Private law instruments as way of EU regional integration, in Mario i. Álvarez ledesMa y Roberto Cippitani (Coord.), Derechos Individuales e IntegracIón regIonal (antología), Roma

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ISBN 978-88-95448-41-1

DERECH

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DIVID

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RACIÓN

REGIO

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DERECHOS INDIVIDUALESE INTEGRACIÓN REGIONAL

(ANTOLOGÍA)

Mario I. Álvarez Ledesma y Roberto CippitaniCoordinadores

ISEGRoma-Perugia-México

€ 54,00$ 71,50

UNIVERSITÀDEGLI STUDI

DI PERUGIA

Derechos InDIvIDualese IntegracIón regIonal

(antología)

Mario i. Álvarez ledesMa y roberto Cippitani

Coordinadores

ISEGRoma-Perugia-México

PROPIEDAD LITERARIA RESERVADA–––––

©Copyright 2013 byIstituto per gli Studi Economici e Giuridici - “Gioacchino Scaduto”

Università degli Studi di Perugia - Dipartimento di Medicina Sperimentale e Scienze Biochimiche Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey – Campus de Ciudad de México

Roma – Perugia – México

ISBN 978-88-95448-41-1

Este libro forma parte de las actividades del Proyecto “IR&RI - Individual Rights and Regional Integration”, financiado por la Unión Europea, EACEA, en el ámbi-to del Programa Jean Monnet - Lifelong Learning Programme. Proyecto n. 528610

Queda prohibida, salvo excepción prevista en la ley, cualquier forma de reproducción, di-stribución, comunicación pública y transformación de esta obra. La infracción de los de-rechos mencionados puede ser constitutiva de delito contra la propiedad intelectual.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––Impreso en Italia, Istituto per gli Studi Economici e Giuridici “Gioacchino Scaduto” s.r.l. Spin-off dell’Università degli Studi di Perugia, Via Margutta, 1/A – Roma por Università degli Studi di Perugia - Dipartimento di medicina sperimentale y Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey – Campus de Ciudad de México

NIF-IVA IT 08967801005

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Università degli Studi di Perugia

ÍNDICE

Preamble pag. 13AndreA SASSi

introducción

Individual rights and models of international cooperation » 19MArio i. ÁlvArez ledeSMA, roberto cippitAni

1. Individual rights and legal system. » 192. Legal subjects within the international law. » 243. The internationalisation of human rights. » 274. The Regional Model. » 335. The courts and the construction of the Regional Legal Order. » 366. The “regional approach” to legal interpretation. » 447. The supranational model of integration. » 518. From the economic rights toward the status

of European Union’s citizenship. » 569. Individual rights in the international integration processes:

some conclusive observations. » 63

Primera Parte

PROCESOS DE INTEGRACIÓN EN LA UNIÓN EUROPEAY EN AMÉRICA: REALIDAD EN CONSTRUCCIÓN

La integración regional y los derechos individuales a la luzdel derecho internacional y de integración » 69AliciA Gutiérrez GonzÁlez

1. Introducción. » 692. La evolución de los procesos de integración a nivel

internacional y regional: aspectos económicos. » 703. La protección de los derechos individuales en el ámbito

del derecho internacional, regional y del derecho de integración. » 954. Conclusiones. » 104

Estado actual y perspectivas de la integración jurídica en América pag. 107JuAn pAblo pAMpillo bAliño

1. Presentación del tema. » 1072. Importancia del derecho comunitario y del derecho común. » 1083. Integración regional y derecho comunitario. » 1114. El derecho comunitario y común europeo como base

de una nueva dogmática global. » 1215. Retrospectiva y actualidad de la Integración Jurídica Americana. » 1336. Algunas reflexiones (económicas, políticas, sociales y jurídicas)

sobre la integración americana. » 1527. Hacia un nuevo ius commune americano. » 159

La ciudadanía europea como elemento esencial y experiencia parael desarrollo de los procesos de integración: ampliación de su regulaciónen el marco de la Unión Europea » 167cArloS FrAnciSco MolinA del pozo

1. Derechos de ciudadanía. Introducción. » 1672. Análsis de la ciudadanía europea en los Tratados. » 1693. Posible ampliación del concepto de ciudadanía de la Unión. » 1754. Consideración de otros posibles derechos de ciudadanía. » 179

Las dicotomias en el derecho » 183leticiA boniFAz AlFonzo

1. Marco Teórico. » 1832. Problemas específicos del derecho. » 1883. Igualdad/ Desigualdad _ Igualdad/Diferencia. » 200

Libre circulación de personas: alcance y límites » 205cAloGero pizzolo

1. Nociones preliminares. » 2052. La cuestión en la Unión Europea. » 2073. La cuestión en el Mercosur. » 2314. La cuestión en la Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN). » 2435. Consideraciones finales. » 249

Secunda Parte

DERECHOS HUMANOS E INTEGRACIÓN REGIONAL

Derechos humanos y democracia como factor de integración regional pag. 253víctor M. MArtínez bullé Goyri

1. Introducción. » 2532. La democracia en América Latina. » 2603. El desarrollo constitucional de los derechos humanos. » 2654. El obstáculo de las condiciones sociales. » 269

El control en el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos.Hacia una restructuración del sistema. » 275MAnuel becerrA rAMírez

1. Introducción. » 2752. El control de convencionalidad. » 2773. Del Caso Almonacid a la evolución actual del CC. » 2784. ¿Hasta dónde pueden llegar los efectos de las sentencias de la Corte IDH? » 2835. ¿Control sobre el control? » 2856. Los minus en el sistema interamericano. » 2877. Hacia el fortalecimiento de la Corte IDH. » 2898. Conclusiones. » 292

La relación entre el ámbito jurisprudencial internacional y nacional sobre derechos humanos » 293luiS cAStillo córdovA

1. Introducción. » 2932. El ámbito jurisprudencial nacional: La posición jurídica del TC. » 2943. El TC como comisionado del Poder constituyente. » 2974. El TC como Supremo intérprete y controlador de la constitucionalidad. » 2995. El TC como creador de derecho constitucional. » 3036. La posición jurídica de la Corte IDH. » 3067. La Corte IDH como Comisionada del Legislador internacional. » 3098. La Corte IDH como intérprete vinculante de la CADH. » 3109. La Corte IDH como creadora de derecho convencional. » 31710. La Corte IDH como controladora de convencionalidad.

El juicio de convencionalidad. » 32611. Las consecuencias de declarar inconvencional una actuación estatal. » 328

12. Implicancias de las posiciones jurídicas de la Corte IDH y del TC. pag. 33113. ¿Puede la Corte IDH interpretar la Constitución nacional

y realizar un juicio de constitucionalidad? » 33314. ¿Puede el TC interpretar la CADH y realizar control convencional? » 33615. A modo de conclusión: No es un mero juego de palabras. » 340

Los derechos humanos en el Mercosur » 343AndreA MenSA GonzÁlez

1. Consideraciones prelimares. » 3432. Los derechos humanos en la normativa mercosureña. » 3453. Antecedentes en materia de derechos humanos. » 3494. Declaración socio-laboral del Mercosur

(Río De Janeiro, 10 de diciembre de 1998). » 3525. Protocolo de Asunción sobre compromiso con la promoción

y protección de los derechos humanos del Mercosur. » 3556. Campaña de información y prevención del delito de trata

de personas - Decisión cmc nº 12/06. » 3567. Observatorio de la democracia del Mercosur. » 3578. Instituto social del Mercosur. » 3579. Acuerdo entre los estados parte del Mercosur y estados asociados

sobre cooperación regional para la protección de los derechos de niños, niñas y adolescentes en situación de vulnerabilidad. » 358

10. Instituto de políticas públicas de derechos humanos del Mercosur. » 35911. Solicitud de opinión consultiva ante la corte interamericana de derechos

humanos presentada por la Argentina, Brasil, Uruguay Y Paraguay. » 36212. Conclusion. » 364

Hacia la integración regional a través de los derechos fundamentales:el caso de la unión europea como historia de un éxito » 367SuSAnA SAnz cAbAllero

1. Introducción. » 3672. Evolución. El vacío de los tratados constitutivos. » 3683. El Tribunal de Justicia como motor de la integración europea:

su liderazgo en la protección de los derechos fundamentales. » 3724. Opciones para salvar la laguna del derecho originario

en materia de derechos fundamentales. » 3985. Aportación del Tratado de Lisboa a la integración

de los derechos fundamentales en Europa. » 4106. Conclusiones. » 415

Integración regional, reformas a la justicia y respeto del estándarinternacional de derechos humanos en los procesos penales seguidoscontra indígenas movilizados socialmente pag. 417JuAn JorGe FAundeS peñAFiel

1. Introducción » 4172. Reformas a la Justicia y procesos de integración en América Latina.

Algo más que un horizonte de Derechos Humanos. » 4233. La neoliberalización global y su impacto en América Latina

como contexto de la “Emergencia Indígena”. » 4254. La “emergencia Indígena” en América Latina y la criminalización

de la protesta mapuche. » 4335. La “criminalización de la demanda mapuche”

¿una crítica política o un problema de derecho? » 4386. Estándar internacional de derechos humanos. » 4407. La interpretación evolutiva en el Sistema Interamericano

de Derechos Humanos. » 4428. El “debido proceso” como estándar normativo de derechos humanos. » 4439. El principio de proporcionalidad. » 44610. Derecho a la igualdad procesal. » 44811. Principio de investigación racional y justa. » 44812. Las garantías judiciales en la Corte Interamericana

de Derechos Humanos. » 45013. Principales conclusiones del estudio de casos en Chile. » 45114. Prisión preventiva de imputados mapuche y cumplimiento

del estándar internacional de derechos humanos. » 46415. Situación mapuche en torno al estándar mínimo de prisión preventiva. » 469

Derechos sociales e integración » 477luz pAcheco zerGA

1. Introducción. » 4772. Los derechos humanos de primera generación. » 4793. Los derechos humanos de segunda generación. » 4864. Los derechos sociales en la Comunidad Andina de Naciones. » 4925. Los derechos de tercera generación en la CAN y en la UE. » 4976. Los cánones de interpretación y aplicación de los derechos

sociales y de solidaridad en los procesos de integración. » 5027. Conclusiones. » 510

Las patentes en medicina y su vínculo con el derechoa la salud como un derecho humano integral pag. 515iliAnA rodríGuez SAntibÁñez

1. Introducción. » 5152. Del origen de la propiedad al concepto de la propiedad industrial. » 5193. El régimen jurídico de las patentes en el ámbito internacional. » 5264. Disposiciones internacionales que generan correlación del binomio

propiedad industrial y derechos humanos en la sociedad del conocimiento. » 5385. La diferencia de criterios entre países desarrollados y menos desarrollados. » 5436. Conclusiones. » 549

The integration of religion within the European Union » 551hedley chriSt

1. Introduction. » 5512. The Meaning of Religion and Religious Bodies. » 5523. A Dialogue Between Religious Bodies and the European Union. » 5554. Religious freedom. » 5595. Laïcité Positive et Laïcité Neutre. » 5676. EU Position Concerning Third Countries. » 5697. Conclusion. » 570

tercera Parte

PERSPECTIVAS DE INTEGRACIÓN

Private law instruments as way of EU regional integration » 575vAlentinA colcelli

1. Instruments of private law and incentivising of regional processin European Union. » 575

2. Individual rights as construction of the EU legal system. » 5783. A joint reconstruction between liability in horizontal

and vertical relationships. » 5824. Discretion and personal non-contractual liability. » 5855. The guarantee of the EU legal system troughs the contractual

liability and compensation for damages suffered. » 5866. Non-wrongful conduct of Member States and recovery

of sums paid but not due. » 5887. Unimplemented Directives in the relationships between private individuals:

a control system at the discretion of Member States. » 5908. Conclusion. » 594

Propiedad intelectual en la integración de chile a los mercadosinternacionales. El desafío de la preservación de los derechos indígenassobre su patrimonio intangible pag. 599hellen t. pAcheco corneJo

1. Introducción. » 5992. Expansión de las normas de Propiedad Intelectual. » 6033. Patrimonio intangible de los Pueblos Indígenas. » 6184. Jurisprudencia asociada al tema. » 6235. Sugerencias y conclusiones. » 630

El nuevo reglamento europeo de protección de datos:hacia un derecho uniforme supranacional » 631eMilio Suñé llinÁS

1. La necesidad de una protección de datos personales uniforme para toda Europa. » 631

2. Legitimación del tratamiento de los datos personales: prohibición del consentimiento tácito. » 634

3. El derecho a la información y los derechos de los niños. » 6374. Derechos de acceso, rectificación y cancelación:

la cuestión de la portabilidad y del derecho al olvido. » 6395. El responsable del tratamiento y sus obligaciones:

no hay que notificar los ficheros. » 6426. Encargado del tratamiento: obligatoriedad del encargado independiente

o delegado de protección de datos. » 6457. Seguridad de los datos, evaluación de riesgos y violaciones de datos. » 6488. Las P. E.T.: protección de la intimidad desde el diseño y por defecto. » 6509. Las autoridades de control: el principio de ventanilla única europea. » 65110. Simplificación de los flujos transnacionales de datos:

decisiones de adecuación y normas empresariales vinculantes. » 653

Notas actuales en torno a la sustracción internacional de menorespor parte de uno de sus progenitores y la mediación » 657nuriA GonzÁlez MArtín

1. Introducción. » 6572. Guía de Buenas Prácticas en Mediación. » 6733. Mediación familiar internacional: desafíos y especialización. » 6824. Desafíos para el Derecho Internacional Privado

Cooperación entre Autoridades. » 6835. Derecho aplicable o conflictos de leyes. » 686

6. Asuntos migratorios. pag. 6897. Cargos penales. » 6908. Especialización y formación. » 6969. La distancia y la tecnología de comunicación

(Online Dispute Resolution -ODR-). » 71010. Conclusiones. » 724

Sobre la indemnización expropiatoria (pretium emptionis)en la experiencia romana » 727AndreA triSciuoGlio

1. Premisa. » 7272. Indemnización expropiatoria en las fuentes jurídicas. » 7313. Observaciones finales. » 740

vAlentinA colcelli (*)

privAte lAW inStruMentS AS WAyoF eu reGionAl inteGrAtion

SuMMAry: 1. Instruments of private law and incentivising of regional process in Eu-ropean Union. — 2. Individual rights as construction of the EU legal system. — 3. A joint reconstruction between liability in horizontal and vertical relationships. — 4. Discretion and personal non-contractual liability. — 5. The guarantee of the EU legal system troughs the contractual liability and compensation for damages suffered. — 6. Non-wrongful conduct of Member States and recovery of sums paid but not due. — 7. Unimplemented Directives in the relationships between private individuals: a control system at the discretion of Member States. — 8. Conclusion.

1. — Instruments of private law and incentivising of regional process in Eu-ropean Union.

Regional integration is the process of overcoming, by common accord, the political, physical, economic (1) and social barriers that divide countries from their neighbours, and of collaborating in the management of shared resources and common regional goods (2).

(*) Università degli Studi di Perugia. (1) S. A. rieSenFeld, Legal Systems of Regional Economic Integration, in Hastings International

and Comparative Law Review, 1997, 20, 3, p. 539, that speaks about the different levels of economic integration speaking about Free Trade Area, where internal trade barriers are eliminated while each member of the Free Trade Area retains their own tariff levels on trade with non-members; or a customs union is a Free Trade Area with the addition of a common external tariff imposed by all the members on external trade; or also a common market is a customs union with free factor mobility (including capital, labour, technology, and goods); an economic union encompasses the common market, with common fiscal and monetary policies, based upon a high level of co-ordination of member states economic policies; or an political union is the highest form of integration, and is based upon com-mon institutions at a supranational level that replace the national institutions as the focus of political decision-making.

(2) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 1 Oc-tober 2008, Regional integration for development in ACP countries, [COM(2008) 604 final

576 valentina colcelli

Generally speaking, “the term integration refers to various kinds of co-op-eration, co-ordination and association. As perceived by the developing coun-tries, it is a process by which discrimination existing in national jurisdictions is progressively removed between the participating states. This is dif ferent from political integration, which may lead ultimately to the complete union of states” (3). In this way the idea of regional integration explains how nations cease to be fully sovereign, and how they collaborate with neighbouring coun-tries in giving up their sovereignty, gaining in exchange new techniques that can resolve conflicts that already exist or may come into existence (4).

The concept of regional integration recalls the idea of progressive inte-gration between nations that find themselves to be neighbours in a limited space. This process determines a transformation and it is able to generate a change that brings a relative homogeneity in the behaviour of each country, in several spheres: social, cultural, economic, juridical, etc. (5).

The peculiar aspect of the actual means of contemporary regional inte-gration is that it is not coercive by nature. Nations can appreciate general advantages – not only economic, but also in relation to other dimensions, such as security and environmental safety issues – in taking part in a process of regional integration, as part of a Union or Community (6).

The system favoured by the European Union is the most advanced form

– Not published in the Official Journal], that explains: The three main objectives of regional integration are: political stability: a pre-requisite for economic development; economic de-velopment: in larger, harmonised markets, the free movement of goods, services, capital and people enables economies of scale and stimulates investment; “Regional public goods”: only cooperation between neighbouring countries can address trans-national challenges such as food security, preservation of biodiversity and tackling climate change”.

(3) P.K Menon, Regional Integration: A Case Study of the Caribbean Community, in Korean Journal of Comparative Law, 1996, 24, p. 197.

(4) E. hAAS, The study of regional integration: reflections on the joy and anguish of pre- theorizing, in International Organization, 1997, 24, p. 610.

(5) P.K MENON, Regional Integration: A Case Study of the Caribbean Community, (1996), cit., p. 197; on the importance of the learning of the ‘language’ of globalized law in the contemporary processes of integration see P. zuMbAnSen, Globalization and the Law: Deci-phering the Message of Transnational Human Rights Litigation, in German Law Journal, 2004, 5, pp. 1499-1520.

(6) M. telò, Europa potenza civile, Bari-Roma, 2004, p. 91.

577private law instruments as way of eu regional integration

of regional integration (7). “The EU cohesion policy is aimed at reducing re-gional inequalities and promoting the development of the lagging regions” (8).

Usually the process of regional integration is realised principally through international treaties, as stipulated by nation states. European integration of-fers a good example of those instruments that accompany the supranational construction built by constitutive Treaties and the juridical sources adopted by EU Institutions.

Private law instruments, of course, were born from the need regulate pri-vate and interpersonal relationships; they are now also new instruments for the realisation of European policies of regional integration.

The construction of the EU juridical system affects the legal systems of Member States in two ways (9). On the one hand, due to the supremacy of EU law and the process of harmonisation of EU citizens’ rights, the legal systems of Member States are directly influenced. On the other hand, compe-tition among the legal systems of Member States influences individual rights indirectly. In the areas that are not part of the EU harmonisation process, this competition is more striking (10). Participation of Member States in promot-ing this process, and ensuring the proper functioning of internal markets, as characterised by free the movement of goods, capital, services and persons (11), means that each Member State, in making its own legislative choices, must take the legislative choices of other Member States into account (12).

(7) A.M. echol, Regional Economic Integration, in International Lawyer (ABA), 1997, 31, 2, p. 453.

(8) M. FArrell, Regional integration and cohesion – lessons from Spain and Ireland in the EU, in Journal of Asian Economics, 2004, 14, p. 930.

(9) E. liiKAnen, Co-Regulation: a modern approach to regulation, Press Releases, 2000. Le Livre blanc sur la gouvernance européenne COM 428 (2001) final and Suivi du Livre blanc sur la gouvernance européenne – Pour un usage mieux adapté des instruments, COM (2782002) final, 5 June 2002, Recours encadré à un mécanisme de corégulation.

(10) Court of Justice, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs / og Selskabsstyrelsen, C-212/97, in ECR 1999, p.I-01459, para 20 (opinion of Advocate La Pergola): “En l’absence d’harmonisation, en somme, c’est la concurrence entre systèmes normatifs («competition among rules») qui doit pouvoir s’exercer librement”.

(11) Art. 3, 1, c), ECT, and Art. 2 EUT. (12) J. dicKSon, Directives in EU Legal Systems: Whose Norms Are They Anyway?, in European

Law Journal, 2011, 17, pp.190-212.


In EU regulations the instruments and institutions of private law are ca-pable of contributing to the regional integration process, often as effectively as through the use of the traditional instruments of public law.

In Europe, due to the widespread distribution of the EU legal system and legal systems of the Member States, the project of regional integration is also being realised with “ausilium” of the typical instruments of private law. The EU has been characterized recently by the use of new ways for governing integration, as complementary or alternative answers to legisla-tive harmonisation realised with institutional instruments.

Private law has been – or is beginning to be seen as – a way to develop the integration process. In the European legal system this use of the typical instruments of private law is clear, because horizontal relationships in the EU legal system, also in view of the functions assigned to legal protection, are selected and adjusted to ensure the existence and survival of the EU legal system.

To understand this use of the instruments of private law it is necessary to analyse whether, in the EU legal system, the selection of relevant inter-ests in horizontal legal relationships occurs in the same manner, and for the same purpose, as the qualification of rights in vertical legal relationships. The relationship between legal protection within the EU legal system and the qualification of individual rights in horizontal legal relationships there-fore needs to be examined. EU rules, in both horizontal and vertical rela-tionships, aim at consolidating the EU legal system. As a result, the Court of Justice assigns the function of guaranteeing the economic order sought by the EU to the typical principles of private law.

2. — Individual rights as construction of the EU legal system.

The European Court of Justice originally played the principal role in qualifying EU individual rights. The Court of Justice identified the existence of the EU legal system in the judgment Van Gend en Loos (13). To guarantee

(13) Court of Justice, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, C-26/62, 1963, ECR, 1. See A. vAuchez, The transnational politics of judicialization. Van Gend en Loos and the making of EU polity, in European Law Journal, 2010, 16, pp. 1-28.


existence of the EU legal system, the Court does not rely on Members States but recognizes subjectivity to individuals. Individuals, trough the recourse to judges and implementation of remedies, become the principal guardians of EU Law. Recognizing subjectivity to individuals and providing remedies (by the Court) was also one way to strengthen the Community primauté. The Court uses the strategy of declaring rights to individuals to ground his “con-stitutional” intuition of existence of the Community legal system.

In order to achieve these aims, it is first necessary to analyse the methods adopted by the EU legal system to qualify individual rights, recalling that, in this system, handling of individual rights cannot be separated from analysis of remedies and of the systems for their protection.

In its early period of operation, between 1960 and 1970, the Court of Luxembourg used Schutznormtheorie to identify individual rights against Eu-ropean Institutions. Schutznormtheorie recognised a legal position without dis-tinguishing between substantive rights and interests. At the same time, the Court of Justice used the principle of direct effect to identify individual rights against Member States.

This initial approach is no longer applied. The competences of the Com-munity were increasing in a functional way in order to reach the internal mar-ket. Thus, it was very difficult to identify new individual rights – created during the expansion of Community powers – by applying Schutznormtheorie and the direct effect theory.

The Court of Justice therefore subsequently used the principle of useful effect to identify individual rights against Member States, which thus became debtors of the individual. The reference here is to the Francovich judgement, after which the qualification criteria for selecting individual rights changed.

The Court uses the idea, borrowed from the common law tradition, that remedies are one of the selection methods of significant subjective interest in the EU legal system. Remedies – ways of qualifying individual rights – fol-low the classical system of qualification of individual rights in the civil law, in which rights are expressed as rules.

Recourse to remedies goes beyond the approach – which we could define as continental – which makes rules the locus of the importance and effectiveness of individual rights. Thus, individual rights are qualified when the judges apply rules concreting and conforming to the objectives pursued by the Community.


In the EU, individual rights in horizontal and vertical relationships are protected by National Courts. However, EC (now Treaty on the functioning of the European Union) and EU Treaties have made “a number of instanc-es for private persons to bring a direct action, where appropriate, before the Court of Justice, (…) not intended to create new remedies in the national courts to ensure the observance of Community law other than those already laid down by national law” (14).

In the Commission’s Notice of 13 February 1993 on cooperation be-tween national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 EC (15), the EU Commission explains that natural persons and enterprises are entitled to access to all legal remedies provided by Member States, in the same conditions that Member States apply in the case of violation of domestic rules.

Referring to the question of Arts. 105 and 106 TFEU (ex arts. 85 and 86 EC), the Commission stated that this equality treatment between domestic and Community rights does not only concern the final declaration of viola-tion of competition rules, but, in order to promote effective judicial protec-tion, also all EU rights.

EU individual rights find their legal protection in the national courts, in a sort of equality treatment with national individual rights. This is not surprising, in view of the relationship existing between directly applicable Community rules and the system of national legal sources.

The effective protection of individual rights regarding the EU legal sys-tem derives from the possibility of using them in actions before national courts (16). It is for “the legal system of each Member State to determine which court has jurisdiction to hear disputes involving individual rights de-rived from Community law, but at the same time the Member States are responsible for ensuring that those rights are effectively protected in each case” (17).

(14) Court of Justice, Rewe / Hauptzollamt Kiel, C- 158/80, 1981, in ECR, p. 1805. (15) OJ C39/6, 1993. (16) Court of Justice, Theresa Emmont / Minister for Social Welfare, C-208/90, in ECR,

1991, p. I-4269. (17) Court of Justice, Bozzetti / Invernizzi, C-179/84, in ECR, 1985, p. 2317.


When the national system of protection is not to able to guarantee Com-munity rights sufficiently, the “equipment” provided by the EU legal system comes into action. The EU legal system has established a uniform network of safeguards of Community individual rights (liability of a Member State, recovery of sums paid but not due, disapplication and obligation to inter-pret national law in conformity with Community law) when the judiciary legal system of the Member State does not safeguard the effectiveness of the protection of Community rights. The EU legal system does not envisage specific or special protection for individual rights. It envisages that national legal protection provided by the Member States should be effective (18).

The Court is not interested in whether the legal protection guaranteed by different jurisdictions of Member States to Community rights is extremely high or better than any other. The national legal protection cannot descend below the minimum standard of necessary safeguards to ensure the effective-ness of the protection of Community rights. If and/or when this happens, the “equipment” (liability of a Member State, recovery of sums paid but not due, disapplication and obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Community law) provided by the EU legal system for the protection of the Community comes into action. The development of international regu-lation and the particular configuration of the Europe Union legal system can influence the status of individual rights in the legal system of Member States in different ways, by means of the circulation of juridical models among the various European systems (19).

Thus, the judiciary legal systems of the Member States ensure the su-premacy of EU law and, at the same time, its effectiveness (20).

(18) About origins and scope of the general principle of effective judicial protec-tion in EU law, see A. Arnull, The principle of effective judicial protection in EU law: an unruly horse?, in Eu L Rev., 2011, 36, 1, p. 51; V. colcelli, Il sistema di tutele nell’ordinamento giuridico comunitario e selezione degli interessi rilevanti nei rapporti orizzontali, in Europa e Diritto Privato, 2, 2009, pp. 557-585.

(19) P. MonAteri, The Weak Law: Contaminations and Legal Cultures, in Global Jurist, 4, 2001, p. 575.

(20) K. lenAertS and T. corthAut, Of Birds and Hedges: The Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU Law, in E.L. Rev., 2006, 31, p. 287.


Individual rights protected by national/EU courts (21) are the best ways for EU integration.

3. — A joint reconstruction between liability in horizontal and vertical rela-tionships.

The system which protects individual rights, based on the application of the principle of the effet utile (useful effect), can be seen as a new means of qualifying the rights of individuals. This is due to the fact that the principle of the useful effect has made a debtor of the Member State that is not active in terms of the obligation to implement those Community rules that are not directly applicable.

In certain cases, private individuals may also be held non-contractually responsible for failing to respect the EU law in question.

For the Court of Justice, the liability of private persons for infringement of Community law is one way of guaranteeing implementation of that law, like the liability of Member States.

This symmetry involves another concept: the criteria guiding actions for damages against Member States may be extended to actions for dam-ages in relationships between private persons. In this sense, some attention should be paid to liability in horizontal relationships, i.e. the provisions of Regulation no. 178/2002. For instance, operators of the food chain may be required to compensate any damage caused by their products, not only because those products may be defective, but also because of the breach of the precautionary principle (Art. 21, Reg. no. 178/2002). However, infringe-ment of the precautionary principle in the food chain by private persons may be a significant indicator of the possibility of joint reconstruction of compensation for damages in the EU legal system.

(21) On how the national Courts participate in the process of legal integration within the EU see U. JAreMbA, The Impact of EU law on National Judiciaries: Polish Administrative Courts and their Participation in the Process of Legal Integration in the EU, in German Law Journal, 12, 3, 2011, p. 930.


The opinion of Advocate-General Van Gerven moves in this direction. In his concluding remarks to Banks v. BBC (22), Van Gerven believed that a significant number of elements could be found in the EU legal case of the Community’s liability for qualifying private persons’ responsibility in EU law infringement.

The first elements of contact between vertical and horizontal liability in the EU legal system are the rules intended to confer rights on individuals.

The infringement of EU rules, understood as aiming at conferring rights on individuals, is the reason for compensation claims for damages caused by institutions, Member States and individuals.

Among other things, identifying these categories of rules means clarify-ing which of them fall within the concept of the EU legal system of a rule intended to confer rights on individuals. Non-contractual liability is thus a “litmus paper” test for determining EU rules from which to implement indi-vidual rights. Principles infringed by institutions must be higher-ranking and designed to protect individuals. Traditionally, higher-ranking principles are the general principles of the EU legal system. However, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice has taken a step forward. It has traditionally equated the meaning of higher rank with general principles, but the current trend of the Luxembourg judges is now different. The Court now uses the same cri-teria applied to configure the non-contractual liability of Member States to qualify the non-contractual liability of the Community (23). Therefore, such non-contractual liability may be recognised even if the rule breached is not a higher-ranking principle as described above (24).

In the case of the non-contractual liability of the Community, Art. 263 TFEU (ex Art. 230 EC) indicates how to find the rules of law intended to confer rights on individuals. Criteria for identifying a higher-ranking princi-ple are like those for identifying rules for legality review of institutional acts: the reference is the Treaty and fundamental principles, and not only general principles.

(22) Court of Justice, Banks / BBC, C-128/92, in ECR, 1994, p. I-1212, para 36-54. (23) Court of Justice, Bergaderm and Goupil / Commission, C-352/98, in ECR 2000, p.

I-5291. (24) See again Court of Justice, Bergaderm and Goupil / Commission, cit.


Some judgements of the Court of First Instance move in this direc-tion (25). There are six recent judgements in which the Court reflects on the value of the WTO agreements. The Court of First Instance stated that these international agreements do not confer rights on individuals. The WTO agreements, by reason of their nature and structure, are not among the rules in the light of which the EU Courts review the legality of action by Community Institutions (26). Only where the Community intends to im-plement a particular obligation assumed within the context of the WTO, or where the Community measure refers expressly to specific provisions of the WTO agreements, can the Court review the legality of the conduct of the defendant Institutions in the light of WTO rules (27).

Thus, in these judgements, the Court is referring to the meaning of the higher-ranking principle. It is among the rules that the Court uses in reviewing the legality of EU bodies’ measures, in accordance with art. 263 TFEU.

Also in cases of non-contractual liability of Member States, principles de-signed to confer rights on individuals are deemed to be directly applicable Community laws (see, e.g., Brasserie du Pêcheur) and not directly applicable Com-munity rules when their implementation is not carried out (see, e.g., Francovich).

In private relationships, only directly applicable Community laws confer rights on individuals, excluding Directives, even when self-executing.

The nature of EU law is not sufficient to identify non-contractual li-ability by the Community or Member States, and now also of individuals. Serious breaches of rules covering discretionary power in implementing leg-islative measures are enforcement elements for non-contractual liability of Community or Member States

In the case of no broad discretion, simple infringement of Community rights by the Community or Member States is enough to lead to configu-ration of non-contractual liability. Instead, when instruments of binding

(25) Court of Justice, FIAMM e FIAMM Technologies / Council of the European Union and Commission, T-69/00, in ECR, 2005, p. II-5393.

(26) Court of Justice, Portugal / Council, C-149/96, in ECR, 1999, p. I-8395, par. 47; Court of Justice, OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft, C-307/99, in ECR, 2001, p. I-3159, par. 24.

(27) See, as regards Court of Justice, Fediol / Commission, C-70/87, in ECR, 1989, p. 1781, para 19 to 22, and, as regards WTO agreements, Court of Justice, Case Biret International / Council, C-93/02 P, in ECR, 2003, p. I- 10497.


secondary legislation do not contain unconditional and sufficiently precise provisions, the non-contractual liability of Member States or EU Institu-tions does not emerge.

When the Institution has narrow discretionary powers to take a legisla-tive measure, the simple failure to fulfil a Community rule is enough to indicate its serious breach.

Conversely, when discretionary powers are ample, the liability of national authorities does not emerge. In these cases, the liability of both Institutions and Member States only arises if they do not emanate a legal act, as they are required to do. It is, therefore, this omission that implies that they have seriously omitted carry out a required act.

The EU legal system shows that liability is not related to the nature of any substantive right. It is by reason of the recognition of a right to com-pensation that the conduct of others – States, Institutions or individuals – affects the legal position of a private person.

EU non-contractual liability may be described in the civil law tradition as a subjective right to have legal rights remedied if they have been damaged. Thus, the non-contractual liability of the Community may also be confi-gured in the absence of infringement of rules. In this particular case, the extent of the damage suffered is sufficient for the claim: the breach must be sufficiently serious, and therefore a causal relationship must exist between it and the damage suffered by the injured party (28).

4. — Discretion and personal non-contractual liability.

The precautionary principle entails the perceived existence of discretion on behalf of those who are believed to breach it, and, as noted in Art. 21, Reg. no. 178/2002, if they are private persons (e.g., owners of restaurant chains). In this case, taking the example of the private operators of a chain of food distributors allows us the chance to delve into the relationship be-tween discretion and non-contractual liability in cases relating to Institutions and Member States.

(28) Court of Justice, Biovilac / Commission, C-59/83, in ECR, 1984, p. 4057, para 28.


In cases of non-contractual liability relating to individuals, it is also im-portant to show evidence of a sufficiently serious failure to respect a regula-tion, such as is the case with the precautionary principle. The precaution-ary principle can be defined as a tool that allows us to interpret scientific uncertainty. This being the case, it allows the interpreter some degree of discretion.

The precautionary principle derives from current scientific knowledge on the long-term consequences of a present situation of doubt, in relation to which inertia may cause irreparable damage.

The attention the Court pays to evaluating the existence of a relationship between the discretion granted to Member States or Institutions and the infringement of rules intended to confer rights on individuals should also be extended to the non-contractual liability of individuals.

Requiring private persons who exercise control over the food chain to respect the precautionary principle and, arising from its breach, their non-contractual liability, means assigning a role of protection of the general EU interest to a private/civil tool.

Protection of the EU legal system and the public order – not only eco-nomic – is the further objective ensured by recognition of non-contractual liability for infringement of the precautionary principle.

The precautionary principle has the same further function as that of remedies to contracts in contrast with Art. 101 TFEU. In this situation, the EU legal system assigns to contract not only the role of self-regulation of private interests directly involved in it, but also the function of guaranteeing the economic order sought by the European Union.

5. — The guarantee of the EU legal system troughs the contractual liability and compensation for damages suffered.

It is possible to make a claim for damages due to actions or contracts that restrict or distort competition, in accordance with Art. 101, paragraph 1, TFEU (ex art. 81 TEC), which deals with the conferral of rights on indi-viduals.

The success of this legislation, and in particular the efficacy of the pro-


hibition established in paragraph 1, can be put at risk if a domestic legal system impedes the exercising of rights conferred by European Union law (the principle of effectiveness), through distortion of competition (29).

In the Manfredi judgements (30), confirming the Court’s reading of Courage v. Creahan, the Court of Justice pointed out that Art. 101, paragraph 1 TFEU produces direct effects in horizontal relationships and confers on individu-als rights which national courts must protect.

The nature of Art. 101 TFEU, in protecting the economic order of the E.U., legitimates anyone to rely on the invalidity of competition-restricting agreements and therefore to seek damages suffered, if a causal link can be established between the competition-restricting agreements or practice and the damage suffered.

Anyone who suffers damage (not only businesses but also consumers), affected by competition-restricting agreements, can claim for damages (31).

The case law of the Court of Justice on infringement of Arts. 101, 102 et seq. TFEU (Arts. 81 and 82 TEC), which are aimed at structuring and safe-guarding the EU internal market, often combine claims for damages with those for absolute or relative nullity of the competition-restricting contract.

Protection for compensation guarantees the fundamental interests of the weaker party to conservation of the contract if the compensation means re-equilibration of the terms of that contract (32).

The fundamental interests of the weaker party to the contract, forced to undergo damage as a result of that sae contract, may coincide with a desire not to conserve an unfair or unbalanced contract. In this case, the remedy which most probably coincides with the weaker party’s interest is a nullity action related to an action for damages, within the bounds of the negative interest.

(29) Court of Justice, Courage / Crehan, C-453/99, in ECR, 2001, p. I-6297. (30) Court of Justice, Manfred / Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others, C-295-

298/04, in ECR, 2006, p. I-6619. (31) Corte di Cassazione, 2 Febbrary 2007, 2305, in Foro it, I, 2007, c.1097. (32) Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust

Rules, COM (2008) 165, 2 April 2008; P.J WilS Wouter, The Use of Settlements in Public An-titrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles, in World Competition 31, 2008, p. 325.


Conversely, the weaker party may envisage maintaining a contract which infringed competition rules. Thus, the balance of the terms of the con-tract is guaranteed by an action for damages, which is based on violation of rules intended to safeguard the internal market. In such cases, protection for compensation is not connected with any nullity action.

In this situation, the EU legal system assigns to the contract not only the role of self-regulation of interests of individuals directly involved in it, but also a function of guarantee of the EU economic order (33). For this reason, contractual liability and actions for damages are ways of safeguarding the EU economic order (34).

6. — Non-wrongful conduct of Member States and recovery of sums paid but not due.

Wrongful conduct undertaken by Member States, as above noted, can be curtailed when a contravention is identified.

Before any parties can be held liable for compensation, any infringement of the rules on the part of Member States and the EU must be seen as suffi-ciently important. Any presumed breach by Member States and institutions has to go beyond the limits of their power, in such a way that a causal link can be seen between the breach and the damage. When such a breach is not clear, the individual retains, in any case, the right to have any funds paid but not due to Member States and Institutions returned.

With regard to the non-wrongful conduct of Member States or Institu-tions, there is one way of protecting the individual rights of EU citizens: the principle of unjust enrichment.

The action of recovery of sums paid but not due is an additional way of guaranteeing the effectiveness of rights within EU law and its supremacy.

In such cases, we explain the tendency on the part of the Court of Jus-

(33) COM (2001) 398 final, 11 July 2001, OJ C 255, 13 September 2001, 1; Grundmann, Stefan and Stuyck, Jules (eds) An Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law (2002, Kluwer, Den Haag).

(34) Court of Justice, The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland), C-5/94, in ECR, 1996, p. I-2553.


tice to identify the existence of a right to repeated sums paid to Member States, which receive sums obtained on the basis of a national rule contrary to EU law. For example, it would be in contrast with the requirement for correct implementation of EU law for an individual to pay a tax which was later proved to be incompatible with EU law (35); or to pay sums on the basis of an unlawful act according to EU regulations, which has been altered or annulled (36), and, in the reverse case, a Member State that does not recover illegally granted state aid (37).

In his opinion to Express Dairy Foods (38),the Advocate-General Capotorti qualifies the recovery of sums paid partially or totally unnecessarily but not due as a “true subjective right” of EU citizens. This right derives from a general principle common to the legal systems of all Member States.

In the recovery of sums paid but not due, the Court of Justice recognises the nature of a remedy common in the European legal system (reimburse-ment of charges paid but not due) applicable in vertical and horizontal rela-tionships. For this reason, the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) contains a detailed description of recovery resulting from the termination of a contract or from any flaw in it. For example, the wrongful nature of sums which are the object of a contract and which are indicated in it may give rise to a claim of infringement of Arts. 101, 102 et seq. TFEU.

Thus, a typical principle of civil law, such as the reimbursement of charg-es paid but not due, achieves a specific purpose of the Community (whose right and whose supremacy would otherwise be frustrated). The aim of EU law would not be achieved if the effectiveness of the return of a sum re-ceived by a Member State by reason of a procedure adopted in violation of an EU law had not been ensured. The sum paid but not due would remain in the hands of the receiving Member State which, not in a state of non-

(35) Court of Justice, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato / San Giorgio, C-199/82, in ECR, 1983, p.3595.

(36) See ex multis Court of Justice, Case Vreugdenhil BV / Commission of the European Com-munities, C- 282/90, in ECR, 1992, p. 1937.

(37) Court of Justice, Commission of the European Communities v Germany, C-70/72, in ECR 1973, p. 813.

(38) Court of Justice, Express Dairy Foods / Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce, C-130/79, in ECR, 1980, p. 1887.


contractual liability, would keep for itself a sum of money collected in viola-tion of an EU law. Again, the Member State which does not recover illegally granted state aid would invalidate any judgement of the Court of Justice on illegal state aid – with consequences, for example, for competition in the EU internal market.

Protection, through recovery of sums paid but not represents a tool for the completion and effectiveness of EU law. The EU therefore has a par-ticular interest in ensuring that the Member State in question does not leave reimbursement of charges paid, or, vice versa, unimplemented, that it does not recover state aid illegally granted. The Court of Justice must be aware that the completeness of this kind of protection and its effectiveness may be mitigated by the tendency of domestic legislation, especially in the field of fiscal law, to reduce or exclude the requirement of the national govern-ment to pay sums perceived as not due.

7. — Unimplemented Directives in the relationships between private individu-als: a control system at the discretion of Member States.

Individual rights, and not only in horizontal relationships, allow stake-holders to request that national legislation not be applied, if it goes against EU law. The only evident restrictions are those EU rules that involve the effet utile.

Directives that have not been implemented do not accompany non-ap-plication when it comes to relationships between private individuals. That said, the expansion of EU power means there remains the chance that Di-rectives will not have some horizontal effect, as relates to the legal position of individuals in relationships that depend on yet to be implemented Direc-tives. Indeed, some jurisprudence of the Court of Justice might be seen as evidence of this (39).

The Court has recognised some horizontal effects in one Directive not implemented in the legal system of the United Kingdom. It has recognised

(39) See Court of Justice, Marshall / Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching), C-152/84, in ECR, 1986, p.723, and Court of Justice, case Arcaro, C-186/95, in ECR, 1996, p. I-4705.


rights to an employee against a Member State which was qualified not as a public authority but as a private employer (40).

In another case, the Court of Justice did not apply German law to an employment contract between Werner Mangold and Rüdiger Helm: the national law did not ensure the full effectiveness of the general principle of equal treatment for men’s and women’s work on grounds of age, during the period in which transposition of Directive 1999/70/EC had not yet expired (41).

These anomalous cases and their reasons may be explained by referring to the criteria governing non-application. In horizontal relationships, they assume a special connotation.

The reference is to Unilver Italia Spa v. Central Food SpA (42), which involved a law applicable to relationships between private individuals (43). The question referred to technical standards and regulations (44) and their direct applicabil-ity in civil proceedings between individuals (concerning contractual rights and obligations) when they are contained in unimplemented Directives (45).

The Court of Justice answered the question, submitted in a preliminary ruling, stating that, in civil proceedings, a national court is required to refuse to apply a national technical regulation which was adopted during a period of postponement of adoptions prescribed in Art. 9 of Directive 83/189/EC: Arts. 8 and 9, cited, are technical standards and regulations.

The Court of Justice, according to its case-law, in which an unimple-mented Directive cannot impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied against an individual (46), could not apply it in the case of Unilever Italia Spa v. Central Food Spa. Non-compliance with Arts. 8 and 9

(40) Court of Justice, Foster / British Gas plc, C-188/89, in ECR, 1990, p. I-3313. (41) Court of Justice, Werner Mangold / Rüdiger Helm, C- 144804, in ECR, 2004, p. I-9981. (42) Court of Justice, Unilver Italia Spa / Central Food Spa, C-443/98, in ECR, 2000, p.

1-7535. (43) Court of Justice, Unilver Italia Spa v Central Food Spa, cit. (44) Court of Justice, CIA Security International SA / Signalson SA e Securitel SPRL,

C-194/94, in ECR, 1996, p.I-220, para 11, and in especially para 12. See also case Court of Justice, Commission / Germany, C-317/92, in ECR, 1994, p. I-2039, para 26.

(45) See also case Court of Justice, Seda Kücükdeve / Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, C-555/07, in Colum. J. Eur. L., 20010, p. 497, para 55-56.

(46) Court of Justice, Faccini Dori / Recreb Srl, C-91/92, in ECR, 1994, I-3325, para 20.


of Directive 83/189/EC, which constitutes a substantial procedural defect, renders inapplicable a technical regulation adopted in breach of those Ar-ticles.

The Court, therefore, stated that its case-law on the prohibition of hori-zontal effects (rights or obligations for individuals) by unimplemented Di-rectives cannot be applied when the infringement of a Directive constitutes a substantial procedural defect.

Non-transposition Directives that define the substantive scope of a legal rule create both rights or obligations for individuals, and the national court must decide the case before it on this basis (47). This may also happen before the infringement by a Member State of a general principle of the EU legal system, in a Directive the period for transposition of which has not yet expired (48).

In the Unilever judgement, the technical regulation adopted in breach of Art. 9, cited, also had an effect on the free movement of products (49).

These judgements, which seem to show a trend different from the Court’s settled case-law on Directives (see, e.g., Faccini Dori), are a clear indication of the meaning of non-application of national law in contrast with the effet utile of a Directive.

When, in the implementation of EU rules, the discretion of a Member State is not considerable, or, rather, is completely reduced (as in technical standards and regulations) or when it does not allow changes as a general principle, national legislation contrary to a Directive for which the period for transposition has not yet expired need not compulsorily be applied (50).

(47) Court of Justice, Unilver Italia Spa / Central Food Spa, cit., para 50 and 51. (48) Court of Justice, Werner Mangold / Rüdiger Helm, C- 144804, in ECR, 2004, p. I-9981. (49) On the value of arts. 8 and 9 of EC Directive 83/189 of 28 March 1983, OJ 1983

L109 8 –12, 30 see case, Court of Justice, CIA Security International SA/Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL, C-194/94, in ECR, 1996, p. I-2201.

(50) See H. Schepel, Constitutionalising the Market, Marketising the Constitution, and to Tell the Difference: On the Horizontal Application of the Free Movement Provisions in EU Law, in Euro-pean Law Journal, 18, 2012, p. 177, also on full direct horizontal effect and their important repercussions for private law and to resolve conflicts between economic freedoms and fundamental rights.


In these cases, the implementation of a Directive by the Member States cannot change the situation, because Member States have a non-considera-ble discretionary power in the implementation of technical regulations, like Arts. 8 and 9, cited.

This statement about horizontal relationships confirms conclusions on non-application in relationships between private individuals and Member States (vertical relationships): non-application is a check of discretion of the Member State in question (51).

Except in the conditions mentioned above, the legal protection of non-application does not apply when the EU law is characterised by the effet utile. In these cases, judges are obliged to interpret national law in conformity with EU law (52).

Also in horizontal relationships, application of national law is pursued by national courts partly through interpretations made following EU Law.

Unimplemented Directives, which cannot produce direct effects between individuals, may make immune from non-contractual and contractual liabil-ity individuals who are engaged in behaviour which, although not permitted by national law, is provided for in an unimplemented Directive (53).

When the moment for the implementation of a Directive has expired and the result prescribed by that Directive is not obtainable by the Member State, or through interpretation of national law in conformity with EU law, it is possible, as described above, to invoke the non-contractual liability of the Member State, in appropriate conditions (54).

(51) See Court of Justice, Seda Kücükdeve / Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, C -555/07, in IRLR, 2010, p. 346.

(52) Court of Justice, Werner Mangold / Rüdiger Helm, C- 144804, in ECR, 2004, p.I-9981 and O. roth, The Internal Market and the Four Freedoms, in Comm. Mark. Law Rerw., 2004, p. 421.

(53) Court of Justice, Marleasing SA / La Comercial Internacional, C-106/89, in ECR, 1990, p. I-4135 para 9.

(54) Court of Justice, Faccini Dori / Recreb Srl, C-91/92, in ECR, 1994, p. I-3325, para 26, 27, 28, 29, 30.


8. — Conclusions.

In the European Union, and the EU legal system, new governance mod-els are emerging as a complementary or alternative response to legislative harmonization (55).

Indeed, we can say that EU legislation follows a vertical partition in terms of economic sectors, abandoning traditional divisions between public and private law (56).

Relationships between individuals concerning contractual rights and ob-ligations therefore emerged later in the EU legal system, but are still re-quired to perform the same function that is reserved for individual rights in vertical relationships. “Contract law instruments such as tort or contract appear only as a small part of many possible tools harnessed in the pursuit of allocative efficiency or distributive justice, synthetically described as the correction of market failures” (57). “The multilevel dimension of European private law rests on the use of combined instruments that operate through the choice of law made by parties and harmonized legislation. Within this combination, different regulatory strategies have to be employed to simulta-neously perform the design of an integrated European market and provide the responses to its failures” (58).

Private and public law can been seen as a way to describe the difference between two distinct regulatory strategies of the European Union and na-tional markets, however the instruments for correcting market failures, and

(55) On the reciprocal influence among legal systems in Europe, see V. colcelli, Revers-ing Ubi Jus ibi Remedium in Civil Law: the Italian case of consumer protection, in European Review Of Privat Law, 1, 18, 2010, p. 143-154.

(56) F. cAFAGGi, H. Muir WAtt, The Regulatory Function of European Private Law, Chelten-ham, 2009, p. XI, explains: “the variety of means available to achieve these goals – which range from traditional public law tools such as state ownership, public franchising or licens-ing, through the more familiar forms of regulation which rely on semiprivate bodies or in-dependent regulatory agencies for standard-making or market controls, to various and still experimental forms of self-regulation by means of voluntary arrangements on the other end of the scale – call for a general framework in order to avoid conflicts, incoherence or redundancy between regulatory approaches”.

(57) Id., p. XI. (58) See again Id., p. XI.


to guarantee the economic order sought by the EU, range across the public and private laws. The selection of public rules is very different (and includes licensing, prohibition or prior authorization, quality standards, mandatory disclosure), and it could potentially be accompanied by administrative or criminal sanctions. In individual situations, contract law and other private in-struments could provide complementary remedies: such as the consequenc-es in the particular case of consumer law relating to information problems, or the tort law that allocates the effects of externalities suffered by third parties. This has been done by determining, for example, the relationships between buyers and sellers (59), service providers and their customers, citi-zens and polluters, producers and users of products, with mixed forms of economic and social rules. These relationships now largely overshadow the ex-post, remedial, market-based arrangements typical of private law, which rely primarily upon the Courts for their implementation.

Therefore the Court of Justice assigns the function of guaranteeing the economic order sought by the EU to the typical principles of private law (60), because in horizontal relationships EU rules have the purpose of consoli-dating the EU legal system, which was initially structured by the regulation of vertical relationships.

All EU laws regulate relationships – whether vertical or horizontal – but they do not regulate generic relations. These relationships have the aim of pursuing the primauté of the EU, and conserving the EU legal system and its internal market.

(59) EC Directive 1999/44 of 25 May 1999, OJ 1999 L 171/12 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees; EEC Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993, OJ 1993 L 95,29-34 on unfair terms in consumer contracts; EC Directive 1999/44 of 25 May 1999, OJ 1999 L 171 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees; EEC Directive 85/577 of 20 December 1985, OJ 1985 L 372 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises. W. G. FriedMAnn, Some reflections on status and freedom, Essays in honour of Roscoe Pound, 1962, Daytona, p. 222. And see Resolutions of EU Council O.J. C 92/1, 1975, O.J. C 133/1, 1981, O.J. C 167, 1986; see also European contractual law Com (2001) 398 def.; protection of consumers’ and users’ rights (Com/2002 208 def.) and the Green Book (Com/2001 531 def.).

(60) H. collinS, Regulating Contracts, Oxford, 1999; see also H. collinS, The Alchemy of Deriving General Principles of Contract Law from European Legislation: in Search of the Philosopher’s Stone, in European Review Of Contract Law, 2, 2006, p. 213.


Due to the close functional relationship between legal protection and substantive rights in the EU legal system, integration with national courts strengthens the above considerations; private relationships have the aim of conserving the legal system, which was established by Treaties and which, within the interstices of the rules, the Court of Justice originally encoded and continues to interpret.

Relationships between individuals, concerning contractual rights and ob-ligations, emerged later in the EU legal system, but they are still required to perform the same function that is reserved for individual rights in vertical relationships.

Therefore results achieved in terms of the function and nature of non-application may be extended from vertical to horizontal relationships: in both, non-application is a tool of control at the discretion of Member States in transposing Directives into national law. Also, national laws are inapplica-ble if they conflict with the effects envisaged by EU rules. This is especially true in cases when the time for protection through non-disapplication is anticipated with respect to the moment of the transposition of a Directive, when that Directive contains technical standards and regulations. This hap-pens when Member State discretion is weak. Which is to say, in horizontal relationships, national legislation contrary to a Directive when the period for its transposition has not yet expired and need not be applied.

The Court of Justice also gives an additional meaning to non-contractual liability in horizontal relationships. Such non-contractual liability ensures the full effectiveness of EU law, as in vertical relationships.

The fact that today we can trace a trend towards the uniform definition of non-contractual liability in EU law reinforces the logic of EU judges: in-fringement of EU rules set out for the purpose of conserving the EU legal system, carried out by individuals against other individuals, means ensuring the effect utile of EU rights (61).

The EU discipline relating to competition may be interpreted in this sense, since anti-competitive business practices that have a direct impact on end consumers are prohibited. Thus consumers may receive compensation

(61) Court of Justice, Courage / Crehan, C-453/99, in ECR, 2001, p. I-6297, para 26 and 27.


for damage caused to them by businesses infringing EU competition rules. The expansion of the number of persons protected by EU legislation

on competition, including consumers, is a way of enhancing the use of non-contractual liability to preserve the effectiveness of internal markets as competitive structures. This is perhaps the aspect that most greatly em-phasises the trend highlighted by the Court, which also applies to horizontal relationships, in that actions for damages (for non-contractual liability) are a way of ensuring the full effectiveness of EU rights.

The EU legal system, as mentioned above, also assigns the function of guarantee of the economic order sought by the European Union to the recovery of sums paid but not due and to contract liability (two typical civil law principles).

They can be used to demonstrate broader conceptual claims: in the EU legal system, the selection of relevant interests in horizontal legal relation-ships arises for the same reason, and in the same way, as the qualification of rights in vertical legal relationships, i.e., to consolidate the EU legal system. There is a relationship between legal protection within the EU legal system and the qualification of individual rights in horizontal legal relationships, and between these new modes of governance and the regulatory functions of European private law: EU rules, in both horizontal and vertical relation-ships, aim at consolidating the EU legal system, and regional integration in the EU internal market. It follows then that the same typical instruments of private law can prove useful in support of integration.

Private law instruments as way of EU regional integration, in Mario i. Álvarez ledesMa y Roberto Cippitani (Coord.), Derechos Individuales e IntegracIón regIonal (antología), Roma

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