Produced by: Performing an Advanced Shutdown: Taking it to the Next Level Dan Sawyer Outage Manager – Ontario Power Generation.

Produced by:

Performing an “Advanced” Shutdown:Taking it to the Next Level

Dan SawyerOutage Manager – Ontario Power Generation

• 881 Mw (Net) 2650 Mw(th)• 15% of Ontario’s Supply• 2700 Full-time Staff• Common Structure• 3 Year Outage Cycles• 55-60 Day Duration• $80 M Budget• 1% FLR •>10 M Man-hrs since last LTA

D1 1992

D2 1990

D3 1993

D4 1993

D1 1992

D3 1993

D4 1993

D2 1990

D1 1992

D3 1993

D4 1993

On Complexity……

Dealing with complexity is an inefficient and unnecessary waste of time, attention and mental energy. There is never any justification for things being complex when they could be simple.

Edward de Bono

Overlap Makes it Even More Complex……….

TIME COST

SCOPESTAFF

COMMUNICATIONS

RISK

MATERIALS

QUALITY

Project Management Components

Project Management 101

‘What Isn’t Measured Isn’t Controlled’

‘Just Because You’re Measuring Something Doesn’t Mean You’re Managing It’

10 TRUTHS FOR CRITICAL PATH MANAGEMENT

1. Time is our enemy and he never rests or goes on vacation2. Bad things happen ……….. so better be prepared3. Time travel machines do not exist4. Never take a hit now if you can defer it to later5. Hide the fat6. It’s riskier to bring a project ahead than have it run late7. Don’t believe everything you’re told 8. Control the bow wave before it washes out your outage9. If you haven’t got time to do it right, when will you find time to do it over? 10. The die is cast by Day 6

When Bad Things Happen

Risk Management Process

Minimize impact of discovery work on: safety and outage schedule

Basic Principles

• Anticipate problems:o Unfavourable results from:

1st time projects Inspections & tests Infrequently performed work Critical system components Known problem areas

• Plan for “what if” scenarios

11

DOES DELAY EXTEND REFUEL TCD?

RESOLVE ISSUE AND CONTINUE

INSPECTION

NO

AUTHORIZATION RECEIVED TO REDUCE

SCOPE?

CUMULATIVE FC INSPECTION DELAY TO REFUEL TCD GREATER THAN 36 HOURS: INITIATE CIGAR SCOPE

REDUCTION VIA REQUEST TO STATION C&E

UP TO 36 HOURS OF FEEDER INSPECTION SCOPE IS AVAILABLE AS “POTENTIAL SCOPE REDUCTION” TO OFFSET CIGAR SCOPE. DETERMINATION OF SCOPE REDUCTION TO BE PERFORMED AT COMPLETION OF CIGAR CAMPAIGN AND

TO FACTOR IN PROGRESS OF FEEDER INSPECTION CAMPAIGN.

THIS INCLUDES 12 HOURS “CRAWLER” INSPECTION AND 24 HOURS VISUAL FACE CLEARANCE INSPECTION.

NO

YES

REFUEL DATE EXTENDED DUE TO FC INSPECTION DELAYS

YES

REVISE SCOPE AND CONTINUE

INSPECTION

Advance Decision Making Matrix

Strategies for Managing Risk

Avoidance• De-scope• Modifying the activity• Additional resources • Adding time to the schedule

Reduction• Add redundancy• Order spare parts• Outsourcing• Additional oversight

12

Acceptance

Risk AssessmentRisk = Probability x Consequences

Assess each “what if” scenario against a risk matrix

Determine the level of contingency planning required

Risk Response Development

Use Challenge Reviews

Purpose: Challenge and test readiness of each department to execute outage within targets

Objective: Awareness of scope, schedule and targets Confirm parts and equipment adequate Understand what could go wrong and

contingencies in-place to handle them

Schedule Contingency

• Management Reserve concept

• Have contingency for crushing the bow wave

• Front end load risky activities

IPTEIPTE

1) W. Feeder Inspections/Set-up2) LLDS activities3) PV8 Iceplug

VAULT PRIORITIES (In Order):

4) Mod Drain activites5) E. Vault Crane Mtce6) UDM Work

12 14 16 18 20 22 00 02 04 06 0810 12 14 16 18 20 22 00 02 04 06 0810 12 14 16 18 20 22 00 02 04 06 0810 12 14 16 1810

Operator Permitry

UNIT 4OVERVIEW

APPLY

REMOVE

APPLY

REMOVE

APPLY APPLY APPLY

FLOW DEFUELLING

CONTROL/COOL/CONTAIN - TODAY #2 SHIFT RRS/LZC: SSM ECI: BLOCKED SDS1: POISED NPC: POISED SDS2: UNAVAILABLE GSS: IN EFFECT

Sat. April 19 #2

APPLY

72100-NV2709 REMOVE

Sun. April 20 #1 Sun. April 20 #2

C14 P14

GENERAL VAULTACCESS

Installmini

W. Feeder Cracking Inspections

To LLDS PV8

iceplug Refillto GFS

C/D &De-press

Mod Drain pre-req's

53340-MCC20963432-PV5753330-HTR333110-BO163310-PV3333130-PM134320-MV26933310-MV25

Mon. April 21 #1 Mon. April 21 #2

O02

Tighten C/P's(as req'd)

Jigsaws

Moderator Drain (Calandria)PHT Drain pre-req's

E. Vault Crane Mtce Access Gate ModsInstallmini

Jigsaws

TightenC/P's

TRFPump up LT's

S&I

35000-RAB&C63331-CV12NPICG56311-RE13/2355720-42RF1

RSG 3 & 533810-RV7243110-HX5A75120-V35463310-PV3433130-PM3

74950-SG1153340-MCC20933110-BO233320-PV853340-MCC20972100-P175120-NV35543310-P172200-RV64182-LC2

55720-42RF148100-MV2247100-TK1

HFD Mtce

AA in-core

APPLY

Lower Pzrlevel

Tues. April 22 #1 Tues. April 22 #2

W. Feeder Thickness Inspections

Moderator Drain (Pipework)

Swap RV72 Permit Iceplug PV8 Drain 33320-PV8 Overhaul

STOP D.O.M. approvalreq'd for Mod drain.

LPSW flowmeas.

LPSW oninter-tie

Rapid Trending

Goal: Early identification & addressing adverse safety conditions or trends

• 22 areas monitored (ex. Ergonomics, Falling Objects, Hand Safety & Hearing Protection)

• Daily field observations rate areas as ‘safe’ or ‘at risk’

• During outage, analyzed for emerging adverse trends

• As areas fall below targets ‘adverse’ conditions are reported to Management and corrective actions taken.

Rapid Trending

Outage Control Center

OutageManager

OCC Manager

(7821)

Maintenance

(7818)

Operations

(7814)

Engineering

(7824)

Materials

(7809)

ContractMonitor

(7808)

Radiation

(7806)

Outage Control Center (OCC)

Communication Center Facilitate

Decision Making

Status Progress

Optimize Coordination & Handoffs

Monitor Critical Path

& 6 Shift Overview

Look Ahead Resolve Emergent Issues /

BarriersProvide Direction & Priority

30 Minute Rule• Employees are to elevate work delays• Every employee should resolve problems themselves but when unable within 30 minutes their line supervisor is contacted• Supervisor immediately resolves problem or contacts the Outage Control Center

For critical path work, OCC representative is contacted immediately

1 Hour Rule• Employees must know who has the next activity in the work sequence. • FLM of the work group to be contacted at least one hour before task will be finished

For critical path work, the OCC and the work group with the next activity "must" be contacted one hour before task is finished.

Outage Control Center

Getting Better

Corrective Action Programo Ensures deficiencies that adversely impact plant operations,

personnel safety, environment or equipment reliability, are promptly identified and corrected

Includes non-conformances, weaknesses with a process, document, or service

Captures information at all levels Record cannot be deleted

Slide 25

Corrective Action Plans

o Allows learning from mistakeso Prevents repeat occurrences by

Evaluating the problem to determine root cause Identifying the solution and actions required Evaluating the effectiveness of corrective action taken

Trending

2 48 792

4357

10788

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

A B CO C D

Darlington CAP's by Resolution Catagory

Trending for Outages

Task Scoping / Planning

28%

15%

17%25%

8%

7%

Inappropriate Scheduling

Late Scoping

Miscellaneous

Delay to Critical Path

Lack of Resources

Materials

Best Practices

• Information Sharingo Independent Nuclear Power Operators (INPO)

est. 1979

o World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) est. 1989

o CANDU Owners Group (COG) est. 1984

Best Practices

• Technical Information Exchange

• Professional and Technical Development

• Audits

• Operating Experience

31

March 11, 2011March 11, 2011• The Fukushima nuclear facilities were

damaged in a magnitude 8.9 earthquake centered offshore of the Sendai region, which contains the capital Tokyo.o Plant designed for magnitude 8.2 earthquake.

An 8.9 magnitude quake is 7 times in greater in magnitude.

• Serious secondary effects followed including a significant tsunami, significant aftershocks and a major fire at a fossil fuel installation.

• The Fukushima nuclear facilities were damaged in a magnitude 8.9 earthquake centered offshore of the Sendai region, which contains the capital Tokyo.o Plant designed for magnitude 8.2 earthquake.

An 8.9 magnitude quake is 7 times in greater in magnitude.

• Serious secondary effects followed including a significant tsunami, significant aftershocks and a major fire at a fossil fuel installation.

Slide 32

Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1

33

Hydrogen Detonation at Unit 1 Hydrogen Detonation at Unit 1

Reactor Building

Refuel Floor

• Safety • Human Performance • Reliability • Value for Money

Fukushima Event: O.P.G. Response Synopsis

OPG Nuclear Powering our future with operational and project excellence

“SAMG”

[email protected]