PRINCIPLES INCLUDED IN LIGHTNING RISK ANALYSIS...SANS/IEC 62305-2, Edition 2, “Protection Against Lightning, Part 2: Risk Management”, (2011 / 2010). NB: Introduce a LPS to mitigate

PRINCIPLES INCLUDED IN LIGHTNING

RISK ANALYSIS

Marlenique Estate, Paarl

South Africa

14 August 2019

Pieter H Pretorius, PhD

1

Objective: Highlight some challenges specific to PV

installations and lightning protection.

Title: Principles Included in Lightning Risk Analysis.

Synonyms-“Principles”: philosophies

opinions

standards

norms

2

OUTLINE

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Introduction / outline.

Risk management (What is risk and what do we want to

achieve?)

Risk assessment process (IEC 62305-2 versus Classic)

Specific aspects: Engineering - Design - Construction

Concluding Remarks

3

OUTLINE

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SANS / IEC 62305 Standard – Protection Against Lightning

67 pages 84 pages 156 pages 87 pages

Comprehensive standard - 394 pages

4

OUTLINE

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Context – large utility scale PV plant

Principles apply to any PV installation.

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OUTLINE

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Type: Flat panel PV

Units operational: 277 632

Capacity: 75 MWp; 64 MWAC

Ref: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lesedi_Solar_Park, Last Accessed 1 Aug 2019.

What is risk?

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RISK MANAGEMENT

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• Risk (R): The value of probable average annual loss (humans and goods)

due to lightning, relative to the total value (humans and goods) of the

structure to be protected;

SANS/IEC 62305-2, Edition 2, “Protection Against Lightning, Part 2: Risk

Management”, (2011 / 2010).

Ref: SANS/IEC 62305-2, Edition 2, “Protection Against Lightning, Part 2: Risk Management”, (2011 / 2010).

P H Pretorius, Lightning Risk Considerations Related to Wire-Line Technology Applied in Large Utility Scale PV Plant, Paper Submitted forpresentation at the 9th CIGRE Southern Africa Regional Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, 1 – 4 October 2019.

What is risk?

7

RISK MANAGEMENT

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P H Pretorius, Lightning Risk Considerations Related to Wire-Line Technology Applied in Large Utility Scale PV Plant, Paper Submitted forpresentation at the 9th CIGRE Southern Africa Regional Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, 1 – 4 October 2019.


Management”, (2011 / 2010).

General equation

RX = NX x PX x LX

where

NX is the number of dangerous events per annum;

PX is the probability of damage to a structure;

LX is the consequent loss.

Equation applies to each risk component RA, RB, RC, RM, RU, RV, RW and RZ

What is risk?

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RISK MANAGEMENT

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For each type of loss that may occur, the relevant risk is evaluated in

accordance with SANS / IEC 62305-2. Risks to be evaluated for typical

structure:

o R1 - Risk of loss of human life (including permanent injury);

o R2 - Risk of loss of service to the public;

o R3 - Risk of loss of cultural heritage;

o R4 - Risk of loss of economic value;

With R1 and R4 more relevant in the context of large, utility scale PV plant.


Management”, (2011 / 2010).

What is risk?

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RISK MANAGEMENT

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• Risk Component (RX): The partial risk depending on the source and

the type of damage;

To evaluate the risk, R, “the relevant risk components (partial risks

depending on the source and type of damage) shall be defined and

calculated.

R, is the sum of risk components. When calculating a risk, the risk

components may be grouped according to the source of damage and the

type of damage”.


Management”, (2011 / 2010).

NB: In terms of coupling modes!

Risk components a function of source and type of damage

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RISK MANAGEMENT

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RX = NX x PX x LX

Note: RA and RB for flow chart later.

Note: RU and RV for flow chart later.

LEMP

all electromagnetic effects of lightning current via

resistive, inductive and capacitive coupling,

which create surges and electromagnetic fields

Number of dangerous events:

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Management”, (2011 / 2010).

RX = NX x PX x LX

The number NX of dangerous events – function of:

• Lightning ground flash density;

• Physical characteristics of the structure to be protected;

• Surroundings of the structure;

• Connected lines;

• Soil resistivity.

Lightning flash density

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Lightning flash density

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• Is the risk for lightning damage in southern parts of Namibia lower / higher

compared to Northern Cape?

R = N x P x L

Soil resistivity

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Lightning collection area

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RISK MANAGEMENT

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Source of image: Furse

• Direct strikes to / near the structure.

• Direct strikes to / near the service lines.

Probability of damage:

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RISK MANAGEMENT

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Management”, (2011 / 2010).

RX = NX x PX x LX

The probability of damage PX – function of:

• Characteristics of the structure;

• Connected lines;

• Protection measures provided;

• Technology employed.

Risk Management Process – SANS / IEC 62305-2

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RISK MANAGEMENT

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Every risk component describes a certain threat to lightning (danger) and a

potential loss.

The loss resulting from lightning is defined as:

• L1 = Loss of human life

• L2 = Loss of service to the public

• L3 = Loss of cultural heritage

• L4 = Loss of economic value

RX = NX x PX x LX

Consequent Loss:

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RX = NX x PX x LX

The consequent loss LX – function of:

• Use assigned to the structure;

• Attendance of personnel or public;

• Type of service provided to public;

• Value of goods affected by damage;

• Measures provided to limit the amount of loss.


Management”, (2011 / 2010).

Part of standard that provides information on:

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Management”, (2011 / 2010).

RX = NX x PX x LX

Annex A – Annual

number of

dangerous events

Annex B –

Probability of

damage

Annex C – Amount

of Loss

Annex E – Case

study


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To assess each risk component, the structure is typically divided into zones ZS with

each zone having homogeneous characteristics.

(Note: A structure may be selected to form a single zone).

Zones ZS are mainly defined by:

• The type of soil or of floor / floor covering (RA and RU);

• Fireproof compartments (RB and RV) ;

• Spatial shields (RC and RM).

RA: Electric shock to living beings due to step and touch potentials (inside and outside of the structure up to 3 m).

RB: Fire and explosion effects inside the structure due to and including sparking;

RC: Component failure due to LEMP on internal installations and incoming services.

RM: Failure of electrical and electronic systems due to LEMP on internal installations.

RU: Injuries of living beings caused by touch voltage inside the structure due to lightning current injected into a line entering the structure.

RV: Fire effects inside the structure due to mechanical and thermal effects including dangerous sparking between incoming lines and metal

parts of installations.


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Further, zones may also be defined according to

• Layout of internal systems (RC and RM),

• Protection measures existing or to be installed (applies to all risk components),

• Loss LX values (applies to all risk components).

Partitioning of the structure into zones (ZS) should take into account the feasibility

of the implementation of the most suitable protection measures.

RC: Component failure due to LEMP on internal installations and incoming services.

RM: Failure of electrical and electronic systems due to LEMP on internal installations.

How much risk can be tolerated?

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• Tolerable risk (RT): The maximum value of the risk which can be

tolerated with the structure protected;

Ref: https://www.encyclopedia.com/computing/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/tolerable-risk, Last Accessed 1 Aug 2019.


Management”, (2011 / 2010).

NB: Introduce a LPS to mitigate the risk – not to eliminate risk!

Objective is to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.

(A level of risk deemed acceptable by society in order that some

particular benefit or functionality can be obtained, but in the knowledge

that the risk has been evaluated and is being managed).

Since zero risk is completely unachievable, most regulators defines

what is called the “Tolerable risk” (or “Acceptable risk”).

LPL Efficiency: 98% 95% 86% 79%

r = 20 m 30 m 45 m 60 m

How much risk can be tolerated?

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SANS / IEC 62305-1:

NB: LPS mitigate the risk – does not eliminate risk!

What do we want to achieve? Principle:

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ALARP - "as low as reasonably practicable”

ALARA - "as low as reasonably achievable”

are terms often used in the regulation and management of safety-critical and

safety-involved systems.

The ALARP principle requires that the residual risk shall be reduced as far as

reasonably practicable.

The residual risk is the amount of risk or danger associated with an action or

event remaining after natural or inherent risks have been reduced by risk

controls.

Ref: https://www.encyclopedia.com/computing/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/tolerable-risk, Last Accessed 1 Aug 2019.

ALARP Principle widely applied in various industries.

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Ref: European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA/OP/10/2013), Risk Acceptance Criteria and Risk Based Damage Stability, Final Report - Part 1: Risk

Acceptance Criteria, Report No 2015-0165, Rev 1, Document No.: 18KJ9LI-47, 24 Feb 2015.

Individual Risk Criteria

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RISK MANAGEMENT

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NB: Can apply to

individual components

at specific locations in

plant.

LSIR – Location specific individual risk

Criteria Used by US Federal Regulatory Agencies

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NB: Can apply to systems in plant.

Ref: Eric Marsden, Risk acceptability and tolerability, https://risk-engineering.org/risk-acceptability-tolerability/, Last Accessed 1 Aug 2019.

Risk Criteria - Approach

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RISK MANAGEMENT

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Tolerable risk – SANS / IEC 62305-2

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Loss

L1

L2

L3

L4

RT per Year

1 x 10-5

1 x 10-3

1 x 10-4

(See cost benefit analysis)

o L1 - Loss of a human life (including permanent injury);

o L2 - Loss of service to the public;

o L3 - Loss of cultural heritage;

o L4 - Loss of economic value (if not otherwise defined – see Cost Benefit Analysis);

Cost Benefit Criteria

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• Cost-benefit criteria - defining the acceptable cost of risk reduction measures

in a cost-benefit analysis.

• Although these do not evaluate the significance of risks directly, and hence are

not strictly risk criteria at all, they do evaluate the need for risk reduction, and

are closely connected to risk criteria.



NB: - In view of contractual agreements.

- Economies of scale.

Cost Benefit Criteria

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RISK MANAGEMENT

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Ref: https://www.popularmechanics.co.za/tech/karoos-kalkbult-solar-pv-plant-could-power-up-to-33-000-homes/, Last Accessed 12 Aug 2019.

NB: - Economies of scale.

Kalkbult PV Plant (Northern Cape):

• 75 MW plant - Fixed tilt;

• 312 000 solar panels;

• 105 hectares (1024,7 m x 1024,7 m);

• 1 800 km of cabling connecting all the panels,

inverters and transformers to the high-voltage

substation;

Deduce:

• Approx 42 Inverter Stations (From image);

• Scada could be in tens of 1000’s of km cable;

• Combiner boxes / (Tracker units with tilt control) /

Earth conductors / SPDs ?

Cost Benefit Criteria – SANS / IEC 62305-2

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Evaluation of Cost of Loss Includes Reflection on Annual Saving in Cost

Without protection measures;

With protection measures;

No Parameter Calculated From Description

1 CLZ CLZ = R4Z x ct Cost of loss in a zone

2 R4Z The risk related to loss of value in the zone, without protection measures

3 ct The total value of the structure (animals, building, content and internal systems including their activities in currency)

4 CL CL = ∑ CLZ = R4 x ct The cost of total loss in the structure

5 R4 R4 = ∑ R4Z The risk related to loss of value, without protection measures

6 CRLZ CRLZ = R'4Z x ct The cost of residual loss in a zone in spite of protection measures

7 R'4Z The risk related to loss of value in the zone, with protection measures

8 CRL CRL = ∑ CRLZ = R'4 x ct The total cost of residual loss in the structure in spite of protection measures

9 R'4 R'4 = ∑ R'4Z The risk related to loss of value in the structure, with protection measures

10 CPM CPM = CP x (i + a + m) The annual cost of protection measures

11 CP The cost of protection measures;

12 i The interest rate;

13 a The amortization rate;

14 m The maintenance rate.

15 SM SM = CL - (CPM + CRL) The annual saving in money

16 SM ≥ 0 Protection is justified if the annual saving in money is equal or more than the annual saving in money

SM = CL – (CPM + CRL)

Saving = Cost of Loss – (Cost of Protection + Cost of Residual Loss (damage))


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Ref: SANS/IEC 62305-2, Edition 2, “Protection Against Lightning, Part 2:Risk Management”, (2011 / 2010).

RA: Electric shock to living beings due to step and touch

potentials (inside and outside of the structure up to 3 m);

RB: Fire and explosion effects inside the structure due to and

including sparking;

If RA + RB < RT, a complete LPS is not necessary; In this case

SPDs according to IEC 62305-3 are sufficient.

Identify structure to be

protected

Identify type of loss

relevant to structure

For each type of loss, calculate the risk components

(RA, RB, RC, RM, RV, RU, RW, RZ)

R > RT Structure protected

Introduce protection

No

Yes

LPS Installed?Yes

SPM Installed?Yes

Calculate new values of

risk components

No No

RA + RB + RU

+ RV > RT

No

Yes

Install adequate type LPS Install adequate type SPMInstall other protection

measures

RU: Injuries of living beings caused by touch voltage inside the

structure due to lightning current injected into a line entering

the structure;

RV: Fire effects inside the structure due to mechanical and

thermal effects including dangerous sparking between

incoming lines and metal parts of installations;

Risk Management Process – Classic Approach

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Ref: Eric Marsden, Risk acceptability and tolerability, https://risk-engineering.org/risk-acceptability-tolerability/, Last Accessed 1 Aug 2019.

Risk assessment process

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RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

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Proposed - based on the risk assessment process for risk quantification and risk

management in renewable energy projects as applied by Michelez, et al, (2011).

The risk management process is based on the classical risk assessment process

that involves:

• The development of a risk register;

• Quantification of the risk level based on probability and impact using the scale

noted by Michelez, et al, (2011);

• Development of a qualitative risk evaluation matrix that reflects the original risk;

• Identification of the mitigation options;

• Development of a qualitative risk evaluation matrix that reflects the mitigated

risk;

Ref: P H Pretorius, Lightning Risk Considerations Related to Wire-Line Technology Applied in Large Utility Scale PV Plant, Paper Submitted for

presentation at the 9th CIGRE Southern Africa Regional Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, 1 – 4 October 2019.

J Michelez, N Rossi, R Blazquez, J M Martin, E Mera, D Christensen, C Peineke, K Graf, D Lyon, G Stevens, “Risk Quantification and Risk

Management in Renewable Energy Projects”, (Report Commissioned by IEA – Renewable Energy Technology Deployment, Altran GmbH & Co, KGKonstantin Graf, 14 Jun 2011).

Risk register

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The Risk Register:

• Includes a list of the lightning risk to different systems or components of the

plant.

• From this follows a risk quantification (Original Risk – without Mitigation) done

to compile the risk quantification matrix.





Risk quantification - risk levels and scale [Michelez, et al, (2011)]

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Risk quantification matrix

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P H Pretorius, Lightning Risk Assessment Beyond the Ordinary – Application to Renewable Plant, Inaugural Earthing Africa 2017 Symposium and

Exhibition, Thaba Eco Hotel, Johannesburg, 5 – 9 Jun 2017.

Depending on impact and probability of occurrence, the risk quantification matrix to

reflect where particular risk will fall.

Example: single risk (A) (original, without mitigation) shown – Objective to lower the

risk from “Intolerable” to ideally “Acceptable”, as illustrated.


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BEFORE MITIGATION

EXAMPLE FOR

ILLUSTRATION ONLY

(Monte Carlo or

measured data).

EXAMPLE FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY


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FOLLOWING MITIGATION

EXAMPLE FOR

ILLUSTRATION ONLY

(Monte Carlo or

measured data).

EXAMPLE FOR ILLUSTRATION ONLY

• Reduced 10%

(mitigation)

Engineering – Where to start ?

• User Requirement Specification (URS);

• Lightning risk assessment (vary widely – 2006 Edition still

in use!);

41

ENGINEERING - DESIGN - CONSTRUCTION

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Design – Experienced designer

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Specific Note from IEC 62305: The following is noted from IEC 62305-3:

“The lightning protection designer and installer should be trained in the proper

design and installation of the LPS components in accordance with the

requirements of this standard and the national rules regulating construction

work and the building of structures”.

Implies that standard is written such that the LPS designer will understand the

aspects covered / not covered and implications thereof.

Implication: Possible underestimation of risk.

Design – Limitations of standards (1)

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• It is specifically noted from IEC 62305-4 that:

“The scope of this part of IEC 62305 deals with the protection of equipment

within structures and not protection of interconnected structures to which

isolation transformers may provide some benefit”.

Limitation: Large earth electrode embedded in high soil resistivity soil, with

wireline technology, will behave as if it is an interconnected structure as a

result of lightning GPR.

Implication: IEC 62305 has limited application to lightning protection of wire-

line technology accompanied by large electrodes, such as that applied in

open field photovoltaic (PV) plants because of the potential equipment threat

presented by lightning GPR.

Ref: P H Pretorius, Lightning Risk Considerations Related to Wire-Line Technology Applied in Large Utility Scale PV Plant, Paper Submitted forpresentation at the 9th CIGRE Southern Africa Regional Conference, Johannesburg, South Africa, 1 – 4 October 2019.

Implication: Underestimation of risk.

Design – Lightning GPR – Electrode Behaviour

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Potential (V)

Distance from Strike Point (m)

Potential function of soil resistivity, electrode material & geometry / mesh density.

Design – Lightning GPR – Loss of Equipotential

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5 / 20 µs

100 Ω.m

100 m x 100 m

Time Domain


46


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5 / 20 µs

100 Ω.m

100 m x 100 m

Time Domain


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800 m x 500 m grid - 50 x 50 m mesh density - buried at 1 m depth -

galvanised steel (12 mm ɸ) - relative resistivity of 7,7 & relative permeability of

600 - strike point off-centre dot on electrode.

Lightning Impulse:

Peak Impulse Current 4 kA (98 % probability);

Rise Time (dI/dt) 1,8 µs

Time to Half Value 30 µs

Time Duration 150 µs allowed in the model.

Ref: P H Pretorius, Loss of Equipotential During Lightning Ground Potential Rise on Large Earthing Systems, Joint IEEE International Symposium on

Electromagnetic Compatibility & Asia‐Pacific Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility (2018 Joint IEEE EMC & APEMC), Suntec Convention

and Exhibition Centre, Singapore, 14 to 17 May 2018.

P.H. Pretorius, “Lightning Damage Associated with Wire Line Technology and Large Electrodes – A Hypothesis”, Inaugural Earthing Africa 2017

Symposium and Exhibition, Thaba Eco Hotel, Johannesburg, 5 – 9 Jun 2017.

Frequency Domain

R = 0,7 Ω

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o Higher soil resistivity presents

higher GPR, as expected;

o Higher frequencies in the

lightning current have a

localized effect on the GPR;

o The localized effect of the

GPR eradicates the

“equipotential” across the

electrode;

o Equipotential (Quasi-

equipotential) is only relevant

at lower frequencies;

Main point:

Loss of Equipotential

Ref: P H Pretorius, Loss of Equipotential During

Lightning Ground Potential Rise on Large

Earthing Systems, Joint IEEE International

Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility &

Asia‐Pacific Symposium on Electromagnetic

Compatibility (2018 Joint IEEE EMC & APEMC),

Suntec Convention and Exhibition Centre,

Singapore, 14 to 17 May 2018.

Frequency Domain


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4,5 m

Impulse: 4 kA, 1.8 / 150 µs

Ref: P H Pretorius, Loss of Equipotential During Lightning Ground Potential Rise on Large Earthing Systems, Joint IEEE International Symposium on

Electromagnetic Compatibility & Asia‐Pacific Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility (2018 Joint IEEE EMC & APEMC), Suntec Convention

and Exhibition Centre, Singapore, 14 to 17 May 2018.

Part of PV plant electrode with panel support structures. Calculated GPD across part of an electrode shown

Finding: Over relatively short distances (23 m to 50 m), significant differences in

potential (up to 66.1 kV) can be presented.

Design – Lightning GPR

Unique Combinations of Conditions

* High soil resistivity (> 1000 Ω.m more prominent at higher soil resistivities)

* Lightning activity

* Wire-line technology

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Ref: P H Pretorius, On Ground Potential Rise Presented by Small and Large Earth Electrodes Under Lightning Conditions, IEEE AFRICON 2017,

Victoria and Alfred (V&A) Waterfront Cape Town, South Africa, 18 to 20 September 2017.

What is risk?

51© 2019

• Is the risk for lightning damage in southern parts of Namibia lower / higher

compared to Northern Cape?


R = N x P x L


If lightning GPR ignored

Design – Lightning GPR Mitigation

❑ Single point earthing

❑ Isolating interfaces (IEC 62305)

(opto isolators / isolation transformers / optic fibre etc).

52


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Design – SANS / IEC 62305 – Isolation Devices

53


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- Isolating interface

Fibre / Radio offers best isolation.

Design – Proposal to Continue Using SANS / IEC 62305-2

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Ref: P H Pretorius, Lightning Risk Considerations Related to

Wire-Line Technology Applied in Large Utility Scale PV

Plant, Paper Submitted for presentation at the 9th CIGRE

Southern Africa Regional Conference, Johannesburg,South Africa, 1 – 4 October 2019.

Existing SANS / IEC 62305-2 Process Proposed Adjunct Process

Mitigate / eliminate lightning GPR –

Consider costGPR?


protected







No

Yes

LPS Installed?Yes

SPM Installed?Yes


risk components

No No

RA + RB + RU

+ RV > RT

No

Yes


measures


protected







No

Yes

LPS Installed?Yes

SPM Installed?Yes


risk components

No No

RA + RB + RU

+ RV > RT

No

Yes


measures


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• IEC 62305-3 notes:

“For the earth termination system: When dealing with the dispersion of the

lightning current (high frequency behaviour) into the ground, whilst minimizing

any potentially dangerous overvoltages, the shape and dimensions of the earth-

termination system are the important criteria. In general, a low earthing

resistance (if possible lower than 10 Ω when measured at low frequency) is

recommended”.

• Referencing a low frequency parameter to addresses lightning (with high

frequency content):

• Shown earlier earth electrode resistance of 0,7 Ω (1000 Ω.m soil);

• Significant GPR levels can still exist - despite << 10 Ω;


Implication: Underestimation of risk (if 10 Ω is only compliance criterion).


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• IEC 62305-2: Indicates that the line installation factors of selected tables in

the standard are based on a soil resistivity of 400 Ω.m.

• Has a direct implication on the collection area of buried cable section: In

general, the higher the soil resistivity, the larger the collection area which is

directly proportional to the square root of the soil resistivity.

In the Northern Cape, in South Africa, where typical utility scale PV plant

are installed, it is not unusual to find soil resistivities well above 1000 Ω.m,

suggesting that the collection area is well underestimated, if not

compensated for.


Implication: Underestimation of risk (if not compensated for).


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• Even though not directly linked to the standard and in some cases, LPS

designers do not have access to financial information of the plant (due to

project confidentiality agreements) when it is required to assess risk in

terms of R4 (Risk of loss of economic value). This in itself constrains the

risk assessment and presents the risk assessment process as

subjective.


NB: In view of financial figures captured in contracts.

Construction – poor installation – increase risk

Poor SPD Wiring

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Image Source: DEHN

Construction – poor installation – increase risk

Poor Installation / Design

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Construction

• Installation Safety Report

• Lightning Risk Assessment

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Responsibility:

Designer & Installer

Liability:

Designer & Installer

Outlined and highlighted some of the principles included in

lightning risk analysis.

SANS – IEC 62305 useful and important standard.

Some limitations / gaps associated with the current version

(Edition 2) of the standard.

Awareness of these are important – design perspective.

Complete / proper design responsibility and liability remains with the design engineer as lightning protection expert.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS

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CONCLUDING REMARKS - TERRATECH

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© 2019

CDEGS SOFTWARE ELPA CERTIFICATION

TERRATECH CERTIFICATION

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© 2019

TERRATECH is the international distributor of CDEGS Software

in South Africa.

What : 1 to 2 day CPD course (includes 50 Hz safety).

When : Nov / Dec 2019

Where : Johannesburg (also considering Cape Town)

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66© 2019

Pieter H Pretorius, PhD

TERRATECH, South Africa

[email protected]

PRINCIPLES INCLUDED IN LIGHTNING RISK ANALYSIS...SANS/IEC 62305-2, Edition 2, “Protection Against Lightning, Part 2: Risk Management”, (2011 / 2010). NB: Introduce a LPS to mitigate

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