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Chapter IV

PUBLICATION, ANSWER, AND DEFAULT

1. Publication of notice.

Under the provision of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Administrator of Land Registration Authority, upon receipt of the order of the court setting the date for initial hearing, shall cause a notice of the hearing to be published in the Of cial Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The notice is to be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved, including adjoining owners so far as known, and in general to all whom it may concern. The notice requires all persons concerned to appear in court on the date and time indicated to show cause why the application for registration should not be granted. The publication in the Of cial Gazette shall be suf cient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

The publication in the Of cial Gazette binds the whole world, inclusive of those who may be adversely affected and those who factu-ally have been innocent of such publication. This is the only way to give meaning to the nality and indefeasibility of the Torrens title to be issued, as against the argument that such rule could result to actual injustice.1

Publication of notice of initial hearing in a Newspaper of general circulation mandatory requirement.

In Director of Lands vs. CA, 276 SCRA 276, the Supreme Court held that land registration proceedings are actions in rem. It is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the

1Francisco v. Ct. of App., Santos, et al., G.R. No. L-35787, Apr. 11, 1980; 97 SCRA 22.

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land sought to be registered, to vest the court with authority over the res. Instead, it is the publication of notice of the application for reg-istration which serves to apprise the whole world that such petition has been led and whosoever is minded to oppose it, may do so within 30 days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear the case. (Director of Lands vs. CA, 276 SCRA 276). In this case, the petitioner did not oppose the institution of land registration proceedings despite notice of publication. Failing to oppose the same at its institution, petitioner is now estopped to contest the validity of the decree. (Ignacio vs. Ba-silio, et al., G.R. No. 122824, Sept. 26, 2001).

As a proceeding in rem, the decree of registration issued in land registration cases is binding upon and conclusive against the entire world. (Cacho vs. CA, 269 SCRA 159). Under Section 28 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496),which was the law in force at the time of the institution of the proceedings, petitioner had one year after the entry of the decree to le a petition for review. However, he failed to contest the said entry. Thus he is bound now by the rule that upon the expiration of one year, every certi cate of title issued in accord-ance with Act No. 496 shall be incontrovertible.

Worthy to note, despite the foregoing rule, petitioner is not with-out a remedy. The landowner whose property has been wrongfully registered in anothers name, after the one year period, could not ask for the court to set aside the decree, but he could bring an ordinary action for damages if, as in this case, the property has passed unto the hands of innocent purchasers for value. (Ching vs. CA, 181 SCRA 9; Sy vs. IAC, 162 SCRA 130).

Laches, when it applies.

Bar by laches appears particularly pertinent in this case. Laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reason-able time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. While a question of

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jurisdiction may be raised at any time, a party may be barred from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel.

Laches sets in if it would take 18 years for a person to le an action to annul the land registration proceedings, especially so if the registrant has already subdivided the land and sold the same to in-nocent third parties. A partys long inaction or passivity in asserting his rights over disputed property precludes him from recovering the same. (Heirs of Teodoro dela Cruz vs. CA, 298 SCRA 172; Aurora Ig-nacio vs. Valeriano Basilio, et al., G.R. No. 122824, Sept. 26, 2001).

Absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the Land Registration Court can not validly con rm and register title to the applicant. Admittedly, the above provision (Section 20, P.D. 1529) provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Of cial Gazette suf ces to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, ab-sent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly con rm and register the title of private respondents. We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due proc-ess rationale behind the publication requirement.

It should be noted further that land registration proceedings is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceedings requires construc-tive seizure of the land against all persons, including the state who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting the application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership but also the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recov-ery of realty. He must prove his title against the whole world. This task which rests upon the applicant can best be achieved when all persons concerned, may, the whole world who have rights or interest in the subject property are noti ed and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of the process require that before the claimed property is taken from the concerned parties and registered in the

PUBLICATION, ANSWER, AND DEFAULT REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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name of the applicant, the said parties must be given notice and op-portunity to oppose.

Purpose and effects of publication.

The primary purpose and effects of publication of the notice of application are (1) to confer jurisdiction over the land applied for upon the court, and (2) to charge the whole world with knowledge of the application of the land involved, and invite them to take part in the case and assert and prove their rights over the property subject thereof.

The case of Benin vs. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531, clearly explains the effects of publication and non-publication of the application, as follows:

The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in virtue of the publica-tion of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void insofar but only insofar as the land not included in the publication is concerned. This is so, because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land not included in the publication the publication being the basis of jurisdiction of the court. But the proceedings and the decree of registration, relating to the lands that were included in the publication, are valid. Thus, if it is shown that a certi cate of title had been issued covering lands where the registration court had no jurisdiction, the certi cate of title is null and void insofar as it concerns the land or lands over which the registration court had not acquired jurisdiction.

This case of Benin, nonetheless, ruled that if the area of the land appearing in the decree of registration and as reproduced in the original certi cate of title is bigger by only 27.10 square meters than that published, the entire parcel of land decreed being more than 879 hectares, then the difference is not so substantial as would affect the

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identity of the land. The failure to publish the bigger area does not perforce affect the courts jurisdiction.

It is also the rule that a land registration court which has val-idly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel of land for registration of title thereto by the publication cannot be divested of said jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative act consisting in the issuance by the Director of Lands of a homestead patent covering the same parcel of land.

Thus, in the situation presented in the case of de los Angeles vs. Santos, 12 SCRA 625, if the applicants succeed in proving their allegations in their application for registration that they are owners pro-indiviso and in a fee simple of the land involved, then the court would have to order a decree of title issued in favor of the applicants and declare the homestead patent a nullity which vested no title in the patentee as against the real owners.

With respect to persons who have been charged with knowledge of the application of land by the publication of the notice of initial hearing, who have or claim rights to the land involved and fail to assert them, their failure cannot operate to exclude them from the binding effects of the judgment that may be rendered therein.

2. Form of notice.

The aforementioned Section 23 requires that copy of the notice of initial hearing duly attested by the Administrator of Land Regis-tration Authority be posted by the Sheriff of the province or city in a conspicuous place on each parcel of land as well as on the bulletin board of the municipality or city in which the land is situated at least fourteen days in advance of the date set for the hearing. The notice shall be substantially in the form prescribed in said Section 23. Said Section never meant to dispense with the requirement of notice by mailing and by posting.2

The date of mailing of the motions, pleading, or any other papers, which may include instruments as the deed of donation,

2Republic v. Marasigan, 198 SCRA 219.


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is considered the date of ling as shown by the post of ce stamp on the envelope or registry receipt.3

3. Mailing and proof of publication and notice.

The time xed by law for the initial hearing of the case is not less than forty- ve days nor more than ninety days from the date of the order. And within seven days after the publication of the notice in the Of cial Gazette, the Administrator of Land Registration Authority shall cause a copy of the notice to be mailed to every person named therein whose address is known.

If the applicant seeks to have the line of a public way deter-mined, the Administrator shall cause a copy of said notice to be mailed to the city or municipal mayor and the provincial governor concerned. If the land borders on a river, navigable stream, or shore, or an arm of the sea where a river or harbor line has been established, or on a lake, or if it otherwise appears from the application or the proceed-ings that a tenant-farmer or the national government may have a claim adverse to that of the applicant, notice shall be given in the same manner to the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Mines and/or the Di-rector of Fisheries and Acquatic Resources. Other persons may also be furnished the same notice if the court may deem it proper. The court, whenever deemed possible, shall require proof of actual notice to all adjoining owners and to all persons who appear to have interest in or claims to the land involved. Mailing of notices to such persons shall be by registered mail, if practicable.

The certi cation of the Administrator and of the sheriff con-cerned to the effect that the notice of initial hearing, as required by law, has been complied with shall be led in the case before the date of initial hearing, and shall be conclusive proof of such facts.4

It may be stated, in this connection, that strong considerations of policy require that this legal presumption of conclusiveness be al-lowed to operate with full force. A party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court;

3Mingoa v. Land Registration Administrator, 200 SCRA 782. 4Sec. 32, Act No. 496, as amended by Sec. 2, Republic Act 96; PD 1529, Sec. 24.

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he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such of cial in the performance of his duties.5

4. Minors and persons under disability given due representa-tion.

Upon the return day of the notice, and proof of service of all orders of notice issued, the court may appoint a disinterested person to act as guardian ad litem for minors and persons not in being, unascertained, unknown, or out of the Philippines, who may have an interest. The compensation of the guardian or the agent shall be determined by the court and paid as part of the expenses of the court.6 Ordinarily, a guardian ad litem has no authority to act or bind a mi-nor in any transaction with respect to his estate, his authority being restricted only to matters connected with the litigation at hand; but he can however do so with the approval of the court.7

5. Notice essential to due process.

The rights and interests of a person in realty, who is not made a party to an action affecting the ownership or possession thereof, are not thereby prejudiced.8 Thus, the purpose of the notice and pub-lication thereof is to invite all persons concerned who may have any rights or interests in the property applied for to come to the court and show cause why the application should not be granted. In other words, everybody is welcome to become a party to the case if he has any rights to enforce or interests to protect. To deprive him of that opportunity will be to deprive him of his right or property without due process of law.

Incidentally, it may be well to understand what is due process of law. This phrase has been discussed a great many times by the courts and by writers on constitutional law. This same idea is couched in different language in the different constitutions of the different states of the Union. In some, the phrase is the law of the land. In others, due course of law. These different phrases, however, have

5Banco Espaol v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921. 6Act 496, Sec. 33. 7Sto. Domingo, etc. v. Sto. Domingo, et al., 103 Phil. 373. 8Albano, 10 Phil. 410.


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been given practically the same de nition by the different courts which have attempted an explanation of them. The phrase due proc-ess of law was de ned by Judge Story, in his work on Constitutional Law, as the law in its regular course of administration through the courts of justice.9

Due process of law is not that the law shall be according to the wishes of all the inhabitants of the State, but simply

First. There shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the govern-ment;

Second, That this law shall be reasonable in its opera-tion;

Third, That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and

Fourth, That it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class.

When a person is deprived of his life or liberty or property, therefore, under a law prescribed by the proper lawmaking body of the state and such law is within the power of said department to make, and is reasonable, and is then enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed, and is applicable alike to all the citizens of a particular class within the state, such persons is not deprived of his property or of his life or of his liberty without due process of law.10

6. Personal notice necessary but not indispensable.

By the description in the notice, To all whom it may concern, all the world are made parties defendant. To require personal notice as a prerequisite to the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason that per-sonal notice could never be given to unknown claimants. The great dif culty in land title arises from the existence of possible unknown

9U.S. v. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104. 10See Story on the Constitution, 5th ed., Secs. 1943-1946; Principles of Consti-tutional Law, Cooley, 434.

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claimants. Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment, in fact, to the transfer of title. Courts have held that in actions in rem, personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the res. Nei-ther may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title issued in a registration proceeding. For the State, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or in the nature of a proceding in rem, which shall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown.11

Thus, notice of application and initial hearing by publication is suf cient and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not a suf cient ground to invalidate the proceedings although he may ask for the review of the judgment or the reopening of the decree of registration, if he was made the victim of actual fraud. However, lack of actual notice or knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings does not of itself constitute fraud.12

7. Who may oppose or answer.

Any person claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and le an opposition or answer on or before the return day, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. The answer shall state all the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest claimed by the party ling the same and apply for the remedy desired, and shall be signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf.13 All that is required to give him a standing in court is that, according to his answer, he has some kind of an interest in the property even though the same is of a purely equitable nature, and that a homestead applicant is deemed also con-templated. It is not essential that he make a claim to the title of the property.14 A lessee who has introduced substantial improvements on

11Roxas v. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Aguilar v. Caoagdan, 105 Phil. 661. 12Republic v. Abadilla, CA-G.R. No. 6902-R, Oct. 6, 1951; Derayunan v. Derayu-nan, 56 O.G. 22, p. 3863, May 30, 1960, CA. 13Sec. 34 of Act 496, as amended by Sec. 1 of Act 3621. 14Couto v. Cortes, 8 Phil. 459; Archbishop of Manila v. Barrio of Sto. Cristo, 39 Phil. 1; Mendoza, et al. v. Reyes, et al., 55 O.G. 23, June 8, 1959, CA.


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a parcel of land as public land, pursuant to a lease agreement with the Government, has an interest on the land, and mandamus will lie to compel the trial court to permit said lessee and his counsel to appear and oppose the application for registration of said land under Act No. 496 to cross-examine witnesses of the applicant.15 Failure to le an answer or opposition within the period granted by the court or within a reasonable time thereafter constitutes abandonment of the opposition.16 But once an opposition has been formally led, it is improper for the court taking cognizance of such registration case to order the dismissal thereof on the ground that the opposition failed to appear on the day set for the hearing.17

Where one who may justly oppose an application for registra-tion should nd himself out of time, it is an error of procedure to le a motion to intervene, for the proper procedure should be to ask for the lifting of the order of general or special default, and then, once lifted, to le an opposition to the application.18 This is so because proceedings in land registration are in rem and not in personam, the sole object being the registration applied for and not the determina-tion of any right not connected with the registration.19

8. Requisites of an opposition.

It is important to note the kind of answer authorized under Sec-tion 25 of P.D. No. 1529. It is quite different from an answer permitted by law in actions in the courts of rst instance. It has two requisites, namely: (1) It shall set forth all the objections to the application and (2) It shall state the interest claimed by the party ling the same. Nothing more is required. Inasmuch as the interest of the respond-ent is nowhere again mentioned throughout the whole extent of the law, it is but fair to assume that the real purpose of the provision which contains mention of such interest was to require the answer to disclose the objections to the application, the requirement that the

15Director of Forestry v. del Rosario, 58 O.G. 3, Jan. 15, 1962, CA. 16Omandam v. Director of Lands, 95 Phil. 450. 17Vda. de Barbin v. Jordas, et al., 55 O.G. 1, Jan. 5, 1959, CA. 18Serrano v. Palacio, 52 O.G. 1, Jan. 1956, CA. 19Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil. 467.

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opponent show his interest being merely for purpose of making plain, full, and clear the objections to the application.20

As expressly provided also in the aforecited Section 25, where the opposition or adverse claim covers only a portion of the lot applied for and said portion is not properly delimited on the plan attached to the application, or in case of undivided co-ownership, con icting claims of ownership or possession, or overlapping of boundaries, the court may require the parties to submit a subdivision plan duly ap-proved by the Director of Lands.

9. Is af rmative relief obtainable in answer?

This question was answered in the negative in the case of City of Manila vs. Lack (19 Phil. 324) adhering to the theory that the re-spondent is merely an objector, one who prevents but cannot obtain. This ruling, however, has been rendered obsolete with the subse-quent passage of an amendatory measures, Act No. 3621, providing that where there is an adverse claim, the court shall determine the con icting interests of the applicant and the adverse claimant or oppositor, and after taking evidence shall dismiss the application if neither of them succeeds in showing that he has title proper for registration, or shall enter a decree awarding the land applied for, or any part thereof, to the person entitled thereto, and such decree, when nal, shall entitle such person to the issuance of an original certi cate of title.21

The new rule seems to be in keeping with the procedure under the Public Land Act, permitting any number of persons (Section 50) to seek judicial con rmation of imperfect or incomplete title to land by presenting their respective applications, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and determined accord-ingly. So also in cadastral proceedings, where an answer or claim may be led with the same effect as an application for registration.

20City of Manila v. Lack, 19 Phil. 324. 21Nicolas v. Pre, et al., 97 Phil. 766.


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10. Basic ground for opposition.

May a person present an opposition to an application for reg-istration on the ground that the land applied for is property of the government? It looks as though the oppositor in this case considers the interests of the government also as his own. It was held, how-ever, that an application for registration may be objected to, if the opposition is based on the right of dominion or some other real right opposed to the adjudication or recognition of the ownership of the petitioner, whether it be limited or absolute; and if none such rights of the respondent have been injured by the judgment, he cannot have, on his part, the right to appeal from the said judgment, whatever it may be, as neither the basic Act nor any other law on this matter grants anyone the right to appeal on behalf of another party and not in his own name and by reason of his own interest. It is only the legal personal right of the respondent, prejudiced by the judgment of the lower court, that can be considered as a valid ground.22

If the ground, therefore, is the property applied for is property of the government, it is incumbent upon its duly authorized repre-sentative to present the opposition and not any private individual.

However, where a private individual opposing an application for registration alleges that while the land sought to be registered was part of the public domain for which he had a sales application ap-proved by the Bureau of Lands and was in actual possession thereof by authority of said Bureau, it was held that such an opposition can-not be dismissed inasmuch as it is predicated upon actual possession which constitutes suf cient interest to make the oppositor an adverse claimant within the meaning of Sec. 34 of Act No. 496.23

11. Effect of failure to answer.

If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the application to be taken for confessed. By the description in the notice, To all whom it may concern, all the world are made parties

22Roxas, et al. v. Cuevas, et al., 8 Phil. 469. 23Salao v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-29146, Aug. 5, 1985; 138 SCRA 17.

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defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. After such default and order, the court may enter a decree con rming the title of the applicant and ordering registration of the same.24

Thus, it was held that when no answer in writing nor any op-position is made to an application for registration of a property in the Court, all the allegations contained in the application shall be held as confessed by reason of the absence of denial on the part of the opponent. A person who has not challenged an application for registration of land, even if the appeal afterwards interposed is based on the right of dominion over the same land, cannot allege damage or error against the judgment ordering the registration, inasmuch as he did not allege or pretend to have any right to such land.25

So also, it was held that a claimant having failed to present his answer or objection to the registration of a parcel of land under the Torrens system or to question the validity of such registration within a period of one year after the certi cate of title had been issued, had forever lost his right in said land, even granting that he had any right therein.26

12. General default not a guarantee to success of application.

That no person is entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system unless he is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is no opposition presented against such registration by third persons, has been af rmed by the courts many times. One of the primary and fundamental purposes of the registration of land under the Torrens system is to secure to the owner an absolute indefeasible title, free from all encumbrances and claims whatsoever, except those mentioned in the certi cate of title issued, and, so far as it is possible, to make the certi cate issued to the owner by the court absolute proof of such title. In order that the petitioner for the registration of his land shall be permitted to have the same registered, and to have the bene t resulting from the certi cate of title nally issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner of the land he is applying for. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have

24Sec. 35 of Act 496, as amended by Sec. 8 of Act 1699. 25Cabaas v. Director of Lands, 10 Phil. 393. 26De los Reyes v. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420.


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the land registered under the Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of the land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he owns the legal estate in fee simple. Courts are not justi ed in registering property under the Torrens system simply because there is no opposition interposed. Courts may, even, in the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner in fee simple, of the land which he is attempting to register.27

The applicant must prove that he has just title to the property inasmuch as just title is never presumed. He cannot merely rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the oppositors. By express provision of Art. 1129 of the New Civil Code, for the purposes of pre-scription there is just title when the claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.28

13. Order of default may be set aside.

The power of the court, in the exercise of its discretion, and in accordance with the immemorial usage of courts of justice operating under our system of procedure, to set aside an interlocutory default order and permit a person to come in and make defense for any good cause shown cannot be questioned. The power to set aside such a judg-ment is a power inherent in courts of general jurisdiction, and may, so it has been declared, be exercised without the grant of statutory authority.29 Moreover, an interlocutory judgment or order remains under the control of the court, in the absence of a legal provision to the contrary, until the nal decision of the case, and may be modi- ed and rescinded, on suf cient grounds shown, at any time before the entry of nal judgment.30 Accordingly, while it may be an error

27Maloles and Malvar v. Director of Lands, 25 Phil. 548; De los Reyes v. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil. 367; Director of Lands v. Agustin, 42 Phil. 277. 28Reyes v. Sierra, et al., G.R. No. L-28658, Oct. 18, 1979; 93 SCRA 472. 2923 Cyc. 389. 30Larrobis v. Wislezenus and Smith, Bell & Co., 42 Phil. 401; De Vela v. Naawa, 62 O.G. 44, Oct. 31, 1966, CA.

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of procedure to le a petition to reopen and/or review on the ground of fraud pending the promulgation of the judgment, the interests of substantial justice and the speedy determination of the controversy should have impelled the trial court to lift its order of general default and once lifted to allow the petitioners to le his opposition to the application.31

14. Issuance of order of general default presumed.

Where the record in a land registration case does not af rma-tively show an order of general default, it is deemed that such order was issued. For, in the absence of showing to the contrary, a judicial proceeding is presumed to be regular, and all steps required by law to be taken before the court may validly render judgment, have been so taken.32

15. General default distinguished from special default.

Under Sec. 26 of P.D. No. 1529, a general default may be or-dered by the court if no person appears and answers within the time prescribed. This is done, as a rule, upon motion of the applicant when the case is called at the initial hearing, but may also be ordered by the court motu proprio. Of course, if the applicant himself fails to appear, the court may dismiss his application without prejudice.

Where a party appears at the initial hearing without having led an answer or opposition and asks the court for time within which to le the same, and this has accordingly been granted, in case of failure of such party to le his answer or opposition within the period allowed, he may be declared specially in default. In other words, a special default operates only against certain speci c person or persons.

16. Order of default, when appealable.

As a rule in ordinary civil cases, a party who has been declared in default loses his standing in court and, consequently, cannot ap-

31Yabut Lee and Liscano v. Punzalan, G.R. No. L-50236, Aug. 29, 1980; 99 SCRA 567. 32Pascual, et al. v. Ortega, et al., 58 O.G. 12, Mar. 19, 1962, CA.


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pear later on, adduce evidence and be heard, and for that reason he is not entitled even to notice. Neither can he appeal from the judgment rendered, and the only exception is when the party in default les a motion to set aside the order of default on the ground or grounds stated in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, in which event he is entitled to notice of all proceedings.33

However, in registration proceedings, where a party appeared and presented an answer in opposition and later amended it, although rejected by the court, he did not lose thereby his standing in court, and the order excluding his answer, which is equivalent to declaring him in default, is appealable as soon as the decision ordering the issuance of the decree in favor of the adverse party shall have been rendered.34

Withdrawal of application in a land registration case does not ter-minate proceedings if there is an adverse claim.

In a land registration case, when the applicant withdraws her application with the consent of the court, and only the Director of Lands and the private oppositors are left, it does not mean, that the withdrawal terminates the proceedings.

They theorized that with the withdrawal of the application for registration in the main case, the con icting interest between the applicant and the oppositors was obliterated, thereby effectively terminating the case itself cannot be sustained. The Supreme Court said that:

As the Director of Lands has registered herein an adverse claim, the lower court was bound to determine the con icting interest of said claimant and the applicant-appellee, and in case neither succeeds, under the evidence, in showing proper title for registration, it may dismiss the case . . .

An opposition presented by the Director of Lands is, for all intents and purposes, as con icting interest as against that of the applicant or of the private oppositors, asserting a claim over the land sought to be registered. Consequently, the withdrawal by either the

33Garcia Lim Toco v. Go Fay, 80 Phil. 166; Mandian v. Leong, 103 Phil. 431. 34See Malagum and Arnopia v. Pablo, 46 Phil. 19.

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applicant or any of the private oppositors from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the con icting interests in the case. Neither is the case terminated because under the above-cited law, as amended, the trial court is required to resolve the claims of the remaining parties, the withdrawal of the application by the applicant and/or some private oppositors notwithstanding.

Section 37 of Act No. 496 (the former Land Registration Act) as amended by Act No. 3621, an oppositor who claims ownership over the property covered by the application of a part thereof, may now claim in his answer that the land be registered in his name in the same proceeding. (Director of Lands vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 47380, Feb. 23, 1999).

On the question in Biblia Toledo-Banaga, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 127944, Jan. 28, 1999, bordered on the necessity of requir-ing the registered owner to rst surrender the Torrens title before the Register of Deeds can cancel such title and issue a new one, the Supreme Court ruled:

Petitioners contention that the execution of the nal and executory decision which is to issue titles in the name of pri-vate respondent cannot be compelled by mandamus because of the formality that the registered owner rst surrenders her duplicate Certi cates of Title for cancellation per Section 80 of P.D. 1529 cited by the Register of Deeds, bears no merit. In effect, they argue that the winning party must wait execution until the losing party has complied with the formality of surren-der of the duplicate title. Such preposterous contention borders on the absurd and has no place in our legal system. Precisely, the Supreme Court had already af rmed the CAs judgment that Certi cates of Title be issued in private respondents names. To le another action just to compel the registered owner, herein petitioner Tan, to surrender her titles constitute violation of, if not disrespect to the orders of the highest tribunal. Otherwise, if execution cannot be had just because the losing party will not surrender her titles, the entire proceeding in the courts, not to say the efforts, expenses and time of the parties, would be ren-dered nugatory. It is revolting to conscience to allow petitioners to further avert the satisfaction of their obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality, or formality of surrender of the duplicate titles. The surrender of the duplicate is implied


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from the executory decision since petitioners themselves were parties thereto. Besides, as part of the execution process, it is a ministerial function of the Register of Deeds to comply with the decision of the court to issue a title and register a property in the name of a certain person, especially when the decision attained nality.

oOo

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Chapter V

HEARING AND EVIDENCE

1. Application of Rules of Court.

By express provision of Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, the rules contained therein are not applicable to land registration and cadas-tral cases, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and when practicable and convenient. Thus, Chief Justice Moran, in his com-mentaries on the Rules of Court, elaborated on this point by stating that the provisions abolishing exceptions and bill of exceptions are applicable by analogy to land registration and cadastral cases, and, in suppletory character, those provisions regarding service of notices, motions, pleadings, and other papers, the rules regarding subpoena, bill of discovery, adjournment, trial by commissioners and judgment, whenever they are not inconsistent with special provisions of law.

The Rules of Court may be applied in cadastral cases when two conditions are present: (1) analogy or need to supplement the cadas-tral law; and (2) practicability and convenience.1 The same rule is true in ordinary land registration proceedings.

2. Assignment to referee.

Under the provision of Section 27 of P.D. No. 1529, the court may either hear the parties and their evidence or refer the case or any part thereof to a referee, also known as commissioner, the lat-ter clothed with power to hear the parties and their evidence and make report thereon to the court. Trial before a referee may be held in any convenient place within the province or city, and at the time and place of trial xed by him after reasonable notice thereof served to the parties. In deciding the application for registration, the court may rely on the report submitted to him, or set such report aside for

1Abellera v. Farol, et al., 74 Phil. 285.

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cause shown, or even order that it be recommitted to the referee for further ndings.

Thus, it was held that if a party fails to make timely and speci c exceptions to the report of a referee and the report is con rmed by the trial judge, he is bound by the ndings and cannot be heard to dispute their truthfulness or escape the legal consequences owing therefrom. The trial judge, however, retains a discretion to accept the report of the referee in part and set aside in part or reverse it entirely even where no exceptions to the referees report are taken.2

Trial by commissioner is also governed by Rule 33 of the Revised Rules of Court.

3. Motion to dismiss.

The Land Registration Act does not provide for a pleading simi-lar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. However, where it shall become necessary for the expeditious termination of land registra-tion cases, it was held that such motion to dismiss as provided in the Rules of Court may be availed of by the parties in land registration proceedings under Rule 132 thereof.3

4. Dismissal without prejudice.

If in any case without adverse claimant the court nds that the applicant does not have title proper for registration, Section 37 of Act No. 496 permits that a decree be entered dismissing the application, which decree may be ordered to be without prejudice. The applicant may, if desired, withdraw his application at anytime before nal decree, upon terms to be xed by the court.

When a decision or decree dismissing the application is ordered to be without prejudice, it simply means that it is not a conclusive judgment and the principle of res judicata does not apply. In other words, the applicant is not precluded from ling later on another application for registration of the same property, the moment he can improve his position as, for instance, some additional evidence

2Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 140, and Land Registration Law, Sec. 36, cited; Kriedt v. McCullough & Co., 37 Phil. 474; Santos v. De Guzman and Martinez, 45 Phil. 643; Baltazar, et al. v. Limpin, et al., 49 Phil. 39. 3Duran v. Oliva, 113 Phil. 144.

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tending to establish or complete his title to the property has been found.

Accordingly, a renewal of an application for registration of the same parcel of land or an amendment thereto upon a ground different from that alleged in the previous application may only be allowed if the dismissal of the rst application was without prejudice and not when the ownership or title to the piece of land was litigated by the same parties and a judgment rendered for one party and against the other.4

While such dismissal without prejudice seems to be conditioned upon the absence of an adverse claimant, as may be seen in the original main provision of Section 37 of Act No. 496, which expressly speci es a case without adverse claimant, we believe, however, that with its amendment by Act No. 3621, particularly the inclusion of the proviso which states that in a case where there is an adverse claim, the court shall determine the con icting interests of the ap-plicant and the adverse claimant, and after taking evidence shall dismiss the application if neither of them succeeds in showing that he has proper title for registration, there seems to be no reason why dismissal without prejudice may not also be decreed where there is an adverse claimant. But, where an applicant led a motion for dismissal without prejudice over the objection of an oppositor, it was held that it is incumbent upon the court to determine the con icting interests between the applicant and the adverse claimant, and only in case neither succeeds to show by evidence that he has proper title for registration, may it order such dismissal.5

5. Requisite for reinstatement of case previously dismissed without prejudice.

The dismissal of the action at the request of the plaintiff, even without prejudice to his right to reinstate the same, becomes a nal decision after the expiration of the time within which an appeal may have been taken, and the cause cannot be reinstated without new notices and new citations to all of the persons interested. Such interpretation of Section 37 of Act No. 496 may work hardship upon

4Heirs of Marquez v. Valencia, 99 Phil. 740. 5Ng Sam Bok v. Director of Lands, 104 Phil. 965.

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the petitioner in a particular case. However, it is the safer rule to fol-low even at the cost of an occasional hardship, to adhere to the right principle.6

From the foregoing doctrine, it can be inferred that if a retrial which in a sense is also a form of reinstatement of the case should be sought before the order for dismissal has become nal or before the lapse of the period within which to appeal, the requisite of publica-tion of new notices and new citations to all persons interested may be dispensed with.

6. Courts with jurisdiction to hear land registration cases.

Originally, the Court of Land Registration created by Section 2 of Act No. 496 was conferred exclusive jurisdiction over all applica-tions for registration of title to land and buildings or interest therein, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications, and with jurisdiction over such other questions as may come before it under the Land Registration Act, subject, of course, to the right of appeal. By virtue, however, of Act No. 2347, the Court of Land Registration was abolished, and all the powers and jurisdic-tion theretofore conferred upon said Court were conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered is situated.

The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (formerly known as City Courts, Municipal Courts, and Municipal Circuit Court), may exercise del-egated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases upon being assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine such cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots the value of which does not exceed P20,000.00, such value to be ascertained by af davit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. The decisions in these cases may be appealed in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.7

6Matute v. Government, 28 Phil. 394. 7BP 129, Sec. 34.

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The jurisdiction of the municipal courts to try and determine cadastral and land registration cases is not an original and exclusive power but is merely delegated to them in proper cases by the Regional Trial Courts with the approval of the Supreme Court. When a mu-nicipal court is assigned to hear and determine a cadastral or land registration case, it sits in behalf of the Regional Trial Court making such assignment and acts like the latter court. For this reason, the appeal from the decisions of the municipal courts so acting should be directly taken to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the same manner as appeals are taken from the Regional Trial Court.8

The rule no longer holds that a regional trial court sitting as a land registration court has limited jurisdiction and has no authority to resolve controversial issues. The Regional Trial Court acting as land registration court now have exclusive jurisdiction not only over applications for original registration of title to lands but also over petitions led after original registration of title with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or peti-tions.9

Jurisdiction of courts over land cases.

In Omandan, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 128750, Jan. 18, 2001, the Supreme Court resolved the issue on the effect of the trial courts decision in a possessory action to the order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and decision of the DENR on the protest over the homestead patent. It said that Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Act, gives primarily to the Director of Lands and ultimately to Secretary of Agriculture (now Secretary of DENR) the authority to dispose and manage public lands. In this regard, courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of reg-istration issued by Director of Lands. Only the DENR Secretary can review on appeal such decree. In this case, the trial courts ruling that respondents title be cancelled, which is a reversal of the Director

8Vda. de Torio v. Mun. Ct. of Mayantoc, 67 O.G. June 7, 1971, CA; Templo v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-37393-94, Oct. 23, 1974; 71 O.G. 46, p. 7746, Nov. 1975; 60 SCRA 295. 9Philippine National Bank v. International Corporate Bank, 199 SCRA 508.


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of Lands award in favor of Lasola, was an error. The DENR under CA 141 had prior jurisdiction over the patent on the subject matter, which is the contested homestead area.

DENRs jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the au-thority of the courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public claimants. But once the DENR has decided, particularly with grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevail.

Therefore, the appellate court did not err in upholding the right of private respondents and in ordering the petitioners to vacate and surrender the land to said respondents.

Regional Trial Courts now have plenary Jurisdiction over land registration proceedings.

The Property Registration Decree provides that said courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications original for registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petition. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certi ed copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders and decisions led or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within ve days from the ling or issuance thereof (Sec. 2, par. 2, P.D. No. 1529). Regional Trial Courts therefore no longer have limited jurisdiction in original land registration cases (Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. vs. First Baptist Church, 152 SCRA 393), so that there is no more dis-tinction between its general jurisdiction and the limited jurisdiction conferred by the Land Registration Act. The reason for the change can be traced from the case of Averia vs. Caguioa, 146 SCRA 459, where it was held that the aforequoted Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law (Act 496) when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simpli ed registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions led after origi-

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nal registration title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.

Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but even the conten-tious and substantial issues x x x which were beyond its competence before. It has removed the principle that a land registration court has limited jurisdiction except where there was then unanimity among the parties or none of them raised any adverse claim or serious objection.

Rule before to P.D. No. 1529.

Even before the explicit grant of general and exclusive jurisdic-tion over original registration of title to lands and over petitions led after such original registration by P.D. No. 1529, the special and lim-ited jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts which did not extend to cases involving issues properly litigable in other independent suits or ordinary civil acts had time and again been relaxed by the Supreme Court. (Moscoso vs. CA, 128 SCRA 705; citing Florentino vs. Encar-nacion, 79 SCRA 193). Such exceptions were based not alone on the fact that the land registration courts are likewise the same Regional Trial Courts, but also under the following conditions: (1) the parties have mutually agreed or acquiesced in submitting the aforesaid issues for determination by the court in the registration proceedings; and (2) the parties have been given full opportunity in the presentation of their respective sides of the issues and of the evidence in support thereof; and the court has considered the evidence already of record and is convinced that the same is suf cient and adequate for render-ing a decision upon the issues. Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited jurisdiction was then held to be not in reality a jurisdictional question but a procedural question involving a mode of practice which may be waived. (Moscoso vs. CA, supra.; Zuniga vs. CA, 95 SCRA 740; Santos vs. Ganayo, 116 SCRA 431).

Delegated jurisdiction.

Section 34 of B.P. Blg. 129 (known as the Judiciary Reorganiza-tion Act of 1980) as amended by R.A. No. 7691, allows inferior courts,


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by way of delegated jurisdiction in certain cases, to hear and deter-mine cadastral or land registration cases. The provision states:

Sec. 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land reg-istration cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots, the value of which does not exceed one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the af davit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their deci-sions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.

Pursuant to the said law, the Supreme Court issued Administra-tive Circular No. 6-93-A dated November 15, 1995 authorizing the inferior courts to hear and decide the cadastral or land registration cases mentioned in the aforequoted law.

In International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines vs. University of the Philippines, 200 SCRA 554, the Supreme Court held that pursuant to R.A. 3990, which establishes a central experiment station for the use of the UP in connection with its research and ex-tension functions, particularly by the College of Agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and Sciences, the above reserved area was ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any existing concessions, if any. When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof.

UP may validly apply for registration of its title to the land ceded to it by the law. Other persons or entities to whom a land might have been similarly ceded by the Republic of the Philippines by law may thus also properly apply for registration of title thereto.

A public land sales applicant is not a proper party to le for registration of the same land covered by his sales application. By l-

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ing such application, he acknowledges that he is not the owner of the land and that the same is public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands. He perforce could not claim holding the land under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership. (Palawan Agricultural and Industrial Co., Inc. vs. Director of Lands, 44 SCRA 15).

However, an applicant is not barred from pursuing his applica-tion although his predecessor-in-interest was a free patent applicant if the latter, at the time he led such public land application, had already acquired an imperfect title through continuous 30-year pos-session in the concept of an owner. (Director of Land Management vs. CA, 205 SCRA 486).

A mortgagee, or his successor-in-interest to the mortgage, can-not apply for the registration of the land mortgaged, notwithstand-ing lapse of the period for the mortgagor to pay the loan secured or redeem it. Such failure to redeem the property does not automatically vest ownership of the property to the mortgagee, which would grant the latter the right to appropriate the thing mortgaged or dispose of it. If the mortgagee registers the property in his own name upon the mortgagors failure to redeem it, such act would amount to a pactum commissorium which is against good morals and public policy. (Reyes vs. Sierra, 93 SCRA 472).

An anticheretic creditor cannot also acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor. His possession is not in the concept of owner but mere holder placed in possession of the land by its owners. Such possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring dominion. (Ramirez vs. CA, 144 SCRA 292).

A person or entity whose claim of ownership to land had been previously denied in a reinvindicatory action, and the right of own-ership thereto of another upheld by the courts, cannot apply for the same land in a registration proceedings. Kipdales vs. Baguio Min-ing Co., 14 SCRA 913, the Supreme Court held that if the former cases were reinvindicatory in character and the pending ones are land registration proceedings, such difference in forms of action are irrelevant for the purpose of res judicata. It is a rmly established rule that a different remedy sought or a diverse form of action does not prevent the estoppel of the former adjudication. x x x Since there can be no registration of land without applicant being its owner, the nal judgment of the Court of Appeals in the previous litigation


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declaring that the mining companys title is superior to that of the applicants shall be conclusive on the question in the present case. The Court also ruled that the vesting of title to the lands in question in the appellee Baguio Mining Company has effectively interrupted and rendered discontinuous the possession claimed by applicants.

Land titles; as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public document.

Article 749 of the Civil Code provides inter alia that in order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that the titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons. From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be contained in a public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effec-tive. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry of Property now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds. Although the non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third person are affected, as in the case at bar. (Gonzales, et al. vs. CA, et al., 358 SCRA 598).

It is actually the act of registration that operates to convey registered land or affect title thereto. Thus, Section 50 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), provides: Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, . . . Further, it is an entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that registration in a public

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registry creates constructive notice to the whole world. (Dizon vs. CA, 236 SCRA 148).

Land registration under P.D. 1529.

Land registration courts can now hear and decide even controver-sial and contentious cases.

A petition for the surrender of the owners duplicate certi cate involves contentious questions which should be threshed out in an ordinary case, because the land registration court has no jurisdiction to try them. Presidential Decree 1529, however, intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious termination of cases. The decree had eliminated the distinction between general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the latters limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even contro-versial and contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues.

That court now has the authority to act not only on applica-tions for original registration, but also on all petitions led after the original registration of title. Coupled with this authority is the power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Especially where the issue of ownership is ineluctably tied up with the question of registration, the land registration court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction.

It is equally important to consider that a land registration courts decision ordering the con rmation and the registration of title, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds the whole world. Thus, the trial courts ruling consolidating the ownership and the title of the property in the name of herein respondent is valid and binding not only on petitioners, but also on everyone else who may have any claim thereon.

Jurisdiction of Land Registration Court.

P.D. No. 1529 has eliminated the distinction between general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and latters jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court. Indeed, in several cases, it has been held that a petition for the surrender of the owners duplicate


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certi cate involves contentious questions which should be threshed out in an ordinary case, because the land registration court has no jurisdiction to try them. Presidential Decree No. 1529, however, in-tended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the expeditious termination of cases. In more recent cases, therefore, the Supreme Court declared that this Decree had eliminated the distinction be-tween general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the latters limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving sub-stantial issues. (Talusan, et al. vs. Tayag, et al., 356 SCRA 263).

Thus, it cannot be contended that the RTC is, in a land regis-tration case, barred from ruling on the validity of the auction sale. That court now has the authority to act not only on applications for original registration, but also on all petitions led after the original registration of title. Coupled with this authority is the power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or peti-tions. Especially where the issue of ownership is ineluctably tied up with the question or registration, the land registration court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction. (Talusan, et al. vs. Tayag, et al., supra.).

7. Extent in exercise of jurisdiction.

The procedure in the Court of Land Registration (now Regional Trial Courts) runs not only against the respondent but against the world; and the court deals not so much with the relative rights of the applicant and the respondent, as with the absolute rights of the applicant against the world, manifested by the indefeasibility of the title when registered. The court cannot permit a faulty title to be registered simply because it happens to be better than a still more faulty one presented by the respondent.10

8. Inherent power of State to adjudicate title.

The State has control over the real property within its limits. The condition of ownership of real estate within the State, whether the owner be a stranger or a citizen, is subject to its rules concerning

10City of Manila v. Lack, 19 Phil. 324.

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the holding, transfer, liability to obligations, private or public, and the modes of establishing title thereto, and for the purpose of determining these questions, it (the State) may provide any reasonable rules of procedure. The State possesses not only the right to determine how title to real estate may be acquired and proved, but it is also within its legislative capacity to establish the method of procedure. The State, as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem or in the nature of proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all persons known or unknown.11

However, the land registration court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable property, such as a navigable river which is part of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title thereof in favor of a private applicant. Thus, where it has been so adjudged, the river not being capable of private appropriation or acquisition by prescription, the title thereto may be attacked, either directly or collaterally, by the state which is not bound by any pre-scriptive period provided by the Statute of Limitation.12

9. Rules of procedure in registration cases.

A land registration proceeding is one which is undoubtedly in rem, in character; the default order issued by the court was entered against the whole world, except as against those who have appeared and led their pleadings in the registration case.13

While land registration is a proceeding in rem and binds the whole world, the single possession of a certi cate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily make the holder a true owner of all the property described therein.

Being in the nature of a proceeding in rem, a registration pro-ceeding somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree of registration. In one sense, there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant. In another sense, the Government, in the case of a cadastral proceeding, or the applicant, in the case of an

11Roxas v. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31. 12Martinez v. Ct. of App., G.R. No. L-31271, Apr. 29, 1974; 70 O.G. 7141, Aug. 1, 1974; 56 SCRA 647. 13Cachero v. Marzan, 196 SCRA 601.


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ordinary registration proceeding, is the plaintiff, while all the other claimants or oppositors are defendants. In accordance with Section 2 of the Land Registration Act, the Court of Land Registration, before it was abolished, was authorized to make from time to time general rules and forms for procedure, conforming as nearly as may be to the practice in special proceedings in regional trial courts, but subject to the express provisions of this Act and of general laws. In effect, therefore, the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence govern registration proceedings, subject to some recognized exceptions. Thus, the judge, for special reasons, may change the order of the trial, and for good reason, in the furtherance of justice, may permit the parties to offer evidence upon their original case.

The reason for the exceptions is made stronger when one con-siders the character of registration proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are involved, and action is taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not always be expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formulae, an opportunity should be given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims of title, if the ends of justice so require.14

In land registration proceedings, the formal presentation of evi-dence (Sec. 35, Rule 132) may be dispensed with when the documents, spread in the record, have been identi ed, marked, and subjected to cross-examination.15

10. Proceedings for ordinary registration under Land Registration Act and for judicial con rmation of imperfect title under Public Land Act, distinguished.

The proceedings under both laws are the same in that they are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceed-ings and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and nal.

The main differences between them, however, are that: (1) Under the Land Registration Act, there exists already a title which

14Rodriguez v. Director of Lands, 31 Phil. 272; Government v. Abural, 39 Phil. 996; Director of Lands v. Roman Cath. Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120. 15Adia, et al. v. Salas, 71 O.G. 49, Dec. 8, 1975, CA, citing People v. Roxas, 6 SCRA 666, Nov. 29, 1962, and People v. Tanjutco, 23 SCRA 361, Apr. 29, 1968.

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is to be con rmed by the court; whereas, under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for belongs to the State, and the occupants and possessors claim an interest only in the same by virtue of their perfected title or continuous, open and notorious possession; (2) Under the Land Registration Act, the court may dismiss the application with or without prejudice to the right to le a new application for the same land; whereas, under the Public Land Act, while the court has jurisdiction or power to adjudicate the land in favor of any of the con icting claimants, it cannot however dismiss the application without prejudice or permit a new application to be led for the same land; (3) Under the Land Registration Act, the ordinary risk that an applicant runs is to have his application denied without losing his land, assuming that there was no oppositor who could establish in his favor title proper for registration; whereas, under the Public Land Act, if the applicant fails, even if there was no oppositor, he runs the risk of losing the land applied for as it will be declared land of the public domain and the decision to that effect becomes res judicata.16

11. Evidence necessary to prove title.

An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title thereto must prove not only the genuineness of said title but also the identity of the land therein referred to.17

In land registration cases, the burden of proof is upon the appli-cant to show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple.18

Ownership in fee simple may be proven with the presentation of documentary evidence which may be in the form of a chain of titles derived from an old Spanish grant, such as a royal grant (titulo real), special grant (concession especial), adjustment title (composicion con el estado) and title by purchase (titulo de compra).

Possessory information title (titulo possesorio), though not a fee simple title, is a prima facie evidence of the fact that the possessor of the land to which it refers is the owner thereof. However, it was held that, according to paragraph 3 of Section 19 of Act No. 496, as

16Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850. 17Republic Cement Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 734. 18Republic v. Lee, 197 SCRA 93.


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amended, a possessory information is not suf cient to confer title susceptible of registration. In addition to it, it is required that the applicant be the owner of the property or that he has been in actual possession thereof for the period required by law. When it appears that the applicants has not been in open and continuous possession under a bona de claim of ownership of the land he seeks to register, he cannot successfully invoke the bene ts afforded by paragraph (6) of Section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of Section 45 of Act No. 2874. In accordance with the provisions of Article 393 of the Mortgage Law, the possessory information could not ripen into a record of ownership if the applicant did not remain in open pos-session of the land, did not comply with the proceedings prescribed by law, and, lastly, did not secure nal registration of his alleged ownership.19

Of course, it is to be borne in mind that under Presidential Decree No. 892 holders of Spanish titles or grants can no longer invoke the same as a basis of ownership for the purposes of apply-ing for registration under Act 496, six months after February 16, 1976. However, if it is not intended to prove ownership but only to show that the land covered by a Spanish title, such as a possessory information title, is no longer public land but private property and as such is not available for a public grant under the Public Land Law, all that may be needed is to establish the validity of the possessory information and produce its effect as title of ownership by showing the fact that such possessory information title was duly registered within the non-extendible period of one year from April 17,1894 until April 17, 1895, as provided in the Maura Law or the Royal Decree of February 13,1894. Only in default of such timely registration may the land revert to the State as part of the public domain.20

Another proof that may be shown to substantiate ones title is a tax deed. But it is not considered absolute or fee simple, particularly under the Philippine law. It was held that proceedings for the sale of land for non-payment of taxes are in personam, and a purchaser

19Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Municipality of Bantay, 28 Phil. 347; Querol and Flores v. Querol, 48 Phil. 90; Government v. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil. 373; Fernandez Hermanos v. Director of Lands, 57 Phil. 929. 20Balbin, et al. v. Medalla, et al., G.R. No. L-46410, Oct. 30, 1981; 108 SCRA 666.

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of a tax title takes all the chances in the sense that the tax title does not give the claimant a new perfect title but only a derivative title of the apparent interest of the tax delinquent. It would therefore be necessary to present further evidence to establish title to the tract of land formerly in the possession of the tax delinquent, before title to it can be obtained.21 While failure to declare land for taxation may be taken to mean that the claimant did not believe himself the owner,22 yet neither tax receipts nor realty tax declarations are suf cient evi-dence of the right of possession over the realty unless supported by other effective proof.23 Tax receipts are not evidence of title to land, unsupported by other proper proof.24

While tax declarations and tax receipts showing payment of taxes are not conclusive evidence of ownership,25 yet when they are coupled with open, adverse, and continuous possession in the concept of owner, such documents constitute evidence of great weight in sup-port of the claim of ownership. They constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property.26 However, the failure of the vendee to declare property in his name does not militate against his acquiring title thereto. Experience has shown that common people do not generally attend to the transfer of tax declarations in their names even in cases where they acquired the property through purchase.27

Ownership may also be proven by an applicant who seeks judi-cial con rmation of imperfect and incomplete title, upon meeting any of the following requirements of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 1942 and 6236, to wit:

a) Those who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, have applied for the purchase, com-position, or other form of grant of lands of the public domain

21Government v. Adriano, 41 Phil. 112. 22Cruzado v. Bustos and Escaler, 34 Phil. 17. 23Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384. 24Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607. 25Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 38. 26Alzate v. Cidro, 67 O.G. 23, June 7, 1971, CA; Director of Lands v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-27594, Nov. 28, 1975; 68 SCRA 177, and Feb. 27, 1976; 69 SCRA 415; 72 O.G. 15, April 12, 1976; Masaganda v. Argamosa, G.R. No. L-37442, Nov. 9, 1981; 109 SCRA 53. 27Pechon v. Gerolinga, 67 O.G. 17, April 26, 1971, CA.


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under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have insti-tuted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have, with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the ling of their applications. (Repealed by PD 1073).

(b) Those who, by themselves or through their predeces-sors in interests, have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preced-ing the ling of the application for con rmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclu-sively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certi cate of title under the provisions hereof. (Amended by PD 1073).

Thus, any occupant of a public agricultural land, who is a citizen of the Philippines, is entitled to have a certi cate of title issued to him therefor upon proving open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof since July 26, 1894, or as later re-quired by law for at least thirty years but to be since June 12, 1945, or earlier.28 However, this being a mere privilege granted by the State, it may be taken advantage of only up to December 31, 1987, the deadline xed by Presidential Decree No. 1073, unless further extended by subsequent legislation. This grace period was conceived to promote social justice by giving land to the landless and to favor actual occupants of lands who, because of the harsh technicalities of the law, could otherwise never acquire title to land they always believed and knew to be their own. The legislative intent was to be lenient and liberal in the con rmation of land titles.

Where it appears that the evidence of ownership and posses-sion adduced by an applicant in a land registration proceeding are so signi cant and convincing, the government is not necessarily relieved of its duty from presenting proofs to show that the land sought to be

28Republic Act 1942; PD 1073; PD 1529, Sec. 14.

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registered is part of the public domain, to enable the courts to evalu-ate the evidence of both sides.29

So, also, where a parcel of land the registration of title to which is applied for has been possessed and cultivated by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest for a considerable number of years without the government taking any action to dislodge the occupants from their holdings and where the land has passed from one hand to another by inheritance or by purchase, the burden is upon the gov-ernment to prove that the land which it avers to be of public domain is really of such nature.30

The bare statement of the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessors-in-interest for more than 20 years, does not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible and conclusive evidence required in land registration.31

Incidentally, it is important to note that the general rule that the nding of fact of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court, admits of certain exceptions, and an illustration of one of them is where the facts and circumstances in the record render untenable that the land in question constitutes an accretion to a private shpond, when in fact it is man-made and arti cial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedi-mentation by the waters of the rivers.32

Nature of the requirement to submit original tracing cloth.

The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. (Director of Lands vs. IAC, 219 SCRA 33). The reason for this rule is to estab-lish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped

29Sinsuat v. Director of Lands, 56 O.G. 42, Oct. 17, 1960, CA. 30Raymundo v. Diaz, et al., 58 O.G. 37, Sept. 10, 1962, CA. 31Republic v. Lee, 197 SCRA 13. 32RP v. Ct. of App., et al., G.R. No. L-61647, Oct. 12, 1984; 132 SCRA 514.


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by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. (Director of Lands vs. CA, 158 SCRA 568). The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioners application for registration. (Angel del Rosario vs. Republic, G.R. No. 148338, June 6, 2002).

The contention that the same was submitted to the branch clerk of court, but the latter submitted the same to the LRA has no merit. Petitioner is duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Isabel Tesalosa, 236 SCRA 336). The Court of Appeals appropriately quoted from the Supreme Courts decision in Director of Lands vs. IAC, 214 SCRA 604, in which it was similarly claimed that applicant failed to present the tracing cloth plan of the land applied for because it had been forwarded to the Land Registration Authority. Rejecting the contention, the Supreme Court, through Justice Nocon, held that it is undisputed that the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in evidence by respondent, which omission is fatal to his application. The submis-sion of the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character.

Respondents counsel on the other hand contends that he sub-mitted the original tracing cloth plan, together with other documents, to the Clerk of Court when he led the application. The application and supporting documents were then elevated to the Land Registra-tion Commission (now the National Land Titles and Deeds Registra-tion Administration) for approval of the survey plan by the Director of Lands. Respondent argues the fact that the Commissioner of Land Registration issued a Notice of Initial Hearing would indicate that respondent had submitted all the pertinent documents relative to his application.

This argument had already been disposed of in Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, wherein the Supreme Court held:

Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-sub-mission of the original tracing cloth plan by claiming that the same must be with the Land Registration Commission which checked or veri ed the survey plan and the technical description thereof. It is not the function of the LRC to check the original survey plan as it had no authority to approve original survey plans. If, for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan was for-

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warded there, the applicant may easily retrieve the same there-from and submit the same in evidence. This was not done.

Respondent further contends that petitioner failed to object to the blue print copy of the survey plan when the same was offered in evidence, thereby waiving the objection to said evidence.

Rule 1, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and conven-ient.

Neither does the advance survey plan, which was attached to petitioners application and marked in evidence, suf ce to comply with the requirement of the law. Although in one case (Republic vs. CA, 167 SCRA 150), it was ruled that a mere blueprint copy of the cloth plan, together with the lots technical description, was suf cient to identify the land applied for registration, both the blueprint copy and the technical description were certi ed as to their correctness by the Director of Lands. In this case, what was marked in evidence, the advance survey plan and the technical description, lacked the necessary certi cation from the Bureau of Lands.

The prayer that the trial court proceedings be reopened in order for him to be able to present in evidence either the original tracing cloth plan or the sepia copy (Diazon Polyester Film) in lieu thereof pursuant to the NALDTRA (LRC) Circular No. 66 dated may 2, 1985, does not hold water. He contends that the original tracing cloth plan or the sepia copy thereof may be considered as newly discovered evidence which, when admitted in evidence, may alter the result of the case.

That cannot be done. For evidence to be admitted under Rule 53, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the same must comply with the following requisites: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is ma-terial, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight, that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. In


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this, the original tracing cloth plan could not be considered as newly discovered evidence since it was already available upon the ling of the application for registration. Although it could not be produced during the trial because it was still in the custody of the LRA at that time, it was his failure to exercise reasonable diligence in producing the same that accounts for its non-presentation in evidence. With regard to the sepia copy of the cloth plan, it is apparent that the prayer to allow its presentation is a mere afterthought because it was never offered in evidence during the trial and petitioner had already turned over his original tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court for submission to the LRA. He should have submitted in evidence the sepia copy duly approved by the Bureau of Lands in lieu of the original tracing cloth plan while the case was still on trial, and not now as he belatedly offers it on appeal.

In Director of Lands vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 65663, Oct. 16, 1992, the Supreme Court emphasized the requirement and ruled that the submission of the tracing cloth plan is a mandatory requirement for registration. They said in Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 that the failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is fatal, it being a statutory requirement of mandatory character. In Director of Lands vs. IAC, 219 SCRA 339, it was said that it is of no import that petitioner failed to object to the presentation of the certi ed copy of the said plan. What is required is the original tracing cloth plan of the land

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