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Proc IWIF-II, 2007, Chengdu
www.swingtum.com/institute/IWIF 1
Model of Financial Market :Insights and its Possible Application
C. H. Yeung1, K. Y. Michael Wong1. Y. C. Zhang1,2
1Department of Physics, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China2Institut de Physique Théorique, Université de
Fribourg, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
IWIF-II
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Outline Introduction
Our model (Wealth Game) VS Minority Game ?
Price Sensitivity and Market Impact – Phase Diagram of final states and wealth
Market Makers, Transaction Cost and Evolutions – Positive gain for agents and market makers
Application on real data: Trading with Hang Seng Index
Conclusion
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Introduction Minority Game (MG) – The model by D.
Challet and Y. C. Zhang in 1997 Successful and simple model of Financial
Market which states that the minority choices will win
One of the main concern for investors:
negative-sum (MG)
VS
positive-sum (Real market) ?
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To include more realistic aspects …
1. What modifications are we making?
2. What important aspects of real markets should be added to capture basic features?
3. Negative sum? Positive sum? Zero sum?
4. Can we apply these financial models on real financial data ?
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1. What modifications are we making?
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The ModelIndividual actions
Collective actions
Pricechanges
N agents Each agent makes decision from his/her
best strategy (higher virtual payoff)
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The Strategy +1/ -1/ 0, buy/ sell/ hold
decisions (different from MG)
Max. Allowed Position K
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Wealth = Cash + Stock Values in hand
)]()1()[1( changeWealth TT tPtPtki
No. of stock in hand,Position
1
0'
)'()1(t
tii tatk
Remark :For MG,
jji
i
tata
tAta
)()(
)()(
changeWealth
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2. What important aspects
of real markets should be added
to capture basic features?
(1) Price sensitivity &
(2) Market impact
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What are price sensitivity and market impact? Price Sensitivity- Sensitivity of
stock price on agent’s collective actions
Define γ : Individual Actions
Pricerises!!
Price movement = (Collective actions)γ
CollectiveActions
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Market Impact - The impact of
synchronized decisions from peer investors during transaction
Define β
Transaction price = Current price
+ β (Synchronized price movement)
MarketImpact !!
Synchronized Actions !!
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Price movement = (Collective actions)γ
(1) Price sensitivity γ
Transaction price = Current price
+ β (Synchronized price movement)
(2) Market Impact β
These 2 aspects we would like to put in the model !!
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Decision of agent ai(t) = +1, 0, -1
Real Price:
Transaction Price PT(t) = Price in between P(t+1) and P(t)
|)(|)]([sign)()1( tAtAtPtP
N
ii tatA
1
)()(
)()]([sign)(
)1()()1()(T
tAtAtP
tPtPtP
Collective actions !!
PriceSensitivity!!
Market Impact !!
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Positive
Negative
Results )1()()1()(:Impact Market
|)(|)]([sign)()1( :Sensivity Price
T
tPtPtP
tAtAtPtP
Final State of the system
Agents’ Wealth
3 phases have positive wealth ???
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Phase Diagram of Final State
Arbitrageurs phase ??
Trendsetter phase ??
Irregular phase ??
Mixture phase ??
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Arbitrageurs phase
For β ≤ 0.5 ⇒Period-2 cycle for P(t) !?
)1()()1()(:Impact Market T tPtPtP
Buy!
sell!
Gain!!Too unrealistic!!
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Trendsetter state
Arbitrageur state
VS
Periodic with characteristic pattern
Period much longer than period 2 !!
What arethey doing?
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Trendsetter state
Start to sell !!(Set up the
downward trend)
Follow the trend !! I was
late...
Trend setters (winners)Trend followers (winners)Late followers(losers)
Depend onstrategies, eg:↑↑↓ buy/sell/hold↑↓↓ buy/sell/hold….
We didn’t teach them to set up and follow trend !!But they do it !!!
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)1()()1()(:Impact Market
|)(|)]([sign)()1( :Sensivity Price
T
tPtPtP
tAtAtPtP
Period 2Unrealistic!
Too periodic!
orUnrealistic!
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What’s the interpretations?The real market is possibly……
Positive
Negative
)1()()1()(:Impact Market
|)(|)]([sign)()1( :Sensivity Price
T
tPtPtP
tAtAtPtP
Possible parameters of real market !!
Agent’s wealth
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3. Negative sum? Positive sum?
Zero sum?
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Positive-sum?Where does the money come
from? Note: Supply and Demand is not balanced in this
model There is a Market Maker behind the game Market Maker is clearing the extra supply and
demand (doing opposite as the actual agents do) So, agents gain,
Market Maker loses All together ~> zero sum
Market Maker ?
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No Market Maker, supply and demand have to be balanced
~> when one agent is holding a buying position, someone else must be holding a selling position
~> zero-sum for agents
Can both Agents and Market Maker gain? Transaction cost + evolution of agents
(agents losing money are leaving the market)
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Transaction Cost (% of P(t))+ EvolutionMarket Maker's Gain VS Transaction Cost
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
0.00% 0.02% 0.04% 0.06% 0.08% 0.10%
Transaction Cost (% of Price)
G
ain
per
ste
p
Existing Agent's Gain VS Transaction Cost
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
0.00% 0.02% 0.04% 0.06% 0.08% 0.10%
Transaction Cost (% of Price)
Gai
n
Withdrawing Agent's Loss VS Transaction Cost
-140
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
0.00% 0.02% 0.04% 0.06% 0.08% 0.10%
Transaction Cost (% of Price)
Lo
ss p
er s
tep
Positive gain for Investors andMarket maker !!~> Participation incentives
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4. Can we apply these financial models on real financial data ?
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Application on real data:Hang Seng Index (HSI)
To convince ourselves that the model share similarities with real market, we test the applicability of the model on HSI
Real HSI as external signals, stock price in the model
Agents are given a certain amount of initial wealth, for initial investment
Wealth dependence maximum position K(t) = Wealth(t) / Price(t)
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Results (HSI from 1987 – 2007)
HSIx 7.5 times
Best 3 among10000 Agentsx 17 times
5 randomagents
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Initially, w(1987)/P(1987) = 5
Wealth growsfaster than inflation
Wealth growsslower than inflation
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Comparison with other models- % of gaining agents
≈ 11% of agents in this model Beat HSI inflation in this 20 years
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Wealth Game has the largest % of gaining agents
But for the best investor…….
Wealth Game Minority Game
x 7.5 times
x 17 times x 25 times
x 7.5 times
Minority Game has more outstanding best investor !
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Difference in wealth counting…..
1
0'
)'()1(t
tii tatk
Wealth Game Minority Game
VSwith
)]()1()[(
changeWealth
HSIHSI tPtPtai )]()1()[1(
changeWealth
HSIHSI tPtPtki
1.Positive sign VS negative sign2.Position dependence VS Single bid
dependence3.Small time lag
Trend following?
Longer memory
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Wealth Game Vs Minority Game
Another similar test :Wealth independent Max Pos. with w(0) = 0
Best investors are more outstanding
Most agentsare losing
Best investors are not as rich as MG, but most aregaining
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Conclusion Behaviors resembling real investors emerge
naturally form this simple model Possible values of γ and β (price sensitivity
and market impact) in real market can be conjectured form the phase diagrams (irregular phase with positive wealth)
Wide participation incentives: positive sum for both existing agents and market maker
The model is tested by using real HSIWealth Game: better average performanceMinority game: more outstanding best agents
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Thank You!!
Questions & Answers Session
Acknowledgement: Supported by the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong(DAG05/06.SC36 and HKUST603606)"
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