR 9. The grantee
shall be liable to pay the same taxes upon its real estate,
buildings, plant (not including poles, wires, transformers, and
insulators), machinery and personal property as other persons are
or may be hereafter required by law to pay ... Said percentage
shall be due and payable at the time stated in paragraph nineteen
of Part One hereof, ...and shall be in lieu of all taxes and
assessments of whatsoever nature and by whatsoever authority upon
the privileges, earnings, income, franchise, and poles, wires,
transformers, and insulators of the grantee from which taxes and
assessments the granteeis hereby expressly exempted. (Par. 9, Part
Two, Act No. 484 Respondent's Franchise; emphasis supplied.)The
word "pole" means "a long, comparatively slender usually
cylindrical piece of wood or timber, as typically the stem of a
small tree stripped of its branches; also by extension, a similar
typically cylindrical piece or object of metal or the like". The
term also refers to "anupright standard to the top of which
something is affixed or by which something is supported; as a
dovecote set on a pole; telegraph poles; a tent pole; sometimes,
specifically a vessel's master (Webster's New International
Dictionary 2nd Ed., p. 1907.) Along the streets, in the City of
Manila, may be seen cylindrical metal poles, cubical concrete
poles, and poles of the PLDT Co. which are made of two steel bars
joined together by an interlacing metal rod. They are called
"poles" notwithstanding the fact that they are no made of wood. It
must be noted from paragraph 9, above quoted, that the concept of
the "poles" for which exemption is granted, is not determined by
their place or location, nor by the character of the electric
current it carries, nor the material or form of which it is made,
but the use to which they are dedicated. In accordance with the
definitions, pole is not restricted to a long cylindrical piece of
wood or metal, but includes "upright standards to the top of which
something is affixed or by which something is supported. As
heretofore described, respondent's steel supports consists of a
framework of four steel bars or strips which are bound by steel
cross-arms atop of which are cross-arms supporting five high
voltage transmission wires (See Annex A) and their sole function is
to support or carry such wires.The conclusion of the CTA that the
steel supports in question are embraced in the term "poles" is not
a novelty. Several courts of last resort in the United States have
called these steel supports "steel towers", and they denominated
these supports or towers, as electric poles. In their decisions the
words "towers" and "poles" were used interchangeably, and it is
well understood in that jurisdiction that a transmission tower or
pole means the same thing.In a proceeding to condemn land for the
use of electric power wires, in which the law provided that wires
shall be constructed upon suitablepoles, this term was construed to
mean either wood or metal poles and in view of the land being
subject to overflow, and the necessary carrying of numerous wires
and the distance between poles, the statute was interpreted to
includetowersorpoles. (Stemmons and Dallas Light Co. (Tex) 212 S.W.
222, 224; 32-A Words and Phrases, p. 365.)The term "poles" was also
used to denominate the steel supports or towers used by an
association used to convey its electric power furnished to
subscribers and members, constructed for the purpose of fastening
high voltage and dangerous electric wires alongside public
highways. The steel supports or towers were made of iron or other
metals consisting of two pieces running from the ground up some
thirty feet high, being wider at the bottom than at the top, the
said two metal pieces being connected with criss-cross iron running
from the bottom to the top, constructed like ladders and loaded
with high voltage electricity. In form and structure, they are like
the steel towers in question. (Salt River Valley Users' Ass'n v.
Compton, 8 P. 2nd, 249-250.)The term "poles" was used to denote the
steel towers of an electric company engaged in the generation of
hydro-electric power generated from its plant to the Tower of
Oxford and City of Waterbury. These steel towers are about 15 feet
square at the base and extended to a height of about 35 feet to a
point, and are embedded in the cement foundations sunk in the
earth, the top of which extends above the surface of the soil in
the tower of Oxford, and to the towers are attached insulators,
arms, and other equipment capable of carrying wires for the
transmission of electric power (Connecticut Light and Power Co. v.
Oxford, 101 Conn. 383, 126 Atl. p. 1).In a case, the defendant
admitted that the structure on which a certain person met his death
was built for the purpose of supporting a transmission wire used
for carrying high-tension electric power, but claimed that the
steel towers on which it is carried were so large that their wire
took their structure out of the definition of a pole line. It was
held that in defining the word pole, one should not be governed by
the wire or material of the support used, but was considering the
danger from any elevated wire carrying electric current, and that
regardless of the size or material wire of its individual members,
any continuous series of structures intended and used solely or
primarily for the purpose of supporting wires carrying electric
currents is a pole line (Inspiration Consolidation Cooper Co. v.
Bryan 252 P. 1016).It is evident, therefore, that the word "poles",
as used in Act No. 484 and incorporated in the petitioner's
franchise, should not be given a restrictive and narrow
interpretation, as to defeat the very object for which the
franchise was granted. The poles as contemplated thereon, should be
understood and taken as a part of the electric power system of the
respondent Meralco, for the conveyance of electric current from the
source thereof to its consumers. If the respondent would be
required to employ "wooden poles", or "rounded poles" as it used to
do fifty years back, then one should admit that the Philippines is
one century behind the age of space. It should also be conceded by
now that steel towers, like the ones in question, for obvious
reasons, can better effectuate the purpose for which the
respondent's franchise was granted.Granting for the purpose of
argument that the steel supports or towers in question are not
embraced within the termpoles, the logical question posited is
whether they constituterealproperties, so that they can be subject
to a real property tax. The tax law does not provide for a
definition of real property; but Article 415 of the Civil Code
does, by stating the following are immovable property:(1) Land,
buildings, roads, and constructions of all kindsadheredto the
soil;x x x x x x x x x(3) Everything attached to an immovable in
afixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;x x x
x x x x x x(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works
which may be carried in a building or on a piece of land, and which
tends directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;x x
x x x x x x xThe steel towers or supports in question, do not come
within the objects mentioned in paragraph 1, because they do not
constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. They are
not construction analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil.
As per description, given by the lower court, they are removable
and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts,
which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from
place to place. They can not be included under paragraph 3, as they
are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be
separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration
upon the object to which they are attached. Each of these steel
towers or supports consists of steel bars or metal strips, joined
together by means of bolts, which can be disassembled by unscrewing
the bolts and reassembled by screwing the same. These steel towers
or supports do not also fall under paragraph 5, for they are not
machineries, receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if
they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the land.
Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works in the land in
which the steel supports or towers are constructed.It is finally
contended that the CTA erred in ordering the City Treasurer of
Quezon City to refund the sum of P11,651.86, despite the fact that
Quezon City is not a party to the case. It is argued that as the
City Treasurer is not the real party in interest, but Quezon City,
which was not a party to the suit, notwithstanding its capacity to
sue and be sued, he should not be ordered to effect the refund.
This question has not been raised in the court below, and,
therefore, it cannot be properly raised for the first time on
appeal. The herein petitioner is indulging in legal technicalities
and niceties which do not help him any; for factually, it was he
(City Treasurer) whom had insisted that respondent herein pay the
real estate taxes, which respondent paid under protest. Having
acted in his official capacity as City Treasurer of Quezon City, he
would surely know what to do, under the circumstances.IN VIEW
HEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioners.
G.R. No. L-46245 May 31, 1982MERALCO SECURITIES INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS,
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF LAGUNA and PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF
LAGUNA, respondents.AQUINO,J.:In this special civil action of
certiorari, Meralco Securities Industrial Corporation assails the
decision of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (composed of
the Secretary of Finance as chairman and the Secretaries of Justice
and Local Government and Community Development as members) dated
May 6, 1976, holding that Meralco Securities' oil pipeline is
subject to realty tax.The record reveals that pursuant to a
pipeline concession issued under the Petroleum Act of 1949,
Republic Act No. 387, Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to
Manila a pipeline system consisting of cylindrical steel pipes
joined together and buried not less than one meter below the
surface along the shoulder of the public highway. The portion
passing through Laguna is about thirty kilometers long.The pipes
for white oil products measure fourteen inches in diameter by
thirty-six feet with a maximum capacity of 75,000 barrels daily.
The pipes for fuel and black oil measure sixteen inches by
forty-eight feet with a maximum capacity of 100,000 barrels
daily.The pipes are embedded in the soil and are firmly and solidly
welded together so as to preclude breakage or damage thereto and
prevent leakage or seepage of the oil. The valves are welded to the
pipes so as to make the pipeline system one single piece of
property from end to end.In order to repair, replace, remove or
transfer segments of the pipeline, the pipes have to be cold-cut by
means of a rotary hard-metal pipe-cutter after digging or
excavating them out of the ground where they are buried. In points
where the pipeline traversed rivers or creeks, the pipes were laid
beneath the bed thereof. Hence, the pipes are permanently attached
to the land.However, Meralco Securities notes that segments of the
pipeline can be moved from one place to another as shown in the
permit issued by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
which permit provides that the government reserves the right to
require the removal or transfer of the pipes by and at the
concessionaire's expense should they be affected by any road repair
or improvement.Pursuant to the Assessment Law, Commonwealth Act No.
470, the provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real
property and issued Tax Declarations Nos. 6535-6537, San Pedro;
7473-7478, Cabuyao; 7967-7971, Sta. Rosa; 9882-9885, Bian and
15806-15810, Calamba, containing the assessed values of portions of
the pipeline.Meralco Securities appealed the assessments to the
Board of Assessment Appeals of Laguna composed of the register of
deeds as chairman and the provincial auditor as member. That board
in its decision of June 18, 1975 upheld the assessments (pp. 47-49,
Rollo).Meralco Securities brought the case to the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals. As already stated, that Board, composed of
Acting Secretary of Finance Pedro M. Almanzor as chairman and
Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos and Secretary of Local
Government and Community Development Jose Roo as members, ruled
that the pipeline is subject to realty tax (p. 40, Rollo).A copy of
that decision was served on Meralco Securities' counsel on August
27, 1976. Section 36 of the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential
Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1, 1974, provides that
the Board's decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of
fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision by
the appellant.Under Rule III of the amended rules of procedure of
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (70 O.G. 10085), a party
may ask for the reconsideration of the Board's decision within
fifteen days after receipt. On September 7, 1976 (the eleventh
day), Meralco Securities filed its motion for
reconsideration.Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata and Secretary Roo
(Secretary Abad Santos abstained) denied the motion in a resolution
dated December 2, 1976, a copy of which was received by appellant's
counsel on May 24, 1977 (p. 4, Rollo). On June 6, 1977, Meralco
Securities filed the instant petition for certiorari.The Solicitor
General contends that certiorari is not proper in this case because
the Board acted within its jurisdiction and did not gravely abuse
its discretion and Meralco Securities was not denied due process of
law.Meralco Securities explains that because the Court of Tax
Appeals has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals and because no judicial review of the
Board's decision is provided for in the Real Property Tax Code,
Meralco Securities' recourse is to file a petition for
certiorari.We hold that certiorari was properly availed of in this
case. It is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
whereby the record of a particular case is ordered to be elevated
for review and correction in matters of law (14 C.J.S. 121-122; 14
Am Jur. 2nd 777).The rule is that as to administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial power there is an underlying power in the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law
and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by the
statute (73 C.J.S. 506, note 56)."The purpose of judicial review is
to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and
protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions"
(73 C.J.S. 507, See. 165). The review is a part of the system of
checks and balances which is a limitation on the separation of
powers and which forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications.Judicial review of the decision of an official or
administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial functions is proper
in cases of lack of jurisdiction, error of law, grave abuse of
discretion, fraud or collusion or in case the administrative
decision is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious (Mafinco Trading
Corporation vs. Ople, L-37790, March 25, 1976, 70 SCRA 139, 158;
San Miguel Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor, L-39195, May 16,
1975, 64 SCRA 56, 60, Mun. Council of Lemery vs. Prov. Board of
Batangas, 56 Phil. 260, 268).The Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, in confirming the ruling of the provincial assessor and
the provincial board of assessment appeals that Meralco Securities'
pipeline is subject to realty tax, reasoned out that the pipes are
machinery or improvements, as contemplated in the Assessment Law
and the Real Property Tax Code; that they do not fall within the
category of property exempt from realty tax under those laws; that
articles 415 and 416 of the Civil Code, defining real and personal
property, have no application to this case; that even under article
415, the steel pipes can be regarded as realty because they are
constructions adhered to the soil and things attached to the land
in a fixed manner and that Meralco Securities is not exempt from
realty tax under the Petroleum Law (pp. 36-40).Meralco Securities
insists that its pipeline is not subject to realty tax because it
is not real property within the meaning of article 415. This
contention is not sustainable under the provisions of the
Assessment Law, the Real Property Tax Code and the Civil
Code.Section 2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax
is due "on real property, including land, buildings, machinery, and
other improvements" not specifically exempted in section 3 thereof.
This provision is reproduced with some modification in the Real
Property Tax Code which provides:SEC. 38. Incidence of Real
Property Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected in all
provinces, cities and municipalities an annualad valorem taxon real
property, such as land, buildings, machinery and other improvements
affixed or attached to real property not hereinafter specifically
exempted.*It is incontestable that the pipeline of Meralco
Securities does not fall within any of the classes of exempt real
property enumerated in section 3 of the Assessment Law and section
40 of the Real Property Tax Code.Pipeline means a line of pipe
connected to pumps, valves and control devices for conveying
liquids, gases or finely divided solids. It is a line of pipe
running upon or in the earth, carrying with it the right to the use
of the soil in which it is placed (Note 21[10],54 C.J.S.
561).Article 415[l] and [3] provides that real property may consist
ofconstructions of all kinds adhered to the soiland everything
attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it
cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object.The pipeline system in question is
indubitably a construction adhering to the soil (Exh. B, p. 39,
Rollo). It is attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes which were
welded to form the pipeline.Insofar as the pipeline uses valves,
pumps and control devices to maintain the flow of oil, it is in a
sense machinery within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code.It
should be borne in mind that what are being characterized as real
property are not the steel pipes but the pipeline system as a
whole. Meralco Securities has apparently two pipeline systems.A
pipeline for conveying petroleum has been regarded as real property
for tax purposes (Miller County Highway, etc., Dist. vs. Standard
Pipe Line Co., 19 Fed. 2nd 3; Board of Directors of Red River Levee
Dist. No. 1 of Lafayette County, Ark vs. R. F. C., 170 Fed. 2nd
430; 50 C. J. 750, note 86).The other contention of Meralco
Securities is that the Petroleum Law exempts it from the payment of
realty taxes. The alleged exemption is predicated on the following
provisions of that law which exempt Meralco Securities from local
taxes and make it liable for taxes of general application:ART.
102.Work obligations, taxes, royalties not to be changed. Work
obligations, special taxes and royalties which are fixed by the
provisions of this Act or by the concession for any of the kinds of
concessions to which this Act relates, are considered as inherent
on such concessions after they are granted, and shall not be
increased or decreased during the life of the concession to which
they apply; nor shall any otherspecial taxesor levies be applied to
such concessions, nor shall 0concessionaires under this Act be
subject to anyprovincial, municipal or other local taxes or
levies;nor shall any sales tax be charged on any petroleum produced
from the concession or portion thereof, manufactured by the
concessionaire and used in the working of his concession. All such
concessionaires, however, shall be subject tosuch taxes as are of
general applicationin addition to taxes and other levies
specifically provided in this Act.Meralco Securities argues that
the realty tax is a local tax or levy and not a tax of general
application. This argument is untenable because the realty tax has
always been imposed by the lawmaking body and later by the
President of the Philippines in the exercise of his lawmaking
powers, as shown in section 342et seq.of the Revised Administrative
Code, Act No. 3995, Commonwealth Act No. 470 and Presidential
Decree No. 464.The realty tax is enforced throughout the
Philippines and not merely in a particular municipality or city but
the proceeds of the tax accrue to the province, city, municipality
and barrio where the realty taxed is situated (Sec. 86, P.D. No.
464). In contrast, a local tax is imposed by the municipal or city
council by virtue of the Local Tax Code, Presidential Decree No.
231, which took effect on July 1, 1973 (69 O.G. 6197).We hold that
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals did not act with grave
abuse of discretion, did not commit any error of law and acted
within its jurisdiction in sustaining the holding of the provincial
assessor and the local board of assessment appeals that Meralco
Securities' pipeline system in Laguna is subject to realty
tax.WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution are affirmed.
The petition is dismissed. No costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-50466 May 31, 1982CALTEX (PHILIPPINES)
INC.,petitioner,vs.CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS and CITY
ASSESSOR OF PASAY,respondents.AQUINO,J.:This case is about the
realty tax on machinery and equipment installed by Caltex
(Philippines) Inc. in its gas stations located on leased land.The
machines and equipment consists of underground tanks, elevated
tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps, computing
pumps, water pumps, car washer, car hoists, truck hoists, air
compressors and tireflators. The city assessor described the said
equipment and machinery in this manner:A gasoline service station
is a piece of lot where a building or shed is erected, a water tank
if there is any is placed in one corner of the lot, car hoists are
placed in an adjacent shed, an air compressor is attached in the
wall of the shed or at the concrete wall fence.The controversial
underground tank, depository of gasoline or crude oil, is dug deep
about six feet more or less, a few meters away from the shed. This
is done to prevent conflagration because gasoline and other
combustible oil are very inflammable.This underground tank is
connected with a steel pipe to the gasoline pump and the gasoline
pump is commonly placed or constructed under the shed. The footing
of the pump is a cement pad and this cement pad is imbedded in the
pavement under the shed, and evidence that the gasoline underground
tank is attached and connected to the shed or building through the
pipe to the pump and the pump is attached and affixed to the cement
pad and pavement covered by the roof of the building or shed.The
building or shed, the elevated water tank, the car hoist under a
separate shed, the air compressor, the underground gasoline tank,
neon lights signboard, concrete fence and pavement and the lot
where they are all placed or erected, all of them used in the
pursuance of the gasoline service station business formed the
entire gasoline service-station.As to whether the subject
properties are attached and affixed to the tenement, it is clear
they are, for the tenement we consider in this particular case are
(is) the pavement covering the entire lot which was constructed by
the owner of the gasoline station and the improvement which holds
all the properties under question, they are attached and affixed to
the pavement and to the improvement.The pavement covering the
entire lot of the gasoline service station, as well as all the
improvements, machines, equipments and apparatus are allowed by
Caltex (Philippines) Inc. ...The underground gasoline tank is
attached to the shed by the steel pipe to the pump, so with the
water tank it is connected also by a steel pipe to the pavement,
then to the electric motor which electric motor is placed under the
shed. So to say that the gasoline pumps, water pumps and
underground tanks are outside of the service station, and to
consider only the building as the service station is grossly
erroneous. (pp. 58-60, Rollo).The said machines and equipment are
loaned by Caltex to gas station operators under an appropriate
lease agreement or receipt. It is stipulated in the lease contract
that the operators, upon demand, shall return to Caltex the
machines and equipment in good condition as when received, ordinary
wear and tear excepted.The lessor of the land, where the gas
station is located, does not become the owner of the machines and
equipment installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof
during the term of the lease.The city assessor of Pasay City
characterized the said items of gas station equipment and machinery
as taxable realty. The realty tax on said equipment amounts to
P4,541.10 annually (p. 52, Rollo). The city board of tax appeals
ruled that they are personalty. The assessor appealed to the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals.The Board, which was composed
of Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata as chairman, Acting Secretary
of Justice Catalino Macaraig, Jr. and Secretary of Local Government
and Community Development Jose Roo, held in its decision of June 3,
1977 that the said machines and equipment are real property within
the meaning of sections 3(k) & (m) and 38 of the Real Property
Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1,
1974, and that the definitions of real property and personal
property in articles 415 and 416 of the Civil Code are not
applicable to this case.The decision was reiterated by the Board
(Minister Vicente Abad Santos took Macaraig's place) in its
resolution of January 12, 1978, denying Caltex's motion for
reconsideration, a copy of which was received by its lawyer on
April 2, 1979.On May 2, 1979 Caltex filed this certiorari petition
wherein it prayed for the setting aside of the Board's decision and
for a declaration that t he said machines and equipment are
personal property not subject to realty tax (p. 16, Rollo).The
Solicitor General's contention that the Court of Tax Appeals has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over this case is not correct.
When Republic act No. 1125 created the Tax Court in 1954, there was
as yet no Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Section 7(3) of that
law in providing that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to review by
appeal decisions of provincial or city boards of assessment appeals
had in mind the local boards of assessment appeals but not
theCentralBoard of Assessment Appeals which under the Real Property
Tax Code has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the said
local boards of assessment appeals and is, therefore, in the same
category as the Tax Court.Section 36 of the Real Property Tax Code
provides that the decision of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen
days from the receipt of its decision by the appellant. Within that
fifteen-day period, a petition for reconsideration may be filed.
The Code does not provide for the review of the Board's decision by
this Court.Consequently, the only remedy available for seeking a
review by this Court of the decision of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals is the special civil action of certiorari, the
recourse resorted to herein by Caltex (Philippines), Inc.The issue
is whether the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery
already enumerated are subject to realty tax. This issue has to be
resolved primarily under the provisions of the Assessment Law and
the Real Property Tax Code.Section 2 of the Assessment Law provides
that the realty tax is due "on real property, including land,
buildings, machinery, and other improvements" not specifically
exempted in section 3 thereof. This provision is reproduced with
some modification in the Real Property Tax Code which provides:SEC.
38. Incidence of Real Property Tax. There shall be levied, assessed
and collected in all provinces, cities and municipalities an
annualad valorem taxon real property, such as land, buildings,
machinery and other improvements affixed or attached to real
property not hereinafter specifically exempted.The Code contains
the following definitions in its section 3:k) Improvements is a
valuable addition made to property or an amelioration in its
condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement of
waste, costing labor or capital and intended to enhance its value,
beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or further purposes.m)
Machinery shall embrace machines, mechanical contrivances,
instruments, appliances and apparatus attached to the real estate.
It includes the physical facilities available for production, as
well as the installations and appurtenant service facilities,
together with all other equipment designed for or essential to its
manufacturing, industrial or agricultural purposes (See sec. 3[f],
Assessment Law).We hold that the said equipment and machinery, as
appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex
(as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are
necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the
gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or
affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein,
are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the
Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.Caltex invokes the
rule that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes
immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or
plant but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any
person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as
the agent of the owner (Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo, 61 Phil
709).That ruling is an interpretation of paragraph 5 of article 415
of the Civil Code regarding machinery that becomes real property by
destination. In theDavao Saw Mills casethe question was whether the
machinery mounted on foundations of cement and installed by the
lessee on leased land should be regarded as real property
forpurposes of execution of a judgment against the lessee.The
sheriff treated the machinery as personal property. This Court
sustained the sheriff's action. (Compare with Machinery &
Engineering Supplies, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 70, where
in a replevin case machinery was treated as realty).Here, the
question is whether the gas station equipment and machinery
permanently affixed by Caltex to its gas station and pavement
(which are indubitably taxable realty) should be subject to the
realty tax. This question is different from the issue raised in
theDavao Saw Millcase.Improvements on land are commonly taxed as
realty even though for some purposes they might be considered
personalty (84 C.J.S. 181-2, Notes 40 and 41). "It is a familiar
phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of
taxation which on general principle might be considered personal
property" (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil.
630, 633).This case is also easily distinguishable from Board of
Assessment Appeals vs. Manila Electric Co., 119 Phil. 328, where
Meralco's steel towers were considered poles within the meaning of
paragraph 9 of its franchise which exempts its poles from taxation.
The steel towers were considered personalty because they were
attached to square metal frames by means of bolts and could be
moved from place to place when unscrewed and dismantled.Nor are
Caltex's gas station equipment and machinery the same as tools and
equipment in the repair shop of a bus company which were held to be
personal property not subject to realty tax (Mindanao Bus Co. vs.
City Assessor, 116 Phil. 501).The Central Board of Assessment
Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
city assessor's is imposition of the realty tax on Caltex's gas
station and equipment.WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and
resolution of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals are affirmed.
The petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit. No
costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26278 August 4, 1927LEON SIBAL
,plaintiff-appellant,vs.EMILIANO J. VALDEZ ET
AL.,defendants.EMILIANO J. VALDEZ,appellee.J. E. Blanco for
appellant.Felix B. Bautista and Santos and Benitez for
appellee.JOHNSON,J.:The action was commenced in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Tarlac on the 14th day of December
1924. The facts are about as conflicting as it is possible for
facts to be, in the trial causes.As a first cause of action the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy
sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution
issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and
sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by
the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land described in
the complaint in the third paragraph of the first cause of action;
that within one year from the date of the attachment and sale the
plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the
defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by
the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which
he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest
corresponding thereto and that Valdez refused to accept the money
and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff.As a second cause of
action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez
was attempting to harvest the palay planted in four of the seven
parcels mentioned in the first cause of action; that he had
harvested and taken possession of the palay in one of said seven
parcels and in another parcel described in the second cause of
action, amounting to 300 cavans; and that all of said palay
belonged to the plaintiff.Plaintiff prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued against the defendant Emiliano J.
Valdez his attorneys and agents, restraining them (1) from
distributing him in the possession of the parcels of land described
in the complaint; (2) from taking possession of, or harvesting the
sugar cane in question; and (3) from taking possession, or
harvesting the palay in said parcels of land. Plaintiff also prayed
that a judgment be rendered in his favor and against the defendants
ordering them to consent to the redemption of the sugar cane in
question, and that the defendant Valdez be condemned to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P1,056 the value of palay harvested by him in
the two parcels above-mentioned ,with interest and costs.On
December 27, 1924, the court, after hearing both parties and upon
approval of the bond for P6,000 filed by the plaintiff, issued the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the complaint.The
defendant Emiliano J. Valdez, in his amended answer, denied
generally and specifically each and every allegation of the
complaint and step up the following defenses:(a) That the sugar
cane in question had the nature of personal property and was not,
therefore, subject to redemption;(b) That he was the owner of
parcels 1, 2 and 7 described in the first cause of action of the
complaint;(c) That he was the owner of the palay in parcels 1, 2
and 7; and(d) That he never attempted to harvest the palay in
parcels 4 and 5.The defendant Emiliano J. Valdez by way of
counterclaim, alleged that by reason of the preliminary injunction
he was unable to gather the sugar cane, sugar-cane shoots (puntas
de cana dulce) palay in said parcels of land, representing a loss
to him of P8,375.20 and that, in addition thereto, he suffered
damages amounting to P3,458.56. He prayed, for a judgment (1)
absolving him from all liability under the complaint; (2) declaring
him to be the absolute owner of the sugar cane in question and of
the palay in parcels 1, 2 and 7; and (3) ordering the plaintiff to
pay to him the sum of P11,833.76, representing the value of the
sugar cane and palay in question, including damages.Upon the issues
thus presented by the pleadings the cause was brought on for trial.
After hearing the evidence, and on April 28, 1926, the Honorable
Cayetano Lukban, judge, rendered a judgment against the plaintiff
and in favor of the defendants (1) Holding that the sugar cane in
question was personal property and, as such, was not subject to
redemption;(2) Absolving the defendants from all liability under
the complaint; and(3) Condemning the plaintiff and his sureties
Cenon de la Cruz, Juan Sangalang and Marcos Sibal to jointly and
severally pay to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sum of
P9,439.08 as follows:(a) P6,757.40, the value of the sugar cane;(b)
1,435.68, the value of the sugar-cane shoots;(c) 646.00, the value
of palay harvested by plaintiff;(d) 600.00, the value of 150 cavans
of palay which the defendant was not able to raise by reason of the
injunction, at P4 cavan. 9,439.08 From that judgment the plaintiff
appealed and in his assignments of error contends that the lower
court erred: (1) In holding that the sugar cane in question was
personal property and, therefore, not subject to redemption;(2) In
holding that parcels 1 and 2 of the complaint belonged to Valdez,
as well as parcels 7 and 8, and that the palay therein was planted
by Valdez;(3) In holding that Valdez, by reason of the preliminary
injunction failed to realized P6,757.40 from the sugar cane and
P1,435.68 from sugar-cane shoots (puntas de cana dulce);(4) In
holding that, for failure of plaintiff to gather the sugar cane on
time, the defendant was unable to raise palay on the land, which
would have netted him the sum of P600; and.(5) In condemning the
plaintiff and his sureties to pay to the defendant the sum of
P9,439.08.It appears from the record:(1) That on May 11, 1923, the
deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of writ of
execution in civil case No. 20203 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Macondray & Co., Inc.vs.Leon Sibal),levied an
attachment on eight parcels of land belonging to said Leon Sibal,
situated in the Province of Tarlac, designated in the second of
attachment as parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 (Exhibit B, Exhibit
2-A).(2) That on July 30, 1923, Macondray & Co., Inc., bought
said eight parcels of land, at the auction held by the sheriff of
the Province of Tarlac, for the sum to P4,273.93, having paid for
the said parcels separately as follows (Exhibit C, and 2-A):
Parcel
1
.....................................................................P1.00
2
.....................................................................2,000.00
3
.....................................................................120.93
4
.....................................................................1,000.00
5
.....................................................................1.00
6
.....................................................................1.00
7 with the house thereon ..........................150.00
8
.....................................................................1,000.00==========
4,273.93
(3) That within one year from the sale of said parcel of land,
and on the 24th day of September, 1923, the judgment debtor, Leon
Sibal, paid P2,000 to Macondray & Co., Inc., for the account of
the redemption price of said parcels of land, without specifying
the particular parcels to which said amount was to applied. The
redemption price said eight parcels was reduced, by virtue of said
transaction, to P2,579.97 including interest (Exhibit C and 2).The
record further shows:(1) That on April 29, 1924, the defendant
Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by
virtue of a writ of execution in civil case No. 1301 of the
Province of Pampanga (Emiliano J. Valdezvs.Leon Sibal 1. the same
parties in the present case), attached the personal property of
said Leon Sibal located in Tarlac, among which was included the
sugar cane now in question in the seven parcels of land described
in the complaint (Exhibit A).(2) That on May 9 and 10, 1924, said
deputy sheriff sold at public auction said personal properties of
Leon Sibal, including the sugar cane in question to Emilio J.
Valdez, who paid therefor the sum of P1,550, of which P600 was for
the sugar cane (Exhibit A).(3) That on April 29,1924, said deputy
sheriff, by virtue of said writ of execution, also attached the
real property of said Leon Sibal in Tarlac, including all of his
rights, interest and participation therein, which real property
consisted of eleven parcels of land and a house and camarin
situated in one of said parcels (Exhibit A).(4) That on June 25,
1924, eight of said eleven parcels, including the house and the
camarin, were bought by Emilio J. Valdez at the auction held by the
sheriff for the sum of P12,200. Said eight parcels were designated
in the certificate of sale as parcels 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11.
The house and camarin were situated on parcel 7 (Exhibit A).(5)
That the remaining three parcels, indicated in the certificate of
the sheriff as parcels 2, 12, and 13, were released from the
attachment by virtue of claims presented by Agustin Cuyugan and
Domiciano Tizon (Exhibit A).(6) That on the same date, June 25,
1924, Macondray & Co. sold and conveyed to Emilio J. Valdez for
P2,579.97 all of its rights and interest in the eight parcels of
land acquired by it at public auction held by the deputy sheriff of
Tarlac in connection with civil case No. 20203 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, as stated above. Said amount represented
the unpaid balance of the redemption price of said eight parcels,
after payment by Leon Sibal of P2,000 on September 24, 1923, fro
the account of the redemption price, as stated above. (Exhibit C
and 2).The foregoing statement of facts shows:(1) The Emilio J.
Valdez bought the sugar cane in question, located in the seven
parcels of land described in the first cause of action of the
complaint at public auction on May 9 and 10, 1924, for P600.(2)
That on July 30, 1923, Macondray & Co. became the owner of
eight parcels of land situated in the Province of Tarlac belonging
to Leon Sibal and that on September 24, 1923, Leon Sibal paid to
Macondray & Co. P2,000 for the account of the redemption price
of said parcels.(3) That on June 25, 1924, Emilio J. Valdez
acquired from Macondray & Co. all of its rights and interest in
the said eight parcels of land.(4) That on June 25, 1924, Emilio J.
Valdez also acquired all of the rights and interest which Leon
Sibal had or might have had on said eight parcels by virtue of the
P2,000 paid by the latter to Macondray.(5) That Emilio J. Valdez
became the absolute owner of said eight parcels of land.The first
question raised by the appeal is, whether the sugar cane in
question is personal or real property. It is contended that sugar
cane comes under the classification of real property as "ungathered
products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code. Said
paragraph 2 of article 334 enumerates as real property the
following: Trees, plants, and ungathered products, while they are
annexed to the land or form an integral part of any immovable
property." That article, however, has received in recent years an
interpretation by theTribunal Supremo de Espaa, which holds that,
under certain conditions, growing crops may be considered as
personal property. (Decision of March 18, 1904, vol. 97, Civil
Jurisprudence of Spain.)Manresa, the eminent commentator of the
Spanish Civil Code, in discussing section 334 of the Civil Code, in
view of the recent decisions of the supreme Court of Spain, admits
that growing crops are sometimes considered and treated as personal
property. He says:No creemos, sin embargo, que esto excluya la
excepcionque muchos autores hacen tocante a la venta de toda
cosecha o de parte de ella cuando aun no esta cogida (cosa
frecuente con la uvay y la naranja), y a la de lenas, considerando
ambas comomuebles. El Tribunal Supremo, en sentencia de 18 de marzo
de 1904, al entender sobre un contrato de arrendamiento de un
predio rustico, resuelve que su terminacion por desahucio no
extingue los derechos del arrendario, para recolectar o percibir
los frutos correspondientes al ao agricola, dentro del que nacieron
aquellos derechos, cuando el arrendor ha percibido a su vez el
importe de la renta integra correspondiente, aun cuando lo haya
sido por precepto legal durante el curso del juicio, fundandose
para ello, no solo en que de otra suerte se daria al desahucio un
alcance que no tiene, sino en que, y esto es lo interesante a
nuestro proposito,la consideracion de inmuebles que el articulo 334
del Codigo Civil atribuge a los frutos pendientes, no les priva del
caracter de productos pertenecientes, como tales, a quienes a ellos
tenga derecho, Ilegado el momento de su recoleccion.x x x x x x x x
xMas actualmente y por virtud de la nueva edicion de la Ley
Hipotecaria, publicada en 16 de diciembre de 1909, con las reformas
introducidas por la de 21 de abril anterior, la hipoteca, salvo
pacto expreso que disponga lo contrario, y cualquiera que sea la
naturaleza y forma de la obligacion que garantice,no comprende los
frutoscualquiera que sea la situacion en que se encuentre. (3
Manresa, 5. edicion, pags. 22, 23.)From the foregoing it appears
(1) that, under Spanish authorities, pending fruits and ungathered
products may be sold and transferred as personal property; (2) that
the Supreme Court of Spain, in a case of ejectment of a lessee of
an agricultural land, held that the lessee was entitled to gather
the products corresponding to the agricultural year, because said
fruits did not go with the land but belonged separately to the
lessee; and (3) that under the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1909, as
amended, the mortgage of a piece of land does not include the
fruits and products existing thereon, unless the contract expressly
provides otherwise.An examination of the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana may give us some light on the question which we
are discussing. Article 465 of the Civil Code of Louisiana, which
corresponds to paragraph 2 of article 334 of our Civil Code,
provides: "Standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered, and
trees before they are cut down, are likewise immovable, and are
considered as part of the land to which they are attached."The
Supreme Court of Louisiana having occasion to interpret that
provision, held that in some cases "standing crops" may be
considered and dealt with as personal property. In the case
ofLumber Co. vs. Sheriff and Tax Collector(106 La., 418) the
Supreme Court said: "True, by article 465 of the Civil Code it is
provided that 'standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered
and trees before they are cut down . . . are considered as part of
the land to which they are attached, but the immovability provided
for is only one in abstracto and without reference to rights on or
to the crop acquired by others than the owners of the property to
which the crop is attached. . . . The existence of a right on the
growing crop is a mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it
were in advance, rendering the crop movable quoad the right
acquired therein. Our jurisprudence recognizes the possible
mobilization of the growing crop." (Citizens' Bankvs.Wiltz, 31 La.
Ann., 244; Porchevs.Bodin, 28 La., Ann., 761; Sandelvs.Douglass, 27
La. Ann., 629; Lewisvs.Klotz, 39 La. Ann., 267.)"It is true," as
the Supreme Court of Louisiana said in the case ofPorche vs.
Bodin(28 La. An., 761) that "article 465 of the Revised Code says
that standing crops are considered as immovable and as part of the
land to which they are attached, and article 466 declares that the
fruits of an immovable gathered or produced while it is under
seizure are considered as making part thereof, and incurred to the
benefit of the person making the seizure. But the evident meaning
of these articles, is where the crops belong to the owner of the
plantation they form part of the immovable, and where it is seized,
the fruits gathered or produced inure to the benefit of the seizing
creditor.A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of
the immovable. It belongs to the lessee, and may be sold by him,
whether it be gathered or not, and it may be sold by his judgment
creditors. If it necessarily forms part of the leased premises the
result would be that it could not be sold under execution separate
and apart from the land. If a lessee obtain supplies to make his
crop, the factor's lien would not attach to the crop as a separate
thing belonging to his debtor, but the land belonging to the lessor
would be affected with the recorded privilege. The law cannot be
construed so as to result in such absurd consequences.In the case
ofCitizen's Bank vs. Wiltz(31 La. Ann., 244)the court said:If the
cropquoadthe pledge thereof under the act of 1874 was an immovable,
it would be destructive of the very objects of the act, it would
render the pledge of the crop objects of the act, it would render
the pledge of the crop impossible, for if the crop was an
inseparable part of the realty possession of the latter would be
necessary to that of the former; but such is not the case. True, by
article 465 C. C. it is provided that "standing crops and the
fruits of trees not gathered and trees before they are cut down are
likewise immovable and are considered as part of the land to which
they are attached;" but the immovability provided for is only onein
abstractoand without reference to rights on or to the crop acquired
by other than the owners of the property to which the crop was
attached. The immovability of a growing crop is in the order of
things temporary, for the crop passes from the state of a growing
to that of a gathered one, from an immovable to a movable. The
existence of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by
anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop
movablequoadthe right acquired thereon. The provision of our Code
is identical with the Napoleon Code 520, and we may therefore
obtain light by an examination of the jurisprudence of France.The
rule above announced, not only by theTribunal Supremo de Espaabut
by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, is followed in practically every
state of the Union.From an examination of the reports and codes of
the State of California and other states we find that the settle
doctrine followed in said states in connection with the attachment
of property and execution of judgment is, that growing crops raised
by yearly labor and cultivation are considered personal property.
(6 Corpuz Juris, p. 197; 17 Corpus Juris, p. 379; 23 Corpus Juris,
p. 329: Raventasvs.Green, 57 Cal., 254; Norrisvs.Watson, 55 Am.
Dec., 161; Whipplevs.Foot, 3 Am. Dec., 442; 1 Benjamin on Sales,
sec. 126; McKenzievs.Lampley, 31 Ala., 526; Crinevs.Tifts and Co.,
65 Ga., 644; Gillittvs.Truax, 27 Minn., 528; Prestonvs.Ryan, 45
Mich., 174; Freeman on Execution, vol. 1, p. 438; Drake on
Attachment, sec. 249; Mechem on Sales, sec. 200 and 763.)Mr. Mechem
says that a valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet
actually in existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence
as the natural increment or usual incident of something already in
existence, and then belonging to the vendor, and then title will
vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes into existence.
(Emersonvs.European Railway Co., 67 Me., 387; Cuttingvs.Packers
Exchange, 21 Am. St. Rep., 63.) Things of this nature are said to
have a potential existence. A man may sell property of which he is
potentially and not actually possessed. He may make a valid sale of
the wine that a vineyard is expected to produce; or the gain a
field may grow in a given time; or the milk a cow may yield during
the coming year; or the wool that shall thereafter grow upon sheep;
or what may be taken at the next cast of a fisherman's net; or
fruits to grow; or young animals not yet in existence; or the good
will of a trade and the like. The thing sold, however, must be
specific and identified. They must be also owned at the time by the
vendor. (Hullvs.Hull, 48 Conn., 250 [40 Am. Rep., 165].)It is
contended on the part of the appellee that paragraph 2 of article
334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of the Code
of Civil Procedure as well as by Act No. 1508, the Chattel Mortgage
Law. Said section 450 enumerates the property of a judgment debtor
which may be subjected to execution. The pertinent portion of said
section reads as follows: "All goods, chattels, moneys, and other
property, both real and personal, * * * shall be liable to
execution. Said section 450 and most of the other sections of the
Code of Civil Procedure relating to the execution of judgment were
taken from the Code of Civil Procedure of California. The Supreme
Court of California, under section 688 of the Code of Civil
Procedure of that state (Pomeroy, p. 424) has held, without
variation, that growing crops were personal property and subject to
execution.Act No. 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognized
that growing crops are personal property. Section 2 of said Act
provides: "All personal property shall be subject to mortgage,
agreeably to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in
pursuance thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in
part provides: "If growing crops be mortgaged the mortgage may
contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself
properly to tend, care for and protect the crop while growing.It is
clear from the foregoing provisions that Act No. 1508 was enacted
on the assumption that "growing crops" are personal property. This
consideration tends to support the conclusion hereinbefore stated,
that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified
by section 450 of Act No. 190 and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that
"ungathered products" as mentioned in said article of the Civil
Code have the nature of personal property. In other words, the
phrase "personal property" should be understood to include
"ungathered products."At common law, and generally in the United
States, all annual crops which are raised by yearly manurance and
labor, and essentially owe their annual existence to cultivation by
man, . may be levied on as personal property." (23 C. J., p. 329.)
On this question Freeman, in his treatise on the Law of Executions,
says: "Crops, whether growing or standing in the field ready to be
harvested, are, when produced by annual cultivation, no part of the
realty. They are, therefore, liable to voluntary transfer as
chattels. It is equally well settled that they may be seized and
sold under execution. (Freeman on Executions, vol. p. 438.)We may,
therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil
Code has been modified by section 450 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and by Act No. 1508, in the sense that, for the purpose
of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel
Mortgage Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of personal
property. The lower court, therefore, committed no error in holding
that the sugar cane in question was personal property and, as such,
was not subject to redemption.All the other assignments of error
made by the appellant, as above stated, relate to questions of fact
only. Before entering upon a discussion of said assignments of
error, we deem it opportune to take special notice of the failure
of the plaintiff to appear at the trial during the presentation of
evidence by the defendant. His absence from the trial and his
failure to cross-examine the defendant have lent considerable
weight to the evidence then presented for the defense.Coming not to
the ownership of parcels 1 and 2 described in the first cause of
action of the complaint, the plaintiff made a futile attempt to
show that said two parcels belonged to Agustin Cuyugan and were the
identical parcel 2 which was excluded from the attachment and sale
of real property of Sibal to Valdez on June 25, 1924, as stated
above. A comparison of the description of parcel 2 in the
certificate of sale by the sheriff (Exhibit A) and the description
of parcels 1 and 2 of the complaint will readily show that they are
not the same.The description of the parcels in the complaint is as
follows:1. La caa dulce sembrada por los inquilinos del ejecutado
Leon Sibal 1. en una parcela de terreno de la pertenencia del
citado ejecutado, situada en Libutad, Culubasa, Bamban, Tarlac, de
unas dos hectareas poco mas o menos de superficie.2. La caa dulce
sembrada por el inquilino del ejecutado Leon Sibal 1., Ilamado
Alejandro Policarpio, en una parcela de terreno de la pertenencia
del ejec