G.R. No. 169956 January 19, 2009SPOUSES JONEL PADILLA and SARAH
PADILLA, Petitioners, vs.ISAURO A. VELASCO, TEODORA A. VELASCO,
DELIA A. VELASCO, VALERIANO A. VELASCO, JR., IDA A. VELASCO,
AMELITA C. VELASCO, ERIBERTO C. VELASCO, JR., and CELIA C. VELASCO,
Respondents.D E C I S I O NNACHURA, J.:Before the Court is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision1 dated February 11, 2005 and the
Resolution2 dated October 4, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 69997 entitled Isauro A. Velasco, Teodora A.
Velasco, Delia A. Velasco, Valeriano A. Velasco, Jr., Ida A.
Velasco, Amelita C. Velasco, Eriberto C. Velasco, Jr. and Celia C.
Velasco v. Spouses Jonel Padilla and Sarah Padilla.The factsThe
facts of the case are as follows:Respondents are the heirs of Dr.
Artemio A. Velasco (Artemio), who died single and without any issue
on January 22, 1949. During his lifetime, Artemio acquired Lot No.
2161 consisting of 7,791 square meters situated at Barangay
Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, covered by Tax Declaration No.
4739. Artemio acquired the lot from spouses Brigido Sacluti and
Melitona Obial, evidenced by a deed of sale dated February 14,
1944.In October 1987, petitioners entered the property as trustees
by virtue of a deed of sale executed by the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan
in favor of spouses Bartolome Solomon, Jr. and Teresita Padilla
(Solomon spouses).Respondents demanded that petitioners vacate the
property, but the latter refused. The matter was referred to the
barangay for conciliation; however, the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement. Thereafter, petitioners caused the cutting of
trees in the area, fenced it and built a house thereon. They
harvested the crops and performed other acts of dominion over the
property.On October 14, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for
accion publiciana, accounting and damages against petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna. They
asked the court to order petitioners to vacate the property and to
pay moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost of
suit.Isauro A. Velasco (Isauro), the brother of the deceased
Artemio, as administrator of the property, was presented as a
witness. He testified that Artemio owned the property. As evidence
thereof, he presented the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan executed by
spouses Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial in favor of Artemio, and
declared that he (Isauro) was present during the signing of the
instrument. He offered in evidence tax declarations and tax
receipts covering Lot No. 2161 which were all in the name of
Artemio. A certification from the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
was likewise presented by Isauro which states that based on the
records of the LRA, Decree No. 403348 was issued on October 10,
1930 covering Lot No. 2161.3Rolando R. Flores, a geodetic engineer,
also testified that on January 16, 1993, upon prior notice to
petitioners, he conducted a survey of the land based on the
technical description of the property and the map from the Bureau
of Lands. The purpose of the survey was to verify if the area
occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161. Upon his examination and
based on his survey, he concluded that the land occupied by
petitioners was Lot No. 2161.4On the other hand, petitioners
averred that the Solomon spouses owned the property; that the said
spouses bought it from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan as evidenced by
a deed of sale dated September 4, 1987; that the land was
identified as Lot No. 76-pt, consisting of 10,000 square meters,
located at Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna; and that the spouses
authorized petitioners to occupy the land and introduce
improvements thereon.Petitioners further claimed that subsequent to
the sale of the property to the Solomon spouses, Lot No. 76-pt. was
levied on in Civil Case No. 320 under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court of Pagsanjan, Laguna. The case was entitled
Rural Bank of Pagsanjan, Inc. v. Spouses Hector and Emma Velasco,
Valeriano Velasco and Virginia Miso. Petitioners alleged that
Valeriano Velasco obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan,
with Hector Velasco as co-maker, and the land was mortgaged by
Valeriano as collateral. Valerianos failure to pay the loan caused
the foreclosure of the land, and on September 17, 1980, Lot No.
76-pt was sold at a public auction by the Provincial Sheriff. The
Rural Bank of Pagsanjan was the highest bidder.Pedro Zalameda
Trinidad, Jr. (Pedro), as a witness for the petitioners, testified
that he was born in Barangay Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, and
had been residing there since birth. He said that based on his
knowledge, the land belonged to Nonong (Valeriano) Velasco because
he used to buy coconuts harvested from the said land and it was
Nonong Velasco who caused the gathering of coconuts
thereon.5Petitioner Jonel Padilla also took the witness stand. He
testified that Pedro was occupying the land when he initially
visited it. A representative of the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan
disclosed to him that the land previously belonged to Valeriano. He
verified from the Municipal Assessor the technical description of
the land, but no longer verified from the Bureau of Lands because
he trusted the bank. Upon his recommendation, his sister and his
brother-in-law purchased the property after verifying the
supporting documents. It was his brother-in-law who went to the
Bureau of Lands and found that it was Lot No. 2161.6On July 27,
1999, the RTC rendered a Decision,7 the dispositive portion of
which reads:WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the [respondents] ordering the [petitioners]
to vacate the land presently occupied by them and restore
possession thereof to the [respondents], to render an accounting of
the proceeds from the crop harvested therefrom starting September
1987 up to the time the property is returned to the [respondents],
and to remove at their expense all the structures they constructed
thereon.8Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA, but on February
11, 2005, the CA issued the assailed decision affirming the
decision of the RTC. They consequently filed a motion for
reconsideration. However, the same was denied in the assailed
resolution dated October 4, 2005.Hence, the instant petition.The
IssuesPetitioners anchor their petition on the following grounds:I.
The alleged sale executed between Brigido Sacluti and Melitona
Obial as seller and Dr. Artemio [Velasco] as buyer was never
established, respondents having failed to present the original copy
thereof during the trial despite their clear and categorical
commitment to do so. Furthermore, the purported Original
Certificate of Title issued in the name of Brigido Sacluti and
Melitona Obial was never presented in evidence, thus, creating the
presumption that had it been presented, the same would have been
adverse to respondents.9II. The spouses Solomon acquired the
subject property from its lawful owner in good faith and for
value.10III. The spouses Solomon acquired the subject property at
the public auction sale conducted by the provincial sheriff of
Laguna based on the judgment and writ of execution issued by the
Municipal Trial Court of Laguna against respondent Valeriano
Velasco for non-payment of a loan considering that (1) the issuance
of Tax Declaration No. 4624 in the name of respondent Valeriano
Velasco is entitled to the presumption of regularity especially
since respondents have not explained how and why it was wrongly
issued in the name of their own brother, respondent Valeriano
Velasco and without any of them taking any action to correct the
alleged mistake; and (2) by their failure to assert their alleged
ownership of the property and their inaction [by not] questioning
the legal action taken by the bank against their co-respondent
Valeriano Velasco and the subject property despite their full
awareness since 1980, respondents are barred by estoppel from
denying the title of the bank and the Solomon spouses.11IV. The
action a quo was barred by prescription considering that
respondents filed their legal action against the petitioners only
on October 14, 1991, more than ten (10) years after the bank had
acquired the subject property on September 17, 1980 at the public
auction conducted by the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna.12V. At the
very least, respondents are guilty of laches, they having slept on
their rights for an unreasonable length of time such that to
dispossess petitioners of the property after they had introduced
substantial improvements thereon in good faith would result in
undue damage and injury to them all due to the silence and inaction
of respondents in asserting their alleged ownership over the
property.13VI. The evidence proves that Lot no. 2161 and Lot no.
76-pt are one and the same.14VII. The failure of Atty. Asinas to
present other witnesses, additional documents and to respond to
certain pleadings brought about by his serious illnesses
constitutes excusable negligence or incompetency to warrant a new
trial considering that the Supreme Court itself had recognized
negligence or incompetency of counsel as a ground for new trial
especially if it has resulted in serious injustice or to an uneven
playing field.15 VIII. The overwhelming testimonial and documentary
evidence, if presented, would have altered the result and the
decision now appealed from.16IX. The petitioners should be awarded
their counterclaim for exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.17The arguments submitted by petitioners may be
summed up in the following issues:I. Who, as between the parties,
have a better right of possession of Lot No. 2161;II. Whether the
complaint for accion publiciana has already prescribed; andIII.
Whether the negligence of respondents counsel entitles them to a
new trial.The Ruling of the CourtWe deny the instant
petition.First. The instant case is for accion publiciana, or for
recovery of the right to possess. This was a plenary action filed
in the regional trial court to determine the better right to
possession of realty independently of the title.18 Accion
publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where the
cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more
than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. The objective of the plaintiffs in accion
publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.19Based on
the findings of facts of the RTC which were affirmed by the CA,
respondents were able to establish lawful possession of Lot No.
2161 when the petitioners occupied the property. Lot No. 2161 was
the subject of Decree No. 403348 based on the decision dated
October 10, 1930 in Cadastre (Cad.) Case No. 11, LRC Record No.
208. The Original Certificate of Title to the land was issued to
Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial. On February 14, 1944, the
original owners of the land sold the same to Artemio. From the date
of sale, until Artemios death on January 22, 1949, he was in
continuous possession of the land. When Artemio died, Isauro acted
as administrator of the land with Tomas Vivero as caretaker. In
1987, petitioners occupied the property by virtue of a deed of sale
between the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan and the Solomon spouses. The
land bought by the Solomon spouses from the Bank is denominated as
Lot No. 76-pt and previously owned by Valeriano. However, it was
proved during trial that the land occupied by petitioners was Lot
No. 2161 in the name of Artemio, whereas the land sold by the bank
to the petitioners was Lot No. 76-pt.Given this factual milieu, it
can readily be deduced that respondents are legally entitled to the
possession of Lot No. 2161.It is a long-standing policy of this
Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were adopted and
affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive and binding.
This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual
findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons
for doing so.20 In the instant case, we find no exceptional reason
to depart from this policy.Second. The case filed by respondents
for accion publiciana has not prescribed. The action was filed with
the RTC on October 14, 1991. Petitioners dispossessed respondents
of the property in October 1987. At the time of the filing of the
complaint, only four (4) years had elapsed from the time of
dispossession.Under Article 555(4) of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the real right of possession is not lost till after
the lapse of ten years. It is settled that the remedy of accion
publiciana prescribes after the lapse of ten years.21 Thus, the
instant case was filed within the allowable period.Third.
Petitioners put in issue that Lot No. 2161 and Lot 76-pt are one
and the same, and that the land was owned by Valeriano when it was
foreclosed by the bank. This, in effect, is a collateral attack on
the title over the property which is registered in the name of
Artemio.We cannot countenance this stance of the petitioners, and
perforce, must strike it down. Title to a registered land cannot be
collaterally attacked.22 A separate action is necessary to raise
the issue of ownership.In accion publiciana, the principal issue is
possession, and ownership is merely ancillary thereto. Only in
cases where the possession cannot be resolved without resolving the
issue of ownership may the trial court delve into the claim of
ownership. This rule is enunciated in Refugia v. CA,23 where the
Court declared, viz.:Where the question of who has prior possession
hinges on the question of who the real owner of the disputed
portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership
and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is
the real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue
of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and
interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on
which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may
likewise pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so
understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of
the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional,
hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the land.Fourth. Petitioners aver that
they are entitled to a new trial due to the failure of their
counsel in the proceedings before the RTC to present testimonial
and documentary evidence necessary for them to obtain a favorable
judgment. They maintain that the failure of their counsel to
present these other evidence was due to counsels lingering illness
at that time, and therefore, constitutes excusable negligence.It
may be reiterated that mistakes of counsel as to the competency of
witnesses, the sufficiency and relevancy of evidence, the proper
defense, or the burden of proof, as well as his failure to
introduce certain evidence or to summon witnesses and to argue the
case, are not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the
incompetence of counsel be so great that his client is prejudiced
and prevented from fairly presenting his case.24In this case, the
illness of petitioners counsel and his alleged failure to present
additional evidence during the trial of the case do not constitute
sufficient ground for a new trial. The Order25 issued by the trial
court in its denial of the motion for new trial filed by
petitioners aptly explains the reason why a new trial is
unnecessary, viz.:Assuming that Atty. Asinas failed to perform the
imputed acts by reason of his ailments, still, the same is
insufficient ground to grant a new trial. The evidence on record
established the fact that [respondents] and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
realty for a long time. Their possession was interrupted by
[petitioners] who entered the property in [1987] pursuant to a deed
of sale between the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan and spouses Bartolome
C. Solomon and Teresita Padilla. Considering that this is an accion
publiciana and [respondents] earlier rightful possession of the
subject parcel of land has been adequately established, the
testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be adduced in a new
trial would not adversely affect the findings of the Court. The
ownership and possession of the property purchased by the Solomon
spouses from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan could be the subject of an
appropriate action.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162288 April 4, 2007MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, and AIR
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, Petitioners, vs.MILAGROS URGELLO,
Respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES, J.:Respondent, Milagros
Urgello, was the owner of Lot No. 913-E of the Banilad Estate in
Cebu City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10873.1 Lot
No. 913-E was subdivided into four parcels, Lot No. 913-E-1, Lot
No. 913-E-2, Lot No. 913-E-3, and Lot No. 913-E-4.2 Sometime in the
1950s, the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) filed a
complaint before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu to
expropriate Lot No. 913-E-3 for the projected expansion of the
Lahug Airport. The case reached the Court of Appeals in which, on
joint motion of the parties, a judgment based on a compromise
agreement was rendered on July 27, 1964.3 In that agreement, the
CAA agreed to purchase Lot No. 913-E-3 for P3,105.00, subject to
the resolutory condition that in the event that the Republic of the
Philippines would no longer use it as an airport, its title or
ownership would revert to respondent or her heirs upon
reimbursement of the purchase price of P3,105.00.4 Respondent thus
executed a Conditional Deed of Sale incorporating the resolutory
condition, which deed was annotated on respondents TCT No. 10873.5
It appears that on April 27, 1966, the Mactan Airport commenced its
operations and the Philippine Airlines stopped using the Lahug
Airport. Filipinas Airways and Air Manila ceased too to use the
Lahug Airport at the end of 1966 and thereafter used the Mactan
Airport. 6On August 2, 1983, the Bureau of Air Transportation (BAT)
by which the CAA was later known, and the Bureau of Equipment of
the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH), entered into
a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the BAT was to lease several
parcels of land, including Lot No. 913-E-3, to MPWH for 25 years to
be used as the site of the latters Seventh Regional Base Shop
Complex.7 The MPWH soon started building fences along the
perimeters of Lot No. 913-E-3.8 After the dismantling of the
hangars and taxiways from the Lahug Airport and putting up of a
repair shop of the Bureau of Equipment of the MPWH, the BAT erected
a fence, over the objection of respondent, enclosing portions of
her Lot Nos. 913-E-2 and 913-E-4.9 Respondent thus filed on June 5,
1983 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a Complaint for
Injunction with Damages against the BAT and the G.M. Tiongco
Construction Company (Tiongco Construction), docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-3908. Tiongco Construction in turn impleaded the MPWH as
third-party defendant.10 Subsequently, respondent, by letter of
July 8, 1985, requested the BAT for the reconveyance to her of Lot
No. 913-E-3 and tendered RPB Demand Draft No. 148284 in the amount
of P3,105.00.11 The BAT received the draft, but it did not reconvey
the lot, prompting respondent to file on August 9, 1985 a
Complaint12 for Reconveyance with Damages against it before the RTC
of Cebu City, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-4115. In the meantime
or on December 20, 1985, the MPWH filed a Complaint13 for Eminent
Domain against respondent and four others, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-4541, for the expropriation of Lot No. 913-E-4, among other
lots. Branch 6 of the Cebu RTC later rendered judgment14 in Civil
Case No. CEB-4115 (respondents Complaint for Reconveyance of Lot
No. 913-E-3), by Decision of January 3, 1989, holding that the
resolutory condition stipulated in the Compromise Agreement forged
between the then CAA and respondent basis of the July 27, 1964
judgment of the Court of Appeals had taken place. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads: Wherefore, judgment is rendered,
ordering the defendant Bureau of Air Transportation to reconvey to
the plaintiff Milagros E. Urgello that parcel of land, Lot No.
913-E-3, subject of the conditional Deed of Sale, after payment
[sic] by the latter of the sum of P3,105.00 as repurchase price.
The plaintiffs claim for damages as well as the defendants
counterclaims are dismissed. No costs.15 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)On November 29, 1989, then President Aquino issued a
Memorandum16 directing the transfer of the general operations of
Lahug Airport to the Mactan International Airport before the end of
1990 and the closure of the Lahug Airport thereafter. On July 31,
1990, Republic Act No. 6958,17 the Charter of herein petitioner
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), was signed
into law. On January 21, 1991, Branch 6 of the RTC Cebu rendered a
decision18 in Civil Case No. CEB-3908 (respondents Complaint for
Injunction against the BAT and Tiongco Construction questioning the
enclosure of portions of her Lot Nos. 913-E-2 and 913-E-4, in which
complaint MPWH impleaded Tiongco Construction as a third-party
defendant) approving a Compromise Agreement entered into on January
17, 1990 by respondent on one hand, and the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the BAT which later became known as Air
Transportation Office (ATO), and the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) and Tiongco Construction on the other. The
pertinent provisions of the Compromise Agreement read:1. DPWH
obligates itself to immediately demolish at its own expense the
concrete wall which it built traversing plaintiffs Lot [No.]
913-[E]-2 and Emerald Street in order to provide access to
plaintiffs properties.x x x x2. Plaintiff hereby agrees to sell and
DPWH agrees to purchase Lot No. 913-E[-4] . . . covering an area of
One Thousand One Hundred Ninety Nine (1,199) square meters of
plaintiffs lot, particularly Lot No. 913-E-4-A, at the agreed price
of Six Hundred Fifty Pesos (P650.00) per square meter or a total of
Seven Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P779,350.00).x x x x3. It is understood that DPWH and ATO will
comply with the Decision rendered on January 3, 1989 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Cebu City in Civil Case No.
CEB-4115 entitled "Milagros Urgello vs. Republic of the
Philippines" for reconveyance of Lot No. 913-E-3.4. In view of the
Decision of January 3, 1989, plaintiff agrees to sell and the DPWH
agrees to purchase Lot [No.] 913-E-3 consisting of One Thousand
Thirty Five (1,035) square meters at the agreed price of Six
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P650.00) per square meter or for the total
amount of Six Hundred Seventy Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P672,750.00).5. To avert future litigations, the parties
hereby waive all their respective demands, claims, counterclaims,
and third-party claims against one another with respect to the
matters treated in this Agreement.6. The DPWH hereby agrees to
withdraw its complaint for eminent domain [covering Lot No.
913-E-4, among other lots] filed against plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 4541 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVII, Cebu City
entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Milagros Urgello, et.
al." Public defendant likewise agrees to withdraw the appeal it had
filed in Civil Case No. 4115 entitled "Milagros Urgello vs.
Republic of the Philippines" (BAT, now ATO) [for reconveyance of
Lot No. 913-E-3].19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)On March
11, 1991, the Republic of the Philippines filed a Manifestation20
in Civil Case No. CEB-4541 (the eminent domain case filed by the
then MPWH covering, among other lots, Lot No. 913-E-4) signifying
its conformity to the January 17, 1990 Compromise
Agreement.Respondent, relying on the Manifestation in open court of
Atty. Agustino Hermoso of the DPWH Regional Office about the
availability of funds already appropriated for her properties,
demanded the payment for Lot Nos. 913-E-3 and 913-E-4, and the
demolition of the concrete wall around Lot No. 913-E-2, as agreed
upon in the January 17, 1990 Compromise Agreement.21 The DPWH
ignored respondents demands, however, prompting her to file on June
18, 1993 in her complaint for Injunction (Civil Case No. CEB-3908)
a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution against the DPWH to
enforce its obligation under the said Compromise Agreement.22 The
motion was granted and a Writ of Execution23 was issued on July 28,
1993 and served upon the DPWH, but it was unenforced per Sheriffs
Return of Service24 dated November 17, 1993.The DPWH having failed
to comply with its undertakings under the January 17, 1990
Compromise Agreement which was approved on January 21, 1991 in
Civil Case No. CEB-3908 (respondents Complaint for Injunction),
respondent filed on October 15, 1996 before the Cebu RTC a
Complaint25 for Reconveyance26 with damages and attorneys fees
against herein petitioners DPWH and ATO,27 docketed as CEB-19418,
the subject of the present petition, praying that judgment be
rendered1. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to immediately
reconvey to plaintiff Milagros A. Urgello:a. Lot No. 913-E-4-A
without any condition;b. Lot No. 913-E-3 upon plaintiffs payment
[sic] to the defendants of the sum of P3,105.00 as repurchase
price;2. Directing defendant DPWH to immediately demolish at its
own expense the concrete wall which it built traversing plaintiffs
Lot No. 913-E-2 and Emerald Street, Lahug, Cebu City, which has
obstructed plaintiffs access to her other properties;3. Enjoining
defendants to solidarily pay plaintiff reasonable rent for their
unlawful occupation of Lot No. 913-E-3 since 1950 and of Lot No.
913-E-4-A since 1990 which deprived plaintiff of any beneficial
enjoyment thereof;4. Alternatively, requiring defendants to
solidarily and immediately pay plaintiff the amount of
P1,452,100.00 (plus interest computed at 12% per annum from 1990)
by way of just compensation for Lot Nos. 913-E-3 and 913-E-4-A
pursuant to the judgment based on the Compromise Agreement;5.
Commanding defendants to solidarily pay plaintiff:c. Moral damages
of P1,000,000.00;d. Actual damages of P100,000.00;e. Attorneys fees
of P300,000.00;6. Affording plaintiffs such other reliefs just and
equitable in the premises.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)In
its Answer,29 petitioner DPWH questioned respondents failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and to serve upon the Office of the
Solicitor General a copy of the complaint, and the jurisdiction of
the trial court.As for petitioner ATO, it posited in its Answer30
that only the DPWH should be held liable for non-compliance with
the Compromise Agreement dated January 17, 1990 basis of the
January 21, 1991 RTC Decision in respondents Complaint for
Injunction claiming that:. . . [T]his Compromise Agreement dated
January 17, 1990 is, as cited by plaintiff[-herein respondent] in
paragraph 20 of her complaint, the one [which was] entered into by
and between her and defendants DPWH and ATO in Civil Cases Nos.
3908 (RTC Br. VI), 4115 (RTC Br. VI) and 4541 (RTC Br. VII)
involving Lot Nos. 913-E-2, 913-E-3, and 913-E-4-A, and whatever is
the reason behind co-defendant DPWHs neglect or failure to
undertake what it assumed as its sole obligation under this
Compromise Agreement, which is all that has given rise to the
present suit, defendant ATO is not privy to it, has no knowledge
about it and should not be made to answer for it;. . . [T]he
obligation of defendant ATO under the Compromise Agreement dated 17
January 1990, above cited, ceased when, in that same document, . .
. co-defendant [DPWH] assumed as its sole obligation the following:
1) to demolish at its own expense a concrete wall which it built
traversing plaintiffs Lot No. 913-[E]-2 and Emerald Street to
provide access to plaintiffs properties; and 2) to unconditionally
pay plaintiff for the lots sold by plaintiff to the former, to wit:
P779, 350.00 as payment for Lot No. 913-E-4-A (1,199 sq. m.); and
P672,750.00 as payment for Lot No. 913-E-3 (1035 sq. m.);x x x x. .
. [F]or plaintiff[-herein respondent] to pursue her old cases
against defendant after the parties in those cases covered by the
Court-approved Compromise Agreement dated January 17, 1990 are
supposed to have already waived all their respective demands,
claims, counterclaims and third-party claims is for her to drag all
the defendants there into an absurdity: the revival of those
demands, claims, counterclaims and third-party claims so needless
when all plaintiff needs to do is focus her attention on the one
party defendant which reneged on what it assumed as its sole
obligation under the same compromise agreement.31 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)1vvphi1.ntIn support of its claim, the ATO
argued that:. . . ATO Mactan, as now established and constituted,
is one of the nine (9) airport cluster centers or area offices of
defendant Air Transportation Office created and established
pursuant to DOTC Department Order No. 92-569 dated January 21,
1992, and was actually established only sometime January 1993, some
two years, more or less, after the Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority (MCIAA) was formally and officially constituted
on December 18, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6958 (the MCIAA
charter);. . . [B]y virtue of RA 6958, MCIAA became the airport
operating authority in Cebu, to the exclusion of defendant ATO, and
the role of defendant ATO in Cebu has since been confined only to
the operation and maintenance of air-traffic-service and
air-navigation-service facilities at Mactan International Airport,
although it does exercise a separate role in supervising the
management, operation and maintenance of the following satellite
airports: Dumaguete Airport in Negros Oriental, Tagbilaran Airport
and Ubay Airport in Bohol and Siquijor Airport in Siquijor;32x x x
x. . . [I]t is clear from the . . . provisions of RA 6958 (the
MCIAA Charter) that the judgment prayed for by plaintiff in her
complaint, including reconveyance by defendant ATO, jointly and
severally with co-defendant Department of Public Works and
Highways, of Lot Nos. 913-E-3 and 913-E-4-A, cannot be done anymore
insofar as defendant ATO is concerned, at least not without the
inclusion of MCIAA as a proper party, if it is not [sic], in fact,
as defendant believes, an indispensable party, since "all assets,
powers, rights, interests and privileges relating to airport works
or airports" both at Mactan International Airport and at the old
Lahug Airport have already been assumed in ownership and/or
administration by MCIAA, to the exclusion and substitution of
defendant ATO, by virtue of MCIAAs authority and missions under RA
6958 creating it;33 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Respondent
later filed with leave and approval of the trial court an Amended
Complaint34 impleading herein petitioner MCIAA as a party
defendant35 and incorporating a prayer for the payment of rentals
should reconveyance of her properties (Lot Nos. 913-E-3 &
913-E-4-A) be denied.36MCIAA, in its Answer with Counterclaim to
the Amended Complaint,37 raised the following
defenses:Plaintiff[-herein respondent] merely seeks the enforcement
of [the January 17, 1990] Compromise Agreement of which defendant
MCIAA is not a party thereto. Defendant is a total stranger and is
a separate and distinct personality from its co-defendants DPWH and
ATO. Defendant MCIAA should not therefore be made solidarily liable
for the non-fulfillment of the terms of the compromise agreement
including those that may arise therefrom. As can be gleaned from
the complaint, Lot [No.] 913-E-3 was no longer possessed by
co-defendant ATO when RA 6958 took effect. In fact, co-defendant
ATO did not make any formal turn over of this lot and its
obligations in the alleged Compromise Agreement to defendant MCIAA.
Defendant MCIAA could not therefore be compelled to assume the
liabilities and obligations of co-defendant ATO in said compromise
agreement.Granting arguendo that defendant MCIAA assumed the
obligations and liabilities of co-defendant ATO by virtue of RA
6958, the only obligation of co-defendant ATO is to comply with the
Decision rendered on January 3, 1989 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch VI, Cebu City in Civil Case No. Ceb-4115 entitled "Milagros
Urgello vs. Republic of the Philippines" for reconveyance of Lot
No. 913-E-3. By virtue of said decision, the said lot was [sic]
already reconveyed to the plaintiff were it not for the obligation
of co-defendant DPWH to purchase the same as stipulated in the
Compromise Agreement. This being the case, ownership over Lot No.
913-E-3 was never acquired nor transferred to defendant MCIAA.38
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)By Decision of March 10, 1999,
Branch 22 of the RTC Cebu disposed as follows:39 WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:1. Ordering
defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily reconvey Lot No.
913-E-3 to plaintiff without anymore need of paying the repurchase
price of P3,105.00 as it was paid already;2. Ordering the
defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily return to plaintiff
Lot No. 913-E-2 and Lot No. 913-E-4 (including Lot No.
913-E-4-A);3. Ordering defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to
solidarily pay rentals on Lot No. 913-E-3 at the rate of P20.00
square meter per month from July 8, 1985 to the present; however,
for defendant MCIAA, payment hereof shall be reckoned from August
15, 1990 only;4. Ordering defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to
solidarily pay rentals on Lot No. 913-E-2 and Lot No. 913-E-4 at
the rate of P20.00 per square meter per month from January 1, 1985
to the present; however, in the case of defendant MCIAA, payment
hereof shall be reckoned from August 15, 1990 only;5. Directing
defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily demolish the fence
traversing Lot No. 913-E-2 at their own expense;6. Ordering
defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to solidarily pay plaintiff
attorneys fees in the amount of P300,000.00.No costs.40 (Emphasis,
italics, and underscoring supplied)In holding petitioners
solidarily liable, the trial court explained:[T]his Court hereby
declares that the reconveyance of Lot [No.] 913-E-3 is a solidary
obligation of all three (3) defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO.
Defendant DPWH is obliged to reconvey because as the evidence of
the case would show, said defendant is the one presently in
possession and occupation of the property being the lessee thereof
by virtue of the questionable Memorandum of Agreement it entered
into with BAT.Defendant MCIAA is also obligated to reconvey on the
ground that it is the legal custodian of the lot by virtue of R.A.
6958 creating the MCIAA and transferring to it all the assets of
the Lahug Airport. While it may be seriously argued that based on
the evidence on record, there was no turnover of any facilities to
defendant MCIAA yet, under the express provision of Sec. 15 R.A.
6958, defendant MCIAA is constituted as the legal transferee of all
facilities, lands, buildings, and other properties of the Lahug
Airport, a division of ATO. It provides, "All existing public
airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties,
movable or immovable, belonging to or presently administered by the
airportsare hereby transferred to the Authority." Construing the
letter of this provision, there is no denying that legally and
technically, defendant MCIAA is the present administrator-custodian
of all the assets, facilities, and properties (including Lot No.
913-E-3) of the Lahug Airport.Moreover, upon the transfer to and
acceptance by MCIAA of these assets, facilities, properties, etc.,
it likewise assumed the liabilities and obligations of ATO which
includes the reconveyance of Lot No. 913-E-3 to its owner her
resolutory condition [sic]. This assumption of liabilities and
obligations of ATO is specifically provided in Section 17 of the
same law, which says:Sec. 17. Transfer of Liabilities and Debts.
Upon the transfer to and acceptance by the authority of the
existing physical facilities, intangible assets and completed
projects referred to in the preceding sections, all debts,
liabilities, and obligations of government agencies or entities
concerned, intangible assets and completed project within the
airports shall likewise be assumed by the authority.The language of
the aforecited provision is very clear, and there can never be
doubt that MCIAA is obligated technically to reconvey plaintiffs
lot. This Court likewise believes that defendant ATO has also an
obligation (jointly and severally with the other defendants) to
effect the reconveyance of the property to the plaintiff. This is
anchored on the fact that considering that there was no turnover of
any facilities, properties, lands, buildings, etc. by it to
defendant MCIAA, defendant ATO is still the open exercising custody
and administration over the properties. On the demand for the
return of Lot No. 913-E-[2] and Lot No. 913-E-4 to plaintiff, this
Court finds the same to be meritorious. As shown in the records,
the aforementioned lots were never included in the expropriation
proceedings over Lot No. 913-E-3. These lots, without the
plaintiffs consent, were unilaterally taken by the government when
BAT fenced the same.1awphi1.nt Such an act violates the
constitutional mandate that "[Private] property shall [not] be
taken for public use without just compensation" (Section 9, Art.
III, Constitution). Likewise, it is deprivation of property without
due process of law. [Is it] not that justice and equity demand that
what is not yours should be returned to its rightful
owner?Corollary to this, the return of Lot No. 913-E-4 necessarily
includes Lot No. 913-E-4-A that was the subject of another
expropriation complaint (Civil Case No. 4541) which ended up in a
compromise agreement and a Decision based thereon. . . .To recall,
one of the provisions of the said compromise agreement was the sale
of Lot No. 913-E-4-A to the government at P779,350.00. However, as
the evidence would show, the government did not pay the said amount
for unexplained reasons. Said failure consequently abrogated the
whole compromise agreement; and there is now created an obligation
on the part of the government to return the property to its owner,
plaintiff herein.As in the case of Lot No. 913-E-3 (expropriated),
the reconveyance/return of Lot No. 913-E-2 and Lot No. 913-E-4 is a
solidary obligation of all the defendants for the same reasons as
already discussed earlier.For the unauthorized use of Lot No.
913-E-3 after the Lahug Airport was abandoned and after plaintiff
tendered her repurchase price, and for the illegal encroachment and
occupation of Lot No. 913-E-2 and Lot No. 913-E-4 by the
government, this Court likewise finds as valid the demand of
plaintiff for rentals on the aforementioned lots.It is an undenial
fact that the government has benefited from the use, occupation,
and possession of these lots; while on the other hand, the
plaintiff herein has suffered from the deprivation thereof. Again,
if we are to live by the sway and dominance of justice, it would
thus be equitable that plaintiff be compensated by the government
in the form of rentals, at least, for after all, no one, not even
the government, is exempted in the eyes of the law.Payment of [the]
rentals should be a joint and several obligation of all the
defendants. . . .The liability of defendant DPWH rests on the facts
[sic] that it is the one which has been in possession and
occupation of these properties. Whereas in the case of defendant
ATO, said defendant through the then BAT was the one which
illegally constructed the fence enclosing the properties. Besides,
because it failed to turnover its facilities, properties, lands,
buildings, etc. to defendant MCIAA, it is still the administrator
and custodian of all these litigated lots.Upon the other hand, the
obligation of defendant MCIAA finds its basis in R.A. 6958, wherein
under this law, specifically Sections 15 and 17 thereof, defendant
MCIAA is supposed to be administering and managing all the
facilities, lands, buildings, and other properties of defendant
ATO. The fact that it has not received even a single property from
defendant ATO does not relieve it from such obligation because the
law (R.A. 6958) is quite specific. Besides, defendant MCIAA should
be doing its job.x x x xOn plaintiffs demand for the abolition of
the fence traversing her Lot No. 913-E-2, the Court hereby directs
defendants DPWH, MCIAA, and ATO to jointly and severally demolish
the same at their own expense. The illegal construction of said
fence has made the government a builder in bad faith under Article
450 of the Civil Code . . . .41 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)On appeal,42 the Court of Appeals, by Decision43 dated
February 17, 2004, affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence,
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari44 filed by MCIAA,
DPWH, and ATO positing that:I. RESPONDENTS MONEY CLAIM MUST BE
FILED WITH THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA).II. PETITIONER MCIAA IS
NOT OBLIGED TO RECONVEY LOT NOS. 913-[3]-2, 913-E-3, AND 913-E-4.
III. PETITIONER MCIAA IS NOT OBLIGED TO PAY RENTALS FOR THE USE OF
THE LOTS.IV. PETITIONER MCIAA IS NOT OBLIGED TO DEMOLISH THE FENCE
TRAVERSING LOT [NO.] 913-E-2.45 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)It bears emphasis that in rendering the appealed judgment,
all that the trial court did was find petitioners liable, providing
the bases therefor. Contrary to petitioners DPWHs and ATOs
undertakings in the January 17, 1990 Compromise Agreement, they
failed to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to respondent despite her return
of the purchase price therefor. Such failure amounts to
expropriation without just compensation.DPWH and the ATO should
thus be held solidarily liable to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to
respondent and pay rentals therefore effective July 8, 1985 when
she tendered/returned the P3,105.00 purchase price.46 Since
respondents cause of action against the ATO with regard to Lot No.
913-E-3 refers to its retention of title thereto despite the
occurrence of the resolutory condition stipulated in the
Conditional Deed of Sale, MCIAAs liability would depend on whether
it is ATOs successor-in-interest with respect to the said lot. Both
the trial court and the appellate court held in the affirmative on
the basis of Republic Act 6958, Section 15 which reads: SECTION 15.
Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible Assets. All existing
public airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other
properties, movable or immovable, belonging to or presently
administered by the airports, and all assets, powers, rights,
interest and privileges relating to airport works or air
operations, including all equipment which are necessary for the
operation of air navigation, aerodrome control towers, crash, fire,
and rescue facilities are hereby transferred to the Authority:
Provided, however, That the operational control of all equipment
necessary for the operation of radio aids to air navigation,
airways communication, the approach control office, and the area
control center shall be retained by the Air Transportation Office.
No equipment, however, shall be removed by the Air Transportation
Office from Mactan without the concurrence of the Authority. The
Authority may assist in the maintenance of the Air Transportation
Office equipment,and of Section 17 which is requoted for
convenience, viz: SECTION 17. Transfer of Liabilities and Debts.
Upon the transfer to and acceptance by the Authority of the
existing physical facilities, intangible assets and completed
projects referred to in the preceding sections, all debts,
liabilities, and obligations of government agencies or entities
concerned in respect of such physical facilities, tangible assets
and completed projects within the airports shall likewise be
assumed by the Authority. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)Petitioners claim, however, as follows: . . . The
provision is clear that it is only upon the transfer to and
acceptance by petitioner MCIAA of a particular physical facility or
property that petitioner MCIAA will assume the obligations of
petitioner ATO over the facility or property.x x x x[I]t is only
upon the transfer to and acceptance by petitioner MCIAA of the lots
can it be said that it assumed the obligations of petitioner ATO
over the lots.47 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis
supplied)To MCIAA, the phrase "upon transfer to and acceptance by"
means that a formal turnover to it of a particular facility by the
ATO and a formal acceptance by it are required before it assumes
the obligations of the ATO thereover. It argues that since ATO
never turned over Lot No. 913-E-3 to it, it cannot be compelled to
assume ATOs obligation to reconvey the same.48Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 6958 is clear, however, that upon its passage, all
existing airport facilities and other properties were thereby
transferred to MCIAA, viz: All existing public airport facilities,
runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or
immovable, belonging to or presently administered by the airports,
and all assets, powers, rights, interest and privileges relating to
airport works or air operations, including all equipment which are
necessary for the operation of air navigation, aerodrome control
towers, crash, fire, and rescue facilities are hereby transferred
to the Authority: (Emphasis supplied)It is a settled rule in
statutory construction thatThe law must not be read in truncated
parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. It
is [a] cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statutes
clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to
produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of
the statute must be considered together with other parts of the
statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.49Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6958 must thus be read
vis a viz Section 15 as well as the other provisions of the said
law. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Hon.
Ferdinand J. Marcos, et al.,50 this Court, passing on Sec. 15 of
Republic Act No. 6958, held:The "airports" referred to [in Section
15] are the "Lahug Air Port" in Cebu City and the "Mactan
International Airport in the Province of Cebu," which belonged to
the Republic of the Philippines, then under the Air Transportation
Office (ATO). It may be reasonable to assume that the term "lands"
refer to "lands" in Cebu City then administered by the Lahug Air
Port and includes the parcels of the land the respondent City of
Cebu seeks to levy on for real property taxes. This section
involves a "transfer" of the "lands," among other things, to the
petitioner and not just the transfer of the beneficial use thereof,
with the ownership being retained by the Republic of the
Philippines. This "transfer" is actually an absolute conveyance of
the ownership thereof because the petitioners authorized capital
stock consists of, inter alia, "the value of such real estate owned
and/or administered by the airports." Hence the petitioner is now
the owner of the land in question. . . . "51 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)Thus, Republic Act No. 6958 transferred Lot
No. 913-E-3 to MCIAA. In another vein, Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 6958 states:Primary Purposes and Objectives The [Mactan-Cebu
International Airport] Authority shall principally undertake the
economical, efficient, and effective control, management and
supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the Province of
Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City hereinafter collectively
referred to as airports, and such other airports as may be
established in the Province of Cebu. In addition, it shall have the
following objectives:(a) To encourage, promote, and develop
international and domestic air traffic in the central Visayas and
Mindanao regions as a means of making the regions centers of
international trade and tourism, and accelerating the development
of the means of transportation and communications in the country;
and (b) To upgrade the services and facilities of the airports and
to formulate internationally acceptable standards of airport
accommodation and service. (Emphasis supplied)If formal transfer
and acceptance of the assets mentioned in Section 15 were needed
before MCIAA could assume the obligations arising therefrom, the
"economical, efficient and effective control, management and
supervision" of the Mactan International Airport and the Lahug
Airport could be impeded by ATO refusing to turn over, and by MCIAA
refusing to accept such assets. MCIAA is thus bound, as ATOs
successor-in-interest, to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3. And it is
solidarily liable with its co-petitioners to pay rentals in arrears
over the said lot. In light of petitioners argument that: . . .
While it is true that R.A. 6958 was signed into law on July 31,
1990, it is equally true that Section 21 of the law provides for
its effectivity fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least
two (2) national newspapers of general circulation, and not fifteen
(15) days from its approval. It was wrong for both courts to
assume, without supporting evidence, that R.A. 6958 was published
in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation on the same
day it was signed into law. (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied),52this Court fixes the effectivity date of the said law
to November 13, 1990, 15 days after it was published in the
Official Gazette.53MCIAA may not be solidarily liable with DPWH and
ATO, however, for the return of Lot Nos. 913-E-2 and 913-E-4 and
for the payment of rentals thereon. These obligations of the DPWH
and the ATO arose from their illegal physical possession of the
said lots up to the present. What Republic Act No. 6958 transferred
from the ATO to MCIAA are the properties owned or administered by
the ATO, not those physically possessed by the ATO. Finally, since
the acts and omissions of the ATO and the DPWH are what compelled
respondent to litigate, only they should be held liable for the
payment of attorneys fees.WHEREFORE, the petition is in PART
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
decision of the trial court, is MODIFIED. As modified, the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:1. Petitioners Department
of Public Works and Highways, Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority, and Air Transportation Office are ordered to solidarily
reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to respondent;2. Petitioners DPWH, MCIAA,
and ATO are ordered to solidarily pay rentals on Lot No. 913-E-3 at
the rate of P20 per square meter per month from July 8, 1985 up to
the present. Payment of rentals on the part of MCIAA shall,
however, be reckoned from November 13, 1990;3. Petitioner DPWH is
ordered to demolish the fence traversing Lot No. 913-E-2; 4.
Petitioner DPWH is ordered to return to respondent Lot Nos. 913-E-2
and 913-E-4; 5. Petitioner DPWH and ATO are ordered to solidarily
pay rentals on Lot Nos. 913-E-2 and 913-E-4, from January 1, 1985
up to the present; and 6. Petitioners ATO and the DPWH are ordered
to solidarily pay attorneys fees in the amount of P300,000.00.SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48612 January 27, 1983CRESENCIO ESPEJO, petitioner,
vs.MARTINO MALATE and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LEYTE, BRANCH I,
respondents. Carlos Mendigo for petitioner. Teodoro E. Atianza for
respondents. VASQUEZ, J.:This is a petition for review on
certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in
Civil Case No. 5036, dismissing the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction after the parties had rested their respective cases.
On January 31, 1974, the plaintiff Cresencio Espejo filed said
civil case against defendant Martino Malate entitled "Quieting of
Title to and Possession of Real Property and Cancellation of Tax
Declaration" before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch I
then presided by Judge Gregorio Collantes. The complaint alleged,
among others, "that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual
possessor of a parcel of coconut land containing an area of 14
hectares, more or less, and assessed at P14,250.00, situated in
Barrio New Kawayan, Tacloban City, which is a portion of Lot No.
5329, Tacloban Cad. No. 220 ... "that the plaintiff acquired said
parcel of land by purchase on May 13, 1963 from the brothers Amando
and Saturnino Saosas and since then and up to the present time he
has been in possession thereof in good faith and with just title,
in concept of owner, uninterruptedly and adversely against the
claims of any individual person or persons whomsoever, paying land
taxes due thereon, and planting coconut trees and introducing
thereon other improvements"; "that the plaintiff's Possession
tacked to that of his predecessors-in-interest over the said land
has been more than forty (40) years, and to proclaim this
possession, the plaintiff had this land declared in his name under
Tax Declaration No. 18316 (which starts with the year 1962) on May
15, 1963"; "that the defendant Martino Malate, a former tenant of
the plaintiff over the land, with evident bad faith, without-the
knowledge, much less consent, of the plaintiff, on December 29,
1964, had a portion of the land declared in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 19484 (which starts with the year 1963); that the
above-cited tax declaration of the defendant, embracing as it does
a portion included within the limits of the land described in
paragraph 3 of the complaint, coupled with the defendant's claim of
ownership of 9.8 hectares therein as described in tax declaration
and his attempt to assume possession thereof by clearing the land
and gathering the coconut therefrom, the latest of which was in
December, 1973, has cast a cloud upon the ownership and possession
by the plaintiff of the lot described in paragraph 3 of the
complaint"; "that plaintiff's Tax Declaration No. 18316, being
based on a bona fide claim of ownership and actual possession which
started on May 13, 1963, and being the older tax declaration,
should prevail over Tax Declaration No. 19484 of the defendant; the
cancellation of the latter tax declaration is in order"; "that a
judicial declaration as to who is the owner and entitled to
possession of the parcel of land is imperative to forestall
breaches of the peace, bodily injury to persons, mayhem or perhaps
even loss of life"; and "that the plaintiff is entitled to have the
cloud cast upon his ownership and lawful possession of the land by
the defendant removed thru a judicial declaration that the
plaintiff is the owner thereof and legally entitled to the
possession thereto." (Rollo, page 27, Record on Appeal, pp. 2-5.)
The defendant Martino Malate, on February 20, 1974, answered the
complaint denying specifically all the allegations therein and
counter-alleged "that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the
land and had been in actual and physical possession thereof, in the
concept of an owner since 1926 introducing improvement thereon." He
also alleged affirmative special defenses and counterclaims. On
November 4, 1974, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground: "(a) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject of
the action or suit; and (b) that the court has no jurisdiction over
the nature of the action or suit. With respect to the first ground,
the defendant argued "that the subject matter of the above-entitled
case is a portion of Lot No. 5329, Tacloban Cad. No. 220, which is
a public land hence, its disposition is governed by the Public Land
Act. Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides
that 'subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have
direct control of survey, classification, lease, sale or any other
form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of
the public domain, and his decision as to questions of facts shall
be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.' It is clear that the Director of Lands has the
jurisdiction over said subject matter, being a public land. "
(Rollo, p. 27, Record on Appeal, pp. 16-17.) The defendant further
concluded that the plaintiff had not exhausted the administrative
remedy available to him of filing the claim in the Bureau of Lands.
As to the second ground, the defendant argued that the action of
the plaintiff was for forcible entry, and was not properly filed,
because when the plaintiff filed the case in January, 1974, it was
only one year from the accrual of the cause of action, which was in
December, 1973, as may be gleaned from the complaint; and that
being a forcible entry case, it must be brought in the proper
municipal or city court, and not in the court of first instance. On
November 18, 1974, the plaintiff filed an opposition to motion to
dismiss arguing that the respondent Court has jurisdiction over the
land in dispute in the matter of deciding as to who, between the
plaintiff or the defendant, has the better right of possession.
Plaintiff points out that the question of who has prior possession
of the land is alleged in paragraphs 4 to 9 of the complaint,
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the answer and paragraph 2 of the affirmative
defenses; that he has alleged that his possession tacked to that of
his predecessors-in-interest has been for more than forty years,
while on the other hand, the defendant has averred that he has been
in possession of the land in question for more than forty- seven
years; that the question presented, therefore, is as to who of them
has prior possession over the controverted land; and that the
action, therefore, is an accion publiciana over which the
respondent Court has jurisdiction, as ruled by the Supreme Court in
Rallon vs. Ruiz, 28 SCRA 332. The respondent Court, on December- 5,
1974, denied the motion to dismiss. On July 16, 1975, it issued an
order requiring the plaintiff to amend the complaint in order to
conform with their claim of possession regarding the property. On
July 31,1975, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint eliminating
therefrom the allegations as to his claim of ownership, and
emphasizing instead his claim of possession. The defendant filed
his opposition to the motion to admit amended complaint on the
following grounds. A. That the amendment sought to be made is a
complete change of the theory of the case both in the complaint and
the evidence so far adduced; B. That the amended complaint
conferred jurisdiction on the Honorable Court but before the said
amendment the Honorable Court did not have jurisdiction to try the
case as envisioned on the original complaint and the evidence so
far adduced; and C. That court cannot admit the said amended
complaint for having no jurisdiction to act on it and that the
amended complaint does not conform to the evidence so far adduced
by the plaintiff. On August 11, 1975, the Court issued an order
admitting the amended complaint reasoning out as follows: ... This
court believes that the plaintiff wanted to emphasize who has the
prior possession of the land in question, the plaintiff or the
defendant. It is admitted that the land in question is a public
land, and that the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the
disposition of the public land conformably with Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. The question of ownership will not be
decided by this court. The only question that will be decided by
this court in this case is, who has the prior possession of the
public land in question. Over this question as to who has prior
possession of the land in question and, therefore, entitled to the
exclusion of the other, this court has jurisdiction as shown by the
decision of the Supreme Court ... (Rollo, p. 27, Record on Appeal,
pp. 45-46.) For the second time, on September 27, 1975, another
motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant on the ground "that
the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the case as the plaintiff has not exhausted the administrative
remedies afforded." It was argued that "there is a pending
administrative investigation of the subject-matter of the case at
bar between the plaintiff and defendant and, therefore, the instant
case should await the resolution of the administrative case." The
defendant was referring to a case wherein he is a protestant, in
the administrative proceeding entitled Cresencio Espejo vs. H. A.
No. 206783 (E-121507) Felipe Mendiola Pastor( transferee), Delia
Pastor (transferee). The plaintiff filed his opposition to the
motion to dismiss, arguing "that the second motion to dismiss filed
by the defendant was based on the same ground as that of the first
motion to dismiss as well as his opposition to the motion to admit
amended complaint; and that the pendency of the case in the Bureau
of Lands is no bar to the present action involving merely the
question of who has prior possession of the land in question. " The
court a quo denied the second motion to dismiss in an order dated
December 16, 1975. On June 18, 1976, after the plaintiff had rested
his case, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on demurrer to
evidence reiterating the grounds raised in his two previous motions
to dismiss. The respondent Court, thru Judge Jesus N. Borromeo
(temporarily presiding the sala vacated. by the retirement of Judge
Collantes), on September 10, 1976, issued an order denying the
defendant's motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence. After the
defendant presented his evidence, the court, thru respondent Judge
Jose P. Arro ,issued an order dated January 23, 1978 dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and declaring the proceedings
taken therein as null and void. In this appeal, the
plaintiff-petitioner raises the following assignment of errors: I.
The trial court erred in holding that, when the court issued an
order to amend the complaint so that the issue of ownership is
deleted from the original complaint and for the amended complaint
to substantially alter the theory of the' tile complaint from-
recovery of the amended complaint does violence to the provision of
Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. II. The trial court erred
in holdieng that it is without jurisdiction and declaring the
proceeding in the case null and void. The defendant-respondent
commented that what was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the
court a quo was an action for reinvindicatoria or action for
ownership; that the action being for ownership or accion
reinvindicatoria is shown by the contents of the prayers of the
complaint itself; and that since the original complaint failed to
allege prior possession, the lower court has no power to place in
the original complaint the theory of prior possession by a mere
stroke of an order to amend the complaint. Both parties were
required to submit their respective memoranda. Only the petitioner
did, and the case was submitted for decision without any memorandum
for the respondents. We agree with the petitioner that the question
of who had prior possession of the land was brought out in the
original complaint. An examination thereof would reveal that there
it contained enough allegations of facts constitutive of the issue
of prior possession The allegations relating to the length and
nature of possession by the plaintiff of the land in question, the
tacking of the plaintiff's possession to that of his
predecessors-in-interest; the adverse claim by the defendant; and
as to whose tax declaration should prevail, support the contention
of the petitioner that the question of "who has prior possession
over the controverted land and is, therefore, entitled to such
possession to the exclusion 'of the other, is contained in the
original complaint. While the said complaint had categorically
alleged a claim of ownership, this Court had had the occasion to
declare such kind of a complaint as an accion publiciana, and to
regard the allegation of ownership therein as a "mere surplusage."
In Molina vs. De Bacud 19 SCRA 956, "(i)n her complaint before the
Court of First Instance of the province (Isabela), respondent
alleged that she was the absolute owner and possessor of these
lands, having inherited them from her mother, Catalina Siccuan;
that in her lifetime her mother was in 'continuous, public, quiet
and adverse possession' of the lands, in the concept of an owner,
and that in 1944 Julian Molina, employing violence, force, strategy
and intimidation,' seized possession of Lot 1 and a part of Lot 2
and cut the trees found therein. As relief, she asked the Court to
declare her the owner of the lands and to order Molina to deliver
to her the lands and products and pay her damages. The petitioners
therein contended "that after finding that the lands in question
are public lands, the trial Court should have dismissed this case
because under Section 4 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 141), the authority to dispose of public lands is vested
exclusively in the Director of Lands. We struck down said argument
as without merit because "the authority given to the Land
Department over the disposition of public land does not exclude the
courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the public
character of the land notwithstanding. This is such an action and
the fact that on her complaint respondent claimed the lands in
ownership did not change the nature of her action. The allegation
of ownership should be regarded as a mere surplusage.In Diaz vs.
Macalinao, 102 Phil. 999, involving substantially similar facts,
this Court ruled that ... (t)he action presented is not one of
ownership, although plaintiffs allege ownership and pray that the
land be declared in their favor... The allegation of ownership and
the prayer therefor may, therefore, be considered as a mere
surplusage and this case be considered as an action for possession.
In Reyes vs. Sta. Maria, 91 SCRA 164, an action to quiet title and
to recover possession, it was held that ... (s)uch an action was
clearly an accion publiciana for the recovery of the right to
possess (possession de jure (if not an accion reivindicatoria)
falling within the lower court's jurisdiction....The lower court
was clearly in error in issuing its dismissal order on its mistaken
notion 'that the allegations of facts are merely constitutive of an
action for unlawful detainer' since the complaint shows on its face
that respondents' refusal to deliver possession of the property was
due to their adverse claim of ownership of the same property and
their counter allegation that they bought the same ... and,
therefore, petitioners' jurisdiction was clearly one for recovery
of their right to possess the property (possession de jure ... .)'
(See also Medina vs. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 278; Ledesma v Marcos, 9
Phil. 618.) Scrutinizing the allegations in the original complaint
in the light of foregoing pronouncements of this Court, the
conclusion comes easy that while the question of ownership was
raised in the original complaint, the said pleading likewise placed
at issue the question of who had the better or prior right of
possession. It has been a recognized principle of law in our
jurisdiction that the courts have jurisdiction to determine who has
prior possession of public land and entitled to be protected in
such possession. (Rallon vs. Ruiz, Jr., 28 SCRA 332; Pitargue vs.
Sorella, 92 Phil 5; Molina vs. De Bacud 19 SCRA 956; Villaflor vs.
Reyes, 22 SCRA 385; Madamba vs. Araneta, 106 Phil. 103; Bueno vs.
Patanao, 9 SCRA 794: Angcao vs. Punzalan, 12 SCRA 706; and Aguilon
vs. Bohol, 79 SCRA 482.) Section 15 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
provides that "all pleadings shall be liberally construed so as to
do substantial justice." The original complaint of the petitioner,
entitled, "Quieting of Title to and Possession of Real Property and
Cancellation of Tax Declaration" could properly be construed as a
plenary action to recover possession or an accion publiciana in
addition to its being one for recovery of ownership. As the
petitioner correctly argued, "there were two (2) issues brought out
in the original complaint the principal one, the issue of ownership
over the land in dispute, and the secondary but no less important
one, the issue of who has prior possession thereof. Over the first
issue, the trial court undoubtedly has no jurisdiction, the land in
question being a public land, but over the second, the trial court
undoubtedly has jurisdiction. The lower court, therefore,
erroneously held that it is devoid of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action in declaring that the petitioner's action is
solely to quiet title or to recover ownership of real
property.1wph1.t The issue of who has the prior possession being
unmistakably alleged in the original complaint, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the case insofar as said issue is
concerned. Jurisdiction of the courts is conferred and governed by
law (Leoquinco vs. Canada Dry Bottling Co., 37 SCRA 535), and is
determined by the pleadings (Pineda vs. CFI of Davao, 1 SCRA 1020),
whether it be jurisdiction over the subject, matter or jurisdiction
over the nature of the action. "Jurisdiction of a court over the
subject matter ... should not be made to depend on the literal
averments of the complaint-indirectly on the ability of the parties
to word or phrase their pleadings where the actual issues are
evident from the record of the case." (Leoquinco vs. Canada Dry
Bottling Co., supra). The trial court having acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter as well as over the nature of the action on
the original complaint, it could validly issue an order to amend
the original complaint. The deletion of the issue of ownership from
the original complaint and the amended complaint having limited the
issue to prior possession did not substantially alter the theory of
the complaint. In determining whether a different cause of action
is introduced by amendments to the complaint, what is to be
ascertained is whether the defendants shall be required o answer
for a liability or legal obligation wholly different from that
which was stated in the original complaint. Any amendment will not
be considered as stating a new cause of action if the fact alleged
in the amended complaint show substantially the same wrong with
respect to the same transaction, or if what is alleged refer to the
same matter but are more fully and differently stated, or where
averment which were implied and made in express, and the subject of
the controversy or the liability sought to be enforced remains the
same. (Rubio vs. Mariano, 49 SCRA 319.) Besides, a superficial
examination of the original complaint, and the amended complaint
would show that both pleadings are virtually Identical. The only
difference was that the words "absolute owner" were delete from the
original complaint, and "prior right of possession" emphasized and
particularized in the ammended complaint. As a matter of fact,
notwithstanding the new reglementary period given to the defendant
within, which to answer the amended complaint, he opted not to file
a new answer and instead relied on his original answer.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby
granted. The order dated January 23, 1978 of the respondent Judge
is hereby annulled and set-aside, and the trial court is ordered to
render judgment on the merits of the case. Costs against private
respondent. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171277 February 15, 2007ALMARIO BEJAR (Deceased), as
substituted by his heirs - CARMELITA BEJAR, ALFREDO BEJAR, GREGORIA
B. DANCEL, BRENDA B. MIANO, LOURDES B. BENDIJO, and SUSANA B.
CAMILO, Petitioners, vs.MARICEL CALUAG, Respondent.D E C I S I O
NSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:Before us is the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated May 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 85430. The factual
backdrop of the case is as follows:On August 2, 2002, the late
Almario Bejar, substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners, filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 12, Manila, a
complaint for illegal detainer and damages against Maricel Caluag,
herein respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 173262-CV. The
allegations therein are partly reproduced hereunder:x x x4.
Plaintiff is the owner of a residential house made of light
materials consisting of wood and galvanized iron roof built on
government-owned land located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila.5.
On December 21, 1981, plaintiff sold one-half (1/2) portion of the
said residential house with an area of twenty-two feet in length
and fifteen feet in width to Fernando Mijares in the amount of
Eleven Thousand (P11,000.00) Pesos x x x6. Subsequently, plaintiff
became the owner in fee simple of the government land where his
residential house was built including the one-half portion he sold
to Fernando Mijares, located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila,
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 156220 registered
and entered in the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 30, 1983 x
x x7. On September 2, 1991, Fernando Mijares, sold his residential
house to Maricel Caluag with residence address at 1391 R.A. Reyes
St., Tondo, Manila to be used as a warehouse for her business x x
x8. Plaintiff badly needs the portion of his land occupied by the
defendant to build a residential house for use of his family;9. On
April 9, 2002, plaintiff through counsel sent a formal demand
letter to defendant for the latter to vacate the portion of the
property situated at 777 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila within ten
(10) days from receipt of the demand letter x x x10. Despite formal
demand from the plaintiff on April 19, 2002, defendant failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to vacate said portion of the
property owned by the plaintiff located at 777 Coral Street, Tondo,
Manila to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff. x x xOn October
15, 2002, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it involves the issue
of ownership. On February 10, 2003, respondent filed a supplement
to her motion to dismiss alleging that pursuant to the "Kasulatan
ng Bilihan ng Bahay," Almario Bejar sold to Fernando Mijares both
his house and the entire lot on which it was constructed, citing
paragraph 4 of the "Kasulatan" which reads:Na alang alang sa
halagang LABING ISANG LIBO PISO (P11,000.00) kuartang Filipino na
kasasalukuyang gastahin na aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahang loob
kay FERNANDO MIJARES x x x ay aking ipinagbili, ibinigay, isinulit
at inilipat ng buo kong pagaari na kalahating harapan ng bahay ko
naipaliwanag sa itaas at ang pagbibili kong ito ay kasama ang lahat
kong karapatan sa lupa kung may karapatan ako na kinatitirikan ng
bahay.2 On June 16, 2003, the MeTC issued an Order dismissing Civil
Case No. 173262-CV for want of jurisdiction, holding that the
actual issue between the parties is the enforceability of the
subsequent sale by Fernando Mijares to respondent of the subject
property; and that, therefore, jurisdiction properly lies with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). On appeal, the RTC, Branch 47, Manila,
on January 5, 2004, rendered its Decision reversing the Order of
dismissal of the MeTC. The RTC held that the issue in Civil Case
No. 173262-CV is who has better possession of the disputed
property. The RTC then directed the MeTC to hear the case on the
merits.Respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration but
it was denied. Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85430.In its
Decision dated May 23, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC
judgment, thus:WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila, in Civil Case No. 03-107631 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order, dated 16 June 2003, of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
12. Manila in Civil Case No. 173262-CV, dismissing Almario Bejars
complaint for lack of jurisdiction is hereby REINSTATED.Let this
case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila for further proceedings pursuant
to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court.SO ORDERED.The
appellate court held that the allegations of the complaint do not
make out a case for illegal detainer or forcible entry.Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision but in its
Resolution dated January 27, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the
same.Hence, the instant petition.For our resolution is the issue of
whether the MeTC has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 173262-CV for
illegal detainer.There are four (4) remedies available to one who
has been deprived of possession of real property. These are: (1) an
action for unlawful detainer; (2) a suit for forcible entry; (3)
accion publiciana; and (4) accion reinvidicatoria. In unlawful
detainer and forcible entry cases, the only issue to be determined
is who between the contending parties has better possession of the
contested property.3 Pursuant to Section 33 (2) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, it is
the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts in Cities,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts that exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over these cases. The proceedings are governed by the
Rule on Summary Procedure, as amended. By contrast, an accion
publiciana, also known as accion plenaria de posesion,4 is a
plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil
proceeding in order to determine the better and legal right to
possess, independently of title.5 There are two distinctions
between the summary ejectment suits (unlawful detainer and forcible
entry) and accion publiciana. The first lies in the period within
which each one can be instituted. Actions for unlawful detainer and
forcible entry must be filed within one year from the date
possession is lost, while an accion publiciana may be filed only
after the expiration of that period but within the period
prescribed in the statute of limitations. The second distinction
involves jurisdiction. An accion publiciana may only be filed with
the RTC, while a complaint for unlawful detainer or forcible entry
may only be filed with the first level courts earlier
mentioned.1awphi1.netAn accion reinvidicatoria, unlike the three
remedies previously discussed, involves not only possession, but
ownership of the property. The plaintiff in this action sets up
title in him and prays that he be declared the owner and be given
possession thereof.6 Otherwise put, the plaintiff alleges ownership
of real property and prays for recovery of such ownership. Under
Article 434 of the Civil Code, two things must be alleged and
proven in an accion reinvidicatoria: (1) the identity of the
property and (2) plaintiffs title to it. Sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases for accion reinvidicatoria is vested in the
RTC.We are guided by the elementary principle that what determines
the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction
over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of
the relief sought.7 To make out a suit for illegal detainer or
forcible entry, the complaint must contain two mandatory
allegations: (1) prior physical possession of the property by the
plaintiff; and (2) deprivation of said possession by another by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.8 This
latter requirement implies that the possession of the disputed
property by the intruder has been unlawful from the very start.
Then, the action must be brought within one year from the date of
actual entry to the property or, in cases where stealth was
employed, from the date the plaintiff learned about it.9 An
examination of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No.
173262-CV does not show that Almario Bejar was deprived of his
possession of the property by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth. Here, the case is for unlawful detainer. The complaint
clearly alleges that Almario Bejar sold one-half portion of his
house to Fernando Mijares; that the latter, in turn, sold the same
portion of the house to respondent; that eventually, Almario Bejar
became the owner in fee simple of the entire lot where his house
was built; that he needs the portion of the lot occupied by
respondent for the construction of a house for the use of his
family; and that despite demand, respondent failed and still fails
to vacate the premises. From the records, it appears that Almario
Bejar filed his complaint within one year from the date of his last
demand upon respondent to vacate the contested portion of the
land.A suit for unlawful detainer will prosper if the complaint
sufficiently alleges that there is a withholding of possession or
refusal to vacate the property by a defendant.10 The cause of
action arises from the expiration or termination of the defendants
right to continue possession which is upon plaintiffs demand to
vacate the premises. The complaint for unlawful detainer must then
be instituted within one year from the date of the last demand.11
All these incidents are present in the instant case.Considering
that the allegations in Almario Bejars complaint in Civil Case No.
173262-CV show that it is one for illegal detainer, hence, it is
the MeTC, Branch 12, Manila which has jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 173262-CV.WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. The RTC Decision is
AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the MeTC,
Branch 12, Manila, for further proceedings with dispatch. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116192 November 16, 1995EUFEMIA SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS and GENEROSA S. CRUZ, respondents.REGALADO,
J.:The judgment promulgated on February 28, 1994 by respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R SP No. 32263 1 reversing the decision of
the regional trial court, as well as its resolution of June 29,
1994 denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are
assailed in this petition for review on certiorari.This case
originated from a complaint for ejectment with damages filed by
herein private respondent Generosa S. Cruz, as plaintiff, against
herein petitioner Eufemia Sarmiento, as defendant, in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan as Civil Case
No. 899, which complaint alleges these material facts:xxx xxx xxx2.
That the plaintiff acquired by purchase a parcel of land known as
Lot No. 2-A of the subd. plan, Psd-03-0345 being a portion of Lot
2, covered by TCT No. T-147219, located at Bo. Mabuco, Hermosa,
Bataan, containing as area of 280 square meters, xerox copy of the
title is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof and for taxation
purposes, the same is declared in the name of the plaintiff, xerox
copy of the tax declaration is hereto attached as Annex "B" of this
complaint;3. That the adjacent lot of plaintiff is still owned by
the family of Atty. Gonzalo Nuguid but the same is being used and
occupied by the defendant where a house was constructed thereon;4.
That when the plaintiff caused the relocation of her lot herein
mentioned, it was found out by the Geodetic Engineer that the
defendant is encroaching on her lot for about 71 square meters,
copy of the relocation sketch by said surveyor is hereto attached
as Annex "C" hereof;5. That when the plaintiff talked to the
defendant that she would like to remove the old fence so that she
could construct a new fence which will cover the true area of her
property, the defendant vehemently refused to let the plaintiff
remov(e) the said fence and menacingly alleged that if plaintiff
remove(d) the said fence to construct a new one, she would take
action against the plaintiff legally or otherwise;6. For fear that
plaintiff may be charged in court should she insist on removing the
fence encroaching on her property, plaintiff now seeks judicial
relief;7. That plaintiff refer(red) this matter to the Katarungang
Pambarangay of Mabuco for settlement, however, the efforts of the
Lupon Tagapamayapa turned futile, as evidenced by a certification
to file action issued by the Lupon secretary and attested by the
Lupon Chairman, copy of the certification to file action is hereto
attached as Annex "D" hereof;8. Plaintiff as much as possible would
like to avoid court litigation because she is poor but nevertheless
she consulted the undersigned counsel and a demand letter was sent
to the defendant for conference and/or settlement but the defendant
stood pat that she will not allow the removal of the fence, thus
depriving the plaintiff of the use and possession of the said
portion of her lot (71 square meters) which is being occupied by
the defendant for several years, xerox copy of the demand letter is
hereto attached as Annex "E" of this complaint;9. That by virtue of
the willful refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiff to have
the fence dismantled and/or to be removed, the plaintiff is
deprived of the possession and she was forced to hire the services
of counsel for which she contracted to pay the sum of P2,000.00
plus acceptance of P1,000.00 until the termination of this case
before this Honorable Court. 2xxx xxx xxxOn January 21, 1993, the
trial court, on motion, issued an order giving the defendant to
file her answer to the complaint. 3 This was opposed by the
plaintiff therein on the ground that Section 15(e) of the Rule on
Summary Procedure does not allow the filing of motion for extension
of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other papers. 4
Nonetheless, defendant filed on January 29, 1993 her "Answer with
Motion to Dismiss." 5 Plaintiff filed and ex-parte motion
reiterating her contention that the filing by defendant of her
aforesaid answer with motion was barred for reason that her
preceding motion for extension of time to file an answer is a
prohibited pleading. 6 On February 4, 1993, the trial court,
finding merit in plaintiff's ex-parte motion, ordered that
defendant's answer be stricken from the records for having been
filed out of time. 7 The case was then submitted for decision.On
February 18, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision with the
following decretal portion:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the
latter:1. To vacate the area being encroached (upon) by the
defendant and allowing the plaintiff to remove the old fence
permanently and (to) make the necessary enclosure of the area
pertaining to the herein plaintiff containing an area of 280 square
meters, more or less;2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P1,500.00 as attorney's fees. No pronouncement as to
damages;3. To pay the cost(s) of this suit. 8 (Corrections in
parentheses supplied.)Defendant filed a motion for the
reconsideration of said judgment, but the same was denied by the
trial court for lack of merit in its order dated March 2, 1993. 9On
appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan Bataan, Branch 5,
in Civil Case No DH-121-93, defendant assailed the jurisdiction of
the court a quo. On June 21, 1993, said lower appellate court
rendered judgment, stating in part as follows:A perusal of the
records of the case and the memorandum of appeal of the adversaries
led this court to the opinion that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the instant appealed case
based on (the) reason that the said case should be one of question
of ownership or accion rei(vin)dicatoria rather than that of
forcible entry as the(re) was no allegation of prior possession by
the plaintiff (of) the disputed lot as required by law and
jurisprudence. Absence of allegations and proof by the plaintiff in
forcible entry case of prior possession of the disputed lot (sic)
cannot be said that defendant dispossesses her of the same, thus,
the legal remedy sought by the plaintiff is not the proper one as
it should have been accion publiciana or accion rei(vin)dicatoria,
as the case may be, and the forum of which is the Regional Trial
Court.This Court declines to venture into other issues raised by
the defendant/appellant considering that the resolution on
jurisdiction renders the same moot and academic. 10 (Corrections in
parentheses ours.)Therein plaintiffs motion for reconsideration
having been denied in said lower court's order dated August 12,
1993, 11 she elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a
petition for review on certiorari, purportedly on pure questions of
law. This Court, treating the petition as a special civil action
for certiorari, referred the case to respondent Court of Appeals
for proper determination and disposition pursuant to Section 9(1)
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. 12On February 28, 1994, the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 13 reversing the
decision of the regional trial court and reinstating that of the
municipal circuit trial court, hence the present petition.The chief
issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of origin had
jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Well-settled is the rule
that