Project Management Task

PROJECT MANAGEMENT TASK

A Legal Aspect Study of Constructions Failure

By :

Alfia Magfirona (D100102004)

CIVIL ENGINEERING FACULTY

MUHAMMADIYAH UNIVERSITY OF SURAKARTA

2012

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CASE 1

Tropicana Casino Parking GarageAtlantic City, New Jersey - October 30, 2003

I. INTRODUCTION

At 10:40 a.m. EST on October 30, 2003, part of the Tropicana Casino Parking Garage in Atlantic City, New Jersey crashed to the ground (See Figure #1). As the name suggests, the structure served the purpose of a parking facility for the Tropicana Casino and Resort. The structure was incomplete at the time of the crash, yet had an expected completion date of March the following year. The project began in April of 2002 and its design was composed or various aspect that referenced Old Havana, Cuba. The crash came to a group of unsuspecting workers who were pouring concrete at the time. Of the 300-400 workers at the sight, over 20 were injured and 4 were found dead. Five of the building's ten stories collapsed as a result of a failure to provide adequate temporary supports until the concrete dried. Also, the steel reinforcements in the concrete were not properly anchored to its supporting columns.

Figure #1: Image showing the front facade of the Tropicana Casino Parking Garage after the collapse (Courtesy of the D'Amato Law Firm).

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II. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE COLLAPSE

Parking Garage BackgroundThe Tropicana Parking Garage collapse occurred during the construction of the 2,400-space lot (“4 Dead,” 2003, 2). The ten-story garage was part of a thirteen-story structure that included a 502-room hotel (Murphy, 2003, 1)(CTL)(Lipton “Workers,” 2003, 1). The construction included stay-in-place precast, pre-stressed formwork as well as a cast-in-place composite floor system. Cast-in-place columns and sheer walls were connected with mild steel reinforced rebar (CTL). The garage was a partially precast, pour-in-place reinforced concrete structure (Foley 1).

Hotel ExpansionThe expansion of the Tropicana hotel was led by the Keating Construction Corporation (Murphy, 2003, 2). The project contractor was Fabi Construction Incorporated of Egg Harbor Township, NJ (Lipton “OSHA,” 2004, 1). The undertaking was intended to evoke images of Old Havana Cuba (“4 Dead,” 2003, 2). Building of the $245 million expansion began in April of 2002 and was expected to be completed in 2004 (“4 Dead,” 2003, 2)(Murphy, 2003, 2).

Design and Later Alterations

The original design was altered during construction, an event that has been pegged as a leading component of the collapse. The original design included 2.5” thick precast concrete panels reinforced with metal wire trusses (Foley 1). Styrofoam blocks were employed to create void spaces in the concrete (Foley 1). Assembly occurred one 44’ bay at a time. The design changes included individual rods of rebar being swapped for factory-made, 8’ mats of rebar (Lipton “Changes,” 2004, 2). Additionally, the beams were made shallower and wider (Lipton “Changes,” 2004, 2)

Just Before the CollapseA group of between 300 and 400 workers were on the construction site Thursday October 30th working to pour concrete (Murphy, 2003, 1). Several days earlier, some of the workers had noticed a few issues with some of the construction that had already been completed. There were numerous cracks in some of the recently poured concrete floors and as well as some of the bent vertical poles that supported these floors (Hanley, 2003). These workers made the contractors aware of the dangerous construction flaws, however the issues were ignored (Lipton “OSHA,” 2004, 1).

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Figure #2: An axial view of the parking garage showing the top floor as it caved into the other floors yet remained hinged on one side (Courtesy of the D'Amato Law Firm).

III. CAUSES OF THE FAILURE

Collapsing Details:A worker was using a crane-mounted hose to pour a 60 feet wide area of concrete floor. At this moment in construction, the supports are under the most intense amount of stress because the wet concrete cannot support itself and it also contains the added weight of the unevaporated water in the concrete. Wet concrete weighs about 160 pounds per square foot (Lipton “Changes,” 2004, 2). Half a dozen metal pogo-stick-like pole devices that temporarily hold up the concrete floors until they harden enough to support themselves had somehow been bent out of shape. This implied that the floors were slightly moving (Lipton “Workers,” 2003, 1). After these poles snapped, after ten o’clock in the morning, the building started to collapse (“4 Dead,” 2003, 1) when a concrete floor on the top level began to fail (See Figure #2). Next, the complex experienced a domino effect. Several precast form works as well some of the composite floors

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began to fail on multiple levels of the building. In total, five stories of the parking garage collapsed. Only the columns and sheer walls around the perimeter remained standing (CTL). The collapse stopped at fifth floor and the walls below absorbed the force of the collapse (Foley 2).

Structural Failure:The failure occurred somewhere between the outer walls and the wide slab panels (See Figure #3). The columns failed either at or below the floor being poured. As weight in the building transferred, the remaining column and floor connections sheared on the outer wall, causing a lean-to collapse pattern between the first and second bays (Foley 2).

Figure #3: The front facade of the existing casino complex and the adjacent site of the building failure (Courtesy of the D'Amato Law Firm).

IV. CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS

The sources used in this article have been compared and compiled with one another. The CNN.com article “4 Dead” claimed that the actual time of the crash was 10:30 am EST. The others, including Jarret Murphy’s article “4th Body Found In Garage Collapse,” said that the building fell at 10:40 am EST. The latter is assumed in this article.

V. PREVENTION

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The Tropicana Casino Parking Garage collapse could have easily been prevented. Several workers reported the initial splices in some of the concrete floors and columns (Lipton “OSHA,” 2004, 1). The contractors could have paid close attention to these warning signs and investigated the possibility that they could fail. Instead, these signs were merely ignored.

VI. CONSEQUENCES

Immediate ConsequencesWhen the garage collapsed, the top floors sloped precariously. (Murphy, 2003, 1) The building shifted a total of 3 inches after the collapse. By the time it had settled enough for rescuers to enter, almost a week had passed. ("4 Dead," 2003, 1) 2 people were immediately found dead, while one was rushed to the hospital where he later passed away. A fourth victim was later found dead on the site. (Murphy, 2003, 1)

Secondary ConsequencesThe construction company was fined $119,500. These fines included 1 willful and 8 serious violations of safety standards. (Lipton "OSHA," 2004, 1) The Tropicana Casino remained open during and after the parking garage collapse. (Murphy, 2003, 2)

Tropicana Parking Garage Investigation Violation Summary

Company Violation Description Penalty

Fabi Construction

Willful

Formwork not erected, supported, braced and maintained so that it would be capable of supporting without failure all vertical and lateral loads that may reasonably be anticipated to be applied to the formwork.

$70,000

Fabi Construction

SeriousReinforcing Steel was not properly installed to allow floors to be secured to columns and sheer wall.

$7,000

Fabi Construction

Serious Shoring plans were not available $7,000

Fabi Construction

SeriousNo inspections of shoring and re-shoring prior to and during concrete pour.

$7,000

Fabi Construction

Serious Shore heads not in firm contact with foundations and forms. $5,000

Fabi Construction

SeriousProper test not performed to determine if concrete gained sufficient strength.

$2,500

Keating Building Serious Formwork not erected, supported, braced and maintained so $7,000

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Constructionthat it would be capable of supporting without failure all vertical and lateral loads that may reasonably be anticipated to be applied to the formwork.

Mitchell Bar Placement

SeriousReinforcing steel and welded wire mesh not properly installed to allow floors to be secured to columns and sheer wall

$7,000

Site Blauvelt Engineers

SeriousInspectors did not ensure that reinforcing steel was installed properly

$7,000

VII. CAUSES

The blame for the failure of the Tropicana Garage has been cast upon many aspects of the building project. The design underwent a series of changes that have been pinpointed as the cause of the failure (Lipton “Changes,” 2004, 1). For example, the columns were made smaller and support beams were moved in the design revisions (Lipton “Changes,” 2004, 2). However, Stephen V. DeSimone—a structural engineer—contended that the problem was in the execution of design, not in the design itself (Lipton “Changes,” 2004 1). In the end, OSHA found that the way the construction plan was executed was flawed, essentially causing the collapse (Lipton “OSHA,” 2004, 2).

The issue with the implementation of the design started with faulty installation of the concrete forms. Also, the way prefabricated steel reinforcement rods and an underlying beam in the garage floors were connected to six critical outer vertical columns made it destined to collapse (See Figure #4). Many of the steel connections were insufficient and therefore could not support the weight of the floor (Lipton “Changes,” 2004, 1). The rebar mats were not placed far enough into the columns and so they were not anchored securely. This problem occurred on all of the upper floors (Lipton “Changes,” 2004, 2). The horizontal reinforcing steel, or rebar mesh should have been pushed farther into the column. Also, more of these bars should have overlapped with the column line (Lipton “OSHA,” 2004, 2). Another problem dealt with the fact that there were insufficient amounts of shoring or support used to hold up the un-solidified concrete floors. Some of the workers noticed that the shoring was bowing and even cracking but were told to keep working (Lipton “Changes,” 2004, 2).

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VIII. WHAT DID THE INDUSTRY LEARN FROM THE EVENT

Earlier Corporation FailuresThe Fabi Construction company had a history of incidence and fatal accidents related to their building endeavors. In June 1995, a worker was moving concrete slabs and fell 100 feet down an elevator shaft because the floor he was standing on collapsed – he died upon impact (Lipton “Changes,” 2004, 2). Again, in October 2002, several workers were injured when a prefabricated concrete panel collapsed (Murphy, 2003 2). On both these occasions, Fabi Construction was issued a series of fines. According to Jim Moran, director of the Philadelphia OSHA branch (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), the role of Fabi Construction in the Tropicana incident “…is even more egregious [because] it is a repeat offender. If you are going to keep fining people for killing other people, on its face, that is ridiculous” (Lipton “Changes,” 2004, 2). Although the guilt for this terrible accident should rest with Fabi Construction, the building

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Figure #4: Close up of the crumbling levels (Courtesy of the D'Amato Law Firm).

industry should learn as a whole to value both in mind and in practice human life. A potential industry improvement could be to better regulate construction companies who are repeat offenders in incidents involving fatalities. Unfortunately, there is no evidence of this change in practice.

Lessons NOT LearnedTo this day, cost effectiveness is one of the top priorities during the design and construction of any building. In the case of the Tropicana Casino Parking Garage, the decision was made to switch from individual rebar rods to rebar mats (Lipton “Changes,” 2004, 2). This option—despite being more cost efficient—inevitably lead, in part, to the collapse. It is highly possible, therefore, that companies after this particular crash, as well as in the future, will make design decisions based more so on cost than on structural soundness and long-term stability.

IX. CONCLUSION

The Tropicana Casino Parking Garage collapsed on October 30, 2003 at 10:40 EST as a result of poor construction techniques. The top five of the ten stories collapsed due to inadequate temporary supports and improperly anchored steel reinforcements in the concrete. The collapse caused 20 injuries and 4 deaths. Fabi Construction, Keating Building Construction, Mitchell Bar Placement, and Site Blauvelt Engineers were charged with a total of $119,500 in violations. One must balance cost effectiveness against structural stability in order to prevent tragedy. The fact that Fabi Construction had a negative record regarding fatal collapses in the past should have set off a red flag to the client. The design, construction, and eventual collapse of the parking garage collectively prove how important each aspect building a structure really is.

X. BIBLIOGRAPHY

http://www.c-t-l.com/template_project.asp?topic=2603 http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?

p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=10810 http://www.fireengineering.com/index/articles/display/202588/articles/fire-engineering/

volume-157/issue-2/features/parking-garage-under-construction-collapses.html http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/27/nyregion/suit-cites-building-flaws-in-garage-

collapse.html?pagewanted=1 http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/nyregion/changes-in-design-preceded-collapse-of-

casino-garage.html?pagewanted=all&pagewanted=prin http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/30/nyregion/osha-cites-4-companies-in-parking-garage-

collapse.html?pagewanted=1 http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/09/nyregion/workers-sensed-danger-before-collapse-of-

parking-garage.html?pagewanted=1 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/10/30/national/main580958.shtml >. http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/10/30/garage.collapse/index.html http://www.damatolawfirm.com/CM/Custom/Tropicana-Images.asp

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CASE 2

Disaster Kansas City

An Historical Look at the 1981 Hyatt Regency Collapse

This article will provide background and an overview of the collapse and its aftermath. On August 25, 2006, the KCMBA will host a CLE at KCMBA Bar Headquarters, which will feature a roundtable discussion focusing on the litigation that followed the disaster. Attending the roundtable discussion will be The Honorable U.S. District Judge Scott O. Wright, who presided over the federal case, former Jackson County Circuit Court Judge Timothy D. O'Leary, who presided over the state case, and a number of attorneys who represented plaintiffs and defendants in the litigation.

Source: http://s0.wp.com/ www.sjblaw.com

A Festive Evening Turns Tragic

On Friday July 17, 1981, a crowd of more than 2,000 gathered in the spacious atrium of the newly built Hyatt Regency Hotel for a popular summer tea dance. The band played Duke Ellington's "Satin Doll" while dancers gathered on and under three massive walkways spanning the atrium. Dancing turned to disaster at 7:05 p.m. when the fourth-floor walkway collapsed onto the second-floor walkway below. The second-floor walkway then collapsed sending tons of concrete and debris onto an atrium floor crowded with tea dance participants. Many of the more than 100 people dancing or standing on the two collapsing walkways were hurled into the air and fell onto the floor below. Dozens of people were trapped beneath the remains of the two walkways.

A large scale rescue operation soon unfolded. Heroes of the evening ranged from a husband who pulled his wife's trapped foot from the wreckage, to a surgeon who performed an emergency

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amputation to save a trapped and bleeding victim, to construction crew workers who toiled throughout the night clearing the debris. A local crane company arrived at the scene to remove sections of collapsed walkway. Dispatchers called in emergency vehicles from throughout the city. Outlying cities such as Belton and Lee's Summit offered help within minutes of the dispatch calls. Victims were rushed to four nearby hospitals. Donors poured into the Greater Kansas City Community Blood Center. Local talk-show host Walt Bodine broadcast throughout the night. As late as midnight, excavators were trying to reach over a dozen people still trapped under the debris. At 5 a.m., workers uncovered the final 31 bodies from the last slab of concrete to be removed. Local lawyers John Alder from Overland Park and John Walter Bergman, Jr. of then Morrison, Hecker, Curtis, Kuder & Parrish were among the names of the deceased.

Despite the efforts of the hundreds involved in the rescue operation, the ultimate outcome proved dire. The next day, the Kansas City Times reported 42 killed in the disaster with dozens injured. In the days following the collapse, the number of deaths rose to 114, with over 200 people injured. The Hyatt collapse would unfold as one of the most deadly events in Kansas City history and one of the worst structural engineering disasters the nation has ever seen.

The Aftermath - Litigation

In the days and months following the Hyatt disaster, investigators, reporters, engineers and lawyers would descend upon the disaster area to undertake the critical process of determining the cause of the walkway collapse. Area lawyers were quick to begin the discovery process. Shortly after the disaster, Max Foust filed motions to permit photos and inspections of the atrium which had been closed since the disaster. Orders also focused on the storage of the remains of the skywalks.

After the disaster, local law firms took seriously the potential conflicts and emotional issues involved in representing clients in the disaster. Given the death of attorney John Walter Bergman, Jr., Morrison, Hecker, Curtis, Kuder & Parrish decided not to represent any defendants in the case. Ironically, the firm's future merger partner, Stinson, Mag & Fizzell would take a lead role in representing defendants. The well-known defense firm of Shook Hardy & Bacon decided to take on several plaintiff's cases. Blackwell, Sanders, Matheny, Weary & Lombardy represented the project manager and one of the related insurance companies, putting Blackwell lawyer William H. Sanders on the opposite side of the case from the family of his friend John Alder, a lawyer from Overland Park who died in the disaster.

Numerous lawsuits were filed in Jackson County Circuit Court, naming a wide array of defendants, including Hyatt Corp., the Crown Center Redevelopment Corp., the project managers, architects, contractors, and steel workers and even the city of Kansas City. Due to the volume of cases and number of attorneys, a state court plaintiffs' committee was formed consisting of Patrick McLarney, Max Foust, Lantz Welch, John Shamberg, Norman Sanders, Preston Williams, Brent Snapp, Patrick Kelly, Clayton Chittim and William Partin.

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On September 1, 1981, Washington D.C. lawyer Irving Younger, along with Overland Park attorney Robert Gordon, filed a class action law suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The latter suit asked the Western District Court to certify Molly Riley as the class representative for all business invitees present at the time of the skywalk collapse.

The class action suits named numerous defendants, including Duncan Architects Inc., later found to play a pivotal role in the disaster. Demands for damages reached levels as high as $237.8 million in actuals and $39 million in punitives for a 34-year-old woman paralyzed from the neck down. The number of individual cases filed would reach the point that communal proceedings in Jackson County Circuit Court included over 70 attorneys. By November 1981, more than $3 billion in damages had been pled in lawsuits surrounding the incident, and the first settlements were reached-three wrongful death cases settled for approximately $700,000.

At the beginning of the litigation process, numerous techniques were employed by the courts and lawyers to manage the onslaught of tort litigation. In state court, for example, Judge Donald Mason consolidated all circuit court cases under a single judge who would handle discovery and oversee standard interrogatories and requests for production. These efforts, however, would soon be overshadowed by the controversy brewing in the Western District class action suit.

A UMKC Law Review Symposium on the Hyatt Disaster from winter 1984 detailed the divisive nature of the Federal class action. Those in favor of the class action argued that a Federal class action would save time by resolving liability issues and handling contentious punitive damages issues. At the time, Missouri case law was thought to bar duplicative punitive damages judgments against the same defendant. Proponents of the class action were also concerned about the order of settlement playing a dominant role in damages received by plaintiffs. On the other hand, those against the class action feared that a class action would result in longer periods for payment, hinder settlements and thwart attorney representation of individual plaintiffs. Prior to the decision on class certification, the parties had settled 121 bodily injury and wrongful death claims through the payment of over $18 million dollars.

In January of 1982, Judge Wright certified a mandatory non-opt-out Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class action on the issues of liability, punitive damages, and compensatory damages. A Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action was also certified for the issue of punitive damages. Although Molly Riley was the initial class representative, she was found to lack diversity from two of the defendants.2 The court, however, determined that four of the plaintiffs did have the requisite diversity and named plaintiffs Stover, Vrabel, Grigsby and Abernathy as class representatives. (Grigsby, Vrabel and Abernathy would later be deleted as class represents due to lack of diversity or settlements.) Settlement activity temporarily stopped.

The class ruling resulted in three distinct advocacy groups in the Federal class action. The plaintiffs, led by attorneys Irving Younger, Robert Gordon and Robert Collins, the defendants

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led by attorneys Robert Driscoll, Joseph Sherman and Michael Waldeck, and the "plaintiffs-intervenors" lead by Patrick McLarney, John Shamberg, and Max Foust. The plaintiffs-intervenors, along with some of the defendants, moved to dismiss the motion for class certification.

Plaintiffs-intervenors would also move to disqualify Judge Wright from presiding over the litigation due to communications with Shirley Stover concerning her potential appointment as a class representative. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit would later find that Judge Wright did not abuse his discretion by refusing to disqualify himself from the case.3

Although Judge Wright was vindicated by both the court and Circuit Judge Heaney's dissent on the issue of disqualification, the Circuit court ultimately vacated the class certification on June 7, 1982. The Eighth Circuit appeal focused on the conflict between the class certification and the Anti-Injunction Act4 which provides that a US court may not use an injunction to stay state court proceedings unless expressly authorized by Congress or where necessary in the aid of jurisdiction or to protect the court's judgment. Court of Appeals Judge McMillian, writing for the majority, concluded "Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy."5

After the June Circuit court decision, the group of plaintiffs aligned in favor of the class action filed for summary judgment on the issue of liability, which motion was denied in July by Judge Wright. They also petitioned the 8th Circuit to reconsider its decertification decision and sought review by the United States Supreme Court. Although Justice Blackmun requested written briefs from the lawyers, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in November.

The state court plaintiffs withdrew from the federal case. Discovery was back in full-swing in the state court, sparked in part by a pre-decertification order in June by Judge O'Leary sustaining the state plaintiffs' motion to proceed with discovery and depositions on the wrongful death issues. Given the prospect of significant overlap in the state and federal discovery processes, Judge Wright issued an order requesting that the plaintiffs' liaison committee in the state court cooperate with the federal court class action team.

In December of 1982, the plaintiffs-intervenors who contested the Federal class action and the defendants would join together to file joint suggestions in favor of the certification of a class action in the Jackson County Circuit Court. certification was ultimately granted. The plaintiffs in support of the state class action certification were represented by a cadre of local attorneys: Patrick McLarney, Max Foust, Lantz Welch and Lynn Johnson. Defendants were represented by a team of lawyers that included local attorneys Robert Driscoll, Michael Waldeck, Thomas Leittem, Lawrence McMullen, Bill Fabian, Joseph Sherman, Kevin Glynn and Heywood Davis.

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The Federal class-action plaintiffs would move the District Court to certify a new mandatory class action, excluding from membership those participating in the state court litigation. The recertification was denied in September with Judge Wright stating, "This Court can not, in good conscience, certify a mandatory class action where the membership of class is governed by the fortuitous circumstance of having rushed to a courthouse to file suit."6 An attempt at certification of a voluntary class action was also initiated. In a September 1982 hearing, the court determined that there was no available plaintiff representative with the requisite diversity. The prior class representative, Ms. Stover, settled her cases and those of her children for approximately $10 million. Accordingly, the District Court declined certification of the voluntary class and instead consolidated pending cases with a trial date set for January 10, 1983.

In October of 1982, however, a defendant was found with the requisite diversity and, over objections by the defense lawyers as to the appropriateness of the new class member and the certification, the Court certified a voluntary class action under Rule 23(b)(3).7 Ironically, the new class representative, Mrs. Deborah Jackson, who was allegedly cut by flying glass in the skywalk collapse, was also present at the 1980 MGM Grand Hotel fire in Las Vegas where she was evacuated by helicopter.

Solutions to the management of mass tort litigation remained a pervasive theme throughout the process leading to ultimate settlement. The plaintiffs-intervenors group's attorneys, including local attorney Duke Ponick, filed a motion in District Court requesting that the court take the unique action of approving a joint federal and state trial to be presided over by Judge Wright and Judge O'Leary. Judge Wright ultimately denied the motion, citing concerns about the inability to bind parties who had not filed lawsuits, equitable distribution of punitive damages and general management problems.

The Jackson County Circuit Court preliminarily approved a state class-wide settlement and held a hearing for final approval on January 5, 1983. The state court settlement allowed class members to fully release their claims in exchange for $1,000, settle for additional amounts, or try the issue of compensatory damages. Defendants agreed not to contest liability and plaintiffs agreed to the establishment of a compensation fund. A $20 million fund was established for supplemental damages in excess of compensatory damages. Prior to final approval of the state settlement by Judge Forrest W. Hanna on January 6, 1983, over 1,025 payments had been made to potential plaintiffs. Settlement of the state claims was embroiled in controversy and a number of federal court hearings took place around the issue of Federal defendants' communications with class members, ultimately leading to the issuance of a contempt order by Judge Wright.

On the first day of the federal court trial, January 10, 1983, counsel for the defendants informed Judge Wright that a settlement agreement had been reached. A settlement hearing was conducted on January 20, 1983. The federal settlement agreement, applicable to the 24 remaining federal class members, provided payments of $1,000 in exchange for full releases or the opportunity to submit the issue of compensatory damages to arbitration or jury trial. Defendants agreed not to

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contest liability, to set up a $10 million settlement fund which included a fund of at least $6.5 million for charitable contributions and a supplemental compensation fund of $3.5 million. A fund of approximately $150 million was established for general compensatory damages. The District Court approved the settlement.9 Federal attorney fee awards amounted to $1.77 million in fees and $441,044 in expenses.

Structure Failure

Because the issue of liability was not litigated due to the settlements, the ultimate issues of cause and responsibility would remain somewhat clouded. Conflicting reports about the design led to speculation about the cause. According to reports by the Kansas City Star, which won a Pulitzer Prize for its coverage, Fred R. Havens, the president of Havens Steel Co., which installed the steel beams supporting the walkways said that "it appeared that the walkways were made for light traffic" while Hyatt Hotels Corp. president Pat Foley said that the skywalks "were designed to hold people shoulder to shoulder, as many as you can jam on there." Then Mayor Richard L. Berkley likely concurred with the latter statement, exclaiming on the night of the disaster that "There is no excuse for that happening in a virtually new building." Multiple investigations were pursued by the hotel owner, Crown Center Redevelopment Corp., the operating company, Hyatt Hotels Corp., the architects, the general contractor and the city.

Investigations would later focus on construction changes from the original design of the suspension rods that supported the cross beams. The Hyatt atrium, which is present in the building today, spanned the distance between the north half of the structure housing approximately 700 guest rooms and the south half of the structure housing ballrooms, meeting space and restaurant space. At the time of the collapse, there were three walkways connecting the guest room space with the functional space. On the west side of the atrium, a walkway spanned the atrium at the fourth-story level and suspended below it was a two-story high walkway. Offset to the east from the fourth and second-floor walkways was a separate walkway spanning the atrium at three stories high. The third-floor walkway did not collapse but was later removed.

The original designs of the fourth-floor walkway and the second-floor walkway called for a continuous steel rod to run from the ceiling supports down through the fourth-floor walkway to the hanging second-floor walkway. The actual construction resulted in a separate rod supporting the suspended second-floor walkway, essentially doubling the load on the fourth-floor box beam. (See the diagram below).

Deutsch, an administrative law judge for Missouri's Administrative Hearing Commission, found structural engineers Jack Gillum and Dan Duncan guilty of gross negligence in the Hyatt disaster. The judge recommended disciplinary action. Both engineers later had their Missouri licenses revoked. In a 1988 Missouri Court of Appeals case, the Eastern District examined a recommendation for discipline due to the box beam connections and the alleged misrepresentations by Mr. Duncan as to the double rod configuration that replaced the single rod

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configuration called for by the original plans. The Court supported findings of gross negligence on the part of Mr. Duncan.

CONCLUSION

This article scratches the surface of the legal battles and engineering issues that enveloped the 1981 Hyatt Regency skywalk collapse. As is evident from the above historical account, the progression of the state and federal court actions was mired in issues relating to the potential allocation of punitive damages, ethical issues regarding legal fees and conflicts of interest, expedient and efficient mass tort management, the

Shortly after the disaster, the Kansas City Star reported that the suspension rods were visible in the aftermath of the collapse. This indicated that the failure occurred where the rods were connected to the cross beams. While the issues of liability and causation were never tried, the changes in the rod connections were consistently seen as a leading cause of the collapse.

In November of 1985, Judge James B. battle between numerous local attorneys and prominent national class-action legal personalities, and deeply personal legal maneuvers ranging from motions for the withdrawal of judges to contempt actions. To delve deeper into these issues and to understand how the skywalk disaster affected the legal community and the national practice of engineering, join the KCMBA for the August 25, 2006 CLE and look for additional articles in this series in the October edition of the KC Counselor.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

http://www.sjblaw.com/CM/Verdicts-Settlements/An-Historical-Look.asp#content

http://s0.wp.com/wpcontent/themes/vip/listverse2/img/favicon.ico?m=1306159117g

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CASE 3

Life Sentence for Two Developers Responsible for Shanghai Building Collapse

http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/chinabuzz

Two corrupt property developers responsible for the collapse of a Shanghai apartment building in June last year, were both sentenced to life in prison by a Shanghai court yesterday. Zhang Zhiqin, the general manager of Meidu Real Estate Company (Meidu), and Que Jingde, the second-largest shareholder in the same company, were sentenced by the Shanghai Municipal No. 1 Intermediate People's Court yesterday. Both men were also chairmen of Shanghai Meilong Capital Investment Company and have been held responsible for the widely-reported collapse of the building that killed one construction worker in the early hours of June 27, 2009. Que Jingde was found guilty of embezzlement and sentenced to life in prison and stripped of his political rights for life. Additionally, the court decided to confiscate two million yuan worth of his personal assets. Zhang Zhiqin was found guilty of corruption and was sentenced to life in prison and was also deprived of his political rights; the court decided to confiscate five million yuan worth of his personal assets. Zhang Zhiqin was also found guilty of embezzlement and negligence.

Long History Corruption and Embezzlement

The court's investigation revealed that in December 1995, defendants Que Jingde and Zhang Zhiqin were appointed by the Shanghai Minhang District Meilong Township's property development company to high-level positions at Mei Dou. Zhang Zhiqin was appointed legal

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representative, board chairman, and director; Que Jingde was appointed board member and deputy director. In October 2000, Mei Dou Company hired an asset evaluation company; an evaluation was conducted involving the assessment of all their assets and liabilities.

In October 2000, the assessment firm issued a report stating that Mei Dou's assets were worth 20 million yuan. In February, 2001, the Minhang District People's Government consented that Mei Dou give 10 million yuan worth of its assets to Que Jingde, Zhang Zhiqin and its other twenty-four rightful owners. From September 2000 to February of 2001, defendants Que Jingde and Zhang Zhiqin exploited their positions during Meidou's restructuring process by methods of deceit and concealment, resulting in 42.46 million yuan of Mei Dou's assets being left unaccounted for in its asset evaluation total.

In April, 2001, after restructuring, Zhang Zhiqin managed to acquire 64 percent of the company's shares; holding the position of legal representative, board chairman, general manager, and director. Que Jingde held 15 percent of total shares. Zhang Zhiqin and Que Jingde occupied 33.7 million worth of Mei Dou's assets of which they embezzled 4.4 million yuan worth for their personal finances.

The court's investigation found, from March to June 2009, defendant Zhang Zhiqin used his positions in Mei Dou to sell apartments in Mei Dou's Lotus Riverside development for a total of 440 million yuan. With these funds he purchased wealth management products from financial institutions through his personal bank accounts or company accounts. In April, 2009, defendant Zhang Zhiqin deposited 25 million yuan into Mei Dou's Company bank account. The audit conducted by Shanghai's Judicial Accounting found, Zhang Zhiqin embezzled 440 million yuan of funds from Mei Dou and used them to earn a net income of 2 million yuan from interest and investment profits. After the investigation, the administrative group responsible for the Lotus Riverside development recovered 415 million yuan of Mei Dou's funds; a majority of the profits.

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Building Collapse Caused by Illegal Underground Garage Excavation

The court investigation found, in August 2006, the construction of Mei Dou's residence compound Lotus Riverside was handed over to Shanghai Zhongxin Company and the development's engineering was commissioned to Guang Qi Company. Later that year in October, Mei Dou acquired the necessary permit for construction and began building. Defendant Zhang Zhiqun was in charge of the Lotus Riverside development.

The court determined, from November 2008 to June 2009, Zhang Zhiqun appointed an unqualified subcontractor, Zhang Yaofen, to excavate the land required to build an underground garage. The subcontractor ordered that the excavated land be piled on the north side of the development's building number 7; the pile reached up to ten meters. At 5 am June 27, 2009, building number 7 of the Lotus Riverside development fell over completely in tact, crushing to death a construction worker.

At 5 am on June 27, 2009, due to the excessive height of the pile of dirt located behind the building number 7, coupled with the excavation taking place of an underground garage on the south side of the building, the pressure on both sides surpassed the amount foundation of the building could withstand and the entire building fell over.

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CONCLUSION

Nine people linked to the building collapse, including the real estate developer, contractor and the supervisor for the project, have been put "under appropriate control", said the official Xinhua News. An official investigation into the collapse of an unfinished building in Shanghai has said that the accident was due to the construction company's "ignorance", rather than flaws in the design or building materials. However, the report stopped short of apportioning blame, and has been criticised for failing to address key issues. Minhang district government announced that nine individuals connected to the incident have had their freedom limited as the probe continues and the capital of the developer has been frozen. Documents filed by the developer - Shanghai Meidu Real Estate Development - with regulatory bodies suggest several board members work for the local township government, something that is illegal. The other six people responsible for the building collapse were handed prison sentences of between three to five years last February. Yesterday, Shanghai Municipal No. 1 Intermediate People's Court rejected the appeal of three of the six and the court's original verdict was upheld.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

http://enlish.sina.com/head/eng20090627pm_gmt.shtml

http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/chinabuzz

http://forum.skyscraperpage.com/

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