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title: PrinciplesforDeterminingtheAirForceActive/reserveMix
author: Robbert,AlbertA.;Williams,WilliamA.;Cook,CynthiaR.
publisher: RANDisbn10|asin: 083302762Xprintisbn13: 9780833027627ebookisbn13: 9780585247687
language: English
subjectUnitedStates.--AirForce--Recruiting,enlistment,etc,UnitedStates.--AirForce--Reserves.
publicationdate: 1999lcc: UG883.R631999ebddc: 358.4/137/0973
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subject:UnitedStates.--AirForce--Recruiting,enlistment,etc,UnitedStates.--AirForce--Reserves.
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PrinciplesforDeterminingtheAirForceActive/ReserveMix
AlbertA.RobbertWilliamA.WilliamsCynthiaR.Cook
PreparedfortheUnitedStatesAirForce
ProjectAIRFORCERAND
Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionunlimited
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TheresearchreportedherewassponsoredbytheUnitedStatesAirForceunderContractF49642-96-C-0001.FurtherinformationmaybeobtainedfromtheStrategicPlanningDivision,DirectorateofPlans,HqUSAF.
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Robbert,AlbertA.1944-PrinciplesfordeterminingtheAirForceactive/reservemix/AlbertA.Robbert,WilliamA.Williams,CynthiaR.Cook.p.cm."MR-1091-AE"Includesbibliographicalreferences(p.).ISBN0-8330-2762-X1.UnitedStates.AirForceRecruiting,enlisting,etc.2.UnitedStates.AirForceReserves.I.Title.II.Williams,WilliamA.1952-III.Cook,CynthiaR.1965-UG883.R631999358.4'137'097321dc2199-042520
RANDisanonprofitinstitutionthathelpsimprovepolicyanddecisionmakingthroughresearchandanalysis.RAND®isaregisteredtrademark.RAND'spublicationsdonotnecessarilyreflecttheopinionsorpoliciesofitsresearchsponsors.
©Copyright1999RAND
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformbyanyelectrnicormechanicalmeans(includingphotocopying,recording,orinformationstorageandretrieval)withoutpermissioninwritingfromRAND.
Published1999byRAND1700MainStreet,P.O.Box2138,SantaMonica,CA90407-21381333HSt.,N.W.,Washington,D.C.20005-4707
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RANDURL:http://www.rand.org/ToorderRANDdocumentsortoobtainadditionalinformation,contactDistributionServices:Telephone:(310)451-7002;Fax:(310)451-6915;Internet:[email protected]
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PrefaceThemixofactiveandreserveforcesconstitutingthetotalAirForcehasshiftedduringthelastdecade'sforcedrawdown.However,reductionsacrosstheactiveandreservecomponentsofthetotalforcehavenotbeenproportional.Moreover,decisionsaffectingonecomponentmayhavebeenmadeindependentlyofdecisionsaffectingothercomponents.Recentforcereductionsandtransfersamongcomponentsmaynothavebeenguidedbyaclearandacceptedsetofprinciplesfordetermininganend-stateforcemix.
Theshapeandsizeoftheforcemixcanhaveimportantimplicationsforthecost,effectiveness,sustainability,andpopularandpoliticalsupportofmilitaryforces.However,forceplannersandprogrammersmaynotbefullyawareoftheseimplicationsandmaythereforemakeoradvocateforce-structuringdecisionsthatdonotoptimallysupportnationalinterests.Thisreportassembles,examines,andrationalizesasetofprinciplestohelpforceplannersandprogrammersrecognizetheseimplications.
Forthemostpart,fundamentalprinciplesapplicabletocontemporaryactive/reserveforcequestionshavebeenhammeredoutinpastpolicydeliberations.Ourcontributionwastoassembletheprinciplesinacoherentframeworkandtoelicitareviewandcritiqueoftheframeworkbycurrentstakeholdersandcommentators.Towardthatend,ourresearchincludedaforum,heldinMay1998,ofleadersandthinkersfromanumberofmilitary,civilian,academic,legislative,andinterest-grouporganizations.
ThisresearchwasundertakenfortheDirectorofStrategicPlanning,HeadquartersUnitedStatesAirForce.Itrespondedto,andbenefited
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from,interestonthepartoftheAirNationalGuardandAirForceReserveadvisorstotheDirector.
ProjectAirForce
ProjectAIRFORCE,adivisionofRAND,istheAirForceFederallyFundedResearchandDevelopmentCenter(FFRDC)forstudiesandanalysis.ItprovidestheAirForcewithindependentanalysisofpolicyalternativesaffectingthedeployment,employment,combatreadiness,andsupportofcurrentandfutureairandspaceforces.Researchisperformedinfourprograms:AerospaceForceDevelopment;Manpower,Personnel,andTraining;ResourceManagement;andStrategyandDoctrine.
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Contents
Preface iii
Figures ix
Tables xi
Summary xiii
Acknowledgments xxi
Acronyms xxiii
ChapterOneIntroduction
1
Background 1
ObjectivesandApproach 3
Perspective 4
Scope 4
OrganizationoftheReport 5
ChapterTwoForce-MixPrinciplesAnOverview
7
SixFactorsinMakingActive/ReserveMixDeterminations
7
SocialandPoliticalConsiderations 7
ReadinessandAvailability 8
PersonnelFlowConsiderations 9
Page 10
Cost 9
IntegratingtheSixFactors 10
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ChapterThreeSocialandPoliticalConsiderations
13
Introduction 13
TheoreticalFramework 14
SocialandPoliticalFactors 15
Militia-NationConsiderations 15
PublicAwareness/TrustofMilitaryInstitutions 18
LinkingForceEmploymenttoPublicSupport 23
RepresentativeForceIssues 24
InfluenceofVeteransinSociety 29
PoliticalInfluenceoftheRC 30
StateMissionsoftheANG 31
HowSocialandPoliticalConsiderationsConstraintheForceMix
33
ChapterFourReadinessandAvailability
35
Readiness 35
PeacetimeReadinessIndicators 36
UnderlyingFactorsExperience,Training,andOperationalIntegration
38
Availability 40
AvailabilityWhenMobilized 40
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AvailabilityWhenNotMobilized 42
ImplicationsfortheForceMix 45
ChapterFivePersonnelFlow
49
EarlierViewsonPersonnelFlow 49
ModelingthePersonnelFlowConstraint 51
ForceMixBasedonStrength 53
ForceMixBasedonFighterWingEquivalents 53
UsingtheModel 56
ImplicationsfortheForceMix 57
ChapterSixCost
59
MeetingMTWDemands:Force-StructureAvailability 60
CostComparisonComplexities 60
CostComparisonResults 62
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DifferencesinDesignedOperationalCapabilities 66
AStrategyforOptimizingForce-StructureAvailabilityandCost
66
MeetingSSC,OOTW,andOtherPeacetimeDemands 67
MeasuringPeacetimeFighterDeploymentCapacityandItsCost
67
MeasuringPeacetimeAirliftProductiveCapacityandItsCost
68
AStrategyforOptimizingDeploymentCapacityandCost
70
TradeoffsBetweentheConflictingDemands 70
ConflictingDemandsforFighterForceStructure 70
AComparativeLookatAirliftForceStructure 71
MakingTradeoffs 73
ImplicationsfortheForceMix 73
ChapterSevenConclusions
75
References 79
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Figures
S.1.AFrameworkforConsideringMultipleForce-MixPrinciplesSimultaneously
xv
S.2.NotionalValuesforForce-MixConstraints:AnANGCase
xviii
1.1.StrengthsandOperatingCosts
2
2.1.AFrameworkforConsideringMultipleForce-MixPrinciplesSimultaneously
11
3.1.ReserveComponentsAreGeographicallyDispersed
19
3.2.PercentageofFemaleOfficersandOfficerAccessionsintheTotalForceAmongThreeAFComponents,FY1996
25
3.3.PercentageofFemaleEnlistedMembersandEnlistedAccessionsintheTotalForceAmongThreeAFComponents,FY1996
26
3.4.PercentageofMinorityOfficersandOfficerAccessionsAmongThreeAFComponentsintheTotalForce,FY1996
27
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3.5.PercentageofMinorityEnlistedPersonnelandEnlistedAccessionsAmongThreeAFComponentsintheTotalForce,FY1996
28
3.6.LocusofPoliticalandSocialConstraintsontheForceMix
34
4.1.AverageORIRatings,19921996
37
4.2.FY1997TDYDaysbyANGAircrews
44
4.3.FY1997DaysinUniformbyANGAircrews
44
4.4.AvailabilityofAFRAircrewsbyDurationofTDY
45
4.5.LocusofAvailabilityandReadinessConstraintsontheForceMix
46
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5.1.SustainabilityofRCFighterPilotRequirements
56
5.2.LocusofthePersonnelFlowConstraintontheForceMix
58
6.1.AlternativeEqual-CostForceMixes
72
6.2.CostConsiderationsintheForceMix
74
7.1.NotionalValuesforForce-MixConstraints:AnANGCase
76
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Tables
3.1.TheMilitiaintheConstitutionandtheBillofRights
16
4.1.AverageFlyingHoursandCombatExperienceofPilotsinTypicalRCandACB52Units
38
4.2.ReadyAircrewProgram(RAP)AnnualTrainingMissions
39
6.1.RecurringPeacetimeCostsforSelectedUnitTypesPreviousCostComparisonStudies
63
6.2.RecurringPeacetimeCostsforSelectedUnitTypesSABLEModel
65
6.3.CostperDeployedAircraft-Day,F16Squadrons
69
6.4.CostPerProductiveFlyingHour,C141Squadrons
69
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Summary
Introduction
WhatshouldAirForcedecisionmakersconsiderwhenmakingforce-mixdeliberationsacrosseachelementofthetotalforceactive,AirForceReserve(AFR),andtheAirNationalGuard(ANG)?Generally,rationaldeliberationsofforce-mixdecisionshavefocusedonthreefactorscost,militaryeffectiveness,andavailability.However,thesethreefactorsmaynotbetheonlyconsiderationsthatshouldapplyindetermininganappropriateforcemix.ThereisalsotheissueunderstoodbutoftenintangibleofhowreserveforceshelptomeetcertainsocialandpoliticalobjectivesimportanttotheAirForceandDepartmentofDefense(DoD)andhowthereservecomponent(RC)capturesvaluableexperienceandexpertisethatwouldotherwisebelost.Inaddition,itisnecessarytounderstandwhytheflowofhumancapitalfromactivetoreserveforcesmustbekeptwithinfeasiblebounds.Finally,itisimportanttounderstandcostconsiderationsinadisaggregatedway;inotherwords,doesthetypeofmissiontheAirForceperformsfavoronecomponentovertheother?
Thisreportanswersthefollowingtwoquestions:(1)whatprinciplesshouldbeconsideredinforce-structuredecisionsthataffecttheactive/reservemix?and(2)howdotheseprinciplesinteractwithoneanother?Weaddressedthefirstquestionprimarilybyreviewingpreviousstudiesorcommentariesonforce-mixissuesandfoundthattherelevantprinciplesaregenerallyrecognizedbuthavenotbeenassembledintoacoherentframework.Inaddressingthesecondquestion,wenotedthattheprinciplesgenerallydonotpre-
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scribeaspecificactive/reservemix.Rather,theytendtosuggestconstraintstheproportionsofthemixshouldbeaboveorbelowsomespecifiedboundary,whichmayvaryasafunctionoftotalforcesizeorotherfactors.Whenconsideredsimultaneously,theseconstraintsmaydefineafeasibleregionwithinwhicharangeofforce-mixpossibilitieswouldbeacceptable.Ifnosuchfeasibleregionexists,force-structureplannersmustchooseorcompromisebetweenconflictingconstraints.
Inproposinganddiscussingtheseprinciples,wehaveobservedthatactivecomponent(AC),AFR,andANGrepresentatives,andtheiradvocatesoutsideoftheAirForce,tendtoseetheissuesthroughdifferentlenses.Wehaveattemptedtoavoidacomponent-specificviewpoint,basingourproposedprinciplesonanoverallobjectiveofmaximizingtheAirForce'scontributiontonationaldefense.Insomecases,thatamountstooptimizingthedistributionofavailableresourceswithintheAirForce'stotalforce.Inothercases,itinvolvesenhancingtheAirForce'spostureforclaimingresources(funds,manpower,policylicense,politicalsupport,etc.)fromthelargersociety.Inthelattercases,theworthyobjective,webelieve,isnottomaximizeAirForceresourcesthroughpoliticalmanipulationbutrathertomaximizethequalityoftheAirForce'slinkagestothelargersociety,relyingonthedemocraticprocesstogoverntheresourceoutcomes.
DesigningaForce-MixFramework
Basedonourreviewofpreviousstudiesandcommentariesontheactive/reservemix,wefoundthatsixmajorfactorsshouldbeincludedindesigningaforce-mixframework:(1)socialconsiderations,(2)politicalconsiderations,(3)readiness,(4)availability,(5)personnelflow,and(6)cost.
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FigureS.1providesaschemeforintegratingthesesixfactors.Arrowsontheboundarylinesindicatetheexpecteddirectionoftheconstraint.Thefiguresuggeststhatsomeoftheseconstraintsmightvaryasafunctionoftotalforcesize.
Thefiguredepictssocialandpoliticalconsiderationsestablishinglower-boundconstraints.Politicalutilitiesdependinpartonthetotalforcemaintainingavisiblepresence,witheitheractiveorreserve
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FigureS.1AFrameworkforConsideringMultipleForce-MixPrinciplesSimultaneously
SOURCES:FY88and89NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct(PublicLaw100-180),FY88DoDAppropriationsAct(PublicLaw100-102),FY98NationalDefenseAutorizationAct(PublicLaw100-202),andFY98DoDAppropriationsAct(PublicLaw105-56).NOTE:Thesumofmilitarypersonnelapproporationsandoperationsandmaintenanceappropriationsisusedasaproxyforop
forces,inlocalcommunities.Astotalforcesizedecreases,reserveforceswillbeincreasinglycalledontoprovidethepresenceandmustthereforeconstitute,ataminimum,alargerproportionofthetotalforce.Thus,thepoliticalconstraintisrepresentedbyaslopingline.Wesuggestthatsocialutilitiesdependonthereserveforcesaminoritywithinthetotalforceoccupyingalargeenoughproportionoftheforcetocontinuetoinfluencethevaluesandcultureoftheactiveforcemajority.
Readinessandavailabilityconsiderationssetupperboundsonreserveforces.Weassumeaconstantdemandforrapidlydeployableforcesthatmustbemetpredominantlywithactiveforces.Asthetotalforce
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becomessmaller,thisconstantdemandcallsforanincreasingproportionoftheforcetobesuppliedbytheactivecomponent(representedbyaslopingavailabilityconstraintlineinthefigure).OurhypothesisisthattherearegenerallynoappreciablereadinessdifferencesbetweenAirForceactiveandreserveforces.Thus,readinessdoesnotconstrainthemix.
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Thepersonnelflowconstraintalsosetsanupperbound.TheRCdependsonacriticalflowofhumancapitalfromtheAC.AstheRCproportionincreases,itbecomessolargerelativetotheACthatthiscriticalflowcannolongerbesustained.Inthesteadystate,thisproportionwouldnotvarywithtotalforcesize.
Takentogether,theseconstraintsformafeasibleregioninwhichaforcemixwouldsimultaneouslysatisfytheprinciplesassociatedwiththeconstraints.Aspecificforcemixcanthenbetargetedonthebasisofcostconsiderations.Reserveforcesareconventionallyviewedaslesscostlythanactiveforces,indicatingthattheproportionoftheforceintheRCshouldbealongtheborderformedbytheupper-boundconstraints.However,reserveforcesmaybemorecostlythanactiveforcesinmeetingoperationsotherthanwar(OOTW)andsmaller-scaleconflict(SSC)demands,sothatthedirectioninwhichcostconsiderationsdrivetheforcedependsontheneedbeingmet.IfOOTW/SSCdemandscannotbemetwiththeleastcostlymajortheaterwar(MTW)forcestructure,itwillbenecessaryforforcestructureplannerstochoosebetweenalarger,morereserve-intensiveforcethatbettermeetsMTWdemands,andanequal-cost,smaller,moreactive-intensiveforcethatbettermeetsongoinghigh-tempodemands.
BuildingtheFrameworkWhattheAnalysisTellsUs
Inexaminingtheavailableevidence,wefoundthatthelociofsomeoftheseconstraintsarecurrentlyunknowableandthatothersaremission-orcomponent-dependent.Wherepossible,wederivednotionalresultsusingavailabledataorwhatwebelievetobereasonableestimatesthereof,focusingforpurposesofillustrationonfighterforcestructure.
Inouranalysisofhowsocialandpoliticalconsiderationsconstrainthe
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forcemix,weintroduceterminologythatallowsustomorepreciselylabeltheassociatedconstraints.Wefindthatasocialidentification,embeddedness,andinvestment(IE&I)constraintissloped,sothatasthetotalforcedecreasesinsizeandismoregeographicallyconcentrated,theRCwillplayanincreasingroleinmaintainingcontactwiththelargersociety.However,thepreciselocation
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ofthislowerboundarycannotbedetermined.WealsofindthataminoritystatusconstraintdrivenbyresearchontheboundarybetweenatokenandminoritylevelofrepresentationforaseparatelyidentifiablesubgroupwithinaninstitutionsetsafloorfortheRCatabout20percentofthetotalforce.
Basedonouranalysisofreadinessandavailability,wefind(ashypothesized)areadinessparitybetweentheACandRC,whichleadstonoreadinessconstraint.Availability,however,islimitedfortheRCbecauseofitspredominantlypart-timeworkforce.BecauseofgreaterlimitsoncumulativedeploymenttimeanddurationofdeploymentrelativetotheAC,theRCislessavailableformeetingcontingencyrequirements.Thus,theavailabilityconstraint,likethesocialIE&Iconstraint,issloped(althoughintheoppositedirection).Inotherwords,asthetotalforcedeclinesinsize,assumingforceemploymentdemandsremainconstant,adecreasingproportionofthetotalforcecanbeplacedintheRC.
Basedonourmodelingofpersonnelflowsbetweentheactiveandreserveforces,wefindthatwecanestablisharoughupperboundontheproportionoftheRCinthetotalforce,assumingotherrelatedparametersareknown.Theseparametersvarybymissionandmissiondesignseries(MDS)andalsobydifferencesbetweenANGandAFRintheirperceivedabilitytoabsorbinexperiencedundergraduatepilottraining(UPT)graduates.
Finally,intermsofcost,ouranalysisarguesforalargerproportionofthetotalforceintheRCwhencontemplatingMTWscenariosandasmallerproportionwhencontemplatingSSCandOOTWscenarios.DecisionmakersmustweighthetradeoffsbetweenmeetingMTWandSSC/OOTWneeds.
ApplyingtheFrameworktoanANGCaseANotionalExample
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FigureS.2depictstheframeworkfortheANGcaseappliedtothefighterforcestructure,wherenotionalpersonnelflowconstraintsmightallowtheRCtooccupyupto42percentofthetotalfighterforce.Thiscreatesafeasibleregiontotherightofthesocialconstraint.Thefeasibleregionmightbereducedifanavailabilityconstraintcameintoplayorifadecisionmakerweretosupplyajudg-
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FigureS.2NotionalValuesforForce-MixConstraints:AnANGCase
mentallocusforthepoliticalconstraint.Withinthisfeasibleregion,cost-consciousdecisionmakerswouldgravitatetowarda42percentmixiftheywereprimarilyconcernedaboutpreparednessforMTWscenariosortowarda20percentmixiftheywereconcernedwithmeetingcurrentcontingencydeploymentneeds.Itispossible,ofcourse,toweighcostmoreheavilythaneitherthepersonnelfloworsocialconstraints.Inthatcase,decisionmakersmightdrivethemixabove42percent,consciouslyacceptingadegradationinexperiencelevelsandreadiness.Alternatively,theycoulddrivethemixbelowthe20percentRCminoritystatusconstraint,possiblycompromisingRCmembers'capacitytoinfluencethevaluesandperceptionsofACmembers.
Ifpersonnelfloworavailabilitywereevaluatedusingdifferentparameters,thoseconstraintscouldconceivablylietotheleftoftheRCminoritystatusorsocialIE&Iconstraints.Therewouldbenofeasibleregion.Insuchacase,decisionmakerswouldhavetocompro-
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misebetweenconflictingobjectives.ThemostlikelyoutcomewouldbetodeemphasizetheminoritystatusandsocialIE&Iconstraintsbecausethecaseforapplyingtheformerinthepresentcontextislesscompellingandthelocusforthelatterisunknown.
Weagainstressthatthespecificforce-mixresultsreportedherearenotional.Wherepossible,weusedinputvaluesthatwejudgedtobeapproximatelycorrect,recognizingthatwedidnothavetheresourcesinthisprojecttoobtainorderiveanalyticallyrigorousinputs,especiallywhentheinputsarelikelytovaryacrossmissions.Also,becauseofvariationsacrossmissionsorMDSs,force-mixdecisionscannotbemadeintheaggregate.TheymustbemadeforeachmissionorMDSindividually.
Conclusions
Althoughtheresultsreportedherearenotional,webelieveourresearchprovidestwoconcretecontributionstotheforce-mixdecisionprocess.Thefirstcontributionisaframeworkforintegratingtherangeofconsiderationsthatdecisionmakersfaceandgainingperspectiveontheargumentsofferedbyvariousinterestgroupshopingtoinfluencetheforcemix.Thesecondcontributionisaroadmapformoredetailedresearchintospecificmission/MDSforcemixesorageneralmodelthatincorporatesmission/MDS-specificinputs.
Perhapsourmostsignificantfindingisthatcostconsiderationscutinoppositedirectionsdependingonwhethertheforceisbeingoptimizedformajortheaterwarpreparednessorforpeacetimecontingencyoperations.Inourview,peacetimecontingencydemandsmustbegivenmoreweightinforce-mixdecisions,especiallyinMDSsexperiencinghighdeployment-relatedstress.
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AcknowledgmentsInspirationforthisprojectcamefromBrigGenJohnHarvey,USAFR(ret.),andBrigGenJosephSimeone,ANG,whoservedasAirForceReserveandAirNationalGuardadvisorstotheAirForceDirectorofStrategicPlansduringacriticalperiodintheproject.LtGenDavidW.McIlvoy,AirForceDirectorofStrategicPlanningattheinceptionoftheproject;hissuccessors,MajGensCharlesF.WaldandNortonA.Schwartz;andtheirdeputydirector,Dr.ClarkMurdock,supportedtheproject.LtColCalHutto,ourAirStaffpointofcontact,providedessentialcoordinationandsupport.MajCarlD.RehberghelpeduswithAirForceReserveissues,whileMajGregRiddlemoserandMr.GaryTaylorprovidedsimilarsupportregardingtheAirNationalGuard.
FortyindividualsjoinedusatRANDinMay1998foraforumthatexploredtheissuesaddressedinthisreport.Wethankalloftheparticipantsinthatforumforhelpingustofocusontherightissuesandtoplacetheminappropriateperspectives.Inparticular,wethankMr.BrianSharratt,DeputyAssistantSecretaryoftheAirForceforReserveAffairs;MajGen(ret.)RogerSandler,presidentoftheReserveOfficerAssociation;MajGenSamCarpenter,militaryexecutivefortheReserveForcesPolicyBoard;MikeHiggins,aprofessionalstafferfortheHouseNationalSecurityCommittee;andLarryKorb,aseniorfellowattheBrookingsInstitute.Otherparticipantsintheforum,towhomwealsooweourappreciation,includeseveralstateassistantadjutantgeneralsforair,seniormobilizationaugmentees,seniorstaffmembersfromtheAirStaffandseveralmajorcommands,academicians,andfellowmembersoftheRANDstaff.
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WithinRAND,BobRoll,ourprogramdirectorattheinceptionoftheproject,providedstrongleadershipandvaluableinsightinshapingtheproject.ColleaguesDonPalmerandCarlDahlmanprovidedhelpfulinputandadvice.PaulSteinbergandJeanneHellercontributedimmeasurablytothereadabilityofthereport.ReviewsbyJackGraserandDickBuddinsharpenedourthinkinginseveralareas.
Anyremainingerrorsare,ofcourse,ourown.
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Acronyms
AC activecomponent
AFR AirForceReserve
ANG AirNationalGuard
DOC designedoperationalcapability
DoD DepartmentofDefense
FH flyinghours
FWE fighterwingequivalent
IE&I identification,embeddedness,andinvestment
MDS majordesignseries
MTW majortheaterwar
NPS nonpriorservice
OOTW operationsotherthanwar
OPTEMPO operationstempo
ORI operationalreadinessinspection
PAA primaryaircraftauthorized
PERSTEMPOpersonneltempo
POL petroleum,oil,andlubricants
PS priorservice
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QDR QuadrennialDefenseReview
RC reservecomponent
RPI ratedpositionidentifier
SAAM specialassignmentairliftmission
SORTS StatusofResourcesandTrainingSystem
SSC smaller-scaleconflict
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TDY temporaryduty
UPT undergraduatepilottraining
UTC unittypecode
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ChapterOneIntroduction
Background
InAirForceandDepartmentofDefense(DoD)force-structuredecisionmaking,eachelementofthetotalforceactive,AirForceReserve(AFR),andtheAirNationalGuard(ANG)hasproponentsthatoftenseektomaximizetheresourcesdevotedtoit.Proponentsincludeseniorleadershipwithinthecomponents,Congress,andstakeholdersexternaltoDoD,suchasassociationsthatadvocatetheinterestsofthevariouscomponents.Inthisoftentimescompetitiveenvironment,resourceallocationdecisionswouldbettersupportpublicinterestsiftheywereguidedbyasetofprinciplesformaximizingatotalAirForcecontributiontonationaldefense.
Moreover,theforcemixhaschangedsignificantlyduringthelastdecade.Figure1.1showsthatactivecomponent(AC)strengthreductionswereproportionallygreaterthanreservecomponent(RC)strengthreductionsduringthelastdecade(whichhasshiftedthemixtowardagreaterproportionintheRC).Infiscalyear(FY)1988,thetwoRCstheANGandtheAFRtogetherconstituted25percentoftotalAirForcestrengthand11percentoftotaloperatingcosts.InFY1998,theRCconstituted33percentofthetotalstrengthand16percentofthetotalcost.InourreviewoftheliteratureandinourinterviewswithACandRCdecisionmakers,wefoundnoevidencethatthisshiftoccurredaspartofaconsciousforce-mixstrategy.Rather,itoccurredasaresultofmanydecisions,takenindependently,regardingactivecomponent(AC)andreservecomponent(RC)forcestructure.Wearguethattherearegoodreasonsformak-
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Figure1.1StrengthsandOperatingCosts
SOURCES:FY88and89NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct(PublicLaw100-180),
FY88DoDAppropriationsAct(PublicLaw100-202),FY98NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct(PublicLaw105-85),andFY98DoDAppropriationsAct
(PublicLaw105-56).NOTE:Thesumofmilitarypersonalappropriationsandoperationsand
maintenanceappropriationsisusedasaproxyforoperatingcost.Thisprovidesonlyarough
indicationofoperatingcosts,becausethemilitarypersonnelappropriationincludesthecost
ofmilitarypersonnelengagedinnonoperatinvbactivities,suchasprocurement.Other
appropriationsProcurement;Research,Development,Test,andEvaluation;Rovolvingand
ManagementFunds;MilitaryCOnstruction;andFamilyHousingareeitherunrelatedorlessclearly
relatedtotheoperatingcostsofthecomponents.
ingforce-structuredecisionsaffectingtheforcemixinanintegratedratherthananindependentway.
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Generally,rationaldeliberationsoftheforcemixhavefocusedonthreefactorscost,militaryeffectiveness,andavailability.AsthedatainFigure1.1suggest,andaswillbedemonstratedinmoredetaillaterinthereport,forcestructurecostslessintheRCthanintheAC.Additionally,AirForceRCunits,incontrasttosomereserveforcesinotherservices,generallymeetorexceedAClevelsofmilitary
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effectiveness.However,reserveforcesarelessavailablethanactiveforcesexceptinsmallnumbers,theycannotbedeployedasrapidlyasactiveforces;therearestrictstatutorylimitsonhowandforhowlongtheymaybecalledupinvoluntarilyforactiveduty;andtherearepracticallimitsonhowlongandhowoftentheycanbeemployedvoluntarily.
Theseconsiderationscanbecombinedtoformanimplicitprinciplefordeterminingacost-effectiveforcemixmaximizetheRCproportion,subjecttosatisfyingavailabilitydemandsthatgenerallyrequireactiveforces.
However,unitoperatingcosts,militaryeffectiveness,andavailabilityarenottheonlyconsiderationsthatapplyindetermininganappropriateforcemix.ThereisalsotheissueunderstoodbutoftenintangibleofhowreserveforceshelptomeetcertainsocialandpoliticalobjectivesimportanttotheAirForceandDoDandhowtheRCcapturesvaluableexperienceandexpertisethatwouldotherwisebelost.Inaddition,itisnecessarytounderstandwhytheflowofhumancapitalfromactivetoreserveforcesmustbekeptwithinfeasiblebounds.Finally,itisimportanttounderstandcostconsiderationsinadisaggregatedway;inotherwords,doesthetypeofmissionbeingperformedfavoronecomponentovertheother?
ObjectivesandApproach
Inpreparingthisreport,wesoughttoanswerthefollowingquestions:
Whatprinciplesshouldbeconsideredinforce-structuredecisionsthataffecttheactive/reservemix?
Howdotheseprinciplesinteractwithoneanother?
Inreviewingpreviousstudiesorcommentariesonforce-mixissues,wefoundthattherelevantprinciplesaregenerallyrecognizedbut
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havenotnecessarilybeenassembledintoacoherentframework.Wealsofoundthatsomeprincipleshavebeenarticulatedformilitaryforcesingeneral,andthusneedtobetailoredtotheAirForcecase.
Inaddressingthesecondquestion,wenotedthattheprinciplesgenerallydonotprescribeaspecificactive/reservemix.Rather,they
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tendtosuggestconstraintstheproportionsofthemixshouldbeaboveorbelowsomespecifiedboundary,whichmayvaryasafunctionoftotalforcesizeorotherfactor.Whenconsideredsimultaneously,theseconstraintsmaydefineafeasibleregionwithinwhicharangeofforce-mixpossibilitieswouldbeacceptable.
Perspective
Inproposinganddiscussingtheseprinciples,wehaveobservedthatAC,AFR,andANGrepresentatives,andtheiradvocatesoutsideoftheAirForce,tendtoseetheissuesthroughdifferentlenses.Wehaveattemptedtoavoidacomponent-specificviewpoint,basingourproposedprinciplesonanoverallobjectiveofmaximizingtheAirForce'scontributiontonationaldefense.Formostoftheprinciplesweadvocate,thatamountstooptimizingthedistributionofavailableresourceswithintheAirForce'stotalforce.
Whenexaminingsocialandpoliticalissues,wefindthattheoperantobjectiveistoenhancetheAirForce'spostureforclaimingresources(funds,manpower,policylicense,politicalsupport,etc.)fromthelargersociety.Thepossibilityexiststhatsuccessinthisendeavorcouldcomeattheexpenseoftheotherservices,ofdomesticprograms,orofothersocialinterests.Evaluatingthesewelfareeconomicimplicationsisbeyondthescopeofourstudy.Consequently,theperspectiveweadoptinevaluatingsocialandpoliticalissuesisnotaneconomicone.Rather,wetakeanorganizationalecologyperspectivemilitaryorganizationswillnotobtainneededresourcesiftheyfailtocultivateappropriatelinkagestothelargersociety.Theworthyobjective,webelieve,isnottomaximizeAirForceresourcesthroughpoliticalmanipulationbuttomaximizethequalityoftheAirForce'slinkagestothelargersociety,relyingonthedemocraticprocesstogoverntheresourceoutcomes.
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Scope
Theendproductinthisresearchisnotaspecificforcemix.Asweshalldemonstrate,theappropriateforcemixiscontingentonanumberofvariablefactors.Ourobjectiveistoidentifytherelevantprinciples,leavingtodecisionmakersandtheirstaffsthetaskofapplyingtheprinciplesinspecificforce-structuringactions.
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OrganizationoftheReport
ChapterTwodescribesingeneraltermsthebroadfactorswehavefoundtobeimportantinforce-mixdecisionsandprovidesamodeltoenablethefactorstobeconsideredsimultaneously.InChaptersThreethroughSix,wediscusstheimplicationsofthesefactorsingreaterdetail,showingbasedonouranalysiswherethelocusofeachfactororconstraintisinthemodel.ChapterSevengivesourconclusionsandrecommendations.
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ChapterTwoForce-MixPrinciplesAnOverviewBasedonourreviewofpreviousstudiesandcommentariesontheactive/reservemix,wefoundthattherelevantissuescanbeaggregatedintosixmajorfactors.Inthischapter,webrieflydescribethosefactorsandindicateingeneraltermshowtheyinfluencetheidealforcemix.Wealsopresentourframeworkforconsideringthefactorssimultaneously.Subsequentchaptersexaminetheindividualfactorsmorethoroughly.
SixFactorsinMakingActive/ReserveMixDeterminations
Thesixfactorsweidentifiedare(1)socialconsiderations,(2)politicalconsiderations,(3)readiness,(4)availability,(5)personnelflow,and(6)cost.Sincesocialandpoliticalconsiderationsarecloselyrelated,wediscussthembelowtogether;thesameholdstrueforreadinessandavailability,whicharealsodiscussedtogether.
SocialandPoliticalConsiderations
Reserveforcesmayhavesocialandpoliticalutilitiesthatdifferfromorcomplementactiveforceutilities.Torealizetheseutilities,wesuggestthattheproportionofthetotalAirForcesuppliedbytheRCmustexceedsomecriticalmass.
Theseutilitiesarerelatedtoanumberofconsiderations.Thereisastronghistoricalandconstitutionalpresumptionthatatleastpartofthenation'smilitaryforcesshouldbeprovidedbycitizen-soldier
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militiasratherthanregularforces.Althoughrootedinpoliticalconcernsprevalentinthenation'srevolutionaryperiod,relianceonmilitiaforcesmayhavecontemporarybenefits.
Reservistsaremorefullyintegratedintothelargersocietythanactive-dutymembers,enablingthemthroughpersonalcontacttoextendpublicawarenessandtrustofmilitaryinstitutions.
Call-upofreservistsforreal-worldemploymentissubjecttostrongerpoliticalchecksandbalancesthantheemploymentofactive-dutyforces,thusdiscouragingmilitaryinvolvementthatlackspublicsupportandbroadeningsupportforemploymentsthatareundertaken.
Reserveunits,especiallythoseoftheANG,arelessgeographicallyconcentratedthanactiveunits.(OnemightexpectthatthegreatergeographicrepresentationoftheRCwouldmakeitmoredemographicallyrepresentativethantheAC,butouranalysisinChapterThreedidnotfinditmarkedlyso.)Representativenessinanyformcontributestopublictrustingovernmentinstitutions.
Byincreasingthenumberofveteransinthesociety,reserveforcesincreasetheproportionofkeypublicpolicydecisionmakersandinfluencerswhohavemilitaryexperienceandarethusmorelikelytotakeinformedpositionsaboutmilitaryissues.
ANGunitsprovideanefficientandeffectivesourceofdisciplinedmanpowertosatisfystatemissions(disasterrelief,civildisturbance,etc.).
ReadinessandAvailability
Becausereserveforcesrelyheavilyonpart-timeparticipantswhohavefull-timeoccupations,theyarelessavailablethanactive-dutyforces.Theymayalsobelessreadythanactive-dutyforcesbecauseoflimitedopportunitiesfortraining,particularlyunit-sizedtraining
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exercisesthatcannotbeeffectivelycompressedorsegmentedintoweekenddrillperiods.Inpractice,theselimitationsapplymoretoArmy,Navy,andMarineCorpsreserveforcesthantoAirForcereservists,manyofwhomcaneffectivelytraininsmallaggregations(individualsorcrews)andwhocanalsobereadilyintegratedinto
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activeforceswithoutinvoluntaryunitcall-ups.Nonetheless,activeforcesmustremainlargeenoughtomeetrapid-deploymentneedsandtoprovidesustainedinvolvementinoperationsthatexceedstatutorylimitationsonthedurationofcall-ups.
Activeforcesalsofacesomereadiness-limitingconditions.Turnoverinactive-dutyflyingsquadronsishigherthaninreservesquadronsbecauseofrotationsintoandoutofcockpitdutiesandtopermitgreaterabsorptionofnewpilotsenteringtheratedforce.RCpilotsoftenhavepreviousACexperience.Asaresult,ACpilotshaveonaveragelessweaponssystemexperiencethantheirRCcounterparts.
PersonnelFlowConsiderations
Tomeettheirmanpowerneeds,reserveforcesrelyheavilyonaflowoftrainedandacculturatedpersonnelfromactive-dutyforces.Itisunlikelythatreserveforcescouldfindsufficientqualifiednonpriorservice(NPS)recruitstomeetalltheirneeds,giventhatnonpriorservicerecruitsgenerallymustagreetoaninitialperiodofactivedutyfortraininglengthyenoughtocompleterecruitandinitialskilltraining.Ifthemaximumacceptablenonpriorserviceinputtoreserveforcescanbedeterminedandifactive-forceseparationandreserveaffiliationratesareknown,anupperlimitontheratioofreservetoactiveforcescanbedetermined.
Cost
Activeandreserveforceoperatingcostshaveoftenbeencomparedonaper-unitorper-aircraftbasis.Thatis,theoperatingcostsofreserveunitsarecomparedwiththoseofsimilaractiveunits.Thiscostcomparisonapproachassumesequalavailabilityandemployabilityofactiveandreserveunits.Suchanassumptionisappropriateforemploymentofforcesinmajortheaterwar(MTW)orsomelarge-scalemilitaryoperationsotherthanwar(OOTW)scenarios,where
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call-upofreserveforcescanmakethemfullysubstitutableforactiveforcesformanyrequirements(thosethatarecompatiblewithstatutorycall-uplimitations).
However,inmostOOTWorsmaller-scalecontingency(SSC)scenarios,thiscostcomparisonapproachisnotappropriate.
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Sustaineddeployments,suchasthoserelatedtopeacekeepinginBosniaorenforcementofno-flyzonesinIraq,generatedemandsthat,givenacceptabledurationsandfrequenciesofdeployment,aredifferentfromMTWdemands.Shortofcall-up,reserveforcesfacealimitonacceptablefrequencyanddurationofemploymentthatismuchtighterthanthatofactiveforces.Thus,inmeetingthesedemands,reserveforcesarenotfullysubstitutableforactiveforces.AnappropriatecostcomparisonforOOTWandSSCscenariosmustbebasedonoutputsusefulinthesescenarios.Arelevantoutputisthenumberofdaysperyearthatanaircraftwithappropriateaircrewsandlogisticsupportcanbedeployed.Thecostperoutputisthencomputedasannualaircraftoperatingcostsdividedbydeployableaircraftdaysperyear.
IntegratingtheSixFactors
Figure2.1providesaschemeforintegratingthesixfactorsdiscussedabove.ThefiguredepictsasetofconstraintsontheproportionofthetotalforcethatisintheRC.Arrowsontheboundarylinesindicatetheexpecteddirectionoftheconstraint.Thefiguresuggeststhatsomeoftheseconstraintsmightvaryasafunctionoftotalforcesize.Insubsequentchapters,wewillindicatewhatwebelievetobetheapproximatelocioftheseconstraintsinsomecontexts.
Thefiguredepictssocialandpoliticalconsiderationsestablishinglower-boundconstraintsontheproportionofthetotalforceintheRC.Politicalutilitiesdependinpartonthetotalforcemaintainingavisiblepresence,witheitheractiveorreserveforces,inlocalcommunities.Astotalforcesizedecreases,reserveforceswillbecalledupontoprovidethepresence,andtheymustthereforeconstitute,atminimum,alargerproportionofthetotalforce.Thus,thepoliticalconstraintisrepresentedbyaslopingline.Thesocialconstraintsuggeststhatthereserveforcesmustoccupysomeminimumconstantproportionofthe
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forceinordertoinfluencethevaluesandcultureofthetotalforce.
Readinessandavailabilityconsiderationssetupperboundsonreserveforces.Weassumeaconstantdemandforimmediatelyandcontinuouslyavailableforcesthatmustbemetprimarilybyusingactiveforces.Asthetotalforcebecomessmaller,thisconstantde-
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Figure2.1AFrameworkforConsideringMultipleForce-Mix
PrinciplesSimultaneously
mandcallsforanincreasingproportionoftheforcetobesuppliedbytheactivecomponent(representedbyaslopingavailabilityconstraintlineinFigure2.1).Asdiscussedaboveandinmoredetaillater,therearegenerallynoappreciablereadinessdifferencesbetweenAirForceactiveandreserveforces.Thus,readinessdoesnotconstrainthemix.
Thepersonnelflowconstraintalsosetsanupperbound.TheRCdependsonacriticalflowofhumancapitalfromtheAC.ThereissomeratioofACtoRCsizebeyondwhichthiscriticalflowcannolongerbesustained.Inthesteadystate,thisratiowouldnotvarywithtotalforcesize.
Takentogether,theseconstraintsformafeasibleregioninwhichaforcemixwouldsimultaneouslysatisfytheprinciplesrepresentedbytheconstraints.Aspecificforcemixintheregioncanthenbetargetedonthebasisofcostconsiderations.Asmentionedabove,re-
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serveforceshavebeenconventionallyviewedaslesscostlythanac-tiveforces,indicatingthattheforcemixshouldbealongtheborderformedbytheupper-boundconstraints.However,ifreserveforcesarefoundtobemorecostlythanactiveforcesinmeetingOOTWandSSCdemands(seeChapterSix),thedirectioninwhichcostconsiderationsdrivetheforcewilldependontheneedbeingmet.Itmaybenecessaryforforce-structureplannerstochoosebetweenalarger,morereserve-intensiveforcethatbettermeetsMTWdemands,andanequal-cost,smaller,moreactive-intensiveforcethatbettermeetsOOTW/SSCdemands.
Notethatwedepictnofeasibleregionatsmallerforcesizes.Inthisforcesizerange,thegoalofkeepingreserveforceslargeenoughtoobtainpoliticalutilitiesmightconflictwiththegoalofkeepingenoughactiveforcestomeetrapiddeploymentdemands.Similarly,itispossiblethatinsomecontextstheupper-boundpersonnelflowconstraintwilllietotheleftofthelower-boundsocialconstraint,sothatthereisnofeasibleregionatanyforcesize.Whenthereisnofeasibleregion,force-structuredecisionmakersmustmaketradeoffsbetweenconflictingprinciples.
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ChapterThreeSocialAndPoliticalConsiderations
Introduction
ThearmedforcesoftheUnitedStatesdonotandcannotoperateinisolationfromthelargerAmericansociety.Theyarepartofapolitywhoseneedstheymustserve.Moreover,towinthetrustandsupportofthelargerpolity,thearmedservicesmustbewidelyperceivedasservingimportantsocialneeds.Withoutthistrustandsupport,thearmedforceswillnotgettheresourcestheyneedtofunctioneffectively.
WearguethattheAirForcecansecuresupportbyunderstandingandmanagingthreekindsoflinkagesbetweenthemilitaryandsociety(Kestnbaum,1998).Theselinkagestaketheformofasharedvaluesystem,asharedsocialstructure,andsharedinterestsandattachments.WefurtherarguethatbecausetheRChasconsiderablymoreopportunityforinteractionwithciviliansociety,itisbettersituatedthantheACtodevelopthesethreelinkages.TheRCcancommunicatethedesiresandexpectationsofciviliansocietytothetotalforceandcan,inturn,communicatethemissionsandneedsofthearmedforcestociviliansociety,thuslimitingoverallisolationofthearmedforcesfromsociety.
Inthischapter,wefirstexplainthetheoreticalframeworkofhoweachoftheselinkagesworkstoincreasetheattachmentbetweenthearmedforcesandsociety.Wethenexamineanumberofsocialandpoliticalfactorsthathaveabearingonthestrengthoftheselinkages.Finally,weassesshowthesesocialandpoliticalconsiderationsshouldoperatetoconstraintheforcemix.
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TheoreticalFramework
Thefirstpotentiallinkagebetweenthearmedforcesandsocietyisasharedvaluesystem.Sharedvaluesinademocraticsocietymightrelatetosuchissuesasdiversityandinclusion,citizenshiprightsinrelationtoobligations,closenessofthemilitarytothepeopleitissupposedtoprotect,responsivenessofthegovernmenttoitspeople,theprotectionofdemocracyfromcentralismandtyranny,andlimitationsonadventurism.Theoperativemechanismtoestablishthislinkageisidentification,wherebypeoplecanlookacrossinstitutionaldividesandfindotherswhosharetheirvaluesorideals.Citizenswhoidentifywiththeirarmedforcesaremorelikelytosupportthem.
Thesecondpotentiallinkageisanetworkofsharedsocialstructuresthroughwhichmilitarymembersareintertwinedwiththeirciviliancounterparts.Sharedsocialstructurescanbefoundintheworkplace,schools,churches,communityserviceorpoliticalorganizations,oreventhroughbeingincommonsocialpositions,suchasmiddle-classtaxpayersinasmalltown.ComparedwiththeAC,membersoftheRCarelikelytohavemanymoresuchsharedstructureswiththeciviliancommunitiesofwhichtheyareapart.Theoperativemechanismtoestablishthislinkageisembeddedness,wherebypeoplewhoareseparatedbyinstitutionalboundariesinonesphere(militaryversuscivilian)arelinkedwithcommoninstitutionsinotherspheres.Anarmedforceembeddedintolargersocietywillhavemoreopportunitiestounderstandandbeunderstoodbycivilians.
Finally,theRCpromotesgreatersharedinterestsandattachmentsbetweenthoseinthearmedforcesandciviliansociety,thethirdlinkage.Forexample,veteransmaintainaninterestinthemilitary;thenumberofveteransinsocietyisarguablygreaterwithalargerRC.Also,themobilizationofreservistsgeneratesinterestamongothersintheircommunities.Theoperativemechanismtoestablishthislinkage
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isinvestment,throughwhichpeoplebecomeinterestedinpersonsandinstitutionsbyvirtueoftheirconnectionsandattachmentstothesepeople.Acitizenryinvestedinitsarmedforcesismorelikelytosupportthem.
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SocialandPoliticalFactors
Anumberofsocialandpoliticalfactorshavebeenofferedasargumentsforreserveforces:
ThemaintenanceofstatemilitiasasentitiesseparatefromanationalarmedforceiswrittenintotheConstitution.
TheRCincreasesthepublic'sawarenessandtrustofmilitaryinstitutions.
Publicreactiontoreservecall-upsprovidesacheckonexcessiveuseofthemilitary.
TheRCismorerepresentativeofsocietythantheAC.
TheRCincreasespoliticalsupportforthearmedforces.
TheNationalGuardservesspecificstateroles.
Eachofthesesocialandpoliticalfactorswouldworkthroughthemechanismsofidentification,embeddedness,and/orinvestmenttoincreasetheconnectionsbetweensocietyandthemilitary.
Beyondthefactthatsuchfactorsarguefortheexistenceofthereserves,itisalsoreasonabletoconsidersuchfactorsinforce-mixdecisions,supplyingdecisionmakerswithcompellingreasonstomaintainsomeminimumproportionoftheforceintheRC.Itmaybemoredifficulttoquantifyhowthesesocialandpoliticalconsiderationsshouldaffecttheforcemixthanitwouldbetoquantifyhowotherfactorssuchascost,effectiveness,orpersonnelflowshoulddoso.Yetwithoutthelinkagesandsupportthatthesesocialandpoliticalconsiderationsembody,themilitarywillbelessabletogathertheresourcesitneeds.Perhapsmoreimportant,theconsiderationsoffersomethingofabasisformaintaininganRCwithinademocraticsociety.
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Militia-NationConsiderations
ThetraditionofcitizensoldiersintheUnitedStatesdatesbacktobeforethenationwasborn,andthenfurtherbackintoAnglo-SaxontraditioninEngland.PartofourromanticunderstandingoftheRevolutionaryWaristhatoffarmerslayingdowntheirplowsand
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pickinguptheirmusketstodrillandthentoserve.TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesreflectsthistraditionandclearlylaysthegroundworkfortheexistenceofpart-timesoldiers,astheexcerptsinTable3.1demonstrate.
Section8ofArticleIgivesCongressthepowertofederalizethemilitiaasameanstoachievebroadergovernmentobjectivessuchassecurityandstability.However,themilitiaisclearlynotafederalforcesincetherearecertainrightsandresponsibilitiesreservedtothestates,suchasofficerappointmentsandtraining.Infact,Section2ofArticleIIdistinctlyseparatestheregularforces,whichnowin-
Table3.1TheMilitiaintheConstitutionandtheBillofRights
ArticleI,Section8
TheCongressshallhavePowerTolayandcollectTaxes,Duties,ImpostsandExcises,topaytheDebtsandprovideforthecommonDefenseandgeneralWelfareoftheUnitedStates;butallDuties,ImpostsandExcisesshallbeuniformthroughouttheUnitedStates;ToprovideforcallingforththeMilitiatoexecutetheLawsoftheUnion,suppressInsurrectionsandrepelInvasions;Toprovidefororganizing,arming,anddiscipliningtheMilitia,andforgoverningsuchPartofthemasmaybeemployedintheServiceoftheUnitedStates,reservingtotheStatesrespectively,theAppointmentoftheOfficers,andtheAuthorityoftrainingtheMilitiaaccordingtothedisciplineprescribedbyCongress;AndTomakeallLawswhichshallbenecessaryandproperforcarryingintoExecutiontheforegoingPowers,andallotherPowers
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vestedbythisConstitutionintheGovernmentoftheUnitedStates,orinanyDepartmentorOfficerthereof.
ArticleII,Section2
ThePresidentshallbeCommanderinChiefoftheArmyandNavyoftheUnitedStates,andoftheMilitiaoftheseveralStates,whencalledintotheactualServiceoftheUnitedStates.
AmendmentII
AwellregulatedMilitia,beingnecessarytothesecurityofafreeState,therightofthepeopletokeepandbearArms,shallnotbeinfringed.
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cludetheAirForceaswellastheArmyandNavy,fromthemilitia,orNationalGuard.
Thisconstitutionallanguagewasacompromisebetweentwofactionsofthedocument'sdrafterstheFederalists,whowantedastrongnationalgovernment,andtheAnti-Federalists,whowantedtoensurestates'rights.TheFederalistsinsertedtheclausethatgrantsCongressthepowertocallforththemilitia.TheAnti-Federalistswantedtomakesurethestateswouldhaveaccesstothemilitiatobalancethepowerfulcentralgovernment,sotheSecondAmendmentwasincorporatedintotheBillofRights.Thelanguageinthisamendmentisoftenunderstoodinalimitedsenseastherighttobeararms.However,therighttobeararmsshouldbeunderstoodinthecontextofmaintainingalocalmilitiathatcanbeusedbythestates.
ThemilitiawasunderstoodbydraftersoftheConstitutiontobeacrucialmeanstocertainendsthatcannotbebetterservedbyenlargingthestandingarmybecausethetwoinstitutionsarefundamentallydifferent.Kohn(1997)suggeststhatthemilitiaisanarmedcountervailingpowertopreventtheregularmilitaryfrombecomingtoostrongandtoensurethatcivilianshavecontrolovermilitaryaffairs.Heseesthiscountervailingpowerasnecessarytopreventtyrannyofastrongcentralgovernmentbasedonmilitarycontrolandtheadventurismofsuchagovernmentattemptingtoincreaseitsspanofcontrolbytryingtoconquerothernations.ThefoundingfatherssawexamplesoftheserisksalloverEurope.
Anotherendthatthemilitiaservesisoneofcitizenship,assuggestedbyKestnbaum(1997).Democraticsocietyisstrengthenedwhenrightsofparticipationinthedemocracyareearnedinthedefenseofthenation.Also,ademocraticarmedforcemustremainrootedinthepeoplebymakingsurethatasubstantialportiondonotseethemselvesstrictlyascareermilitarybutinsteadidentifywithciviliansandplan
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toreturntocivilianlife.
ThoughtheConstitutioncallsforamilitia,itdoesnotofferdirect,specificpurchaseonthequestionofsizingtheNationalGuard.Atitsheart,theConstitutionisadocumentembodyingthesharedvaluesofoursociety,andtheexistenceoftheRCisanexpressionofthesevalues.ThefunctionoftheRCinthisinstanceistohelpmaintain
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thedemocracyandenhanceitsvalue.Decisionmakersneedtobeawareofthisfunctionwhensizingthetotalforce.
PublicAwareness/TrustofMilitaryInstitutions
TheRCservestopromotepublicawarenessandtrustofmilitaryinstitutionsbyprovidingcivilianscontactwiththemilitaryandbyprovidingmilitarymemberscontactwithciviliansociety.
CivilianContactwiththeMilitary
Thecontacthypothesissuggeststhatonerolereservistsplayiscommunicatingtheculture,structures,andgoalsofthemilitarytoawiderpublic.ThisrolehasnotgoneunrecognizedwithintheRCcommunity.McDonald(1996)exhortsreserveofficerstodeveloplinkswiththecommunityandtotrytoenhancetheimageofthereservesthroughthemedia.''Youngofficersrepresentanimportantlinkbetweenthearmedforcesandtheciviliansocietyandarefirst-classmilitaryambassadors.Theyarekeyplayersinpromotingabroaderunderstandingoftheimportanceofourmilitarydefense"(p.34).
Contactbetweenthemilitaryandsocietyprovidesanentranceforpositivemilitaryvaluesintothebroaderculture.Forexample,militarysociologistCharlesMoskosandhisassociates(e.g.,MoskosandButler,1996)havelongmadetheargumentthatthemilitaryhasahigherpercentageofAfricanAmericanmanagersthananyotheremploymentsectoroftheU.S.economy.Thesemanagersare,ofcourse,themembersoftheofficercorps.Inthemilitary,whitesaremuchmorelikelytoreportto,andtakedirectordersfrom,blacksthantheyareinthecivilianeconomy.RCmemberswhoaremanagedbyminorityofficersinthemilitarywillbeabletorecognizeandcommunicatethevalueofdiversityintheircivilianjobs.
CiviliancontactwiththemilitaryisenhancedbythefactthattheRC,
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particularlytheANG,isbydesignfarmoregeographicallydispersedthantheAC.AsindicatedinFigure3.1,75percentoftheAirForceACisconcentratedin13states,whereas75percentoftheRCisspreadover25states.Foroperationalreasonsrelatedtoheavydeploymentdemand,theACcanbemademoreefficientandlessstressedbyconcentratingitonasmallernumberoflarger-scaleinstallations.IfsuchrebasingweretooccurwithintheAC,theRC'srelativelygreatergeographicaldispersalwouldtakeonevengreater
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Figure3.1ReserveComponentsAreGeographicallyDispersed
importanceasanavenuetoincreaseopportunitiesforcontactbetweenciviliansandthemilitary.
MilitaryContactwithCivilians
Theflipsideofpublicsupportformilitaryinstitutionsismilitarymembers'understandingofthelargersociety.Althoughactive-dutymembersofthemilitarymayhavesignificantcontactwithciviliansintheirdailylivesandjobs,theymayalsobeisolatedfromthem,especiallyifstationedonaremotebaseorabroad.Themilitarybrancheshavetakenconsiderablecaretodevelopculturesthatreflectcertainvalues,withaneyetowardmakingabetter,stronger,andmorecohesivefightingforce.Thesevaluesmaynotbesharedor,ifshared,followedbylargersociety.Ricks(1997)tellsofMarinesafterbootcampbeingfacedwithakindofcultureshockwhentheygohomeonleave.Civiliansare"abunchoffreaks"(p.233);"overweight,andalittlesloppy"(p.228);"self-destructive,nottrying,justgoofingaround"(p.229);''losers"(p.229);"peoplewithobnoxiousattitudes,nopolitenesswhatsoever,nasty"(p.231).OneMarine,freshoutofbootcampsays"Defendingmycountry?Well,it'snotreallymy
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country.ImayliveinAmerica,buttheUnitedStatesissoscrewedup"(p.236).
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Thequotations,althoughnotarepresentativesample,aretellingandareacauseforconcern.Membersofthemilitaryaresworntoprotectandservethelargersociety.Thepotentialdangerliesinanarmedforcethatdecidesthatitisabovesocietyorthatsocietyisnotworthyofprotection.Whilewedonotconsiderthisalikelyoutcome,itistheworst-caseconsequenceofamilitarythatbecomestooremoteanddisconnectedfromthegeneralcitizenryandtheirvalues.
Infact,membersofthemilitaryareverydifferentfromciviliansintermsoftheirpoliticalaffiliation.Ina1997OlinInstitutepaper(alsocitedintheWallStreetJournal,1997),Holstifoundthatthemilitaryisnotablyconservativeandpartisan.In1976,33percentofthemilitaryand25percentofthecivilianopinionleaderssurveyedidentifiedthemselvesasRepublicans.1By1996,67percentofthemilitaryopinionleaderswereRepublicans,whereasonly34percentofthecivilianleaderswere.Thissignificant,radicalshifttotherightisevenmorepronouncedamongyoungermilitaryopinionleaders:92percentofthosebornafter1954areRepublican.TheWallStreetJournalarticlecitesanunnamedthree-stargeneralwhoclaimsthatthe"singlegreatestdangerfacingtheU.S.militarytoday[is]thepossibilitythatapoliticizedmilitarywillstaythatway,growinglessandlessresponsivetociviliancontrolovertime."
Reservistsofferabridgebetweenthemilitaryandlargersocietybecause,asfull-timeemployeeswithinandgenerallylonger-termresidentsoftheirrespectivecommunities,theyenjoygreaterembeddednessinsharedsocialstructuresthantheirACcounterparts.WhereasACairmenandofficersmayalsohavecontactwithcivilians,theircontactsaregenerallylessextensiveandlesswelldevelopedthanthatoftheirRCcounterparts.TheRCisbettersituatedthantheACtomakeknowntheAirForce'smissionsandneedstocivilians
1Inthisstudy,asurveysamplewasdrawnfrom4000opinionleaders
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whosenameshadbeenderivedfromsuchgeneralsourcesasWho'sWhoinAmericaandWho'sWhoofAmericanWomen,aswellasmorespecializeddirectorieslistingleadersinoccupationsthatareunderrepresentedinWho'sWho,includingmedialeaders,politicians,militaryofficers,laborleaders,StateDepartmentandForeignServiceOfficers,andforeignpolicyexpertsoutsidegovernment.ThemilitarysampleincludedstudentsattheNationalWarCollegeandasmallernumberofsenioruniformedPentagonofficerswhosenamesweredrawnrandomlyfromtheCongressionalDirectory.
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andinabetterpositiontounderstandthevaluesandinterestsofciviliansandconveythesebacktothetotalforce.
ImplicationsfortheForceMix
Theforce-miximplicationsofincreasedopportunityformilitary/civiliancontactarerelatedtohowtheviewsandideasofaminoritygrouparerespectedbythemajority.Inthiscase,theissueiswhetherabetterappreciationofthevaluesandinterestsofthelargersocietyfoundamongmembersoftheRC(aminority)canbeeffectivelycommunicatedtomembersoftheAC(amajority).Insightcanbefoundintheliteratureonorganizations.Kanter(1977)offersatypologyofminoritygroupsbasedontheirlevelofrepresentationinanorganization.Herworkfocusesonwomenintheworkplace,butthereasoningcanbeextendedtoanysituationwhereless-representedindividualsaretryingtomakeanimpactinalargergroup.
InKanter'ssystem,auniformgroupisonewheremembersareallinonecategory.Askewedgroupisonewheremostofthepeopleareofonetype,perhapsmakingup85percentofthewhole.Membersoftheminoritygroupwouldberareenoughtoappearastokensandwouldfaceheightenedperformancepressures,sincetheirsuccessesmaybediscountedbuttheirfailureshighlypublicizedandscrutinized.Moreseriously,socialisolationwouldmakeit"difficultfor[thesemembers]togenerateanalliancethatcanbecomepowerfulinthegroup"(p.209).Intiltedgroups,thesplitislesssevere,withperhaps65percentofmembersinonegroupand35percentintheother.Kantercharacterizesthelargergroupinthisrangeasamajorityandmembersofthesmallergroupasaminorityratherthanastokens.Here,"minoritymembershavepotentialalliesamongeachother,canformcoalitions,andcanaffectthecultureofthegroup.Theybegintobecomeindividualsdifferentiatedfromeachotheraswellasatypedifferentiatedfromthemajority"(p.209).Atratiosof60:40through
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50:50,themajorityandminoritymembersarebalancedandcanbecomedistinctive"subgroupsthatmayormaynotgenerateactualtype-basedidentifications''(p.209).
FortheRCtobetakenseriouslytobeabletoformacoalitionthatcanbeheardthisanalysiswouldsuggestthatmaintainingthestatusofminorityratherthantokenisnecessary.Kanterisnotclearontheproportionatwhichmembersofasubgroupceasetobetokens
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andachieveminoritystatus.2Indeed,thiscanbeexpectedtovarybysituation.However,onepossiblereadingoftheworkisthatasubgroupacquiresminoritystatuswithaslittleas20percentorasmuchas40percentofthepopulation.ThisindicatesthattheRCshouldconstituteaminimumproportionofthetotalAirForceinthe2040percentrangestoensureithassufficient"voice."ThisassumesthattheANGandAFRcanjointogetherinacoalitiontorepresenttheviewpointsofthecitizen-soldier.
Kanter'sargumentsabouttokenismandhowproportionsofminoritiesaffecttheirperceivedinfluencewerebasedonobservingfemalesintheworkplaceintheearly1970s.Inherexample,companymanagementdidnotprovidetheleadershiprequiredtoreducediscriminationagainstwomenwithintheorganization.Inmanycases,womenfounditdifficulttodotheirjobseffectivelybecauseofeffortstosubvertthematalllevelsoftheorganization.Thelevelofminorityrepresentationsheoffersasapointatwhichminoritiescanbeheard(35percent)isprobablyafunctionofthisproblematicsituation.
Incontrast,RCmembersperformingtheirjobsamongACmembersmightnotbeasnoticeableasfemaleswouldbeinapredominatelymaleenvironment.Indeed,itisquestionablewhetherACofficersandairmeninfactviewRCindividualsasbeingofdistinctandlowerstatus.Also,theAirForcedoeshaveexperienceintegratingaminoritygroupintoitsranks.ThehistoryofremovingracialbarriersblockingAfricanAmericanparticipationinthearmedservicesoffersafascinatingexampleofhowstrongleadershipenabledanorganizationtogivelietotheargumentthatsocialcohesionresultingfromracialsimilarityisacriticalfactorinunitperformance(RostkerandHarris,1993).StrongcivilianandmilitaryleadershipthatfocusedonlegislatingacceptablebehaviorsofwhitesratherthanonchangingattitudeshelpedcreatetheintegratedAirForcethatweobservetoday.
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2Otherresearchongendertokenismfindsadifferentrangeofeffects.Southetal.(1982)findthat"tokenwomenarenotfoundtofacemoresevereorganizationalpressuresthannontokens"(p.587).Yoder(1991)findsthatthestudiedpressuresonwomen"occuronlyfortokenwomeningender-inappropriateoccupations,"whereasintheAirForce,RCmembersarenotininappropriateoccupations.Izraeli(1983),however,generallysupportsKanter'sworkontokenism.
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ItisextremelydoubtfulthatmembersoftheRCareinapositionanalogoustothatofAfricanAmericansbeforeintegration(orofwomeninKanter'sstudy).Incontrast,theRCiswellintegratedintothefunctioningofthetotalforce.Moreover,themessageremainsthatastrong,effective,andeducatedleadershipcanensurethatmembersoftheRCaretreatedwithrespect.Thus,webelievethataconstrainttowardtheminimum(20percent)ofKanter's"minoritystatus"rangeofthresholdswouldbesufficienttoensurethattheRChaseffectivevoiceinthetotalforce.
LinkingForceEmploymenttoPublicSupport
AftertheVietnamWar,themilitarydevelopeditstotalforcepolicy,whichithasmaintainedtothepresentday.Binkin(1993,pp.110111)offersaconsidereddiscussionofthebasisforthispolicyanditsviability.
AsrelatedbyBinkin,GeneralCreightonAbrams,afterthearmedforces'Vietnamexperience,advocatedacloseoperationalassociationbetweentheactiveArmyandtheRCtokeeptheACfrombeingsenttoawarwithouttheinvolvementoftheRC.TheRCwouldbridgethegapbetweentheactivemilitaryandAmericancitizens,sothattheactivemilitarywouldbelessisolatedincaseofwar.Hence,"ifreservesmustbeactivatedinordertosustainactiveforcesinanythingmorethanlimitedcontingencies,presidentswillbelessinclined(andpoliticallylessable)tobecomeinvolvedinmilitaryactionswithoutextensivenationaldebateandpoliticalconsensus."(Lacy,1986;alsocitedinBinkin.)
Thetotalforcepolicyincreasesthepossibilitythatcivilianswillbeacquaintedwithsomeonewhoisservinginthetheaterofwar,andpossiblysomeonewhobecomeswoundedorkilled.Inshort,sincemembersoftheRCareembeddedinsociety,theirfriendsandcoworkerswillhaveahigherprobabilityofbeingdirectlytiedto
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someonemakingasacrificeforthecountry.Thetotalforcepolicybringsthewarhometoalargernumberofcivilians.Ifonlymilitarycareerprofessionalswereinvolved,theboundariesaroundwhogetskilledorwoundedcouldkeepthewaronanintellectualandless-emotionallevelforthosecivilianswithoutfriendsorcoworkerswhoareservingandsacrificing.Thus,usingtheRCensuresaninvolvedsociety.
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Binkin(pp.149151)teststhispropositionusingdatafromthePersianGulfconflict,reachingmuchthesameconclusionsasaRANDreport(RAND,1992,pp.9597).(Infactthetwoauthoritiesciteeachotheronthistopic.)BinkinplotsGalluppolldataonpublicsupportforthewaragainstreservemobilizations,showingthatsupportforthewardeclinedasreserveswerebeingcalledup.Hedoesnotdefinitivelystatethattherewasacause-and-effectrelationshipbetweenthetwofactors,buthesuggeststhatsupportmighthavedeclinedfurtheriftheconflicthadbeenlongerandthenumberofAmericancasualtieshadincreased.Publicopiniondidnotnecessarilyactasabrakeintheshortandrelativelyunbloody(forAmericans)conflict.RANDcitesanecdotalevidencethat"mobilizationofreservesalsomobilizedsupportofthewar"andthatemployerssupportedtheirreservistemployees(p.96).However,thereisnostrongevidenceeitherwaythatintegratingthereserveswiththeactivemilitaryhelpsmaintainsupportordiminishesit.
RAND(1992)concludesthatifdecisionmakersconsiderthatintegrationofthecomponentsoftheforceisimportantandnecessary,thenthisisapoliticalreasontoshapetheforceinsuchaway.Theresultinginteractionproducesacitizenrythatknowsandcaresmoreaboutthemilitaryandtheinstitutionandmaybemorelikelytoparticipateknowledgeablyinanypublicdebateaboutforceemployment.Peoplemaybemorelikelytosupportfundingforthearmedforcessothatthosetheyknowwillbebetterpreparedintheeventofmilitaryaction.
However,theseanalysesofferlittleornopurchaseontheproportionofthetotalforcethatmustbeintheRC.IfthethesisunderlyingthetotalforcepolicyisvalidthatusingtheRCimposesacheckoninappropriatemilitaryactionandcreatespublicsupportforthoseactionsthatareundertakenresearchershaveofferednohypothesesonhowmanypeoplemusthavecontactwithRCmemberstoobtainthose
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effects.
RepresentativeForceIssues
Krislov(1974)suggeststhatonemethodofsecuringbroadsocialsupportforgovernmentpolicyandactionistodrawarepresentativesegmentofsocietyintothegovernment.Doingsopromotesbothinvestmentinthevaluesofandidentificationwiththeinterestsofthe
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governmentonthepartofallsegmentsofsociety.AppliedtotheAirForceforce-mixquestion,thisperspectivewouldarguetoincreaseproportionsoftheforcethataremoredemographicallyrepresentativeanddecreasethosethatarenot.Todeterminetherelativerepresentativenessofthevariouscomponents,wereviewedDoDdemographicdataonofficersandenlistedpersonnelbothatcurrentstrengthsandamongnewaccessions(DoD,1997).
GenderDiversity
Figure3.2showsthepercentageofwomenintheofficercorpsaswellasnewofficeraccessionsinfiscalyear1996.Figure3.3doesthesamefortheenlistedranks.
Ofthethreebranches,theAFRhasbyfarthehighestpercentageofactivefemaleofficers,atover24percent,whiletheANGhastheleastdiverseofficercorpsofthethreecomponents,beingonly13.4percentfemale.
Allthreecomponentsareattractingfemaleofficersatahigherpercentagethantheircurrentrepresentation,withnewfemaleofficers
Figure3.2PercentageofFemaleOfficersandOfficerAccessionsinthe
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TotalForceAmongThreeAFComponents,FY1996
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Figure3.3PercentageofFemaleEnlistedMembersandEnlistedAccessions
intheTotalForceAmongThreeAFComponents,FY1996
intheAFRmakingupalmost28percentofthetotal.Ifthetrendismaintained,itwillleadtoagradualincreaseinthepercentageoffemaleofficersinthethreebranches.Thus,thelevelofgenderdiversityamongofficersintheAirForcecouldbeincreasedbymakingtheAFRlargerrelativetotheothertwocomponents.
Fortheenlistedcorps,theAFRisagainthemostgender-representativecomponent.Infiscalyear1996,19.1percentofthemembersoftheAFRwerefemale,whereaswomenmadeup16.9percentoftheACand15.1percentoftheANG.TheANGagainhastheleastgenderdiversityintheAirForce.
However,ofthethreecomponents,theACisrecruitingthelargestpercentageofenlistedfemales,at26percent.Ifthistrendcontinues,theACshouldsurpasstheAFRasthemostgender-representativecomponent.TheAFRlagsbehind,with21.4percentofitsnewrecruitsbeingfemale.Again,theANGattractsthesmallestproportionofnewfemalerecruits,at17.7percent.However,allthreecomponentsarerecruitingfemalesathigherlevels,whichovertime
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willincreasethepercentageoffemaleenlistedairmen.Thus,thelevelof
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genderdiversityamongenlistedpersonnelintheAirForcecouldbeincreasedbymakingtheAFRandAClargerrelativetotheANG.
Wenotethatouranalysesofgenderrepresentationwereconductedatanaggregateratherthananoccupationallevel.Someoccupationshavebeen,historically,morefemale-intensivethanothers.Thus,itispossiblethatgenderdifferencesamongthecomponentsreflectdifferencesintheoccupationalmixamongthecomponents.
Racial/EthnicDiversity.Figure3.4breaksdownthenumbersfortheofficercorpsandforofficeraccessionsofthethreecomponentsinfiscalyear1996intermsofracial/ethnicdiversity.Figure3.5providesthesameinformationforenlistedpersonnel.
Asthefigureshows,therearefewmajorracial/ethnicdifferencesamongACandRCofficers.TheANGhasthehighestpercentageofHispanicofficers,whereastheACleadsinpercentageofblacks.However,thedifferencesarenotgreat.
Figure3.4PercentageofMinorityOfficersandOfficerAccessionsAmong
ThreeAFComponentsintheTotalForce,FY1996
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Figure3.5PercentageofMinorityEnlistedPersonnelandEnlistedAccessions
AmongThreeAFComponentsintheTotalForce,FY1996
Forofficeraccessions,thereareagainonlyslightdifferencesinrecruitmentpatternsofminorities.TheANGexceedstheothertwocomponentsinitsrecruitmentofHispanics.TheAChasthehighesttotalproportionofminorityaccessions.
AsshowninFigure3.5,theenlistedranksaremarkedlymoreracially/ethnicallydiversethantheofficercorps.Inparticular,theAFRhasahighpercentageofblacks,at18percent.DifferencesamongthecomponentsregardingparticipationbyHispanicsarelessmarked,withtheANGhavingthehighestproportioninitscurrentstrengthandtheACrecruitingthelargestproportion.TheANGleadsinthe"other"category,whichincludesAsians,NativeAmericans,andPacificIslanders.Wecannotdrawclearconclusionsaboutwhichcomponentdoesthebestjobofrecruitingandretainingminorities.
ImplicationsfortheForceMix
WefoundthattheRCismorediversethantheACinsomegenderandracial/ethniccategoriesandlessdiverseinothers.Thus,representativenessdoesnotargueforshiftingtheproportionofthe
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forcetowardeithertheRCortheAC.
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InfluenceofVeteransInSociety
Holdingforcecostsconstant,alargerRCproportionresultsinalargertotalforceand,arguably,producesmoreveterans(memberswithsomemilitaryservice).3Theinfluenceoftheseveteranscanbepositiveindefense-relatedmatters.Inaddition,veteranshavetiestoothersinsocietyandcanthusincreaseunderstandingofthemilitaryamongthosewithwhomtheycomeintocontact.
ButlerandJohnson(1991)studiedhowAmericansfeltaboutfiscalsupportforthemilitary(spendingonarmsandforeignaid,inparticular),theobligationtoserve,theoverallqualityofthemilitary,andminoritiesinthemilitaryandopportunitiesforminoritiesserving.TheyanalyzeddatafromtheGeneralSocialSurvey,abiennialnationalsurveyofadultsnotlivingininstitutionalsettings(suchashospitals,prisons,andmilitarybarracks).Theypooleddatafrom1982,1983,and1984togenerateasamplewithalargernumberofveteransandAfricanAmericans.Generally,theyfindthat,holdingotherfactorsconstant,veterans,olderpeople,andsouthernersaremorelikelytosupportthemilitary,whilemorehighlyeducatedpeoplearelesssupportiveofthemilitary.Characteristicshavinglittleeffectincluderaceandincome.Ofimportancehereistheirfindingthatmilitaryserviceincreasessupportforthemilitary.
Ivie,Gimbel,andElder(1991)analyzeddataonmenandwomenwhowereborninthe1920stoseeifmilitaryexperiencesinWorldWarIIandKoreaaffectedtheirattitudestowardthemilitary.Theyfindthatbeingaveteranorbeingmarriedtoaveteran,havingachildwhoservedinthemilitary,andmaintainingsocialtieswithfriendsfromtheserviceincreasesupportformilitarypreparedness.4
3Holdingcostsconstant,alargerRCproportionresultsinasmallerACandanRCthatincreasesbymorethanthedecreaseintheAC.SomeproportionofthelargerRCrequirementwouldbemetusingnonprior
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serviceresources.IfthosenonpriorserviceresourcesturnoveratthesameorhigherratesthanthesmallernumberofACresourcestheydisplace,theresultwillbemoreveterans.Althoughwedonothaveseparateturnoverforprior-serviceandnonpriorservicereservists,wenotethatturnoverintheRCisgenerallyhigherthanturnoverintheAC.4Supportformilitarypreparednessismeasuredbyafive-pointscalerangingfrom"stronglydisagree"to"stronglyagree,"indexingsupportforthefollowingfourstatements:(1)Astrongdefenseshouldbethenumber-oneprioritytoday,rankingabovesocialneedsandabalancedbudget;(2)RegistrationforthedraftisneededtoensureastrongAmerica;(3)Militarytrainingshouldreceivestrongsupportinourcollegesand
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Similarly,ButlerandJohnson(1991)findthatveteranstatusispositivelyrelatedtosupportforthemilitary.
MilitaryexperienceisincreasinglyrareamongmembersofCongress.Withinthelast25years,thepercentageofmemberswithanymilitaryexperiencehasfallenfrom70.6to35.8percent.5WithfewerveteransinCongress,thereisagreaterpossibilitythatmilitaryappropriationswillfallshortofneeds.6
PoliticalInfluenceoftheRC
MembersoftheRCcanusetheirextensivepoliticalnetworkstogarnernationalsupportforthearmedforces.TheANG,inparticular,hasmembersinall50stateswhocanlobbytheircongressionalrepresentativesinsupportoftheirgoals.EvenwithoutactivelobbyingbytheRC,congressionalinterestinmaintainingalocalmilitarypresence,perhapsbecauseofjobs,willenhancethelikelihoodthatCongresswillvoteinsupportofparticularACorRCgoals.
OneexampleistheperpetualoverfundingofC130transportaircraftprocurement.Yearafteryear,Congress,perhapslobbiedbyeithertheaircraftmanufacturerorlocalreservecomponents,fundsprocurementofmoreC130sthantheAirForcerequests.7TheextrasfindahomeintheRC,whereinfactalargeportionoftheairliftmissionexists.
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highschools;and(4)Allmenabove18shouldberequiredtotakeacertainamountofmilitarytraining.5Dataforthe93rdCongressarederivedfromRosterofUnitedStatesCongressionalOfficeholdersandBiographicalCharacteristicsofMembersoftheUnitedStatesCongress,17891993:MergedDataFile,9thInter-UniversityConsortiumforPoliticalandSocialResearch,1993,AnnArbor,Michigan.Dataforthe105thCongressarederivedfromCongressionalUniverse(worldwidewebservice),CongressionalInformationService,
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Bethesda,Maryland(accessedDecember17,1998).6AsstatedintheIntroduction,theobjectiveoffosteringalargernumberofveteransinsocietyandingovernmentisnottomaximizemilitaryresourcesbutrathertohelpcreateconditionsinwhichdemocraticsocialandpoliticalprocessesresultinanappropriatelevelofmilitaryresources.7ThisraisesthequestionofwhethertheAirForceinfactreliesonknowledgethatthiswillhappenwhenitputstogetheritsbudgetrequestsforaircraftacquisition.IfprogrammersknowthatCongressisgoingtoforceacertainnumberofairliftaircraftontheAirForce,theAirForcecanaskformorefightersorbombersthanifithadtohusbanditsresourcesmorecarefully.
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Accordingtothisargument,RCpoliticalinfluenceshouldbeharnessedinsupportofallnewweaponacquisitionsbyplanningforinitialintroductionofnewweaponsinbothACandRCunits.Butshouldforce-mixdecisionsbeshapedtoinvokepoliticalsupport?Ourviewisthatthepublicinterestisgenerallynotwellservedwhenanagencyattemptstobendnationalprioritiestowarditsownendsthroughpoliticaladvocacyratherthanshapingitsmissiontowhatthecitizenrydeemsimportant.Thisisparticularlytrueifalesseffectiveorefficientforcemixwereadoptedtogainpoliticaladvantage.
WedistinguishsuchdirectpoliticalRCinfluencefromamoreindirectsort,whichisthedevelopmentofpublicsupportforthearmedforcesthroughvotingandothermanifestationsofpoliticalpreferences.Themilitaryneedspublicsupporttosustainitselfinanenvironmentoflimitedresources,wheredefenseisjustoneofmanypublicgoodscompetingfortaxdollars.TheRC,withitstiestothelargersociety,iswellpositionedtocommunicatetheimportanceofdefenseandnationalsecuritypolicytoacitizenrywhosemoreimmediateconcernsandinterestsmaylieinotherdirections.WeargueinthisreportthattheRC'sindirectinfluencethroughtheprocessesofidentification,embeddedness,andinvestmentplaysasignificantroleingeneratingpublicsupportforthemilitary.
StateMissionsoftheANG
Unliketheothercomponentsofthearmedservices,theNationalGuardhasastaterole.Itcanbecalleduponbystategovernorstoofferemergencyassistanceinadisasterthatmaypresentproblemstoanoverwhelmedcitizenry.Examplesaresnowstorms,floods,earthquakes,andfires,aswellasemergenciesresultingfromsocialunrest.
Brown,Fedorochko,andSchank(1995)examinedthenatureofthestatemissionsoftheNationalGuardtodetermineiftheGuardhad
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sufficientmanpowertofulfillthem.Theycollectedsurveydatafrom49ofthe54NationalGuardentities(inall50states,plustheDistrictofColumbia,Guam,PuertoRico,andtheU.S.VirginIslands).Inaddition,theyconducted15sitevisitstostudyindepthstaterequirementsfortheGuardandhowwelltheyhadbeenmet.The
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studyincludedboththeArmyNationalGuardandtheAirNationalGuard.
TheauthorsexaminedcaseswheretheGuardwascalledouttorespondtostateemergencies,includingHurricaneAndrewthatstruckFloridaandLouisianain1992,HurricaneInikithatdamagedHawaiiin1992,theenormousMidwesternfloodsin1993thatputhugeportionsofWisconsin,Missouri,Iowa,Illinois,SouthDakota,Nebraska,Kansas,andNorthDakotaunderwater,andthe1992LosAngelesriotsthatfollowedtheacquittalofthepoliceofficerswhohadbeenaccusedofbrutalizingRodneyKing.Ineachofthesecases,NationalGuardsmennumberinginthethousandswerecalleduptorespondtothecrisisconditions.8
ThestaffingoftheNationalGuardwasmorethanadequatetoperformallthestatemissionsforwhichitwascalledupon.TheGuardusuallybackedupstateresourcesandtheFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)ratherthanservingasafront-lineresponsetodisaster.TheremaynotbeenoughNationalGuardcapacitytofullyresolvepeakdisasters,butthesepeaksarerelativelyrare,andtheGuardisonetoolinanadequatepackageofemergencyreliefthatissufficienttorespondtocivilemergencies.BrownandhiscolleaguesdonotrecommendincreasingthesizeoftheGuardtorespondtopeakdisasters,whichtheycharacterizeasanuneconomicalapproach.SizingtheGuardtodealwithraredisasterswouldmeancreatingaforcethatisunderusedthevastmajorityofthetime.Ifincreasedcapabilityshouldbeconsiderednecessary,regionalpactsbetweenthestateGuardorganizationscouldinstitutionalizeandeasethesharingofresourcesamongthestates.TheexampleoftheOklahomaAirGuardairliftingfeedtocattleinNewMexicowhiletheNewMexicoGuardrespondedtootheraspectsofaheavysnowstormshowstheviabilityofthisoption.
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Brownetal.(1995)reportthatonlyasmallfractionofANGunitsormembersserveonstatemissionsinanygivenyear(andinmanyyearsthereisnorequirementfortheirservices).Thus,evena
8MajordisasterstendtorequireresourcesmorelikelytobefoundintheArmyNationalGuardthanintheAirNationalGuard.However,theANGcontributesspecialcapabilities,suchasairliftandcivilengineering,inadditiontogeneral-purposemanpower.
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significantlyreducedRCwouldnotnegativelyaffecttheabilityoftheANGtoperformitsstatemissions.
StatemissionsoftheANGgarneragreatdealofpositivepublicityfromthemediaandsupportfromthepublic,increasinginterestandinvestmentintheinstitution.Moreover,citizenswhomayhavelittleornocontactwiththemilitaryoritsmembersinusualtimesmayhavesignificantcontactduringdisasters,furtherdeepeningthismeansofattachmentbetweenciviliansocietyandthearmedforces.ThisisprobablynotasufficientreasontosetaflooronthesizeorproportionoftheANGinthetotalforce.
HowSocialandPoliticalConsiderationsConstraintheForceMix
Ourcurrentresearchseekstodeterminethedegreetowhichsocialandpoliticalconsiderationsshouldconstraintheforcemix.WeillustrateourfindingsusingthetwoconstraintlinesdepictedinFigure3.6.NotethatthelinesinFigure3.6arelabeleddifferentlyfromthecorrespondinglinesinFigure2.2.ThelabelsintroducedheremorefullyreflectthevocabularyandconceptsintroducedinChapterThree.OnelinerepresentstheRCproportionofthetotalforceneededtoprovideasufficientlevelofsocialidentification,embeddedness,andinvestment(IE&I)linkingthearmedforcestothelargersociety.TheotherlinerepresentstheminimumproportionthattheRCmustoccupytohaveameaningfullevelofrepresentationandinfluencewithinthetotalforce.
TheIE&Iconstraintlineisslopedbutitsprecisepositioncannotbedetermined.Wecantheorizethatasthetotalforcedecreasesinsizeandismoregeographicallyconcentrated,theRCwouldplayanincreasinglyimportantroleinmaintainingcontactwiththelargersociety.TheRCwouldhavetooccupyanincreasinglylargerproportionofthetotalforcetoprovidetherequiredmassina
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sufficientnumberofcommunities.Thisexplainstheslopeoftheline.However,wehavenobasisforestimatingthemassorcommunitypenetrationneededtoobtainthesebenefits.Thus,thepositionofthelineisunknown.
Aminoritystatusconstraintisshownat20percent.Asdiscussedearlier,thisisatthelowendofKanter'srangeofthresholdsbetween
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Figure3.6LocusofPoliticalandSocialConstraintsontheForceMix
atokenandminoritylevelofrepresentationforaseparatelyidentifiablesubgroupwithinaninstitution.WeofferthisconstraintwiththecaveatthatKanter'stheorywasdevelopedafterobservingdemographicminoritiesthataremoreclearlydistinctthanaretheactiveandreservecomponentsofthearmedservices,andinasituationwhereleadershipdidnotworktoensurethattheminoritywastakenseriously.Generalizingthetheorytoapplyitintheforce-mixcontextmustbedonewithcaution.
Finally,weofferacaveatthatAirForceforce-miximplicationscannotbeconsideredinisolationfromthoseoftheotherarmedservices.Inmanycases,thesocialandpoliticalfunctionsthatarepartofthelogicofastrongRCareservedsimilarlybytheArmyandtheAirForceNationalGuardsandReserves.TheArmyRCismuchlargerthantheAirForceRC,andpresumablyhowtheArmyaddressestheforce-mixquestionwouldhavemoreofaneffectonthefeedbackloopbetweenthemilitaryandsocietythanwouldtheforcemixwithintheAirForce.
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ChapterFourReadinessAndAvailabilityInthischapter,wediscusseffectiveness:howwellRCunitsservemilitaryneedsrelativetosimilarlyconfiguredACunits.Toanswerthisquestion,weconsideredtwoaspectsofeffectiveness:thereadinessofaunittoperformitsintendedmilitaryfunctionsandtheavailabilityofaunitforemploymentbynationalcommandauthorities.Readinessdependsontheunit'saccesstoresources(personnelandequipment)andtoprocesses(trainingandmaintenance)neededtokeeptheseresourcescombat-ready.Availabilitycombineselementsofresponsiveness(howsoonisaunitavailable)andduration(forhowlongisitavailable).IfACandRCunitssystematicallydifferineitherofthesetwoaspects,effectivenesswillbeaffectedbytheforcemix.
Readiness
Generally,modernRCairassetsreceivemuchpraisefortheircombateffectiveness.Forexample,RCunitsandaircrewsservedduringoperationsDesertShieldandDesertStormwithlittlereadinessdifferencesbetweenthemandtheirACcounterparts(RAND,1992,pp.5657).SimilarevidenceexiststhatRCunitsperformwellwhendeployedforcurrentpeacetimecontingencyoperations.1
1AcurrentjointforcecombatoperationscenterdirectorsaidthattherewasnodiscernibledifferencebetweenRCandACunitsdeployedinhisareaofresponsibility.HeclaimedthatonlyminimallocalareacheckoutwasrequiredforexperiencedRCunits.Anotherobserverattributedonlyaverageorbelow-averageperformancetoRCcombatrescueunits,someofwhicharrivedatforwardoperatingareaslackingbasiccombatrescue
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skills.ThisobserversaidRCrescueunitsmaynothaveadequateaccessto
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Althoughactualperformanceincombatisthebestreadinessindicator,itcannotbeobservedduringpeacetime.Thus,wemustlookatavailablepeacetimereadinessindicatorstodeterminehowRCunitscomparewithACunits.SomemeasuresofreadinessareavailablefromthejointreadinessreportingstructuretheStatusofResourcesandTrainingSystem(SORTS).Otherindicatorsincludeoperationalreadinessinspections(ORIs)andexerciseswhereRCunitsperformwiththeiractivecounterparts.SORTSmeasuresinputstoreadinesspersonnelstatus,equipmentstatus,andtrainingwhereasinspectionsandexercisestendtomeasureoutputsoroutcomesmoreakintoactualcombatcapabilities.
PeacetimeReadinessIndicators
Asaninputmeasure,SORTSprovidesalimitedmeansforbenchmarkingunits.AirForceunitsgenerallymaintainahighernaturalstateofreadinessthantheotherservicesinboththeACandRC,andSORTSrevealslittledifferencebetweenRCandACairunits.
ORIresultsalsoshowlittledifferencebetweenACandRCunits,althoughtheprocessforRCunitscanbesomewhatdifferentfromthatforACunits.2Theinspectionteamincludesaugmenteesfromthegainingcommandandmucheffortisinvestedinmakingsurethattheprocessmirrorstheactiveprocessforlikeunits.FewdifferencesbetweentheACandRCwerefoundinORIresultsfortheyears19921996(seeFigure4.1).Overallratings(onascaleof1to11)areslightlylowerforRCunits,althoughtheyarestillwellinthesatisfactoryrange.Forfighterunits,theoverallscoresaresomewhathigherforRCunitsthanforACunits.3
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rangesandotherforcesnecessarytotraintothesamelevelasactive-dutycombatrescueunits.Inaddition,theseunitsmaybemoreactivelyengaged
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withstateandlocalmissions,whichbuildbasicairmanshipbutdolittleforthemoredemandingcombatrescuemissionwhereahighdegreeofcoordinationwithsupportingforcesisrequired.Thecombatrescuemissionhasarelativelyhighmissionoperationstempoforthetotalforce.2DoingwellontheORIinmostRCunitsishighlydesired,justasitisintheactiveforce.OnereservisttoldRANDthatthefirstquestionaskedduringhisinitialhiringinterviewwashiswillingness(andability,givencivilianemployment)tomakehimselfavailablefortheunitORI.3UnpublisheddatagatheredfromAirCombatCommand,officeoftheInspectorGeneral,byRANDresearchersWillardNaslundandCraigMoore.
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Figure4.1AverageORIRatings,19921996
RCunitshavehistoricallydoneverywellinvariouscombatcrewcompetitions.ThiscouldbetheresultofanRCunithavinghigheraveragetotalcareerandmissiondesignseries(MDS)flyingtimeandgreaterexperienceoverallthanasisterACunithas.ButcompetitionsmaynotbeanappropriatereadinessgaugeforRCorACperformance,becausetheflightandmaintenancecrewswhoparticipatearethebest-of-the-best.However,ahigheraveragenumberoftotalcareerflyinghoursandmoretimewiththeunitaremajorstrengthsthatRCaircrewsbringtothetotalforce.ThisdifferenceinexperiencewillincreaseasanticipatedshortagesofACpilotsemerge.4
4Operationspersonnelatamixed-forceactivewingtoldRANDthatsomecombatfightersquadronshad4050percentofpersonnelwithlessthantwoyearsofactiveflyingexperiencebeyondtheirinitialmissionqualification(RANDinterviews,AprilMay1998).
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UnderlyingFactorsExperience,Training,andOperationalIntegration
WeidentifiedthreefactorsthatunderlietheRC'sreadinessparitywiththeAC.First,asmentionedabove,RCpersonnelgenerallyhavemoreunit-specificandaircraft-specificexperiencethantheirACcounterparts.Second,RCaircrews,despitehavingfeweravailabledutydays,comeclosetoachievingqualitativelywhatACunitsachievewithhighernumbersintheirtrainingprograms.Third,relativelysmallRCelementscanbereadilyintegratedwithotherRCandACelementstoformprovisionalunitsforemployment.
Experience
ExperiencelevelsinRCunitsaregenerallysignificantlyhigherthantheyareinACunitsforseveralreasons.First,manymembersofRCunitshavepriorACexperience.Second,RCaircrewstendtoremainincockpitflyingdutiesfarlongerthanACaircrews,whomustrotatebetweenstaffandcockpitassignments.Asanexample,Table4.1showsindicatorsofexperienceforpilotsintwoB52squadrons,oneintheRCandoneintheAC.
Training
ThetrainingprogramforanRCunitgenerallycontainsthesamecategoriesoftrainingmissionsasthetrainingprogramofanACunitwithasimilarmission,butwithfewermissionsrequiredinsomecases.Table4.2shows,forexample,thenumberofannualtrainingmissionsforcomparableRCandACunits.Annualmissionrequirementsareidenticaltomaintainabasicmission-capablestatus(forpilotsinstaffpositions),butcombatmission-readystatus(forpilotsinlinecockpitpositions)requiresfewermissionsintheRC.Someobserversbelievethatgenerallyhigherexperiencelevels
Table4.1AverageFlyingHoursandCombatExperienceof
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PilotsinTypicalRCandACB52Units
Indicator RC ACTotalhours 32661809B52hours 22441446Instructor/evaluatorhours 621 464Proportionofpilotswithcombatexperience
60% 12%
SOURCE:OfficeofAirForceReserve,HeadquartersUSAF,dataasofApril1998.
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Table4.2ReadyAircrewProgram(RAP)AnnualTrainingMissions
BasicMissionCapable CombatMissionReadyInexperiencedExperiencedaInexperiencedExperienceda
F16,Block40AC 72 60 116 96ANG 72 60 90 76
A10AC 72 60 102 90ANG 72 60 90 72SOURCE:DirectorateofTraining,HeadquartersAirCombatCommandRAPtaskingmessagesforJuly1998toJune1999.aExperiencedpilotsarethosewhoexceedanestablishedflying-hourthresholdthatvariesbyMDS.
permitRCunitstomaintainthesameproficienciesasACaircrewsevenwithfewertrainingmissions.
OperationalIntegration
Tobeconsideredreadyintheprevailingenvironmentofcontingencydeployments,RCunitsmustbeabletofunctioneffectivelyinthepackagesizesatwhichtheyarecommonlyavailable.Asdiscussedinmoredetailbelow,RCparticipationinmostcontingencydeploymentsdependsonvoluntaryparticipationratherthanmobilization.DeployablepackagesofRCpersonnelandequipmentthereforetendtobeoflessthanfullsquadronscale.
Fortunately,airoperationsandtheirdirectsupportallowsmallerpackagesfrommultipleunitstobeassembledtoformprovisionalunitsatemploymentsiteswithoutunacceptablylosingoperationaleffectiveness.AnexampleistheANGRAINBOWdeploymentofANGBlock42F16C/Ds.Aircraft,manpower,andresourcesare
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combinedfromthreeunitstodeployin-theaterinaunifiedmissionpackage.EachunitcommanderhasflexibilityinmeetinghisdeploymentcommitmentswhileenablingtheANGtodeployasufficientlysizedunitinpeacetime.5
5TheRAINBOWconceptdemonstratesthatintegrationofsmallerunitsispossiblewithoutmajorproblems.However,unlessunitsareexercisedonaregularbasis,unitcommandersmayfeelmorecomfortablewithmembersoftheirownsquadronsandlogisticssupport.RecentRAINBOWdeploymentshaveconcentratedondeploying
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Availability
Inthepast,availabilitywasrelativelyeasytodefineforRCunits.RCunitswerewrittenintooperationalplansinamannersimilartoACunits.RCunitsgenerallyflowintoadeploymentschedulealongsideACunits,assumingtimelymobilizationoftheRCunits.Aftermobilization,RCunitsbecomefull-timeassetsforaspecifiedduration.However,thisisnotacompletepictureofhowjointforcecommandersareusingforcestoday.Recurringandlong-durationpeacetimeforceemploymentsrequiretheRCtoparticipateinanonmobilizedstatus.Thus,availabilityofreservistsunderbothmobilizedandnonmobilizedconditionsmustbeconsidered.
AvailabilityWhenMobilized
LegallimitsonmobilizationarecontainedinTitle10,USCode,Section12301-12305.Themainprovisions,whichapplytoallreservecomponentscollectively(Army,Navy,AirForce,MarineCorps,andGuard),areasfollows:
IntimeofwarornationalemergencydeclaredbyCongress,reserveunitsandindividualsnotassignedtounitsmaybeorderedtoactivedutyforthedurationofthewaroremergencyandforsixmonthsthereafter.
Atanytime,areserveunitorindividualnotassignedtoaunitmaybeorderedtoactivedutyfornotmorethan15daysayear.
IntimeofnationalemergencydeclaredbythePresident,ReadyReserveunitsandindividualsnotassignedtounitsmaybeorderedtoactivedutyfornotmorethan24consecutivemonths.6Notmorethan1,000,000membersoftheReadyReservemaybeonactivedutyatanyonetimeunderthisprovision.
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equipmentfrommultipleunitswhiledrawingmanpowerprimarilyfromasingleunit.Researchneedstodeterminewheretheproblemsofintegrationdetractfromaunit'sabilitytoperformitsmission.However,leadership,personality,andsharedexperiencemayplaythekeyroleinsuccessfulintegrationatthetacticalunitlevel.6TheReadyReserveconsistsofallreservistsexceptthoseinaninactiveorretiredstatus.
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WhenthePresidentdeterminesitisnecessarytoaugmenttheactiveforce,SelectedReserveunitsandindividualsnotassignedtounitsandaspecialmobilizationcategoryoftheIndividualReadyReservemaybeorderedtoactivedutyfornotmorethan270days.7Notmorethan200,000membersoftheSelectedReservemaybeonactivedutyunderthisprovisionatanyonetime,ofwhomnotmorethan30,000maybemembersoftheIndividualReadyReserve.
TheprovisiontorecalltheSelectedReserveforperiodsupto270dayswasaliberalization,in1994,ofpreviouslawthatallowedacall-upof90daysplusa90-dayextension.TheprovisionforaspecialmobilizationcategorywithintheIndividualReadyReservewasaddedin1998.
Theseprovisionslimittheavailabilityofreservistsinseveralways.Limitsonthedurationofcall-upsandonthenumbersallowedonactivedutyaresuchthattheACmustbeusedtomeetmanycontingencies,especiallythoseinwhichdeclarationofanationalemergencyisdeemedinappropriateorundesirable.AlthoughitisonlynaturalthattheACshouldbethefirstoptionconsideredtomeetmostcontingencies,decisionmakersshouldconsiderthelegallimitationsonRCavailabilityindeterminingtheforcemix.Ingeneral,thetotalforceshouldbesizedsothattheACcanmeetallbut200,000manpowerrequirementsinapeacetimecontingencyor1,000,000manpowerrequirementsinanationalemergencyshortofdeclaredwar.
Anotherlimitationonavailabilityistherequirementthatreservistswhoareorganizedandtrainedinunitsmustberecalledwiththeirunitsratherthanindividually.Asapracticalmatter,relativelysmallunitpackages(unittypecodes,orUTCs)canbespecifiedinmobilizationplans.Still,thisprovisioncouldimpedetheflexibleandefficientuseofreservistsinsomecircumstances.
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7TheSelectedReserveconsistsofindividualswhoparticipateininactive-dutytrainingperiodsandannualtraining.TheindividualReadyReserveconsistsofReadyReservememberswhoarenotintheSelectedReserve.ThespecialmobilizationcategoryofIndividualReadyReservistssubjecttocall-upundertheprovisioncitedheremustbewithin24monthsofseparationfromactiveduty,volunteersforentryintothespecialmobilizationcategory,andingradesandskillsdesignatedbytheservicesecretaryconcerned.
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AvailabilityWhenNotMobilized
InhisFY1999AirForcePostureStatementtoCongress,ActingSecretaryoftheAirForceF.WhittenPetersstatedthattheservicehadhelpedtoreduceoperationaltemporatesforactiveunitsthroughthe
creativeuseoftheReserveandGuardunitsandincreasesinmanninginhighlystressedspecialties.However,theseeffortshaveplacedanewburdenontheRC.During1997,RCaircrewsservedanaverageof110daysinuniform,withtheirsupportteamsserving80days.(DepartmentoftheAirForce,1998,pp.23.)
Althoughthose110daysinuniformwerenotalldaysdeployedoverseas,theyweredaysthatmayhavebeenspentawayfromafull-timejob,home,andfamily.AssumingthattheRCiscurrentlyrespondingatornearitscapacitytoalleviateheavydeploymentdemands,thisnumberofdaysinuniformmaybeanapproximateupperlimitonparticipationforthepart-timeRCforce.Giventimerequiredfortrainingandotheradministrativeneeds,availabilityofpart-timersfordeploymentisconsiderablylessthanthe110daysinuniformstatedabove.
ThalerandNorton(1997)estimatedthenumberofcontingencydeploymentdaysavailableforACandRCaircrews.Assumingadesiredmaximumof120temporaryduty(TDY)daysperyearisestablishedforactiveaircrews,theycalculatedthatACaircrewsinthecontinentalUnitedStatesspendaround50TDYdaysperyearparticipatinginindividualtraining,jointexercises,andotheractivitiesnotrelatedtocontingencyoperations.Thisleaves70daysavailableforcontingencyoperations.8ThalerandNortonalsopostulatethatRCcrewsareavailablefor50daysofTDYperyear,ofwhich15daysareavailableforoverseascontingenciesafternoncontingencytraining,exercise,andotherneedsaresatisfied.ThislimithasbeenvalidatedthroughourowninterviewswithRCrepresentativesattheheadquar-
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8ThalerandNortonpostulatethataircrewsinEuroperequireslightlymorenoncontingencyTDY(60days),leavingslightlyfewerdaysavailableforcontingencies(60days).
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tersandunitlevel.9ACaircrewdeploymentstoSouthwestAsiahavebeenreducedto45days,whichmaybeclosetoaminimumrotationdurationtopermiteffectivecontinuityofoperationsforfightersorcommandandcontrolaircraft.Althougha45-dayoverseasdeploymentfitswithinthepostulated50-daylimitforRCaircrews,suchadeploymentwouldnotallowenoughadditionalTDYforaREDFLAGorotherunittrainingdeploymentafterreturntothehomestation.RCunitscanrotateaircrewstodeploymentsitesinincrementsoffewerthan45days,buttheimpactofshorterrotationsonoperationaleffectivenessremainstobeexamined.
TheANGhascollectedaircrewactivitydatathathelptoputThalerandNorton'spostulatedlevelofavailabilityinperspective.Figure4.2showsthenumberofTDYdaysexperiencedbyactiveflyingaircrewsinANGwingsduringFY1997.TheaveragenumberofTDYdaysis37days,somewhatfewerthanthe50dayspostulatedbyThalerandNorton(1997).
TDYbyreservistsisincludedwithintotaltimespentinuniform.Figure4.3showsthenumberofdaysinuniformforactiveflyingaircrewsinANGwings(allpayperiodsfortraditionalguardsmenandperiodsbeyondthenormaldutydayforfull-timetechniciansandactiveGuard/Reservestatusindividuals).WesupplythesedatatohelpputtheTDYdatainperspective.
ThereisevidencethatlengthofaTDYassignmentisasimportantasthetotalyearlytimeawayindeterminingtheavailabilityofRCaircrews.AFRvolunteerratesfornormaloperations,smallcontingencies,andlargecontingenciesduring1996areshowninFigure4.4.ThedatashowasteepdropoffinvolunteersforTDYsof10daysormore.Accordingtothesedata,thereservestrategicairliftpilot,whoisofferedshorterTDYs,maybemorelikelytovolunteerthanafighterpilotorcivilengineerwhomustvolunteerinchunksof
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45daysormore.
9Intervieweeshavesaidthatforsomepersonnel,50daysperyearisatthehighendofwhattheycanexpecttoprovidegiventheirfull-timeworkandfamilyresponsibilities.However,exceptasconstrainedbylaw,full-timereservistsmayhavethesameavailabilityasACmembers.
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Figure4.2FY1997TDYDaysbyANGAircrews
Figure4.3FY1997DaysinUniformbyANGAircrews
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Figure4.4AvailabilityofAFRAircrewsbyDurationofTDY
ImplicationsfortheForceMix
TheevidenceindicatesthatRCunitsareasreadyasACunitsforuseinamajortheaterwar,andhaveapproximatelythesameavailability,assumingmobilization.RCunitsmaintainahighlevelofreadiness,notwithstandingfewertrainingmissionsthanACunits,becausetheyhavehigherexperiencelevels.However,formajoroperationsshortofdeclaredwarandforcurrentpeacetimecontingencyoperations,RCunitshavelimitedavailabilityrelativetoACunits.
Givenreadinessparity,100percentoftheforcecouldbeintheRCwithnolossofeffectiveness,asindicatedbythelocusofthereadinessconstraintinFigure4.5.ThisfindingoffersnoguaranteethattheRCcouldmaintainitscurrenthighstateofreadinessinthelongrunifithadnoACasasourceofexperiencedaccessions.ThispersonnelflowconstraintwillbeconsideredseparatelyinChapterFive.
Availability,ontheotherhand,islimitedfortheRCbecauseofitspredominantlypart-timeworkforce.Becauseoflimitsonmobiliza-
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Figure4.5LocusofAvailabilityandReadinessConstraints
ontheForceMix
tion,theRCcannotsatisfycertainshort-noticeorlong-durationrequirementsspecifiedinoperationalplans.GreaterlimitsoncumulativedeploymenttimeanddurationofdeploymentrelativetotheACmeanthattheRCislessavailableformeetingcontingencyrequirements.Asthetotalforcedeclinesinsize,assumingtheseforceemploymentdemandsremainconstant,theavailabilityconstraint,asdepictedinFigure4.5,permitsadecreasingproportionofthetotalforcetobeplacedintheRC.10However,thespecificlocusofthis
10Toillustratewhythelineisslopedformajorcontingencies,considerahypotheticalMTWrequirementfor2,000,000militarypersonnel,ofwhomamaximumof1,000,000maybemobilizedreservists.Ifthetotalforceconsistsof3,000,000militarymembers,atleast1,000,000mustbeintheactivecomponentinordertomeettheMTWrequirement.ThislimitstheRCtonomorethan67percentofthetotalforce.Ifthetotalforcewerelarger4,000,000therequirementcouldbemetwithanRCofupto75percentofthetotal.Toillustratewhythelineisslopedforsmallerpeacetimecontingencies,considerahypotheticalfighterforcemix.
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AssumethatACsquadronscan
(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)
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constraintvariesbymissionorfunction.Theavailabilityconstraintforahigh-tempoassetsuchasanAWACSunitwillbefardifferentfromtheconstraintforalow-tempoassetsuchasanairdefenseorspaceoperationsunit.
(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)
support1200deployedaircraft-daysperyearandRCsquadronscansupport360.(TheseavailabilityestimatesarederivedinChapterSix.)Ifthetotalforcemustbesizedat20fighterwingequivalents(FWEs),eachconsistingofthreestandard-sizedsquadrons,tosupportatwo-MTWscenarioandmustsupply,say,50,000deployeddaysperyear,itcanconsistof,atmost,8.73RCFWEs,or43.6percentofthetotalfighterforce.Thecomputationsare:RCcontribution8.73FWE3squadrons360deployedaircraft-days=9428deployedaircraft-daysACcontribution(208.73FWE)3squadrons1200deployedaircraft-days=40,572deployedaircraft-daysThesumoftheRCandACcontributionstodeployedaircraft-daysis50,000.AnysubstitutionofmoreRCFWEsforfewerACFWEsresultsinfewerthan50,000deployedaircraft-days.Ifthetotalforceisreducedto16FWEsbutfacesthesamedeploymentdemand,itcanconsistof,atmost,threeRCFWEs,or19percentofthetotalfighterforce.
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ChapterFivePersonnelFlowIndividualswhoseparatefromactivedutyandsubsequentlyaffiliatewithareserveunitprovideasignificantbaseonwhichtobuildRCreadiness.YearsofexperiencegainedbyindividualsintheACandRCarenotequivalent,becauseofdifferencesinthetimeavailabletopracticemilitaryskills:38daysayearintheRC(62daysforpilots)and225daysintheAC(RAND,1992).1Itisdifficultforreservistswhohaveneverbeenonactivedutytogainproficiencyincomplexskillswiththislimitedamountofannualtraining.2Thus,RCreadinessdependsonasignificantflowofexperiencedmanpowerfromtheACtotheRC,whichimposesaconstraintonforce-mixplanning.
EarlierViewsOnPersonnelFlow
TheGatesCommission(formally,thePresident'sCommissiononanAll-VolunteerArmedForce),formedin1969tomakerecommendationsaboutthetransitionfromconscriptiontoanall-volunteerforce,recognizedthepossibleimplicationsforRCsustainability.Amongotherconcerns,theCommissionexaminedwhetheranall-volunteeractiveforcewouldsustainasufficientflowofpriorservice(PS)accessionstothereserveforcesandwhethertheremainingnonpriorservice(NPS)accessionrequirementcouldbemetfromthecivilian
1The38-dayfigureforreservistsisbasedon12monthlyweekenddrillsoftwodayseachplus14daysofactive-dutytrainingperyear.Aircrewsareauthorizedanadditional24daysofflighttrainingperiods,foratotalof62days.2Thiswouldnotbetrue,however,forreservistswhosefull-timeoccupationscloselymatchtheirreserveduties.
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recruitingpool(President'sCommission,1970,pp.109117).Withexpectedactiveandreserveforcesizes,theCommissionprojectedfeweractiveforcelossesandthereforeasmallerpoolfromwhichtorecruitPSaccessionstotheRC.However,withexpectedgainsinreserveforceretention(predicatedontheCommission'srecommendedpayenhancements),theCommissionconcludedthattheall-volunteerforcewouldyieldaratioofPStoNPSreserveaccessionsatorabovehistorical(pre-Vietnam)levels.
NPSaccessionsfelldramaticallybetween1970and1976,forcingthereservestorelyevenmoreheavilythananticipatedonPSrecruiting(BrinkerhoffandGrissmer,1986,p.214).ShortfallsinNPSaccessionscausedreservestrengthstodropsignificantlyfrom1973to1978,duringtheearlyyearsoftheall-volunteerforce.By1983,however,strengthlevelswererestoredandreserveforcescontinuedtoenjoyahighproportionofPStoNPSaccessions.ThePSproportionoftotalreserveaccessions(acrossallservices)was31.9percentin1970,risingtoapeakof79.6percentin1974,andlevelingoutat56.6percentin1982(BrinkerhoffandGrissmer,p.209).
RecognizingtheimportanceofPSpersonneltothereserves,CongressenactedtheArmyNationalGuardCombatReadinessReformActof1992,whichdirectedtheSecretaryoftheArmytoestablish''anobjectiveofincreasingthepercentageofqualifiedprioractive-dutypersonnelintheArmyNationalGuardto65percent,inthecaseofofficers,andto50percent,inthecaseofenlistedmembers,bySeptember30,1997."3Anexaminationofrelevant1989datashowedthattheArmyNationalGuardwasexperiencingPSaccessionswellbelowthesegoals.However,hadthesegoalsappliedtotheANGandAFR,theywouldhavebeenfarexceededforbothofficers(85and87percentfortheANGandAFR,respectively)andenlistedpersonnel(63and75percent,respectively)(RAND,1992,p.263).
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Theactive-to-reserveflowofpilotsisespeciallymeaningfultoairRCreadiness.Becauseofthelengthofundergraduatepilottrainingandsubsequentweaponsystemqualification,mostpilotsintheairRChaveprioractiveservice.AnanalysisofDoD'sBaseForce(aplan-
3Section1111ofPublicLaw102-484,asamendedbyPublicLaws103-35,103-60,and103-337.See10USC10105.
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ningandprogrammingtemplatedevelopedin1989)revealedthatitcontainedanactive-to-reservepilotratioofabout1to0.9(RAND,1992,p.234).ThisratiowasconsideredsufficienttosupporttherequiredflowofpilotsintotheRC.However,previouslypublishedresearchdoesnotindicatehowfarthisratiocanshifttowardagreaterreserveproportionwithoutjeopardizingthesupplyofPSpilotstotheRC.
ModelingthePersonnelFlowConstraint
Theactive-to-reserveflowofpersonnelcanbemodeledbyrepresentingthedemandforPSaccessionsintheRCandtheavailabilityofexperiencedlossesfromtheactiveforce.Tocomputethereservedemand,letbetheannualaccessionrequirementforthereservecomponent,thereservecomponentstrength,andtheannualaggregatelossratefromthereservecomponent.4Assumingconstantstrengthfromyeartoyear,theannualreserveaccessionrequirementisaproductofthelossrateandthestrength:
Thisaccessionrequirementcanbecomputedfortheentirereservestrengthorforanysubsetofit.Forexample,therequirementmightbecomputedseparatelyforofficerandenlistedpersonnelorforasingleoccupationalgroupsuchaspilots.Thelossrateusedforthispurposeshould,ofcourse,correspondtothespecificstrengthsubsetofinterest.
Thetotalpooloflossesfromactivestrengthcanbesimilarlycomputedbyapplyingalossratetotheactivestrength.LetPbethePSpoolofACseparateesavailableforaccessiontotheRC,Satheactivestrength(eithertotalstrengthorsomesubsetofinterest),andtheaggregatelossratefromtheactiveforce:
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4Populationvariablesareexpressedinuppercaseandrateorratiovariablesareexpressedinlowercase.
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Someactive-forcelossesmaybeeitherineligibleforentryintotheRC(e.g.,retirees)orwillnotmeetRCrequirements(becauseofgrade,yearsofservice,orothersimilarcharacteristics).Ofthoseeligibleandmeetingrequirements,somewillnotbeinterestedinaffiliatingwithanRCunit.ThePSpoolmustbeadjustedtoaccountforthesefactors.LeterepresenttheproportionofthePSpooleligibleandmeetingrequirementsandftheproportionwillingtoaffiliatewithareserveunit.TheadjustedavailablePSpool,AP,isthus:
TheratioofavailablePSrecruitstoaccessionrequirements,,isthusameasureoftheabilityoftheactiveforcetosustaintheexperienceneedsofthereserveforce,anditisafunctionofactiveandreservestrengths,activeandreservelossrates,andthereserveeligibilityandaffiliationratesofactiveforcelosses.5Insomecases,therearespecifiedvaluesforthisratio.Forexample,tomeetthecongressionalguidelinediscussedabove,theratioforArmyNationalGuardaccessionshasavalueof0.65.TheAFRplansforandobtainsPSaccessionsforvirtuallyallitspilotrequirements,sothattheratiohasavalueofapproximately1.TheANGabsorbsalargerproportionofNPSpilotaccessions,resultinginaratioofabout0.57.6Letxrepresentthedesiredratio.Therelationshipcanbeexpressedformallyas
wherexisavaluebetween0and1.
5Thisformulationassumes,forsimplification,thatPSaccessionsaffiliatewithreserveunitsinthesameyeartheyleavetheactiveforce.Inthesteadystate,theformulationholdswithoutthisassumption.6AccordingtodatasuppliedbyANG/XO,theANGlosesabout350pilotsperyear.TheANGgets180UPTslotsperyeartobefilledbyANG
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members,yielding150UPTgraduatesperyearaftertrainingattrition.Theremaining200lossesarereplacedusingPSaccessions.
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ForceMixBasedOnStrength
IfadesiredvalueforxinEq.(4)isknown,theequationsforAPandArcanbeusedtosolvefortheneededratioofactivetoreservestrengths.Substitutingtheright-handsidesofEqs.(1)and(3)forArandAPyields:
Bytransformation,theminimumratioofactivetoreservestrength,,canbefound:
Givenaspecifiedvalueofxandexpectedvaluesofe,f,andtheminimumSa/Srcanbecomputed.7Forexample,usingnotionalvaluesx=1,lr=0.10,e=0.7,f=0.5,andla=0.06,Sa/Srmustbeatleast4.8(i.e.,activepilotstrengthmustbeatleast4.8timesasgreatasreservepilotstrength).ForacasemorerepresentativeofcurrentANGexperience,avalueofx=0.57mightbeused,yieldingarequiredACtoRCratioof2.7to1.
ForceMixBasedOnFighterWingEquivalents
Theforcemixisoftendiscussedintermsofaratioofactive-to-reservepersonnelstrengths.Ifso,thecalculationsabovearesufficienttoexpressthesustainabilityconstraint.Inothercontexts,themixisexpressedasaratioofactive-to-reserveunits.Notably,the
7Ingeneral,expectedvaluesshouldbeselectedsotheyproduceaconservativeestimateoftherequiredratio.Inthiscase,ahigherSa/Srratioismoreconservative.Thus,aprudentanalystwouldselectavalueforlrnearthehighendofhistoricallyobservedreservelossratesandvaluesforfandlanearthelowendoftheirhistoricallyobservedranges.
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force-structuremixisoftengivenasaratioofactive-to-reservefighterwingequivalents(FWE).8
TodeterminerequiredFWEratiosbasedonexperiencedpilotneeds,furthercomputationsarerequired.Theseadditionalcomputationswillconvertpilotstrengthstothenumberofaircrafttheycansupport.SinceFWEarealineartransformationofthenumberofoperationalaircraft,aproportionthatholdsforaircraftwillalsoholdforFWE.Theadditionalinputfactorsrequiredarecrewratiosandallowancesforpilotsinnonoperationalpositions.LetFSijbetheforcestructure(numberofaircraft)inactiveorreservecomponentiandweaponsystemj,Sijbethepilotstrength,cijthecrewratio,andoijtheproportionofthepilotforceinoperationalpositions.9Then
and
Equation(8)isexpressedasaninequalitybecause,likeEq.(6),itdenotestheminimumrationeededtosatisfypersonnelflowconsiderations.Theresultscanbesummedacrossallfighterweaponsystemstodetermineatotalforcestructuremix:
8AFWEconsistsof72operationalaircraft.9Operationalpositionsincluderatedpositionidentifier(RPI)1and2positionsinoperationalsquadrons.Nonoperationalpositionsincludeallother
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pilotrequirements,includingRPI1and2positionsintrainingunits.
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Usingnotionalvaluesoa=0.6,ca=1.25,or=0.8,cr=1.25,andSa/Sr=4.8(andassuming,forthesakeofsimplification,thatthesevaluesareconstantacrossallweaponsystems),wecancomputeFSa/FSr=3.6.Translatingthisratiotoaproportion,thesenotionalfactorswouldsuggestaforce-structuremixthatisnomorethan22percentintheRC.WithSa/Sr=2.7(moreappropriatefortheANG),theresultisFSa/FSr=2,oraforcethatisnomorethan33percentintheRC.
Therequiredforce-structureratiocanbefurtherrefinedtorecognizethatreservefighterpilotaccessionrequirementscanbemetfromsourcesotherthanactive-dutyfighterpilotlosses.Somerequirementscanbemetusinglossesfromotherservicesorpilotswhoseactive-dutyflyingwasnotinfighters.Becausethesepilots,especiallythosewhohavenotflownfighters,willrequireextensivetransitiontrainingandwilldiluteexperiencelevelsinreserveunits,alimitontheproportionofreservefighterpilotaccessionstakenfromthesesourceswouldappearreasonable.Toseehowthislimitaffectstheforcemix,weintroduceanotherfactorinEq.(4).Lettbethemaximumproportionofreservefighterpilotaccessionsthatmaybetransitioningfromadifferentflyingcommunity.Iftwereset,forexample,at30percent,thenonly70percent(1t)ofthereserveaccessionsrequiredtomeetthePSfighterpilotaccessiontargetwouldhavetocomefromtheactive-dutyfighterpilotlosses.Thus,ifAPrepresentstheavailablePSpooldrawnfromactive-dutyfighterpilotlosses,Eq.(4)becomes
Eq.(6)becomes
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Iftheforce-mixconstraintsarerecalculatedwitht=0.3,thestrengthratioconstraint,Sa/Sr,dropsfrom4.8to3.3andtheFWEratioconstraint,dropsfrom3.6to2.5(28percentintheRC).UsingthePSaccessionratiomorerepresentativeoftheANG,Sa/Srdrops
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from2.7to1.9andtheFWEratioconstraint,dropsfrom2to1.4(42percentintheRC).
Figure5.1capturesthesesustainabilitycalculationsgraphically.ItshowsannuallossesasasubsetoftotalACfighterpilotstrength.WithintheannuallossnumberisasubsetofthoseeligibletoaffiliatewiththeRC.Withinthatpopulationisasmallernumberwillingtoaffiliate.Thisnumber,plussimilareligibleandwillingpilotlossesfromotherthantheAirForcefighterpilotinventory,mustbelargeenoughtofillannualRCfighterpilotaccessionrequirements.
UsingtheModel
Theinputvaluesusedfortheabovecalculationsareroughestimatesdevelopedfromlimiteddatasourcesorpartiallyinformedopinion.Determiningmorepreciseexpectedvaluesforthevariousinputfactorsneededforthiscomputationisbeyondthescopeofthisstudy.However,thefactorscanbedeterminedthroughanalysisofhistori-
Figure5.1SustainabilityofRCFighterPilotRequirements
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calpersonnelflowsandexpertjudgmentonexperiencerequirements.WenotethattheQuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR)recommendedareductionoftheactivecomponenttoabout12FWEandanincreaseinthereservecomponentto8FWE.ThisyieldsanFSa/FSrratioof1.5forfighterunits,suggestingthatacloseexaminationofthesustainabilityconstraintiswarranted.
Anaircraft-denominatedforcemixcanbeanalyzedusingrequirementsformilitaryoccupationsotherthanpilot,givensomefigurecomparabletothecrewratiothatrelatesmanpowertoaircraft.However,formostotheroccupations,theRCcanabsorbanappreciableproportionofNPSaccessions.Forthoseoccupations,therequiredratioofprior-servicerecruitstoreserveaccessionrequirements(xintheequationsabove)willbemuchlessthan1,asitisforAFRpilots,orperhapsevenlessthanthe0.57weassumedforANGpilots.Thus,thepilot-basedanalysisislikelytoprovidethemosttightlyconstrainingresult.
ImplicationsfortheForceMix
AnupperboundontheproportionofthetotalforceintheRC,relatedtopersonnelflow,canbedeterminedifotherrelatedparametersareknown.TheseotherparametersarelikelytovarybymissionorMDSandalsobydifferencesbetweentheANGandAFRintheirperceivedabilitytoabsorbinexperiencedUPTgraduates.Accordingly,asdepictedinFigure5.2,theconstraintwillalsovarybymissionorMDSandbycomponent.Inthenotionalexamplesprovidedhere,thefighterforce-structureconstraintvariedfrom28percentfortheAFRto42percentfortheANG.
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Figure5.2LocusofthePersonnelFlowConstraintontheForceMix
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ChapterSixCostPaststudieshaveshownthatoperationsandsupportcostsforRCflyingunitsaregenerally,butnotuniversally,lowerthanthecostsofsimilarlyequippedactiveunits.A1990DoDreporttoCongressontotalforcepolicycomparedthecostsof11unittypesfoundinboththeACandRCandfoundlowercostsintheRCforallbutonetypeofunit(DoD,1990).Palmeretal.(1992,p.49)foundthatcostsintheRCarelowerthanthoseintheAClargelybecauseRCunitsuselessfull-timemanpowerandflyfewerhoursperyear.
Inthischapter,wewilldemonstratethatusingtotaloperationsandsupportcostsforACandRCunitsisnotsufficientinitselftoindicatetherelativecostadvantagesofonecomponentovertheother.Unitoutputsmustalsobeconsidered.Theappropriatebasisforcomparingcostsamongcomponentsiscostperrelevantoutput.
Relevantoutputswillvaryindifferentcontexts.Formeetingthedemandsofmajortheaterwars(MTWs),wherefullmobilizationofreserveforcescanbeassumed,therelevantoutputisatrainedandreadyunit.Inthiscontext,totaloperationsandsupportcostsperunitareappropriateformakingAC/RCcomparisons.ThisisthecontextandtheapproachusedinmostAC/RCcostcomparisons.Formeetingthedemandsofsmall-scalecontingencies(SSCs)ahigh-tempocontextwithmoreorlesscontinuousoperationsthatfallbelowthethresholdformobilizationofreserveforcesrelevantoutputwillbemission-dependent.Forfighterunits,forexample,itmightbethenumberofdeployedaircraft-daysperunitoftimethataunitcansupport.Forairliftunits,itmightbeflyinghoursdevotedtoproductive(i.e.,movingfreightandpassengers),asopposedto
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training,missions.WewillsuggestthattheleastcostlyforcemixformeetingMTWdemandsmaynotbetheleastcostlymixformeetingongoingSSCdemands.Thus,foragivenbudgetconstraint,force-mixdecisionmakersmayhavetomaketradeoffs.
Forseveralreasons,thischaptercontainsmoredetailsthantheprecedingchapters.First,inaddressingcost,weoftensawsignificantdifferencesinperspectivebetweentheACandtheRC.TocountersubjectiveestimatesofrelativeACandRCcosts,werelyonconcreteinformation.Second,asmentionedabove,weproposenewapproachesforevaluatingcostsinlightofthekindsofdemandsgeneratedbySSCs.Wethoughtthatconcreteexampleswouldhelptomakethecaseforthesenewapproaches.
MeetingMTWDemands:Force-StructureAvailability
ConventionalapproachestocomparingACandRCcostsforairforceshavegenerallyattemptedtocapturetheoperatingcostsofsimilarlysizedandequippedsquadrons.TheimplicitpremiseofthesecostcomparisonsisthatareservesquadronoperatingagivenMDSisequivalenttoanactivesquadronoperatingthesameMDSforsomecost-relatedpurpose.Thatpurpose,presumably,isutilizationoftheunitinanMTW,whentheoptiontomobilizereserveunitsmakesthemfullyavailableduringaperiodofsomeduration.Thus,tomeetMTWdemands,thecostofprovidingatrainedandreadyunitisthepeacetimeoperatingcostoftheunit.
Itmaybeusefultodiscussthesecostsonaperprimaryaircraftauthorized(PAA)basisratherthanaper-unitbasis,becauseunitsofthesameMDStypeoftenvaryinthenumberofPAAtheyareassigned.Anotherrefinement,pursuanttoourrecommendedcost-per-outputapproach,wouldconsiderdesignedoperationalcapabilities(DOCs),whichcanalsovaryacrossunitsofthesametype.Some
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unitsare,bydesign,morecapablethanothers.
CostComparisonComplexities
Costcomparisonsbetweenactiveandreserveunitsarequitecomplex.Costanalystsmustclassifycostsasdirectversusindirect,fixed
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versusvariable,andrecurringversustransitional.Thesedistinctionsmaybeunderstoodasfollows:
Directcostsareincurredwithintheactivitybeingcosted,whereasindirectcostsareeitheroverheadcostsorcostsincurredbyotheractivitiestosupportthecostedactivity.Foraflyingsquadron,directcostsincludepayandotherpersonnelcostsofindividualsassignedtothesquadron;petroleum,oil,andlubricants(POL)consumedbythesquadron;andotheroperationsandmaintenancecosts,suchasconsumablesuppliesandparts.Indirectcostsincludeheadquartersstaffsoflargercommandstowhichtheunitisassigned,accessionandtrainingcostsneededtosustainthepersonnelstrengthsoftheunit,depotmaintenance,medicalsupport,andotherbasesupport.
Fixedcostsarethosethatwouldbeincurredwhetherornottheunitisintheforcestructure,whereasvariablecostsarethosethatareincurredonlyiftheunitisintheforcestructure.Alldirectcostsarevariable,whereasindirectcostshavefixedandvariablecomponents.Forexample,headquartersstaffsizesareunlikelytobeaffectedbytheadditionorsubtractionofagivenunit.
Marginalcostsarethosefixedandvariablecoststhatareincurredasaresultofaunitbeingpartoftheforcestructureor,conversely,thosecoststhatcouldberemovedfromtheUSAFbudgetwithoutaffectinganyotherorganizationiftheunitunderanalysisweredisestablished.
TotalcostsincludethemarginalcostsplusaproportionalcostofthesupportstructureallocatedfromtheoverallUSAFoverheadcosts,suchasheadquarters,theacquisitionorganizations,andmedicalorganizations.Totalcostdevelopmentistheobjectiveofactivity-basedcosting,whichisreceivingmuchattentionbutforwhichastraightforwardmethodologyisnotavailabletoanalystsmakingforce-structureadjustments.ThisapproachisusedforsettingDoDreimbursementratesforvariousoutputs,suchasairliftorsealift.
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Thereisarecurring,orsteady-state,costlevelforongoingoperationofaunit.However,establishingordisestablishingaunitwillentailsometransitionalcostsorsavings.
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Thereisnoonecombinationofthesecostcategoriesthatisappropriateforallpurposes.Forexample,whencomparingthecostofalternativeforcestructures,suchasplacementofaunitintheACorRC,analystsshouldcomparethemarginalcostofanACorRCunit,includingdirectandindirectvariablecostsandexcludingfixedcosts.Inpractice,itisoftendifficulttoidentifyandexcludethefixedcomponentofindirectcosts,resultinginoverstatingmarginalcosts.However,ifthecostanalystistryingtodeterminethefullcostofaunit,suchasforsettingareimbursementratetorecovercostsfromanotheragency,fixedcostsshouldbeallocatedtotheunitandincludedinthecostestimate.Forquickcomparisonofmanyoptions,analystsmustgenerallyconfinetheirattentiontorecurringcostsonly.However,astheoptionsbecomeconcrete,theproperapproachistoconsidertransitionalcostsaswell.Thisrequiresanalyststodevelopcostsforaseriesofpost-decisiontimeperiodsandtodiscountthemtothedecisionpoint.However,transitionalcosts,especiallyforindirectcosts,maybedifficulttodetermine.
Toaddtothecomplexity,categorizingcostsasdirect/indirect,fixed/variable,andmarginal/totaldependsontheunitofanalysis.IfoneisconsideringthemarginalcostofaddingordeletingsquadronsfromtheACortheRC,thesquadronistheunitofanalysis.Allcostsincurredwithinthesquadronareregardedasdirect,variablecosts.Ataless-aggregatelevel,onecouldconsiderincreasingordecreasingthenumberofPAAinasquadron.Inthatcase,thePAAwouldbetheunitofanalysis.Certainsquadronoverheadcostswouldberegardedasfixed;costsrelatedtothenumberofPAAintheunitwouldberegardedasdirectandvariable.Atanevenless-aggregatelevel,thenumberofflyinghoursperPAAcouldbetheunitofanalysis.CertainownershipcostsofaPAAwouldberegardedasfixed;costsrelateddirectlytoflyinghourswouldberegardedasvariable.Inthisstudy,wegenerallytreatthesquadronastheunitofanalysis.
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CostComparisonResults
SeveralrelativelyrecentstudiesbyDoD(1990),theInstituteforDefenseAnalysis(IDA)(Wilsonetal.,1992),andRAND(Palmeretal.,1992)havecomparedthecostsofselectedunittypesintheACandRC.FindingsareshowninTable6.1.Itisnotclearthattheauthorsofthesestudieshavesucceededinisolatingthemarginalcostsof
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Table6.1RecurringPeacetimeCostsforSelectedUnitTypesPreviousCost
ComparisonStudies(Costsin$millions/annualflyinghours[FH])
Unit Crew Active ANG AFRType PAA RatioSource Cost FH Cost FH CostF16 24 n.s.aDoDb 64.8 8134 48.8 5064 51.6 4682F16C/D 24 n.s. IDAc 91.7 8134 58.7 5064 62.4 4682F16 24 n.s. RANDd 63.6 unk 36.0 unk 38.4 unkKC135 10 n.s.DoD 36.3 2840 44.2 3500 42.1 3801KC135 10 1.27IDA 47.5 2840KC135 10 1.5 IDA 51.1 3500 54.2 3801KC135 10 n.s. RAND 35.0 unk 30.0 unk 32.0 unk
(tenant) (tenant)KC135 10 n.s. RAND 34.5 unk 48.0 unk
(host) (host)an.s.=notspecified;unk=unknown.bSource:DoD(1990),Table5.CostsindicatedareinFY1992dollars.cSource:Wilsonetal.(1992).ThispaperisrelatedtoDoD(1990).Itincludesthesamedirectandaverageannualequipmentcostsplusinfrastructurecosts.dSource:Palmeretal.(1992).CostsindicatedareinFY1993dollars.
unitoperation,oreventhattheyintendedtodosoineverycase.Almostcertainly,theseestimatesincludesomeallocationsoffixedcosts.
Althoughthereappearstobesomeconsistencyamongthecostsreportedbyvariousstudies,therearesignificantsimilaritiesanddifferencesintheunderlyingdata.TheDoDandIDAstudieswerecompanionpieces.1TheDoDtotalcostfiguresarecomposedofdirectunitcosts,definedaspersonnelcosts,operatingcosts,andsomethingakintoadepreciationcostforunitequipment.TheIDAtotalcostincludestheseelementsplusanallocatedinfrastructurecost.TheRANDfiguresincludedirectcostssuchaspersonnelandconsumables,butalsodepotmaintenanceanitem
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thattheIDAreport
1TheDoDstudygroupdidsomeofitsownanalysisandcommissionedseveralsupportingstudiesbyfederallyfundedresearchanddevelopmentcenterswhosereportsweretobepublishedseparately.TheIDAstudywasoneofthose.
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includesininfrastructurecostsandindirectcostssuchasbaseoperatingsupportandtraining.
Thesearepeacetimecosts.IntheeventofanMTW,mobilizationofRCunitswouldmaketheirpayandflyinghourscomparabletoACunitsandhigheroperatingtemposwoulddriveupthecostsofbothACandRCunits.
PaststudieshavegenerallyshownthatRCunits,flyingfewerhoursandrelyingtoasignificantextentonpart-timelabor,arelesscostlythanACunits.TheF16datashowninTable6.1aretypicalofthesestudies.TheKC135,alsoshowninTable6.1,isananomalyintheseearlierstudies,RCKC135unitsweregenerallyfoundtoflymorehoursandthereforetobemorecostlythanACunits.
TheofficeoftheDeputyAssistantSecretaryoftheAirForceforCostandEconomics(SAF/FMC)maintainsaunitcostingmodelanddatabasecalledSABLE(forSystematicApproachtoBetterLongRangeEstimating)thatcanbeexercisedtoobtaincurrentcostestimates.DataobtainedfromtheSABLEmodelareshowninTable6.2.
AllcostsshowninSABLEarevariablevaryingasafunctionofPAA,flyinghours,orauthorizedpersonnelstrengths.However,itislikelythatsomeoftheunderlyingfactors(suchasinstallationsupportcostsperperson)haveallocatedfixedcostsembeddedwithinthem.2
TheSABLEdatashowthatRCcrewsgenerallyflyfewerhoursthanACcrews,andinsomecaseshavelowercrewratios,resultinginlowerannualO&ScostsperPAAfortheRC.(Aswithearlierstudies,thesedatashowthattheKC135Risanexceptiontothegeneralrule.)
2Duringpreparationofthisreport,someRCrepresentativesweinterviewedwereskepticalthatpaststudiesortheSABLEmodelaccuratelycapturethecostadvantages(apart-timeworkforceandaless-elaboratesupportstructure)inherentinRCoperations.Wenote,however,
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thatSABLEcostfactorsaredesignedtotakesuchdifferencesintoconsideration.Personnelcountsandcostsaredifferentiatedforactive-dutyanddrill,ratedandnonrated,officerandenlisted,andmilitaryandcivilianpersonnel.Theper-capitainstallationsupportcostfactorishigherforACunits.Activepersonnelincurseveralcategoriesofcost(permanentchangeofstation[PCS],medical)notpresentforRCpersonnel.WefindnoostensiblebasisfordiscreditingSABLE-generatedcostcomparisons.
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Table6.2RecurringPeacetimeCostsforSelectedUnitTypesSABLEModel
(FY1997$)
UnitType Component PAA
CrewRatio
AnnualFlyingHours(FH)
FHperCrew
AnnualO&SCosts
AnnualO&SCost
perPAACostperFH
F16C Active 18 1.25 6,426 286 $46.1M $2.6M $7,174F16C ANG 18 1.25 4,230 188 $32.7M $1.8M $7,730F16A AFR 15 1.25 3,689 197 $31.1M $1.2M $8,432F15C Active 18 1.25 5,670 252 $64.6M $3.6M $11,393F15E Active 18 1.25 6,246 278 $69.9M $3.9M $11,191F15A ANG 18 1.25 3,888 173 $46.7M $2.6M $12,011A10 Active 12 1.5 5,304 295 $31.2M $2.6M $5,882A10 ANG 18 1.25 4,770 212 $34.0M $1.9M $7,128A10 AFR 12 1.25 2,993 199 $25.5M $2.1M $8,520C130E Active 16 2 10,304 322 $58.2M $3.6M $5,648C130E ANG 8 1.75 3,120 223 $25.6M $3.2M $8,205C130E AFR 8 1.75 2,841 203 $22.2M $2.8M $7,814C141B Active 16 1.8 16,192 562 $103.1M $6.4M $6,367C141B ANG 8 2 2,928 183 $34.8M $4.3M $11,885C141B AFR 8 2 2,772 173 $31.9M $4.0M $11,508C141B AFR(Assoc) 16 1.8 4,990a 173 $23.9M $1.5M $4,790KC135RActive 12 1.27 3,672 241 $29.3M $2.4M $7,979KC135RANG 10 1.5 3,500 233 $35.9M $3.6M $10,257KC135RAFR 10 1.27 2,940 231 $27.3M $2.7M $9,286KC10 Active 12 2 7,164 299 $64.7M $5.4M $9,031KC10 AFR(Assoc) 12 1.5 3,740 208 $41.8M $3.5M $11,176NOTE:DataweredevelopedfromtheSABLEcostmodelmaintainedbySAF/FMC.PAA,crewratios,flyinghours,andoperatingandsupport(O&S)costswereextractedfromSABLE.Threeoftheratiosreportedinthetable(flyinghourspercrew,costperPAA,andcostperflyinghour)werecomputedforthisanalysisusingdataextractedfromSABLE.ThecostperPAAandcostperFHreportedherearetotalunitcostsperPAAorFH.TheyshouldnotbeconfusedwithSABLElogisticscostfactorsthatareexpressed
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onaper-PAAorper-FHbasis.aSABLEindicateszeroflyinghoursforaC141Bassociateunit.Tocalculatethecostperflyinghour,weassumedthatAFRassociateunitcrewswouldflythesamenumberofhoursasAFRnon-associateunitcrews.
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However,costsperflyinghouraregenerallylowerforACunits,perhapsbecauseofeconomiesofscale.
DifferencesinDesignedOperationalCapabilities
RCunitsinsomecaseshavenarrowerDOCsthancomparablyequippedACunits.ThedifferencesinDOCsarenecessarybecausetheRCunits,withfewerannualflyinghourspercrew,areunabletotrainadequatelytothewiderrangeofcapabilitiesfoundintheACunits.Ideally,acost-per-outputapproachtocostcomparisonswouldaccountforthesedifferencesincapabilityinthecontextofprovidingreadyunitstomeetMTWdemands.However,wewereunableinthescopeofthisresearchtodevelopanapproachforcomputingacostpercapability.Capabilitiesarenotuniforminmanyimportantrespects.Forexample,somearemorecostlytodevelopthanothersandsomemaybemorevaluabletoendusers(warfightingcommands)thanothers.Anexplicitcost-per-capabilitymeasurewouldhavetoaccountforthislackofuniformity.Lackingsuchanapproach,decisionmakersconsideringalternativeAC/RCmixesmustsubjectivelyweighrelativecostsandcapabilitiesofACandRCunits,particularlyinthefaceoftheoftendifferingcapabilitiesamongvariousMDSoflike-missionaircraft.
AStrategyforOptimizingForce-StructureAvailabilityAndCost
SincetheannualoperatingcostsofRCunitsaregenerallylessthanthoseofACunits,cost-effectivenessinmeetingMTWdemandsisachievedbyplacingasmuchoftheforcestructureintheRCaspossible.Forfighterunits,forcestructureisgenerallymeasuredinFWE,calculatedasthenumberofPAAintheinventorydividedby72(thenumberofaircraftinanotionalwingconsistingofthree24-PAAsquadrons).TheforcestructureisoptimizedbyplacingjustenoughforcestructureintheACtomeetrequirementsthatareincompatiblewithRCemploymentandplacingtheremainderoftheforcemixin
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theRC.TheforcemixattheendofFY1997was13ACFWEand7RCFWE,buttheQuadrennialDefenseReviewdeterminedthatthemixcouldshiftto12ACFWEand8RCFWE(Cohen,1997,p.30).
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MeetingSSC,OOTW,andOtherPeacetimeDemands
InadditiontoprovidingreadyforcesforMTWs,ACandRCunitsprovideforcesforSSCsandOOTW.Inthepast,theforcestructurerequiredtomeetthesenon-MTWdemandswasconsideredtobealesserincludedcasewithintheMTW-relatedforcestructure.However,itisbecomingapparentthatoperatingtemposimposedbySSCsandOOTWareplacinggreatstressesonthecurrentforcestructure.TheforcestructurethatisbestformeetingMTWdemandsmaynotbebestformeetingSSCandOOTWdemands.Accordingly,itisappropriatetocomparetherelativecostsofACandRCunitstomeetthesenon-MTWdemands.
InanythingotherthananMTWscenario,widespreadmobilizationofRCunitsisunlikely.Thus,asdiscussedinChapterFour,RCavailabilitytogenerateproductiveoutputinsupportofSSCandOOTWdemandsismorelimitedthanthatoftheAC.Forcost-comparisonpurposes,theappropriatecost-per-outputapproachistodividetheannualoperatingcostbyadenominatorthatrepresentsaproductiveoperationaloutputinanSSC(nonmobilization)environment.Forexample,thedenominatorforfightersmightbethemaximumnumberofdaysdeployedforcontingencyoperationsthattheunitcanbeexpectedtosupport.Forairliftunits,thedenominatormightbeproductiveflyinghours.Inthefollowingparagraphs,wedevelopexamplesofhowthesecostcomparisonsmightbedevelopedforfighterandairliftassets.Similarpeacetimeoutputmeasuresandcostcomparisonscouldbeconstructedforothermissionsandweaponsystems.
MeasuringPeacetimeFighterDeploymentCapacityandItsCost
AsdiscussedinChapterFour,ThalerandNorton(1997)estimatedthatof120totalTDYdaysavailableperyear,ACfighteraircrews
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have70daysperyearavailableforcontingencyoperations.3ThalerandNortonalsopostulatethatRCcrewsareavailablefor50daysofTDY
3ThalerandNortonpostulatethataircrewsinEuroperequireslightlymorenoncontingencyTDY(60days),leavingslightlyfewerdaysavailableforcontingencies(60days).
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peryear,ofwhich15daysmaybeusedforoverseascontingencies.Foranentiresquadron,thenumberofavailabledayspercrewismultipliedbythenumberofcrewsintheunit.For24-PAAsquadronswithacrewratioof1.25,thisyields1500deployedaircrew-daysperyearforanACunitand450foranRCunit.
Informationaboutdeployableaircrew-dayscanbecombinedwithsquadronoperatingcostsandotherfactorstodeterminethecostofadeployedaircraft-day.Assumingthatdeployedunitsoperateatthesamecrewratioasattheirhomebases,itappearsthatACunitscanprovide1200daysofdeployedaircraftoperationsperyearwhereasreserveunitscanprovide360.(Availabledeployedaircrew-daysmustbedividedbythedeployedcrewratiotodeterminethenumberofavailabledeployedaircraft-days.)Dividingtheannualoperatingcostsofafighterunitbythesefiguresyieldsacostperdeployedaircraft-day.4AsrecapitulatedinTable6.3,usingtheSABLE-reportedF16CunitoperatingcostsshowninTable6.2,thecostperdeployedaircraft-dayforanACunitis$51,250.ThecomparablecostforanANGunitis$121,111.
MeasuringPeacetimeAirliftProductiveCapacityandItsCost
Forairliftunits,contingency-deployedaircraft-daysmaynotbetheappropriatemeasureofusefuloutput.Amoreappropriatemeasuremightbethecostperproductiveflyinghour.Inthismeasurement,productiveflyinghoursarethosedevotedtoJointChiefsofStaff(JCS)-directedmissions,channeltraffic,andspecialassignmentairliftmissions(SAAMs).Table6.4providesthecostcalculations.Notethatthistabledependscriticallyupontheassumptionoftheproportionofflyingdevotedtoproductivemissions.WehadnoimmediateaccesstoempiricaldataasabasisoftheratesusedinTable6.4.Werelied,instead,onroughestimatessuppliedbyacolleaguefamiliarwithactiveandreserveairliftoperations.Unlesstheseestimatesarewidely
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inaccurate,datasuggestthatACunitsprovidetheleast
4AnnualoperatingcostsofbothACandRCunitsmightriseasaresultofaprolongedcontingencydeploymentforreasonssuchasincreasedflyinghours,transportationofunitpersonnelandotherassetstoandfromthetheaterofoperations,andincreasedconsumptionofmunitions.Webaseourcostcomparisonsonpeacetimeoperatingcosts,butamorerigorouscostanalysismightconsiderthelikelychangesinoperatingcostsassociatedwithtypicalOOTWandSSCdeployments.
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Table6.3CostperDeployedAircraft-Day,F16Squadrons
AC ANG1.TDYdaysperyearpercrewmember 120 502.TrainingandothernoncontingencyTDYdaysrequiredperyear
70 35
3.AvailablecontingencyTDYdaysperyear(line1minusline2)
50 15
4.PAA 24 245.Crewratio 1.25 1.256.Contingency-deployeddaysperyear(line3×line4×line5)
1500 450
7.Contingency-deployedaircraftoperationdaysperyear(line6dividedbyline5)
1200 360
8.Unitoperatingcostsperyear(Table6.2) $61.5Ma$43.6Mb9.Costpercontingency-deployedaircraft-day(line8dividedbyline7)
$51,250$121,111
a18-PAAunitcost($46.1M)linearlyscaledto24-PAA.b18-PAAunitcost($32.7M)linearlyscaledto24-PAA.
Table6.4CostPerProductiveFlyingHour,C141Squadrons
RC
ACIndependentlyEquipped Associate
1.FlyinghoursperPAAperyear(Table6.2)
1,012 347 312
2.Proportionproductive(JCS-directed,channel,SAAM)(roughestimates)
80% 50% 50%
3.ProductiveFHperPAA(line1×line2)
810 174 156
4.AnnualcostperPAA(Table6.2) $6.4M $4.0M $1.5M
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5.CostperproductiveFH(line4dividedbyline3)
$7,901 $22,988 $9,615
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expensivelift,followedbyRCassociateunits.However,anassociateunitmustbepairedwithanACunit.Incontrasttothesepairings,independentlyequippedairliftunitscostfarmoreperproductiveflyinghour.
AStrategyforOptimizingDeploymentCapacityandCost
ProvidingthegreatestcapacityforSSC,OOTW,andotherpeacetimeoperationsatagivenbudgetlevel(or,equivalently,minimizingthecostforagivencapacity)requiresforcemixesdifferentfromthosethatoptimallymeetMTWdemands.Tomeetnon-MTWdemands,theoptimalmixinfighterMDSsplacesjustenoughoftheforceintheRCtosatisfysocialandpoliticalconsiderationsandtheremainderintheAC.Theoptimalmixformeetingnon-MTWairliftneedssplitstheforceevenlyintoACandRCassociateunits.
TradeoffsbetweentheConflictingDemands
Aforcemixthatoptimallymeetsnon-MTWdemands(byminimizingtheproportionoftheforceintheRC,subjecttosocialandpoliticalconstraints)maynotprovideaforcestructurelargeenoughtomeetMTWdemands.Likewise,aforcemixthatoptimallymeetsMTWdemands(bymaximizingtheproportionoftheforceintheRC,subjecttomobilization-relatedavailabilityconstraints)maynotprovideenoughdeploymentcapacitytomeetnon-MTWdemands.
ConflictingDemandsforFighterForceStructure
WhenfacedwithaconflictbetweenMTWandnon-MTWdemands,decisionmakersmustweighthetradeoffs.Figure6.1illustrateshowthetradeoffscanbeconceptualizedandquantifiedforthefighterforce.ItprovidesinformationaboutpotentialalternativeFWEforcemixeswithcostsheldconstantattheleveloftheQDR-proposedmixof12ACandeightRCFWE.ItshowsthatasthenumberofRCFWE
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increases(fromzerototenonthehorizontalaxis),thenumberoftotalforceFWEavailabletomeetMTWneeds(ontheleftaxis)alsoincreases.Inaddition,asthenumberofRCFWEincreases,thenumberofcontingency-deployedaircraft-daysthatcanbegeneratedtomeetnon-MTWneeds(ontherightaxis)declines.Notethatthe
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QDRforcemix,witheightFWEintheRCandatotalof20FWE,cangenerateanestimated51,800contingency-deployedaircraft-days.Holdingcostsconstant,eachincreaseofoneFWEintheRCresultsinadecreaseof0.7FWEintheAC,oranetincreaseof0.3FWEinthetotalforce.However,eachincreaseofoneFWEintheRCdecreasesthetotalforce'scapacityfordeployedaircraft-daysbyabout1480peryear(1080additionaldeployeddaysattributabletotheadditionalRCFWEminus2560deployeddaysattributabletothe0.7FWElostfromtheAC).Asanillustrationofhowthefigurecanbeused,consideraforcemixthatcontainedonlythreeFWEintheRC.ReadinguptotheFWElineandacrosstotheleftaxis,itcanbeseenthatthetotalforce,ifheldtothesamecostasthe20-FWEQDRmix,wouldprovideonly18.5FWEforuseinanMTW,ofwhich15.5wouldbeintheactiveforce.However,itwouldhaveacapacityfor59,200deployedaircraft-days.
TodeveloptheunderlyingdataforFigure6.1,wehadtomakeanassumptionaboutthemarginalcostofanFWEintheACandRC.Tosimplifyourcostcalculations,weassumedthatmarginalunitswouldbeequippedwithF16Cs,costedasshowninTable6.3.5
Inpractice,thelinearchangesincostassumedherewouldprobablyholdovermodestchangesfromthecurrentforcestructurebutnotformoreradicalchanges.Attheextremes,somecoststhatareconsideredfixedforsmallchangeswouldbecomevariable.Forexample,ifthecurrentAC/RCmixweretiltedmuchmoretowardtheRC,sustainabilityofRCpilotaccessionsfromACtrainedpilotlossesmightbecomeinfeasible,forcingtheRCtoincursignificantadditionalcoststotrainNPSpilotsandflythemenoughtoreachproficiencyintheirweaponsystems.
AComparativeLookatAirliftForceStructure
WehavenotanalyzedMTWversusnon-MTWdemandsforall
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MDSs.However,sinceasignificantproportionofairliftcapacityisintheRC,wehavedevelopedanotionalapproachforconsideringthetradeoffs
5AnassumptionofF16Cequipageforthemarginalunitisreasonable,becauseF16sarebyfarthemostnumerousfighteraircraftinboththeACandRC.
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Figure6.1AlternativeEqual-CostForceMixes
inanairliftMDS.WeillustratetheapproachusingavailabledatafortheC141B.
ThemarginalcostofprovidingMTWcapacitycanbederivedfromTable6.2.ThedataindicatethatC141BRCunits,likefighterunits,arelesscostlythanACunits,allowingmoreforcestructuretobegeneratedforMTWpurposesbyshiftingtheAC/RCmixtowardtheRC.However,inairliftunits,thecostdifferencesbetweenassociateandindependentlyequippedunitsrequireamorenuancedanalysis.Forthispurpose,weconsideredtwocases.Inthefirstcase,wepairanACandRCassociateunitandobservethetotalcostofthetwounits(associateunitsmustbepairedwithACunits).Inthesecondcase,wedeterminethecostforprovidingthesamenumberofaircraftinRCindependentlyequippedunits.Inthefirstcase,a16-PAAACC141Bunit($103.1M)pairedwitha16-PAAAFRassociateunit($23.9M)hasatotalannualcostof$127M.Thesameforcestructurecouldbeprovidedbytwo8-PAAindependentlyequippedRCunits($34.8MforanANGunitor$31.9MforanAFRunit)atatotalcostof$63.8Mto$69.6M.Sincethemarginalcostoftheforcestructureinthe
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independentlyequippedunitsislowerthanintheAC/associate
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unitpairing,greaterequipmentcapacityisgainedbyshiftingtheforce-structuremixtowardindependentlyequippedunits.However,independentlyequippedunitswouldprovideonly32crews,whereastheactive/associatepairwouldprovide58crews,permittingmoreintenseoperationoftheavailableequipment.
Formeetingnon-MTWdemands,Table6.4indicatesthatAC/associatepairingsprovidemoreliftcapacitythanindependentlyequippedRCunitsatagivenbudgetconstraint.Thus,thereisapotentialconflictbetweenMTWandnon-MTWdemandsifequipmentcapacityinanMTWscenarioismoreimportantthanaircrewavailability.
MakingTradeoffs
MakingthetradeoffsbetweenpotentialMTWcapacityandrealizedpeacetimecapacityrequiresbalancingtherisksandbenefitsinMTWandnon-MTWscenarios.Thetaskiscompoundedbyuncertaintyaboutthedemandsforcapacityineitherscenario.Analysiscanaidthedecisionprocessbyprovidingestimatesofexpecteddemandsandusingthemasabasisforquantifyingexpectedrisksandstresses(suchworkisbeyondthescopeofthisanalysis).
ImplicationsfortheForceMix
AsdepictedinFigure6.2,costconsiderationsargueforalargerproportionofthetotalforceintheRCwhencontemplatingMTWscenariosandasmallerproportionwhencontemplatingSSCandOOTWscenarios.
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Figure6.2CostConsiderationsintheForceMix
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ChapterSevenConclusionsOurmodelforgraphicallydepictingasetofforce-mixprinciplespresentedinChapterTwopostulatedafeasibleregionwithinwhicharangeofforcemixeswouldbeacceptableandwithinwhichcostconsiderationscouldprevail.Inexaminingtheavailableevidence,wefoundthatthelociofsomeoftheseconstraintsarecurrentlyunknowableandthatothersaremission-orcomponent-dependent.Wherepossible,wederivednotionalresultsusingmission-dependentvaluespertinenttothefighterforce.
TheresultsshowninFigure7.1depicttheANGcase,wherenotionalpersonnelflowconstraintsmightallowtheRCtooccupyupto42percentofthetotalfighterforce.Afeasibleregionisthuscreatedtotherightoftheminoritystatusconstraint.Thefeasibleregionmightbereducedifanavailabilityconstraintcameintoplayorifadecisionmakerweretosupplysomejudgmentallocusforthesocialidentification,embeddedness,andinvestment(IE&I)constraint.Withinthisfeasibleregion,cost-consciousdecisionmakerswouldgravitatetowarda42percentmixiftheywereprimarilyconcernedaboutpreparednessforMTWscenariosortowarda20percentmixiftheyweremoreconcernedwithmeetingcurrentcontingencydeploymentneeds.Itispossible,ofcourse,toweighcostmoreheavilythaneitherthepersonnelfloworsocialconstraints.Inthatcase,decisionmakersmightdrivethemixabove42percent,consciouslyacceptingadegradationinexperiencelevelsandreadiness.Alternatively,theycoulddrivethemixbelowthe20percentRCminoritystatusconstraint,possiblycompromisingRCmembers'capacitytoinfluencethevaluesandperceptionsofACmembers.
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Figure7.1NotionalValuesforForce-MixConstraints:AnANGCase
Ifpersonnelfloworavailabilitywereevaluatedusingdifferentparameters,thoseconstraintscouldconceivablylietotheleftoftheRCminoritystatusorsocialIE&Iconstraints.Therewouldbenofeasibleregion.Insuchacase,decisionmakerswouldhavetocompromisebetweenconflictingobjectives.ThemostlikelyoutcomewouldbetodeemphasizetheminoritystatusandsocialIE&Iconstraintsbecausethecaseforapplyingtheformerinthepresentcontextislesscompellingandthelocusforthelatterisunknown.
Weagainstressthatthespecificforce-mixresultsreportedherearenotional.Wherepossible,weusedinputvaluesthatwejudgedtobeapproximatelycorrect,recognizingthatwedidnothavetheresourcesinthisstudytoobtainorderiveanalyticallyrigorousinputs,especiallywhentheinputsarelikelytovaryacrossmissions.Also,becauseofvariationsacrossmissionsorMDSs,force-mixdecisionscannotbemadeintheaggregate.TheymustbemadeforeachmissionorMDSindividually.
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Althoughtheresultsreportedherearenotional,webelieveourresearchprovidestwoconcretecontributionstotheforce-mixdecisionprocess.Thefirstcontributionisaframeworkforintegratingtherangeofconsiderationsthatdecisionmakersfaceandforgainingperspectiveontheargumentsofferedbyvariousinterestgroupshopingtoinfluencetheforcemix.Thesecondcontributionisaroadmapformore-detailedresearchintospecificmission/MDSforcemixesorageneralmodelthatincorporatesmission/MDS-specificinputs.
Perhapsourmostsignificantfindingisthatcostconsiderationscancutinoppositedirectionsdependingonwhethertheforceisbeingoptimizedformajortheaterwarpreparednessorforpeacetimecontingencyoperations.Inourview,peacetimecontingencydemandsmustbegivenmoreweightinforce-mixdecisions,especiallyinMDSsexperiencinghighdeployment-relatedstress.
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