Problem of evil

St. Augustine on the Problem of Evil

Enchiridion, 10-12

In his struggles with the problem of evil, Augustine argues first that the fact that there are things of varying goodness makes for a greater goodness of things as a whole than if there weren't such variety. And he further argues that evil is not something fully real but only something dependent on that which is more real, as disease (which is an evil) can exist only in a body (which is a good). Thus God, as the source of all that is, is not in contest with a positive being or an ultimate reality which is evil and would be His counterpart. Though Augustine's ideas were bold and daring, they troubled many later Christians who felt they were unable to reconcile them with the existence of sin, Satan, and damnation. Yet variations on this theme continue to be popular: what we perceive to be evil is, in some ultimate sense, good. (It should be noted that the classic "problem of evil" exists only in those religions like Christianity, Judaism, and Islam in which there is believed to be a single, good, almighty god, and is absent in other world religions.)

According to Augustine, what happens to vices when they are not residing in a human soul? Can you find any flaws in his analogy of evil with disease? (Remember: Augustine could not have known about germs and viruses!)

By the Trinity, (1) thus supremely and equally and unchangeably good, all things were created; and these are not supremely equally and unchangeably good, but yet they are good, even taken separately. Taken as a whole, however, they are very good, because their ensemble constitutes the universe in all its wonderful order and beauty.

And in the universe, even that which is called evil, when it is regulated and put in its own place, only enhances our admiration of the good; for we enjoy and value the good more when we compare it with the evil. For the almighty God, who, as even the heathen acknowledge, has supreme power over all things, being Himself supremely good, would never permit the existence of anything evil among His works, if He were not so omnipotent and good that He can bring good even out of evil. For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present--namely, the diseases and wounds--go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, (2) but a defect in the fleshly substance--the flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils--that is, privations of the good which we call health--are accidents. (3) Just in the same way, what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. And when they are not transferred elsewhere: when they cease to exist in the healthy soul, they cannot exist anywhere else.

Problem of evil

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In the philosophy of religion and theology, the problem of evil is the question of how to explain evil if there exists a deity that is omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient (see theism).[1][2] Some philosophers have claimed that the existence of such a God and of evil are logically incompatible or unlikely. Attempts to resolve the question under these contexts have historically been one of the prime concerns of theodicy.

Some responses include the arguments that true free will cannot exist without the possibility of evil, that humans cannot understand God, that suffering is necessary for spiritual growth or evil is the consequence of a fallen world.

There are also many discussions of "evil" and associated "problems" in other philosophical fields, such as secular ethics,[3][4][5] and scientific disciplines such as evolutionary ethics.[6][7] But as usually understood, the "problem of evil" is posed in a theological context.[1][2]

Contents

[hide]

1 Detailed arguments o 1.1 Logical problem of evil o 1.2 The Evidential problem of evil o 1.3 Related arguments

2 Answers and theodicies o 2.1 Free will

2.1.1 Plantinga's free will defense o 2.2 Consequences of sin o 2.3 Soul-making or Irenaean Theodicy o 2.4 Afterlife o 2.5 Mankind's limited knowledge o 2.6 Definition of evil as absence of good o 2.7 Evil is an illusion o 2.8 Evil is complementary to good o 2.9 "Evil" suggests an ethical law o 2.10 No best of all possible worlds o 2.11 Lacking omnipotence or omnibenevolence

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o 2.12 God's nature is freedom and/or agency giving love 3 General criticisms of all defenses and theodicies 4 By religion

o 4.1 Islamic concept of evil o 4.2 Ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt o 4.3 The Bible o 4.4 Later Jewish interpretations o 4.5 Gnosticism o 4.6 Christianity

4.6.1 Irenaean theodicy 4.6.2 Pelagianism 4.6.3 Augustinian Theodicy 4.6.4 Saint Thomas 4.6.5 Luther and Calvin 4.6.6 Christian Science

o 4.7 Hinduism o 4.8 Buddhism

5 By philosophers o 5.1 Epicurus o 5.2 David Hume o 5.3 Gottfried Leibniz o 5.4 Immanuel Kant o 5.5 Victor Cousin o 5.6 Peter Kreeft o 5.7 William Hatcher

6 See also 7 Notes 8 Further reading 9 External links

o 9.1 Encyclopedias

[edit] Detailed arguments

Numerous different versions of the problem of evil have been formulated.[1][2][8]

[edit] Logical problem of evil

One example among many of a formulation of the problem of evil is often attributed to Epicurus [9] and may be schematized as follows:

1. If an all-powerful and perfectly good god exists, then evil does not.2. There is evil in the world.3. Therefore, an all-powerful and perfectly good god does not exist.

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This argument is of the logically valid form modus tollens (denying the consequent). In this case, P is "God exists" and Q is "there is no evil in the world".

Since it is unclear precisely how the antecedent of the first premise of "Epicurus"' argument entails the consequent, later philosophers have offered refinements such as:[2]

1. God exists.2. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.3. A perfectly good being would want to prevent all evils.4. An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence.5. An omnipotent being, who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, has the

power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.6. A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent

that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil.

7. If there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being, then no evil exists.8. Evil exists (logical contradiction).

Versions such as these are referred to as the logical problem of evil. They attempt to show that the assumed propositions lead to a logical contradiction and cannot therefore all be correct. Most philosophical debate has focused on the propositions stating that God cannot exist with, or would want to prevent, all evils (premises #3 and #6), with many defenders of theism arguing that God could very well exist with and allow evil in order to achieve a greater good and/or allow free will.

Many philosophers accept that arguments such as Plantinga's free will defense (in brief, that possibly God allows evil in order to achieve the ultimately greater good of free will) successfully solve the logical problem of evil in terms of human action;[10] the question of how free will and God's Omniscience are compatible remains, however (see the Argument from free will). Plantinga's defense further seeks to explain natural evils by positing that the mere logical possibility of "a mighty nonhuman spirit"[11] such as Satan is sufficient to resolve the logical form of the problem of natural evil. Since Plantinga's goal is to defeat only the assertion that God and evil are logically incompatible, even a highly implausible but possible, coherent instance of God's coexistence with evil is sufficient for his purposes.

[edit] The Evidential problem of evil

The evidential version of the problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version), seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism. As an example, a critic of Plantinga's idea of "a mighty nonhuman spirit" causing natural evils may concede that the existence of such a being is not logically impossible but argue that due to lacking scientific evidence its existence is very unlikely and thus an unconvincing explanation for the presence of natural evils.

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William L. Rowe's famous example of natural evil: "In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering."[12]

A version by William L. Rowe:

1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

3. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[2]

Another by Paul Draper:

1. Gratuitous evils exist.2. The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to

gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.3. Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.[13]

These arguments are probability judgments since they rest on the claim that, even after careful reflection, one can see no good reason for God’s permission of evil. The inference from this claim to the judgment that there exists gratuitous evil is inductive in nature, and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument.[2]

The logical possibility of hidden or unknown reasons for the existence of evil still exist. However, the existence of God is viewed as any large-scale hypothesis or explanatory theory that aims to make sense of some pertinent facts. To the extent that it fails to do so it is disconfirmed.[2] According to Occam's razor, one should make as few assumptions as possible. Hidden reasons are assumptions, as is the assumption that all pertinent facts can be observed, or that facts and

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theories humans have not discerned are indeed hidden. Thus, as per Draper's argument above, the theory that there is an omniscient and omnipotent being who is indifferent requires no hidden reasons in order to explain evil. It is thus a simpler theory than one that also requires hidden reasons regarding evil in order to include omnibenevolence. Similarly, for every hidden argument that completely or partially justifies observed evils it is equally likely that there is a hidden argument that actually makes the observed evils worse than they appear without hidden arguments. As such, from a probabilistic viewpoint hidden arguments will neutralize one another.[1]

A common response to the evidential argument is by claiming that we can see plausible and not hidden reasons for God’s permission of evil. This is discussed in a later section.

[edit] Related arguments

Doctrines of hell, particularly those involving eternal suffering, pose a particularly strong form of the problem of evil (see problem of hell). If unbelief, incorrect beliefs, or poor design are considered evils, then the argument from nonbelief, the argument from inconsistent revelations, and the argument from poor design may be seen as particular instances of the argument from evil.

[edit] Answers and theodicies

Responses to the problem of evil have sometimes been classified as defenses or theodicies. However, authors disagree on the exact definitions.[1][2][14] Generally, a defense attempts to defuse the logical problem of evil by showing that there is no logical incompatibility between the existence of evil and the existence of God. A defense need not argue that this is a probable or plausible explanation, only that the explanation is logically possible, for if on some logically possible explanation God and evil are logically compatible, then whatever the case with respect to that explanation's being true or not, God and evil are logically compatible.[15]

A theodicy,[16] on the other hand, is in a way more ambitious, since it attempts to provide a plausible justification—a morally sufficient reason—for the existence of evil and thereby rebut the "evidential" argument from evil.[2] Richard Swinburne maintains that it does not make sense to assume there are greater goods that justify the evil's presence in the world unless we know what they are—without knowledge of what the greater goods could be, one cannot have a successful theodicy.[17] Thus, some authors see arguments appealing to demons or the fall of man as indeed logically possible, but not very plausible given our knowledge about the world, and so see those arguments as providing defenses but not good theodicies.[2]

[edit] Free will

The free will argument is as follows: God's creation of persons with morally significant free will is something of tremendous value. God could not eliminate evil and suffering without thereby eliminating the greater good of having created persons with free will who can make moral choices.[2][8] Freedom (and, often it is said, the loving relationships which would not be possible

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without freedom) here is intended to provide a morally sufficient reason for God's allowing evil.[18]

C. S. Lewis writes in his book The Problem of Pain:

“ We can, perhaps, conceive of a world in which God corrected the results of this abuse of free will by His creatures at every moment: so that a wooden beam became soft as grass when it was used as a weapon, and the air refused to obey me if I attempted to set up in it the sound waves that carry lies or insults. But such a world would be one in which wrong actions were impossible, and in which, therefore, freedom of the will would be void; nay, if the principle were carried out to its logical conclusion, evil thoughts would be impossible, for the cerebral matter which we use in thinking would refuse its task when we attempted to frame them.[19] ”

"Natural" evils such as earthquakes and many diseases are sometimes seen as problems for free will theodicies since they don't seem to be caused by free decisions. Possible reasons for natural evils include that they are caused by the free choices of supernatural beings such as demons (these beings are not so powerful as to limit God's omnipotence—another possible response, discussed later); that they are caused by original sin which in turn is caused by free will; that they are caused by natural laws that must operate as they do if intelligent, free agents are to exist; or that through observation and copying they allow humans to perform greater evils, which makes moral decisions more significant.[20][21]

For many evils such as murder, rape, or theft it appears that the free will and choice of the victim are diminished by the free will decisions of the offender. In some cases such as murdered very young children it appears that they never had any free will choices to make at all. A possible response is that a world with some free will is better than a world with none at all, however an omnipotent deity should by some definitions be able to circumvent this without impinging on the free will of the offender.

Another possible objection is that free will could exist without the degree of evil seen in this world. This could be accomplished by inducing humans to be inclined to always make, or make more, good moral decisions by causing these to feel more pleasurable; or if harmful choices were made, then for some or all of them God would prevent the harmful consequences from actually happening; or if harmful consequences occurred, then God would sometimes or always immediately punish such acts, which would presumably diminish their frequency; or the worst diseases could have been prevented, more resources could have been available for humanity, extremely intense pains either did not arise or could be turned off when they served no purpose. A reply is that such a "toy world" would mean that free will has less or no real value. A response to this is to argue that then it would be similarly wrong for humans to try to reduce suffering, a position for which few would argue.[1] The debate depends on the definitions of free will and determinism, which are deeply disputed concepts themselves, as well as their relation to one another. See also compatibilism and incompatibilism and predestination.

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There is also a debate regarding free will and omniscience. The argument from free will argues that any conception of God that incorporates both properties is inherently contradictory.

While not affecting the validity of the free will argument itself, this reasoning creates problems for other common religious beliefs. It implies that there can be no heaven unless its inhabitants have no free will and thus lose its tremendous value. If a heavenly existence is still more valuable than an earthly existence, then the earthly one seems unnecessary. Another problem is that an omnibenevolent deity does not seem to have the tremendous value associated with free will, since he can not fail to do what is good.[8]

[edit] Plantinga's free will defense

Plantinga's free will defense is the most famous response to the logical problem of evil. In its complete form it is a long and a rather technical logical argument, as is the logical argument from evil it seeks to answer. It shares much with free will theodicies, but appeals to human freedom only to demonstrate that the existence of the proposition that God exists (i.e., there exists an almighty, wholly good, omniscient being) is compatible with the proposition that evil exists. To show their consistency, Plantinga looks for some possibly true proposition consistent with the proposition that God exists and which, together with that proposition, entails that evil exists. His candidate is the proposition that it was not within God's power to actualize a world containing moral good (or as much moral good as does exist) without actualizing one containing moral evil.

[edit] Consequences of sin

Another possible answer is that the world is corrupted due to the sin of mankind (like the original sin). Some argue that because of sin, the world has fallen from the grace of God, and is not perfect. Therefore, evils and imperfections persist because the world is fallen. An objection is asking why God did not create man in such a way that he would never sin. A reply is that God wanted man to have free will which makes this another example of the free will argument.[22] Some have wondered whether free-agency, or the loving relationships to which it is thought to be necessary, constitutes a good large enough to justify the evil it brings in its wake.

There are also beliefs that when people experience evils it is always because of evils they themselves have done (see Karma and the just-world phenomenon) or their ancestors have done (see again the original sin).

[edit] Soul-making or Irenaean Theodicy

Evil and suffering may be necessary for spiritual growth. This is often combined with the free will argument by arguing that such spiritual growth requires free will decisions. A problem with this is that many evils do not seem to promote this, such as the suffering of young, innocent children. Others enjoy lives of ease and luxury where there is virtually nothing that challenges them to undergo moral growth.[23] Another problem attends this kind of theodicy when "spiritual growth" is cashed out in terms of its usefulness in overcoming evil. But of course, if there were

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no evil that needed overcoming in the first place, such an ability would lose its point. One would then need to say something more about the inherent value in spiritual health.

[edit] Afterlife

Another response is the afterlife theodicy. Christian theologian Randy Alcorn argues that the joys of heaven will compensate for the sufferings on earth. He writes[24]:

“ Without this eternal perspective, we assume that people who die young, who have handicaps, who suffer poor health, who don't get married or have children, or who don't do this or that will miss out on the best life has to offer. But the theology underlying these assumptions have a fatal flaw. It presumes that our present Earth, bodies, culture, relationships and lives are all there is. ”

The afterlife answer was called “a very curious argument” by the philosopher Bertrand Russell. He argued:

“If you looked at the matter from a scientific point of view, you would say, ‘After all, I only know this world. I do not know about the rest of the universe, but so far as one can argue at all on probabilities one would say that probably this world is a fair sample, and if there is injustice here then the odds are that there is injustice elsewhere also.’ Supposing you got a crate of oranges that you opened, and you found all the top layer of oranges bad, you would not argue: ‘The underneath ones must be good, so as to redress the balance.’ You would say: ‘Probably the whole lot is a bad consignment;’ and that is really what a scientific person would argue about the universe. He would say: ‘Here we find in this world a great deal of injustice, and so far as that goes that is a reason for supposing that justice does not rule in the world; and therefore so far as it goes it affords a moral argument against deity and not in favor of one.’”[25]

[edit] Mankind's limited knowledge

One argument is that, due to mankind's limited knowledge, humans cannot expect to understand God or God's ultimate plan. When a parent takes an infant to the doctor for a regular vaccination to prevent some childhood disease, it's because the parent cares for and loves that child. The young child however will almost always see things very differently. It is argued that just as an infant cannot possibly understand the motives of its parent while it is still only a child, people cannot comprehend God's will in their current physical and earthly state.[26]

Another suggestion is that, the Problem of Evil argument is logically flawed because it silently assumes that people really can comprehend what God should do. In other words, for the Problem of Evil to be valid, it must be proven that there can be no god which cannot be so comprehended.[27]

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A counter-argument is that God could make it absolutely clear to and assure humanity that, even if these cannot be understood in detail, good reasons and a plan do exist. Here the problem of evil becomes similar to the argument from nonbelief.[2]

This defense to the problem of evil has also been debated about whether or not it is an appeal to ignorance.

[edit] Definition of evil as absence of goodMain article: Privatio boni

The fifth century theologian Augustine of Hippo maintained that evil exists only as a privation (lack, absence) in that which is good and thus evil is not created by God. Evil is only privatio boni or an absence of good such as in discord, injustice, and loss of life or of liberty. However, this doesn't completely solve the problem of evil, as the question remains why God neglected to create those goods that are found to be lacking in the world.[28]

[edit] Evil is an illusion

One possible argument is that evils such as sin and disease are illusions. An argument against is that the sensation of suffering caused by such illusions is evil.[28] Strictly speaking, the claim that evils don't exist represents a dissolution rather than a solution to the problem of evil, which is only generated on the supposition that evil exists.

[edit] Evil is complementary to good

Concepts such as yin and yang argue that evil and good are complementary opposites within a whole. If one disappears, the other must disappear as well, leaving emptiness. Compassion, a valuable virtue, can only exist if there is suffering. Bravery only exists if we sometimes face danger. Self-sacrifice is another great good, but can only exist if there is inter-dependence, if some people find themselves in situations where they need help from others.

[edit] "Evil" suggests an ethical law

Another response to this paradox argues that asserting "evil exists" would imply an ethical standard against which to define good and evil which implies the existence of God. See the argument from morality.

C. S. Lewis writes in his book Mere Christianity,

“ My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of just and unjust? A man does not call a line crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line. What was I comparing this universe with when I called it unjust?... Of course I could have given up my idea of justice by saying it was nothing but a private idea of my own. But if I did that, then my argument against God collapsed too—for the argument

”

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depended on saying the world was really unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please my fancies.[29]

But it's not clear from the argument as stated how the existence of an ethical standard implies the existence of God. One must supply more premises in order to show that moral standards entail or make probable the God of Theism (cf. the theistic "argument from morality").

[edit] No best of all possible worlds

Assume that there is no best of all possible worlds. Then for every possible world, however good, there is a better one. For any world God creates, there is a better. Then it is argued that God cannot be criticized for not having created a better world since this criticism would apply no matter which world God were to create. One can not be faulted for failing to perform some act where there is no logical possibility of performing it.

One response is that, even accepting the basic assumption that there is no best of all possible worlds, a value system which sees all worlds except the best possible one as equally valuable is questionable. But the argument only assumes that all worlds are equally permissible for God to create, not that they are equally valuable.

Another response is to argue from a deontological approach that certain forms of the problem of evil do not depend on the claim that this world could be improved upon, or upon the claim that it is not the best of all possible worlds: it is that there are in the actual world evils which it would be morally wrong for God to allow. That there might be better and better worlds without limit is simply irrelevant.[1]

[edit] Lacking omnipotence or omnibenevolence

The problem of evil will not be encountered if God is either not omnipotent or not omnibenevolent.

Dystheism is the belief that God is not wholly good.

In polytheism the individual deities are usually not omnipotent or omnibenevolent. However, if one of the deities has these properties the problem of evil applies. Pantheism and panentheism may or may not have a problem of evil depending on how God is perceived. Belief systems where several deities are omnipotent would lead to logical contradictions.

Ditheistic belief systems (a kind of dualism) explain the problem of evil from the existence of two rival great, but not omnipotent, deities that work in polar opposition to each other. Examples of such belief systems include Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, and possibly Gnosticism. The Devil in Islam and usually in Christianity is not seen as equal in power to God who is omnipotent. Thus the Devil could only exist if so allowed by God. The Devil, if so limited in power, can therefore by himself not explain the problem of evil.

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Process theology and open theism are other positions that limit God's omnipotence and/or omniscience (as defined in traditional Christian theology).

The omnipotence paradoxes have led some theists to propose nuanced elaborations of the notion of omnipotence. Greater good arguments invoke such elaborations when they argue that God cannot do what is logically impossible and that the existence of some greater good, such as free will, may not be obtainable by God without the existence of evil.[8]

[edit] God's nature is freedom and/or agency giving love

Thomas Jay Oord argues that the theoretical aspect of the problem of evil is solved if one postulates that God's eternal nature is love. As necessarily loving, God always gives freedom and/or agency to others, and God cannot do otherwise. Oord calls his position, "Essential Kenosis," and he says that God is involuntarily self-limited. God's nature of love means that God cannot fail to offer, withdraw, or override the freedom and/or agency God gives creatures.[30]

[edit] General criticisms of all defenses and theodicies

Steven M. Cahn has argued that there exists a "problem of good" (or "Cacodaemony") which is a mirror image of the problem of evil. The problem is the same except for that omnibenevolence is replaced by omnimalevolence, greater good is replaced by greater evil, and so on. Cahn argued that all arguments, defenses, and theodicies regarding the problem of evil applies similarly to the problem of good. However, critics have noted that the "problems" are about whether such omnipotent beings "could" or are "likely" to exist, not that they "must" exist, so these problems do not logically contradict one another.[31][32]

An argument that has been raised against theodicies is that, if a theodicy were true, it would completely nullify morality. If a theodicy were true, then all evil events, including human actions, can be rationalized as permitted or affected by God, If every conceivable state of affairs is compatible with the "goodness" of God, the concept is rendered meaningless.[33] Volker Dittman writes that,

“ the crucial point is, that .... there will be no evil, because every suffering could be justified. Worse: It would be impossible to act evil. I could torture and murder a young child, but this would be justified for a higher good (whatever the perfect solution is, it could be something else than free will). This would be the end of all moral, which clearly is absurd. The theist could not point to the ten commandments and claim that they are necessary, because one goal of morals – to prevent evil – would be granted no matter how I behave...[34] ”

[edit] By religion

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[edit] Islamic concept of evil

This section does not cite any references or sources.Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (December 2010)

In Islam, all that is good in this universe is related to existing things which originated from the will of Allah. Life in Islam is seen as a test, therefore those who suffer in life are rewarded for their patience in the afterlife. This results in Allah evening things up between humans, so that those who weren't patient, moral etc. are punished in the afterlife. The problem that non-believers have is that there's nothing such as the afterlife, therefore, the fact that life itself isn't fair is just a brute fact.

Since the only source of existence is Allah, no good can be achieved without help and will of Allah.

As Muhammad said:

La Hawla wa la Quwatta illa Billah (There is no Might or Power except with Allah) [Sahih al-Bukhari; al-Fath al-Bari #11:213, Sahih Muslim #4:2076]

The ability of human beings to make choices with their freewill is bestowed by Allah: He has granted them intelligence and wisdom to understand what is bad and good for them. For example, he has given children the ability to learn that fire is dangerous to touch. The process of learning and intelligence keeps going on throughout human life. The existence of free will and intelligence is impossible if Allah intervenes in people's decisions without letting them think and understand the outcomes of his thoughts and actions.

It is part of Allah's blessing that the results of bad deeds lead people to learn not to repeat mistakes; it is part of his mercy that he has promised to forgive the mistakes until the free will to chose goodness exists.

[edit] Ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt

The problem of evil takes at least four formulations in ancient Mesopotamian religious thought, as in the extant manuscripts of Ludlul bēl nēmeqi (I Will Praise the Lord of Wisdom), Erra and Ishum, The Babylonian Theodicy, and The Dialogue of Pessimism.[35] In this type of polytheistic context, the chaotic nature of the world implies multiple gods battling for control.

In ancient Egypt, it was thought the problem takes at least two formulations, as in the extant manuscripts of Dialogue of a Man with His Ba and The Eloquent Peasant. Due to the conception of Egyptian gods as being far removed, these two formulations of the problem focus heavily on the relation between evil and people; that is, moral evil.[36]

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[edit] The Bible

The Book of Isaiah states that Yahweh is the source of at least some disasters: "...I bring prosperity and create disaster: I, Yahweh, do all these things".[37] But Isaiah doesn't attempt to explain the motivation behind the creation of evil (assuming that a natural disaster is in fact evil).

The Book of Job is one of the most widely known formulations of the problem of evil in Western thought. In it, Satan challenges God regarding his servant Job, claiming that Job only serves God for the blessings and protection that he receives from him. God allows Satan to plague Job and his family in a number of ways, with the limitation that Satan may not take Job's life, although his children are killed. [NB: the term satan is not truly a proper name, but literally means 'the accuser' being preceded by the article ha 'the' in ancient texts]. Job discusses his condition with three friends and questions God regarding his suffering which he finds to be unjust. A fourth friend, Elihu, arrives to chastise Job for standing on his own righteousness, rather than God's. God then responds to Job in a speech "out of a whirlwind" (chapters 38,39) and more than restores Job's prior health, wealth, and gives him new children, as though he has been awakened from a nightmare into a new awareness of spiritual reality.

Bart D. Ehrman argues that different parts of the Bible give different answers. One example is evil as punishment for sin or as a consequence of sin. Ehrman writes that this seems to be based on some notion of free will although this argument is never explicitly mentioned in the Bible. Another argument is that suffering ultimately achieves a greater good, possibly for persons other than the sufferer, that would not have been possible otherwise. The Book of Job offers two different answers: suffering is a test, and you will be rewarded later for passing it; another that God in his might chooses not to reveal his reasons. Ecclesiastes sees suffering as beyond human abilities to comprehend. Apocalyptic parts, including the New Testament, see suffering as due to cosmic evil forces, that God for mysterious reasons has given power over the world, but which will soon be defeated and things will be set right.[38]

[edit] Later Jewish interpretationsSee also: Holocaust theology

An oral tradition exists in Judaism that God determined the time of the Messiah's coming by erecting a great set of scales. On one side, God placed the captive Messiah with the souls of dead laymen. On the other side, God placed sorrow, tears, and the souls of righteous martyrs. God then declared that the Messiah would appear on earth when the scale was balanced. According to this tradition, then, evil is necessary in the bringing of the world's redemption, as sufferings reside on the scale[citation needed].

Tzimtzum in Kabbalistic thought holds that god has withdrawn himself so that creation could exist, but that this withdrawal means that creation lacks full exposure to god's all-good nature.[citation needed]

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[edit] Gnosticism

Gnosticism refers to several beliefs seeing evil as due to the world being created by an imperfect god, the demiurge and is contrasted with a superior entity. However, this by itself does not answer the problem of evil if the superior entity is omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Different gnostic beliefs may give varying answers, like Manichaeism, which adopts dualism, in opposition to the doctrine of omnipotence.

[edit] Christianity

[edit] Irenaean theodicy

Irenaean theodicy, posited by Irenaeus (2nd century AD – c. 202), has been reformulated by John Hick. It holds that one cannot achieve moral goodness or love for God if there is no evil and suffering in the world. Evil is soul-making and leads one to be truly moral and close to God. God created an epistemic distance (such that God is not immediately knowable) so that we may strive to know him and by doing so become truly good. Evil is a means to good for 3 main reasons:

1. Means of knowledge Hunger leads to pain, and causes a desire to feed. Knowledge of pain prompts humans to seek to help others in pain.

2. Character Building Evil offers the opportunity to grow morally. “We would never learn the art of goodness in a world designed as a hedonistic paradise” (Richard Swinburne)

3. Predictable Environment The world runs to a series of natural laws. These are independent of any inhabitants of the universe. Natural Evil only occurs when these natural laws conflict with our own perceived needs. This is not immoral in any way

[edit] Pelagianism

The consequences of the original sin were debated by Pelagius and Augustine of Hippo. Pelagius argues on behalf of original innocence, while Augustine indicts Eve and Adam for original sin. Pelagianism is the belief that original sin did not taint all of humanity and that mortal free will is capable of choosing good or evil without divine aid. Augustine's position, and subsequently that of much of Christianity, was that Adam and Eve had the power to topple God's perfect order, thus changing nature by bringing sin into the world, but that the advent of sin then limited mankind's power thereafter to evade the consequences without divine aid.[39] Eastern Orthodox theology holds that one inherits the nature of sinfulness but not Adam and Eve's guilt for their sin which resulted in the fall.[40]

[edit] Augustinian Theodicy

St Augustine of Hippo (354 AD – 430) in his Augustinian theodicy focuses on the Genesis story that essentially dictates that God created the world and that it was good; evil is merely a consequence of the fall of man (The story of the Garden of Eden where Adam and Eve disobeyed God and caused inherent sin for man). Augustine stated that natural evil (evil present in the natural world such as natural disasters etc.) is caused by fallen angels, whereas moral evil (evil caused by the will of human beings) is as a result of man having become estranged from G

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od and choosing to deviate from his chosen path. Augustine argued that God could not have created evil in the world, as it was created good, and that all notions of evil are simply a deviation or privation of goodness. Evil cannot be a separate and unique substance. For example, Blindness is not a separate entity, but is merely a lack or privation of sight. Thus the Augustinian theodicist would argue that the problem of evil and suffering is void because God did not create evil; it was man who chose to deviate from the path of perfect goodness.

This, however, poses a number of questions involving genetics: if evil is merely a consequence of our choosing to deviate from God's desired goodness, then genetic disposition of 'evil' (currently fictitious) must surely be in God's plan and desire and thus cannot be blamed on Man. Similarly, the idea of inherent sin because our forebearers committed some sin seems incompatible with the teachings in the Bible. The Old Testament states "should the children's teeth be set on edge because their fathers ate sour grapes?"[41]

[edit] Saint Thomas

Saint Thomas systematized St. Augustine principles supplementing them. Evil, according to St. Thomas, is a privation, or the absence of some good which belongs properly to the nature of the creature. There is therefore no positive source of evil, corresponding to the greater good, which is God; evil being not real but rational—i.e. it exists not as an objective fact, but as a subjective conception; things are evil not in themselves, but by reason of their relation to other things, or persons. All realities are in themselves good; they produce bad results only incidentally; and consequently the ultimate cause of evil if fundamentally good, as well as the objects in which evil is found.

"Evil is threefold, viz., metaphysical evil, moral, and physical, the retributive consequence of moral guilt. Its existence subserves the perfection of the whole; the universe would be less perfect if it contained no evil. Thus fire could not exist without the corruption of what it consumes; the lion must slay the ass in order to live, and if there were no wrong doing, there would be no sphere for patience and justice. God is said (as in Isaiah 45) to be the author of evil in the sense that the corruption of material objects in nature is ordained by Him, as a means for carrying out the design of the universe; and on the other hand, the evil which exists as a consequence of the breach of Divine laws is in the same sense due to Divine appointment; the universe would be less perfect if its laws could be broken with impunity. Thus evil, in one aspect, i.e. as counter-balancing the deordination of sin, has the nature of good. But the evil of sin, though permitted by God, is in no sense due to him; its cause is the abuse of free will by angels and men. It should be observed that the universal perfection to which evil in some form is necessary, is the perfection of this universe, not of any universe: metaphysical evil, that is to say, and indirectly, moral evil as well, is included in the design of the universe which is partially known to us; but we cannot say without denying the Divine omnipotence, that another equally perfect universe could not be created in which evil would have no place."(Catholic Encyclopedia:Evil).

[edit] Luther and Calvin

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Both Luther and Calvin explained evil as a consequence of the fall of man and the original sin. However, due to the belief in predestination and omnipotence, the fall is part of God's plan. Ultimately humans may not be able to understand and explain this plan.[42]

[edit] Christian Science

Mary Baker Eddy (the founder of the Christian Science movement) regarded evil as an illusion (both of and to material sense). To explain this, Eddy started with a concept of God as infinite inexhaustible Spirit, wholly good and reasoned to the conclusion that the so-called "opposite of God" could not be actual or factual. This is not unlike St. Thomas Acquinas' conception previously discussed. But Eddy took this a step further to its (to her, logical conclusion, in that) She taught her students that to speak of God, on one hand, as omnipresent and omnipotent, but to accept, on the other hand, the notion that this very infinite spiritual omnipresence could have a (seeming) opposite was self-contradictory, by definition, explaining that to the infinity of God, good, evil would be unknown just as in a room full of light, darkness is unknown. In her book, Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures, Eddy describes both evil (false, material self-decieved sense) and it sense of reality which it calls matter, as impossible or unknown to infinite God, Spirit, writing, "Life is neither in nor of matter. What is termed matter is unknown to Spirit, which includes in itself all substance and is Life eternal. Matter is a human concept. Life is divine Mind. Life is not limited. Death and finiteness are unknown to (true, real, actual or spiritual) Life. If (this true spiritual one and only) Life ever had a beginning, it would also have an ending. ."[43] To Eddy, Evil, was not some "thing," to be known by Truth as reality, but the hypothetical absence of good. This absence of good could only seem to exist to a self-deceived, ignorant false belief, which Eddy called mortal mind, linking it to the Pauline carnal mind of the New Testament. To Eddy, mortal mind was a state of self-deception or ignorance of true being. This false sense postulated both "places" (states or modes of belief) for the absence of all-inclusive good, or God (which Eddy called evil), as well as places where good and evil co-existed and stuggled for supremacy. To Eddy and to her students, dealing with or overcoming evil consists in "removing its mask" (of seeming reality) in thought by declaring for the allness of God and the nothingness of God's so-called opposite. Eddy concluded that Christ healed both physical as well moral sickness and deformity by refusing to accept as reality what the physical senses were displaying and, in its place, declaring for or "seeing" God's perfect spiritual image and likeness. In Science and Health, she explained, "Jesus beheld in Science (through his spiritual or divinely mental seeing or vision) the perfect man where where sinning mortal man appears to mortals. In this perfect (spiritual or divinely mental) man the Saviour saw God's own likeness, and this correct view of man healed the sick. Thus Jesus taught that the kingdom of God is intact, universal, and that man is pure and holy. .... To the five corporeal senses, man appears to be matter and mind united; but Christian Science reveals man as the idea of God, and declares the corporeal senses to be mortal and erring illusions. Divine Science shows it to be impossible that a material body, though interwoven with matter's highest stratum, misnamed mind, should be man, the immortal idea of being, indestructible and eternal. Were it otherwise, man would be annihilated. [44] Consequently, she and her followers claim to have no philosophical problem with the concept of an almighty and wholly good deity. In regard to the question as to what caused or causes the illusion of evil, Christian Science responds that the question is meaningless, and furthermore that enquiring into the origin of the illusion of evil tends to reinforce it, since such an enquiry would strengthen the belief that evil is real. Mary

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Baker Eddy writes: "The notion that both evil and good are real is a delusion of material sense, which Science annihilates. Evil is nothing, no thing, mind, nor power."[45] In dealing with moral evil or sin, Eddy expanded the concept of sin beyond obvious moral failings, (murder, cruelty, ect.) seeing both sin and sickness as but two different sides of the same coin, "material sense" or "material belief," what an ignorant self-deceived "false" limited (even hypothetical - never actual) consciousness was believing at a particular moment teaching her students, "When sin or sickness seems true to material sense, impart without frightening or discouraging (your) the patient (being treated metaphysically by scientific prayer or "Christian Science treatment") the truth and spiritual understanding, which destroy disease. Expose and denounce the claims of evil and disease in all their forms, but realize no reality in them. A sinner is not reformed merely by assuring him that he cannot be a sinner because there is no sin. To put down the claim of sin, you must detect it (operating as seeming or apparent "reality), remove the mask (that deceives both victim and perpetrator), point out the illusion (to the ignorant beliefs of the patient requesting metaphysical treatment or prayer), and thus get the victory over sin and so prove its unreality. The sick are not healed merely by declaring there is no sickness, but by knowing that there is none." [46]

[edit] HinduismMain article: Problem of evil in Hinduism

Hinduism is a complex religion with many different currents or schools. As such the problem of evil in Hinduism is answered in several different ways such as by the concept of karma.

[edit] Buddhism

In Buddhism, there is no theistic "problem of evil" as Buddhism generally rejects the notion of a benevolent, omnipotent creator god, identifying such a notion as attachment to a false concept. For instance, in the Bhūridatta Jātaka the Bodhisattva sings:

If the creator of the world entire

They call God, of every being be the Lord

Why does he order such misfortune

And not create concord?

If the creator of the world entire

They call God, of every being be the Lord

Why prevail deceit, lies and ignorance

And he such inequity and injustice create?

If the creator of the world entire

They call God, of every being be the Lord

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Then an evil master is he, (O Aritta)

Knowing what's right did let wrong prevail![47]

[edit] By philosophers

[edit] Epicurus

Epicurus

Epicurus is generally credited with first expounding the problem of evil, and it is sometimes called "the Epicurean paradox" or "the riddle of Epicurus."

"Either God wants to abolish evil, and cannot; or he can, but does not want to. If he wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not want to, he is wicked. If God can abolish evil, and God really wants to do it, why is there evil in the world?" — Epicurus, as quoted in 2000 Years of Disbelief

Epicurus himself did not leave any written form of this argument. It can be found in Christian theologian Lactantius's Treatise on the Anger of God where Lactantius critiques the argument. Epicurus's argument as presented by Lactantius actually argues that a god that is all-powerful and all-good does not exist and that the gods are distant and uninvolved with man's concerns. The gods are neither our friends nor enemies.

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[edit] David Hume

David Hume's formulation of the problem of evil in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion:

"Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?"[48]

"[God's] power we allow [is] infinite: Whatever he wills is executed: But neither man nor any other animal are happy: Therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of nature tends not to human or animal felicity: Therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?"

[edit] Gottfried Leibniz

Gottfried Leibniz

In his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, the sceptic Pierre Bayle denied the goodness and omnipotence of God on account of the sufferings experienced in this earthly life. Gottfried Leibniz introduced the term theodicy in his 1710 work Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal ("Theodicic Essays on the Benevolence of God, the Free will of man, and the Origin of Evil") which was directed mainly against Bayle. He argued that this is the best of all possible worlds that God could have created.

Imitating the example of Leibniz, other philosophers also called their treatises on the problem of evil theodicies. Voltaire's popular novel Candide mocked Leibnizian optimism through the fictional tale of a naive youth.

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[edit] Immanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant argued for sceptical theism. He claimed there is a reason all possible theodicies must fail: evil is a personal challenge to every human being and can be overcome only by faith.[49] He wrote

We can understand the necessary limits of our reflections on the subjects which are beyond our reach. This can easily be demonstrated and will put an end once and for all to the trial.[50]

[edit] Victor Cousin

Victor Cousin argued for a form of eclecticism to organize and develop philosophical thought. He believed that the Christian idea of God was very similar to the Platonic concept of "the Good," in that God represented the principle behind all other principles. Like the ideal of Good, Cousin also believed the ideal of Truth and of Beauty were analogous to the position of God, in that they were principles of principles. Using this way of framing the issue, Cousin stridently argued that different competing philosophical ideologies all had some claim on truth, as they all had arisen in defense of some truth. He however argued that there was a theodicy which united them, and that one should be free in quoting competing and sometimes contradictory ideologies in order to gain a greater understanding of truth through their reconciliation.[51]

[edit] Peter Kreeft

Christian philosopher Peter Kreeft provides several answers to the problem of evil and suffering, including that a) God may use short-term evils for long-range goods, b) God created the possibility of evil, but not the evil itself, and that free will was necessary for the highest good of real love. Kreeft says that being all-powerful doesn't mean being able to do what is logically contradictory, i.e., giving freedom with no potentiality for sin, c) God's own suffering and death on the cross brought about his supreme triumph over the devil, d) God uses suffering to bring about moral character, quoting apostle Paul in Romans 5, e) Suffering can bring people closer to God, and f) The ultimate "answer" to suffering is Jesus himself, who, more than any explanation, is our real need.[52]

[edit] William Hatcher

The mathematical logician William Hatcher (a member of the Baha'i Faith), who used relational logic to claim that very simple models of moral value cannot be consistent with the premise of evil as an absolute, whereas goodness as an absolute is entirely consistent with the other postulates concerning moral value.[53] In Hatcher's view one can only validly talk about an act A being "less good" than an act B, one cannot logically commit to saying that A is absolutely evil, unless one is prepared to abandon other more reasonable principles.

Augustine of Hippo

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From TheopediaJump to: navigation, search

15th century painting of St. Augustine

Aurelius Augustinus (354 - 430) is often simply referred to as St. Augustine or Augustine Bishop of Hippo (the ancient name of the modern city of Annaba in Algeria). He is the pre-eminent "Doctor of the Church" according to Roman Catholicism, and is considered by Evangelical Protestants to be in the tradition of the Apostle Paul as the theological fountainhead of the Reformation teaching on salvation and grace.

Multimedia

Renewing Your Mind: Saint Augustine (Real, Win) The Swan is Not Silent: Sovereign Joy in the Life and Thought of St. Augustine (MP3), by John

Piper - Devotional biographical sketch St. Augustine , (MP3) by Cornelius Van Til Introducing... Augustine PT. 1 , (MP3) by Mike Reeves Introducing... Augustine PT. 2 , (MP3) by Mike Reeves Augustine and the City of God , by N. Needham

David Calhoun (Lecture MP3s)

Augustine's Confessions Augustine & Pelagian Controversy Augustine's Theology of History

Contents

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[hide]

1 Life 2 Influence as a theologian and thinker 3 Augustine on the problem of evil 4 Early Christian writings 5 Quotes 6 Resources

o 6.1 Primary o 6.2 Secondary

7 See also 8 References 9 External links

Life

Augustine was born in 354 in Tagaste, a provincial Roman city in North Africa. He was raised and educated in Carthage. His mother Monica was a devout Christian and his father Patricius a pagan. His father converted to Christianity on his death bed, which came from the persuasion of his wife. As a youth Augustine followed the unpopular Manichaean religion, much to the horror of his mother. In Carthage, he developed a relationship with a young woman who would be his concubine for over a decade and produce a son. His education and early career was in philosophy and rhetoric, the art of persuasion and public speaking. He taught in Tagaste and Carthage, but soon aspired to compete with the best, in Rome. However, Augustine grew disappointed with the Roman schools, which he found apathetic. Manichaean friends introduced him to the prefect of the City of Rome, Symmachus, who had been asked to provide a professor of rhetoric for the imperial court at Milan.

The young provincial won the job and headed north to take up his position in late 384. At age thirty, Augustine had won the most visible academic chair in the Latin world, at a time when such posts gave ready access to political careers. However, he felt the tensions of life at an imperial court, lamenting one day as he rode in his carriage to deliver a grand speech before the emperor, that a drunken beggar he passed on the street had a less careworn existence than he.

Although Monica pressed the claims of Christianity, it is the bishop of Milan, Ambrose, who had most influence over Augustine. Ambrose was a master of rhetoric like Augustine himself, but older and more experienced. Prompted by Ambrose's sermons, Augustine moved away from Manichaeism, but instead of becoming Catholic like Ambrose, he converted to pagan Neoplatonism. Augustine's mother followed him to Milan and he allowed her to arrange a society marriage, for which he abandoned his concubine (however he had to wait two years until his fiance came of age; he promptly took up in the meantime with another woman).

In the summer of 386, in a garden, Augustine underwent a profound personal crisis and decided to convert to Christianity, abandon his career in rhetoric, quit his teaching position in Milan, give up any ideas of marriage (much to the horror of his mother), and devote himself full time to

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religion, celibacy and the priesthood. Ambrose baptized Augustine on Easter day in 387, and soon thereafter in 388 he returned to Africa. On his way back to Africa his mother died, as did his son soon after, leaving him relatively alone.

In 391 he was ordained a priest in Hippo Regius, (now Annaba, in Algeria). He became a famous preacher (more than 350 preserved sermons are believed to be authentic), and was noted for combating the Manichaean heresy.

In 396 he was made coadjutor bishop of Hippo (assistant with the right of succession on the death of the current bishop), and remained as bishop in Hippo until his death in 430. He left his monastery, but continued to lead a monastic life in the episcopal residence.

Augustine died on August 28, 430, during the siege of Hippo by the Vandals. He is said to have encouraged its citizens to resist the attacks, primarily on the grounds that the Vandals adhered to Arianism, which had been condemned as heretical.

Influence as a theologian and thinker

Augustine remains a central figure, both within Christianity and in the history of Western thought. As he himself was much influenced by Platonism and Neoplatonism, particularly by Plotinus, Augustine was important to the "baptism" of Greek thought and its entrance into the Christian, and subsequently the European intellectual tradition. Also important was his early and influential writing on the human will, a central topic in ethics, and one which became a focus for later philosophers such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. It is largely due to Augustine's arguments against the Pelagians, who did not believe in original sin, that Western Christianity has maintained the doctrine of original sin. Augustine also contended that God exists outside of time in the "eternal present" -- time existing only within the created universe.

Augustine's writings helped formulate the theory of the just war. He also advocated the use of force against the Donatists, asking "Why ... should not the Church use force in compelling her lost sons to return, if the lost sons compelled others to their destruction?" (The Correction of the Donatists, 22-24)

Thomas Aquinas took much from Augustine's theology while creating his own unique synthesis of Greek and Christian thought. Two later theologians who claimed special influence from Augustine were John Calvin and Cornelius Jansen. Calvinism developed as a part of Reformation theology, while Jansenism was a movement inside the Roman Catholic Church; some Jansenists went into schism and formed their own church.

John Calvin was an ardent student of Augustine's writings which is abundantly evident in his Institutes and the basic tenets of Calvinism. Augustine taught that man has nothing to do with his own salvation. Man has inherited the totally depraved nature of Adam and Eve after the Fall -- to the point they are spiritually incapable of availing themselves of God's grace. As a result of the depraved Adamic nature being inherited, infants are born in sin and with a sinful nature. Augustine argued that the only way any are saved is by God intervening and choosing some whom he calls his elect to be saved. This choosing is totally independent of those chosen. Those

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thus chosen cannot ever be lost or fall from grace. Conversely, those not sovereignly chosen before the foundation of the world to everlasting life are irrevocably doomed to hell.

Augustine was canonized by popular recognition and recognized as a Doctor of the Church in 1303 by Pope Boniface VIII. His feast day is August 28, the day on which he is thought to have died. Roman Catholics consider him the patron saint of brewers, printers, theologians, sore eyes, and a number of cities and dioceses.

"De Doctrina Christiana (On Christian Teaching) is the book Augustine wrote to train preachers. He composed three chapters on how to understand the Bible, then after thirty years of regular preaching, added a final chapter on how to communicate what has been understood." Themelios 33.1 (2008): 39. See also On Christian Doctrine at CCEL.

Augustine on the problem of evil

Scholars have carefully investigated Augustine's life due to his contributions to theodicy, the problem of evil. Throughout Augustine's youth, he had been involved in a belief called Manicheanism. This was an ancient religion from Persia that accounted for the world's entire disharmony in terms of an eternal struggle between physical light and darkness or good and evil. After several years as an adherent of the Manichaean religion, Augustine read the writings of Neoplatonists such as Plotinus, which in turn helped him move beyond the materialism of Manichaeism. Then, at the age of 32, Augustine became a Christian.

Augustine now an adamant follower of Christ sought to deal with the problem of evil. The Scriptures taught that his monotheistic God was all good and all-powerful therefore he desired to understand how and why sin and evil existed. Augustine discovered experientially and biblically that his sin problem was more than one of knowledge or wrong thinking. His affections and will also reacted against what God knew, loved, and willed. He realized that he could not, by his own thinking transform the depravity of his own nature, overcome his separation from God, or remove his verdict of guilt before God's justice. The prodigal son realized his total depravity and the need for God's grace for any hope.

Augustine consequently proposed a solution to the problem of evil in the world attributing it to the Fall of humanity after the disobedience in the Garden of Eden. From this view, Man is responsible for evil by being led astray by Satan. Accordingly, this not only absolves God of creating evil but also allows Him to show the world His love by bringing Christ into the world. (Cf. Confessions, 4:24, 5:20, 7:4)

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Thomas Aquinas on The Metaphysical Problem of Evil Author: Bill King Quodlibet Journal: Volume 4 Number 2-3, Summer 2002 ISSN: 1526-6575

Preface

In general, the problem of evil has historically been a recurring blemish against the claim that Christianity is an internally coherent, and reasonable, belief system. In this project I will give a presentation of Thomas Aquinas' metaphysical solution to the metaphysical problem of evil. It is my intentions in this work to help further a more adequate understanding of not only Thomas Aquinas, but also give an exposition of the type of detailed analysis that he presents in his writings. However, this paper should not be seen as a complete apologetic work, but only as a demonstration of the internal coherency between the Christian notion of God and the metaphysical problem of evil. Nonetheless, if this project could contribute to that end, then I have, in part at least, accomplished my goals.

I would like to thank Fr. Michael Dodds, O.P., Fr. Stephen Ernest, S.V.D., and Fr. Edward Krasevac, O.P., from the Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology; and Rev. Donald L. Gelpi, S.J., from the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley; and finally Dr. John J. Glanville from San Francisco State University, for their proof reading of this work. However, I take full responsibility for any errors found either in substance or otherwise. Finally, I am indebted to my wife Jeanette's continual stability, love, and patience in my never-ending pursuit of "fides quaerens intellectum."

Chapter 1

Introduction

In the field of Philosophy of Religion there is a fundamental area of research for both the philosopher and theologian, and this is usually expressed as "the problem of evil." Depending on what angle the issue is looked at, there can be numerous variations or approaches to solving the problem of evil. [1] Of course the problem of evil does not emanate in a vacuum. The problem that I will be referring to is usually discovered arising within a particular notion of theism. [2] The formulation of the general problem of evil is that if there is an all-knowing, all-good, and all-powerful God who created this world, how is it that there is evil? The dimension of evil though that we are concerned with is the metaphysical problem of evil that comes primarily via the antitheistic argument that: 1) God is the creator of everything, and 2) evil is a thing, therefore, 3) God created evil. [3] This argument compels the theistic thinker to address several sticky issues; not only does the theist have to give an account on what is evil, but he or she must address what the cause of evil is, and whether or not God is ultimately that cause.

In this paper I will focus on the metaphysical formulation of the problem of evil, and its classical metaphysical response via Thomas Aquinas. Because this paper focuses on Aquinas’ response to the metaphysical problem of evil, I must spend some time laying out in greater detail his metaphysical outlook. In doing this we will be better able to understand his position of evil as a privation; for without understanding the notions of ‘matter’, ‘privation’, and ‘form’, to a certain degree, we will not be able to understand the place evil has in his metaphysics. Similarly, without a brief, but reasonable, account of his causal principles we can not even begin to address the question of where evil belongs in the causal structure. The causal principles are crucial to Aquinas’ answer that evil is a privation, and that God can not be the cause of evil. As a result, we will briefly address the four causes regularly utilized within the Thomistic/Aristotelian worldview. We will then apply the theory of evil as a privation within the causal explanations; this will help us understand the answer as to how things can be evil. And this will naturally lead us into the question of whether or not God can be the cause of evil, which will be the final issue discussed.

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Usually, the typical kinds of responses to the problem of evil are claimed to be either a defense or a theodicy. The brief account of a theodicy is that there is a justification of the actions of God for allowing evil; a defense claims to show that the antitheistic arguments against theism, via the problem of evil, are ineffective.

The burden on the theist then would be either to defend, by way of an adequate argument, the coherence of theism; and/or justify, by way of an explanation, the existence of evil in a Judeo-Christian worldview. Even though there is a distinction made between a defense and a theodicy, there seems to be no a priori basis for rejecting the claim that the explanation, as understood as a defense, may also be utilized as a theodicy. [4]

My contention is that we only need to argue for the possibility (i.e., noncontradictoriness) of God creating a world in which real evil can, and does exist; and that God can not be the cause of such evil. If this can be done, then the necessary and sufficient condition has been met for establishing an internally coherent system; at least when considering the relation between the cause or causes of evil and the Christian notion of God. If these factors can be shown, then the burden has been lifted; hence, internal coherency has been adequately established for God and the existence of real evil; all the while, eliminating God as the cause of this evil. [5] However, this form of argument by no means proves, or is meant to prove, that Christian theism is true; its goal is to demonstrate internal consistency between the cause and real existence of evil, with the notion of the Christian God. For even though Christianity would be internally consistent, when advancing the relation between evil and God, this does not show the inconsistency of other worldviews, nor does it rule out the possibility of other contrary views to Christianity being internally consistent. [6]

I also would like to suggest that the metaphysical explanation should be considered as a preliminary and foundational stage in explaining the consistency of the relation between evil and the Christian God. For the metaphysical explanation must be antecedent to the moral or physical explanations. [7] The moral and physical problem of evil may generally be accounted for in the metaphysical one, but that does not mean that the metaphysical answer is a thoroughgoing answer for the general problem of evil within Christian theism. It does mean that some of the moral and physical evils may be explained under the metaphysical solution.

As stated above, the metaphysical problem is specifically ‘what is evil’ [8] ; and secondarily, regardless whether it is a thing or not, ‘what is the cause of evil?’ [9] The moral problem of evil attempts to resolve the question of ‘why’ is there evil; thus, the theist usually appeals to the notion of human free will to give an account for the ‘why’ question. The physical problem of evil addresses alleged unnecessary evils that are believed to not arise from human freedom (such as earthquakes). Thus, the theist may appeal to some form of providential necessity for evil, which in some cases, can be reduced to the answer given for the moral and/or metaphysical problems of evil. Likewise, appealing to human free will is at times not only a solution for moral and physical evils, but also some metaphysical evils as well. [10]

In this paper though, we will focus on the metaphysical solution to the metaphysical problem of evil as stated on page one; namely, the problem

is commonly understood as: God created everything, but if evil exists, then doesn’t that mean God created evil? We should clearly see that the classical position could not hold to any conclusion that suggests God created evil. It is true that God created everything, but does the theist need to accept the second premise, which suggests that evil is a thing? But if evil is not a thing, then is it an illusion? Again, the Christian can not accept the illusionary response as an account for evil; for evil has not been traditionally explained in this manner, nor is this explanation consistent with what Scripture says about evil. Neither can the Christian accept some form of dualistic worldview that suggests an evil deity versus a good deity (e.g., Zoroastrianism or Manichaeism); for then we have God not being perfectly sovereign. Surely scripture, tradition, and common sense, have taught us that evil is real; and surely Scripture and tradition teach us that there is only one true God—Yahweh—who has perfect sovereignty. But in what

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sense then is evil real? And what coherent account can be given to explain what evil is; furthermore, what can be said about the cause of such evil?

Chapter 2

Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas was a Dominican Friar of the 13th century. The roots of his classical response can be traced back to St. Augustine. So let us now see what Aquinas had to say about the metaphysical problem of evil.

Aquinas addresses the same problem that was presented on page one. He states his opponent’s position as such: "Everything created is something. But evil is something created, as is said in Isaias [sic] (5,6-7), ‘ . . . I am the Lord making peace and creating evil . . ..’ Therefore evil is something." [11] Using the same terms as Aquinas, 1) If God created everything, and 2) evil is a thing, then 3) God created evil. His interlocutor’s position is further supported by several arguments that are meant to suggest that evil has a cause as a substance and is not a mere privation of the good. Since they are opposites (good and evil), and there are degrees of each between the two extremes, then they must be first principles. But if evil is a first principle for all that is evil, then evil can not be a privation of good. [12] To further argue that evil is a substance his interlocutor suggests that: " . . . everything that corrupts, acts. But evil, precisely as evil, corrupts, as Dionysius says. Therefore evil, precisely as evil, acts. But nothing acts except inasmuch as it is something. Therefore evil, precisely as evil, is something." [13] His opponent’s position attempts to argue that evil can not be a mere privation of good. Aquinas presents his opponent’s view that is allegedly supported by appeals to reason, scripture, and tradition; however, Aquinas does not buy into it, and furnishes us with a response. Aquinas argues that it is true that God created everything, but evil is not a thing. Now of course Aquinas is not suggesting that evil is not real, rather he is arguing that it is not a substance. That is, it does not exist in-itself, but only as inhering in a good substance. Without a good substance there could be no evil. This is the traditional Augustinian move that evil is a privation. That is, a ‘lacking’ of the good. In Aquinas’ Compendium of Theology he lucidly states this doctrine of privation:

. . . As the term good signifies ‘perfect being’, so the term evil signifies nothing else than ‘privation of perfect being’. In its proper acceptance, privation is predicated of that which is fitted by its nature to be possessed, and to be possessed at a certain time and in a certain manner. Evidently, therefore, a thing is called evil if it lacks a perfection it ought to have. Thus if a man lacks the sense of sight, this is an evil for him. But the same lack is not an evil for a stone, for the stone is not equipped by nature to have the faculty of sight. [14]

This concept of evil as privation needs some unpacking, for it is a metaphysically complex notion. [15] His example of the stone lacking sight versus the human being lacking sight is of some help. But the question is, in what sense is Aquinas saying the stone lacks sight versus the human lacks sight? Are they used in the same sense? If they were used in the same sense, then it would be ‘lacking’ in the same way. Surely then, Aquinas is not using ‘lacking’ in the same way.

In order for us to answer these questions we must turn to chapter two of Aquinas’ De Principiis naturae, [16] it is here that he addresses this distinction of ‘lacking’ as understood in two different senses. He starts out by presenting three principles of natural change; viz., matter, form, and privation. He says, concerning matter and privation, that "matter and privation refer to the same subject, but according to different reasoning." [17] What does this mean? A simple way to understand what he is trying to say here is that when we refer to, for example, the ‘morning star’ and the ‘evening star’, or ‘John Wayne’ and ‘Marion Morrison,’ the referent is the same for each subject, but the sense in which it is used is different. [18] Similarly, matter and privation are referring to the same subject, but in a different sense. A lump of bronze is both matter and privation, i.e., bronze is deprived of shape, but only a privation accidentally. The bronze lump has the potential to be a bust of Aristotle when melted and appropriately shaped

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according to his likeness; and as such, it is only accidentally deprived of the shape of a bust of say, Plato (hence only accidental form).

Aquinas continues his division, and separates accidents into two kinds: necessary accidents versus non-necessary accidents. An example of a necessary accident would be ‘a triangle’s angles equal the same as two right angles’; and an example of a non-necessary accident would be something like ‘discovering a pirate’s treasure while digging a hole for a plant’ [19]. We can see that it is the nature of the thing (substance) itself that dictates the necessity, or non-necessity, of an accident. The fact that I am wearing a blue shirt is a non-essential (non-necessary) accident for me. However, the fact that I seek the good, or knowledge, is an essential (necessary) accident for me. [20]

The result of this brief description is that for Aquinas privation is clearly an accidental principle, but necessary for change. That is because matter never is completely absent of privation. The way to understand this better would be to imagine a bust of Plato having the form of the likeness of the actual Plato. But it is also, as a bust of Plato, deprived of the likeness of Aristotle, i.e., Aristotle’s face and head. In other words, it has the potential to be melted down and receive the form of Aristotle’s face and head. Aquinas says, concerning matter, "inasmuch as it [matter] is under one form, it is deprived of another, and vice versa." [21]

Now form itself is that "toward which generation moves." [22] In other words, the actual artist actualizes what is only potential in the bronze, but actual in the artist’s mind (namely, the form of the bust of Plato or Aristotle, et al.). And the form of Plato’s bust is the end or telos, but that end or telos is not possible without the antecedent principles of matter and privation, along with the antecedent conditions of that form actually being already in nature, or the mind. [23] Without matter, and without the lacking of form, or without the condition of potentiality (privation) there could be no bust of Plato or Aristotle (accidental forms). But we should keep in mind that the form of the bust of Plato is only an accidental form, i.e., it is only being accidentally and not substantially. It is possible that the bust could have been of Aristotle, et al. Some of these form-matter complexes are, or were, substantial in nature (e.g., both Plato and Aristotle actually existed in nature as substantial beings), but are not substantial in art; in art they are only accidental. The forms of the busts of Plato and Aristotle are not accidental forms alone, for they both, in these examples, were substantial form-matter compositions in nature. Plato, the human being, as a substance in potentiality, may acquire numerous accidental forms, such as the accidental mode of being a musician, an athlete, etc.; but these are only accidental changes/forms, and are not necessary for Plato to be who he was. If Plato should undergo a substantial change to his being, which in fact he did, he would cease to be. Aquinas articulates this in the following quotes:

There are certain things which can be [esse] but do not, and others which are. [24] Those which can be [and are not] are said to be in potency, whereas those which already are, are said to be in act.

He goes on to elucidate on the distinction between substantial being versus accidental being:

. . . [T]he matter that is in potency to exist substantially is called matter out of which, whereas the matter that is in potency to be accidentally is called matter in which. Likewise, properly speaking, what is in potency to be a substance is called prime matter, whereas what is in potency to be accidentally is called a subject. Accordingly, accidents are said to be in a subject, but substantial form is not spoken of in this way . . . form makes matter be, whereas an accident does not make a subject be. The subject, however, makes an accident be . . . . What makes something to be substantially is called substantial form, and what makes something to be accidentally is called accidental form. [25]

At this juncture let us now summarize: 1) The three principles of natural change are form, matter and privation. We saw that Aquinas believes that prime matter and privation are metaphysical principles that work together. [26] And we further saw that form and prime matter are the metaphysically necessary

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principles for different modes of being. Without prime matter and form you have no natural being, and without privation, you have no natural being, the three are necessary for natural change. The result is that all matter is in potency and that matter must have form to be. 2) We also found that natural being is in both potency and act. There are modes of being that are in potency accidentally (e.g., the form of the bust of Plato, or the accidental qualities of being a musician, a chess player, etc.). And there are modes of being that were or are in actuality substantially (Plato, as a finite human being that actually existed, thereby, also in potency, as in the process of acquiring different modes of being accidentally). Accordingly, all accidents are said to be in, or dependent on, a subject; so, for example, the mode of being of the accidental form of ‘white’ is an accidental form that depends on its being in Plato’s substance (i.e., substantial complex of matter/form). 3) We also discovered that accidental being could be either necessary or non-necessary. In other words, its (i.e., the accidental form’s) mode of being is necessary when it can not be, at least conceptually or metaphysically, separated from the substantial being in which it is dependent on. So, for example, a triangle has the accidental mode of being of ‘angles equaling two right angles’ which is a necessary accidental mode of being. And the ‘discovering a lost treasure while digging a hole for a plant’ is a non-necessary accidental mode of being. Likewise, the actual playing of classical piano is a non-necessary accidental mode of being. Or the fact that Plato was a philosopher is a non-necessary accidental mode of being dependent on Plato’s substantial mode of being.

Two final crucial inferential points can be made from what has been given so far: namely, 1) that the nature of the substantial being will dictate the restrictions of the mode of being for the accidental form. In other words, whether the accidental mode of being is necessary or not, depends on the nature of the substantial being it is dependent on. 2) Whether or not the substantial being has a real privation also depends on the nature of the substantial being. For the stone can not have a real privation of sight if it is a stone, but a human can. For human nature dictates at least the potentiality for sight. Whether that sight is actualized or not is another question. Similarly, the fact that my substantial being has the accidental mode of being of playing classical piano and my wife does not, (i.e., all things being equal, she only has the accidental mode of being of potentially playing classical piano), makes her have a real privation of playing classical piano. She has the potential to do so, but it is not actualized as it is for me, and clearly playing piano is a nonessential accidental mode of being. However, Buford the dog is not in privation of the accidental mode of being of playing classical piano, for it is not even a potentiality within a dog’s nature to play classical piano.

So now we need to address the issue of what Aquinas means by "lack" in the context of what has been stated so far. Thus, at this juncture, we are primarily concerned with in what sense does the stone "lack" sight, and in what sense does the blind man "lack" sight? Aquinas says:

Although generation is from not-being, one should realize that we maintain, not that negation is a principle, but rather that privation is, for negation does not determine a subject for itself. Not to see can be attributed even to non-being, for example, "Chimeras do not see." Likewise, we can attribute it to beings that are not meant to see, such as a stone. But privation is attributed only to a determinate subject in which the missing perfection is meant to be. For example, blindness is attributed only to those things that were born to see. Moreover, it is in accordance with the fact that generation does not arise from non-being simply, but from nonbeing which is in some subject—and not just any subject, but a determined one—that privation is said to be a principle. For not everything which is not-burning will burn, but only those things that are apt to burn . . . privation is an accidental principle, as has previously been explained; the other two [form and matter] are essential principles. [27]

Here we should have a clearer picture of what Aquinas is trying to suggest; viz., when we talk about something having an absolute negation of an accident (whether essential or not) we are talking about the absolute incapacity of that being for even having that accident (one sense of ‘lack’). So, a rock does not have within its nature the capacity for sight, but a human does. A human has the potentiality for sight (e.g., a zygote); and similarly, as humans we can be in privation of sight (e.g., blindness) for it is the ‘lacking’ of a perfection that we should have; but a rock lacks this potentiality absolutely. [28] A rock is in absolute negation of both the capacities to actually see and the potential to privation of sight; because

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within its nature there is the absolute negation of this capacity for privation of sight and even the potential to actualize sight.

Section I

The Four Causes

Now before we answer the question of how modes of being, and the principles of natural change are related with the privation of evil, let us first address Aquinas’ position on the causes. Doing this will further help us understand his answer to the metaphysical problem of evil. For if evil is simply a privation of good, and not a substance in and of itself, then ‘what causes evil’? (if it even has a cause) would be the next logical question to address. [29]

In Aquinas’ De Principiis naturae, he addresses these causal principles. For Aquinas, everything that is in the mode of being of act/potency must intend to act to an end. Of course Aquinas does not imply that all things that act do so intentionally via deliberating, for this would be absurd. Those things that can deliberate on what ends to strive for can act to choose one end over another, but everything else is determined to an end. But there are acts, such as involuntary acts, that are still intentional, but not deliberated by agents that have the potential to deliberate an act. [30] For example, blinking is an intentionally

determined act. That is, the agent (human being) intends an end by blinking (which may be for the health of the eyes); and clearly, this intended end is not of deliberation for the agent (at least the involuntary blinks). Similarly, when I play a certain chord on the piano, there is no deliberation between the notes, i.e., there is no need for me to play the notes individually to figure out which notes comprise the chord--they are predetermined. [31] My purpose is to play and hear America the Beautiful and the means for completing this end is also intended, but not deliberated. The point Aquinas is trying to emphasize is that acts have a "natural inclination toward something." [32] The act of playing certain chords comes naturally for the pianist; one does not have to deliberate over which notes make up the specific chord. So for Aquinas, all things ‘intend’ to an end via deliberation or natural inclination.

Aquinas then continues in chapter two and lists the four causes: material, efficient, formal, and final, two of which are considered to be intrinsic (matter and form), and two of which are considered to be extrinsic (efficient and final). Additionally, Aquinas points out that we should not confuse a cause with a principle, in some cases we will find a relevant difference. There are examples where a principle is not a cause; for example, the principle of privation, since it is only an accidental principle, it can not be an essential cause. [33] Privation is a principle of change, but not a cause of change, hence, it could not be considered as an essential cause. We can understand this better by noticing that, for example, the color black is the principle of white changing, but not the cause of white changing. Aquinas gives us a strict definition of what a cause is:

. . . [A] cause is said to be that out of whose being another being follows. Accordingly, what is prior by way of being that by which motion starts cannot be called an essential cause, even if it is called a principle. This is the reason for including privation among principles, but not among causes. A privation is that from which generation departs. It can, however, be called an accidental cause, inasmuch as it coincides with matter . . . [emphasis added]. [34]

His point should be apparent, since privation is not a mode of being, for there is no being out of which privation brings about another being, privation can not be considered as a cause, but only as a principle of change. Privation is a necessary condition in order for change to occur, but change will not occur due to privation alone. [35] Change is caused by efficient, material, formal, and final causes, and privation is not an essential cause, but a principle of change. Let us, by way of example, explain what role each of these causes would then play in relation to different modes of being.

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An actualized sperm and ovum are potentially a human being (i.e., an actual being as sperm and ovum, but also a being in potency to be human), which upon their uniting (the natural inclination of both the sperm and ovum) become an actualized zygote (actual human), but also a unique individual person; i.e., the zygote has the potential (natural inclination) to choose, act, love, dream, reason, grow, etc. (all activities that may or may not come to fruition in a person). Of course, whether a particular zygote does actually manifest these accidental modes is a different question altogether. [36] Nonetheless, the potentiality is present, unlike for a stone. The privation of the act of reasoning is a real lack for the zygote, but not for the stone. We can also see, by this example, that the secondary efficient cause by which the zygote comes to be, is both the mode of being of the sperm and ovum (extrinsic causes), and the mode of being of both parents (extrinsic causes). [37] The primary efficient and existential (or sustaining) cause of the zygote would of course be God as both the initiating (or efficient) cause and sustaining cause of its being. Additionally though, we can consider the mother as not only a secondary efficient cause, but also as a secondary existential cause; this is so because she is the human incubator whose actual substantial being sustains the being of the zygote. [38] The sperm and ovum have passed from a mode of being that is both actual and potential, to a zygote that is in both act-potency. Even though the zygote will mature in its natural course of development—through sustenance, education, relationships, etc. (accidental instrumental causes)—these are only accidental changes, not changes in its substance. The formal cause is, of course, the substantial form of the human being, namely, the human soul, that by which a human is human. The material cause is that out of which we are made—the prime matter which has the possibility of existing as human. The secondary exemplar cause would be that after which the zygote comes to be—the parents, while the primary exemplar cause would of course be God, because we are all made in the image of God. And lastly, but by no means the least, we have the final cause, that for which the zygote came to be. This answers the crucial question of why something happened. Hence, the question for why the zygote came to be (i.e., what is the final cause of the zygote) is for communion with God. In this example [39] we can clearly see how the causes can work together. Further, it is God’s act as the primary efficient and sustaining cause that brings it full circle to him as the final cause also. There is some real metaphysical truth in the fact that God is both the Alpha and the Omega.

At this point we should have a clearer understanding of both the meaning of privation and its different senses; furthermore, we should see (by my example) the interdependent role, and different significance, that each cause plays in relation to the modes of being. This is all the more apparent when considering the role that accidental causes versus essential causes play in the solution for the cause of evil. We are now ready to examine these metaphysical notions in relation to the metaphysical problem of evil.

But before doing this there is one more point that needs to be more explicitly laid out in order for us to complete Thomas’ metaphysical picture. For Aquinas, as I alluded to above, all things strive (naturally or otherwise) to an end, but additionally, all things are determined to a good.

He says:

That every agent acts for an end has been made clear . . . [but] . . . the agent would not be inclined to it except by virtue of some agreement with it. But, what is appropriate to something is good for it. So, every agent acts for a good. [40]

The point that Aquinas is stressing, and which he argues for, prior and subsequently to this text, is that all things have a natural impulse or intellectual faculty to act to an end; but that end must be good for it. For the end is determined by some natural desire. And nothing is naturally inclined to act in such a way that is contrary to its own good, for the good "provides the terminus for appetite . . . [t]herefore, every agent acts for the sake of a good." [41] Another way to look at this is to say that since all things act for an end and all things desire (naturally or otherwise) the good, and being is good, then all things desire being/good. [42]

Section II

How about that evil?

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What can we now say about Aquinas’ assessment of evil? First, evil is not a thing, that is, it is not a substance; hence, it has no essence. He states:

. . . [E]vil is simply a privation of something which a subject is entitled by its origin to possess and which it ought to have, . . . privation is not an essence; it is, rather, a negation in a substance. Therefore, evil is not an essence in things. [43]

Second, since evil is not a substance, but a privation of a good substance, evil can not ‘wholly’ corrupt some thing. [44] The reason is that there is no-thing there for evil to subsist in. Aquinas says that: " . . . no matter how much evil be multiplied, it can never destroy the good wholly." [45] Additionally, the explanation that evil is not a substance, brings in the third crucial point that needs to be addressed; viz., if evil is not a substance (not a form-matter composition), then what could be the cause of evil? This latter issue also implicitly brings up the question of whether or not God is the cause of evil.

Clearly, given the construction of the causes given above, and the notion that evil is not a substance, what follows from this is that evil does not have a formal cause per se; for only that which is substance can have form, evil is not a substance, hence evil has no form. Evil, by definition, is the privation of form. [46] What then can we say about the final cause of evil? With this too, evil can not have a final cause, for only substances that move toward fruition of perfection or increase of order can have a final cause. [47] Evil is neither a substance, nor that which desires/intends naturally to order/perfection, hence, evil does not have a formal or final cause per se. Aquinas articulates as much in the following quote:

. . . [T]hat which has a per se cause is intended by its cause, for what happens outside the agent’s intention is not a per se effect but an accidental effect, for example the digging of a grave is accidentally the cause of finding a treasure when this happens outside the intention of the gravedigger. But evil as such cannot be intended, nor in any way willed or desired because the desirable has the nature of good, to which evil as such is opposed . . . every per se cause has a fixed and determined order to its effect, and what is done in keeping with order is not evil, but evil occurs when order is neglected; hence evil as such does not have a per se cause. [48]

Now we should consider the material cause of evil. If evil is not a substance, and all that is, is good, then (following the act/potency principle) the only material cause for evil is a good substance. So, the material cause for evil must be, at least accidentally, a good substance. [49] That implies there is no essential evil material cause. [50] Aquinas again expresses as much in the following quote:

Now everything which is accidental, is reduced, i.e., is traced back to that which is per se; but if evil does not have a per se cause, as has been shown, it remains that only good has a per se cause. Nor can the per se cause of good be other than good, since a per se cause produces its like. It remains then that good is the accidental cause of any evil. But evil, which is a defective good, may also be a cause of evil; nevertheless it always comes back to this that the first cause of evil is not evil, but good . . . evil is accidentally caused by the good, either by virtue of the matter of the effect, or by virtue of its form. For, if the matter is not well disposed to the reception of the agent’s action on it, there must result a defect in the product. [51]

Chapter 3

Is God at fault?

What now can be said about an efficient cause for evil? This question is indeed related to the metaphysical problem of evil; viz., if only good substances could be the per accidens cause of evil, what then causes evil as a per se efficient cause, would it not be God then? Are not per accidens causes reduced to per se causes? How can one avoid God as the metaphysical efficient cause of evil, if indeed God is the efficient cause of all good substance, it seems then that God would be the efficient cause of

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evil? Let us turn to Aquinas and see how he addresses this problem. The argument that God would be the cause of evil proceeds as follows:

. . . [T]he effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (A.1). Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above (Q.2, A.3; Q.6, AA.1, 4), it follows that also every evil is from God. [52]

In general Aquinas responds to this problem by first making a distinction between evil as fault and evil as penalty. For Aquinas, evil considered as penalty is caused by God as the efficient cause, but only as per accidens. In particular, Aquinas argues that it is within the nature of an ordered teleological cosmos to be a just cosmos. And punishment would be necessary

in order to maintain an ordered and perfecting end in consideration of such a cosmos that is comprised of imperfect beings. He elaborates on this in more detail in the Christian notion of divine providence. [53]

When discussing evil as fault though, Aquinas turns away from looking at God as the per accidens efficient cause of this evil, for the efficient cause of fault lies in an imperfect being’s will or the pre-existing material deficiency. But since God is perfect, in the sense that he lacks nothing, and is wholly actualized [54], he can not be the efficient cause of imperfection. Only an imperfect being (that which lacks) can be the efficient cause of imperfection, but again only accidentally; hence, the efficient cause of the imperfection of the evil of fault would lie in the imperfect agent’s will or pre-existing material imperfection. Aquinas wants us to further notice that the intentions of God are not to bring about such evils, but such evil as penalty is necessary for a teleologically greater good:

But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order of the universe . . . and thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruption of things . . . [emphasis added]. [55]

Let me elaborate further by the following analogy: Let us suppose that a bicycle manufacturer specialized in making tricycles. One day the parents of Rachele bought her one of those fantastic tricycles. Now Rachele was an autonomous, free-willed little girl who seldom took her parents advice. [56] One day Rachele was pushing her tricycle to its limits, indeed she was going so fast that she lost control and fell. Unfortunately, she bumped her head and ultimately required some stitches to close the wound (the unfortunate consequences, or penalty, for not accepting the wisdom of her parents). However, her parents felt it was the fault of the manufacturer for making a defective tricycle, and they wanted to sue them (penalty). But, upon investigation it was discovered that Rachele was careless in her behavior, and the manufacturer was found to be free of any culpability. From that point on Rachele began being more cautious with her freedom and taking better care of her tricycle.

The manufacturer of the tricycle was not found to be culpable for the accident, nor could the manufacturer be found to be the per se cause of the accident, in fact we can only see the manufacturer as a per accidens cause in the sense of creating the tricycle in which to help Rachele enjoy her play time. Additionally, we can see that due to Rachele’s lacking of knowledge (privation) of the proper way to behave while on the tricycle, we see her (and possibly her parents too) as a secondary per accidens cause for the evil consequences.

As a result, we can see that the question of the efficient cause per accidens of evil lies squarely, and primarily, in the dimension of the imperfect beings in evil as fault and only accidental providentially by God when evil is considered as penalty. [57] However, God is only the accidental efficient cause for the necessary [58] evils within the scope of his divine providential control. Ultimately, it appears that all evils are necessary, at least those evils in the sense of bringing about perfection and justice in an imperfect cosmos in relation to penalty. [59] And when considering the efficient cause he does make a distinction between those evils that require fault and those evils that require penalty. The former rests in the agent

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causation of the imperfect will and pre-existing material deficiencies, but only via per accidens; while the latter evils’ causes rests via per accidens within the providential intentions of God for the imperfect beings to be perfected.

Hence, Aquinas’ answer is:

The effect of the deficient secondary cause [imperfect being] as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; . . . And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause. [60]

Conclusion

We can see that Aquinas has pointed out several important factors when considering the metaphysical problem of evil. In the beginning of this paper we laid out the antitheistic metaphysical problem of evil as follows:

1. God is the creator of everything.2. Evil is a thing.3. Thus, God created evil. [61]

Obviously, if we accepted premises one and two the conclusion would not be the orthodox view of Christianity. Surely, God created everything, and surely evil is real; so, the problem then was in how one defined ‘thing’ in premise two. We found that, according to Thomas, evil is real but it is not a substance, instead it is a real lacking of what should be. So the argument above was then responded to in the following way:

1. God is the creator of everything.2. Evil is not a thing, but a privation.3. Thus, God is not necessarily the creator of evil. [62]

However, after getting to this point Aquinas had to then explain what he meant by ‘substance’ or ‘thing’; and furthermore if evil was not a substance or thing, then what is it? He showed us that a substance is a primary matter/substantial form complex that is good; but evil could not fall under this category, for then God, as the creator of all that is good, would be the creator of evil. Also, by rejecting the notion that evil was a substance Aquinas avoided metaphysical dualism. Finally, by expressing evil as real, he avoids illusionism. Thus, we found that evil was not a substance, but a privation of some good that should be there. But we needed some clarity in what was meant by ‘privation’. For Aquinas, it was a sort of ‘lacking’ of the good that was not meant to be this way. But it was not an absolute negation as a rock not having even the potential to see; instead, it was defined much like a human being that is blind. Blindness is a real lack, and humans have the potential to see, and to lack this actuality is to be deprived of a mode of being that should be there. The result was that this evil was a real ‘lacking’.

Furthermore, we discovered that the cause of evil then could only be a good substance, for only that which is actual could bring about something real (ex nihilo nihil), and all that is actual is good. But in what sense is evil caused then? Since evil was not an actualized substance or essential principle it could not have, or be, an essential cause, nor could it have a formal or final cause. Instead, it was only a per accidens principle of change, and not the per se cause of change. Much like white is the principle of change to black in the sense that it must begin as other than black, but white is not the cause of the change to black. Thus, the cause of evil would then be a good substance only accidentally.

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At that juncture we were then able to see that Aquinas had demonstrated not only that evil was a privation of being as a per accidens principle of change, but also that evil has no direct per se cause. He further showed us that good substance was the cause of evil only accidentally.

But the natural problem that arose then was ‘is not God then the cause of this evil, since all per accidens causes are reducible to the first principle?’ Thomas’ rejoinder was to make a distinction of evils of fault and evils of penalty. In the former, culpability rested squarely in the lacking in both being and will of the secondary per accidens causes of evil, namely, finite human being’s and their will, and the lacking of being found in other imperfect beings. The latter evil of penalty was necessary evil in order to contribute to the perfecting of the cosmos in that it was just for such penalty to occur. Without it the cosmos would not strive toward perfection, which is the natural intention of a perfect being such as God. As a result we found that it was not the intentions of God to have either kind of evil (privation), but nonetheless the evil of penalty is permitted in order for the cosmos to intend to a perfecting ordered and just cosmos. Hence, God is the efficient cause of evils only per accidens, i.e., only in the sense of God sustaining all being to progress toward an ordered and perfecting reality, hence God is not culpable. Second, we can conclude that all evils ultimately arose due to the secondary per accidens causes of finite and imperfect beings, as both fault and penalty. For if there were no imperfect beings there would be no need for penalty or fault.

No matter where one may stand concerning the relation of evil to the notion of a Christian God, it should be apparent, that to ignore Aquinas’ analysis of the metaphysical problem of evil would be leaving out an important thinker within the circles of both philosophy and theology. Regardless of today’s philosophical, and in some cases theological anti-Thomas thought, this author finds that not only is Thomas’ metaphysical explanation insightful, but it is indeed successful.

EndNotes

[1] (Feinberg 1979, 3.; Peterson 1998, 393-401.)

[2] Specifically, the traditional Judeo-Christian view.

[3] See the following for a general coverage of the issue of evil (Summa theologiae, Ia.48-49); see the follow for the antitheistic argument (De malo, Ia.1.1).

[4] It appears that Erickson makes no such distinction between a theodicy and defense. See (Erickson, 1998, 436-456).

[5] Of course this assumes that in some way the explanation of the cause or causes of evil will eliminate God as a possible culpable candidate; in particular, we will find that it is unavoidable, when discussing efficient causality, to bring in the question of moral culpability. At least to a certain degree the discussion of efficient causality will necessarily touch on the moral problem of evil. That will be addressed in chapter 3.

[6] My point here is that internal consistency alone would not be sufficient as an apologetic.

[7] Simply put, if one attempts to explain either moral or physical evil prior to metaphysical evil, then he or she would naturally have a preconceived notion of ‘what’ the nature of evil is and what is the cause of this evil. Hence, we must begin with explaining first what evil is and what is the cause of it, before one can explain why there is evil. Aquinas follows this same strategy in De malo, although he does not explicitly call this the "metaphysical problem of evil"; nevertheless, it is de facto what he is analyzing, i.e., the nature and cause or causes of evil (at least initially). You will also notice that the order of his presentation in the De malo follows a similar strategy appropriated in this paper: Article 1: "Whether Evil Is Something?", Article 2: "Whether Evil Exists in Good?"; (Articles 1 and 2 can be understood as concerned

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with the questions of what is evil from two senses; viz., both in-itself and in some ‘thing’. Article 3: "Whether Good Is the Cause of Evil?"; Article 4: "Whether Evil Is Properly Divided into Punishment and Fault?" Articles 3 and 4 deal with the cause or causes of evil. And naturally when dealing with efficient cause Aquinas wants us to distinguish not only per accidens and per se cause, but also understand how that will work out when it comes to the moral notion of culpability.

[8] The implication of premise two—"evil is a thing"—found on page one, compels us to address what ‘is’ evil, if not a thing?

[9] Taken from the conclusion of the argument found on page one: "God created evil." The implications for this conclusion, apologetically speaking, would be ‘what is the cause of evil,’ if not God? This must be responded to in order for one to adequately explain the causal framework for evil.

[10] For a good account of the theistic approaches for the metaphysical, physical, and moral scope of evil, from within a Protestant Thomist position, see: (Geisler and Corduan 1988, 295-385).

[11] (De Malo, Ia.1.1).

[12] Ibid., Ia.1.5,6,7.

[13] (Ibid,Ia.1.8.; Summa theologiae, 1a.48.1).

[14] (Compendium theologiae 114, 125-126).

[15] (Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 7).

[16] Throughout this paper I have used Dr. John Glanville’s corrections of the English translation to the Latin text of De Principiis naturae given in a graduate seminar on Aquinas at San Francisco State University.

[17] (De Principiis naturae, 2.8)

[18] For the reader that may not be familiar with these common examples given in philosophy of language, Marion Morrison was the name of John Wayne before he became an actor. With the star example, we have Venus seen in the West after sunset, and seen before sunrise in the East.

[19] Aquinas’ example of ‘risibility of man’ is hard for the contemporary mind to agree with, thus, I gave the example of the triangle. Also, I believe the latter example is Aristotle’s, although I can not recall exactly where it is in the text. Additionally, the fact that finding the pirates treasure is a ‘chance’ event is irrelevant to my point; for that does not negate it as a non-necessary mode of being.

[20] Aquinas held the Aristotlian teleological metaphysics. In particular though, with a somewhat slight difference to Aristotle’s notion of "All men by nature desire to know" -- Metaphysics Bk A .1, Aquinas said we seek the good and that good is God. Of course, Aquinas would likely suggest that when one seeks knowledge (assuming it is the True), he or she is implicitly seeking the good, and the good is ultimately God. See (Summa contra Gentiles, III, 1, 2&3.; Summa theologiae, Ia IIae, Q.1.; De Principiis naturae, 3.

[21] (De Principiis naturae, 2.9).

[22] (Ibid., 2.7 or 8 depending on the English translation of the Latin text used. (In Bobik it is 2.7, in Goodwin it is 2.8)

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[23] This is a simple appeal to the principle of noncontradition--that something can not both be and not be at the same time and in the same sense. Hence, Plato’s form of his face and head, or the properties and/or conditions of it, must necessarily be, or have been (at least as an idea), at one time in order for Plato’s bust to come-to-be. One can not make something to be from nothing.

[24] Nota quod quoddam potest esse licet non sit, quoddam vero est. If this were literally translated it would be as follows: "Mark (take note) the fact that some thing may (can) be but do not be, there be other things which be." The relevance of my placing the literal translation is twofold: First, there is a common practice amongst some translators to put "exist" in place of "be," and second, in order to avoid such an uncritical translation I have incorporated the text here. As Dr. John Glanville, and other Maritain Thomists may point out, they do not like to translate ‘esse’ as ‘exists’ – it loses its raw meaning that someone reading the Latin would be able to get. It is better to use ‘be’ – it ties the concept of ‘being’ more firmly into the concept of ‘exists’ – which mere ‘exists’ in English lacks. I thank my wife Jeanette, and Dr. J. Glanville, for pointing this out to me.

[25] (De Principiis naturae, I).

[26] The reader should avoid blurring the distinction between the logical application of these principles (which make them metaphysical principles) with what they explain (viz., natural change). What should be understood is that these principles are metaphysical principles in the sense that they are applied to the physical in order to explain and understand natural change; but that would not make them solely physical principles (in one sense they can be considered as physical principles, but within another usage they are metaphysical ones too). A philosophy dictionary points this out most lucidly by defining metaphysics as: " . . . [T]he philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure of reality," see (Audi 1999, 563). Adler also lucidly describes Aristotle’s central books in the Metaphysics as: " . . . [T]reat[ing] of sensible, physical substances; their nature as substances; the distinction between substance and accident, form and matter, potentiality and actuality, as principles of the composite nature of changing substances; and the properties of such existences in virtue of their having being. . . .. " (Ader 1999, 538). So, the fact that I focus my discussion primarily from within Aquinas’s De Principiis naturae, is irrelevant when it comes to trying to have a clearer understanding of what Aquinas believes about these metaphysical principles, regardless where they are found. Aquinas also discusses these metaphysical principles in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Bk VIII, (by that above confused and odd logic it would make these principles only metaphysical ones, since that text is about metaphysics, but this would be absurd, for that is contradictory). Aquinas also discusses them in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics Bk I, Lec. 13; Bk II, Lec. 2. Thus, it seems completely incorrect to suggest that De Principiis naturae is "all physics, [and] not metaphysics," (as Fr. Dodds contends), for that not only confuses the fact of a distinction between application of metaphysical notions, from their potential for physical explanation; but additionally it would be inconsistent with both Aquinas’ and Aristotle’s view of these principles.

[27] (De Principiis naturae, II, 10 & 11).

[28] I actually see, but I also contain the potential for the ‘privation of sight’. That is I can go blind. Likewise, I as a zygote, had the potential to see, even though I did not actually see, or even able to exercise seeing at that point. But a big rock (analogous to the zygote) does not have even the potential to see (but has the potential to be smaller). As a result, applying not seeing (lack of sight) to a rock is not used in the same sense as applying privation of sight (lack of sight) to a human.

[29] Simply put, if evil is not a substance, then we need to not only account for its existence; but also, if we say it exists, then naturally we ask what causes it to exist.

[30] Intentional is not being used here in the same sense as found in the popular English colloquia, i.e., necessarily requiring an act of the will by the agent.

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[31] My point here (which is taken from Aquinas’ briefer example of a cithara) is to exemplify that if one deliberates over what notes are to be played simultaneously, then one has now broken the notes into a succession (or a trill, or some variance thereof), and as such, would no longer be playing a chord. The act of playing a chord is predetermined, i.e., requiring no deliberation.

[32] (De Principiis naturae, 3.19).

[33] Thus, we will see that evil in-itself can not be an essential cause, but only an accidental cause and a principle of change.

[34] (De Principiis naturae, III.21.)

[35] We should also make note of the fact that this does imply the necessity of evil (discussed below).

[36] What accidental modes are essential or nonessential is rather irrelevant at this point. As a matter of fact, this is a rather controversial issue that neither space or time will allow me to address in this paper.

[37] The sperm and ovum and the parents are both instrumental causes too. Primary instrumental causes are the parents, but the sperm and ovum are considered secondary instrumental causes.

[38] The use of primary and secondary causes is common knowledge amongst Aristotelian thinkers, hence, my reason for not elaborating on this. But for those readers who may not be familiar with this terminology, the primary is considered as the first efficient cause, while the secondary is considered to be an aiding efficient cause for the primary efficient cause. Secondary causes are not necessary in every event, however, a primary cause is. My wife may tell me to take out the trash, then she would be considered the primary efficient cause of the trash being dumped (assuming I do take it out), then I am the secondary efficient cause. However, if I choose not to (which is suicidal) and she takes it out, she would be the primary cause, with no secondary cause. Additionally, I did not expound on the difference between existential versus nonexistential causes. Simply put, an existential cause is considered to be an ongoing sustaining cause; while a nonexistential cause is much like a one-time temporal cause. The father is a one-time shot as the donor of the sperm for the zygotes coming-to-being, he is clearly neither a direct or indirect primary or secondary existential cause.

[39] Taken from: (King 1998, 10-13).

[40] (Summa contra Gentiles, III, 1.3, 7,8,9).

[41] (De veritate III, 22.1 & 2; Summa contra Gentiles, III, 1.1.2, 3, 12).

[42] Put slightly different we have: " . . . if good is that which all desire, then being itself must be called a good, because all desire to be." See (Summa contra Gentiles, III, 7.3).

[43] Ibid., 3.7.2.

[44] (Summa theologiae, Ia 48 ad 4; Summa contra Gentiles, III, 12). We must keep in mind that Aquinas has two senses in which we can speak of evil; first, in-itself and second as the subject of evil. Here we are speaking of evil-in-itself. See: (De malo 1, Response).

[45] (Summa contra Gentiles, III, 12.1).

[46] " . . . But evil has no formal cause, rather is it [evil] a privation of form . . . ." See (Summa theologiae, Ia 49.2).

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[47] " . . . [L]ikewise, neither has it [evil] a final cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end . . .." Ibid.

[48] (De malo, Ia 1.3).

[49] Only what is in act can bring about substance, evil is not in act, hence, evil does not bring about substance. See (Summa contra Gentiles, III, 1.10 & 11).

[50] " . . . [E]very evil is caused by good, as was shown above (A.1), and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct cause." See (Summa theologiae, 1a 49.3).

[51] (De malo Ia 1.3; Summa theologiae, Ia 49.2). Thomas argues as follows: "Evil . . . has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally . . . evil is caused in the action otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason of the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the instrumental agent . . . sometimes by the power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter . . . [b]ut this very fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause; and thus is good the cause of evil . . . evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, . . . [b]ut involuntary things the defect of the action comes from the will actually deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule." It should be pointed out that these quotes, for the most part, address the efficient cause of evil. This will be covered more in Chapter 3.

[52] (Summa theologiae, Ia 49.2).

[53] (Ibid., Ia 22.3) " . . . [C]orruption and defects in natural things . . . are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even the universal good . . ." (Ibid., Ia 22.2). Also, "Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe." See (Summa contra Gentiles, III, 71).

[54] Aquinas defines perfect as " . . . which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection." (Summa theologiae, Ia 4.1). And specifically for God, Aquinas says: "Now God is the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect . . . [h]ence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality . . . ." (Ibid., Ia 4.1 Q.4; Summa contra Gentiles, III, I.28).

[55] (Summa theologiae, Ia 49.2).

[56] Clear case of ‘lacking’ wisdom of experience.

[57] We must keep in mind that for Aquinas evil as punishment is necessary for the maintaining a just universe, as such he says: " . . . [T]he order of justice has as an adjunct the privation of a particular good of a transgressor, inasmuch as the order of justice requires that a transgressor be deprived of a good he desires. So accordingly, the punishment itself is good simply, but an evil to this person . . . . it is clear that evil is said to be created not inasmuch as it is evil but inasmuch as it is good simply and evil only in a certain respect." [emphasis added] See: (De malo 1, Reply 1). "A wise provider does not consider what is good for merely one of the things that fall under his providence. He is concerned rather with what is better for all. Consequently, even though the corruption of a thing in the universe is not good for that thing, it is good for the perfection of the entire universe, because the continual generation and corruption of individuals makes it possible for the species to be perpetual; and it is in this that the perfection of the universe essentially consists." (De veritate, 5.3 "Answers to Difficulties" 2).

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[58] Throughout Aquinas’ use of evil as being necessary, one might think he is using it in the sense of being both logically (conceptually necessary) and metaphysically (causally necessary) necessary in relation to God with corruptible beings. I refer the reader to the above listed texts, and the note itself, in footnote 57.

[59] For the notion of a "corruptible thing" within God’s divine providence see (De veritate, 5.3).

[60] (Summa theologiae, Ia 49.2).

[61] See page one.

[62] I want to thank Fr. Dodds for pointing out the lack of clarity found in my first construction of this argument.

Selected Bibliography

Primary Sources

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica, 5 vols., 1911, Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, N.Y.: Christian Classics Thomas More Publishing, 1981.

--------. Compendium Theologia. English Translation Light of Faith: The Compendium of Theology, 1947. Translated by Cyril Vollert, S.J., Manchester: Sophia Institute Press, 1993.

--------. De Malo. Translated by Jean Oesterle, Indianapolis: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995.

--------. De Principiis Naturae. 1950. Translated by Robert P. Goodwin. Taken from Selected Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1965.

--------. De veritate, 1954. 3 vols. Translated by Robert W. Mulligan, S.J., James V. McGlynn, S.J., Robert W. Schimdt, S.J., Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1995.

--------. Summa Contra Gentiles, 1955. Bks. 1,2,3 Pt.1, Translated by Anton C. Pegis, James F. Anderson, Vernon J. Bourke. Indianapolis: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975.

Secondary Sources

Adler, Mortimer J. The Great Ideas. New York: Scribner Classics, 1999.

Audi, Robert, Ed. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Bobik, Joseph. Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the De Principiis Naturae and the De Mixtione Elementorum of St. Thomas Aquinas. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998.

Copleston, Frederick, S.J. A History of Philosophy. Vol. 3 1962. New York: Doubleday, April 1993.

--------. Aquinas. New York: Penguin Books, 1955.

Elders, Leo J. S.V.D. The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: E.J. Brill, 1990.

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--------. The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: E.J. Brill, 1993.

--------. The Philosophy of Nature of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Peter Lang Pub., 1997.

Erickson, Millard J. Christian Theology, 2nd Ed. 1983, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1998.

Feinberg, John S. Theologies and Evil. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1979.

Geisler, Norman. Christian Apologetics. 1976. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1989.

-------- Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1991.

-------- and Brooks, Ronald M. Come Let Us Reason: An Introduction to Logical Thinking, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1990.

-------- and Winfried, Corduan. Philosophy of Religion. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1988.

Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. 1956. Translated by L.K. Shook. Indianapolis: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1994.

-------- The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, 1936. Translated by A.H.C. Downes, Indianapolis: University of Nortre Dame Press, 1991.

King, Billy J. Descartes’ Cosmological Argument. Unpublished M.A. Thesis, San Francisco State, 1998.

Madden, Edward H. Evil and The Concept of God, Springfield, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1968.

Peterson, Michael L. God and Evil: An Introduction to the Issues. Boulder: Westview Press, 1998.

--------. "The Problem of Evil," A Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Edited by Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999.

Plantinga, Alvin C. God, Freedom, and Evil, 1974. Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977.

-----------. The Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader, ed. James F. Sennett, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998.

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5-31-01

John Hick's The Problem Of EvilJOHN HICK’S THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

I. John Hick discusses in his essay The Problem of Evil, the objections to the belief in the existence of God is the presence of evil in the world. He begins by posing the traditional challenge to theism in the form of the dilemma: That if God was perfectly loving, he must wish to abolish evil, and being all powerful, is able to perfectly do so as he will its. He then proceeds to present some views regarding this issue, giving insights from three point of views, that of contemporary Christian Science, the Boston Personalist school, and the theologian Augustine. The first opinion takes evil as an illusion, as a construct of the human mind. The second confers upon God finity, God as a struggling ruler, making do with what he can. The third hold the rational that Evil is merely the corruption of the good, the going wrong of something primarily good. The author then proceeds argue from the premise that “If god is an all-good and all-powerful God, why

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then has he created a world where sin and suffering occur?” He brings the case to the matter of free will. Man is gifted with the freedom to choose this actions and make his own decisions, and in leaving him to his own devices, he has the capacity to choose evil over good. Thus sin and wrongdoing is inseparable from man’s very nature as human beings, and suffering is the consequence of man’s errors. But what about other evils that befall mankind that are not directly caused by their actions? Natural calamities and other fortuitous events are built into the structure of this world and do not stem from man’s actions and decisions. Why would an all powerful God allow these to happen? Hick proceeds to make a case that man’s world is not a perfect world, cause in a perfect world where there is no pain or suffering, there can be no instance of soul making. In a dream world, there can be no formation of the self, no room for improvement, no way to distinguish between right and wrong. There...

John Hick’s Solution to the Problem of Evil: A Critique

 by David Mayo (UMD Philosophy Department)

I. Why Evil is a Problem for Theist

II. Hick's General Strategy

III. Moral Evil

A. Criticisms of the Justification of Moral Evil

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III. Natural Evil

A. Criticisms of the Justification of Natural Evil

IV. Final Considerations

Alleged proofs for the theological hypothesis have been examined. Even if someone was convinced that none of the proofs we looked at were valid, it would not follow that the theological hypothesis was false--it might be that there is a valid proof we didn't consider--or it might be that there is no proof possible, but that the hypothesis is still true.

I. THE PROBLEM

The Argument from the problem of Evil is a reductio ad absurdum argument by the skeptic to show that the theological hypothesis, as traditionally understood, must be false. The argument is simply this--if the world had been created by an all-loving God (who therefore would not want evil), and who was all-powerful (and thus could create whatever he wanted) there would be no evil. But in fact there is evil; therefore the world couldn't have been created by an all-loving, all-powerful God.

II. HICK'S GENERAL STRATEGY

Hick, a theologian, tries to answer this argument by showing that, just as a loving human father (or even a compassionate human dentist) must sometimes inflict pain for the greater good in the long run, so the existence of some evil is essential to God's (ultimately good) plan. Notice Hick must show that all evil which exists is in some way essential--for to the extent that any evil is unnecessary, but still permitted/caused by God, to that extent God is not good. (A father who beats his children unnecessarily, only once in a while, is to that extent not good.)

Hick's general ploy is to argue that there are two distinct kinds of evil: (1) moral evil, and natural evil. Hick argues man had to be given free will, if his choosing good was to be meaningful, and not the action of a "mere puppet." It is argued that the natural evil of this life, like a very thorough and unpleasant curriculum at a school, is essential for the divine purposes of this life to be achieved. Hick describes the purpose of this life as "a final stage in soul-making."

I will to suggest some objections to Hick's position:

First, note Hick insists that God only permits evil, he does not cause it. But anyone who for a moment took the First Cause argument seriously, maintaines that God Caused Everything. He may not have caused the evil directly, but he caused the conditions which ultimately caused it--and he presumably knew infallibly (God knows all!) that it would result in evil. (Note, for instance, the Aquinas -Father Copleston argument that any event in this world is a contingent event, and all contingent events must ultimately be traceable to some non-contingent (necessary) Being, or event.) It seems, then, that he "caused" the evil in at least the same sense that someone

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who poisons the food he knows someone is about to eat, "causes" their death--even though he does not force them to eat the food.

III. MORAL EVIL:

What sense of "free will" does Hick have in mind? He says "we can never provide a complete causal explanation of a free act." But many human acts we CAN explain completely--Mayo ate breakfast because he was hungry! Hick seems to be suggesting that a "free will" is not (as a Compatibilist would say) a will which is free from compulsion, but instead (as a Free Will-ist said) a will free from causation. But if free acts are uncaused acts, they are chance, random, "come as a gift." (See William James.) But (1) how could someone reasonably be punished for what they do randomly, "by chance," or for no reason, and again (2) how do you square this with the jist of the First Cause argument, which is that the cause of everything, ultimately, is God?

Hick describes the choice of good and evil as a kind of test which man must undergo, and for God to tamper with the test, or to somehow guarantee that everyone should choose good, would make the test a fraud, BUT--must God "grade on quite such a high curve"? John Mackie suggests that God might have, not guaranteed that everyone pass, but nevertheless have created a world in which as a matter of fact everyone just happens to pass. (For God knew infallibly who would pass, and who wouldn't, before He created the world,) Would it, for instance, prove that Mayo had made up a fraudulent test, if everyone happened to pass? Must some fail if the test is to be fair? Surely a test tests the teacher as well as the student--if the teacher is sufficiently clear, and inspiring, it should be possible for him to teach what is to be taught, to everyone. (Are unclear teachers desirable, because managing to learn from them is "more virtuous"? Why isn't the "word of God" spread in such an effective and convincing way that everyone both hears and accepts it?)

A. CRITICISMS OF MORAL ARGUMENT

The testing circumstances of God's test seem very odd. The fact that God knows infallibly who will pass, and who fail--this fact, it seems to me, makes it a fraudulent test. If I gave a test, and knew (infallibly) in advance exactly what grade everyone would get--THIS test, it seems to me, would be fraudulent. One taking such a test might ask "what's the use, it's already settled--AND KNOWN!) And remember, God's foreknowledge is infallible. I am suggesting, in other words, that even if God didn't cause the choices of man (which he must have, if he caused everything) he still knows them in advance, infallibly, and this seems just as damaging to the legitimacy of the "test".

But another problem with the test remains--it seems more often than not to be a test of the "William Tell" variety. (William Tell was a Swiss folk hero who was required by the "bad guy" to shoot an apple from his son's head with a bow and arrow.) That is, if one party "flunks" the test, (e.g. violates God's commandments) it is not always this sinner who suffers as a result, but often innocent bystanders. (Indeed, tho sinner may later repent, and be forgiven!) Imagine a teacher who lobbed a grenade at each student he caught cheating, which then killed students around the cheater! Hitler presumably violated God's commandment "Thou shalt not kill"--but

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Hitler's "taking the test" was rather hard on a lot of Jews. In short, it seems an all-knowing, all-powerful test designer could have designed a test in which innocent bystanders were less liable to be hurt. It is hardly an excuse for the evil the Jews suffered, that Hitler had to be given a fair test, in which he could do right or wrong--to them.

Another objection: Imagine a human father who, without forcing his child, tempts it with a lollypop (which he knows infallibly the child will not be able to resist)--or who even permits a friend to tempt it--to run across the street without looking, just as a steam-roller is coming. Suppose the father had previously told the child not to do it. The father maintains the child is responsible, since the child makes a "free choice." Such a father, it seems to me, could only be written off as a sadist. BUT--I think the essential elements of the sadism are present in the care of Moral Evil:

(1) God knows--infallibly--who will fail, yet still provides/permits the fatal temptation.

(2) God has told Man not to give in to temptation (at least he has told some men) and this is supposed to excuse him, since men "choose freely."

Suppose now that the human father did this to 5 of his children, just to prove (to himself? to them? to whom? that 2 of them were really virtuous. Surely if he knew and could predict infallibly in advance, which would pass the test and which fail, then it seems the glory which (according to Hick) could only legitimately be heaped upon those who passed the test if they actually went through it, was purchased at the price of the lives of the other children. This is an all-loving father??

IV. NATURAL EVIL:

Hick suggests that, if the objective of this world were to make man as comfortable as possible, then natural evil would be unjustifiable. BUT the objective of this world is to provide man with a test, challenges, etc, thus evil is necessary to "set the stage" for a fair test. (An analogy I will use: a particular course at a university is very unpleasant, but essential if the graduates are really to come out the best possible.)

A. CRITICISMS OF THE ARGUMENT ABOUT NATURAL EVIL.

A. Of such a "university," it would be naive, shortsighted and wrong of the "curriculum committee" to strive to eliminate the difficult course, simply on the grounds that it involved suffering. But SURELY AS HUMAN BEINGS WE DO WANT TO TRY TO ELIMINATE NATURAL SUFFERING. Hick suggests that natural suffering is essential. I am suggesting this is complete outrageous--if anyone did seriously believe suffering was essential, then he would resist any attempt to eliminate it. But we all want to minimize human suffering. In fact, many people, if pressed for a goal or "meaning" to life, might spell it out in terms of trying to "make the world a better place"--of trying, that is, to cut down on the amount of suffering our children will have to undergo. But if Hick's argument is sound, the presence of such evil must be essential to "God's plan."

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B.But the theologian may answer, some souls may need to be exposed to more suffering than others, if they are to achieve the status the "school" is striving for.

1. But (as insisted above) some souls never DO make the grade--Hick's argument about moral evil was that it is essential to a fair test that some people should flunk it. So the greater suffering of some persons cannot be justified by saying that each must suffer however much is necessary for them to be able to pass the test.

2. If God could create some souls which can get by, "undergo the proper test," with very little suffering, then it is quite unclear why He couldn't see to it that all souls are this way. If some people get souls which will need to suffer a lot, and others get souls which need suffer only a little, it seems the soul-dispenser is unjust.

C. The believer may answer that although some men seem to suffer more than others, in fact we all suffer the same amount. Even the rich suffer, although over different issues, as much as the poor.

1. Isn't this outrageous? Granted, we all suffer some--isn't it clear that some people make it through life with relatively little suffering--no major crises, they grow up in a loving home, find someone they love, marry and have children who love them. Others suffer a great deal--to suggest that everyone suffers exactly the same is to fly in the face of the facts. Isn't it self-evident that those who are starving endure more suffering than those whose biggest worry is a Phil 1001 final?

2. Again, if someone were convinced (as Hick suggests) that everyone will be subjected to the same amount of physical suffering--or that they must be, if their soul is to be properly processed or tested,

a. It would be morally wrong, incompatible with God's plan, to try to ease the suffering of another person. (And it would be futile, since God would presumably see to it that any suffering someone is able to prevent, will be replaced by other which will make up that person's quota.")

b. It would be wrong to do this in the long run as well--to hope, and work, for a world for our children in which they do not have to endure as much suffering. This would be like removing the difficult course from the curriculum, with the result that the graduates of tomorrow wouldn't really "have it." What seems a favor is really cheating them in the long run.

 V. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: Two final points:

(1) Look at nature--isn't it obvious that nature is neither "for" nor "against" humans, but that it is neutral? Some of us have very bad luck--some children inherit diseases which kill them before they are rational--but not before they can suffer unspeakable pain. Others have relatively pleasant, comfortable lives. And part of the meaning of life, in Mayo's mind at least, has to do with making the world a place in which there is as little suffering as possible.

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(2) How, on Hick's hypothesis, do we explain the children

who die before they are even moral agents? (A related problem--how do we explain those who aren't even Christians, who never make the choices between good and evil, or are never even aware of such choices, or of the tests which, according to Christianity, are essential?

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