JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06 Preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material Klaus Lützenkirchen Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Joint Research Centre, European Commission Karlsruhe, Germany JRC Information Day and S&T Workshops Bucharest – 11 May 2006
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Preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material
JRC Information Day and S&T Workshops Bucharest – 11 May 2006. Preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material Klaus Lützenkirchen Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Joint Research Centre, European Commission Karlsruhe, Germany. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material
Klaus Lützenkirchen Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Joint Research Centre,
European CommissionKarlsruhe, Germany
JRC Information Day and S&T WorkshopsBucharest – 11 May 2006
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
• Traditional Safeguards and Physical Protection fail(operator accountancy versus verification)
• Illicit trafficking of nuclear material
• Seizure (border control, intelligence services)
• Nuclear Forensic analysis
Illicit Trafficking and Nuclear Forensics
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Threat by nuclear terrorism:• Theft of nuclear material to produce a nuclear explosive device• Theft of radioactive material ( Dirty Bomb)
Fight against Illicit Trafficking
UO2 Fuel• stolen in Lithuania,• seized in Poland,• produced in Russia,• analysed at JRC-ITU
(Source IAEA)
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
– Training sessions for law enforcement services and laboratory experts jointly with IAEA (2002, …): New EU and CC, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova,…
– Model Action Plan: RITNUM Handbook national Response to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material (developed jointly with ITWG)
– Delivery of portable equipment for categorisation of material
– Demonstration exercises inside countries and at borders : 07/2002 Bucharest, 10/2002 BG/TR, 09/2004 PL/BY, ….
Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear MaterialProjects with Romania
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
target fieldSPEC
Exploranium: GR-135
XRF: ICS-4000
SAIC: RADSMART
Handheld Gamma Spectrometers
NaI
CdTe
Illicit trafficking and radiation detection
(Support to IAEA)
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Demonstration Exercise
Romania18 July, 2002
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
National Exercise on Combating Nuclear Terrorism
Braşov County, Romania,10 May 2006Interception of illegal transport
• geometry 5 x 5 x 5 cm, unconventional application/reactor
• elemental composition pure U metal
• isotopic composition natural U D2O or graphite moderated reactor
• main impurities Al, Ca, Fe, Mg, Mn, Na, Pb, Si (200 mg material)
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
1. Origin
• Nuclear Materials Database
nuclear fuel data from western and Russian suppliers (UO2, MOX) (based on World Nuclear Industry Handbook and bilateral contracts, various degrees of access)
• Electronic literature archive on non- conventional fuels (Russian sources)
• Open literature
Nuclear Forensics
Geometry points at German origin
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
2. Age determination
• spiking with 228Th (or 233Pa)
• chemical separation
• measurement: alpha spectrometry or mass spectrometry
Nuclear Forensics
5*107
2*104 After 20 years
Age via 234U / 230Th
α-spec.: 59.0 1.5 years
ICP-MS: 59.3 2.0 years
=> Date of production: second half of 1943
Age indicates German (or US) nuclear programme
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Case StudyIllicit Trafficking - Case Study : Find 26 – Rotterdam
On 16th Dec. 2003- 2-3 kg radioactive material was detected in a scrap metal shipment in Rotterdam harbour. The shipment arrived from a dealer in Jordan. Materials sent to ITU on 10th March 2004 and consisted of 2 bulk samples and 3 swipes.
ICP-MS• Main impurities (>1000 ppm): Al, Ca, Cr, Fe, Mg, Mo, Na, Ni, P
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Results - bulk SEM/EDX
• agglomerates of small crystals with an average length of 10 µm and diameter of 2 µm• uranium together with Fe, Ni and Cr• Al, Ca, Mg and Si were in the amorphous part around
11 Line W% A%
Cr Ka 0.71 2.96
Fe Ka 1.67 6.45
Ni Ka 0.75 2.77
U Ma 96.87 87.82
100.00 100.00
200 m
20 m
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Find-26: RotterdamBulk material:
• natural uranium oxides with ≈ 70% U
• presence of (CO3)2-
• main impurities: Al, Ca, Cr, Fe, Mg, Mo, Na, Ni, P
• lead isotopic composition
Swipes:
• natural uranium, Cs-137, Eu-154 and Am-241 (evidence of nuclear activities)
What information did the analysis yield?
• Intermediate product, possibly (NH4)4
(UO2)(CO3)3
• Impurities point to phosphate rich ores
(North Africa, Middle East, USA, South
Africa, Brazil)
• Pb isotopic composition (natural) indicates low uranium content in the ore, which is the case for P-rich ores
• evidence of nuclear activities
• Origin of the material: combination of scientific results and information from other services
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Radioactive Dispersion Devices (RDDs) or Dirty Bombs)
What is a “dirty bomb”?
A “dirty bomb,” also known as a radiological weapon, is a conventional explosive such as dynamite packaged with radioactive material that scatters when the bomb goes off. A dirty bomb kills or injures through the initial blast of the conventional explosive and by airborne radiation and contamination—hence the term “dirty.”
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
The propagation of the radioactive cloud in a cityRDD with 2000 Ci 60Co
(7.4∙1013 Bq)
1.5 kg conv. explosives
No real explosion!scale 1:10,000 DMA IKONOS satellite map (wind with 0.5 m/s from 290° north, weather conditions neutral/unstable)
Inhalation dose in the center of the explosion: 680 mSv
Radioactive Dispersion Devices
In collaboration with the BfS, Germany
JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, 11.05.06
Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials
Conclusions:
• has extensive experience in working with IAEA, EU member states, national and international organisations in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material
• is developing tools for modelling / scenario assessment reports for and post event support following a Radioactive Dispersion Event
• has the experience, dedicated facilities and extensive databases for nuclear forensic analyses